Nævnet stadfæstede i oktober 2026 Udlændingestyrelsens afgørelse vedrørende en kvindelig statsborger samt et barn fra Syrien. Indrejst i 2024.
Flygtningenævnet udtalte:
”Ansøgeren er etnisk kurder og muslim født i landsbyen [landsby A], der ligger i [by A] i Al-Hasakah-provinsen i Syrien. Ansøgeren har ikke været medlem af politiske eller religiøse foreninger eller organisationer eller i øvrigt været politisk aktiv. Ansøgeren har som asylmotiv henvist til, at hun ved en tilbagevenden til Syrien frygter familien til hendes mindreårige datters far, idet hun frygter, at de vil slå hende ihjel og tage hendes datter. Ansøgeren har til støtte herfor oplyst, at ansøgeren lod sig skille fra den mindreårige ansøgers far, fordi han behandlede hende dårligt og var voldelig over for hende. Hans familiemedlemmer har efterfølgende henvendt sig på ansøgerens families bopæl i Syrien og sagt til ansøgerens far, at de vil slå ansøgeren ihjel, hvis hun kommer tilbage til Syrien. Ansøgeren har endvidere i forbindelse med nævnets behandling af sagen henvist til, at hendes far bebrejder hende, hvad der er sket. Ansøgerens far mener, at hun har bragt skam over familien, og ansøgeren tror ikke, at hendes far vil lade hende og hendes datter bo hos familien i Syrien, hvorfor hun ikke vil have et netværk i Syrien. Ansøgeren har som asylmotiv endvidere henvist til, at hun frygter situationen i Syrien, og at hun frygter at vende tilbage som kurder, idet mange kurdere oplever problemer og oplever at blive slået ihjel. Ansøgeren har i forbindelse med sagens behandling i Flygtningenævnet gjort gældende navnlig, at de omstændigheder, at hun er af kurdisk afstamning, og at hun er en enlig kvinde uden mandligt netværk, hver især eller som elementer i en kumulativ vurdering skal føre til, at hun meddeles opholdstilladelse. Om situationen for kurdere i Syrien fremgår følgende af Udlændingestyrelsens rapport ”Syria, Situation of certain groups” fra december 2025, side 31 ff.: “5. Kurds[.] Estimated at 2 to 2.5 million individuals, the Kurdish population forms Syria’s largest ethnic minority, comprising up to 10% of the country’s pre-war total of 23 million. The Kurdish population is concentrated in Northeast Syria — particularly in the regions of Afrin, Kobani, and Jazira, with smaller concentrations in districts of Raqqa city — as well as in neighbourhoods of Aleppo and Damascus. This report focuses on the situation of Kurds living in government-held areas and therefore does not cover the situation of Kurds in Northeast Syria, which remains under the de facto control of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). 5.1. Treatment of Kurds[.] Apart from isolated incidents,151 ordinary Kurds residing in government-controlled areas generally continue their daily lives without major restrictions, harassment, mistreatment, discriminatory treatment, or attacks based on their ethnicity,152 provided they do not engage in political activity. According to a Syrian lawyer DIS consulted, individuals perceived as politically active or critical of the authorities may face reprisals comparable to those experienced by government critics of any background. In Damascus, where an estimated one-third of the population is of Kurdish origin and where Kurdish communities have been established for centuries, Kurds are described as an integrated part of society. In long-established Kurdish-dominated Damascus neighbourhoods such as Rukn al-Din and Wadi al-Mashari, Kurds reportedly resemble other residents and are therefore difficult to identify ethnically; no changes or abuses affecting this particular group have been reported since the fall of the former government. According to a Kurdish civil society activist, Kurds are not prevented from accessing housing or public services, nor have they faced ethnically motivated dismissals from public employment. The activist highlighted the presence of several high-ranking Kurdish officials within government institutions, including the Minister of Education. The source emphasised, however, that the current broader economic crisis affects Kurds in the same way as all other Syrians. The same source stated that Kurds residing abroad are reportedly able to return without facing administrative or security obstacles, and the source personally knows of several such cases. The current authorities demonstrate a greater degree of tolerance towards Kurdish flags and symbols compared with the previous government. For instance, during a recent Kurdish cultural festival in Damascus, participants openly displayed Kurdish flags without any intervention from the authorities. A Kurdish activist interviewed by DIS stated that this would have been inconceivable under the former government. As regards the status of stateless and naturalised Kurds, a source stated that the current authorities have not revoked the Syrian citizenship of the Ajanib — Kurds from Hasakah who were naturalized in 2011 by the former government. However, the situation of the Maktoomeen remains unresolved. According to a Kurdish activist, members of this group continue to be denied basic rights, including the ability to complete secondary education. 5.2. Incidents involving Kurds in government-controlled areas[.] One concern noted among Kurds in Damascus is a persistent sense of fear regarding potential repercussions if tensions between the authorities and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) escalate, according to a Kurdish activist. Reported isolated incidents involving Kurds primarily relate to individuals originating from outside Damascus. For example, Kurdish travellers from Northeast Syria were reportedly stopped for questioning or were delayed for extended periods at checkpoints and subjected to harassment, although they were ultimately permitted to continue their journey. In other instances, Kurds from Northeast Syria have been arrested in Damascus without a clear justification for their detention; they were, however, released following a negotiated agreement. Moreover, there were reports of Kurdish visitors from Qamishli and Aleppo being arrested in the Sha’lan area of Damascus for speaking Kurdish, and some were reportedly tortured in detention. Those detained were interrogated on suspicion of links to the SDF’s intelligence apparatus but were released after a short period. These arrests coincided with the PYD’s (Democratic Union Party) attempts to open offices in government-controlled areas, which apparently increased scrutiny of Kurdish-speaking individuals. During this period, both politically active and apolitical Kurds from Northeast Syria were detained on suspicion of links to the SDF, but all were released shortly thereafter. Isolated revenge attacks or kidnappings by unidentified groups targeting Kurds originating from the areas controlled by the interim government have also been recorded, but according to SNHR, these do not constitute a systematic pattern.” Nyere oplysninger om forholdene for kurdere i Syrien tyder på, at der er sket en vis forværring af situationen for kurdere i forhold til beskrivelsen oven for – i hvert fald i den nordøstlige del af landet – i form af en offensiv mod de kurdisk-kontrollerede områder fra overgangsregeringens side, jf. herved navnlig det anførte i Europa-Parlamentets resolution af 12. februar 2026 (2026/2602(RSP)). Heroverfor står, at den syriske præsident ved et dekret af 16. januar 2026 (dekret nr. 16/2026) formelt anerkendte kurdere som en oprindelig del af det syriske folk, sikrede kurderes kulturelle og sproglige rettigheder og ophævede tidligere diskriminerende foranstaltninger. Flygtningenævnet tiltræder, at denne del af asylmotivet – at ansøgeren er etnisk kurder – ikke kan føre til, at hun risikerer asylbegrundende forfølgelse ved en tilbagevenden til Syrien. Forholdene for kvinder i Syrien må efter baggrundsoplysningerne karakteriseres som vanskelige, og for enlige kvinder uden netværk må de anses for særligt vanskelige. Forholdene har dog ikke en sådan karakter, at de efter Flygtningenævnets praksis uden videre kan anses for asylbegrundende. Der skal således foreligge andre individuelle risikofaktorer, som – sammenholdt med at ansøgeren er en enlig kvinde uden netværk – gør, at hun har behov for international beskyttelse. Flygtningenævnet finder, at ansøgeren ved en tilbagevenden til Syrien ikke kan anses for at være en enlig kvinde uden netværk, idet hun der vil have både sine forældre, en bror og to søstre. Flygtningenævnet kan således ikke lægge ansøgerens forklaring om et modsætningsforhold til sin far til grund. Flygtningenævnet lægger herved vægt på, at ansøgeren har forklaret skiftende om et sådant modsætningsforhold, idet hun under samtalen med Udlændingestyrelsen den 23. marts 2026 forklarede, at hendes familie i Syrien støtter hende. Flygtningenævnet tiltræder af de grunde, Udlændingestyrelsen har henvist til i den påklagede afgørelse, at heller ikke ansøgerens forklaring om trusler fra og modsætningsforhold til ansøgerens eksmands familie i Syrien kan lægges til grund. Flygtningenævnet anser det derfor ikke sandsynliggjort, at der er en reel risiko for, at ansøgerens datter vil blive frataget hende og overdraget til hendes eksmands svigerfamilie. Flygtningenævnet finder herefter, at ansøgeren ikke har sandsynliggjort – heller ikke ved en kumulativ vurdering – at hun ved en tilbagevenden til Syrien vil være i en konkret og individuel risiko for forfølgelse omfattet af udlændingelovens § 7. Flygtningenævnet stadfæster derfor Udlændingestyrelsens afgørelse.” Syri/2026/38/anjv
