Nævnet stadfæstede i juli 2025 Udlændingestyrelsens afgørelse vedrørende en mandlig statsborger fra Rusland. Indrejst i 2003 og oprindeligt meddelt opholdstilladelse efter udlændingelovens § 7, stk. 2. Klageren blev i 2022 idømt fængsel i syv måneder for overtrædelse af bl.a. knivlovens § 7, stk. 2, lov om euforiserende stoffer § 3, stk. 1, straffelovens § 293 a og færdselslovens § 118 samt udvist af Danmark med indrejseforbud i 6 år.
Flygtningenævnet udtalte:
”Klageren har haft opholdstilladelse efter udlændingelovens § 7, stk. 2, og der skal herefter i medfør af udlændingelovens § 49 a træffes afgørelse om, hvorvidt udlændingelovens § 31 er til hinder for, at klageren kan udsendes til Rusland. Klageren er etnisk tjetjener og muslim fra Tjetjenien, Rusland. Klageren har ikke været medlem af politiske eller religiøse foreninger eller organisationer eller i øvrigt været politisk aktiv. Klageren har som asylmotiv henvist til, at han ved en tilbagevenden til Rusland frygter at opleve problemer, herunder blive slået ihjel eller udsat for tortur, fordi hans afdøde [nære familiemedlem A] var frihedskæmper på tjetjenernes side og i Rusland anses for at være landsforræder. Flygtningenævnet kan ikke lægge til grund, at klageren har en aktuel og asylbegrundende konflikt med myndigheder eller personer i Rusland i anledning af [sit nære familiemedlems A’s] forhold. Nævnet har ligesom Udlændingestyrelsen lagt vægt på, at klageren ikke har noget nærmere kendskab til [klagerens nære familiemedlem A’s] konflikt, og at klageren ikke er bekendt med, om hans familie, herunder klagerens [nære familiemedlem B], har oplevet problemer på grund af [klagerens nære familiemedlem A]. Hertil kommer, at konflikten ligger mange år tilbage i tiden. Flygtningenævnet kan heller ikke lægge til grund, at klageren har en aktuel og asylbegrundende konflikt med myndigheder eller personer i Rusland i anledning af [sit nære familiemedlem B’s] forhold som følge af, at [familiemedlem B] var medlem af den tjetjenske oprørshær i perioden fra [efteråret] 1999 til [foråret] 2003. Nævnet har i den forbindelse lagt vægt på det anførte i Flygtningenævnets afgørelse [fra foråret]2022 vedrørende forlængelse af klagerens [nære familiemedlem B’s] opholdstilladelse efter udlændingelovens § 7, stk. 2, hvor det – i lyset bl.a. af oplysninger om [klagerens nære familiemedlems B’s] rejseaktiviteter til Rusland, herunder Tjetjenien – er lagt til grund at [klagerens nære familiemedlem B] ikke har sandsynliggjort, at [klagerens nære familiemedlem B] ved en tilbagevenden til Rusland vil være i risiko for forfølgelse eller overgreb som nævnt i udlændingelovens § 7, stk. 1 eller stk. 2. Der foreligger heller ikke faktiske oplysninger i sagen, der understøtter, at klageren på grund af sine familierelationer i øvrigt skulle være i risiko for forfølgelse eller overgreb ved en tilbagevenden til Rusland. Klageren har derudover gjort gældende, at han ved en tilbagevenden til Rusland og Tjetjenien risikerer tvangsmæssigt at blive sendt til fronten i Ukraine. Om tvangshvervning af tjetjenere til krigen i Ukraine fremgår følgende af Udlændingestyrelsens/Migrationsverkets COI-rapport, Russia – Recruitment of Chechens to the war in Ukraine, april 2024 (s. 20 ff): ”4.3.3. Coercive recruitment Coercive recruitment of ethnic Chechens to the Russian invasion of Ukraine has been ongoing since February 2022 but it has ebbed and flowed in terms of scale and intensity throughout the duration of the full-scale invasion. According to Harold Chambers, the extent of coercive recruitment in Chechnya peaked around the time of the announcement of the partial mobilisation in Russia at the end of September 2022. There are many unknown variables regarding coercive recruitment in Chechnya, including the scale. Chechens who are coercively recruited are forced to sign contracts with the MoD and according to HRW and Mark Galeotti this means that the paper trail of coercively recruited Chechens looks as if they volunteered for the Russian war effort. Galeotti further elaborated that most of the corroborated cases of coercive recruitment has come from Grozny. All sources consulted on the topic of coercive recruitment stated that coercive recruitment in Chechnya has been directed at certain groups of the local population. Critics of the authorities are at most risk of being coercively recruited. Harold Chambers assessed that even being a member of the ‘wrong’ Telegram-channel could put a person at risk of being recruited, and he added that the Chechen authorities possess the necessary software to monitor social media platforms. HRW stated that activists and members of civil society organisation could risk being recruited. They further elaborated that cases of recruitment of ad due to their activism is not limited to Chechnya and Chechens but has also been documented in the rest of Russia. Family members of vocal critics of the Chechen authorities also risk being recruited. The brother of a well-known Chechen dissident, Khassan Khalitov, had been forcefully sent to the frontline in Ukraine. Alexander Kvakhadze of the Rondeli Foundation added that he had heard of other similar cases. In Chechnya, HRW had seen examples of persons being recruited because they were a part of the LGBT community. These persons were given a choice: either they would to be outed so that their LGBT identity would be known in the public and by their families – which would entail the risk of them being killed – or they could sign a contract with the MoD. Users of illegal drugs and alcohol has also been forced to sign contracts with the MoD. Harold Chambers stated that the authorities used coercive recruitment to get rid of what the Chechen authorities has labelled ‘undesirables’. HRW noted that any deviation from the norms and rules of Kadyrov could be used to force persons to sign contracts with the MoD or the National Guard. The Chechen authorities use forced recruitment to Ukraine as a form of punishment in Chechnya. Although certain groups can be identified as being more at risk than others it should be noted that there is a high degree of unpredictability and arbitrariness in the actions of Chechen authorities in regards to coercive recruitment. Sources have indicated that any contact with Chechen authorities can involve risks from a recruitment perspective. According to Chambers, this type of seemingly random recruitment seemed to be most prevalent during the autumn of 2022. At that time, the authorities coercively recruited most Chechen men they came into contact with without regard for their physical and/or mental condition. Chambers knows of cases where people involved in car accidents were recruited and sent to Ukraine. Three sources also noted reports of Chechens trying to obtain external passports have been coercively recruited. Chambers further elaborated that Chechens trying to avoid recruitment by leaving Russia at the Astrakhan border crossing into Kazakhstan have been recruited at the border by Chechen authorities.” Af Udlændingestyrelsens/Migrationsverkets COI-rapport, Russia – Conscription, marts 2025 fremgår bl.a. følgende (s. 59f): “Chechens are being conscripted for military service, and they might be sent to any part of Russia to serve. Chechen conscripts serve in many different units including in the National Guard. According to Mark Galeotti, there still seems to be evidence that Chechen conscripts tend to be deployed to Chechen units. However, it is difficult to tell in practice, as the data is not fully transparent. When the head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, wants to express his loyalty to Kremlin, local municipalities are directed to fill specific quotas with men to the military. According to Freedom House, many people from Chechnya become elite contract soldiers to ensure the safety of their families. Pressure on families is used as a weapon to exercise control over unwilling family members in Chechnya. Although this source was not certain that these practices applied to conscripts, however, it is probable. The situation for Chechens is different compared to the situation of other Russians, because most officers in the Russian military dislike Chechens and Kadyrov. Chechens do not fight in Ukraine with the regular Russian military. They only fight in local Chechen groups. The vast majority of Chechens have not been required to undertake conscription since 1991, even though Chechnya officially resumed conscription on a limited scale in 2014. In 2024, only 500 Chechens were drafted in each conscription cycle, representing a mere 0.33 percent of the total number of conscripts in the military's latest intake, which is a proportion that has remained unchanged even after the full-scale invasion began in Ukraine.” Flygtningenævnet finder, at klageren i lyset af indholdet af de ovenfor gengivne baggrundsoplysninger ikke har sandsynliggjort, at han ved en tilbagevenden til Rusland og Tjetjenien på nuværende tidspunkt vil være i en konkret risiko for tvangsmæssigt at blive sendt til fronten i krigen mellem Rusland og Ukraine, idet hans formodning om, at dette vil ske, ikke i tilstrækkelig grad er understøttet af baggrundsoplysningerne sammenholdt med hans profil og oplysningerne om hans forhold i øvrigt. De artikler, der er fremlagt af den beskikkede advokat, kan heroverfor ikke føre til en anden vurdering. Klageren er herefter ikke i risiko for asylbegrundende forfølgelse eller overgreb ved en tilbagevenden til Rusland, og udlændingelovens § 31 er derfor ikke til hinder for, at klageren kan udsendes til Rusland. Flygtningenævnet stadfæster derfor Udlændingestyrelsens afgørelse.”
Løbenummer: Rusl/2025/8/CARA
