Nævnet meddelte i marts 2026 opholdstilladelse (B-status) til en kvindelig statsborger fra Syrien. Sagen er sambehandlet med Syri/2026/6/Sael. Indrejst i 2015.
Flygtningenævnet udtalte: ”Flygtningenævnet finder anledning til indledningsvist at bemærke, at det ikke er korrekt som anført i Udlændingestyrelsens afgørelse af [vinteren 2025/2026], side 5, at Den Europæiske Menneskerettighedsdomstol afsagde dom i sagen A.F. mod Østrig den 24. september 2025. Der er retteligt tale om, at domstolen den 23. september 2025 traf en beslutning i den pågældende sag om ophævelse af en tidligere iværksat midlertidig foranstaltning i medfør af § 39 (”Rule 39”) i domstolens procesreglement (”Rules of Court”) om, at klageren ikke for indeværende skulle udsendes til Syrien. Domstolen offentliggjorde den 24. september 2025 en pressemeddelelse herom. Ansøgeren er etnisk araber og sunnimuslim fra Rif Damaskus, Syrien. Ansøgeren har ikke været medlem af politiske eller religiøse foreninger eller organisationer eller i øvrigt været politisk aktiv i Syrien. Under sin oprindelige asylsag, hvor Udlændingestyrelsen meddelte afslag [i vinteren 2023/2024], henviste ansøgeren som asylmotiv bl.a. til, at hun frygtede de daværende syriske myndigheder som følge af, at hun i Danmark havde deltaget i to demonstrationer mod regimet, senest i 2019, at hendes far havde været politisk aktiv i Syrien, og at hendes [familiemedlem] var deserteret. Ansøgeren har under mødet i Flygtningenævnet frafaldet disse asylmotiver. Flygtningenævnet har derfor ikke taget stilling hertil. Ansøgeren har i forbindelse med sin verserende asylsag som asylmotiv for det første henvist til den generelle situation i Syrien. Ansøgeren har imidlertid under mødet i Flygtningenævnet ligeledes frafaldet dette asylmotiv som følge af nævnets afgørelser af 3. og 4. marts 2026 i sager vedrørende syriske statsborgere. Flygtningenævnet har således heller ikke taget stilling til dette asylmotiv. I forbindelse med den verserende asylsag har ansøgeren som asylmotiv for det andet henvist til, at hun ved en tilbagevenden til Syrien vil være enlig kvinde uden eller med et meget begrænset mandligt netværk. Til støtte herfor har ansøgeren bl.a. anført, at hun vil være i en sårbar og udsat position som enlig kvinde som følge af den generelle situation i Syrien, når der tillige henses til hendes helbredsmæssige tilstand, idet hun lider af en [fysisk] sygdom og som følge heraf bl.a. [har et fysisk handicap], har nedsat [funktion] og har brug for hjælp i det daglige. I forbindelse med den verserende asylsag har ansøgeren som asylmotiv for det tredje henvist til, at hun opfylder betingelserne for at opnå asylretlig konsekvensstatus som følge af hendes voksne brors opholdstilladelse i medfør af udlændingelovens § 7, stk. 1, eller hendes fars opholdstilladelse i medfør af udlændingelovens § 7, stk. 2. Flygtningenævnet kan i det væsentlige lægge ansøgerens forklaring til grund. For så vidt angår det af ansøgeren påberåbte asylmotiv om at være enlig kvinde i Syrien sammenholdt med hendes helbredsmæssige situation: Flygtningenævnet finder, at ansøgeren ikke har sandsynliggjort, at hun ved en tilbagevenden til Syrien vil være i risiko for asylbegrundende forfølgelse som følge heraf. Flygtningenævnet har herved lagt vægt på, at forholdene for kvinder i Syrien er beskrevet således i Syria, Situation of Certain Groups, Udlændingestyrelsen, 9. december 2025, pkt. 8 (side 42ff): ”8. Women. In March 2025, President Ahmed al-Sharaa signed a constitutional declaration that includes Article 21 on women’s rights. Article 21 states that the Syrian state shall uphold women’s social status, protect their dignity, and support their role within both the family and society. It guarantees their rights to education and employment, as well as the protection of their social, economic, and political rights. The article also commits to safeguarding women from all forms of oppression, injustice, and violence. Despite these legal guarantees by the interim government, Syrian women continue to face major barriers to equality due to discriminatory laws, conservative social norms, and limited protection. A Syrian human rights organisation expressed concern that the new authorities hold restrictive views on women’s role in society. At the same time, isolated cases of women being appointed to prominent positions have been reported, including a feminist Christian woman who was a member of the Syrian National Dialogue Committee, serving as Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, and several women as university deans. In general, women’s rights and livelihood opportunities remain a critical concern, as women are frequently not economically independent. 8.1. Incidents involving women. Reports issued earlier in 2025 describe cases of sexual violence and harassment against women, especially at checkpoints and during return journeys through unsafe areas. These incidents occurred across different parts of the country, including in zones previously controlled by the SDF, SNA, and the former government. Violence and abuse against women are perpetrated by a mix of state actors, groups linked to them, and non-state or criminal actors. SNHR had not documented cases of government-perpetrated abuses specifically targeting women, but there had been reports of kidnappings by unidentified armed groups, particularly in Homs, where the bodies of several abducted women were later found. The perpetrators and motives remain unknown. In general, the situation of women with regard to freedom of movement varies across Syria. In Damascus, many women move around independently but take precautions, while in smaller towns and rural areas stricter cultural norms limit their mobility. In the coastal region, fears of kidnapping by armed groups have led some women to leave university and kept girls from attending school. In Aleppo, some women covered their hair to avoid harassment. According to an international organisation, women’s main concerns relate to harassment at checkpoints or by armed men rather than by regular police. 8.1.1. Sectarian variations. The situation of women in Syria — including their safety and treatment — reportedly varies widely, largely depending on their sectarian background and the region in which they live.… A Syrian human rights organisation observed that Sunni women, especially if they are wearing the hijab (such as women from Idlib, Aleppo, and Homs), face fewer challenges than Alawite, Christian and Druze women. Non-Sunni women appear more vulnerable, especially when their identity is visible through appearance or behaviour. Most cases of discrimination, harassment and abuse of women are reported from minority areas, while such cases are rarely reported from Hama, Aleppo, or Daraa. In addition to a woman’s religious background and appearance, the way she is treated depends on her social class, income, and family background; wealthier or well-connected women are usually treated more fairly and respectfully than poorer women without influence. 8.1.2. Regional variations. The situation of women also varies significantly between regions. Women in smaller towns and rural communities often live under stricter cultural norms and depend on family networks for protection; their main concern is harassment at checkpoints or by armed men, rather than actions by the regular police. In Damascus, on the other hand, many women go out alone and participate in daily life, but they take precautions. Government protection for women against violence or harassment is generally insufficient — for example, in cases of abduction in the coastal areas, Suweida, and parts of Homs, and Damascus. Many women do not even report incidents to the police, presumably because they do not trust the authorities. A Syrian human rights organisation was aware of only one case, involving a woman from the coastal area who filed a rape complaint. In regions dominated by armed groups or conservative factions, individuals targeting women are not being held accountable. In cases of kidnapping and rape of Alawite or Druze women, the authorities failed to protect them and only reacted superficially after the cases received widespread publicity, according to a Syrian human rights organisation. In a recent case in Hama, the identities of the men who raped an Alawite woman were widely known; however, the perpetrators had not been arrested. The Syrian Women’s Political Movement interviewed by DIS noted, however, that — after an increase in kidnappings in the coastal areas — the authorities began to intervene more actively, following pressure from civil society and women’s groups. Yet the lack of a neutral investigation of subsequent abductions of several women in Suweida means that it is still not possible to determine which actors were be-hind the kidnappings or to hold anyone accountable. 8.1.3. Precautionary measures and dress code. In order to minimise the risk of harassment or abuse, some women reportedly adjust their behaviour. For example, women avoid staying out late, unfamiliar areas, and taking taxis driven by unknown men, and they coordinate transport with friends or relatives to ensure safety. Some women have reportedly adopted the headscarf out of fear of harassment, as reported in Aleppo or among Alawite women in Homs, despite there being no official directive regulating women’s attire. In areas controlled by the interim government, women have at times been informally warned by individual local authorities, religious leaders, or security actors with extremist ideological views for not wearing the Islamic veil. On the coast in Tartous and Latakia, and in Suweida, as well as in parts of Homs and Damascus, local actors — some of whom are connected to the authorities — have reportedly imposed the hijab and carried out campaigns promoting stricter religious dress codes for women. However, a female activist said she had neither witnessed nor heard of any cases in which Syrian women were assaulted for not wearing the Islamic veil any-where in the country. She added that when meeting female Alawites at civil society activities, they told her they faced no restrictions on their freedom to dress as they wished. Still, isolated local incidents may occur where women are asked to cover their hair. 8.2. Access to public services. The government’s overall position on women’s rights and representation remains uncertain. Some members of the new administration have openly opposed women’s participation in specific roles and have criticised previous efforts to advance gender equality. According to SNHR, daily life, including access to public services, reportedly remains largely unchanged, with no notable improvement or deterioration in women’s rights or protection. However, according to the Syrian Women’s Political Movement, public services have improved in some areas, while in others they have deteriorated. Administrative services have improved in some urban and government-controlled areas and public officials there act professionally. In contrast, women still experience discrimination and insecurity in regions dominated by armed groups or conservative factions. In some areas, such as a ‘one-stop window’ office in Damascus, administrative processes are efficient and staff treat women respectfully. In contrast, in more conservative or conflict-affected areas such as Douma, women often face discriminatory treatment when dealing with local authorities. Officials may question their presence, ask for a male relative to accompany them, or delay their paperwork, which makes administrative procedures longer and more difficult for women than for men. 8.3. Single, widowed and divorced women. In addition to their individual sectarian background and specific region, women face different challenges depending on their civil status. The situation of single, widowed, or divorced women has not changed or improved under the new government; they continue to face the same difficulties regarding employment, transport, housing, protection, and access to official documents. With regard to housing, single women and widows face social restrictions; although they are legally allowed to rent housing and complete official procedures independently, social norms often obstruct their access. Landlords and local officials may question or discourage women from living alone. Women whose husbands are missing or deceased and those married to foreign nationals face severe administrative problems. The problem is most acute in the northwest where foreign fighters were present. During the conflict, some of these fighters married Syrian women in religious or informal ceremonies that were never officially registered and sometimes had children. When the men were later killed, disappeared, or returned to their home countries, the women were left without legal proof of marriage and therefore could not register their children. Although Syrian law states that a child of an unknown father can be registered as a Syrian citizen, this is rarely implemented in practice. Social stigma and bureaucratic reluctance prevent families from talking publicly about this issue. Some women register children under the name of a male relative instead in order to obtain pa-pers. The restriction in the nationality law for women to pass on citizenship to their children re-mains a key barrier. 8.3.1. Return of single, widowed, and divorced women. An international NGO found it very difficult to generalise about the situation of single women returning, as it depends on a number of factors, including conditions in the area of return, the individual woman’s economic situation etc. However, single women and female-headed households constitute a particularly vulnerable group upon return. They are generally highly dependent on family members, as they are rarely economically independent. If a single mother returns, it is usually expected that her family will host her, which often entails living restrictions, including limited freedom of movement, imposed by the family. Local security conditions in the area of return can further limit women’s movement. Women returning to Syria without a husband will generally not be able to support themselves in Syria due to the deteriorated economic situation with very high rental costs and very limited job opportunities. For many single women, the high cost of housing combined with prevailing social attitudes toward women living alone makes it difficult to secure accommodation. As a result, many choose to remain abroad or in refugee camps. Women at-tempting to return to Damascus encounter significant obstacles in securing both housing and employment. Some women who previously resided in refugee camps in Idlib and sought to resettle in Damascus following the fall of the former government ultimately had to return to the camps due to the prohibitively high rental costs. Female public-sector employees seeking to reclaim their former positions have been unable to do so, as personnel from the previous administration continue to occupy these posts despite the establishment of the new government. For single women and elderly people, reintegration heavily depends on access to a supportive family network. Many women returning to Syria without a husband or a male head of household rely heavily on their extended families and often move in with them, especially when they do not have access to their immediate families (e.g. due to displacement abroad). Returnees from neighbouring countries, particularly those who have lived in camps, often need to re-establish contact with family members who stayed behind in Syria upon arrival. Women whose husbands are missing (e.g. due to forced disappearance) face particularly complex situations, as they must rebuild their lives from scratch. This includes reconnecting with relatives to clarify potential inheritance rights while coping with the emotional challenge of deciding whether to declare their husband deceased or continue searching for him. There are also cases of female-headed households returning to Syria while the husband remains abroad, for instance in Lebanon or Türkiye, to secure an income for the family. According to a humanitarian organisation interviewed by DIS, these cases illustrate a distinct return experience where economic survival depends on family support across borders.” For kvinder, der vender tilbage fra udlandet, kan der desuden henvises til Syria, Security Situation, Return and Documents, Udlændingestyrelsen 9. december 2025, pkt. 3.3 (navnlig side 32f): ”Dynamics related to gender and vulnerability. Having strong community and family support is particularly important for women returnees. Many women returning to Syria without a husband or a male head of household rely heavily on their extended families and often move in with them, especially when they do not have access to their immediate families (e.g. due to displacement abroad). An international NGO found it difficult to generalise about the situation of single women returning, as it depends on a number of factors, including conditions in the area of return and the individual woman’s economic situation. Nevertheless, the source noted certain trends: single women and female-headed households may face heightened vulnerability upon return and often rely on family members due to limited economic independence. In cases where a single mother returns, it is commonly expected that her family will host her, which can involve living re-strictions, including reduced freedom of movement, imposed by the family. In addition, the security situation in the area may also affect women’s freedom of movement. Some female-headed households return while husbands remain abroad (e.g., in Lebanon or Türkiye) to secure income, illustrating cross border family dependence. Women whose husbands are missing face complex reintegration, including reconnecting with relatives to clarify inheritance while coping with decisions about declaring the husband dead or continuing the search for him.” Der kan endvidere henvises til EUAA, Country Guidance: Syria, December 2025, pkt. 4.10 (s. 49ff) og UK Home Office, Country Policy and Information Note Syria: Women, december 2025. Af sidstnævnte rapport fremgår det mere overordnet: “In general, women in Syria are unlikely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm from state or non-state actors.” Som anført i Flygtningenævnets afgørelser af 3. og 4. marts 2026 om kvindelige ansøgere fra Syrien er forholdene for kvinder i Syrien, herunder særligt enlige kvinder, vanskelige, men de kan ikke uden videre anses for asylbegrundende, og der skal således også foreligge andre relevante individuelle risikofaktorer, der sandsynliggør et behov for international beskyttelse i Danmark. Helbredsmæssige forhold kan i særlige tilfælde tillægges betydning ved vurdering af, hvorvidt en asylansøger ved en tilbagevenden til hjemlandet risikerer forfølgelse eller overgreb i medfør af udlændingelovens § 7. Flygtningenævnet finder imidlertid, at ansøgeren ikke i tilstrækkelig grad har sandsynliggjort, at hendes helbredsmæssige situation udgør sådanne relevante individuelle risikofaktorer som anført ovenfor, der sandsynliggør et behov for international beskyttelse i Danmark. Flygtningenævnet kan i den forbindelse henvise til, at det fremgår af forarbejderne til udlændingelovens § 7, stk. 2, således som bestemmelsen blev affattet ved lov nr. 365 af 6. juni 2002 (jf. lovforslag nr. L 152 af 18. februar 2002, bemærkningerne til lovforslagets § 1, nr. 1), at sociale, uddannelsesmæssige, helbredsmæssige eller lignende socioøkonomiske omstændigheder ikke kan begrunde beskyttelsesstatus, men at der i ganske særlige sager i stedet vil kunne meddeles humanitær opholdstilladelse efter udlændingelovens § 9 b. Kompetencen til at behandle spørgsmål om, hvorvidt der foreligger helbredsmæssige forhold, der indebærer, at udsendelse af en udlænding vil udgøre en krænkelse af Den Europæiske Menneskerettighedskonventions artikel 3, henhører således under Udlændinge- og Integrationsministeriet, som har kompetencen til at behandle sager, hvori der er ansøgt om opholdstilladelse af humanitære grunde, jf. udlændingelovens § 9 b. For så vidt angår det af ansøgeren påberåbte asylmotiv om konsekvensstatus: Flygtningenævnet finder, at hendes voksne brors opholdstilladelse i medfør af udlændingelovens § 7, stk. 1, ikke bevirker, at hun er berettiget til konsekvensstatus på baggrund heraf. Flygtningenævnet har herved lagt vægt på, at hensynet til bevarelsen af familiens enhed ikke taler for, at ansøgeren er berettiget til konsekvensstatus på dette grundlag. Ansøgerens bror var således fyldt 18 år, da ansøgeren indrejste i Danmark, og siden ansøgerens udrejse til [europæisk land] i 2021 for at søge asyl dér har ansøgeren ikke haft fælles bopæl med broren, heller ikke efter hendes fornyede indrejse i Danmark. Det er endvidere ikke sandsynliggjort, at der skulle foreligge et sådan afhængighedsforhold mellem ansøgeren og hendes voksne bror, at hensynet til bevarelsen af familiens enhed tilsiger, at ansøgeren meddeles konsekvensstatus på denne baggrund. Flygtningenævnets flertal finder derimod efter en konkret vurdering af samtlige sagens omstændigheder – herunder de oplyste omstændigheder om ansøgerens afhængighed af sin far, der rækker ud over den afhængighed, selve slægtskabet indebærer – at ansøgerens fars opholdstilladelse i medfør af udlændingelovens § 7, stk. 2, udgør et tilstrækkeligt grundlag for, at ansøgeren som følge af hensynet til bevarelsen af familiens enhed er berettiget til asylretlig konsekvensstatus. Flygtningenævnet meddeler derfor [ansøgeren] opholdstilladelse i medfør af udlændingelovens § 7, stk. 2.” Syri/2026/7/Sael
