Nævnet stadfæstede i november 2025 Udlændingestyrelsens afgørelse vedrørende en mandlig statsborger fra Pakistan. Indrejst i 2025.
Flygtningenævnet udtalte:
”Ansøgeren er etnisk [etnicitet A] og [etnicitet B] og muslim fra [by A] i [distrikt] i Pakistan. Ansøgeren har været medlem af og aktiv i Ahmadiyya-bevægelsen inden for islam, hvor han har været med til at […] Ansøgeren har som asylmotiv oplyst, at han ved en tilbagevenden til Pakistan frygter at blive udsat for overgreb eller blive slået ihjel af tilhængere af grupperingerne Kha-tam-e-Nabuwat eller Tehreek-e-Labaik, fordi han er medlem af Ahmadiyya-bevægelsen. Ansøgeren har til støtte herfor oplyst, at han under et ophold i [by B] deltog i et [kursus]. Her mødte ansøgeren en dreng ved navn [A], som fandt ud af, hvilken by ansøgeren kom fra. Ansøgeren har videre oplyst, at [A] sagde til ansøgeren, at han skulle forlade Ahmadiyya-bevægelsen og blive sunnimuslim. Ansøgeren har herom videre oplyst, at mens han fortsatte på [kursus], fik han af nogle andre drenge at vide, at [A] kunne finde på at overfalde ansøgeren. Ansøgeren har endvidere oplyst, at han på grund af denne frygt valgte at forlade [kursus] og rejste hjem efter cirka tre måneder. Ansøgeren har som asylmotiv videre oplyst, at han specifikt frygter personerne [A], [B] og [C], som han har haft konflikter med, fordi han er medlem af Ahmadiyya-bevægelsen. Ansøgeren har til støtte herfor oplyst, at han under sit ophold i [by C], mødt to personer, ved navn [B] og [C], som tilhører den religiøse gruppe Khatam-e-Nabuwat, der mener, at Mohammed er den sidste profet. Dette står i kontrast til Ahmadiyya-bevægelsens forståelse, hvilket har ført til en konflikt. Ansøgeren har videre oplyst, at de to personer oplyste ansøgeren, at han skulle forlade Ahmadiyya og blive sunnimuslim, hvorefter de begyndte at slå ham. [C] har desuden truet ansøgeren med en kniv. Ansøgeren har om sit asylmotiv videre oplyst, at den religiøse gruppe Khatam-e-Na-buwat findes overalt i Pakistan og er udbredt i hele landet Ansøgeren har til støtte herfor oplyst, at medlemmerne begynder at true og fornærme personer, der ikke følger gruppens religiøse opfattelser. Ansøgeren har endvidere oplyst, at mens han udførte arbejde sammen med en VVS'er hos en mand ved navn [D] i [by A], blev [D] stukket ned og dræbt af en person ved navn [E]. Ansøgeren har herom oplyst, at der efter hændelsen blev udsendt en [X] i byen med budskabet om, at Ahmadiyya-medlemmer ikke længere var i sikkerhed. Flygtningenævnet lægger som Udlændingestyrelsen ansøgerens forklaring om konflikten mellem ansøgeren og [A], [B] og [C] til grund. Flygtningenævnet lægger ligeledes til grund, at ansøgeren er ahmadiyya. Flygtningenævnet lægger således til grund, at ansøgeren på [skole] i [by B] var truet af [A] på grund af, at ansøgeren var medlem af ahmadiyya-bevægelsen. [A] ville have, at ansøgeren skulle konvertere, hvilket ansøgeren ikke ville. Ansøgeren valgte derfor at stoppe på [skolen] og flyttede fra [by B] [i efteråret] 2023/2024. Flygtningenævnet lægger ligeledes til grund, at kollegaerne [C] og [B] på den [sted i by C], hvor ansøgeren senere fik arbejde [i vinteren] 2023/2024, trak en kniv mod ansøgeren, fordi de havde fundet ud af, at ansøgeren var medlem af ahmadiyya-bevægelsen. De andre kolleger tog kniven fra dem for at redde ansøgeren. Ansøgeren rejste herefter til sin [familiemedlem] i [by D] [i vinteren] 2023/2024, hvor han opholdt sin indtil sin udrejse [i foråret] 2023/2024. Flygtningenævnet finder imidlertid ikke, at ansøgeren har sandsynliggjort. at disse konflikter med [A], [B] og [C] har et sådant omfang og intensitet, at ansøgeren kan få asyl. Flygtningenævnet bemærker herunder, at disse konflikter fremstår som afsluttede. Flygtningenævnet lægger til grund, at forholdene for ahmadiyya-troende i Pakistan er problematiske. Forholdene for religiøse mindretal i Pakistan er nærmere beskrevet i EUAA's Country og Origin Information, Pakistan - Country Focus, december 2024, og af pkt. 6.2.4 (notehenvisninger er udeladt). Det fremgår følgende om forholdene for ahmadiyya-troende: "According to the 2023 population census, there were 162 684 Ahmadis in Pakistan, representing some 0.07 % of the population. Other sources indi-cate that the Ahmadi population in Pakistan can be around 500 000 or 600 000 people. Comparing the census figures from 2017 and 2023, the population of Ahmadis has decreased in all provinces of Pakistan, in particular in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Bal-ochistan, by 85 % and 74 %, respectively. Sources indicated that Ahmadis were hiding their religious identity which made the official count of their community difficult. They primarily reside in Rabwah district of Punjab. In 1974, Ahmadis in Pakistan have been declared to be 'non-Muslims' by the National Assembly of Pakistan through an amendment to the Constitution indicating that 'any follower of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is a non-Muslim'. The Constitution refers to the Ahmadis community also as the Quadiani group or the Lahori group. Pakistani Penal Code criminalizes various aspects of Ahmadi faith. While Ahmadis consider themselves as Muslims, orthodox Muslims reject Ahmadis because they believe that their founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, de-clared himself as a prophet, which contradicts a core belief in Islam that considers Prophet Mohammad as the final prophet. Thus, the Ahmadis are perceived as 'blas-phemous unbelievers' in Pakistan. Since 1974, Ahmadis have been subjected to re-peated attacks by lslamic extremists in the country. Same aspects of the religious identity and practice of Ahmadis have been further criminalised since April 1984. Between 1984 and September 2023, 280 Ahmadis were killed in targeted violence. Sources indicated that the crucial issue is that while the government does not recognise Ahmad-iyya as Muslims, they consider themselves Muslims.Ahmadis face 'systemic and structural barriers' when it comes to participation in public and political life and some-times refuse to participate in political life because of discrimination. Because Ahmadis are neither considered to be Muslims nor one of the non-Muslim minorities by the government, when voting, they have to register separately. The violence against Ahmadis has been reportedly fuelled by the Tehreek-e Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), a pro-scribed organisation, which later became a political party, whose spokesperson de-scribed Ahmadis as 'blasphemers'. According to Human Rights Watch, 'the persecution of the Ahmadiyya community is embedded in Pakistani law and encouraged by the Pakistan government.' According to Nida Aly, Executive Director of the Asma Jahangir Legal Aid Cell (AGHS) interviewed by EUAA, 'the moment individuals are identified as Ahmadis, their life is in danger.' Targeting of Ahmadis increased in 2023 and continued in 2024. Among the abuses that the Ahmadiyya have faced are discrimination and hate speech, false blasphemy accusations, arbitrary arrests, desecration of graves, targeted killings, attacks on places of worship and cemeteries. and they were prevented from practicing their religion both at home and in public. Despite the 2022 decision of the Supreme Court of Pakistan that religious minorities including Ahmadis have a right to practice their religion at home they continued facing attacks within their houses. Police officers were reportedly fearful of providing protection to Ahmadis out of fear that they themselves can be attacked by a mob. According to the Centre for Social Justice, 65 Ahmadis were accused of blasphemy in 2023. NCHR recorded 334 Ahmadis facing blasphemy charges in 2023. When a mob attacked an Ahmadi in Lahore in August 2023, the authorities have charged eight Ahmadis with blasphemy in-stead of prosecuting the attackers. Ahmadis are not only forbidden to call themselves Muslims but also to use features that can be associated with Islam. An Ahmadiyya representative indicated that the number of attacks on their places of worship in 2023 was the highest since 1984. USDOS reported that according to Ahmadiyya representatives, their religious sites continued lacking police protection in 2023. The NCHR recorded 39 attacks on Ahmadi places of worship in the period January-September 2023 and CERD reported that 36 Ahmadiyya places of worship were destroyed in 2023. In September 2023, 74 Ahmadi graves were desecrated in Daska, Punjab province. On 12 June 2024, 17 graves were desecrated in Bahawalpur district, Punjab. In September 2023, in Shahdara Town, Lahore, a mob attacked an Ahmadi place of wor-ship because it allegedly looked like 'a traditional mosque'. Police failed to stop the attack despite being present at the scene. In September 2023, the Lahore High Court ruled that Ahmadi places of worship built before 1984 shall not be affected by the provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code that criminalise certain aspects of Ahmadi faith, such as using architectural aspects associated with traditional mosques, such as mina-rets. Despite the ruling, attacks on Ahmadi places of worship continued, reaching an 'alarming number', including in April 2024 in Punjab and in May 2024 in Mirpus Khas. In October 2024, partial destruction of several Ahmadi mosques in cooperation with the police officers was reported from Punjab. In 2023, CRSS did not record any Ahmadi casualties of sectarian violence. In March 2024, a local Ahmadi leader was shot dead in Multan. Also in March 2024, an Ahmadi was killed in in District Hasilpur. On 8 June 2024, two Ahmadis were shot dead for religious reasons by a Sunni extremist student in Mandi Bahauddin district of Punjab province. On 27 July 2024, an Ahmadi dentist was shot dead near his clinic in Punjab's Gujrat district. On 8 July 2024, two Ahmadis were killed in Saad Ullah Pur. In February 2024, the Supreme Court acquitted an Ahmadi, who was accused of 'distributing a proscribed book' (a com-mentary on Koran). The court ruled that the aet happened before it was made illegal and noted that he had already spent over 13 months in prison, even though the maxi-mum sentence for the crime was six months. The decision was challenged by the Pun-jab government and some religious parties. The Council of Islamic ldeology, a state body advising the parliament and the govemment on religious issues, objected the part of the court's verdict allowing Ahmadis to practice their faith within their places of worship. In June 2024, Ahmadis were prevented from participating at the Muslim holiday Eid and faced police harassment, arbitrary arrests and detention. According to Amnesty International, between 10 and 19 June 2024, during Eid, 36 cases of arbitrary arrests of Ahmadis were recorded in Punjab. Public officials allowing Ahmadis to con-duet ritual sacrifices like Muslims faced harassment from the lawyers.1305 Reports of Ahmadis not being allowed to freely celebrate Eid also occurred in 2023." Fra det lidt ældre baggrundsmateriale kan der om de generelle forhold for Ahmadiyya-troende bl.a. henvises til UK Home Office, Country Policy and Information Note Pakistan: Ahmadis, version 5.0, september 2021. Fra nyere baggrundsmateriale kan der om de generelle forhold for Ahmadiyya-troende bl.a. henvises til Country Policy and information Note Pakistan - Ahmadis fra marts 2025. FN's Menneskerettighedskomite har den 19. juli 2024 i sagen R.M. og Q. M. mod Sverige 4062/2021 og 4191/2022 udtalt, at forholdene for ahmadiyya-troende ikke i sig selv kan begrunde asyl. Det fremgår således bl.a.: "The Committee is seriously concerned by credible reports regarding widespread human rights violations against Ahmadi Muslims in Pakistan. However, in the light of the above considerations, it deems that the authors have not sufficiently substantiated their claim that, if they were returned to Pakistan, they would personally be exposed to a risk of being tortured or subjected to ill-treatment,14 or that the evaluation by the migration authorities of their claim under article 7 of the Covenant was clearly arbitrary or erroneous or amounted to a denial of justice.15 Accordingly, the Committee declares that claim inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol." Flygtningenævnet finder, at forholdende for ahmadiyya-troende i Pakistan som anført ovenfor er problematiske og præget af udbredt diskrimination i forhold til muligheden for religionsudøvelse. Flygtningenævnet finder imidlertid ikke, at de generelle forhold er af sådan karakter, at de i sig selv kan føre til opholdstilladelse i Danmark efter asyl-reglerne. Ansøgerens forklaring for Flygtningenævnet om livet i Pakistan som ahmadiyya-troende, herunder om forværring af forholdene i de senere år, kan ikke føre til en anden vurdering. Flygtningenævnet finder herefter, at ansøgeren ikke har sandsynliggjort, at han er omfattet af udlændingeloven § 7. Ansøgeren er således ikke er omfattet af udlændingelovens § 7. Flygtningenævnet stadfæster derfor Udlændingestyrelsens afgørelse.” paki/2025/7/MPC
