

Flygtningenævnets baggrundsmateriale

Bilagsnr.:	463
Land:	Libyen
Kilde:	UN Security Council
Titel:	Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan
Udgivet:	7. februar 2023
Optaget på baggrundsmaterialet:	7. juni 2023



Security Council

Distr.: General
7 February 2023

Original: English

Letter dated 7 February 2023 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Panel of Experts on the Sudan has the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution [2620 \(2022\)](#), the final report on its work.

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#) concerning the Sudan on 29 December 2022 and was considered by the Committee on 6 February 2023.

The Panel would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Laura Victoria **Bernal Moncada**
Coordinator
Panel of Experts on the Sudan

(Signed) Nikolai **Dobronravin**
Expert

(Signed) Patrick **Loots**
Expert

(Signed) Rajeev **Yadav**
Expert



Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan

Summary

Darfurian armed movements who had signed the Juba Agreement for Peace in the Sudan remained committed to it. The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army under the leadership of Abdul Wahid Mohamed Ahmed al-Nur (SLA/AW) remained outside of the Agreement but also refrained from major military action against Government of the Sudan forces. Community-based armed groups, widely known as “tribal militias”, also remained outside the Agreement. The Government of the Sudan remained committed to the Agreement and used additional intercommunal reconciliation agreements as instruments for local peacemaking. Several non-signatory Darfurian movements present in Libya began talks with the Government of the Sudan regarding security arrangements unrelated to the Agreement under a separate process (the “Niamey Process”).

The political crisis at the national level remained unresolved, while the economic situation continued to deteriorate. The fragmentation of political actors, combined with economic weakness, as well as continuous and varied external pressures, affected the financial, administrative and security capacities of the Sudanese authorities in Darfur. SLA/AW, Resistance Committees, communists and some other political forces continued to reject the Agreement as a whole. Internally displaced persons in North, West and South Darfur felt that the Agreement in fact aggravated their situation. While the civilian political actors and the military reached an agreement on a national political transition on 5 December 2022, most Darfurian signatory movements rejected it. The agreement implied amending the Juba Peace Agreement in such a way that the role of the Darfurian movements under the new arrangement would be unclear.

All regional States continued to support the peace process in the Sudan. According to the Sudanese authorities, the situation on the borders was calm. However, a delayed political transition and internal conflicts in neighbouring States could affect the security situation in Darfur.

The security situation in Darfur was fragile, especially during the first half of the year, while the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement was slow and fragmented. The only noteworthy achievement during the reporting period was the training and graduation of an estimated 2,000 members of the Darfurian armed movements who were expected to form part of the Joint Security-Keeping Force, which itself was designed to combine the forces of the Government of the Sudan and the armed movements. However, the deployment of these trainees was delayed due mainly to disagreements on the unified command structure and funding. Government interlocutors repeatedly highlighted to the Panel that the lack of further implementation of the Agreement was due to a lack of financial resources.

Meanwhile, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the Sudanese Armed Forces and the signatory Darfurian armed movements engaged in aggressive recruitment campaigns. The security situation was exacerbated by the significant deployment of the armed movements’ fighters and RSF members, who often participated in local conflicts across Darfur. In addition, the largest violation of the ceasefire since the signing of the Agreement occurred in April 2022 in West Darfur (Kereinik and El Geneina) when RSF clashed with one of the armed movements, the Sudanese Alliance. Although two investigations of the violence were initiated, only one person was arrested. The violence also spiked in Jebel Marra in November when SLA/AW fought with a dissident faction led by Mubarak Aldouk.

In June 2022, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as “Hemetti”) travelled to North and West Darfur to campaign for local peace processes, which resulted in the signing of several reconciliation agreements. The Government of the Sudan attributed the relative peace of the second half of the year to those agreements. However, many highlighted that the agreements lacked legitimacy and were unlikely to bring long-term stability.

Since the mercenary activities of the Darfurian armed movements in Libya were less lucrative than in previous years, opportunistic business and criminal activities became the main source of revenue for the armed movements in Libya. Meanwhile, in Darfur, illegal toll points became a new source of funding for the signatory armed groups. SLA/AW continued profiting from the gold mines in Jebel Marra and from business activities in South Sudan.

Regarding arms and the arms embargo, the proliferation of weapons and ammunition in Darfur intensified and continued to pose a serious threat to security there. The increased numbers of arms in the hands of the civilian population created a serious obstacle for the Government of the Sudan in ensuring security in Darfur. On the other hand, some of the Government forces played a destabilizing role themselves when they armed local communities. Despite the obligation under the Juba Peace Agreement to hand in their arms and military materiel, the signatory armed movements gave up only a limited number of small weapons while keeping the heavy ones.

On the sanctions measures, violations of the arms embargo continued, as the Government of the Sudan did not obtain the approval of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#) concerning the Sudan for the transfer of military supplies and weapons into Darfur. Due to a lack of cooperation by the Government of the Sudan and regional States, the implementation of the travel ban and asset freeze remained a challenge.

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
I. Introduction	6
II. Peace process	6
III. National context	8
IV. Regional context	9
A. Chad	10
B. Libya	10
C. Central African Republic	10
D. South Sudan	11
E. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Qatar	12
F. Regional organizations	12
V. The Juba Peace Agreement	13
A. Implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement	13
B. Military recruitments	15
C. Darfurian armed groups	15
VI. Signatory and non-signatory Darfurian armed movements in Libya	16
VII. Non-signatory armed groups in South Sudan	17
VIII. Conflict dynamics in Darfur	17
A. Violation of the ceasefire in Kereinik and El Geneina (22–25 April 2022)	18
B. Violence in Jebel Marra (2–27 November 2022)	19
IX. Financing of Darfurian armed groups	20
A. Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid in Darfur	20
B. Groups signatory to the Juba Peace Agreement	21
C. Darfurian armed groups in South Sudan	21
D. Financing of armed groups in Libya	22
E. Gold seizure in the United Arab Emirates	24
X. Arms and the arms embargo	24
A. Proliferation of arms in Darfur	25
B. Arms ban violations and increased insecurity	26
XI. Protection of civilians	27
A. Implementation of the National Plan for the Protection of Civilians in Darfur	27
B. Reconciliation agreements and arbitrary arrests and detentions	28
C. Deployment of Rapid Support Forces troops	29
D. Violence against women and girls	29
E. Accountability for past and current human rights violations	29

F.	Current humanitarian situation	30
XII.	Travel ban and assets freeze	31
A.	Gaffar Mohammed Elhassan (permanent reference number: SDi.001)	31
B.	Jibril Abdulkarim Ibrahim Mayu (permanent reference number: SDi.004)	31
C.	Musa Hilal Abdalla Alnsiem (permanent reference number: SDi.002)	32
XIII.	Recommendations	33
Annexes		35

I. Introduction

1. On 15 February 2022, the Security Council adopted resolution [2620 \(2022\)](#), by which the Panel of Experts was mandated, inter alia, to provide the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#) with a final report no later than 13 January 2023. In the present report, the Panel outlines its findings and investigations since the beginning of its mandate on 13 March 2022.

2. The Panel conducted two missions to the Sudan, mainly to Darfur, in May and November. The Panel held meetings with the Government of the Sudan at the national and local levels, including the Humanitarian Aid Commission; the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission; the National Peace Commission; the Ministry of Interior; the Ministry of Justice; the Sudanese Armed Forces; the General Intelligence Service; the Sudanese Police Force; the Rapid Support Forces (RSF); the governors in Darfur; and the Darfuri armed movements. The Panel also met with the representatives from civil society, including internally displaced persons; victims and eyewitnesses of violence; civil society organizations, including women's organizations; and traditional authorities. In addition, the Panel met with representatives from different United Nations agencies and programmes, the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS) and the diplomatic community. During its mandate, the Panel also conducted visits to Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Kenya, India (Hyderabad), the Russian Federation and the United Arab Emirates.

3. The Panel wishes to express its appreciation to the Government of the Sudan for the assistance it received during its two missions in the Sudan, including its issuance of Darfur travel permits, facilitating meetings with a variety of stakeholders in Khartoum and Darfur, and assisting with logistics.

4. The Panel worked in full conformity with the best practices and methods recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (see [S/2006/997](#)). The Panel gathered information from different sources, including government interlocutors and local contacts, as well as through desk research and videoconference and telephone interviews. Different media outlets were consulted. Information contained in the present report was collated and triangulated from at least three different sources.

II. Peace process

5. Throughout the reporting period, groups signatory to the Juba Agreement for Peace in the Sudan in Darfur¹ remained committed to the Agreement; at the same time, most of them did not join a framework agreement signed on 5 December which would amend the Agreement. The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army-Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW), the major non-signatory movement in Darfur, refrained from major military action and, in fact, coordinated its economic and educational activities with the Sudanese State security forces (see paras. 7 and 56–60). Community-based armed groups, widely known as “tribal militias”, remained outside the Agreement and any

¹ The Juba Peace Agreement signatory movements included the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army under the leadership of Minni Arko Minawi (SLA/MM); the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), led by Jibril Ibrahim; the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army-Transitional Council under the leadership of Al-Hadi Idris; the Gathering of Sudan Liberation Forces (a coalition of movements), led by Al-Tahir Hajar; the Sudanese Alliance (another coalition of movements) under the leadership of Khamis Abdallah Abkar; two splinter groups from the non-signatory Sudan Liberation Movement/Army under the leadership of Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW); and the Third Front-Tamazuj (see also [S/2022/48](#), annex 6).

type of informal peace deal. The Government of the Sudan, confirming its commitment to the Agreement, used intercommunal reconciliation agreements as instruments of local peacemaking. RSF supervised most of these agreements. Since June, several non-signatory Darfurian movements present in Libya have been in talks with the Government of the Sudan within the framework of the “Niamey Process”, supported by Promediation, a French non-governmental organization, and unrelated to the Agreement.

6. Juba Peace Agreement signatory armed movements in Darfur continued to support the Agreement, as it granted their leaders positions in the State institutions and included guarantees for the processes of integration into the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) or demobilization. In this context, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army under the leadership of Minni Minawi (SLA/MM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) did not welcome the idea of amending the Agreement, which could weaken their leaders’ positions at the national level.

7. SLA/AW, the major non-signatory armed movement in Darfur, continued to exercise control over the so-called “liberated territories” in Jebel Marra. Commercial relations between the “liberated territories” and the rest of Darfur continued without interruption; children from Jebel Marra were brought for school examinations to Government-controlled areas. The violent clashes in Jebel Marra were mostly due to infighting between SLA/AW forces loyal to Abdul Wahid and the dissident factions, primarily the faction led by Mubarak Aldouk. RSF used this faction as its proxy. Being aware of this, SLA/AW threatened to break the ceasefire. Besides SLA/AW, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N, the faction led by Abdul Aziz al-Hilu) also exercised some influence, especially among the Masalit of West Darfur, but did not have its own zone of control in Darfur. Tribal militias remained active in Darfur, especially among the pastoralists. These groups contributed to intercommunal violence, as in Central Darfur, involving Misseriya and Awlad Rashid communities.

8. The Government of the Sudan has systematically worked on local reconciliation agreements in Darfur, some of which the Sudanese authorities shared with the Panel.² The signing of reconciliation agreements was sometimes followed by more efforts to ensure communities’ peaceful coexistence at the local level. For example, the Masalit and Fulani communities reached an agreement on reconciliation involving the Tulus and Graidia localities in South Darfur. After the agreement, RSF strengthened its presence in Tulus, stressing its friendliness towards the local Fulani community. In Graidia, the reconciliation activities included a football match with Tulus, without any incidents. According to the Graidia authorities, there were no militia activities, and the situation was “very secure”.³ However, the Panel was not able to visit Graidia to further investigate. According to the non-State interlocutors, the cancellation of this visit was partly due to a cattle-rustling incident in the locality.

9. It remained unclear to what extent the local reconciliation agreements could bring more than a short peace break to the affected communities. Some interlocutors informed the Panel that the authorities arrested the opponents of the reconciliation agreements. Moreover, according to some interlocutors, “this is for you [the Panel], and for international community.”⁴ The suspiciousness of some could be attributed to the fact that the reconciliation was led by the Chair of the RSF Reconciliation and Peace Committee, Colonel Musa Hamid Ambello, who had previously been accused of taking part in intercommunal violence in West Darfur (Krinding I camp) (see sect. XI).

² See annex 7.

³ Panel’s meeting with the Executive Director of the Graidia locality, Nyala, December 2022.

⁴ Panel’s meeting with the Darfur Bar Association in Khartoum, November 2022.

10. Between 9 and 11 June, several non-signatory Darfurian movements in Libya tried to reach a separate agreement from the Juba Peace Agreement on security arrangements with the Government of the Sudan. These movements participated in talks in Niamey (the “Niamey Process”), which ended with a joint statement.⁵ The Sudanese authorities welcomed the ongoing efforts of the “Niamey” movements to unify under one umbrella, the Alliance of Democratic Track Forces. According to the Panel’s interlocutors, the effectiveness of these efforts and the “Niamey Process” would depend on external funding. The participating movements were expecting support from Qatar, as the assistance provided by the United Arab Emirates to Darfurians in Libya had diminished (see para. 32).

III. National context

11. The political crisis at the national level, with regular demonstrations against the rule of the military, continued. The path to a transition towards a fully civilian government, demanded by the Resistance Committees and other political forces (mainly urban youth, also supported by SLA/AW), remained unclear. The economic situation remained harsh, with little purchasing power. The national currency was remarkably stable, which was due, according to some of the Panel’s interlocutors, to an unofficial flow of cash from the Gulf States. SLA/AW, Resistance Committees, communists and some other political parties continued to reject the Juba Peace Agreement as a whole. The geographical scope of the Agreement remained a subject of debate, especially the eastern, northern and central tracks. In the western part of the Sudan (Darfur and Kordofan States), most of Kordofan was not represented as a special track in the Agreement,⁶ which led to more demands from local political forces.

12. On 5 December, the Forces for Freedom and Change-Central Council (FFC-CC) and the military reached an understanding on further transition and signed a political framework agreement. This agreement, according to the Sudanese authorities and the Panel’s interlocutors in the National Umma Party and Darfurian Juba Peace Agreement signatory movements, could open the way towards a more comprehensive transition, including a civilian Government and a single professional army. Most political forces, such as the FFC-Democratic Bloc, which included SLA/MM and JEM, and the Resistance Committees, rejected the framework agreement. According to the Panel’s interlocutors in Khartoum, FFC-CC has been trying to convince the FFC-Democratic Bloc, including its Darfurian participants, to join this agreement as a new step towards democratic transition. The impact on Darfur would imply the renegotiation of the Agreement.

13. The fragmentation of political forces, combined with economic weakness and the vulnerability of the country – in essence, one major corridor links the ports with Khartoum and the rest of the Sudan – as well as continuous and varied external pressure, has affected the situation in Darfur. In the meeting with the Panel, a leader of the National Umma Party said that it was the only national force and “the party of Darfur”.⁷ The interim leader of the Ansar religious community, the core of the National Umma Party, is Abdul Mahmoud Abbo, from the Al-Barti community in North Darfur. At the same time, some of the Panel’s interlocutors argued that the real influence of the party in Darfur was not as strong as seen from Khartoum.

⁵ See annex 4.

⁶ Panel’s meeting with al-Tahir Hajar, leader of the Gathering of the Sudan Liberation Forces (GSLF) and member of the Sovereign Council, November 2022.

⁷ Panel’s meeting with Maryam al-Mahdi, December 2022.

14. Furthermore, the economic and political crisis affected the financial, administrative and security capacities of the Sudanese authorities in Darfur. The level of insecurity and crime increased with the return of Darfurian forces from Libya and their redeployment from Khartoum to Darfur. The Panel was able to see this upsurge of tensions in May and June. By December, the level of insecurity had decreased but was still high, and the presence of police beyond the capitals has been weak or non-existent. The opponents of the Government blamed the authorities (“no State, no President”).⁸

15. In meetings with the Panel, internally displaced persons in North, West and South Darfur argued that the Juba Peace Agreement in fact aggravated their situation. The leaders of the internally displaced persons in the Kalma and Otash camps stressed that, in their opinion, internally displaced persons were either not represented at the Juba talks or represented by those who were not their real voice.

IV. Regional context

16. All States in the region continued to support the peace process in Darfur. Among neighbouring States, Chad and South Sudan played a special role, and both of them were expected to join the Darfur Permanent Ceasefire Committee and the Joint High Military Committee for Security Arrangements established in the Juba Peace Agreement (chap. 8, paras. 25.5.3 and 25.6.5). There were no major cross-border incidents involving the Sudan and its neighbouring countries. According to the Sudanese authorities, the situation on the borders was calm.

17. This situation may be seen as stability on a knife edge. Delayed political transition and internal conflicts in neighbouring States retained the potential for further deterioration and spillover into Darfur. Illegal gold mining, trafficking of drugs and arms, and cattle-rusting do not recognize international boundaries; Darfur remains a zone of trafficking in persons towards the Mediterranean (Libya and, more recently, Morocco) and Europe.

18. The return of Darfurian forces from Libya brought a new threat to regional stability. These forces came with experience and weapons, and they have continued to ignore the international boundaries, moving freely across Chadian territory.

19. Another threat was extremist activities, such as those of Da’esh, across the Sahara and the Sahel. At the time of writing, there was no activity by radical armed groups in Darfur, but the situation could change fast if the returning Darfurian fighters remain frustrated. Some interlocutors noted that, due to the pressure on extremist groups, “they are trying to go towards soft landing spots”, including the Sudan.⁹ The Panel has received unconfirmed reports regarding the presence of Darfurian elements not only in neighbouring States, but also as far away as the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Throughout the reporting period, there were no cases of visible threats to neighbouring countries emanating from Darfur. On the other hand, developments in neighbouring States did affect the situation in the border areas of the Sudan. Leaders of internally displaced persons also shared this view, linking instability in Darfur with that in neighbouring countries, even though they probably referred to the problem of “new settlers”.¹⁰

20. The Panel also observed the involvement of other regional powers, such as Türkiye with its strong humanitarian presence (schools, hospitals and mosques) in Darfur, and growing bilateral relations. Turkish media and authorities stressed that

⁸ Panel’s meeting with internally displaced persons in the Otash camp, December 2022.

⁹ Panel’s meetings with United Nations agencies, November 2022.

¹⁰ Panel’s meeting with internally displaced persons in the Kalma camp, December 2022.

Darfur had been an ally of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, before the Sultanate was occupied by British forces and annexed to Anglo-Egyptian Sudan in 1916.

A. Chad

21. Relations between the Sudan and Chad remained generally stable. There were a few cases of tensions, mainly due to border area conflicts over cattle rustling. One major incident occurred in July near Bir Saliba (West Darfur), when cattle rustling led to 18 deaths among Sudanese participants. In this context, the Sudan made an official protest to the Ambassador of Chad in Khartoum and rejected the version of the events presented by the Chadian side. Hemetti asked: “Is it normal to kill 18 persons because of five camels? ... Camels are compensated with camels.”¹¹ Ultimately, the sides resolved the problem with a protocol on compensation, signed at Birak (Chad).¹²

22. The Sudan-Chad joint force continued to be present at the border, but was unable to control most of it. Some of the Panel’s interlocutors said that the joint force played an important role in cross-border intercommunal reconciliation.

B. Libya

23. The Government of the Sudan maintained official relations with the authorities in Tripoli, which are not recognized by Egypt, as well as relations with the authorities in the east of Libya. The Governor of North Darfur and the authorities in Khartoum informed the Panel that there were no problems in bilateral relations and no border violations. At the same time, there was little monitoring of the situation on the border, except the Desert Shield forces and the Sudanese part of the Sudanese-Libyan joint forces. According to the Sudanese authorities, there were some attempts to form joint forces, “but Libya has no government”.¹³

24. Darfurian armed groups and individual fighters continued to be present, while the transition process in Libya stalled. According to an official interlocutor of the Panel, these forces did not cooperate with the Libyan National Army of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, except with regard to border protection.¹⁴ Other interlocutors presented a different view of the situation, indicating that the Darfurians not only cooperated, but also had formed support battalions, connected with the 128th Brigade of Hassan Maatug al-Zadma. Moreover, there was cooperation between some Darfurian forces and the Government of Chad, including in the Kouri Bougoudi gold mining area.

C. Central African Republic

25. Official bilateral relations between the Central African Republic and the Sudan remained stable, with continued military cooperation. At the same time, Central African opposition movements maintained a presence in Darfur. In March and April, Sudanese authorities announced that the border would be closed in order to fight crime and general insecurity. The closures were partial, and large trucks could cross

¹¹ Hemetti’s speech at the funeral in El Geneina, July 2022.

¹² See annex 5.

¹³ Panel’s meeting with the General Intelligence Service, November 2022.

¹⁴ Panel’s meeting with al-Tahir Hajar, leader of GSLF and member of the Sovereign Council, November 2022.

the border; there were reports about four such trucks, heavily armed, travelling from the Central African Republic towards Jebel Marra.¹⁵ In November, Sudanese and Central African interlocutors also informed the Panel of significant crossings from Darfur into the Central African Republic (mainly Arabs, in two separate groups of 17 and 12 vehicles, both near Birao) which did not belong to the forces of the Government of the Central African Republic, nor to Central African Republic opposition movements. While there was no independent confirmation of these cross-border activities, the Panel's interlocutors confirmed that the border remained open.

26. The strengthening of government control in the Central African Republic contributed to the flow of Central Africans (refugees, as well as economic migrants involved in gold mining) to South Darfur, to the Sudanese side of the border town of Am Dafok (Umm Dafog), as well as Dimsu, Radom and even Nyala. On the other hand, Misseriya, Ta'a'ishah, Rizeigat, Salamat, Fulani, Kara and other community-based groups moved freely across the border. According to the Panel's interlocutors, "the situation makes it impossible for any group to move without weapons" in the border areas.¹⁶ The movement of nomads remains officially regulated by the bilateral protocol of 1960. According to the Panel's official interlocutors, the situation was calm, with active commercial movement. The Sudanese authorities said that "no Sudanese Misseriya operated in other countries" and that while "the Central African Republic Misseriya worked in the Central African Republic, Chadian Misseriya worked in Chad".¹⁷ The Panel did not have independent confirmation of such separate activities.

27. Since 2014, according to the Sudanese authorities, the Sudan has been supporting the Central African Republic-Chad-Sudan tripartite force created in 2011. The Sudan and the Central African Republic were cooperating on redeployment of the Central African side of this force inside that country, although there was no specific time frame for this redeployment. The Government of the Sudan also informed the Panel that the Central African armed groups did not engage in any activity inside the Sudan, and that no force was receiving training there. There has been an official nomad route ("murhal Wadi Howar") across South Darfur towards Am Dafok. According to non-government interlocutors, the presence of the State in the border areas remained patchy, allowing for the flow of illegal migrants and weapons. However, SAF and RSF acted in good coordination in the area between Bi'r Majangare and Am Dafok.

D. South Sudan

28. South Sudan played a special role in the Juba talks which led to the Juba Peace Agreement, "having good knowledge of conflict in the Sudan".¹⁸ Relations between two countries were officially based on the four freedoms principle in accordance with the Framework Agreement on the Status of Nationals of the Other State and Related Matters between the Republic of the Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan.¹⁹ At the same time, the situation in South Sudan remained fragile, and the end of the transition period in accordance with the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan of 2018 was postponed until 2024, with

¹⁵ Panel's meeting with United Nations agencies, Nyala, December 2022.

¹⁶ Panel's meetings with interlocutors from South Darfur, November–December 2022.

¹⁷ Panel's meeting with the General Intelligence Service, November 2022.

¹⁸ Panel's meeting with al-Tahir Hajar, leader of GSLF and member of the Sovereign Council, November 2022.

¹⁹ See [S/2012/733](#), annex.

President Salva Kiir proposed as an official candidate by the ruling Sudan People's Liberation Movement.

29. The border areas remained beyond the control of both States. For example, according to the Panel's interlocutors, the road from Bi'r Majangare to South Sudan had only the one SAF base, so the border was practically open. According to the Sudanese authorities, signatory movements mostly left for the Sudan, but SLA/AW was still in South Sudan (600–700 elements and 40 armoured vehicles). Other Panel sources gave different figures on the "Secular Sudan Division" of SLA/AW in South Sudan (see para. 45).

E. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Qatar

30. The official interlocutors of the Panel in Egypt and the United Arab Emirates confirmed their support for the Sudan, including Darfur. Egypt stressed that it was actively engaged in contacts with all political forces in the Sudan. All of these States took part in the efforts which led to the signing of the framework agreement involving FFC-CC, SAF and RSF. Saudi Arabia granted some support to the Permanent Ceasefire Committee. At the same time, the interests of these States were mostly at the national level, focusing on Khartoum rather than the peripheries of the Sudan, including Darfur. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have been active inside the Quad for Sudan (together with the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), pushing towards a democratic transition in the Sudan.

31. The relations between Egypt and the Sudan included systematic interaction between the armed forces of both countries, including military exercises (outside Darfur). Like relations between the Sudan and South Sudan, the Egypt-Sudan relationship has a deep historical context, as the Sudan was an Anglo-Egyptian condominium before its independence in 1956, and the common history still haunts bilateral relations. Like the Sudan and South Sudan, Egypt and the Sudan have also followed the principle of "four freedoms".²⁰ Officially, the Darfurian armed movements were not present in Egypt, even though they have offices there.

32. Qatar lost its leading role in the peace process after the talks in Juba but it retained good relations with Darfurian movements, especially JEM. The movements involved in the "Niamey Process" hoped that Qatar could become a new source of funding, in view of regional competition and diminished support from the United Arab Emirates to the Darfurian movements present in Libya.

F. Regional organizations

33. The African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) took part in the tripartite efforts (together with UNITAMS) aimed at a return to civilian government in the Sudan. At the same time, the membership of the Sudan in the African Union has remained suspended since the events of 25 October 2021, when part of the civilian component was forced to leave the Cabinet of Ministers. The Sudanese sought to strengthen the role of IGAD in the region. However, according to some of the Panel's interlocutors, this regional organization has been weakened

²⁰ Agreement on freedom of movement, residence, work and property ownership between the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of the Republic of the Sudan, 4 April 2004, available at www.citizenshiprightsafrika.org.

(or even “totally debilitated”) since 2019.²¹ The League of Arab States was also ready to play a role in Darfur, but it could not find interested interlocutors in Khartoum.²²

V. The Juba Peace Agreement²³

34. The implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement and the National Plan for the Protection of Civilians in Darfur was considered essential to attain long-lasting peace and stability in Darfur, including by Darfur and State-level officials. These two documents established the necessary protocols and architecture to address the root causes of the violence and instability (chaps. 6 and 7 of the Agreement and sect. 8 of the Plan), protect civilians (chap. 8 of the Agreement and sect. 5 of the Plan) and secure access to justice, accountability and remedy for past and current human rights violations (chaps. 3 and 4 of the Agreement and sects. 3 and 7 of the Plan). These documents are also aimed at protecting the rights of internally displaced persons and refugees (chap. 5 of the Agreement and sect. 2 of the Plan).

35. The Panel’s official interlocutors noted that they had made significant economic and political efforts to ensure that the Juba Peace Agreement and the National Plan for the Protection of Civilians were implemented to the best of their economic capacity. However, despite these efforts, such implementation had been delayed and fragmented. Government representatives told the Panel that this was due to the country’s political turmoil following the events of 25 October 2021, with one Government official stating, that “for the agreement and the plan to be executed, a functioning executive branch [was] required”. In addition, these officials stated that the current economic crisis and the international community’s failure to fulfil its promise of financial support for the implementation of the Agreement and the Plan had exacerbated the existing problems. Other interlocutors emphasized that delays in the implementation of the Agreement were due to the inability of high-ranking officers in Government to agree on critical articles, such as those referring to the establishment of a unified army and those pertaining to justice and accountability.

A. Implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement

36. During the reporting period, Government efforts to implement the Juba Peace Agreement were focused on chapter 8 of the Agreement. This chapter dealt with the permanent ceasefire and the security arrangements. In 2021, the Government established the Joint High Military Committee for Security Arrangements²⁴ and the Permanent Ceasefire Committee²⁵ (see S/2022/48), and, during the reporting period, the Government established the Sectoral Committees.²⁶ The only additional advancement was the graduation in July 2022 of approximately 2,000 members of the

²¹ Panel’s meetings with African Union and United Nations interlocutors, Addis Ababa, June 2022.

²² Panel’s meetings and telephone communication with the League of Arab States, June–July 2022.

²³ The information in the present section is based on the Panel’s interviews with the National Coordination Mechanism, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Interior, the Darfur Permanent Ceasefire Committee and commanders of the Darfurian armed movements in Khartoum, Libya and Darfur, May–November 2022.

²⁴ The Joint High Military Committee for Security Arrangements is in charge of monitoring the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement. See Agreement, chap. 8, para. 25.5.

²⁵ The Permanent Ceasefire Committee is in charge of planning, coordinating, managing, overseeing, verifying, monitoring and supervising the permanent ceasefire and the implementation of decisions. See Juba Peace Agreement, chap. 8, para. 25.6.

²⁶ The Sectoral Committees are in charge of monitoring and examining claims of violations and resolve disputes. See Juba Peace Agreement, chap. 8, para. 25.7.

Darfurian armed movements in El Fasher, North Darfur. These trainees were expected to form part of the Joint Security-Keeping Force established in article 29 of chapter 8 of the Agreement. However, the force has yet to be deployed, and as it stands, it fails to comply with the letter of the Agreement.

37. Members of the Permanent Ceasefire Committee in El Fasher and leaders of the Darfurian armed movements told the Panel that the failure to deploy the Joint Security-Keeping Force was due to disagreements on the unified command structure and the number of officers from the movements that would be trained and integrated into the Force, as well as logistical and financial challenges. Regarding the composition of the Force, paragraph 29.3 of chapter 8 of the Agreement established that the Force should be comprised of forces from the Sudanese Armed Forces, the Rapid Support Forces, the Police forces, the forces of the General Intelligence Service and the forces of the signatory armed struggle movements. However, the Panel found that the Government forces were reluctant to be part of the Force. The Panel also found that there were flaws in the registration procedure for trainees, making it impossible to verify if the individuals at the training centre were indeed combatants returning from Libya, new recruits or civilians. According to the commander of the training centre, the trainees were registered under a “gentleman’s agreement”, whereby combatants were given a form to complete and trusted to provide truthful information about their background. Meanwhile, a member of the Permanent Ceasefire Committee noted that “it was not possible to identify if those at the training centre were the same we registered at the Assembly Areas”. He further noted that it was impossible to know if the individuals who received training were civilians or combatants.

38. Officials who were part of the training of the forces highlighted to the Panel the failure to provide joint training for SAF, RSF, the Sudanese Police Force, the General Intelligence Service and the Darfurian armed movements, as well as a failure to assess which forces should be trained and which ones demobilized. Senior security sources believed that the Joint Security-Keeping Force would split along ethnic lines when it was redeployed owing to how the individuals had been assembled and trained. The members of the signatory Darfurian armed groups in the Sovereign Council told the Panel that the establishment of a unified army under one command was essential for long-term peace and stability in Darfur. The importance of a unified army was also recognized in the Juba Peace Agreement and the political framework agreement signed by FFC-CC and the military (see para. 12). However, in order to achieve this and to ensure that the benefits of peace reached the civilian population, it would be essential to implement the protocols related to accountability, such as chapters 3 (justice, accountability and reconciliation) and 4 (compensation and reparations), as well as those that address the root causes of the conflict, such as chapter 6 (nomads and herders sector). So far, the Government has not made advances in the implementation of these chapters.

39. The Darfur regional disarmament, demobilization and reintegration commission, as provided for in the Juba Peace Agreement, has yet to be formed. The National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission confirmed that a third phase of disarmament would take place only after the security arrangements²⁷ had been implemented.²⁸

²⁷ Juba Peace Agreement, chap. 8, para. 10.2.

²⁸ Panel’s interview with the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, Ministry of Interior, Khartoum, May 2022.

B. Military recruitments

40. In violation of paragraph 18.1 of chapter 8 of the Juba Peace Agreement, which prohibited “military activities, including military movements, reconnaissance, hostile reinforcements [and] recruitment”, RSF launched in July 2022 what was described to the Panel by a member of the Sovereign Council as the “most aggressive recruitment campaign” since the Agreement was signed. A high-ranking official in Khartoum described the recruitment exercise as a “mobilization of ethnic groups”. According to a variety of local sources, including community leaders and members of the Darfurian armed movements, Hemetti intended to recruit soldiers from “African tribes” in order to amplify his support base, ensure his own safety and bolster his political and military position. SAF and the signatory Darfurian armed movements also launched aggressive recruitment campaigns, creating a dangerous cycle of escalation. Traditional administrators in North and West Darfur from the Fur and Misseriya Jebel communities told the Panel that, due to the overwhelming presence and superior equipment of RSF soldiers in comparison with all other forces operating in Darfur, they felt they had no choice but to send members of the communities to join RSF to secure protection in case of conflict.

C. Darfurian armed groups

Signatory Darfurian armed movements in Darfur

41. It was underlined in the Juba Peace Agreement that members of the Darfurian armed movements were to be based in specific areas, called “assembly areas”, and not stationed among the civilian population.²⁹ The Permanent Ceasefire Committee in North Darfur told the Panel that, in 2022, five assembly areas had been set up there to host members of the Darfurian armed movements. According to the Committee, the assembly areas in North Darfur were in Korma (Sudan Liberation Movement/Army-Transitional Council (SLA/TC)), Mellit (Gathering of the Sudan Liberation Forces (GSLF) and Sudanese Alliance), Umm Barru (SLA/MM) and Sereif (JEM). The Permanent Ceasefire Committee in El Fasher told the Panel that it estimated that 1,000 soldiers from each of the movements were in their respective assembly areas; however, it noted that the most recent inspection visit had been in May 2022. The Committee also told the Panel that an undefined number of their forces were deployed outside the areas agreed in 2022. The Panel requested permission to visit the assembly areas, but it was not granted.³⁰ Consequently, the Panel was unable to verify the numbers provided by Committee. However, a number of interlocutors in the Darfurian armed movements noted that most Darfurian fighters remained outside those areas. Information gathered by the Panel indicated that the movements’ main locations were, among others, as follows:

- Sudan Liberation Movement/Army-Transitional Council
 - North Darfur: Jabal Siro, Tinah (west from Tawilah), Fata Borno, Kulkul, Mado and Korma
 - South Darfur: Fasha
- Sudan Liberation Movement/Army-Minni Minawi
 - North Darfur: Umm Barru, Abu Gamra, El Fasher, Wadi Howar, Donki Shatta, Wadi Furawiyah (Minni Minawi’s area of origin), Musbat, Kafod and Kurni

²⁹ Articles 21 to 23 of chapter 8 contained the provisions regulating assembly points.

³⁰ Confidential sources told the Panel that the groups would reassemble a small group of fighters in those areas if permission for the visit of the Panel was granted.

- West Darfur: Jebel Moon and Sirba
- Gathering of the Sudan Liberation Forces
 - North Darfur: Sarafaye, Ayn Siro, Dor, Donki Ba'shum, Umm Barru and Kafod
 - West Darfur: Jebel Moon
 - Central Darfur: Nertiti (near Jebel Marra)
- Justice and Equality Movement
 - North Darfur: El-Serif Beni Hussein, Tinah, El Fasher, Kurni and Saraf Umrah
 - West Darfur: Sirba
 - South Darfur: Tulus and Bileil
 - East Darfur: Mahjaria
- Sudanese Alliance
 - North Darfur: Um Kaddadah and Mellit
 - West Darfur: El Geneina and Furawiyah.

42. Leaders of internally displaced persons and community leaders raised concerns about the increased presence of the Darfurian armed movements, especially in North and West Darfur. They noted that, as a result of the Government's failure to provide financial support, the movements had established checkpoints to collect money from merchants and civilians, while others noted that the armed movements were operating parallel detention centres, arresting people and demanding ransoms. Particular concerns were raised in El Fasher regarding two detention facilities run by members of SLA/MM and SLA/TC, respectively. According to testimonies collected by the Panel, at least 12 civilians were being held in those facilities as of November 2022 and, although the police had been informed, no action had been taken.

43. The widespread presence of the Darfurian armed movements outside the assembly areas is also presenting significant challenges for humanitarian actors (see para. 93).

VI. Signatory and non-signatory Darfurian armed movements in Libya

44. A number of signatory Darfurian armed movements (SLA/MM, GSLF and SLA/TC) remained in Libya. They continued to coordinate with the Libyan National Army of Khalifa Haftar. These groups continued to be hosted by the 128th Brigade, commanded by Hassan Maatuq al-Zadma, in the Jufrah district. The SLA/MM military force, led by Commander Faysal Saleh, remained the largest signatory Darfurian armed group in Libya, with approximately 100 vehicles, while GSLF, under the command of Aboud Adam Khater, continued to be the second largest signatory movement there. Although the presence of SLA/TC was minimal, its commander, Saleh Jebel Si, remained in Libya. SLA/AW was the largest force, with approximately 300 cars, among signatory and non-signatory Darfurian armed movements. It continued to be led by the SLA/AW Chief of Staff, Yusif Ahmed Yusif, known as "Karjakola". The movement expanded its presence considerably in Libya, operating between Sabha, Jufrah and Sirte. The non-signatory groups in Libya included the Sudanese Revolutionary Awakening Council/Collective Leadership; the Sudanese Revolutionary Awakening Council Musa Hilal faction; the New Justice and Equality Movement (New JEM), led by Mansour Arbab; the New JEM splinter group called the Agreement Revolution, led by Magdi Hussein Sharaf; the Sudanese Liberation

Army (SLA), led by Abbas Mohamed “Jebel Moon”; and the Sahwa Revolution, led by Mohamed Bakhit Ajab al-Dor, known as “Doydoy”.

VII. Non-signatory armed groups in South Sudan

45. In 2022, SLA/AW held a three-month conference in Jau, Ruweng Administrative Area, in South Sudan, bringing together SLA/AW members from Jebel Marra and Libya. During the conference, Abdul Wahid was reconfirmed as the leader of the movement, while three commanders, under Major General Abdullah Haran, were sent to Jebel Marra to oversee operations in the gold mines (see paras. 56–58). SLA/AW also kept a military force of approximately 40 to 60 vehicles in Jau, while Major General Abdullah Haran, the movement’s deputy-chair, continued to lead SLA/AW operations in this area. In addition, at the time of writing, he commanded five brigadiers supporting him: Osman Haroun, Musa Aradib, Isa Mandub, Juma Hamed Danaa and Muzammil Mohamed Ahmed. The movement detained dozens of individuals (see S/2021/40) in two separate prisons; one of them, supervised by the military intelligence unit, under the command of Zakaria Baraka, was notable for its harsh conditions, with individuals kept in isolation and, in many cases, under the ground. During the reporting period, the movement did not conduct any military activities, and the majority of his soldiers were employed on two farms. As troops became increasingly dissatisfied with the conditions in the camp and at the lack of future prospects, desertion was becoming an increasing concern.

VIII. Conflict dynamics in Darfur³¹

46. In June 2022, Hemetti travelled to North and West Darfur to promote the signing of several reconciliation agreements. The Government attributed the relative peace of the second half of 2022 to those agreements, as well as to the work of the nomads and farmers commissions,³² and the nomads and farmers executive committees³³ in hotspots areas of Darfur. The interlocutors believed that the work of those institutions played a key role in mitigating conflict between nomads and farmers.

47. In spite of this positive development, other interlocutors of the Panel noted that the commissions and executive committees were unable to prevent crop disruptions caused by the early return of nomads from the North. In West Darfur, conflict-affected areas, such as Kereinik, Sirba and Jebel Moon, experienced widespread crop destruction. In addition, crop damage was observed in the areas surrounding Tawilah (North Darfur). Interlocutors feared the onset of a new cycle of large-scale violence as a result of the high levels of crop destruction, in particular in volatile regions of West Darfur where there was a considerable presence of Darfurian armed movements and a substantial new deployment of RSF soldiers.

48. Representatives from the Tama, Gimir, Fur and Misseriya Jebel communities on the executive committees in a number of locations in North and West Darfur told the Panel that the committees were having a difficult time mediating and resolving conflicts as a result of the movement of nomads. They informed the Panel that authorities, notably RSF, refused to assist in preventing agricultural disruptions.

³¹ The information in the present section is based on Panel’s telephone interviews with internally displaced persons, victims and families of victims in Kereinik, the members of the nomads and farmers commission and executive committees, humanitarian actors, SAF, RSF, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Interior and confidential sources, El Fasher, El Geneina, May–November 2022.

³² The commissions are comprised of representatives of nomads and farmers in an effort to improve relations between farmer and nomad communities in Darfur.

³³ The committees are comprised of nomads and farmers in hot spot areas.

49. In addition, combined economic difficulties and significant influence from the Darfurian diasporas also led to the growth of a secessionist movement among the Masalit, especially among youth and internally displaced persons. According to the Panel's interlocutors, a very high number of Masalit were convinced that they needed independence or a special status in the Sudan, but that the time was not ripe.³⁴ Similar declarations made by SPLM-N of al-Hilu, also a Masalit, as well as the activities of the Masalit diaspora, contributed to the growth of secessionist feelings in West Darfur. According to one interlocutor in Khartoum, this was an expression of anger and despair; in fact, the Masalit, according to that interlocutor, could not be in Chad and could not survive by themselves.³⁵

A. Violation of the ceasefire in Kereinik and El Geneina (22–25 April 2022)

50. On 22 April 2022 at 2 a.m., two members of the Arab community, including local leader and RSF commander Major Hassan Bakai, were killed, allegedly by two members of the Masalit community. Violence quickly escalated after members of the Masalit community refused to surrender those who had allegedly committed the crime when the Arab delegation that went to take the alleged perpetrators into custody was ambushed. Twelve Arab representatives, including three members of RSF, were killed. The surviving Arab representatives went back to their community and within hours mobilized thousands of fighters, including from North Darfur and Chad, and attacked the Masalit communities. By midday on 23 April, 10,000 Masalits had been displaced from their homes. The attack continued into 24 April, before spreading to the capital of West Darfur, El Geneina.

51. During these attacks, the authorities failed to protect civilians. Due to the Governor's lack of command and control over the security committee, his instructions to intervene were not followed. On 23 April, SAF forces in Kereinik were ordered to withdraw to their barracks. Meanwhile, some members of RSF had supported the attackers. Sixty-three cars with RSF licence plates were used during the attacks, while individuals wearing RSF uniforms were seen on motorcycles.³⁶ On 25 April, violence spread to El Geneina, where members of the Sudanese Alliance clashed with members of RSF in town, in the largest ceasefire violation since the signature of the Juba Peace Agreement. During the attack in El Geneina, the teaching hospital was targeted.

52. A number of human rights violations were committed during the attacks. These included an attack on schools and medical facilities in Kereinik and El Geneina, the looting of humanitarian facilities, the killing of civilians, the burning down of the market in Kereinik and the burning down of five villages.³⁷ According to the United

³⁴ Panel's interviews with confidential sources, West Darfur, November–December 2022. Also, the so-called "Gilani Agreement" (usually dated 1919), regularly referred to by the Masalit as an argument for their right to self-determination. See, for example, "The Masalit tribe threatens to secede from the Sudan following the recent violence in West Darfur", *Sudan Tribune*, 27 April 2022, available (in Arabic) at <https://sudantribune.net/article258141/>; "Sudan or Chad? Why a Darfur sultan regrets a twist of colonial fate", BBC News, 31 May 2022, available at www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-61426698. See also S/2022/48, annex 8.

³⁵ Panel's meeting with Maryam al-Mahdi, December 2022.

³⁶ When asked by the Panel about this participation in the attacks, the RSF sector commander in El Geneina denied it. He noted that, if there was any such involvement of RSF soldiers, including the usage of many RSF vehicles, it was not in response to a command.

³⁷ Panel's interviews with eyewitnesses, victims, families of victims, humanitarian workers, Darfurian armed groups and local officials, by telephone and in person, in El Geneina and Kampala, May, June and November 2022.

Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), at least 21 children were killed.³⁸ The International Organization for Migration reported that 249 individuals had been killed and over 35,000 people had been displaced.³⁹ The Arab representatives to whom the Panel spoke noted that more Arabs had died in that attack than in any other past clashes between the communities.⁴⁰ Two major enquiries were launched to investigate these events, one by the Permanent Ceasefire Committee and one by the Government, the latter of which was submitted to the Office of the Public Prosecutor in November 2022.⁴¹ Only one person from the Masalit community, Hamadi Doshka, was arrested; he remains in custody in Port Sudan.

B. Violence in Jebel Marra (2–27 November 2022)

53. In 2019, 2020 and 2021, reports of the Panel examined internal SLA/AW rivalries, as well as the clashes and conflict in Marra between General Abdelgadir Abdelrahman Ibrahim, known as “Gaddura”, and Mubarak Aldouk.⁴² New clashes broke out in early November when Gaddura’s forces, led by Commanders Dafallah Mohamed and Yusif Abdelkarim, attacked Aldouk and his forces at his base. The conflict, which lasted a few weeks, was intense in the villages of Daya, Wara and Kia, with heavy losses on both sides. Some witnesses mentioned the death of 30 fighters, including five commanders of Gaddura’s forces, among them Ahmed Fuka, Idris Yagoub, Khalid Koskos and Musa Sibi. Commander Aldouk was injured and evacuated by RSF from Rokero to Nyala, where he received treatment in the Turkish Hospital. He was later flown to Khartoum, where he received treatment at Fedail Hospital. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated that, as a result of the fighting, 5,600 individuals had been displaced to Sabanga and Toga, as well as in the villages of Tartora, Kumaj, and Jokosti.⁴³

54. According to Panel sources, Aldouk has been receiving logistical support from RSF through Hassabo (a former SLA/AW commander who three years ago joined RSF).⁴⁴ Interlocutors highlighted that Aldouk was no longer a member of the SLA/AW movement, as he was now informally affiliated with RSF and received direct support from Taha Humaidan, the Forces Head of the RSF Peace Committee in Nyala. Some other interlocutors indicated that Aldouk had been in touch with another SLA/AW dissident faction led by Ahmed Ibrahim Yusuf “Kazinski”, and might formally join it.

³⁸ United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), “At least 21 children reported killed in violence in Sudan’s West Darfur”, statement by Adele Khodr, UNICEF Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa, available at www.unicef.org/press-releases/least-21-children-reported-killed-violence-sudans-west-darfur.

³⁹ International Organization for Migration, “IOM Sudan – Displacement Tracking Matrix Kereneik (Kereneik Town), West Darfur Update 8: 31 May 2022”, available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/iom-sudan-displacement-tracking-matrix-kereneik-kereneik-town-west-darfur-update-8-31-may-2022>.

⁴⁰ The Arab representatives to whom the Panel spoke highlighted that, due to cultural reasons, they would not disclose the number of people who died.

⁴¹ On 9 November 2022, the Panel submitted a letter (S/AC.47/2022/PE/OC.2) to the Government of the Sudan requesting the report, and was awaiting a response at the time of writing.

⁴² S/2019/34, paras. 46, 50 and 51; S/2020/36, paras. 45 and 126; and S/2021/40, para. 36.

⁴³ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Sudan: Conflict in Shamal Jabal Marrah, Central Darfur”, Flash Update No. 01 (24 November 2022), available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-conflict-shamal-jabal-marrah-central-darfur-flash-update-no-01-24-november-2022-enar>.

⁴⁴ In October 2022 there were clashes between Gaddura’s forces and the RSF unit under Hassabo in which 4 soldiers from Hassabo’s units died.

IX. Financing of Darfurian armed groups

55. Although opportunities stemming from mercenary activities have decreased significantly, Libya continued to be an important source of financing for Darfurian armed groups. SLA/AW, the only Darfurian armed group holding territory in Darfur, continued to profit from gold mining activity in Jebel Marra.

A. Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid in Darfur

56. SLA/AW continued to generate financing from gold mining activity in territories under its control in Jebel Marra by taxing miners and merchants operating at the mines. The yield and productivity of the existing artisanal gold mine in Torroye,⁴⁵ in south-eastern Jebel Marra, has declined. The optimum exploitation of the existing mines required mechanical equipment that was unavailable in the area controlled by SLA/AW at the time of writing. The number of workers operating at the mines was reported to be significantly less, with sources claiming the decrease to be about 90 per cent of the employment levels seen during the peak mining period in 2020. Confidential sources informed the Panel that new mines in the vicinity of the existing ones were being explored.

57. Under the overall command and control of General Commander Gaddura, another SLA/AW commander, Abdulrazig Turti, supervised the mining operations. Ever since the discovery of gold in the Torroye mines in 2019, disputes over revenue-sharing from the mine have often led to internal conflict between SLA/AW factions. During the present reporting period, the mining operations were often halted for brief periods of time. SLA/AW was also exploiting a gold mine in the area of Danaya, west of Gardud, South Darfur, where it had an arrangement with some Arab militias (from the Sa'dah and Hawtiyah tribes) to manage the mines.

58. In the past, the commanders in Jebel Marra had been reluctant to share the income from gold with Abdul Wahid and Abdullah Haran. In 2022, after the SLA/AW conference in Jau in South Sudan (see para. 45), Abdullah Haran sent some commanders from South Sudan to Jebel Marra to organize the mining operations and bring greater visibility with regard to finances to the SLA/AW high command.

59. Sources pointed to a business relationship between SLA/AW and Ahmed Saleh, a prominent gold trader from the Fur community, based in Nyala and originally hailing from eastern Jebel Marra. He had maintained good relations with Abdul Wahid and often did business with SLA/AW. Ahmed Saleh was assassinated in February 2022, and some interlocutors blamed government agencies for their alleged involvement. Sources also informed the Panel that the rebel SLA/AW commanders, Mubarak Aldouk and Zanoun Abdulshafi, were being supported by the Government of the Sudan against SLA/AW, with the objective of taking over the Torroye gold mines.

⁴⁵ S/2021/40, paras. 142–148.

Figure I

Photograph of Ahmed Saleh, gold trader from the Fur community who had been based in Nyala



Source: confidential.

60. The taxation activities practised by SLA/AW in the Jebel Marra territories and the internally displaced person camps under its control was described by the Panel in its report of January 2019.⁴⁶ A source from the Kalma camp confirmed the practice of collecting taxes from the residents of the camp. A truck driver who was bringing agricultural produce from the Jebel Marra area (controlled by SLA/AW) to Nyala market in South Darfur was interviewed by the Panel and said that the movement was taking up to 200 Sudanese pounds at the toll manned by SLA/AW.

B. Groups signatory to the Juba Peace Agreement

61. With the delays in the implementation of security arrangements, the signatory movements have found it difficult to financially support, and provide logistics to, the commanders and soldiers who returned to Darfur from Libya in 2021 and 2022. The signatory movements have set up illegal toll points along roads in Darfur, in cooperation with local villagers, and share the tax profits with them. The signatory armed movements are looking for new resources to finance their new political activities in the Sudan and consider future mining projects as an important potential source of revenue. The signatory armed groups are engaged in business and commercial activities, including illegal ones, to augment their income.

C. Darfurian armed groups in South Sudan

62. SLA/AW, the main Darfurian armed group present in South Sudan, led by its Deputy Chair, General Abdullah Haran, has continued its business activities, mainly in agriculture and transportation,⁴⁷ in cooperation with the local Dinka elites. Agriculture labour was provided by prisoners detained by SLA/AW in South Sudan.⁴⁸ SLA/AW also collected contributions from Fur traders based in South Sudan. Support provided by the Government of South Sudan to SLA/AW and other Darfurian groups in South Sudan has been minimal. However, the Government of South Sudan did provide support to Abdul Wahid (car, food and shelter) during the peace negotiations with various Sudanese and South Sudanese interlocutors. Abdul Wahid received financial and logistics support from the SPLA colonel and businessman, Simon Lueth

⁴⁶ S/2019/34, paras. 61–63.

⁴⁷ S/2020/36, paras. 161–166.

⁴⁸ Ibid., para. 103.

Tor,⁴⁹ and from the Sudanese businessman, Ashraf Seed Ahmad Al-Cardinal, who had extensive business interests in South Sudan.

63. In the past year, SLA/AW in association with members of the local Dinka elite, carried out the production and sale of sesame seed oil under the brand name Black Gold Enterprises. The sesame was cultivated in Jau, in the agricultural fields controlled by SLA/AW. According to confidential sources from SLA/AW, during the 2021/22 agricultural season, around 36.5 metric tons of sesame was cultivated and used for the production of Black Gold sesame seed oil and became an additional source of income.

Figure II

Black Gold sesame seed oil



Source: confidential.

D. Financing of armed groups in Libya

Mercenary activities

64. Over the past five years, Libya has been the principal source of financing for Darfuriian armed groups. During the reporting period, most Darfuriian armed movements in Libya continued to work for the Libyan National Army, securing areas and manning checkpoints. During the active armed conflict and military operations between the Libyan National Army and the Government in Tripoli, the Darfuriian armed movements were engaged in offensive operations on the side of the Army and were substantially rewarded for their efforts by the Army, backed by support from the United Arab Emirates. Besides receiving significant sign-up fees, the Darfuriian movements received monthly support, which could be as high as \$1.2 million per month for the larger movements.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Member of the Dinka elite from Pariang, with close business ties to SLA/AW (ibid., paras. 162–163).

⁵⁰ Panel's interviews with confidential sources and armed movements with a presence in Libya, April 2022.

65. Since the relative peace and the absence of active conflict in Libya, there has been drastic reduction in payments and support to the Darfurian armed movements in Libya. Sources in the movements told the Panel that, since October 2021, the support and payments provided to the movements have been minimal and were mainly limited to food supplies. The larger Darfurian armed movements were able to support themselves in Libya because of their prior accumulated resources. However, they found it difficult to pay their soldiers. Those movements were engaged in business and commercial activities to finance themselves. The situation was dire for the smaller Darfurian movements, which included many non-signatory groups, who were resorting to such measures as selling and cannibalizing their cars for spare parts and selling their weapons to support themselves. The lack of funding stemming from mercenary activities in Libya has created opportune conditions and opened a window for the non-signatory Darfurian movements to sign peace agreements with the Government of the Sudan and to return to Darfur.

66. Sources within the Government of the Sudan, along with multiple other sources, informed the Panel that the SLA/AW Chief of Staff, Karjakola, who was based in Libya, had sent five cars to General Commander Gaddura in Jebel Marra, while SLA/TC forces in Libya sent five cars to SLA/TC in Darfur. The cars were alleged to have been brought from Libya into Darfur in early 2022, under the guise of security arrangements in accordance with the Juba Peace Agreement for the signatory armed movements. The members of SLA/TC and SLA/AW denied having received the vehicles.⁵¹ The Panel interviewed a confidential source with ties to SLA/AW, who confirmed the information about the armed cars sent by Karjakola in Libya to Gaddura in Jebel Marra. The cars were detained for a brief period in Nyala by the Sudanese authorities. However, as they were ostensibly covered by the security arrangements, the cars were released and managed to reach the SLA/AW headquarters in Jebel Marra.

Cross-border criminal and commercial activities⁵²

67. With the drastic reduction in financial support from Libya, the Darfurian armed movements in Libya and across the region, including the signatory armed movements, are increasingly resorting to criminal and commercial activities to support themselves. Some movements were operating checkpoints within Libya, collecting taxes from trucks. Many movements are engaged in activities related to the transportation of water and oil. A member of one armed movement informed the Panel that smuggling an oil tanker truck from Libya to the Chad border and to the Sudan generated profits of \$10,000 and \$20,000, respectively.

68. Some members of Darfurian armed groups were engaged in the smuggling of arms, drugs and commercial goods and providing protection to migrant traffickers, in cooperation with local criminal groups in the region.

69. The criminal and commercial activities carried out by signatory armed movements, who now have forces within Darfur, often created tensions and friction with government forces of the Sudan, including Sudanese Armed Forces, Rapid Support Forces and the Sudan Police Force engaged in border control and law enforcement, and carried the risk of escalating into a violent incident. According to confidential sources, in an incident that took place in October 2022, a convoy belonging to one of the signatory armed movements and carrying commercial and contraband items from Libya was intercepted and detained at the joint Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces checkpoint in North Darfur. The signatory

⁵¹ Panel's interviews with confidential sources, May 2022.

⁵² This section is based on interviews with members of Darfurian armed groups and confidential sources conducted in March, April, May and November 2022.

armed movement called in reinforcements, leading to heightened tensions and potential conflict. The situation was resolved after negotiations between the armed movements and the government authorities. In another incident that took place in November 2022, when a contraband consignment coming from Libya and allegedly containing drugs was detained by the police in North Darfur, the police were surrounded and threatened by forces from the signatory armed movements. The stand-off was sorted out after negotiations.

70. The smuggling of cars from Libya into the Sudan remained a regular activity. Darfurian and other armed groups were often involved in providing protection to the convoys. Cars were directly brought from Libya into Al-Malihah in North Darfur on Libyan trucks or driven across the borders in convoys, from Libya to Chad to Darfur. The car dealers or smugglers informed the Panel that the Libyan trucks coming into Al-Malihah charged \$1,000 per car, with one double-decker truck carrying 12 to 15 cars. The Panel was informed of another route for cars, from Benin to El Geneina in Darfur, through the Niger and Chad. The roads were better along that route, and the criminality was less prevalent. Currently, owing to the declining economic situation in the Sudan and high inflation, the demand for cars has gone down. Some of the cars were imported into Darfur for the car markets in Ethiopia and, with distribution inside Ethiopia and on the Ethiopian border, that demand has also dried up.

E. Gold seizure in the United Arab Emirates

71. The Panel received information that authorities in the United Arab Emirates had seized gold that allegedly belonged to one of the signatory Darfurian movements. The Panel had previously sought additional information from the authorities in the United Arab Emirates regarding the case.⁵³ The various interlocutors that the Panel had contacted were not aware of the gold seizure. The Panel has again requested the authorities in the United Arab Emirates to provide additional information, if any, about the seizure.⁵⁴ During its visit to the United Arab Emirates in October 2022, the Panel reiterated its request. At the time of writing, the information was yet to be received.

X. Arms and the arms embargo

72. Pursuant to paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution [1556 \(2004\)](#), paragraph 7 of resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#), and paragraphs 7 to 9 of resolution [1945 \(2010\)](#), as updated in resolution [2035 \(2012\)](#), the Panel continued to investigate and monitor possible breaches of the arms embargo in Darfur by any actors, including the Government of Sudan, Member States, individuals, the signatory armed groups and other State and non-State actors. In addition, the Panel had reported in the past that the presence and proliferation of arms and ammunition in Darfur was a key driver in destabilizing the region (see [S/2021/40](#) and [S/2022/48](#)). During the current reporting period, the Panel continued to investigate the proliferation of weapons and ammunition in Darfur, which, according to new data, has intensified (see annex 12 on the implementation status of the Arms Trade Treaty).

A. Proliferation of arms in Darfur

73. The presence and numbers and variety of arms in the hands of nomads, farmers and inside the internally displaced persons and refugee camps in Darfur has increased

⁵³ [S/2022/48](#), para. 161.

⁵⁴ See [S/AC.47/2022/PE/OC.12](#).

in comparison with the Panel's observations made during missions to Darfur in 2021 and early 2022. That trend was also reported and confirmed by the Panel's multiple interlocutors.⁵⁵

74. During the Panel's missions to El Fasher, North Darfur, and El Geneina, South Darfur, in May and June 2022, "technical" vehicles, mostly armed with multiple types of machine guns, assault rifles, submachine guns, hand-held and under-barrel grenade launchers and portable anti-tank guns, were observed by the Panel in all neighbourhoods. Individuals on the vehicles were wearing a variety of uniforms and civilian clothing, making it difficult to determine their affiliations. According to interlocutors of the Panel with first-hand knowledge, such sightings were evidence of an increased inflow of sophisticated weaponry in Darfur.⁵⁶ Multiple unidentified 4x4 technical vehicles with civilian-clothed armed occupants were observed in both El Fasher and El Geneina. Those elements were identified by interlocutors and informers as members of the General Intelligence Service and continued to be present in both El Fasher and El Geneina. Most vehicles were equipped with mounted 12.7 mm Khawad 85 automatic machine guns manufactured by the State-owned Military Industry Corporation. In addition, fighters of the five signatory armed groups were observed by the Panel in El Fasher, El Geneina, Nyala, Zamzam, Tawilah and Sulay'ah (see annex 11).

75. Arms and ammunition remained easily available and accessible in Darfur, with mostly Chadian, Libyan and South Sudanese cross-border arms dealers continuing to sell arms and ammunition (see part IV above). Other sources of arms and ammunition included continuous leaks from the Government's stockpiles, weapons and ammunition seized during attacks or thefts and signatory armed movements returning from Libya and selling their weapons in Darfur.⁵⁷

76. The presence and availability of arms perpetuated violence and attacks among different communities. It also enabled aggressors to initiate large-scale atrocities with the knowledge that arms were readily available to support their various agendas. Prices of weapons and ammunition fluctuated based on supply and demand. The price of a single 7.62x39 mm bullet for a Kalashnikov (AK47) assault rifle could increase from the standard \$1 per round to \$1.50 per round.⁵⁸ In the light of those price fluctuations, multiple representatives from native administrations⁵⁹ and interlocutors from both the nomad, herders and farming community told the Panel that they were stockpiling ammunition while the prices were low in anticipation of and preparation for any future conflicts that may affect them, their families or allies. This has become a vicious cycle that was evident during the serious violence in Kereinik and Kulbus of June 2022 which required minimal provocation in order to trigger large scale mobilization of willing armed participants to engage in acts violence or retaliation attacks using from the most basic to very advanced weaponry.

77. During the reporting period, Darfuri state authorities took several ad hoc measures to reduce the presence and availability of weapons. For instance, on 14 June 2022, in Ed Daein, the capital of East Darfur, penalties were established for the carrying and use of firearms by civilians and for the wearing of the *kadamul* (men's

⁵⁵ Panel's interviews with confidential sources in internally displaced persons and refugee camps, international non-governmental organization staff in Tawilah, Zamzam, El Fasher, El Geneina and Sulay'ah, November 2022.

⁵⁶ Panel's interviews with Sudanese Armed Forces, Rapid Support Forces and security officials, May and June 2022.

⁵⁷ Interviews with Sudanese Armed Forces confidential sources, November and December 2022.

⁵⁸ Interviews with confidential sources in Sulay'ah, Zamzam, El Fasher and El Geneina, November and December 2022.

⁵⁹ Panel's interviews with the native administration of Sulay'ah, December 2022. See also <https://csf-sudan.org/the-native-administration-in-peace-and-conflict-an-aid-workers-primer/>.

traditional turban that can be used to conceal the identity of the person wearing it). In another example in North Darfur, the Governor, Nimir Mohamed Abdul Rahman banned the use of motorbikes (which were commonly used during attacks), the carrying of weapons by civilians and the wearing of the *kadamul*. In addition, the state security committee banned the use of unlicensed vehicles. The presence of unlicensed vehicles, with no registration or identification markings, continued in West Darfur and represented approximately 50 per cent of all vehicles in the cities of El Fasher and El Geneina.

B. Arms ban violations and increased insecurity

Return of signatory armed groups to Darfur

78. In paragraph 3 of its resolution [2620 \(2022\)](#), the Security Council requested the Government of the Sudan to submit requests for consideration by the Committee and, where appropriate, prior approval for the movement of military equipment and supplies into the Darfur region, particularly in the context of the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement. During the first quarter of the reporting period, signatory armed movements continued to arrive from Libya to Darfur with armed 4x4 technical vehicles and weapons. Weapons included heavy and light machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and anti-aircraft weaponry. Despite the commitment to surrender long-range weapons and artillery in accordance with chapter 8, paragraph 22.5, of the Juba Peace Agreement, only small weapons were handed over at the training centres and at assembly points that had been designated to canton the armed movements. The heavy weaponry and military cars remained in the hands of the Darfurian armed groups. At the time of writing, the Committee has not received a request from the Government of the Sudan for the transfer of those weapons to Darfur, in accordance with paragraphs 3 of the resolution. This therefore constituted a violation of the arms embargo provisions.

79. In addition to that violation, the ability of the signatory armed movements to retain weapons further exacerbated the already precarious security situation. Signatory armed movement leaders in Darfur informed the Panel that they would only hand over their heavy weaponry once a joint specialized technical committee⁶⁰ was established and tasked with evaluating and assessing the value of their weapons and assets. They also expected the Government of the Sudan to reimburse them for the value of the weapons before they handed them over, as envisaged in title 2, chapter 8, paragraph 22.6, of the Juba Peace Agreement, in which it is stated that the parties agreed to establish a joint specialized technical committee to evaluate and assess the value of weapons and assets, provided that the Government of the Sudan committed itself to reimbursing their value to the armed struggle movements. That also included the crew-administered long-range weapons, artillery and relevant ammunition to be handed to the head of the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee before entering the assembly areas, as envisaged in chapter 8, paragraph 22.5, of the Agreement.⁶¹ The signatory armed movements kept the heavy weapons in undisclosed location, ready to be deployed.

Government of the Sudan

80. Government forces visibly continued to develop their military capacity and presence in West and North Darfur, complementing their presence with multiple new 4x4 “technical” vehicles. For instance, in a public event in July 2022, Hemetti visited members of the Rapid Support Forces in the Zuruk area of North Darfur and presented

⁶⁰ Juba Peace Agreement, title 2, chapter 8, para. 22.6.

⁶¹ Panel’s meeting with members of the Permanent Ceasefire Committee, El Fasher, November 2022.

27 BTR 8x8 armoured personnel carriers, 31 technical 4x4 vehicles mounted with DShK heavy machine guns, and two trucks mounted with multiple rocket-launcher systems. No exemption requests for these transfers of military equipment to Darfur have been received by the Committee. This therefore also constituted a violation of the arms embargo. The Government of the Sudan also deployed additional security forces in each of the five Darfur states to safeguard the end of the agricultural season, which started in May and ended in October 2022. Some elements from these forces have relocated from other regions of the country to Darfur, constituting violations of the arms embargo, as no exemption requests were submitted to the Committee for those transfers.

XI. Protection of civilians⁶²

A. Implementation of the National Plan for the Protection of Civilians in Darfur

81. In May 2020, the Government of the Sudan published its National Plan for the Protection of Civilians in Darfur. Under the plan, the Government established actions that it would take to protect civilians in areas related to internally displaced persons and refugees; the rule of law and human rights; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; combating violence against women and children; humanitarian action; strengthening conflict avoidance and resolution mechanisms; issues involving nomads and herdsman; reconstruction, development and basic services; and water and sanitation.

82. According to reports on the implementation of the National Plan for the Protection of Civilians submitted by the Government of the Sudan to the President of the Security Council ([S/2020/429](#), [S/2020/901](#), [S/2021/107](#), [S/2021/263](#) and [S/2022/682](#)), achievements during the current reporting period included the registration of an unknown number of refugees, the provision of food and sanitation supplies in some of the refugee camps, the construction of toilets and the start of a project to drill eight wells for potable water in East and West Darfur; the opening of at least one prosecutor's office in North, East, South and West Darfur; the launch of an inquiry into the events that occurred in Kereinik in 2022, followed by the submission of a final report to the Office of the Public Prosecutor; the signing of a contract to provide vehicles and fuel for the Civilian Protection Force;⁶³ capacity-building and training on issues related to women and children and the deployment of legal advisers on gender for communities; the facilitation of reconciliation sessions in South and West Darfur by the Rapid Support Forces; the creation of detailed maps of a number of nomadic routes; sports and cultural sessions to promote peace; the provision of two vehicles and medical devices by the Rapid Support Forces to the hospital in Kereinik. Despite those developments, humanitarian actors told the Panel that the implementation of the National Plan had been slower than expected and noted that it had failed to translate into any greater protections for Darfurians.

⁶² The information in this section is based on Panel's interviews with internally displaced persons, women, activists, victims and families of victims of human rights violations, the Ministry of Interior, the Sudan Police Force, the Rapid Support Forces, the Sudanese Armed Forces and confidential sources, May–November 2022.

⁶³ The Civilian Protection Force consists of Rapid Support Forces, Sudanese Armed Forces and the Sudan Police Force and would be deployed to protect civilians.

B. Reconciliation agreements and arbitrary arrests and detentions

83. During the reporting period, six reconciliation agreements were signed under the sponsorship of General Hemetti (see para. 8). In meetings with the Panel, interlocutors from the Government mentioned that the relative peace enjoyed by Darfurians since July 2022 was due to those agreements. Community members and human rights activists told the Panel that the agreements lacked legitimacy, as they had been negotiated under the auspices of General Musa Ambello of the Rapid Support Forces, who had been in charge during the outbreak of violence in the Krinding internally displaced persons camp in El Geneina, from 29 to 31 December 2019.⁶⁴

84. Other interlocutors, including some of the traditional leaders who signed the reconciliation agreements, raised concerns about their sustainability. They told the Panel that the agreements would not necessarily translate into long-term stability for Darfur, as they failed to address the root causes of the conflict. In addition, tribal leaders told the Panel that General Hemetti had failed to fulfil the commitments that had been made when the agreements were signed. They stressed that one of the main reasons they had signed the agreements was the promise to compensate victims of violence and rebuild villages that had been affected by violence, but they were still waiting for reparations. In West Darfur, interlocutors noted the discontent among community members, who felt that the only reason the traditional leaders had signed the agreements was the personal compensation they received from General Hemetti, who had offered them cars and cash.

85. The discontent in West Darfur has been exacerbated by the arbitrary arrest and detention, carried out between 25 and 27 July 2022, of 176 people who had voiced concerns about the agreements.⁶⁵ The individuals arbitrarily detained were from the Gimir, Tama, Darouk and Erenga communities. The arrests took place in the areas in West Darfur. The Governor of West Darfur, General Khamis Abdallah Abkar, ordered the detentions, invoking emergency law.⁶⁶ In a November 2022 meeting with the Panel, the West Darfur security committee confirmed the arrest of the individuals and informed the Panel that they remained in detention since the end of July. They also informed the Panel that the emergency law remained in effect in West Darfur and that the detainees would not be released until a newly created committee evaluated each individual case.

⁶⁴ African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “Joint UNAMID/OHCHR public report, report on human rights violations committed by rapid support forces and armed Arab militias against IDPs and villages in West Darfur, 29–31 December 2019”.

⁶⁵ The list is on file with the Panel at the request of its sources, as they fear retaliation.

⁶⁶ A national emergency law was issued by the Sovereign Council after the events of 25 October 2021, to create a state of emergency. The national state of emergency was lifted in May 2022. The governors of the five Darfurian states have also used state of emergency decrees as a method to control the situation in the conflict areas.

C. Deployment of Rapid Support Forces troops

86. The Panel witnessed increased deployment of Rapid Support Forces soldiers in North and West Darfur. The security committees⁶⁷ in North and West Darfur, as well as the executive directors of Tawilah, North Darfur, and Sulay‘ah, West Darfur, told the Panel that the Rapid Support Forces deployed its troops to increase protection during the harvesting season, which started in November 2022 and was expected to last until February 2023. However, members of the local communities and traditional administrators raised concerns about the deployment of the Rapid Support Forces, as they were participants in the conflict and not guarantors.

87. Traditional administrators told the Panel that, on several occasions in November 2022, they had approached the Rapid Support Forces to intervene and put to stop the early migration of nomad Arabs, which disturbed their harvest, but that the Rapid Support Forces commanders refused to intervene. A traditional chief of the Misseriya Jebel community informed the Panel that they had requested protection from the commander of the Rapid Support Forces in Sulay‘ah in November 2022, but that he had declined to act, on the grounds that the Misseriya Jebel had already started the harvest. That refusal was interpreted as an indication that, in the event of a conflict, the Rapid Support Forces would side with nomad Arabs. Meanwhile, a traditional leader from the Fur community told the Panel that the presence of the Rapid Support Forces did not guarantee their security, as they had, in the past, failed to protect their community when conflict erupted. He noted that, in 2022, a commander of the Rapid Support Forces gave cars and weapons to herders in Tawilah, a clear indication that the force was not neutral.

D. Violence against women and girls

88. During the reporting period, the Panel gathered several reports from victims of sexual and gender-based violence and their families. The interviewees emphasized that violence against women and girls remained a serious concern. They highlighted that women were reluctant to report the violations to the authorities, owing to high levels of stigmatization and impunity. Women told the Panel that the lack of police and prosecutors specializing in sexual and gender-based violence was a significant deterrent to reporting those crimes, as was the lack of accountability. During the Panel’s visit to North Darfur, women reported that the main hotspots were the surrounding areas of Zamzam internally displaced persons camp and the outskirts of Tawilah town, to the north of the camp. A total of 49 incidents of sexual and gender-based violence were reported to the Panel as having occurred since March 2022, including 2 separate incidents of abductions, 41 cases of sexual violence and the killing of six women.⁶⁸

E. Accountability for past and current human rights violations

89. In title 1, article 1, of the Juba Peace Agreement, entitled “General Principles”, justice, accountability, reconciliation and transitional justice were recognized as being critical for ensuring durable peace and security (para. 1.22), and combating

⁶⁷ The security committees are state-level committees established to coordinate all security-related actions. Under the leadership of the Governor (Wali), the Committees have representatives from the Sudanese Armed Forces, the Rapid Support Forces, the Sudan Police Force and the General Intelligence Service.

⁶⁸ Reports received came from victims and their families, as well as leaders of internally displaced persons, El Fasher, Tawilah, El Geneina, May and November 2022.

impunity and bringing justice for victims were recognized as being necessary for building national reconciliation and healing (para. 1.24). Title 2, chapter 3, of the Agreement provides for the establishment of the mechanisms and bodies that would deal with justice, accountability and reconciliation. Similarly, in section 3 of the National Plan for the Protection of Civilians, it is stated that access to justice and the rule of law will be guaranteed. Despite the recognition of the importance of justice and accountability in building sustainable peace, the Government failed to implement any of the mechanisms established under the Agreement. Interlocutors interviewed by the Panel stressed that high-level officials lacked the political will to establish chapter 3 mechanisms amid concerns of being found guilty for gross human rights violations.

90. Access to justice in Darfur remained limited, as the judicial system was underfunded. There was a shortage of competent prosecutors and judges, and limited resources were available to the police. The Ministry of Interior told the Panel that in 2022 the police was allocated a special budget and was granted additional logistical support. The Minister stressed that the police in the whole Darfur region was fully operational and equipped to fulfil its functions. In El Fasher and El Geneina, however, the police officers told the Panel that they did not have enough cars, fuel or communication equipment to perform their functions, a situation that was even more precarious outside the capitals of the Darfur states. In Sulay'ah, for instance, the police did not have communication equipment or fuel and, in the absence of a local prosecutor, assumed those responsibilities. In North Darfur, in a meeting with the Panel, the prosecutor noted that he faced significant challenges, including the lack of local prosecutors in rural and remote areas.

F. Current humanitarian situation⁶⁹

91. Significant political developments regarding power-sharing and the political participation of the Darfurian armed movements in the central Government and state governments failed to benefit the Darfurian population not affiliated with the armed movements or improve the humanitarian situation. Interlocutors outside the Government repeatedly told the Panel that, two years after its signature, they have not seen any tangible benefits resulting from the Juba Peace Agreement. The majority of interviewees said they viewed the Agreement as a tool for a few individuals to gain access to political power, and not a document that would benefit the Darfurian population; that feeling was especially prevalent among nomadic communities.

92. This failure of the Juba Peace Agreement to create better conditions in Darfur is reflected in the current humanitarian situation. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, between January and August 2022, the most recent period for which data was available at the time of writing, over 70 per cent of cases of forced displacement due to conflict were registered in Darfur (126,000 out of 177,000), with West Darfur accounting for 50 per cent of all new conflict-related internally displaced persons in the Sudan during the same period.⁷⁰ Meanwhile, data gathered by the International Committee of the Red Cross through two surveys conducted between January and March 2022 in areas affected by violence in Darfur,

⁶⁹ The information in this section is based on Panel's interviews with internally displaced persons, women, activists, victims and families of victims of human rights violations, the Ministry of Interior, the police, the Rapid Support Forces, the Sudanese Armed Forces and confidential sources.

⁷⁰ United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Sudan humanitarian update", No. 7, July–August 2022, available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-humanitarian-update-july-august-2022-no-07-enar>.

showed that families in Darfur are spending over 65 per cent of their income on food and that 7 out of 10 households said they were poorer than they were one year earlier.⁷¹

93. Humanitarian actors informed the Panel that securing access for the delivery of humanitarian aid was becoming increasingly challenging, owing to the return of the Darfurian armed movements across Darfur, in addition to new deployments of the Rapid Support Forces. They explained that, owing to the constant movement of the various armed actors, it was difficult to determine who controlled certain territory in order to negotiate access.⁷² They also noted that, in order to gain access to locations outside the major urban centres, they required armed government escorts because carjacking and crime were becoming increasingly prevalent in Darfur. Interlocutors emphasized that the availability of those escorts was limited (in West Darfur, 7 out of 10 escort requests had been declined in the preceding quarter) and that the price of escort services was constantly increasing.

XII. Travel ban and assets freeze

94. The Panel continued to monitor the implementation of the assets freeze and travel ban measures imposed through paragraphs 3 (d) and 3 (e) of Security Council resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#) by Member States. At present, three individuals are listed by the Committee.

A. Gaffar Mohammed Elhassan (permanent reference number: SDi.001)

95. The Panel had provided updated information on Gaffar Mohammed Elhassan to the Committee in its letter dated 9 December 2021.⁷³ He retired from the military in 2010 and was leading a retired life. After his retirement, he received a pension and was receiving rent from a portion of his house that he had rented out. The Government of the Sudan neither requested nor received from the Committee an exemption from the assets freeze for the pension or the rent payments received by Gaffar Mohammed Elhassan.

B. Jibril Abdulkarim Ibrahim Mayu (permanent reference number: SDi.004)

96. The Panel had provided updated information on Jibril Abdulkarim Ibrahim Mayu to the Committee in its letter dated 19 May 2021.⁷⁴ For the past few years, the former JEM veteran was based in Libya as a senior member of a new rebel movement, Assembly of Justice and Equality Movement Forces, comprising ex-JEM members from the Zaghawa Kobe clan. He was believed to be unwell and, in 2021, had been seeking medical treatment in Benghazi. Recent information suggests that Jibril Abdulkarim Ibrahim Mayu had travelled to Chad, where some members of his family reside. Further information suggested that he was trying to negotiate with the authorities in the Sudan to enter the country to receive medical treatment. Failing to obtain that permission, he was believed to have travelled back to Libya.

⁷¹ International Committee of the Red Cross, “Sudan: violence exacerbating poverty and food insecurity”, 28 April 2022.

⁷² See also United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023: Sudan* (November 2022).

⁷³ See S/AC.47/2021/PE/OC.17.

⁷⁴ See S/AC.47/2021/PE/OC.6.

97. In 2018, 2019 and 2020, the Panel had requested that the Government of Chad examine certain instances of possible travel ban violations pertaining to Jibril Abdulkarim Ibrahim Mayu in relation to his visits to Chad during the period 2011–2014. No response was received. Through a letter dated 24 August 2022, the Panel again sought information from the Government of Chad regarding a recent purported visit to Chad by Jibril Abdulkarim Ibrahim Mayu. No reply had been received at the time of writing.

C. Musa Hilal Abdalla Alnsiem (permanent reference number: SDi.002)

98. Musa Hilal was in the custody of the Government of the Sudan for more than three years prior to his release in March 2021. Musa Hilal travelled to Chad during the last week of April 2021, as a member of the official delegation of the Government of the Sudan, to offer condolences on the death of the President of Chad, Idriss Deby. Hilal's visit to Chad constituted a violation of the travel ban provisions imposed under paragraph 3 (d) of Security Council resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#). The Panel met with Musa Hilal in October 2021, when he confirmed the facts reported by the Panel in its January 2021 report.⁷⁵ He informed the Panel that he had sold a property in 2016, that part of the money had been with him when he was arrested in 2017 and that the money had been seized by the arresting party.⁷⁶ Hilal further informed the Panel that the arresting party had taken control of his personal wealth, animal wealth and artefacts during his arrest.

99. The Panel again met with Musa Hilal in June 2022, when he reiterated that his money and assets, which had been seized during his arrest, had not been returned to him, and that he had been in negotiations with the authorities for their return. During that meeting, he again enquired about the travel ban provisions and the procedure for seeking exemptions for travel related to medical treatment and for religious purposes, which was explained to him.

100. The Government of the Sudan previously did not submit its implementation report on the travel ban and assets freeze or replies to the Panel's letters thereon. In a letter dated 20 June 2022, the Panel again sought a response from the Government of the Sudan regarding the violation of the travel ban by Musa Hilal, who had travelled to Chad in April 2021 as part of an official delegation of the Sudan. The Government of the Sudan was asked to confirm the visit by Hilal and whether any exemption for the travel had been submitted to the Committee. In the letter, the Panel also sought the response of Government of the Sudan on the implementation of the assets freeze for Musa Hilal, including on the money and assets taken under control by the arresting party during his arrest in November 2019.

101. The Government of the Sudan replied, in a letter dated 11 July 2022, and informed the Panel that Musa Hilal held no official position and was not part of any official delegation within or outside the Sudan. The relationship between Musa Hilal and the family of the late President Deby is through marriage. In the letter, the Government further informed the Panel that, at the time of his arrest, no money was obtained or seized, and that there had been no money among the court exhibits. Musa Hilal does not have any active bank accounts or balances, and the Sudanese authorities have not found any evidence of his selling or buying real estate. In the letter, the Government asked the Panel to share additional information on the matter so that it could be investigated.

⁷⁵ [S/2021/40](#), para. 137.

⁷⁶ [S/2022/48](#), para. 142.

102. In a letter dated 9 November 2022, the Panel requested that Government of the Sudan provide the travel details of Musa Hilal's visit to Chad, including the travel documents used for the visit, the dates of his exit from and entry into the Sudan and the details of the transport used. In the letter, the Panel also provided the details of the property sold in 2016, of which, according to sources, Musa Hilal was the beneficial owner. The property is located in Khartoum, on the intersection of Omak Street and Al Safa Road, close to Obeid Khatim Street. According to sources, the building is currently being used for the Al Ajlan Hotel Apartments. The Government was requested to investigate the sale of the property and inform the Panel of the outcome.

Figure III
Photographs of the property sold in 2016



Source: Google Maps and confidential sources.

103. The Panel had also sought confirmation from the Government of Chad about Musa Hilal's visit to Chad in April 2021, as well as on the details thereof.⁷⁷ No response was received. The Panel has again requested this information from Chad, in a letter dated 24 August 2022. No response has been received.

XIII. Recommendations

104. The long borders with neighbouring States and the weakness, or full absence, of Sudanese security forces in the border areas make it difficult to control a significant number of localities in Darfur. Ad hoc solutions, such as the deployment of joint security forces (Sudanese Armed Forces, Rapid Support Forces, General Intelligence Service and Sudan Police Force), have taken place only at the onset of violence and

⁷⁷ See [S/AC.47/2021/PE/OC.7](#).

have remained an inadequate tool to prevent conflict. In that context, the Panel recommends that the Committee encourage the Government of the Sudan to strengthen the presence of security forces in the border areas, subject to the existing arms embargo measures and exemption procedures.

105. Recalling past recommendations on the subject, the Panel recommends that the Committee request the Government of the Sudan and the regional governments to implement the assets freeze and travel ban on the designated individuals.

106. The Panel recommends that the Committee encourage the Government of the Sudan to expedite the implementation of the security arrangements, in accordance with chapter 8 of the Juba Peace Agreement.

107. The Panel recommends that the Committee urge the Government of the Sudan to expand its support for the Permanent Ceasefire Committee.

108. The Panel recommends that the Committee consider requesting the Secretariat to provide technical assistance, as appropriate, to the Government of the Sudan for submitting requests for exemptions to the arms embargo, in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution [2620 \(2022\)](#).

109. The Panel recommends that the Security Council urge the Government of the Sudan to operationalize the joint specialized technical committee, which would evaluate and assess the value of weapons and assets of the signatory armed groups, in accordance with chapter 8, paragraph 22.6, of the Agreement.

Annex 1 – Mandate

On 11 February 2021 the Security Council recalled its previous resolutions concerning Sudan, in particular 1591 (2005), 1651 (2005), 1665 (2006), 1672 (2006), 1713 (2006), 1779 (2007), 1841 (2008), 1891 (2009), 1945 (2010), 1982 (2011), 2035 (2012), 2091 (2013), 2138 (2014), 2200 (2015), 2265 (2016), 2340 (2017), 2400 (2018), 2455 (2019), and 2508 (2020), and 2026 (2022) and its Presidential Statement of 11 December 2018 (S/PRST/2018/19).

In paragraph 1 of resolution 2620 (2022), the Security Council recalled the measures imposed by paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution 1556 (2004), as modified by paragraph 7 of resolution 1591 (2005), and paragraph 4 of resolution 2035 (2012), and the listing criteria and measures imposed by subparagraphs (c), (d) and (e) of paragraph 3 of resolution 1591 (2005), as modified by paragraph 3 of resolution 2035 (2012), and *reaffirms* the provisions of subparagraph (f), (g) of paragraph 3 of resolution 1591 (2005), paragraph 9 of resolution 1556 (2004), and paragraph 4 of resolution 2035 (2012).

In paragraph 2 of resolution 2620 (2022), the Council further extends the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 12 March 2023 originally appointed pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) and previously extended by resolutions 1779 (2007), 1841 (2008), 1945 (2010), 2035 (2012), 2138 (2014), 2200 (2015), 2265 (2016), 2340 (2017), and 2400 (2018), *reaffirms* the mandate of the Panel of Experts' as established in resolutions 1591 (2005), 1779 (2007), 1841 (2008), 1945 (2010), 2035 (2012), 2138 (2014), 2200 (2015), 2265 (2016), 2340 (2017), 2400 (2018), 2455 (2019), 2508 (2020), and 2562 (2021) and *requests* the Panel of Experts to provide to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan (hereafter "the Committee") with an interim report on its activities no later than 12 August 2022, and provide to the Council, after discussion with the Committee, a final report by 13 January 2023 with its findings and recommendations, and *further requests* the Panel of Experts to provide updates every three months to the Committee regarding its activities, including Panel travel, and the implementation and effectiveness of paragraph 10 of resolution 1945 (2010), and *expresses its intention* to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding the further extension of the mandate no later than 12 February 2023.

In paragraph 3 of resolution 2620 (2022) the Council recalls paragraph 3(a) (v) of Security Council resolution 1591 (2005) and *requests* the Government of Sudan to submit requests for the Committee's consideration and, where appropriate, prior approval for the movement of military equipment and supplies into the Darfur region, particularly in the context of the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement, in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 1591 (2005), as clarified and updated in paragraph 8 of resolution 1945 (2010) and paragraph 4 of resolution 2035 (2012).

In paragraph 4 of resolution 2620 (2022) Recalls the criteria established in paragraph 3 (c) of its resolution 1591 (2005), and expanded in paragraph 3 of 2035 (2012), and in this regard, expresses its intention to regularly review the measures on Darfur, as recalled in paragraph 1, in light of the upcoming interim report by the Panel of Experts due by 12 August 2022 as well as the final report by the Panel of Experts due by 13 January 2023, and taking into account relevant Security Council resolutions;

In paragraph 5 of resolution 2620 (2022) the Security Council takes note of the Secretary-General's report of 31 July 2021 (S/2021/696), as requested in resolution 2562 (2021), providing a review of the situation in Darfur and recommending benchmarks to assess the measures on Darfur, and expresses its intention to consider by 31 August 2022 establishing clear, well-identified, and realistic key benchmarks, with readiness to consider adjusting measures renewed in paragraph 1 above to respond to the situation in Darfur in light of the evolving situation on the ground, taking note of the Committee Chair's report and recommendations.

Annex 2 – Terminology and media coverage of the situation in Darfur

The Panel has retained terms such as “tribe”, “Janjaweed”, “militias”, “settlers”, “nomads” and personal and place names as provided by the various sources. Such usage does not necessarily reflect the views of the Panel.

Throughout the reporting period, the Panel observed regular derogatory use of the above mentioned words and biased coverage of the situation in Darfur in various national and Sudanese diaspora media and social networks (sometimes amounting to media wars). Such coverage presented significant difficulties to the work of the Panel. However, the Panel, made all efforts to verify the information they received from their interlocutors and other sources.

Annex 3 – Statement of SLA/AW concerning the fighting in Jebel Marra

The General Command of Self – defence forces of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army sternly warn the putschist regime of Khartoum of launching attacks on its controlled territories

The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) field intelligence had gathered credible information that; on 27th of October 2022, the putschist regime forces of Khartoum consists of Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militias and a few hand-picked local collaborators and hirelings from El Fashir in 30- 4wheel drive land cruiser vehicles are planning to wage aggressive attacks on areas controlled by the self-defense forces of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) under the leadership of Abdul Wahid Mohammed Ahmed Al Nour.

Whereas; the movement adhere to the Geneva Convention on the civilized rules of armed conflict, known to all SLA combatants in standing orders, codified in the movement's purity of arms doctrine and remain committed to, the signed long- standing, renewed unilateral cessation of hostilities (CoH) for humanitarian reasons although the regime still exploit hunger and humanitarian denial as a tool of war, as well as to allow the people's glorious December revolution to realize its noble objectives through peaceful means of national struggle. However; the general command of the movement would like to clarify the followings: –

1- The Sudan Liberation Army forces had tangibly kept observing its unilateral ceasefire, and as self-defense forces have long observed a halt to offensive operations and only undergo combat when attacked.

2- Any act of aggressive attacks on areas controlled by the movement will be considered a deliberate declaration of war and therefore, the movement will do what it can to protect civilians, and their properties and further repulse the attack in a manner to safeguard and maintain the sovereignty of its controlled territories.

3- As the movement is fully aware of the plots and treachery of the murderous coup regime and the outcome of their clandestine meetings held in the national capital Khartoum to stage these attacks, the movement had ordered its forces to be vigilant and remain in combat- ready repulse situation until ordered otherwise.

4- Based on the ill and insidious intentions of the coup regime and the on going killings, the movement might be forced heavy heartedly to, rescind its unilateral cessation of hostilities that have signed, renewed and committed to over the past years, despite the on going genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity by the regime forces and its paratroops militias. It's high time for the movement to reconsider caging itself to a futile and unyielding cease fire while people are slaughtered and their lives are tampered with.

Waleed Mohammed Abaker, (Tonjou)

The Military Spokesperson of the Sudan Liberation Army

28th of October 2022.

Source: <https://slma.net/en/the-general-command-of-self-defense-forces-of-the-sudan-liberation-movement-army-sternly-warn-the-putschist-regime-of-khartoum-of-launching-attacks-on-its-controlled-territories/>

Annex 4 – Statement of the Darfurian armed movements, which joined the “Niamey Process”

Several non-signatory Darfurian movements present in Libya have tried to form a single bloc in order to achieve better conditions for their security arrangements with the Government of the Sudan Annex 7 – Non-signatory Darfurian armed groups in Libya

Promediation

Statement on the consultations between the Sudanese government delegation and the Alliance of Democratic Track Forces

On 11 – 12 June 2022, representatives of the Alliance of Democratic Track Forces, which brings together seven armed movements having forces in Libya, held an informal meeting with a high-level delegation mandated by the Sudanese government. The purpose of these initial discussions was to consult on the future forms of participation of these groups in the peace process in Sudan, to contribute to the success of the democratic transition, and to discuss ways for the withdrawal of their forces from Libya and their peaceful return to Sudan.

This meeting was held in Niamey - Republic of Niger, at the invitation and thanks to the facilitation of Promediation. The participants expressed their gratitude to the president, government and people of the Republic of Niger for their hospitality and their commitment to support stability in the region. This country is considered a model for the peaceful management of internal conflicts and has been able to develop the capacity and know-how to manage crises and differences through dialogue and in a respectful manner.

This meeting represents a major contribution to the stabilization of Darfur and Sudan, but also Libya and more broadly the entire region. It falls under the framework of various international efforts to implement the ceasefire agreement in Libya signed in October 2020, under the auspices of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, which aims at the departure of foreign forces from the country. The withdrawal of Sudanese armed groups remains one of the key points regarding the implementation of this agreement.

The discussions were cordial and fruitful, between sons of Sudan determined to find durable and definitive solutions to the conflict in Darfur and to ensure the successful and peaceful return of Libya-based fighters to Sudan. Two main topics were on the agenda: the participation of these movements in the peace process in Darfur and the political transition on the one hand, and the security arrangements on the other. With regards to the security arrangements, the discussion focused on the practical modalities and timetable concerning the return of fighters from Libya to Sudan, as well as their cantonment and integration into the Sudanese security forces or their return to civilian life.

The two parties agreed to continue their efforts to move forward on the technical, logistical and financial aspects of the return and integration of the fighters. The


Alliance of Democratic Track Forces and the government delegation also agreed on the importance of ensuring the full contribution of the Alliance of Democratic Track Forces to the political transition and the ongoing peace process in Sudan.

The parties are aware of the severe financial difficulties currently hindering the implementation of the comprehensive peace process in Sudan. They encourage and urge international partners to assume their responsibilities towards Sudan and Libya and to spare no effort in order to successfully complete the ongoing peace processes in these two countries. The parties request the assistance and support of Promediation to mobilize strong and swift support from international partners in order to ensure the success of the process that they initiated in Niamey, in particular the withdrawal of armed groups from Libya and the implementation of security arrangements.

Niamey - Republic of Niger

June 11, 2022

Annex 5 – Reconciliation and compensation agreement after a cross-border incident (Sudan-Chad)



Source: Twitter

The United Nations Translation from French

Republic of Chad
 Ministry of Defence, Veterans and War Victims
 General Staff of the Armed Forces
 Joint Chad-Sudan Force
 Office of the Chief of Staff

No. [illegible]
 Minutes of reconciliation agreement

A bloody intercommunal confrontation took place between 3 and 5 August 2022 in Birceliba, the Sudan, involving Sudanese and Chadian herders. This clash, triggered by the theft of three camels from Chad, resulted in the death of 27 people, comprising 9 Chadians and 18 Sudanese, with more than 40 people from both sides injured.

The commanders of the Joint Chad-Sudan Force, having learned of the confrontation that night, met in Birak, a town in Chad located on the border with the Sudan. Accompanied by traditional leaders from both sides and General Djalal Bakhit Ibrahim, the coordinator of the Sudanese joint force, General Oussama Mahamat Khalide Al-Sanhouri, Commander of the Joint Chad-Sudan Force, and his deputy, General Ousmane Bahar Mahamat Itno, visited the site of the confrontation and entrusted the case to the traditional leaders to rule on the facts as is the custom. Following two weeks of deliberations, the parties have agreed as follows:

- The Chadian side shall return 40 camels to the Sudan and pay cash in the amount of 1,300,000 CFA francs for four additional camels, out of the total number of 55 camels missing following the confrontation; confirmation is pending with regard to the remaining 11 missing camels for which compensation is to be determined.
- On 21 September 2022, the Sudan shall return the three camels taken from Chad.
- Chad shall pay blood money (“diya”) for the 18 Sudanese herders killed, for a total of 108,000,000 CFA francs, that is 6,000,000 CFA francs for each deceased herder.
- The Sudanese side shall pay blood money (“diya”) for the 9 Chadian herders killed in the amount of 54,000,000 CFA francs, that is 6,000,000 CFA francs for each deceased herder.
- The four horses and five camels killed in the fighting are valued at 2,250,000 CFA francs, to be paid on 21 September 2022 by the Chadian side.

With regard to the first item above, as the Sudanese side was unable to return the three camels to the Chadian side, those three camels are considered as having been among the 55 camels taken.

In order to prevent this type of incident from occurring in the future, the following recommendations have been made:

1. In the event of cattle theft, the owner must notify the nearest post or company of the Joint Force.
2. The post or company must mobilize within 30 minutes of receiving such notification.
3. Should it fail to act, the post or company shall be held responsible.
4. In order to catch the criminals, the number of personnel serving in the Joint Force must be increased and logistical reinforcements must be provided, in particular to the following companies: Birak, Koulbous, Birceliba, Mistré, Béida and Adé.
5. The regular Sudanese forces deployed at the border shall assist the Joint Force in pursuing the criminals.
6. The States shall no longer pay blood money (“diya”) in connection with intercommunal confrontations stemming from cattle theft.
7. A new local committee must be established to provide support to the companies and posts in the form of intelligence and information about the thieves and their hiding places.

In witness whereof this reconciliation agreement has been concluded for all due intents and purposes.

Done at Birak on 21 August 2022
 The traditional authorities

[illegible]

22-29309

Annex 7 – Intercommunal reconciliation agreements in West Darfur

Below, there are three intercommunal agreements overseen by RSF in West Darfur and shared with the Panel by the Government of the Sudan. The effectiveness of these agreements would depend on follow-up activities of local administrations and Government security forces. See also S/2022/48 Annex 9 – A Local Peace Agreement, West Darfur.

Agreement I

**The Rapid Support Forces
Peace and Reconciliation Committee**

Date: / / 20

No.:

In the name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate

The Republic of the Sudan

West Darfur State

Jebel Moon locality

Reconciliation document between the Misseriya and Rizeigat Arab tribal branches

El Geneina

June 2022

Sudan - Khartoum - Rapid Support Forces Tower

0123957402 - 0912353608

Reconciliation document between the Misseriya and Rizeigat Arab tribal branches in the Jebel Moon locality

Introduction

The Almighty said in his revelation: "No good can come of most secret consultations except for those who enjoin charity, right behaviour and reconciliation among the people. Whoever does that is pleasing to God and will receive a mighty reward". Reconciliation can only be between adversaries and enemies. Conflict, enmity and mutual anger engender evil, discord and fragmentation that cannot be contained. That is why the sharia in its wisdom urges reconciliation among people via blood, wealth, possessions and even religious traditions. God Almighty said: "Hold on tight all together to the rope of God. Do not be divided. Remember God's blessing to you. When you were enemies, he joined your hearts. Through His blessing you become brothers. You were on the edge of the pit of Hell. He saved you from it. That is why God reveals his verses to you - so you may be guided" (Qur'an 3: [95]).

- This reconciliation is a joint effort to settle disputes, redress grievances, make reparation for damage and correct injustices and mistakes resulting from past conflict between the two parties, namely, the Rizeigat and Misseriya Arab tribal branches. It is based on the principles of our true Islamic religion, which prohibits fighting between Muslims urges mutual compassion, solidarity and cooperation among them. It calls for reconciliation and shuns bloodshed. In order to instil a culture of peace, forgiveness and confidence-building between the two parties, and taking into account the ties of blood and kinship between them, on the day of Saturday, 18 June 2022; under the generous sponsorship of the State, represented by Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, Vice President of the Sovereignty Council and Commander of the Rapid Support Forces; under his direct authorization to the Peace and Reconciliation Committee of the Rapid Support Forces chaired by Colonel Musa Hamid Ambello; and under the immediate supervision of Brigadier General Idris Hasan Ibrahim, the two parties agreed to conclude a sustainable reconciliation agreement in accordance with the following conditions and commitments:

1. Reconciliation between the two parties shall be comprehensive and sustainable. War must not break out again no matter what the justifications and reasons. Everyone must be governed by the voice of reason.
2. Compensation and reparation for the damage caused to the two parties shall be made in accordance with customs, practices and precedents. This will be done by the Vice President of the Sovereignty Council and Commander of the Rapid Support Forces.
3. The two parties commit fully to refraining from protecting criminals such as thieves and murderers, and from all attacks. They commit to opening the road between Seleia and El Geneina without obstruction by either party. All agree to address any adverse incidents resolutely via law, through a joint regular force formed from the army, Rapid Support, the police, and so on.
4. Facilitation will be provided for displaced persons and refugees to return to their villages of origin that they left because of the war, and to engage in farming as they used to without obstruction by any party.
5. It will be agreed to form a joint technical mechanism made up of both sides, headed by a patrol to resolve problems [at the first sign of hostilities], in coordination and cooperation with the competent Government agencies.
6. Both parties commit fully to refrain from setting fire to the other's villages and pastures.
7. The moral and historical right of the Misseriya Jebel to the land will be preserved, with full commitment to the right for all to live accordance with citizenship and respect for inherited values, customs, traditions and rights.
8. A joint unit will be formed in the event of any incidents that violate social peace or any acts of theft. A joint mechanism will be established. It will be agreed there will be no blood money for a thief who resists and is killed by the joint forces of the unit.
9. It is advised that a joint military force be set up to impose the authority of the State and the rule of law, and ensure that the reconciliation between the two parties is sustainable.
10. Nomads will return to the villages that they left as a result of the war, especially the villages of Asa, Saqq, Kharubah and Karanu.
11. Markets, water sources, and public health and service facilities will be opened for the mutual benefit of both parties immediately upon signature of the reconciliation agreement between the two parties with no time restriction. Awareness will be disseminated of a culture of peace and community coexistence, with a view to overcoming tragedy and hatred.
12. The parties commit to a joint military force made up of the army, Rapid Support and the police to be set up and deployed to protect the reconciliation agreement and spread peace in the northern Geneina area.
13. Proactive engagement will be maintained by the leaders of the civil administration, the tribes and the youth to disseminate a positive spirit and constructive interaction to instil the principle of building trust and sustaining peace.

We ask God for success, recompense and succor

Signatures of representatives of the parties to the reconciliation agreement

No.	Representing Rezeigat	Signature	Representing Misseriya	Signature
1	Amir Masar Abdulrahman Asil		Fursha Jallabi Abdullah Mahdi	
2	Amir Sanusi Tahir Karshum		Amir Hafiz Shaykh Ahmad	
3	Amir Ahmad Khalil Shit		Omda Abkar Abdulshafi' Suni	
4	Amir Abbas Musa Jibril		Omda Ibrahim Yahya Muhammad	
5	Amir Abdulrahman Muhammad Jum'ah		Omda Ibrahim Yahya Muhammad	
6	Amir Taha Musa Adam Khatir		Omda Ishaq Da'ud Najm	
7	Omda Muhammad Ushayqir Uthman		Omda Dawm Ibrahim Muhammad	
8	Aqid Hasbullah Isa Hanunah		Omda Adam Dawmah Ali	
9	Omda Hasan Isa Daqdaq		Aqid Ibrahim Ahmad Yahya Mahdi	
10	Omda Nur Abdulwahid Hamdan		Aqid Abdullah Raja Dudin	
11	Omda Daqqah Idris Ajinah		Omda Shaykhuldin Muhammad Mahin	

<i>No.</i>	<i>Representing Rezeigat</i>	<i>Signature</i>	<i>Representing Misseriya</i>	<i>Signature</i>
12	Omda Khamis Muhammad Musa		Omda Abdullah Muhammad Husayn	

1. Chair of the Peace and Reconciliation Committee: Colonel Musa Hamid Ambello [*Signature*]
2. Supervisor of the Peace and Reconciliation Committee: Brigadier General Idris Hasan Ibrahim [*Signature*]
3. Supervisor of the reconciliation agreement: General Khamis Abdullah Abkar, Governor of West Darfur State [*Signature*]

Witnesses:

1. *Sultan Sa'd Abdulrahman Bahrudin* [*Signature*]
2. *Sultan Hashim Uthman Hashim* [*Signature*]

Sponsor and guarantor of the reconciliation agreement: Vice President of the Sovereignty Council and Commander of the Rapid Support Forces

Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo [*Signature*] Date:

Agreement II

**The Rapid Support Forces
Peace and Reconciliation Committee**

Date: / / 20

No.:

In the name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate

**The Republic of the Sudan
West Darfur State**

**Reconciliation document between the Arab Tribes and the Gimir Tribe in West Darfur State and the Saraf
Omra locality**

**El Geneina
July 2022**

Sudan - Khartoum - Rapid Support Forces Tower

0123957402 - 0912353608

**Reconciliation document between the Arab Tribes and the Gimir Tribe in West Darfur State and the Saraf
Omra locality**

Introduction

The Almighty said in his revelation: "No good can come of secret consultations except for those who enjoin charity, right behaviour and reconciliation among the people. Whoever does that is pleasing to God and will receive a mighty reward". Reconciliation can only be between adversaries and enemies. Conflict, enmity and mutual anger engender evil, division and fragmentation that cannot be contained. That is why the sharia in its wisdom urges reconciliation among people via blood, wealth, possessions and even religious traditions. "Hold on tight all together to the rope of God. Do not be divided. Remember God's blessing to you. When you were enemies, he joined your hearts. Through His blessing you become brothers. You were on the edge of the pit of Hell. He saved you from it. That is why God reveals his verses to you - so you may be guided" (Qur'an 4: 103).

- This reconciliation is a joint effort to settle disputes, redress grievances, make reparations and correct injustices and mistakes that resulted from past conflict between the two parties, namely, the Arab tribes and the Gimir tribe in West Darfur State and Saraf Omra. It is based on the principles of our true Islamic religion, which prohibits fighting between Muslims and urges compassion, solidarity and cooperation among them. It calls for reconciliation and shuns bloodshed. In order to instil a culture of peace, forgiveness and confidence-building between the two parties, and taking into account the ties of blood and kinship between them, on the day of Wednesday, 6 July 2022, under the generous sponsorship of the State, represented by Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, Vice President of the Sovereignty Council and Commander of the Rapid Support Forces; in the honoured presence of two Sovereignty Council members, Al-Hadi Idris and Al-Tahir Abu Bakr Hajar, and a representative of the Governor of the region, Ahmad Qaridiya; under his direct authorization to the Peace and Reconciliation Committee of the Rapid Support Forces under the chairmanship of Colonel Musa Hamid Ambello; and under the immediate executive supervision of Brigadier General Idris Hasan Ibrahim, the two parties agreed to conclude a sustainable reconciliation agreement in accordance with the following conditions and commitments:

1. That reconciliation between the two parties shall be comprehensive and sustainable. War must not break out again no matter what the justifications and reasons. Everyone must be governed by the voice of reason.

2. Looted money and property will be returned based on agreed-upon customary procedures in accordance with the rules, regulations and customs that are generally followed when an accusation is made against a specific person, persons or entity.
3. Displaced persons will return to their villages and places of origin from which they were displaced as a result of the war. They will be permitted to dig drinking water wells for humans and livestock, in accordance with local and state regulations.
4. Mobilization will not be permitted. Military camps and troop concentrations among the two parties will be broken up.
5. Markets and roads leading to all localities and states will be opened without obstruction by any party. Water sources and public services shall be ensured.
6. The agricultural season will be protected in accordance with prevailing local and state procedures. Agriculture may not expand at the expense of pastures, especially open-air corrals.
7. Adverse incidents that undermine security and social peace will be combated by deploying a joint force to impose the authority of the State and the rule of law.
8. Livestock routes, summer encampments and agricultural farms will be secured in accordance with the prevailing regulations, customs, traditions and inheritance rules.
9. All components of the regular forces will adhere to strict impartiality and shall enforce the authority of the State and the rule of law on all components of society in the aforementioned areas.
10. Criminals and bandits may not be protected or supported by any tribe or tribes involved in the reconciliation process, or any other party.
11. Self-restraint will be adhered to. A sharp tone will be avoided when it comes to ownership of land, whether farms or pastures. The decisive factor will be prevailing custom.
12. A joint technical committee will be formed that will include the [tribal leaders] and civil administrations to follow up the implementation of the terms of the reconciliation agreement between the two parties.
13. Compensation and reparation for the damage caused to the two parties shall be made in accordance with customs, practices and precedents. That will be done by the Vice President of the Sovereignty Council and Commander of the Rapid Support Forces.

We ask God for success, recompense and succor

Signatures of representatives of the parties to the reconciliation agreement from both parties:

No.	Representatives of Arab tribes	Signature	No.	Representatives of the Gimir tribe	Signature
1	<i>Amir</i> Masar Abdulrahman Asil		1	A. Abdulghani Adam Abkar	
2	<i>Amir</i> Sanusi Tahir Karshum		2	<i>Sultan</i> Yahya Bulad Idris	
3	<i>Amir</i> [Muhammad] Khalil Shit		3	<i>Amir</i> Barakat Isma'il Barakat	
4	<i>Amir</i> Abdullah Muhammad Abdulhadi		4	A. Sayfuldin Uthman Idris	
5	<i>Amir</i> Abdulrahman Muhammad Jum'ah		5	A. Khalil Abkar Yahya	
6	<i>Amir</i> Muhammad Musa Adam Khatir		6	<i>Nazir</i> Kamal Ahmad Mustafa	
7	<i>Amir</i> Tahir Ali Abdullah		7	A. Khalil Rakib Ahmad Baydah	
8	<i>Amir</i> Hafiz Hasan Umar		8	A. Adil Izzuldin Yunus	
9	<i>Amir</i> Muhammad Abdulaziz Takishu		9	A. Jabir Mustafa Hashim	
10	<i>Amir</i> Adam Hasbullah		10	<i>Fursha</i> Kamal Zakariya Abdulbanat	

<i>No.</i>	<i>Representatives of Arab tribes</i>	<i>Signature</i>	<i>No.</i>	<i>Representatives of the Gimir tribe</i>	<i>Signature</i>
11	<i>Amir</i> Yusuf Ibrahim Hasan		11	<i>Muhandis</i> Habib Uthman Idris	
12	<i>Amir</i> Bisharah Dajo Hasan		12	A. Muhammad Sulayman [Hidr]	
13	<i>Amir</i> Abdulrahman al-Fadil		13	A. Ahmad Adam al-Nur	
14	<i>Omda</i> Dhakariya Ali al-Durrah		14	<i>Aqid</i> Yusuf Sharif Muhammad	
15	<i>Sheikh</i> Isa Yahya Abdulrahim		15	Dr. Muhammad Adam Muhammadayn	
16	<i>Ustadh</i> Umar Adam Salih		16	A. Abdulsamad Abdulhamid	
17	<i>Ustadh</i> Muhammad Zayn Idris Adam		17	A. Adam Ushr Ahmad	
18	<i>Omda</i> Hasan Isa Daqdaq		18	A. Ya ‘qub Ishaq Ibrahim	
19	<i>Omda</i> Asil Muhammad Da'ud		19	A. Muhammad al-Amin Adam	
20	<i>Omda</i> Ibrahim al-Habbu		20	<i>Aqid</i> Salih Ahmad Adam	

1. Chair of the Peace and Reconciliation Committee: Colonel Musa Hamid Ambello

2. Supervisor of the Peace and Reconciliation Committee: Brigadier General Idris Hasan Ibrahim

3. Supervisor of the reconciliation agreement: General Khamis Abdullah Abkar, Governor of West Darfur State

Witnesses:

1. *[Illegible line]*

2. *[Illegible line]*

Sponsor and guarantor of the reconciliation agreement: Vice President of the Sovereignty Council and Commander of the Rapid Support Forces

Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo Date:

Agreement III**The Rapid Support Forces
Peace and Reconciliation Committee**

Date: / / 20

No.:

*In the name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate***The Republic of the Sudan
West Darfur State****Reconciliation document between the Awra and Shali branches of Gimir and the Tama tribe in Dar Masalit
El Geneina
July 2022**

Sudan - Khartoum - Rapid Support Forces Tower

0123957402 – 091235360

*In the name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate***Reconciliation agreement document between the Awra and Shali branches of Gimir and the Tama tribe in Dar
Masalit****Introduction**

The Almighty said in his revelation: "Hold on tight all together to the rope of God. Do not be divided. Remember God's blessing to you. When you were enemies, he joined your hearts. Through His blessing you become brothers. You were on the edge of the pit of Hell. He saved you from it. That is why God reveals his verses to you – so you may be guided" (Qur'an 4: 103).

God Almighty gave himself the name of "Peace". He named the Garden where the righteous among his servants dwell "The Abode of Peace". And he made the greeting used by the people of the Garden "Peace". This is a clear sign that peace is the basis of the universe created by God Almighty. The Prophet said: "No Muslim is permitted to terrorize another Muslim"; that is a verified hadith. So the Prophet himself forbade us from intimidating or frightening a Muslim, even as a joke. Therefore, under the aegis of the Peace and Reconciliation Committee of the Rapid Support Forces, chaired by Colonel Musa Hamid Ambello; the supervision of Brigadier General Idris Hasan Ibrahim, the General Supervisor of the Committee, and all its members; and the direct sponsorship of the Vice President of the Sovereignty Council and Commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, who has sponsored comprehensive reconciliations in Sudan and devoted himself to encouraging anything that can inspire security and tranquility in the hearts of citizens, especially in West Darfur, in the wake of the tribal conflict now raging; and in addition to the reconciliation agreements that have already been reached, which include the following:

1. The reconciliation agreement concluded on Saturday, 18 June 2022 between the Rizeigat and Misseriya Arab tribal branches;
2. The cessation-of-hostilities agreement concluded on Saturday, 25 June 2022 between the Arab tribes and the Masalit;
3. The reconciliation agreement concluded on Saturday, 25 July 2022 between the Arab tribes and the Erenga tribe in the Sirba locality;

Therefore, on Friday, 1 July 2022, Awra and Shali branches of Gimir and the Tama tribe in Dar Masalit do agree to a comprehensive reconciliation agreement to put an end to the bloodshed in accordance with the following conditions:

1. Disputes over farms between two parties will be reviewed, and the courts will issue rulings in accordance with the relevant principles, regulations and laws in force.
2. A joint military unit will be relied on in the event of any incident that violates social peace or and incidents of theft. A joint mechanism will be established among them.
3. Markets, water sources, and public health and service facilities will be opened for the mutual benefit of both parties immediately upon signature of the reconciliation agreement between the two parties with no time restriction. Awareness will be disseminated of a culture of peace and community coexistence, with a view to overcoming tragedy and hatred.
4. Looting and plunder will be combated. Action will be taken to eliminate crime or obstruction of farmers and herders. Fleeing criminals will not be protected.
5. There will be a joint mechanism made up of various regional social forces represented on a council to consider various matters, problems, crises and clashes. Their decision will be applicable to all.
6. The Government will be the guarantor of decisions, pacts and instruments, in accordance with the rule of law and imposition of the authority of the State.
7. Competitive conflict with political dimensions that affect the cohesion of the social fabric will be avoided.
8. A joint military force will be set up to impose the authority of the State and the rule of law and ensure that the reconciliation between the two parties is sustainable.

[Translator's note: Page repeated at this point in the pdf]

9. Compensation and reparation for the damage caused to the two parties shall be made in accordance with customs, practices and precedents. That will be done by the Vice President of the Sovereignty Council and Commander of the Rapid Support Forces.

We ask God for success, recompense and succor

Representatives of the two parties signing the reconciliation agreement:

No.	<i>Representatives of the Tama tribe</i>	<i>Signature</i>	<i>Representatives of the Gimir affiliates Awra and Shali</i>	<i>Signature</i>
1	<i>Amir Ja'far Isma'il Muhammad Ahmad</i>		<i>Sultan Yahya Bulad Idris</i>	
2	<i>Omda Abkar Harun Ahmad</i>		<i>Nazir Kamal Ahmad Mustafa</i>	
3	<i>Omda Nuruldin Ishaq Abdullah</i>		<i>Fursha Zakariya Abdulbanat Muhammad</i>	
4	<i>Omda Yahya Hasan Abkar</i>		<i>Magdum Khalil Rakib Ahmad Baydah</i>	
5	<i>Omda Musa Yahya Idris</i>		<i>Ustadh Kamal Zakariya Abdulbanat Muhammad</i>	
6	<i>Omda Bilal Ibrahim Harun</i>		<i>Amir Fadl al-Dawm Ahmad</i>	
7	<i>Omda Ahmad Ya'qub Jum'ah</i>		<i>Omda Ishaq Da'ud al-Dawmah</i>	
8	<i>Omda Ibrahim Siddiq Muhammad</i>		<i>Omda Musa Ibrahim Muhammad Adam</i>	

No.	<i>Representatives of the Tama tribe</i>	<i>Signature</i>	<i>Representatives of the Gimir affiliates Awra and Shali</i>	<i>Signature</i>
9	<i>Omda</i> Sunbuk Ya‘qub Ibrahim		<i>Omda</i> Muhammad Ishaq Muhammadayn	
10	<i>Aqid</i> Adam al-Nur Ya‘qub Dahab		<i>Aqid</i> Adam Ishaq Muhammadayn	
11	<i>Bashmuhandis</i> Abdullah Muhammad Abdullah		<i>Shaykh</i> Dawm Abdullah Abdulrahim	
12	<i>Ustadh</i> Mahjub al-Nur Adam		<i>Ustadh</i> Ya‘qub Ishaq Ibrahim	

1. Chair of the Peace and Reconciliation Committee: Colonel Musa Hamid Ambello [*Signature*]
2. Supervisor of the Peace and Reconciliation Committee: Brigadier General Idris Hasan Ibrahim [*Signature*]
3. Supervisor of the reconciliation agreement: General Khamis Abdullah Abkar, Governor of West Darfur State [*Signature*]

Witnesses

1. [*Illegible*]
2. [*Illegible*]

Sponsor and guarantor of the reconciliation agreement: Vice President of the Sovereignty Council and Commander of the Rapid Support Forces

Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo [*Signature*]

Date:.....


Annex 8 – Areas occupied by “new settlers” (Sudanese or non-Sudanese), as presented by the IDPs in Kalma and Otash IDP camps

At the meetings with the Panel the IDPs in Kalma and Otash IDP camps presented various lists of their areas of origin, which were, according to them, occupied by “new settlers”, including Sudanese and foreign population, and sometimes sold by traditional administrators without consent of the IDPs. Below are examples of the cases where the reconciliation work (including the census) may need to be done before the return of the IDPs to the areas they see as their hawakeer.

“Adwa Administrative Unit, 23 villages that have been sold out by the Janjaweed and militias. The person who sold the land was Nazir Musa Abul Gasim, the head of Borgo tribe [...]

Kreiki/Nitaga locality. The village of new settlers under the leadership of Omda Ali Hamed from an Arab tribe (Halbawi) was established after the real owners of the village were expelled”.

Annex 10 – Map of Pariang area, South Sudan



Source: <https://reliefweb.int/map/south-sudan/south-sudan-pariang-county-reference-map-march-2020>

Annex 11 – Weapons observed by the Panel in Darfur

During the panel's two mission to Darfur in 2022 limited observations were made of weapons in possession of military groups in Sudan. Locations included El Fasher, El Geneina, Tawila and Seleia. Similar type of weapons observed by the panel are produced by the Sudan Military Industry Corporation (MIC), except for 12.8 108 mm DShK.

Weapons used by the signatory armed movements in Darfur that could be identified and verified included:

- Sub-Machine gun: 7.62 x 39 mm. Automatic for infantry and special units (AK47 variants)
- Sub-Machine gun: 9 x 19 mm Automatic individual weapon
- Mokhtar multi-purpose machine gun, Type 80: 7.62 x 54 mm.
- Khawad 12.7 mm anti-aircraft machine Gun Type 85: 12.7 x 108 mm.
- 60.75 mm Mortar shell used with Nimir 60 mm
- 82 mm Mortar shell used with 82 mm mortar launcher
- 120 mm Mortar for use with Ahmed 120 mm mortar launcher
- 40 mm Anti-Tank Grenade MBY04 used in RPGG7 Rocket launcher
- 12.8 x108 mm DShK belt-fed machine gun from unknown origin
- Unidentified RPGG Rocket launchers
- 12.8 x108 mm DShK belt-fed machine gun from unknown origin

The following weapons, ammunition and military vehicles were observed in Darfur in use by both the SAF and the RSF:

- Sub-Machine gun: 7.62 x 39 mm. Automatic for infantry and special units (AK47 variants)
- Sub-Machine gun: 9 x 19 mm Automatic individual weapon
- Terab: Automatic sub-machine gun: 5.56 x 45 mm. Terab is weapon of choice used by RSF in Darfur.
- Mokhtar multi-purpose machine gun, Type 80: 7.62 x 54 mm. Infantry automatic rifle and used for anti-aircraft fire.
- Khawad 12.7 mm anti-aircraft machine Gun Type 85: 12.7 x 108 mm. This weapon is very popular among the SAF and RSF and mounted on most technical Toyota Land Cruiser vehicles used by the SAF and RSF in Darfur.
- Grenade Launcher: 35 mm automatic grenade launcher based on Chinese QLZ-87 made by MIC Sudan.
- 60 mm Mortar
- 80 mm Mortar
- 120 mm Mortar
- Light Anti-tank Rocket Launcher: BRY01
- Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle (AIFV): AV6x6 SH1
- Reconnaissance Vehicle DBA01
- Reconnaissance Vehicle BRDM-SH
- 60.75 mm Mortar shell used with Nimir 60 mm
- 82 mm Mortar shell used with 82 mm mortar launcher
- 120 mm Mortar for use with Ahmed 120 mm mortar launcher
- 40 mm Anti-Tank Grenade MBY04 used in RPGG7 Rocket launcher
- Land Surveillance Truck
- 7.62 mm Semi-Automatic Sniper Rifle ADY02 Model 85
- Armoured Personnel Carrier BTR
- Armoured Personnel Carrier APC04
- Armoured Personnel Carrier V4x4-SH2
- PG-7 AT/incendiary MBY04-1 for use in RPG-7 rocket launcher
- 12.8 x108 mm DShK belt-fed machine gun from unknown origin
- BTR 8x8 vehicles (Only RSF observed)

Joint Sudan/Chad Border Force

Weapons used by the force and observed by the Panel included:

- Sub-Machine gun: 7.62 x 39 mm. Automatic for infantry and special units (AK47 variants)
- Sub-Machine gun: 9 x 19 mm Automatic individual weapon
- Mokhtar multi-purpose machine gun, Type 80: 7.62 x 54 mm. I
- Khawad 12.7 mm anti-aircraft machine Gun Type 85: 12.7 x 108 mm.
- 60.75 mm Mortar shell used with Nimir 60 mm
- 82 mm Mortar shell used with 82 mm mortar launcher
- 120 mm Mortar for use with Ahmed 120 mm mortar launcher
- 40 mm Anti-Tank Grenade MBY04 used in RPGG7 Rocket launcher
- 12.8 x108 mm DShK belt-fed machine gun from unknown origin

Annex 12 – United Nations Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) implementation Status

The object of the ATT is to establish the highest possible common international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms and to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms. The ATT aims at contributing to international and regional peace, security and stability and reducing human suffering. It also promotes cooperation, transparency, and responsible action by States Parties in the international trade in conventional arms. The ATT Secretariat engaged Sudan to build its capacity and work towards Sudan's ratification of the ATT. The ATT would provide Sudan and Darfur ratification of established global standards for the international trade in conventional weapons and establish international trust and transparency measures in managing the flow and transfer of weapons to Darfur.

The National Sudan Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (SDDRC) informed the panel that due to political developments the process to consider Sudan's decision to sign and ratify the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was temporarily slowed down due to funding limitations.

Interlocutors informed the Panel that the hold that was put on funding in October 2021 to support the Sudan Government to accede towards signing and ratification the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was lifted. It is expected that a High-Level workshop would be held in January 2023 in Khartoum funded by the ATT Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) in support of the project called the "*Support awareness creation towards accession to the ATT by the Republic of Sudan*". The aim of this workshop would be to engage with all relevant actors in the Sudan.