Nævnet meddelte i marts 2026 opholdstilladelse (K-status) til en kvindelig statsborger fra Syrien. Indrejst i 2019.
Flygtningenævnet udtalte:
”Ansøgeren er etnisk kurder og sunnimuslim fra Syrien. Ansøgeren har ikke været medlem af politiske eller religiøse foreninger eller organisationer eller i øvrigt været politisk aktiv. Ansøgeren henviste som asylmotiv i forbindelse med sin oprindelige asylsag til, at hun frygtede, at de syriske myndigheder ville tilbageholde hende, fordi hendes sønner har unddraget sig militærtjeneste. Til støtte herfor oplyste ansøgeren, at de syriske myndigheder kom og opsøgte ansøgeren og hendes ægtefælles bopæl i Rif Damaskus i 2013 eller 2015 for at spørge efter sønnerne, inden hun flyttede tilbage til [landsby]. Da myndighederne så, at sønnerne ikke var til stede, sagde de til ansøgeren, at de ville tage hendes ægtefælle, hvis sønnerne ikke meldte sig. Ansøgeren henviste videre til, at hun frygtede de generelle forhold som følge af krigen. Ansøgeren har i forbindelse med den verserende asylsag fortsat henvist til, at hun frygter de generelle forhold i Syrien, herunder de generelle forhold for kurdere. Hjemområde[:] Flygtningenævnet tiltræder, at ansøgeren efter omstændighederne skal vurderes i forhold til Rif Damaskus som hjemområde. Udlændingelovens § 7, stk. 1 og 2[:] Flygtningenævnet finder i lyset af regimeskiftet i Syrien, at der ikke er grundlag for at meddele ansøgeren asyl under henvisning til det oprindeligt fremsatte asylmotiv. Ansøgeren har for Flygtningenævnet navnlig gjort gældende, at hun ved en tilbagevenden til Syrien vil være i risiko for kønsspecifik forfølgelse som følge af de undertrykkende forhold for kvinder i landet. Forholdene for kvinder i Syrien er beskrevet således i Syria, Situation of Certain Groups, Udlændingestyrelsen, 9. december 2025, pkt. 8 (s. 42 ff.): ”8. Women[:] In March 2025, President Ahmed al-Sharaa signed a constitutional declaration that includes Article 21 on women’s rights. Article 21 states that the Syrian state shall uphold women’s social status, protect their dignity, and support their role within both the family and society. It guarantees their rights to education and employment, as well as the protection of their social, economic, and political rights. The article also commits to safeguarding women from all forms of oppression, injustice, and violence. Despite these legal guarantees by the interim government, Syrian women continue to face major barriers to equality due to discriminatory laws, conservative social norms, and limited protection. A Syrian human rights organisation expressed concern that the new authorities hold restrictive views on women’s role in society. At the same time, isolated cases of women being appointed to prominent positions have been reported, including a feminist Christian woman who was a member of the Syrian National Dialogue Committee, serving as Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, and several women as university deans. In general, women’s rights and livelihood opportunities remain a critical concern, as women are frequently not economically independent. 8.1. Incidents involving women. Reports issued earlier in 2025 describe cases of sexual violence and harassment against women, especially at checkpoints and during return journeys through unsafe areas. These incidents occurred across different parts of the country, including in zones previously controlled by the SDF, SNA, and the former government. Violence and abuse against women are perpetrated by a mix of state actors, groups linked to them, and non-state or criminal actors. SNHR had not documented cases of government-perpetrated abuses specifically targeting women, but there had been reports of kidnappings by unidentified armed groups, particularly in Homs, where the bodies of several abducted women were later found. The perpetrators and motives remain unknown. In general, the situation of women with regard to freedom of movement varies across Syria. In Damascus, many women move around independently but take precautions, while in smaller towns and rural areas stricter cultural norms limit their mobility. In the coastal region, fears of kidnapping by armed groups have led some women to leave university and kept girls from attending school. In Aleppo, some women covered their hair to avoid harassment. According to an international organisation, women’s main concerns relate to harassment at checkpoints or by armed men rather than by regular police. 8.1.1. Sectarian variations. The situation of women in Syria — including their safety and treatment — reportedly varies widely, largely depending on their sectarian background and the region in which they live. … A Syrian human rights organisation observed that Sunni women, especially if they are wearing the hijab (such as women from Idlib, Aleppo, and Homs), face fewer challenges than Alawite, Christian and Druze women. Non-Sunni women appear more vulnerable, especially when their identity is visible through appearance or behaviour. Most cases of discrimination, harassment and abuse of women are reported from minority areas, while such cases are rarely reported from Hama, Aleppo, or Daraa. In addition to a woman’s religious background and appearance, the way she is treated depends on her social class, income, and family background; wealthier or well-connected women are usually treated more fairly and respectfully than poorer women without influence. 8.1.2. Regional variations. The situation of women also varies significantly between regions. Women in smaller towns and rural communities often live under stricter cultural norms and depend on family networks for protection; their main concern is harassment at checkpoints or by armed men, rather than actions by the regular police. In Damascus, on the other hand, many women go out alone and participate in daily life, but they take precautions. Government protection for women against violence or harassment is generally insufficient — for example, in cases of abduction in the coastal areas, Suweida, and parts of Homs, and Damascus. Many women do not even report incidents to the police, presumably because they do not trust the authorities. A Syrian human rights organisation was aware of only one case, involving a woman from the coastal area who filed a rape complaint. In regions dominated by armed groups or conservative factions, individuals targeting women are not being held accountable. In cases of kidnapping and rape of Alawite or Druze women, the authorities failed to protect them and only reacted superficially after the cases received widespread publicity, according to a Syrian human rights organisation. In a recent case in Hama, the identities of the men who raped an Alawite woman were widely known; however, the perpetrators had not been arrested. The Syrian Women’s Political Movement interviewed by DIS noted, however, that — after an increase in kidnappings in the coastal areas — the authorities began to intervene more actively, following pressure from civil society and women’s groups. Yet the lack of a neutral investigation of subsequent abductions of several women in Suweida means that it is still not possible to determine which actors were behind the kidnappings or to hold anyone accountable. 8.1.3. Precautionary measures and dress code. In order to minimise the risk of harassment or abuse, some women reportedly adjust their behaviour. For example, women avoid staying out late, unfamiliar areas, and taking taxis driven by unknown men, and they coordinate transport with friends or relatives to ensure safety. Some women have reportedly adopted the headscarf out of fear of harassment, as reported in Aleppo or among Alawite women in Homs, despite there being no official directive regulating women’s attire. In areas controlled by the interim government, women have at times been informally warned by individual local authorities, religious leaders, or security actors with extremist ideological views for not wearing the Islamic veil. On the coast in Tartous and Latakia, and in Suweida, as well as in parts of Homs and Damascus, local actors — some of whom are connected to the authorities — have reportedly imposed the hijab and carried out campaigns promoting stricter religious dress codes for women. However, a female activist said she had neither witnessed nor heard of any cases in which Syrian women were assaulted for not wearing the Islamic veil anywhere in the country. She added that when meeting female Alawites at civil society activities, they told her they faced no restrictions on their freedom to dress as they wished. Still, isolated local incidents may occur where women are asked to cover their hair. 8.2. Access to public services. The government’s overall position on women’s rights and representation remains uncertain. Some members of the new administration have openly opposed women’s participation in specific roles and have criticised previous efforts to advance gender equality. According to SNHR, daily life, including access to public services, reportedly remains largely unchanged, with no notable improvement or deterioration in women’s rights or protection. However, according to the Syrian Women’s Political Movement, public services have improved in some areas, while in others they have deteriorated. Administrative services have improved in some urban and government-controlled areas and public officials there act professionally. In contrast, women still experience discrimination and insecurity in regions dominated by armed groups or conservative factions. In some areas, such as a ‘one-stop window’ office in Damascus, administrative processes are efficient and staff treat women respectfully. In contrast, in more conservative or conflict-affected areas such as Douma, women often face discriminatory treatment when dealing with local authorities. Officials may question their presence, ask for a male relative to accompany them, or delay their paperwork, which makes administrative procedures longer and more difficult for women than for men. 8.3. Single, widowed and divorced women. In addition to their individual sectarian background and specific region, women face different challenges depending on their civil status. The situation of single, widowed, or divorced women has not changed or improved under the new government; they continue to face the same difficulties regarding employment, transport, housing, protection, and access to official documents. With regard to housing, single women and widows face social restrictions; although they are legally allowed to rent housing and complete official procedures independently, social norms often obstruct their access. Landlords and local officials may question or discourage women from living alone. Women whose husbands are missing or deceased and those married to foreign nationals face severe administrative problems. The problem is most acute in the northwest where foreign fighters were present. During the conflict, some of these fighters married Syrian women in religious or informal ceremonies that were never officially registered and sometimes had children. When the men were later killed, disappeared, or returned to their home countries, the women were left without legal proof of marriage and therefore could not register their children. Although Syrian law states that a child of an unknown father can be registered as a Syrian citizen, this is rarely implemented in practice. Social stigma and bureaucratic reluctance prevent families from talking publicly about this issue. Some women register children under the name of a male relative instead in order to obtain papers. The restriction in the nationality law for women to pass on citizenship to their children remains a key barrier. 8.3.1. Return of single, widowed, and divorced women. An international NGO found it very difficult to generalise about the situation of single women returning, as it depends on a number of factors, including conditions in the area of return, the individual woman’s economic situation etc. However, single women and female-headed households constitute a particularly vulnerable group upon return. They are generally highly dependent on family members, as they are rarely economically independent. If a single mother returns, it is usually expected that her family will host her, which often entails living restrictions, including limited freedom of movement, imposed by the family. Local security conditions in the area of return can further limit women’s movement. Women returning to Syria without a husband will generally not be able to support themselves in Syria due to the deteriorated economic situation with very high rental costs and very limited job opportunities. For many single women, the high cost of housing combined with prevailing social attitudes toward women living alone makes it difficult to secure accommodation. As a result, many choose to remain abroad or in refugee camps. Women attempting to return to Damascus encounter significant obstacles in securing both housing and employment. Some women who previously resided in refugee camps in Idlib and sought to resettle in Damascus following the fall of the former government ultimately had to return to the camps due to the prohibitively high rental costs. Female public-sector employees seeking to reclaim their former positions have been unable to do so, as personnel from the previous administration continue to occupy these posts despite the establishment of the new government. For single women and elderly people, reintegration heavily depends on access to a supportive family network. Many women returning to Syria without a husband or a male head of household rely heavily on their extended families and often move in with them, especially when they do not have access to their immediate families (e.g. due to displacement abroad). Returnees from neighbouring countries, particularly those who have lived in camps, often need to re-establish contact with family members who stayed behind in Syria upon arrival. Women whose husbands are missing (e.g. due to forced disappearance) face particularly complex situations, as they must rebuild their lives from scratch. This includes reconnecting with relatives to clarify potential inheritance rights while coping with the emotional challenge of deciding whether to declare their husband deceased or continue searching for him. There are also cases of female-headed households returning to Syria while the husband remains abroad, for instance in Lebanon or Türkiye, to secure an income for the family. According to a humanitarian organisation interviewed by DIS, these cases illustrate a distinct return experience where economic survival depends on family support across borders.” For kvinder, der vender tilbage fra udlandet, kan der desuden henvises til Syria, Security Situation, Return and Documents, Udlændingestyrelsen 9. december 2025, pkt. 3.3. (navnlig s. 32 f): ”Dynamics related to gender and vulnerability. Having strong community and family support is particularly important for women returnees. Many women returning to Syria without a husband or a male head of household rely heavily on their extended families and often move in with them, especially when they do not have access to their immediate families (e.g. due to displacement abroad). An international NGO found it difficult to generalise about the situation of single women returning, as it depends on a number of factors, including conditions in the area of return and the individual woman’s economic situation. Nevertheless, the source noted certain trends: single women and female-headed households may face heightened vulnerability upon return and often rely on family members due to limited economic independence. In cases where a single mother returns, it is commonly expected that her family will host her, which can involve living restrictions, including reduced freedom of movement, imposed by the family. In addition, the security situation in the area may also affect women’s freedom of movement. Some female-headed households return while husbands remain abroad (e.g., in Lebanon or Türkiye) to secure income, illustrating cross border family dependence. Women whose husbands are missing face complex reintegration, including reconnecting with relatives to clarify inheritance while coping with decisions about declaring the husband dead or continuing the search for him.” Der kan endvidere henvises til EUAA, County Guidance: Syria, december 2025, pkt. 4.10 (s. 49 ff.), og UK Home Office, Country Policy and Information Note Syria: Women, december 2025. Af sidstnævnte rapport fremgår det mere overordnet: “In general, women in Syria are unlikely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm from state or non-state actors.” Selvom forholdene for kvinder i Syrien, herunder særligt enlige kvinder, efter baggrundsoplysningerne er vanskelige, finder Flygtningenævnet ikke, at forholdene uden videre kan anses for asylbegrundende, og at der således også skal foreligge andre relevante individuelle risikofaktorer, der sandsynliggør et behov for international beskyttelse i Danmark. Nævnet lægger efter ansøgerens forklaring til grund, at hun ved en tilbagevenden til Syrien ikke vil have et reelt familienetværk, der kan bistå hende, og det må på baggrund af de foreliggende baggrundsoplysninger lægges til grund, at enlige kvinder i Syrien har meget begrænsede muligheder for at opnå myndighedsbeskyttelse i Syrien. Ansøgeren har desuden henvist til, at hun ved en tilbagevenden til Syrien vil være i risiko for forfølgelse, fordi hun er kurder. Af Udlændingestyrelsens rapport, Syria, Situation of certain groups, december 2025, pkt. 5 (s. 31 ff.), fremgår følgende om situationen for kurdere i Syrien: “5. Kurds[:] Estimated at 2 to 2.5 million individuals, the Kurdish population forms Syria’s largest ethnic minority, comprising up to 10% of the country’s pre-war total of 23 million. The Kurdish population is concentrated in Northeast Syria — particularly in the regions of Afrin, Kobani, and Jazira, with smaller concentrations in districts of Raqqa city — as well as in neighbourhoods of Aleppo and Damascus. This report focuses on the situation of Kurds living in government-held areas and therefore does not cover the situation of Kurds in Northeast Syria, which remains under the de facto control of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). 5.1. Treatment of Kurds Apart from isolated incidents, ordinary Kurds residing in government-controlled areas generally continue their daily lives without major restrictions, harassment, mistreatment, discriminatory treatment, or attacks based on their ethnicity, provided they do not engage in political activity. According to a Syrian lawyer DIS consulted, individuals perceived as politically active or critical of the authorities may face reprisals comparable to those experienced by government critics of any background. In Damascus, where an estimated one-third of the population is of Kurdish origin and where Kurdish communities have been established for centuries, Kurds are described as an integrated part of society. In long-established Kurdish-dominated Damascus neighbourhoods such as Rukn al-Din and Wadi al-Mashari, Kurds reportedly resemble other residents and are therefore difficult to identify ethnically; no changes or abuses affecting this particular group have been reported since the fall of the former government. According to a Kurdish civil society activist, Kurds are not prevented from accessing housing or public services, nor have they faced ethnically motivated dismissals from public employment. The activist highlighted the presence of several high-ranking Kurdish officials within government institutions, including the Minister of Education. The source emphasised, however, that the current broader economic crisis affects Kurds in the same way as all other Syrians. The same source stated that Kurds residing abroad are reportedly able to return without facing administrative or security obstacles, and the source personally knows of several such cases. The current authorities demonstrate a greater degree of tolerance towards Kurdish flags and symbols compared with the previous government. For instance, during a recent Kurdish cultural festival in Damascus, participants openly displayed Kurdish flags without any intervention from the authorities. A Kurdish activist interviewed by DIS stated that this would have been inconceivable under the former government. As regards the status of stateless and naturalised Kurds, a source stated that the current authorities have not revoked the Syrian citizenship of the Ajanib — Kurds from Hasakah who were naturalized in 2011 by the former government. However, the situation of the Maktoomeen remains unresolved. According to a Kurdish activist, members of this group continue to be denied basic rights, including the ability to complete secondary education. 5.2. Incidents involving Kurds in government-controlled areas. One concern noted among Kurds in Damascus is a persistent sense of fear regarding potential repercussions if tensions between the authorities and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) escalate, according to a Kurdish activist. Reported isolated incidents involving Kurds primarily relate to individuals originating from outside Damascus. For example, Kurdish travellers from Northeast Syria were reportedly stopped for questioning or were delayed for extended periods at checkpoints and subjected to harassment, although they were ultimately permitted to continue their journey. In other instances, Kurds from Northeast Syria have been arrested in Damascus without a clear justification for their detention; they were, however, released following a negotiated agreement. Moreover, there were reports of Kurdish visitors from Qamishli and Aleppo being arrested in the Sha’lan area of Damascus for speaking Kurdish, and some were reportedly tortured in detention. Those detained were interrogated on suspicion of links to the SDF’s intelligence apparatus but were released after a short period. These arrests coincided with the PYD’s (Democratic Union Party) attempts to open offices in government-controlled areas, which apparently increased scrutiny of Kurdish-speaking individuals. During this period, both politically active and apolitical Kurds from Northeast Syria were detained on suspicion of links to the SDF, but all were released shortly thereafter. Isolated revenge attacks or kidnappings by unidentified groups targeting Kurds originating from the areas controlled by the interim government have also been recorded, but according to SNHR, these do not constitute a systematic pattern.” De nyeste oplysninger om forholdene for kurdere i Syrien tyder imidlertid på, at der er sket en vis forværring af situationen for kurdere i forhold til beskrivelsen ovenfor i hvert fald i den nordøstlige del af landet, herunder Hasaka-provinsen, i form af en offensiv mod de kurdisk-kontrollerede områder fra overgangsregeringens side, jf. herved navnlig det anførte i Europa-Parlamentets resolution af 12. februar 2026 (2026/2602(RSP)). Heroverfor står, at den syriske præsident ved et dekret af 16. januar 2026 (dekret nr. 16/2026) formelt anerkendte kurdere som en oprindelig del af det syriske folk, sikrede kurderes kulturelle og sproglige rettigheder og ophævede tidligere diskriminerende foranstaltninger. Flygtningenævnet bemærker mere generelt, at der i lyset af regimeskiftet ikke ses at være tilstrækkeligt grundlag for i nævnets fremadrettede praksis vedrørende syriske statsborgere, herunder kurdere, at opretholde anvendelsen af det forsigtighedsprincip, der har været anvendt af nævnet siden 2019. Efter en samlet vurdering af de ovennævnte forhold finder Flygtningenævnets flertal, at ansøgeren har sandsynliggjort, at hun ved en tilbagevenden til Syrien vil være i en konkret og individuel risiko for at blive udsat for forfølgelse som nævnt i udlændingelovens § 7, stk. 1. Der er ikke grundlag for at fastslå, at ansøgeren vil kunne henvises til et internt flugtalternativ andre steder i Syrien. Der er uanset ansøgerens forklaring om, at hun under opholdet i Danmark som almindelig deltager har overværet [et antal] demonstrationer rettet mod det nye styre i Syrien og dets behandling af kurdere, ikke grundlag for at antage, at dette skulle være de syriske myndigheder bekendt, og at ansøgeren på dette grundlag skulle være blevet negativt profileret over for de syriske myndigheder i forhold til sin kurdiske baggrund. Konklusion[:] Det følger af det ovenfor anførte, at Flygtningenævnet meddeler ansøgeren opholdstilladelse i medfør af udlændingelovens § 7, stk. 1. De nærmere vilkår for opholdstilladelsen fastsættes af Udlændingestyrelsen.” Syri/2026/3/flfr
