Nævnet stadfæstede i august 2026 Udlændingestyrelsens afgørelse vedrørende en mandlig statsborger fra Rusland. Sagen er sambehandlet med rusl/2026/34/SRWM. Indrejst i 2023.
Flygtningenævnet udtalte:
Ansøgeren er etnisk tjetjener og muslim fra [by A], Tjetjenien. Ansøgeren har ikke været medlem af politiske eller religiøse foreninger eller organisationer. Ansøgeren har som asylmotiv henvist til, at han frygter at blive sendt til krigen imellem Rusland og Ukraine, idet han er blevet indkaldt til militærtjeneste, og idet han har udtalt sig kritisk om de tjetjenske myndigheder under sin studietid fra 2015 til 2019 samt efterfølgende til venner og bekendte. Ansøgeren har til støtte for sit asylmotiv henvist til, at der [i vinteren 2021/2022] mødte fire bevæbnede mænd og en lokal politibetjent op på hans bopæl, hvorefter de gav ansøgeren såvel som hans [familiemedlem A] en indkaldelse til militærtjeneste. Ansøgeren har endvidere oplyst, at de fem personer opførte sig aggressivt, og at de krævede, at ansøgeren og hans [familiemedlem A] underskrev det udleverede dokument. Ansøgeren og hans [familiemedlem A] underskrev indkaldelserne, hvorefter myndighedspersonerne førte dem til rekrutteringskontoret i [by A]. Her blev de begge tilbudt penge, såfremt de underskrev en kontrakt, og de fik ligeledes at vide, at de ville modtage træning og skydetræning. Ansøgeren og hans [familiemedlem A] fik herefter lov til at gå, men de fik at vide, at de ville blive indkaldt igen. De besluttede herefter begge at rejse, hvorefter de tog ophold i [byB]. Ved udgangen af 2022 rejste de begge videre til [by C] Ingusjetien for at tage ophold. Ansøgeren har oplyst, at myndighederne [i foråret] 2023 igen opsøgte hans og [familiemedlem As] bopæl. Ansøgerens [familiemedlem B] fortalte ved denne lejlighed myndighederne, at de var udrejst til udlandet. [Familiemedlem B] har oplyst, at myndighederne [i foråret] 2023 igen opsøgte ansøgeren og [familiemedlem As] bopæl, og at myndighederne i forbindelse med opsøgningerne [i foråret] 2023 har afleveret yderligere militærindkaldelser til både ansøgeren og hans [familiemedlem A]. Ansøgeren har endelig oplyst, at han og [familiemedlem A] herefter igen rejste til [by B] [i foråret] 2023, hvor de begge fik lavet udenrigspas af en af deres familiemedlemmers bekendte. De udrejste herefter legalt af Rusland i april 2023. Supplerende baggrundsoplysninger: Tvangs¬hverv¬ning af tjetjenere til krigen i Ukraine er nærmere behandlet i Udlændin¬ge¬sty¬rel¬sens/Migrationsverkets COI-rapport, ”Russia – Recruitment of Chechens to the war in Ukraine”, april 2024 (s. 20 ff.), hvor følgende er anført: ”4.3.3. Coercive recruitment: Coercive recruitment of ethnic Chechens to the Russian invasion of Ukraine has been ongoing since February 2022 but it has ebbed and flowed in terms of scale and intensity throughout the duration of the full-scale invasion. According to Harold Chambers, the extent of coercive recruitment in Chechnya peaked around the time of the announce¬ment of the partial mobilisation in Russia at the end of September 2022. There are ma¬ny unknown variables regarding coercive recruitment in Chechnya, in¬clu¬ding the scale. Chechens who are coercively recruited are forced to sign contracts with the MoD and according to HRW and Mark Galeotti this means that the paper trail of coercively recruited Chechens looks as if they volunteered for the Russian war ef¬fort. Galeotti further elaborated that most of the corroborated cases of coercive recruit¬ment has come from Grozny. All sources consulted on the topic of coercive recruitment stated that coercive recruit¬ment in Chechnya has been directed at certain groups of the local population. Critics of the authorities are at most risk of being coercively recruited. Harold Chambers as¬ses¬sed that even being a member of the ‘wrong’ Telegram-channel could put a person at risk of being recruited, and he added that the Chechen authorities possess the neces¬sa¬ry software to monitor social media platforms. HRW stated that activists and mem¬bers of civil society organization could risk being recruited. They further elaborated that cases of recruitment of ad due to their activism is not limited to Chechnya and Chechens but has also been documented in the rest of Russia. Family members of vocal critics of the Chechen authorities also risk being recruited. The brother of a well-known Chechen dissident, Khassan Khalitov, had been forceful¬ly sent to the frontline in Ukraine. Alexander Kvakhadze of the Rondeli Foundation added that he had heard of other similar cases. In Chechnya, HRW had seen examples of persons being recruited because they were a part of the LGBT community. These persons were given a choice: either they would to be outed so that their LGBT identity would be known in the public and by their fa¬milies – which would entail the risk of them being killed – or they could sign a contract with the MoD. Users of illegal drugs and alcohol has also been forced to sign contracts with the MoD. Harold Chambers stated that the authorities used coercive recruitment to get rid of what the Chechen authorities has labelled ‘undesirables’. HRW noted that any devia¬tion from the norms and rules of Kadyrov could be used to force persons to sign con¬tracts with the MoD or the National Guard. The Chechen authorities use forced recruit¬ment to Ukraine as a form of punishment in Chechnya. Although certain groups can be identified as being more at risk than others it should be noted that there is a high degree of unpredictability and arbitrariness in the actions of Chechen authorities in regards to coercive recruitment. Sources have indicated that any contact with Chechen authorities can involve risks from a recruitment perspective. According to Chambers, this type of seemingly random recruitment seemed to be most prevalent during the autumn of 2022. At that time, the authorities coercively recruited most Chechen men they came into contact with without regard for their physical and/or mental condition. Chambers knows of cases where people involved in car accidents we¬re recruited and sent to Ukraine. Three sources also noted reports of Chechens try¬ing to obtain external passports have been coercively recruited. Chambers further ela¬bo¬rated that Chechens trying to avoid recruitment by leaving Russia at the Astrakhan border crossing into Kazakhstan have been recruited at the border by Chechen autho¬rities.” I EUAA’s COI-rapport - The Russian Federation – Country Focus, december 2025, s. 95-97, er følgende anført: “4.4. Military recruitment in Chechnya: As noted by Huseyn Aliyev, the Chechen Republic stands out within Russia for its unique interpretation and application of federal laws. Other republics of the North Caucasus largely follow the same practices as elsewhere in the country, while Dagestan’s authorities ‘have somewhat different approach to mobilisation and conscription’, conducting more frequent raids on potential conscripts, compared to other regions in Russia. In contrast, Chechnya is also an outstanding case due to the level of political repression, with all forms of critique being harshly suppressed, with no changes regarding this in 2025. 4.4.1. Chechen military units: After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, significantly expanded Chechen military formations, reportedly establishing ten additional units, including new regiments and battalions as well as ‘volunteer’ Akhmat unit, which are subordinated to the Russian MoD. In addition, a new regiment and a separate OMON (Special Police Mobile Unit) detachment were established within the National Guard (Rosgrvardiya). The military and paramilitary Chechen units are colloquially known as ‘the kadyrovtsy.’According to Huseyn Aliyev, there are roughly nine different Akhmad regiments, with some of them being part of Rosgvardiya and others being under MoD and the Ministry of Interior (MoI). At least seven or eight of these units have reportedly been deployed to Ukraine and are either operating directly within the country or on Ukraine-Russian border. In March 2025, a new regiment, Akhmat-Kavkaz, subordinated to MoD, was created. The Akhmat special forces are often viewed as Ramzan’s Kadyrov’s private army and have been deployed to fight in Ukraine since the start of the war in February 2022. After the disbandment of the Wagner group, some of its fighters transferred entire units to Akhmat battalions, due to reluctance to serve under the MoD, with the Akhmat Battalion commander stating in October 2023 that it was a ‘mass influx.’ In April 2024, Ramzan Kadyrov announced that another 3 000 former Wagner fighters were expected to join the Akhmad battalion. From late 2022, the Chechen forces in Ukraine have increasingly assumed rear area tasks, such as policing, supporting Russia-appointed local authorities, and providing border security duties. For instance, several Chechen units have been deployed in or around Mariupol, where they are tasked with so-called implementation of ‘law and order.’ 4.4.2. Forced recruitment: Chechen authorities employ distinct methods of military recruitment, compared to other parts of Russia, with cases of forced recruitment reported since summer 2022. As noted by Memorial, while Ramzan Kadyrov claims that Chechnya deploys to Ukraine ‘volunteers’ and in numbers that ‘fulfilled the plan,’ Chechen security resort to such methods as pressure, threats, kidnapping, violence, fabrication of criminal cases, blackmailing, and extortion. Moreover, the authorities have reportedly also used such methods as kidnappings of relatives and threatened to ‘dishonour’ female family members of men refusing to join the military, as reported by the opposition movement NIYSO. Longstanding practices also include forced recruitment of prison inmates, and intimidation of suspects accused of various minor offences, ranging from traffic violations to alcoholconsumption (which is formally prohibited in Chechnya) and drug use to petty crimes, such as public disturbances. ‘Volunteering’ to serve in Ukraine is routinely presented as an opportunity of repentance. The authorities have also pressured critics of Ramzan Kadyrov and LGBTIQ persons to either enlist for military service or face imprisonment. Among people subjected to forced recruitment are also relatives and family members of opposition figures, including those who are abroad. Some of them were in their late 50s or 60s, ‘indicating that there is no age limit.’ Recruitment efforts in Chechnya have been heavily driven by certain recruitment quotas assigned to law enforcement agencies. In October 2024, police stations and traffic police units were tasked with recruiting 20 – 50 volunteers each. According to activists, some agencies which have exceeded the quota used group chats to exchange recruits for 100 000 or 200 000 rubles [1 025 – 2 050 euros] among themselves. Security forces reportedly use arbitrary detention of men, stopping cars for alleged traffic violation or for travelling together with a woman who is not a relative (staged by the law enforcement officers) or detaining men of military age at the borders with other republics of the North Caucasus to check their phones, resulting in their transfer to military unit deployment sites.” Fra det nyeste baggrundsmateriale kan der endvidere henvises til Landinfos Temanotat, Russland, Rekruttering til krigen i Ukraina, 6. august 2026, der dog ikke specifikt omhandler situationen i Tjetjenien. Den konkrete sag: Flygtningenævnet kan ikke lægge ansøgerens forklaring til grund om, at han er blevet søgt tvangshvervet til militæret. Flygtningenævnet har herved – ud over tidspunktet for den angivelige opsøgning [i vinteren 2021/2022] forud for den russiske invasion af Ukraine i februar samme år sammenholdt med oplysningerne i baggrundsoplysningerne om militærtjeneste, mobilisering og tvangsrekruttering – navnlig lagt vægt på, at ansøgeren ikke kan anses for at tilhøre en af de risikogrupper, der er nævnt i de ovennævnte baggrundsoplysninger. Ansøgeren har til asylsamtalen [i efteråret] 2025 oplyst, at han ikke på noget tidspunkt har været tilknyttet politiske grupper eller foreninger, og at han ikke har haft politiske aktiviteter i eller uden for hjemlandet, herunder på de sociale medier eller ved deltagelse i demonstrationer. Det forhold, at ansøgeren til asylsamtalen har oplyst, at han har udtalt sig kritisk om de tjetjenske myndigheder under sin studietid i perioden 2015-19, kan ikke føre til en anden vurdering, idet der ikke er oplysninger i sagen, der tyder på, at de tjetjenske myndigheder skulle være blevet gjort bekendt med udtalelserne, der heller ikke forud for [vinteren 2021/2022] skulle have ført til opsøgninger fra myndighedernes side. Det forekommer desuden påfaldende, at ansøgeren først skulle være blevet foreholdt disse udtalelser [i vinteren 2021/2022]. Ansøgeren fremstår således ikke profileret i forhold til de russiske/tjetjenske myndigheder. Det er endvidere indgået i Flygtningenævnets vurdering af sagen, at ansøgeren fik udstedt pas og udrejste legalt af Rusland i 2023 efter angiveligt at være blevet indkaldt. Flygtningenævnet bemærker, at hvis de russiske/tjetjenske myndigheder havde ønsket at tvangsrekruttere ansøgeren og hans [familiemedlem A] til militærtjeneste forud for den forestående invasion af Ukraine, fremstår det desuden som anført af Udlændingestyrelsen usammenhængende, at ansøgeren og hans [familiemedlem A] i [vinteren 2021/2022] fik lov til at tage hjem igen efter at de angiveligt havde fortalt myndighedspersonerne på militærkommissariatet, at de ville tænke over deres tilbud. Det fremlagte brev fra myndighederne fra [foråret] 2023 om fremmøde til lægeundersøgelse mv. kan ikke i sig selv føre til en formodning om, at ansøgeren vil blive udsat for tvangshvervning. Flygtningenævnet er opmærksom på den alvorlige situation, der er en følge af Ruslands invasionskrig mod Ukraine og på, at der finder tvangshvervning mv. sted. Der er imidlertid fortsat ikke grundlag for at antage, at helt uprofilerede mænd, der også falder uden for de ovenfor nævnte risikogrupper, i almindelighed er i en asylbegrundende risiko for tvangshvervning. Der er ikke grundlag for at antage, at personer, der vender tilbage til Rusland/Tjetjenien efter længere tids lovligt ophold i udlandet generelt er i asylbegrundende risiko for overgreb fra myndighe¬dernes side. Ansøgeren har herefter ikke sandsynliggjort, at han har behov for international beskyttelse i Danmark efter udlændingelovens § 7, stk. 1 eller stk. 2. Flygtningenævnet stadfæster derfor Udlændingestyrelsens afgørelse. rusl/2026/35/SRWM
