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REGIONAL ANALYSIS SYRIA

03 July 2014

Part II – Host countries

This Regional Analysis of the Syria conflict (RAS) is now produced quarterly, replacing the [monthly RAS of 2013](#). It seeks to bring together information from all sources in the region and provide holistic analysis of the overall Syria crisis. While Part I focuses on the situation within Syria, Part II covers the impact of the crisis on neighbouring countries. More information on how to use this document can be found on page 40. Please note that place names which are underlined are hyperlinked to their location on Google Maps. The Syria Needs Analysis Project welcomes all information that could complement this report. For more information, comments or questions please email SNAP@ACAPS.org.

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Regional Overview

The second quarter of 2014 has seen a continuation of refugee influx into neighbouring countries, however the increase in numbers is lower than in the previous quarters due to tighter entry restrictions in the various countries. Refugees arriving in Turkey primarily fled continued fighting in Aleppo, Hama and Idlib. An increasing number of refugees arriving in Lebanon indicated that their displacement was a secondary one as they had been displaced internally before, and present high levels of vulnerability.

The advance of IS in Iraq in recent weeks has changed the political dynamics in the region and created a corridor under the influence of Islamic State (IS) that stretches from eastern Syria to north-western Iraq. By 26 June, the takeover of Mosul and large areas in northern and central Iraq had led to the displacement of an estimated 648,000 persons, adding to large existing IDP communities. Food, shelter, health, NFIs and water have been identified as priority needs for humanitarian assistance. Access to IS-controlled areas is difficult at present. In Syria, serious protection issues stemming from extreme interpretations of Sharia law by IS are taking place.

Border restrictions: The closure of border crossings continues to affect the refugee entry and returns, the trade and supply of goods to neighbouring Syrian Governorates and the opportunities for delivering humanitarian aid into Syria.

The Peshkapour border crossing in Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I), the main crossing for Syrian refugees, has been closed for commercial and refugee transit due to disputes between Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Syrian Kurdish groups who control the crossing point. In the course of the Iraq conflict, IS has taken over the only official border crossing between Iraq and Jordan and reportedly also another one on the Syrian border, Al Qa'im. The overall conflict dynamics by IS in the region is likely to affect border crossing activities and policies.

All neighbouring countries of Syria furthermore continue to tighten their borders for people fleeing Syria, increasing the likelihood of rising numbers of unofficial border crossings. Lebanon temporarily closed its Arida border point to Syrians in late April for unknown reasons. Lebanon has also increased entry restrictions for Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS). Numbers of registered arrivals of PRS in Lebanon decreased compared to the previous six weeks as a direct result of the tighter rules.

Cross-border access: Cross border access for humanitarian assistance from neighbouring countries into Syria remains difficult. In late June, the Government of Syria (GoS) warned the UN Security Council that the proposed resolution on authorising cross-border humanitarian aid into opposition-controlled areas without its consent, would amount to an attack on the Syrian state and on its territorial integrity and political independence. ([Reuters 2014/06/20](#)) NGOs operating in northern Syria consider that the proposal included in the same draft resolution to establish UN monitors at the border crossings of Bab al-Hawa and Bab al-Salam in Turkey; Yarobiyeh in Iraq and Tal Shihab in Jordan will not improve the situation of currently restrained humanitarian access. The NGOs feel that the effective delivery of humanitarian aid could instead be improved by strengthening and further enabling cross-border activities of the humanitarian actors who are currently operational. ([NGO forum 2014/06/24](#))

Effects of dry weather: The region has seen a lack of precipitation in the last few months, following below-average rainfalls in the winter months and higher than normal air temperatures in winter and spring. These weather conditions have already had an effect on agricultural production in the region. Turkey has reported impacts on yields of crops, nuts, fruit, barley and wheat. Prices of food are expected to rise and the loss of, or limited supply of agricultural produce will affect both host populations and refugees, as well as food support into Syria. The dry weather conditions are also expected to disrupt the water supply and quality in many areas, including those where water supply is usually not an issue. Prices for water are expected to rise, making the ones with little or no income the most vulnerable in terms of access to safe water. It is likely that high temperatures and, in some parts of the region, humid conditions in the summer will aggravate the water shortages and cause hygiene problems and fuel disease transmission rates.


Detention of Syrian refugees continues to be observed throughout the region. In Egypt, detention for illegal migration continues as people increasingly attempt to escape the economic burdens and instability by travelling to Europe by boat. In Lebanon, the number of detentions is on the increase on grounds of illegal entry and stay. With the enforcement of more restrictive entry measures in the countries in the region currently hosting Syrian refugees, and with many people crossing the borders at unofficial crossings, the detention numbers could rise over the next coming months.

Child labour: As many refugee families have exhausted their resources and coping mechanisms to reduce their economic vulnerabilities, more and more children within the refugee population in the host countries are engaging in income generating activities to support their families, especially where there is no father or male relative present. Child labour is an issue also in host populations, with children involved in small trade, artisanal, mining or agricultural work. Child labour poses an additional problem for educational development where children have access to schooling but are forced to work instead of attending classes.


Possible Developments

- **Forced returns:** Due to increasing domestic concerns with national security coupled with the growing refugee population, host countries increasingly return refugees to Syria. Forced returns occur on an individual basis and with specific groups rather than through mass returns, which would draw significant attention. In Egypt, returns continue to occur under the new government, with Syrians being denied entry at the airport and returned to Syria or to other third countries. In Jordan, the re-verification process of the urban caseload in local police stations leads to dozens of forced returns due to the lack of protection presence in police stations. In Lebanon, PRS are particularly vulnerable to forced returns as their legal status runs out with no channels for renewal and they are no longer allowed (re-)entry.
- **IS regional influence:** With IS's successful gains in Iraq, extremist groups and individuals, particularly in Jordan and Lebanon, are further mobilised and begin planning and/or staging high profile attacks. In Lebanon, such attacks further aggravate sectarian tensions while in Jordan, there is a GoJ crackdown on extremists' activities, particularly in Ma'an. The overall security situation in Jordan, however, remains stable with western government reinforcing security and military assistance to the Kingdom.
- **Funding shortfalls:** With increased attention focused on the humanitarian crisis in Iraq and competing global crises, there is a weak donor response to refugee response activities in the latter half of 2014. As a result, programmes targeting refugees are scaled back, with increasing cuts to non-lifesaving activities and disproportionate cuts to the response in urban areas, particularly in Iraq and Jordan. The situation in Iraq is further exacerbated by the limited funding available from the KRG, which had previously invested significant amounts in camp infrastructure, water supplies and basic services.
- **Water shortages:** The low levels of rainfall this year have a negative impact on refugee coping mechanisms due to its multi-pronged effect on social cohesion, health, livelihoods and the overall economy of host countries. Social cohesion continues to deteriorate between refugee and hosting communities across the region. This year, social tensions are further aggravated by water shortages which affect both drinking water supplies and agricultural activities. As many refugees, particularly in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey rely on the agricultural sector for informal work and livelihoods, this further aggravates refugees' ability to survive. Turkey's agricultural production sector, which makes up a significant part of its economy, is also hard hit and further exacerbates Turkey's recent economic problems, following years of high growth. In Jordan and Lebanon, the lack of adequate and clean water supplies leads to an increase in communicable diseases, particularly diarrhea among young children.

Humanitarian profile (See Annex B for definitions)



Place of origin Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR (May 2014)



2014 Q2 Timeline - Main events Host Countries


Lebanon improved security situation: Since the GoS forces' offensive in the Qalamoun region and the rolling out of the Lebanese Armed Forces' security plan in the north and the Bekaa border regions, security in Lebanon has noticeably improved. Bombings in Beirut have stopped since March despite few rockets' shelling on eastern Lebanon.

Opening of Azraq camp and protection concerns in Jordan: The camp, designed for an initial capacity of 50,000, with the ability to expand to accommodate 130,000, opened on 30 April. As of 6 June, the camp hosted around 7,100 refugees. There have been a high number of unofficial departures from the camp due to the harsh weather conditions, the long distances to services and the lack of livelihood opportunities. In addition, the GoJ announced that Syrian nationals will not be allowed to enter the country through airports unless they hold a residency permit or have proof that they are transiting. An unknown number of refugees were sent back to Syria during the GoJ re-verification process in Zaatari.

Rising departures from Egypt to Europe: Former army chief, Al-Sisi, won the presidential elections at the end of May and this was expected to bring political semi-stability. However, protection concerns for refugees remain high. UNHCR reported an increase in the number of Syrian refugees charged with attempting to illegally depart Egypt. In early June, the Italian navy rescued more than 5,000 people, mostly Syrians and Egyptians, who had attempted the perilous journey across the Mediterranean by boat. Detentions for illegal migration have also continued. As of 3 June, Egypt had detained 519 additional refugees from Syria and was holding 102 at police stations.

Security deterioration in Lebanon: After the remaining pockets of armed fighters along the Lebanese-Syrian borders were isolated, a new stage of violence started in June. In a 1 week period from 20 June, 3 explosions hit the Bekaa and different areas in Beirut. Lebanese security forces have been increasingly pursuing foreign fighters. Extremists are expected to try to carry out a significant number of terror attacks in Lebanon.

and water shortages: the lack of rainfall has caused frequent water cuts and impacted agricultural and livestock production.



Access constraints in Iraq: The ongoing conflict in Anbar province continues to present challenges, including access to the refugees in Al Obady camp and IDPs in Anbar. On the Kurdish side, the KRG started digging a trench to limit smuggling from north-eastern Syria.

Increase in refugees in Turkey: the number of camp registered refugees has increased by 6% since December 2013, with more than 220,000 people living in camps. The registered urban population also increased by 27%.

PRS banned from entry to Lebanon: On 8 May, the GoL placed prohibitive restrictions on entry by PRS. To enter Lebanon, PRS must possess either an entry permit obtained through the Lebanese embassy in Damascus, a residency permit of 1 to 3 years, or an exit and return permit. HRW has stated that the process to apply for the permits is unclear and makes it almost impossible for Palestinian refugees to enter Lebanon.

Conflict developments in Iraq: IS fighters suddenly advanced in north-western and central Iraq. The capture of swathes of Ninewa, Salah Eddine and Diyala governorates has led to the displacement of an estimated 648,000 people. IS has also threatened to push to the capital and Shi'a-majority areas. In Anbar governorate to the west, armed violence displaced close to 500,000 people earlier this year. IS progress came after Prime Minister Maliki, the leader of a Shi'ite political party, won the largest share of Iraqi parliamentary seats in national elections that took place on 19 May.

Possible developments:

Funding decline: A new targeting system is introduced by UNCHR in Lebanon. The number of beneficiaries is largely reduced. A weak donor response to refugee response activities is also witnessed in Iraq and Jordan.

Violence spill-over: With IS's successful gains in Iraq, extremists, particularly in Jordan and Lebanon, are further mobilised and begin planning and/or staging high profile attacks.

Water shortages: In Jordan and Lebanon, the lack of adequate water supplies leads to an increase in communicable diseases, particularly diarrhoea. Turkey's agricultural production sector, which makes up a significant part of its economy, is also hard hit by the water shortages.

Lebanon


Displaced

Syrian registered refugees and awaiting registration	1,111,583
Palestinian refugees from Syria	53,070
Syrian returnees	Unknown
Syrian migrants	Unknown

Non displaced

Host communities affected by the Syria crisis	1,500,000
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OCHA 2014/05/31, UNHCR 2014/06/24



Key Issues

Water shortages: Water shortages are expected this summer after the country experienced one of the driest winter seasons in decades. There will likely be a significant drop in water availability, a reduction in water quality, and water needs in areas where water availability and quality are not usually an issue. Hot and humid summer months will increase the prevalence of hygiene-related problems and waterborne diseases. By late 2013, 909,000 Syrian refugees and 1.5 million Lebanese were already in need of water support.

Shelter: Shelter remains a priority need for refugees, as more are turning to improvised shelters due to the lack of other options. 40% of refugees reportedly live in insecure and/or unfinished buildings and informal settlements, where they are subject to limited access to water and hygiene facilities, and often face overcrowding and harsh weather conditions. Also, due to lack of available shelters and increasing rent prices, a rising number of refugees are at risk of eviction.

Mines: A recent nationwide impact assessment survey indicated that there are areas where refugees live within 10-20 metres of known minefields in West Bekaa and Rashaya. Due to Lebanon's previous years of conflict, cluster munitions, landmines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) are still active and spread throughout populated areas. Due to the refugee crisis, pressure on resources and land is leading populations into hazardous areas.

Increased restrictions for PRS: In early May, the Lebanese Government placed prohibitive restrictions on Palestinian Refugees from Syria (PRS) wanting to enter Lebanon or to renew their visas. It states that they need to possess either an entry permit approved by the Directorate of General Security, a residency permit

of 1 to 3 years, or an exit and return permit. It requires entry permits to be obtained through the Lebanese embassy in Damascus. A circular issued by the General Security Office on 22 May requires PRS to regularise their legal status within a month.

Possible Developments

Targeted assistance: A new targeting system is to be introduced in early summer, and is expected to reduce the number of UNHCR registered people currently benefiting from UNHCR cash assistance for Non Food Items. Up until now, people considered as vulnerable (60-70% of the total registered) were benefiting from this assistance. With the new targeting system, it is expected that the number of beneficiaries will probably be reduced by at least 50%, mainly due to funding restrictions. This could cause significant unrest among affected populations, and is likely to further increase the vulnerability level of households who fall outside the targeted group.

Increased needs: As the crisis lingers, both host communities and refugees who have been in the country for months or years see their capacity for resilience reduced. Also, an increasing share of newcomers has been through several internal displacements before crossing into Lebanon, which also made them more vulnerable. This, combined with reduced funding and a decrease in humanitarian assistance, is very likely to result in a widening gap between needs and services capacity.

Increase in security incidents: Although the reporting period has shown a decrease in security incidents compared to previous months, shelling and clashes in the border areas continue to be a source of concern., Recent bombings and suspicions of planned attacks are raising fears that the country could go back to higher levels of insecurity, notably due to the current polarised and unstable political environment, the absence of a Lebanese President, and the reported presence of Islamic State (IS) in Lebanon. Sectarian violence has so far been brought under control by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) security plan, but a breakdown of the security agreement could lead to an escalation of tensions and incidents between Sunnis, Shias and other smaller confessional groups.

Increased tensions between refugees and host communities: While the Lebanese community has overall been hospitable, tensions continue to run high in areas hosting vulnerable Lebanese populations and a high concentration of Syrian refugees. The expected water shortages are likely to further aggravate the situation, as groundwater availability will drop, and the price of purchased water will increase. Additionally, water rationing is likely to have an effect on agriculture and related livelihood opportunities.

Increase in the number of Informal Tented Settlements (ITS): Although ITS only account for 15% of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, a potential increase in the

number of informal settlements is a cause of concern, considering the fact that the rental market is already under high pressure and refugees are finding it increasingly difficult to afford rented accommodation. The potential influx of refugees in the coming months could also contribute to this increase. This is to be put in perspective with the Government's no-camp policy, which makes these settlements illegal and adversely impacts the vulnerability level of populations residing there. The number of informal settlements has increased by 154% between July 2013 and May 2014.

Operational constraints

On 20 June, a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) exploded at one of the main check points in the Bekaa. Security forces were on high alert following suspicions of planned attacks in Beirut and the surrounding area, and checkpoints were established in and around the capital, and in the Bekaa. Despite these recent incidents, the situation has been relatively stable, believed to be the result of the Lebanese security forces' plan to detect groups aiming at destabilising the country and to arrest major terrorist suspects and members of fundamentalist groups. ([DailyStar 2014/06/23](#), [DailyStar 2014/06/22](#))

In the Bekaa, northern Lebanon and border areas, pockets of insecurity continue to hinder the delivery of humanitarian assistance. However, UNDSS reported that border clashes and shelling have reduced compared to the first quarter of 2014.

In April and May, military operations in border areas have prevented aid organisations from travelling to areas such as Aarsal and Tfail, where clashes were reported on several occasions between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and armed men allegedly coming from Syria.

Access to parts of Akkar and to Palestinian refugee camps was also limited at times. Over 45 rockets and shells, most of which were reportedly fired from Syria, landed in the Bekaa and Akkar, causing one injury and material damage.

In Tripoli, the LAF security plan led to an overall reduction of violence, notably between the neighbourhoods of Jabel Mohsen and Bab at Tabbaneh. Aid organisations did not face access restrictions to the area in April or May. ([OCHA 2014/05/31](#))

Data sources and limitations

- ACTED conducted an assessment in Beirut and Mount Lebanon (Baabda, Metn, Keserwane, and Jbeil) to identify the needs of refugees and host communities in urban and peri-urban areas. The report indicated that sampling methods do not allow for a representative interpretation of findings.
- Amnesty International published a report on Syrian refugees in need of health care in Lebanon. The report focuses on Syrian refugees rather than on other refugees (PRS), and does not include information about Syrian

refugees who receive care outside the UN system, through alternative relief networks.

- The health information system continues to publish records and statistics on morbidity and mortality per geographic area in Lebanon. Of the 166 PHCs (Primary Health Centres) & MHPSS (Mental Health and Psychosocial Support) Centres supporting Syrian refugees, around 20% currently report into this system.
- Update on the Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees (VASyR) 2014: As a follow up to the 2013 VASyR, UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP are currently conducting a second round VASyR for 2014; Data collection is currently carried out in 5 regions of Lebanon by 11 cooperating partners.
- In late May, phase 1 of the Inter-Agency Multi-Sector Needs Assessment (MSNA) was completed and a secondary data review and analysis of available data was published. The report included 8 sector chapters which provided some preliminary findings on priorities and information needs. In terms of methodology, it stated that cross analysis by geographic areas and sectors was not possible given that the data was incomparable. Comparing different affected groups was also difficult as most of the data focused on Syrian refugees, with limited information on host communities and PRS, and almost no information on Lebanese returnees.

Additionally, the report pointed out the following information gaps:

- Limited information on reasons for secondary displacement (motivation and intention)
- Limited data on coping strategies (positive and negative)
- Limited data on sources of income, as well as access and availability to some goods in the market
- Limited information on how information is communicated to and from communities
- Lack of information on priorities as stated by the communities themselves and on their knowledge of services
- Limited data on persons with specific needs

Displaced Populations

New arrivals: According to data collected by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) under the New Comers Programme, the number of identified individuals entering Lebanon decreased slightly, from 20,876 in March, to 18,484 in April and 15,127 in May. The highest proportions of newcomers originated from Damascus (17-20%) and Homs (13-14%), and they largely indicated insecurity and destruction

of their home as primary reasons for fleeing. From March to May, an increasing share of newcomers indicated that crossing into Lebanon was a secondary displacement. Most of the identified households (HHs) reported that they arrived through the two official border-crossings, Al-Masnaa and Abboudia, and the unofficial crossing in Aarsal. The vast majority of people crossing through Aarsal reported that lack of documents was the primary reason for not going through official crossing points.

Increased vulnerability of new comers: During the reporting period, sampling surveys showed an increase in the percentage of Syrian refugees who underwent internal displacement before crossing into Lebanon. Their proportion went from 45% in January to 52% in April. Refugees who were internally displaced several times inside Syria before arriving in Lebanon also increased sharply, from 11% in January to 54% in April. (UNHCR 2014/04) This trend suggests that newly arrived refugees experience higher levels of vulnerability compared to those crossing at the start of the crisis, due to reduced livelihoods, successive displacements and harsh living conditions in Syria.

Entry restrictions: As of late May, most Syrians continue to be granted access, but existing entry restrictions require them to have valid and undamaged identification cards or passports. However, the Government is reportedly considering restricting admissions at the border, and on 4 June, the Social Affairs Minister suggested that only Syrians fleeing from areas close to the border with Lebanon would be allowed to enter. According to UNHCR in June, the majority of Syrian refugees come from Homs (22%), Aleppo (20%), Rural Damascus (13%) and Idlib (13%). (OCHA 2014/05/31, UNHCR 2014/04, UNHCR 2014/06/19)

In April, the border area remained relatively calm, although border control was stepped-up against smugglers and illegal departures. An increase in arrests and detention of Syrians for illegal entry and stay has also been reported. The Arida border point was closed to Syrians from 24 to 27 April for unknown reasons. (OCHA 2014/05/31, UNHCR 2014/04)

Increased restrictions for PRS: In early May, the Lebanese Government placed prohibitive restrictions on PRS wanting to enter Lebanon or to renew their visas. It states that they need to possess either an entry permit approved by the Directorate of General Security, a residency permit of 1 to 3 years, or an exit and return permit. It requires entry permits to be obtained through the Lebanese embassy in Damascus. A circular issued by the General Security Office on 22 May requires PRS to regularise their legal status within a month. (IA 2014/06/06, OCHA 2014/05/31)

Registered refugees

Number: As of late June, 1,060,000 Syrians are registered as refugees with UNHCR in Lebanon and up to 50,000 are awaiting registration. By late May, the

waiting time for registration with UNHCR had increased to 29 days, compared to 26 days in April and 22 days in March. (UNHCR 2014/06/19, IA 2014/05/26) Refugees are currently residing in over 1,700 locations, of which some 1,000 are informal settlements. (UNHCR 2014/03)

New registrations: UNHCR registered 50,500 and 46,300 Syrian refugees in April and May respectively, which is consistent with the average of approximately 50,000 per month. As of late May, the refugee population had reached 73% of the RRP6 projection made in December 2013, which indicated that there could be over 1.5 million Syrian registered in the country by the end of 2014. (UNHCR 2014/05, UNHCR 2014/04)

Registration renewal: Until June 2013, refugee documentation was issued for a 1-year period. As many refugees have been residing in Lebanon for over a year, renewal of registration is necessary. In May, 53,500 refugees underwent verification and had their documents renewed, a 6.5% increase compared to April. (IA 2014/06/06)

Unregistered refugees

The number of Syrians in Lebanon who are not registered with UNHCR is unknown, but it is estimated their number could be equivalent to 10-20% of the current registered population.

Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS)

Number: As of 27 May, 53,070 Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS) were recorded with UNRWA. Between 15 April and 31 May, the number of PRS grew by 73. The decrease in registered arrivals compared to the previous 6 weeks is due to entry restrictions. (OCHA, 2014/05/31)

Refugee needs and concerns

Protection

Legal status and access to civil status documentation: Syrian refugees who entered through unofficial border crossings or who are unable to renew their residency permit are not recognised as legally present in Lebanon. This puts them at risk of arrest, limits their freedom of movement, limits their access to employment, and restricts their access to public services including birth registration. (UNHCR 2014/04)

According to a recent assessment, unregistered refugees indicated that the main reasons for not registering were fear of reprisal against family members still in Syria, fear that information would be sent to Syrian authorities and fear that they might be deported. (ACTED 2014/04)

On 9 May, the GoL announced that people returning to Syria after 1 June would be stripped of their refugee status should they subsequently return to Lebanon.

Statelessness and birth registration: Tens of thousands of people are estimated to be stateless in Lebanon, although the number is difficult to ascertain. They have limited or no access to healthcare, education, social services or employment, and face limitations of movement and risk of arrest. Additionally, they have no civil registration records and cannot register births and marriages. With the crisis in Syria and the subsequent influx of refugees, the number of stateless persons and persons at risk of statelessness has risen in Lebanon. The number includes Syrian Kurds who were denaturalised in Syria in 1962. While at least 24,000 Syrian refugees have been born in Lebanon, records show extremely low levels of registration. According to a survey of over 5,570 Syrian newborns, 72% do not possess an official birth certificate. ([UNHCR 2014/04](#))

Physical safety: Some resident and refugee communities in border areas have at times been affected by shelling and shooting from Syria. Access to legal counsel and legal representation can be restricted due to irregular civil status, which leaves affected communities without recourse when facing protection incidents. ([UNHCR 2014/04](#))

Mines, Landmines and ERW: Due to Lebanon's previous years of conflict, cluster munitions, landmines and ERW are still active and spread throughout populated areas. Lack of information and competition for resources/land can at times lead refugees and host communities into hazardous areas. According to a nationwide impact assessment survey completed in March, there are areas where refugees live within 10-20 metres of known minefields in West Bekaa and Rashaya. ([OCHA 2014/05/31, Mine Action Group/Lebanese Mine Action Centre 2014/03](#))

Child protection: A recent assessment indicated that at least 300,000 Syrian refugee children cannot enrol in school, due in part to the overstretched public education system. It is suspected that a high number of them are engaged in work as an alternative, while other negative coping mechanisms include child marriage. Separated or unaccompanied children are also of high concern, and suggest the need for stronger referral mechanisms. ([Global Communities 2014/04, ACTED 2014/04, UNHCR 2014/04](#))

Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV): Refugee women and children are particularly at risk of, or affected by, SGBV, especially unaccompanied adolescents, single female heads of HHs, young mothers and young spouses, and women/girls living with disabilities. Overcrowding in refugee accommodation also increases the risk of SGBV incidents and reduced economic opportunities, can also lead to negative coping mechanisms such as early marriage and survival sex. A reported 25% of SGBV case survivors are under 18 years old. It is difficult to identify and support those affected because refugees are dispersed in more than 1,700 locations throughout the country. Those whose mobility is restricted because of security issues and cultural values are particularly difficult

to identify and support. Additionally, survivors' access to services is constrained by social stigma, risk to personal security, lack of information and growing tension between refugees and host communities. ([UNHCR 2014/04](#))

Health

Many refugees arrive in Lebanon suffering from health conditions which existed prior to their displacement, or which they developed during their displacement as a result of trauma and substandard living conditions. Main health-related needs include reproductive health and family planning, child health, mental health, and the treatment of acute illness and chronic disease. High costs of health care and reduced financial resources can limit the refugees' access to primary, secondary and tertiary health care within the public and private system. ([UNHCR 2014/04](#))

Additionally, with expected water shortages over the summer months, there is concern that hygiene-related problems and disease transmission will increase, due to the reduced water availability and the subsequent decline in good hygiene practices. ([Global Communities 2014/04](#))

Morbidity: In the first quarter of 2014, primary healthcare facilities participating in the Health Information System reported nearly 47,500 refugees presenting with acute health conditions. Acute respiratory tract infections (35%) were the leading cause of morbidity, followed by ear infections (4%) and urinary tract infections (3%). 37% of patients were children under 5. ([UNHCR 2014/04](#))

Epidemiology: Between January and March, facilities participating in the Health Information System reported 8 cases of suspected measles, 18 cases of non-meningococcal meningitis, and 28 cases of hepatitis A associated acute jaundice syndrome. Suspected cases were not yet confirmed. ([IA 2014/03](#))

On 8 May, the first case of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) in Lebanon was detected. The MERS virus has killed some 117 people in Saudi Arabia since it was detected in September 2012. Cases have been reported in Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Malaysia, Oman, Tunisia, France, Germany, Spain, Italy and the UK. ([WHO, 2014/05/08](#))

Child Malnutrition: According to UNICEF, 2,000 children under the age of 5 are at risk of dying from malnutrition due to food shortages, with over half of these children suffering from severe acute malnutrition. Over 50% of children suffering from severe acute malnutrition are in the Bekaa. Between 5% and 10% of children under 5 in Bekaa and north Lebanon suffer from acute malnutrition. ([UNICEF 2014/02/25, Amnesty International 2014/05](#))

A new mass nutrition screening campaign took place late May/ early June in the Bekaa, where the highest levels of malnutrition in Lebanon were reported. The

campaign will also screen for polio, vitamin A deficiency and measles, and will target Syrian refugee children in ITSs and collective shelters. ([UNICEF 2014/05/19](#))

Polio: Lebanon launched a round of polio immunisation on 11 April, targeting around 600,000 Syrian, Lebanese, and Palestinian children aged up to 5: 94% of targeted children were vaccinated against polio. Lebanon has been polio-free for 12 years. This is the 4th polio immunisation drive in Lebanon since the start of the Syrian crisis. Previously, a 10-day campaign in March managed to reach 492,000 children under age 5, or 82% of the 600,000 targeted. ([OCHA, 2014/05/31](#))

Children and Women: Children represent 37% of primary health care patients and 25% of those for referral and specialised health care. Also for referral and specialised services, an estimated 70% of patients were female – this is a disproportionate rate considering 52% of the refugee population is female. This is mostly due to obstetric care needs, which include deliveries, miscarriages, and other complications related to pregnancy and delivery. ([UNHCR 2014/04](#), [UNHCR 2014/05](#))

Availability: Due to the daily increase in the number of refugees, UNHCR resources are currently unable to meet all health care needs, and assistance needs to be prioritised. Secondary and tertiary care, along with lifesaving interventions related to maternal and infant care, are very costly. ([UNHCR 2014/04](#)) 4 key issues may further affect the availability of health care: budget constraints leading to more targeted/reduced assistance; a new influx of refugees widening the gap between needs and capacities; the onset of summer which might increase the potential for disease outbreaks; increased need among populations in informal settlements due to deteriorating WASH and nutrition conditions.

Access: A recent report by Amnesty International pointed out key challenges faced by refugees to access health care in Lebanon, along with health and protection concerns which may arise as a result of these challenges.

In most cases, UNHCR has to pay for the treatment of refugees, as health care is largely privatised in the country. To increase coverage, the agency has adopted a public health approach, prioritising basic primary and emergency care. ([UNHCR 2013/06](#))

Criteria for UNHCR contributions are limited to cases where the prognosis is good, and covers only lifesaving health services and care related to basic functions. ([UNHCR 2014/01](#)) Those who meet these criteria see 75% of the treatment costs covered, but still have to pay 25% of costs plus the cost of medicine. The only patients covered 100% are those who meet UNHCR's vulnerability criteria, or those who are victims of torture or SGBV. High-cost

health care is not covered, such as treatment for chronic diseases requiring repeated hospitalisation (cancer treatment, kidney dialysis), babies with extremely low birth weight and poor prognosis and blood diseases, unless there is a need for an emergency transfusion. ([Amnesty International 2014/05](#))

Complications arising from limited health care access: Limited access to secondary and tertiary health care is reported to be causing medical conditions to become more serious and at times, life-threatening. Those who qualify for UNHCR's coverage but are unable to pay the remaining 25% can get into debt, significantly increasing their vulnerability. ([Amnesty International 2014/05](#))

Protection concerns arising from the lack of access to health care: According to a UNHCR survey sent to 3,170 refugee HHs in February, a quarter of the HHs had returned to Syria since their registration, and 11% of them had returned for medical reasons. Amnesty International also indicated that in some cases, people who returned to Syria for medical reasons stayed there for the duration of their treatment. ([Amnesty International 2014/05](#))

Livelihoods and food security

An estimated 70% of Syrian refugee HHs are in need of food assistance, and the winterisation baseline survey indicated that only 22% of HHs interviewed had any sort of income. This situation is likely to deteriorate as water shortages are expected to impact agricultural production and related livelihoods. HHs relying completely on external assistance largely cited lack of work as their main problem. Reasons for unemployment also included medical conditions or disability. ([UNHCR 2014/04](#), [Vulnerability Assessment for Syrian Refugees 2013/05](#))

With limited income generating opportunities, vulnerable refugee HHs experience difficulties meeting their basic needs. Financial assistance is reportedly critical as many refugees rely on markets and rented apartments, and many refugees seem to prefer financial support to aid distribution, as it enables them to prioritise their expenses and saves them the time and cost of travelling to distribution sites. ([UNHCR 2014/04](#))

According to a recent assessment, over 80% of HHs indicated that they had to borrow money or open a line of credit to meet their basic needs. The main causes for this were high rental costs, and expenditure on food, healthcare and education. ([ACTED 2014/04](#))

Differences between Lebanese nationals, established Syrian refugees and new comers: An ILO assessment of Syrian refugees' employment found that low wages, high unemployment, and lack of labour market regulations pose serious challenges to livelihoods for both residents and refugees. Almost a third of Syrian refugees are unemployed and most of those who are working endure harsh

working conditions and earn substantially less than their Lebanese counterparts. The average monthly income for a Syrian refugee in Lebanon is almost 40% less than the national minimum wage. ([ILO 2014/04/01](#))

UNHCR reports that newcomers arriving in recent months are in general more vulnerable than those who arrived in the past, because they spent their savings and assets while staying or being internally displaced in Syria, and find it more difficult to find employment or accommodation upon arrival in Lebanon. ([UNHCR 2014/04](#))

HHs' Demographics and Vulnerability: According to a recent assessment, the demographic composition of HHs is strongly correlated to the level of vulnerability, especially for HHs without able-bodied men of working age, as it limits their income-generating capacity. While sampling methods are not representative, ACTED indicated that in assessed HHs, 13% were female-headed, 3% were led by disabled men, and 2% were headed by a person over 65. ([ACTED 2014/04](#))

Dependency: According to the same assessment, the majority of HHs engaged in employment had only 1 worker. Almost half of working refugees were supporting 5-7 HH members, which explains why only a third of HHs reported depending on employment earnings alone. ([ACTED 2014/04](#))

WASH

Water shortages: Water shortages are expected this summer after the country experienced one of the driest winter seasons in decades, with only half of the precipitation and surface flow of an average year. Available groundwater resources are estimated at around 80% of an average year. ([OCHA 2014/05/31](#), [IA 2014/06/06](#))

Additionally, snow – which is not counted in yearly precipitation, constitutes a reservoir which slowly releases water feeding groundwater and surface water. In the winter 2013-2014 however, Lebanon recorded extremely low snowfalls compared to the average year, which will add up to the drop in groundwater levels for this season. ([IA 2014/06/06](#))

Consequently, there is likely to be a significant drop in water availability, a reduction in water quality, and water needs in areas where water availability and quality are not usually an issue. It is likely that the hot and humid summer months will increase the prevalence of hygiene-related problems and disease transmission. ([Global Communities 2014/04](#))

Consequences of water shortages and persons of concern: According to local authorities and humanitarian partners in late 2013, 909,000 Syrian refugees and 1.5 million Lebanese were in need of water support.

Considering the upcoming water shortages and expected higher salinity levels of groundwater near coastal areas, the price of water is expected to rise. ([OCHA 2014/05/31](#))

Populations of concern include anyone without water storage to sustain them during the shortage period, as well as people who depend on a spring/well liable to dry, depend on NGO water delivery, or live in a dry zone. Coastal populations are also at risk of unmet water needs as they increase groundwater use, which encourages saline intrusion.

Mapping of the most vulnerable locations and identification of mitigation activities is currently ongoing. Early reports indicate that WASH coverage (representing varying levels of WASH services) for ITS population is only at 40% in over 1,000 settlements (58% of the total ITS number). ([UNHCR 2014/05](#), [UNICEF 2014/05/19](#))

In the Bekaa, Zahle hosts nearly 400,000 refugees, and has seen groundwater levels drop by 11m. ([UNICEF 2014/05/19](#))

In Beirut and Mount Lebanon (Baabda, Metn, Keserwane, and Jbeil), an assessment indicated that 48% of refugee HHs have inadequate or absent WASH facilities. 40% of water sources were found to be contaminated and poor living conditions severely increased health and hygiene risks. Many vulnerable refugees and Lebanese nationals in these areas live in illegal accommodation, which cannot be connected to the municipal water network, limiting their water supply. This results in both poor hygiene levels and higher water spending. All these factors are resulting in increased prevalence of waterborne diseases. ([ACTED 2014/04](#))

In Beirut and Mount Lebanon (Baabda, Metn, Keserwane, and Jbeil), bacteriological tests have shown that in 40% of HHs tested, the water is contaminated with coliform bacteria. The assessment also indicated that only 4.8% of respondents who drink tap water reported that they treat their water before drinking it. This contributes to the high rates of waterborne disease (diarrhoea). ([ACTED 2014/04](#))

Overcrowding of shelters, the lack of clean water availability and access to latrines in Beirut and Mount Lebanon are also having negative impacts on the hygienic, social, and psychological health of Syrian and host populations. It is causing many skin infections (dermatitis, scabies and leishmaniasis) and the spread of lice. ([ACTED 2014/04](#))

Shelter


Substandard accommodation: Shelter remains a priority need for refugees, as more are turning to improvised shelters due to the lack of shelters. Most refugees (81%) rent accommodation, including 57% who live in apartments that are often

shared with other displaced families, and 40% who live in insecure and/or unfinished buildings and informal settlements (15%). (UNHCR, 2014/05/23) The number of informal settlements has increased by 154% between July 2013 and May 2014. (OCHA 2014/05/31) Refugees living in substandard shelters are subject to limited access to water and hygiene facilities, and often face overcrowding and harsh weather conditions. A recent assessment showed 80% of assessed HHs got into debt to meet their basic needs (including paying rent) and a third of HHs require shelter upgrading/rehabilitation. (ACTED 2014/04)

Eviction: Eviction is also of concern, as only 10% of registered Syrian refugees reportedly possess a written rent agreement. In the Bekaa and in the North, evictions are increasing, in many cases due to the inability of families to pay the rent. (UNHCR 2014/03) Between the beginning of 2014 and late May, protection and shelter agencies recorded some 50 refugee families evicted and another 220 under threat of eviction in the Tripoli area. For the same period, there are records of 133 families evicted and another 470 under threat of eviction in the Bekaa. (OCHA 2014/05/31)

The ACTED assessment indicated that cash programming can at times have a negative effect as landlords raise rents when informed that HHs are receiving cash. (ACTED 2014/04)

Rent burden: Nationwide, a study of shelter conditions for refugees indicated that over 20% of HHs are paying more than USD 300 a month. More than 80% of registered refugees pay on average USD 200 per month in rent for accommodation, including substandard shelters. (IA 2014/05/23) An assessment indicated that the average cost of rent is USD 320 per month per HH, which is significantly higher than the national average rent of 193 USD. In the same assessment, key informant interviews revealed that refugees are paying inflated rent prices for shelters, a trend which is worsening over time. (ACTED 2014/04)



Overcrowding: The ACTED assessment covering Beirut and Mount Lebanon indicated that due to shelter access constraints, an estimated 36% of HHs assessed suffer from overcrowding and are reportedly living with less than 3.5 m² of shelter space per person. This proportion increases to 46% in Beirut. (ACTED 2014/04)

Education

According to current registration data there are 420,000 Syrian, 21,000 Palestinian, 7,000 Lebanese returnees and 40,000 vulnerable Lebanese children in need of education services. Over 50% of Syrian refugee children aged 5 to 17 are estimated to be out of any form of education, with adolescents being particularly left out. Main causes include language, education costs and transportation. (UNHCR 2014/04, RRP6 2014/05)


Host communities

Vulnerability of Lebanese host communities

The Syrian crisis is increasingly affecting the most vulnerable Lebanese residents. The number of registered Syrian refugees and recorded Palestinian refugees hosted by Lebanon equals a quarter of the total estimated Lebanese population. According to the RRP6 in late 2013, an estimated 1.5 million


Lebanese may need some sort of assistance in 2014 due to the influx of Syrian refugees. Main reasons include additional pressure on public services and competition over income generating opportunities. (UNHCR 2014/03)

In May, the UN presented an update of its vulnerability map, which showed 13 additional cadasters compared to late 2013. Currently, there are 242 vulnerable localities, which host 68% of the Lebanese population living on less than USD 4 /day and 86% of registered Syrian refugees. (OCHA, 2014/05/31)



According to an assessment conducted by ACTED, many vulnerable Lebanese HHs have similar needs to Syrian refugees. Although statistically non-representative, the survey showed that 82% of assessed vulnerable Lebanese HHs had to get into debt to meet their basic needs, 39% needed structural work to make their homes weatherproof, and over 46% needed rehabilitation of their WASH facilities. Also, 40% were either unemployed or relying on remittances. The report also stated that 80% of assessed Lebanese HHs did not receive any assistance. (ACTED 2014/04)

Comparison of assistance required by Syrian refugees and Lebanese communities (ACTED Vulnerability assessment results)



Economy and livelihoods

Unemployment and competition in the job market: According to a recent report by Oxfam, the impact of refugee presence is perceived differently between regions. In some areas such as Sidon and North Baalbek, municipal respondents see this impact as neutral, because Syrian refugees reportedly accept jobs that Lebanese are not willing to perform. However, in other areas, Lebanese nationals expressed frustration about decreasing wages and job competition due to the influx of refugees. (Oxfam/BRIC, 2013/04)

An assessment by the International Labour Organisation found that Syrian workers are willing to work for lower salaries, longer hours and in more difficult conditions. This reportedly has great impact on Lebanese youth (15-24 years old), as this age group accounts for 32% the working-age Syrian refugee population. Before the crisis, this age group already faced high rates of unemployment in Lebanon (17% of 20-24 year olds). (ACTED 2014/04, ILO 2014/04/01, World Bank 2013/09/20, Central Administration of Statistics 2006)

The impact of the refugee influx on Lebanese employment rates also differs substantially depending on the area. A Save the Children study found that unemployment rates ranged from 58% in Wadi Khaled, to 44% in Sahel Akkar to 23% in Bekaa (Save the Children 2014/05/27).

Economy: There are also positive effects of the crisis. In April, WFP indicated that through its food security interventions, the organisation injected USD 73

million into the Lebanese economy in 2014, benefitting shop owners and traders. (IA 2014/06/06)

Social cohesion

Tensions between communities: In Wadi Khaled, Akkar, and the Bekaa Valley, a study showed that an overwhelming number of Lebanese view the presence of Syrian refugees as a threat. More than 90% are supportive of night curfews and other restrictions on the use of space, and the same proportion supports restrictions on political freedom. Over 75% were in favour of restricting Syrian refugees' access to work and other opportunities. ([Save the Children and the American University of Beirut, 2014/05](#)). A pilot project for Community Dialogue was conducted in 5 Tripoli communities and 6 South Lebanon communities between December 2013 and January 2014. It indicated that, according to respondents, the main causes of tensions are the lack of employment opportunities for both communities, housing shortages, increases in rent, polarised political affiliations and general poverty. The research also indicated that although most Lebanese residents and Syrian refugees interact relatively comfortably on a daily basis in the assessed communities, they both prefer to reside in separate neighbourhoods and seem reluctant to share living spaces. ([Search for Common Ground, 2014/06](#)).

According to a recent assessment in Beirut and Mount Lebanon, there have been no significant acts of violence between refugees and host communities to date, but there are records of rising tensions which have consequences, such as the imposition of a curfew on Syrian refugees. ([ACTED 2014/04](#))

Focus group discussions showed that Syrian refugees do not always feel welcome, a perception largely based on negative experience with landlords and neighbours (threat of eviction, discrimination by landlords against Syrian rentees). ([ACTED 2014/04](#))

Tensions are also fed by the limited assistance provided by aid organisations to vulnerable Lebanese populations. There is a general perception that Lebanese communities have been overlooked by humanitarian actors and there is often a lack of knowledge among local populations of the different services available and the required eligibility criteria for accessing these services. ([ACTED 2014/04](#))

Mapping of risks and resources: UNDP started a conflict-sensitive needs assessment in May, taking into account risks, needs and resources available. Mapping is expected to be complete by the end of June. Additionally, ACTED/REACH and OCHA have started an in-depth host community assessment which aims to establish a framework through which host communities can be targeted and prioritised by aid organisations. The report should identify needs and vulnerabilities, along with potential for tensions and dispute. ([OCHA, 2014/05/31](#))

Turkey

Displaced

Syrian registered refugees and awaiting registration	789,678
Palestinian refugees from Syria	Unknown
Syrian returnees	Unknown
Syrian migrants	Unknown

Non displaced

Host communities affected by the Syria crisis	Unknown
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UNHCR 2014/06/26



Key Issues

- Syrian refugee numbers in Turkey have increased by 18% in the 2nd quarter of this year, primarily as a result of continued fighting in Aleppo, Hama and Idlib. On 26 June the total number of refugees registered or awaiting registration was 789,678, of whom 218,561 (28%) were residing in camps and 571,117 (72%) were outside camps. In mid-June, the Turkish Deputy Prime Minister announced that the number of Syrians in Turkey had exceeded 1 million since the crisis began over 3 years ago. The new influx of refugees has further exacerbated the situation in camps, many of which are reaching their capacity. ([UNHCR 2014/06/20](#), [Guardian 2014/06/19](#), [UNHCR 2014/06/26](#))
- On 11 April, a Law on Foreigners and International Protection entered into force in Turkey in line with the requirements of the EU accession. It provides a comprehensive framework for protecting and assisting all asylum-seekers and refugees and integrates the notion of Temporary Protection (TP). Syrians are under the TP regime and, as all other asylum seekers and refugees in the country, are now under the competency of the General Directorate of Migration Management (GDMM), the newly established authority for asylum and migration issues in Turkey. The GDMM is the body responsible for registration, status determination, and access to rights for persons in need of international protection. A secondary legislation, a directive to be issued in the upcoming months by the Council of Ministers, will define modalities of the regime of Temporary Protection. ([UNHCR, 2013/12/16](#), [UNHCR 2014/04/11](#), [UNHCR 2014](#))
- Since the end of 2013, Turkey has experienced dry weather conditions, which have impacted the growth of crops. There has been a lack of precipitation for months, with very low amounts over winter, below-average

amounts in spring, and also abnormally high temperatures in the winter. In mid-June the Drought Management Centre for Southeastern Europe expected that the current water balance deficit would deepen further, especially in eastern Turkey. There have already been major difficulties for agricultural producers as a result of the weather conditions: the yield of various nuts, fruits, vegetables and grains has severely decreased and wheat and barley crops have been lost. Turkey's wheat harvest is expected to fall due to the significant decrease in rainfall, from the record-high wheat harvest in 2013 at 22 million tons to an expected 17.3 million tons in 2014. It is likely that Turkey will have to import wheat, barley and other staple commodities in order to meet domestic demand and the prices of food are expected to increase in coming months, directly affecting access to food of those living outside camps. Increased food prices will make food supplies into Syria more costly as well, potentially affecting the level of assistance. ([WFP 2014/06/16](#), [DMCSEE 2014/06/12](#), [DMCSEE 2014/06/04](#), [TodaysZaman 2014/05/22](#))

- The dry conditions have also led to critically low levels of water reservoirs and the effect on water supply needs to be monitored. Water saving measures might have to be introduced, which would most likely affect residents in cities most. Many of Turkey's main hydroelectric plants are located in regions affected by the weather conditions, generating power from dams built around the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Effects of the low water levels on actual electricity production need to be monitored as well. ([Todayszaman 2014/04/27](#), [DMCSEE 2014/06/04](#))
- The economic impact of the influx of Syrian refugees has become increasingly obvious for the Turkish Government. At the end of April, Prime Minister Erdogan stated that Turkey had spent \$3.5 billion on Syrian refugees so far. With rising numbers of refugees and little prospect of return for large numbers of Syrians, the economic burden will increase. There will also be further increased demand on local services and resources (e.g. in the health sector), particularly in border towns. ([AA 2014/01/15](#), [Syrianobserver 2014/04/01](#), [Businessinsider 2014/05/27](#), [AlMonitor 2014/04/29](#))

Data sources and limitations

The following reports on Turkey were published in the 2nd quarter:

- Numbers of refugees registered by the Turkish authorities are published in UNHCR bulletins. Estimated total numbers of refugees issued by the Turkish authorities reflect the fact that refugee registration is an on-going process.
- The International Crisis Group produced a report on the Turkish humanitarian engagement and related issues, mainly based on interviews that were carried out on the ground. ([ICG 2014/04/30](#))

- The Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (ORSAM) published a comparative study on the situation of Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries. ([ORSAM 2014/04](#))
- Studies on protection-related issues of Syrian refugees conducted by Turkish NGOs, have been referenced in secondary sources.
- The Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) carried out a field survey among Syrian refugees in June and July 2013. The report resulting from the survey was also consulted. ([AFAD 2013](#))

Possible developments

Continued refugee influx: Continued fighting around Aleppo City, Hama and in Idleb causes further displacement into Turkey. The capacity of government camps is increasingly overstretched, particularly in terms of food supplies, WASH and health services. Many refugees are out of the camps but do not have the means to pay for their own accommodation. There are also people who have been able to rent places but are running out of financial resources. Overall, an increasing number of non-camp refugees face challenges in finding adequate shelter and their needs are in flux. Informal settlements and makeshift shelters are on the rise, with people having limited access to health and WASH services. There is animosity between refugees and the Turkish population in neighbourhoods in urban areas, and refugees are increasingly vulnerable to harassment.

Displaced

- There have been reports that camps have reached their capacity limits, with new arrivals accommodated in waiting areas. This will present a further challenge for new arrivals who do not have the means to pay for out-of-camp accommodation or stay with friends and relatives.
- The majority of refugees are concentrated in 5 provinces adjacent to Syria: Hatay, Kilis, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa and Mardin. Most refugee camps are located in these provinces and they also account for most of the registered refugees living outside camps. In some border provinces like Kilis, Syrians outnumber the local population, putting a heavy burden on local administration and services. Additionally, there are refugees that are not yet accounted for in formal records, either through registration activity or enumeration mechanisms. Major cities in western Turkey such as Ankara, Antalya, Izmir, Istanbul, Konya and Mersin have also attracted large numbers of Syrian refugees, although exact figures are not known. In mid-September

2013, estimated Syrian refugee figures in Istanbul were placed at between 100,000 and 200,000 and it is assumed that these numbers have been rising since then with refugees seeing better livelihood opportunities in a bigger city. ([Brookings 2014/05/12](#), [AlMonitor, 2013/12/02](#))

Refugee needs and concerns

Shelter:

- Urban refugees face great difficulties in meeting their health and shelter needs. The increased demand for rental property has already pushed up rents in cities and neighbourhoods where refugees have settled. Many refugees find themselves in very poor quality housing and those who do not have enough resources end up having to find shelter in abandoned buildings, or in makeshift shelters. ([Brookings 2014/05/12](#))
- The AFAD survey carried out in June and July 2013 found that around 10% of the out-of-camp refugee population lived in makeshift shelters or under plastic covers. They are highly vulnerable with respect to protection, health, hygiene and sanitation needs. With rising numbers of Syrian refugees over the last year, and limited or unaffordable accommodation available, these numbers have possibly increased. ([AFAD 2013](#))

Housing Types of Syrian refugees living non-camps (AFAD)

Type	%
House or flat	74.1
Ruins	14
Public buildings	0.6
Tent	0.8
Makeshift / Plastic cover	10.1
Open Area	0.4

Source: [AFAD 2013](#)

- High rents, limited accommodation, diminishing resources available and hosting of additional family members are factors behind the overcrowding that has been observed in refugee flats. The AFAD survey found that almost 20% of the out-of-camp refugee population lives in housing units of up to 15 people, and more than 6% share the housing unit with an even greater number of people. It is likely that due to the economic situation of refugees and the limited affordable space available, overcrowding, and with it,

decreasing sanitary conditions are on the rise. ([AFAD 2013](#), [ICG 2014/04/30](#))

People per Housing Unit in camps and non-camps

Number of People	% In Camps	% Non Camp
1-3	14. 7	7. 3
4-6	56. 1	30. 7
7-10	27. 4	36. 5
11-15	1. 8	19. 3
16 and more	0	6. 1

Source: [AFAD 2013](#)

- As many Syrian families are running out of financial resources to pay for accommodation, there is increased reluctance on the part of landlords to accept Syrian tenants. ([ICG 2014/04/30](#))

Education:

- According to a recent UNICEF post there are many informal schools in southern Turkey run by Syrian volunteers. It is not known whether these volunteers are necessarily qualified teachers. The Ministry of National Education is mapping these schools and will evaluate them and eventually recognise those meeting the minimum standards. The availability and access to education and certification for children outside camps is critical, and further baseline information is needed to identify the need for education provision for children in host communities. ([UNICEF 2014/06/07](#))
- In late June, the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces reported the Turkey's Minister of Education had approved the recognition of high school certificates issued by the Ministry of Education in the Syrian interim government, including certificates issued by the Syrian Coalition last year. This allows Syrians holding such a certificate to apply to University in Turkey, though certain entry requirements such as the completion of Turkish language courses will be needed for Syrians to register in certain universities. ([ETILAF, 2014/06/28](#))

Protection:

- According to an ORSAM study published in April, there are several reasons why refugees choose to stay outside camps. Some people enter Turkey illegally and do not want to be registered, while other refugees cannot cope with camp life. Some have the financial means to live in non-camp accommodation or can stay with relatives. There is also reduced capacity to

accommodate new arrivals in camps. With more restricted border crossings, and limited capacity in camps, numbers of non-camp refugees might be proportionally on the rise in the future. If new arrivals who reside outside of camps have limited financial resources available, problems of overcrowding of accommodation and accommodation in makeshift shelters might increasingly become a problem. ([ORSAM 2014/04](#))

- In late April, it was reported that municipal officers from Istanbul's Bayrampasa district evicted 100 mostly Turkmen Syrian families originally from Aleppo from their makeshift camp. Their tents were burnt, leaving some of the evicted with no choice but to take refuge with their families in a local bus station rather than being housed in official camps. It will be necessary to monitor the situation, should such actions occur again. ([AlMonitor 2014/04/29](#), [Hürriyet Daily News 2014/04/28](#))
- There have been reports that Turkish men are marrying Syrian refugees as second or third wives. Most of these marriages are reportedly arranged in return for money. Other reports indicate that underaged girls are sold for marriage. Turkish civil law does not allow polygamy, and the legal age for marriage in Turkey is 17 years according to Article 124 of the Civil Code. There is a need for more figures and baseline information in order to identify the extent of the humanitarian impact of the issue. ([Brookings 2014/05/12](#), [Today's Zaman 2014/05/30](#), [Economist 2014/06/14](#), [HürriyetDaily, 2014/01/15](#), [COE 2009/04/30](#))
- The ICG reports that as more Syrian refugees run out of savings, the need to find paid work has become more urgent. A valid passport and residence permit is needed in order to obtain an official work permit. On top of this, an employer would need to show that a Turkish national could not be found for the position. The inability to work legally has created an underground labour force for adults with no social security and often for less pay than their Turkish colleagues. Illegal work is taken on in industries such as construction, textile manufacturing and heavy industry, as well as in the agricultural sector. As illegal workers are not protected by social security, possible exploitation, illness or injury pose a risk to the workers. The new directive on temporary protection will provide an update on the issue of work permits. ([Brookings 2014/05/12](#), [ICG 2014/04/30](#))
- With dwindling resources available, many non-camp refugee children earn money for the family. As an estimated 50% of Syrian refugees in Turkey are children, and with a reported low school attendance rate of these children, a high number of them may be engaged in activities that potentially can be high-risk and dangerous to their health and to their physical and psychological development. Although Turkey is a signatory to the International Labour Organization's Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (No: 182), current legislation is not enforced and child labour in Turkey remains an issue. According to the Turkish Child Labour Force Survey from

2012, 893,000 out of 15,247,000 Turkish children aged between 6 and 17 years were employed, and in more than 40% of cases they carried out unpaid work. 45% of working children were found to be working in agriculture. ([Turkstat, 2013/04/02](#), [STL, 2013](#), [ICG 2014/04/30](#))

- A study in a camp in Gaziantep found that 34% of the persons interviewed had Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Most traumatic events (66.2%) were related to living in an area affected by war. The primary types of trauma were cited as: witnessing the death of a close friend or family member (except spouses and children) (66%); being abducted or taken hostage (48); and being subject to, or witnessing torture (42%). These studies indicate that the need for the provision of psychological services to refugees is high. ([Medscape 2014/06/05](#))

Livelihoods:

- A large number of Syrian refugees in İstanbul and Ankara reportedly survive by begging on the street, indicating the lack of opportunities for income-generating activities available. ([TodaysZaman 2014/05/17](#))
- A Syrian woman was detained by İstanbul police when she allegedly attempted to sell her 3 month-old baby. Incidents like these have not been reported often, but might be indicative of the difficult economic situation faced by refugees. ([Hürriyet Daily News 2014/05/12](#))
- The current drought conditions may have an impact on livelihoods in the agricultural sector, the second largest source of employment in the Turkish economy, with decreasing employment opportunities and lower wages. This closes off further potential opportunities for those Syrian refugees who had managed to find work in this sector. ([TodaysZaman 2014/05/22](#))

Health:

- Syrian refugees in camps have access to health care in mobile health units or hospitals. Health services and vaccination campaigns in the camps are paid for by the government. According to AFAD, about 90% of male and 95% of female camp residents use the health services in the camps. Problems with health services in camps that have been identified in a report prepared by the Turkish Medical Association include the absence of specialised medical services, overworked personnel and language barriers. ([Brookings 2014/05/12](#), [AFAD 2013](#))
- In April, AFAD implemented a new rule on medicine costs for Syrians in İstanbul. According to the new rule, pharmacies can only provide medicine to Syrians if the prescription is given by a hospital in the same district. Previously, refugees could get medicines at any pharmacy. The new rule decreases the number of pharmacies where refugees can get medicines, as

some pharmacies are reluctant to supply medicine to Syrian refugees due to the delay in receiving AFAD reimbursement ([ICG 2014/04/30](#), [UNHCR 2014/26/04](#))

- The AFAD field survey found that 74% of children in camps were vaccinated against polio, compared to only 55% of refugee children in the non-camp population. A similar picture unfolded for measles vaccination among refugee children under 10 years old; while 72% of children in camps are vaccinated against measles, only 59% of Syrian refugee children not residing in camps are vaccinated. These figures give an indication of the increased vulnerability of the non-camp population to communicable diseases, especially in light of deteriorating shelter and possibly worsening sanitary conditions for refugees whose financial resources have become more constrained and whose access to health services is limited. ([AFAD 2013](#))

Host community

- With the economic consequences of the influx of Syrian refugees becoming more visible, Turks living near the border express frustration about the large number of refugees that are competing with locals for jobs and affordable housing. A poll of Turks by the Center for Economic and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) in November 2013 showed that 86% of respondents want the intake of Syrian refugees to be stopped. With another major growth of refugee numbers in 2014, this tendency may have increased. The continuing influx of refugees and the impact they have on services, especially in border towns but also increasingly in urban centres in the western parts of the country, raises issues with host communities. Social tensions have been observed for example in Ankara, where a building housing Syrian refugees was set on fire after a dispute with a local man. ([EDAM 2014](#), [Hürriyet Daily News 2014/05/08](#), [Businessinsider 2014/05/27](#))
- The existing health infrastructure and services in Turkey have been stretched by the growing refugee population. The opening of health services to Syrian refugees was not supported by an increase in capacity and the increased demand has caused public frustration among Turkish people. Additionally, the feeling that Syrians are better treated than Turkish citizens in public hospitals has become widespread in border provinces. ([ICG 2014/04/30](#)), PI 2014/06/27)

Political developments

- Recent political developments inside Turkey and in the region might have an impact on the stability inside the country and the political role that Turkey plays in the region.
- On 10 June, IS members kidnapped the Turkish consul and 24 of his guards and assistants in Mosul, while 28 Turkish truck drivers transporting diesel from Turkey's southern port of Iskenderun to a power plant in Mosul were

also kidnapped by IS fighters. The Government in Ankara imposed a gag order on all reporting about the hostages in Mosul. The growing IS threat in Iraq might further strengthen Turkey's relationship with the KRG, who has been countering IS attacks. ([Guardian 2014/06/11](#), [WSJ 2014/06/11](#), [ElArabyia 2014/06/11](#), [ALMonitor 2014/06/18](#), [RSF 2014/06/19](#), [Eurasianet 2014/06/13](#))

- In mid-June, Turkey reportedly deployed additional armoured vehicles, tanks and troops at several border posts in the southern province of Kilis, which borders Syrian territories controlled by IS. ([DailySabah 2014/06/18](#))
- 2 people were killed when the Turkish military intervened against road-blocking by Kurdish militants who were protesting against the construction of military outposts at Lice-Diyarbakir on June 7. In Kurdish provinces and Istanbul's Kurdish-populated districts, there were widespread protests over the killings and clashes re-erupted between security forces and demonstrators. During the June 8 Diyarbakir funeral of the men killed at Lice, one Kurdish young man who split off the procession entered a Turkish air force base and lowered the Turkish flag, sparking nationalist protests in the west of the country. ([ALMonotor 2014/06/10](#), [Businessinsider 2014/06/10](#))
- Prime Minister Erdogan will be seeking Kurdish support if he bids for Turkey's presidency on 10 August. For the first time, the president will be elected through direct popular vote. Support from Kurds, Turkey's largest minority at around one fifth of the population, could provide the simple majority needed to win without a runoff. In the run-up to the elections, Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AKP) submitted a draft bill to parliament that is designed to legally secure the negotiations with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) on 26 June. The bill will put the peace process under legal protection and grant legal immunity to the key actors. ([Reuters 2014/04/13](#), [Daily Sabah 2014/05/24](#), [Daily Sabah, 2014/06/27](#), [Al Monitor 2014/06/27](#), [AFP 2014/06/26](#))

Economic developments

- Turkey has manifested its economic interests in Iraq especially in the energy sector. Iraqi Kurdistan has built a pipeline connecting Kirkuk with its newly built pipeline to Turkey, potentially cementing Kurdish control over the northern oil hub and reducing its reliance on Baghdad. The link could allow the Kurds to start exports of Kirkuk crude oil through their own network, giving them a major source of independent revenue and supporting their ambitions of sovereign statehood. Baghdad's military retreat from the north following the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (IS) attack allowed the KRG's Peshmerga forces to seize control of long-disputed Kirkuk and its oil reserves. ([DailyStar 2014/06/18](#), [MiddleeastEye 2014/06/20](#))
- In 2013, Turkey exported \$11.9 billion of goods to Iraq and imported \$200 million. Iraq is Turkey's second largest trading partner and figures point to

Iraq potentially being Turkey's most lucrative and rapidly developing market. The surrender of Iraqi towns to IS has had an effect on the Turkish markets. The Istanbul stock exchange climbed to 81,600 points on 10 June; after IS occupied Mosul, within four days, the index fell to 77,646 a 4,000-point loss. Interest rates and oil prices rose. After IS took control of Mosul and began advancing toward other towns, Turkey's Foreign Ministry warned hundreds of Turkish companies and thousands of Turkish workers to leave Anbar, Baghdad, Basra, Diyala, Kirkuk, Mosul and Salahuddin. Two major Turkish banks closed their branches in Baghdad. ([ALMonitor 2014/06/18](#), [MiddleeastEye 2014/06/20](#))

Jordan


Displaced

Syrian registered refugees and awaiting registration	604,900
% registered and awaiting registration in camps	0*
Palestinian refugees from Syria	14,200
Syrian returnees	100,000+
Syrian migrants	Unknown

Non displaced

Host communities affected by the Syria crisis	Unknown
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*Some Syrians may be awaiting UNHCR organised transport to registration centres from more remote location.
Source: [UNHCR 2014/07/01](#), [\(UNRWA 2014/07/01\)](#)



Key Issues

- The growing conflict in north and central Iraq between the Government of Iraq (GoI) and anti-government groups, including IS, has further deepened Jordan's national security concerns. On 22 June, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) left the only official border crossing between Iraq and Jordan, with conflicting reports stating that the crossing is under control of either IS or local tribes. Pro-IS supporters openly celebrated IS's gains in Jordan's troubled central town of Ma'an, leading to concerns with internal unrest. The dynamics of the Iraqi conflict will likely affect border restrictions as well as refugee and asylum policies for Syrians and Iraqis trying to flee and those who are in the Kingdom. Since early 2014, Iraqis trying to enter via the border crossing have not been allowed entry without a visa and some of those arriving at Jordanian airports with visas have also been denied entry.
- The long-awaited opening of Azraq camp took place on 30 April. The new camp was planned for an initial capacity of 50,000, with the ability to expand to accommodate 130,000 refugees. However, there are strong signs that Azraq will not reach capacity. First, there have been a high number of unofficial departures from the camp, most likely due to the lack of services and livelihood opportunities, as well as the extremely harsh climactic conditions. At the end of May, about half of the refugees registered in Azraq failed to collect their food vouchers. Secondly, access to asylum continues to be restricted by the Jordanian authorities. Conflict intensified in Dar'a in recent months and caused additional displacement, however, the western border remained heavily restricted with about 95% of new arrivals entering through the eastern border crossings. Those displaced within Syria are forced to take longer and

more dangerous routes to access asylum. In addition, in May, the Government of Jordan (GoJ) announced that Syrian nationals will not be allowed to enter the country through the airports unless they hold a residency permit or have proof that they are transiting.

- The Ministry of Interior (MoI) appears to have re-started implementation of its national policy to evict residents of informal tented settlements (ITS) with even broader interpretation than in the past. The eviction policy was developed in August 2013 focused on settlements located on public land. The policy was implemented briefly in Mafraq governorate in late 2013 but had been put on hold for much of this year. According to sources, about 1270 residents of 2 settlements located on private land in southeast Amman were evicted in the early hours of 28 June and forced to move to Azraq camp. Some evictees reported that up to 6 residents had been forcibly returned to Syria. Unlike previous evictions, the residents were not allowed to identify other options, such as finding non-camp housing to rent.
- The Za'atari camp re-verification process to update refugees' biometric data and return their identity documents (which had been confiscated by the Jordanian authorities upon their initial entry) was completed in June. The process presented several protection issues:
 - An untold number of refugees were identified by the Jordanian authorities and forcibly returned to Syria. While no information on this issue was provided by UNHCR, reliable sources said that some of those deported included refugees who had worked without legal authorisation or had entered Jordan on forged documents.
 - A significant number of identity documents were misplaced by the Jordanian authorities. In March, it was estimated that up to one third of documents were misplaced by the Jordanian authorities, which will have an impact on refugees' ability to access and update identity documents and civil registration.
 - In order to maintain their legal status and access basic services and refugee assistance, all refugees in non-camp settings will have to undergo the re-verification process led by the MoI in local police stations, with virtually no oversight by UNHCR or other protection actors. While local authorities have demonstrated considerable flexibility, the lack of clear policies and uneven implementation could create significant protection concerns for some refugees. For example, many refugees who left the camps unofficially to live in urban areas may be forced to return to camp or find means to access the official bail-out process. UNHCR confirmed that the re-verification process in non-camp areas will continue after Ramadan, with no new measures taken to ensure that local authorities are respecting refugees' basic rights.

Possible Developments

Eviction of ITS: The MoI continues to roll out its eviction policy across the country and in addition, targets all tented settlements, regardless of whether they are located on public or private land. Azraq camp becomes overwhelmed by the evictions of some of the larger scale settlements. Due to the living conditions in Azraq, most of those evicted eventually leave the camp.

Full closure of the Syria-Jordan border: As GoJ concerns increase with the infiltration of fighters and suspected extremists (including both foreign nationals and Jordanians) from Syria, as well as from Iraq, the western crossing points bordering Dar'a are sealed off and no longer allow the injured and other medical cases to enter Jordan. In addition, cross border assistance is further limited due to concerns that aid is diverted to extremist groups. Humanitarian needs in southern Syria increase significantly and hundreds of people die due to airstrikes, including barrel bombs and the lack of adequate medical care.

Extremist attacks: With extremist groups invigorated by IS's gains in Iraq, some groups plan and attempt to execute high-profile attacks against the GoJ and/or western targets in Jordan. It is unlikely that these succeed to de-stabilise the GoJ.

Operational constraints

- In recent months, aid agencies have faced an increased rate of rejection of refugee assistance projects by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC). They have also been advised to increase the proportion of Jordanians targeted for assistance to 50%, compared to the 30% stipulated for most aid agencies since mid-2013. This increase is viewed as an attempt to pressure international donors to channel more resources through GoJ systems and institutions, as outlined in the recently finalised National Resilience Plan, rather than the Regional Response Plan led by the UN.
- Despite the roll out of the Za'atari Governance Plan in June 2013, there continues to be a lack of clarity on its implementation. The plan was designed to ease tensions within the camp by decentralising services, security and camp management structures. However, a number of concerns remain, including the role of street leaders and various donor-funded security initiatives which were designed to address the challenge.

Data sources and limitations

10 assessments were published in the second quarter of 2014:

- ILO published reports on: 1) children working in the agricultural sector, including those from Syria, in Mafrqa governorate and the Jordan Valley 2) children working in urban areas of Amman, Irbid and Mafrqa governorates and 3) preliminary analysis of the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on Jordan's labour market. ([ILO 2014/04/30](#))
- REACH published reports on: 1) refugees residing in informal tented settlements (ITS) in Ajloun, Balqa, Irbid, Kerak and Mafrqa governorates 2) a survey of refugees in Za'atari camp to gauge intentions to move and related reasons, such as income generation sources and satisfaction with aid services and 3) a health assessment in Za'atari camp. ([REACH 2014/06](#), [REACH 2014/06](#))
- Oxfam published a report on the perceptions of refugees residing in Za'atari camp, Balqa and the Jordan Valley to identify needs and aid gaps to this population. ([Oxfam 2014 2014/06/02](#))
- Handicap International and HelpAge International published an assessment of refugees with disabilities and specific needs in Amman, Irbid and Za'atari camp (as well as in Lebanon). ([HI/HAI 2014/04](#))
- CARE published a multi-sectoral report on urban refugees in Amman, Irbid, Mafrqa and Zarqa governorates. ([CARE 2014/04](#))
- UNRWA has finalised a needs assessment report on Palestinian refugees from Syria in Jordan, however, the final report has not been made public.

Various assessments are ongoing:

- REACH is conducting 1) a national mapping and assessment of refugees living in informal tented settlements 3) thematic assessments of youth, education and health in Za'atari camp 4) an assessment of challenges in 160 host communities identified as the most vulnerable and 5) a food security monitoring exercise with WFP.
- UNHCR and JHAS began a telephone survey among registered non-camp refugees to assess their knowledge and access to available health services and is planning to conduct the survey every 3-6 months. ([Health WG 2014/05/08](#))
- UNHCR, WHO and Johns Hopkins University are conducting a health access and utilisation assessment among non-camp refugees. ([UNHCR 2014/06/09](#))
- FAO, UNICEF and WFP have shared initial findings from their annual assessment of the nutrition status among refugees conducted in April. ([UNHCR 2014/06/09](#))
- ACTED, FAO and the Ministry of Agriculture are conducting a food security and livelihoods assessment of Jordanians affected by the Syrian refugee influx.

- The Education Working Group is conducting an inter-agency assessment of education needs in camp and host communities.

Information gaps: There are significant gaps in protection trends monitored by UNHCR which have not been shared with the wider humanitarian community, including:

- Refoulement and other incidents of forced return
- the number and reported reasons for spontaneous returns
- the number of refugees bailed out from the camps
- the number of refugees forcibly returned to the camps

In addition, there is a lack of data available on the border buffer zone as it is heavily militarised and requires GoJ permission to enter. Due to a lack of regular border monitoring, the number of those who arrive to the Jordan-Syria border crossing seeking asylum is not available, nor is the number of those who have been screened out by the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) and are not permitted to enter the Kingdom. Similarly, there is no monitoring at Jordan's airports to identify Syrian asylum seekers who may be denied entry.

Displaced

- **New arrivals:** The rate of daily arrivals decreased in the second quarter compared to the first quarter of 2014. In February, the daily average reached a peak of 370, but in early June, it had dropped to about 140 arrivals each day. ([CCCM 2014/06/17](#))

Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS)

- **Number:** Around 14,200 PRS are recorded in Jordan by UNRWA, with an average of 630 newly recorded each month between January and May. 188 PRS and their family members are being held in the Cyber City transit facility and are not permitted to enter the camps or urban areas of Jordan. ([UNRWA 2014/07/01](#))
- The number of reported refoulements of PRS has decreased since spiking in March. According to reliable sources, over 100 PRS had been forcibly returned by the GoJ authorities, with over one-third occurring between January and March. The crackdown was believed to be linked to a US-led diplomatic push for an Israeli-Palestinian settlement, which has since faltered. It is also possible that due to the lack of success in halting deportations, PRS are no longer reporting such incidents. ([PI 2014/05/28](#))

- Since a 2012 GoJ announcement that PRS would not be allowed to enter Jordan, the number of PRS in Jordan recorded by UNRWA remains low. Many PRS in Jordan are believed to be living in hiding due to fears of arrest and refoulement. Generally, PRS do not come forward for assistance until several months after their arrival, when they have exhausted their resources and coping mechanisms.
- UNRWA Jordan's funding appeal is not included in the Refugee Response Plan due to pressure from the GoJ. UNRWA Jordan's appeal for USD 14.6 million is about 25% funded. ([UNRWA 2014/05/25](#))

Unregistered refugees

- There is no information available on the number and locations of unregistered refugees. Since September 2013, the GoJ has stated that there are up to 1.3 million Syrians in Jordan, however it is unclear where this estimate comes from. ([Reuters 2014/04/30](#))

Syrian returnees

- The number of refugee returns organised by the GoJ increased in the 2nd quarter compared to the beginning of the year, with at least 400 returns reported each week since early April. About 10% of those entering at the border during the second quarter are refugees who had previously registered with UNHCR in Jordan, indicating that there is significant 're-circulation' of displaced between Syria and Jordan. The GoJ estimates that over 90,000 refugees, including 115 PRS, voluntarily returned to Syria in 2013. ([CCM 2014/06/10](#))
- A recent REACH profiling exercise in Za'atari camp showed that 98% of those surveyed had no intentions of leaving the camp in the next 6 months. ([REACH 2014/05](#))

Refugee needs and concerns

Protection

- **Documentation:** The Za'atari camp re-verification process to update refugees' biometric data and return their identity documents (which had been confiscated by the Jordanian authorities upon their initial entry) was completed in June. The process presented several protection issues:
 1. An untold number of refugees were identified by the Jordanian authorities and forcibly returned to Syria. While no information on this issue was provided by UNHCR, reliable sources said that some of those deported included refugees who had worked without legal authorisation or had entered Jordan on forged documents.

2. A significant number of identity documents were misplaced by the Jordanian authorities. In March, it was estimated that up to 1/3 of documents were misplaced by the Jordanian authorities, which will have an impact on refugees' ability to access and update civil registration documents. [\(PI 2014/03/31\)](#)
 3. In order to maintain their legal status and access basic services and refugee assistance, all refugees in non-camp settings will have to undergo the re-verification process led by the Ministry of Interior (MoI) in local police stations, with virtually no oversight by UNHCR or other protection actors. While local authorities have demonstrated considerable flexibility, the lack of clear policies and uneven implementation could create significant protection concerns for some refugees. For example, many refugees who left the camps unofficially to live in urban areas may be forced to return to camp or find means to access the official bail-out process. UNHCR confirmed that the re-verification process in non-camp areas will continue after Ramadan, with no new measures taken to ensure that local authorities are respecting refugees' basic rights.
- The GoJ announced that it will no longer provide visas on arrival to Syrian nationals, unless they hold a residency permit or are transiting to another country. Reliable sources said that Syrian nationals who hold a return ticket and supporting letters may be allowed in for short stays, however, this option is unlikely to be available for most Syrians trying to flee. [\(Jordan Times 2014/05/05, Maqar 2014/05/31\)](#)
 - Access and awareness of the importance of maintaining updated civil documentation may be a growing issue among Syrian refugees. UNHCR has advocated that some fees be waived, but this exemption was only applied in Za'atari camp, although some judges in urban areas have waived fees on a case by case basis. Refugees in non-camp settings are likely to be more vulnerable, due to the limited access to information. Those who do not register marriages with Jordan's religious courts prior to conducting the religious ceremony are subject to a fine of JD 1,000 (USD 1,410). In addition, birth certificates cannot be issued by law without identity documents and a marriage certificate, which could cause statelessness. If a birth is not registered within 30 days, the fine is JD 10 (USD 14) but after 1 year, applicants must file a lawsuit; a bureaucratic and costly process. [\(PWG 2014/06/04, UNHCR, PI 2014/06/24\)](#)
 - **ITS:** Although representing a fraction of the registered refugee population, residents of ITS present unique vulnerabilities compared to those in host communities, particularly with regards to protection, food security and access to safe water and sanitation facilities. The vast majority of ITS residents who originate from outside Dar'a, reported that they had left Za'atari camp due to tribal/clan tensions with refugees from Dar'a, who form the vast majority of the camp population. [\(REACH 2014/06\)](#)
 - The Ministry of Interior (MoI) appears to have re-started implementation of its national policy to evict residents of informal tented settlements (ITS) with even broader categorisations. The eviction policy was developed in August 2013 focused on settlements located on public land. The policy was implemented briefly in Mafrqa governorate in late 2013 but had been put on hold for much of this year. According to sources, about 1270 residents of 2 settlements located on private land in southeast Amman were evicted in the early hours of 28 June and forced to move to Azraq camp. All those evicted were registered refugees and about one-third had entered through official crossings and were not technically required to be residing in camp. There were ongoing investigations of 6 males among the residents reportedly being deported to Syria. Unlike previous evictions, the residents were not allowed to identify other options, such as finding non-camp housing to rent. It is expected that the evictions of ITS across the country will continue in the coming months. [\(PI 2014/07/02\)](#)
 - A REACH assessment of ITS in 5 northern governorates found that Mafrqa hosts the largest number, with 4,100 people living in 54 sites, followed by Balqa, which hosts about 2,100 residents in 20 sites. About 3% of the ITS population were identified as disabled, which is significantly higher than the 1.8% identified among the overall Syrian refugee caseload through the UNHCR registration system. Although there may be a higher level of vulnerability in the ITS, the difference may also be due to different definitions of 'disability' used by agencies. [\(REACH 2014/06, CARE 2014/04, UNHCR 2014/06/07, HI/HAI 2014/04\)](#)
 - **Child labour:** According to an ILO report, Jordanian and Syrian children working in the agricultural sector in Mafrqa governorate and the Jordan Valley face a very high risk of experiencing serious injuries while working. The assessment found that 22% of children experienced an injury while working, of which 37% required medical treatment and 5% of injuries resulted in an inability to work. The majority of working children among both Jordanian and Syrian nationalities were between the ages of 12 and 17. However, there was not significant evidence that the worst forms of child labour were occurring, such as those involving trafficking, prostitution, illicit activities or other work which would affect the well-being of a child. [\(Jordan Times 2014/06/10, ILO\)](#)
 - A separate ILO report on child labour in urban areas of Amman, Irbid and Mafrqa found that 45% of Syrian families reported that income from child labour formed a main source of income. Most Jordanian and Syrian child labourers reportedly worked 6-7 days/week for 4-8 hours/day for pay ranging between JD 3-5 (USD 4.20-7). The assessment found that older children were more likely to work in hazardous work environments, which included heavy manual labour or metal work. The main causes of child labour in urban areas were identified as financial need and weak value placed on education within families. [\(Jordan Times 2014/06/09\)](#)

- On 5 April, a protest escalated into violence after Jordanian security forces detained a group of refugees trying to escape Za'atari camp. One refugee was killed and dozens of Jordanian security personnel and refugees were injured. In the months preceding this incident, 'bail out' procedures, which allow refugees to officially leave the camp, had been tightened. ([Reuters 2014/04/05, LA Times 2014/04/06, UNHCR 2014/01/14](#))
- **People with special needs:** Jordan has the highest rate of war wounded Syrian refugees at 6.6% of the total number of refugees compared to 3% in Lebanon. The disparity between the host countries is attributed to the improved accessibility and systems to evacuate the injured from Syria to Jordan, compared to the mountainous border between Syria and Lebanon. Za'atari camp in particular hosts the highest proportion, with 8.9% of residents having experienced an injury, as most of those injured in southern Syria are treated and evacuated to the camp. In the first 4 months of 2014, it was reported that 2,500 war wounded were transferred to Jordan from Syria through the western crossing points bordering Dar'a governorate. ([Health WG 2014/05/29, HI/HAI 2014/04/06](#))
- Since April, there have been increasing media reports of fighters from Syria, including a number of Jordanian citizens, attempting to enter the Kingdom, and clashing with Jordan's border guard forces. In several instances, heavy weaponry was used against suspected militants, suspected to be affiliated with Jabhat Al Nusra, to deter entry. The Jordanian authorities, with support from its international allies, have focused on containing any potential threats from the Syrian conflict spilling into Jordan, including the radicalisation of its citizens. However, several areas within Jordan have been historical hotbeds for extremist groups. The increase in the movement of fighters may be due to the intensification of fighting in southern Syria; some of those attempting to enter Jordan are seeking medical attention. Those who have been caught have been detained and referred to Jordan's State Security Court. Local media sources reported that the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) have killed 14 suspected fighters and wounded 24 between late April and mid May. ([Jordan Times, 2014/05/18, Jordan Times 2014/06/16, WP 2014/04/25](#))

Health

- The MoH/WHO epidemiological bulletins were first published in 2014 to track communicable diseases in non-camp areas. While it is too early to detect major trends or make comparisons to the health situation in camps, according to the most recently published MoH/WHO epidemiological bulletin in April, there are no major outbreaks. In addition:
 - An alert was triggered by a spike in reports of acute watery or acute bloody diarrhoea in Za'atari camp in early May. ([Health WG 2014/05/08](#))

- In the second quarter of 2014, there was 1 case of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP), bringing the total to 7 this year. None of these cases have been confirmed as polio. The vaccination campaign in Jordan continued in June with a focus on hard to reach populations. A rapid assessment of AFP surveillance at public health facilities found that there was a limited understanding of AFP and reluctance among health workers to report suspected cases. ([Health WG 2014/05/08, WHO 2014/04/11](#))
- There was 1 new case of measles of an unvaccinated 14 month old reported in Za'atari camp, bringing the total number of measles cases in Jordan in 2014 to 10. ([Health WG 2014/05/08, WHO 2014/04/11](#))
- There were 11 cases of Hepatitis A reported in 5 governorates, with Mafraq reporting the highest number, with 5 cases. The total number of cases reported in 2014 is 230. ([WHO 2014/04/11](#))
- 17 cases of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) have been confirmed in Jordan and resulted in 6 deaths as of early June. While little is known about the virus' transmission, it does not appear to be easily transmitted and most of the cases in Jordan are health workers. Neighbouring Saudi Arabia has been most affected by MERS, reporting about 700 cases and nearly 300 deaths. Travellers and those from the Gulf region, health workers and those who have had close contact with confirmed MERS cases appear to be most at risk. Upcoming pilgrimage season to Saudi Arabia could lead to increases in the number of cases in Jordan, however, Syrian refugees do not appear to be at particular risk. ([Health WG 2014/05/29, Al Arabiya 2014/06/02](#))
- A telephone survey of registered refugees in non-camp settings found that over 90% said that they hold a MoI service card to access basic services and were aware of the available services. Two thirds of respondents reported they were aware of emergency assistance not covered by the public health system and 56% of children under 5 have an immunisation card. Of those reporting chronic health condition, 24% were unable to access appropriate health services and medicine. ([Health WG 2014/05/08](#))

Nutrition

- 2 cases of severe acute malnutrition and 8 cases of moderate acute malnutrition were identified and treated among new arrivals to Azraq camp in May. ([UNHCR 2014/06/09](#))
- According to initial findings of the inter-agency nutrition assessment conducted in April, there is no major nutrition crisis among Syrian refugees in Jordan. Overall, the nutritional status among registered refugees in non-camp settings was better than those residing in Za'atari camp. ([UNHCR/UNICEF/WHO 2014/05/04](#))
- There are immediate concerns with the high levels anaemia rates among refugees in Za'atari camp, indicating a deficiency of micronutrients. In addition, malnutrition rates among women of reproductive age were higher than that of

children. According to a 2007 study by the Syrian Ministry of Health, there was a 22.3% prevalence of anaemia among children under 5. In non-camp areas, the anaemia prevalence among refugee children was similar to the pre-crisis situation in Syria at 25.9% but was significantly higher in Za'atari at 48.7%. [\(UNHCR/UNICEF/WHO 2014/05/04, UNICEF 2010\)](#)

Area	Global acute malnutrition	Moderate acute malnutrition (MAM)	Severe acute malnutrition (SAM)	Stunting
Za'atari camp	1.2%	0.9%	0.3%	17%
Non-camp	0.8%	0.8%	0.0%	9%
Emergency threshold	15%		2%	
Syria pre-crisis data				23%

Livelihoods and food security

- Although ITS residents are vulnerable in terms of access to basic services and protection risks, they appear to have improved access to livelihoods compared to other non-camp refugees. Although all ITS residents reported having an income in the past 30 days, the average level of debt (JD 573 or USD 808) among ITS residents was significant, although slightly lower compared to the average found in a recent CARE assessment of urban refugees. The average debt varied significantly between governorates; while ITS residents in Ajloun total less than 70 individuals, the average household debt was more than double the average of other ITS assessed. [\(REACH 2014/06, CARE 2014/04, IRD/UNHCR 2014/04, UNHCR 2014/06/07\)](#)
- Registered Syrian companies who meet the JD 1 million minimum requirement for investing in Jordan are permitted to apply for work permits for Syrian nationals, up to 30% of their total staff. According to the ILO, there are 20 Syrian companies now registered in Irbid governorate. While this is unlikely to impact a significant number of refugees, it is a major breakthrough for the GoJ in easing its labour laws on foreign workers. [\(PWG 2014/06/04\)](#)
- In April, the Ministry of Labour issued 69,000 work permits for foreigners; the majority for Egyptian nationals and only 2.5% permits for Syrian nationals. The majority of Syrian refugees engage in undocumented work due the challenges and high costs of obtaining work permits. The cost of work permits in some sectors was increased by 30% in order to discourage demand. [\(Jordan Times 2014/04/29, Jordan Times 2014/06/14\)](#)

WASH

- A REACH assessment found that 57% of households in ITS lack access to latrines and that 11 settlement sites (out of 87 assessed) had no sanitation facilities. About half of all households rely on commercial water vendors for their water supplies. The vast majority of those in Balqa (73%) and Ajloun (100%) governorates rely on vendors, compared to just 8% in Irbid governorate, where most ITS households have access to public water connections. [\(REACH 2014/06\)](#)
- In Za'atari camp, water demands are growing with the onset of summer and as some residents procure their own water storage tanks and other water-intensive appliances, such as washing machines. This has led to a number of complaints by refugees over unfair distribution and attempts to increase aid agency oversight at water distribution points. UNICEF estimated that actual demand for water in the camp may be nearly twice as high as the 3.8 million litres currently supplied to the camp each day. A REACH assessment showed that 36% of refugees in Za'atari highlighted the need for WASH improvements as the top priority over other sectoral assistance. While the need for maintenance of WASH facilities was identified, the governance and management of water resources is also a likely key issue contributing to dissatisfaction. [\(CCM 2014/04/29, REACH 2014/05, CCM 2014/06/10\)](#)

Shelter

- The vast majority or 87% of households in ITS in 5 governorates reported that they do not pay rent. Among those that pay rent, the average monthly cost was reported to be JD 20. Although there was a crackdown on ITS in Mafrq in December 2013, only 14% reported that they had been threatened with eviction. This is likely due to the fact that only about 6% of ITS are now located on public land, unlike the pre-crackdown period. However, there were also 340 ITS households identified in December which were not found in the latest assessment, indicating that they were likely subject to eviction and moved to Za'atari camp, host communities or possibly to another ITS in an area not covered by the most recent assessment. 94% of ITS reported having access to municipal electric connections. [\(REACH 2014/06\)](#)
- Following the completion of the re-verification exercise in Za'atari camp and its theoretical closure to new arrivals (now that Azraq camp has opened), it is expected that the camp population will remain relatively stable. A REACH profile also found that 98% of those surveyed have no plans of moving from the camp in the next 6 months. [\(REACH 2014/05\)](#)

Education

- Schools in both camp and non-camp settings broke for summer holidays in mid-June. [\(ESWG 2014/05/20\)](#)
- 65,000 children or 31% of all registered Syrian refugee children are not eligible to attend formal education due to previous missed education. Of those eligible

for formal education, 74% are enrolled in school, however, attendance rates are likely lower due to the various obstacles refugees face in accessing education, such as long distances to school, transportation costs, security concerns, discrimination faced by local students and teachers, etc. In ITS, it was reported that 41% of children are attending school. However this figure may be inflated, as there may be reluctance among families to admit that their children are not attending school. About 85% of Palestinian refugee children recorded by UNRWA are attending either UNRWA or public schools. ([UNICEF 2014/05/19](#), [REACH 2014/05](#), [UNRWA 2014/05/27](#))

Host communities

- The GoJ reported an unemployment rate of 11.8% in the first quarter of 2014. While this represents a slight increase from 11% unemployment reported in the 4th quarter of 2013, the 2013 average unemployment rate was 12.6%. ([DoS 2014/04/15](#))
- Inflation in Jordan increased by about 3.3% in the first 4 months of 2014, compared to the same time period last year, with the highest increases found in cigarettes, rental costs and clothing. Recent assessments have found that price increases are a key source of tension between refugees and host communities, particularly with regards to housing costs, which continued to increase at a national average of 7.7% in the first 4 months of the year. According to the IMF, inflation is expected to stabilise at 3% in 2014 after hitting 4.7% in 2012. ([DoS 2014/05/12](#), [IMF 2013/10](#))
- Jordan's exports increased by 11.8% in the first quarter of 2014, compared to the same period in 2013, however, there are concerns that this growth will slow due to the intensifying conflict in Iraq, which is one of Jordan's main trade partners. The largest growth was witnessed in the export of fertilizer, vegetable produce and clothing. This increase in export value resulted in only a slight decrease in the trade deficit as Jordan is heavily reliant on imports. ([DoS 2014/05/22](#))
- GoJ water authorities continue to crack down on illegal connections and unauthorised wells throughout the country. Since August 2013, the Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MoWI) reported that 265 illegal wells have been sealed and that punishments for water violations have been increased. While this is a much needed effort, it could also lead to increased tensions between water vendors and those who rely on these water sources, such as farmers, and the GoJ. ([Jordan Times 2014/06/03](#))

Iraq

Displaced

Syrian registered refugees and awaiting registration	225,500
% registered and awaiting registration in camps	3.4%
Unregistered Syrian	~25,000
Palestinian refugees from Syria	~100
Syrian returnees	46,500+
Syrian migrants	Unknown
Non displaced	
Host communities affected by the Syria crisis	Unknown

Source: [UNHCR 2014/06/15](#)




Key Issues

- Following relatively quiet national elections in late April, Sunni opposition groups and IS launched a surprise offensive in northern and central Iraq in early June, capturing various towns, including Mosul, Iraq's second largest city, within a 1 week period and displacing an estimated 650,000 people. Local authorities estimated that 500,000 people had been displaced from Mosul alone, with 300,000 entering the KR-I. However, it appears that the number of IDPs in the KR-I is likely significantly lower based on field assessments, the number of entry permits issued and the fact that many IDPs returned to Mosul in recent weeks. The remaining population fled within Mosul and dispersed in towns and villages in Nineveh, Diyala and Salah Al Din governorates. Recent clashes between the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) and anti-government groups across central Iraq have resulted in an additional 150,000 people being displaced and with limited access to international assistance, as most aid agencies have evacuated most international staff from Baghdad and shifted operations to the KR-I. The June displacement comes on top of an estimated 560,000 people displaced from and within Anbar governorate since December 2013; 1 million IDPs and returnees related to Iraq's 2006-08 sectarian violence; and 225,000 Syrian refugees.
- This latest offensive has re-ignited violence and displacement among largely sectarian lines, as Sunni tribal leaders and former Baathists paved the way for IS's takeover and the latter publishing graphic photos claiming mass execution of Shi'a security forces. In response to the attacks, Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani issued a call to arms for Shi'a fighters and Shi'a

militias in Baghdad were on high alert as the country braced for a possible offensive on the capital. While the deterioration of Iraq's political and humanitarian situation is expected, it will also continue to be highly dynamic and have major implications for Syria's conflict, as well as the entire region.

- The KR-I leadership is increasingly moving towards separation from Iraq, with the 1 July announcement of an independence referendum in the coming months. The highly exposed weaknesses of the ISF have left a security vacuum for the Kurdish security forces, or peshmerga to take de facto control of disputed areas, such as eastern Mosul and oil rich Kirkuk, which will further aggravate the already strained relations between Baghdad and the KRG. Relations between the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I) and the central Government of Iraq (GoI) remain tense as the first international oil shipment from the KR-I was exported via Turkish pipelines against the GoI's stated policy in May. GoI has halted budget payments to the KR-I since March and a significant number of public sector workers have not been paid for months, including teachers and health staff working in the Syrian refugee camps. Due to the KR-I's budget shortfalls, as well as increasing weariness among host communities, the KRG is expected to decrease existing support to the refugee camps.

The Islamic State (IS): Iraq Conflict



- The Peshkapour border between Syria and the Kurdish Region of Iraq (KR-I), has been closed since 10 April due to disputes between the KRG and

Kurdish groups in Syria, which had Kurdish groups who control the crossing point. All cross border movements were reportedly banned at the crossing points, including smuggling activities, but since 10 June it appears that some humanitarian aid and refugee returns were permitted. On 15 June, the peshmerga gained control of the Rabia'a/Yaroubiyah border crossing which has remained closed throughout much of the Syria crisis. Syria's Al Hasakeh governorate, which neighbours the KR-I is heavily dependent on cross border trade and supplies due to heavy restrictions on all trade and smuggling via Turkey.

- Polio remains a top health concern as a second case has been confirmed in northern Baghdad and a Syrian refugee child in Dohuk has also been affected. The likelihood of a major disease outbreak, such as polio, measles or cholera is compounded by the significant population movements from north and central Iraq and possible water supply issues due to the increased demand and extreme summer temperatures in Iraq. WHO sent in a cholera preparedness and response team to work with the KRG and aid agencies.
- The situation of an estimated 5,500 Syrian refugees residing in the border town Al Qa'im and Al Obaidy camp is of significant concern, as these areas have been captured by anti-government groups. There were reports of 300 refugees returning to Syria of IS gains in the area, but information on the area remains extremely limited. UNHCR had pre-positioned 2 months of food and NFIs due to insecurity, however, in late June a break in the food pipeline was reported and could lead to increased returns. The humanitarian situation in eastern Syria, particularly Deir-Ez-Zor, where most refugees originate, is one of the most severe and is unlikely to be able to re-absorb any returning refugees. ([UNHCR 2014/06/20](#), [UNAMI 2014/06/26](#))
- The humanitarian coordination system for Iraq is deeply fractured and the latest crisis is further testing the system. Prior to June, the UN cluster system was operating from Baghdad and only covering internal displacement. UNHCR lead the refugee response coordination from the KR-I, but also integrated the Anbar IDP response in the KR-I into sectoral meetings. Currently, with most of the cluster system, including the Humanitarian Coordinator, now relocated from Baghdad and operating from Erbil, these systems continue to be separate, even though both are addressing internal displacement. This has led to a proliferation of meeting and at times, duplication. Furthermore, the sector working groups designed for refugee response, are becoming increasingly dominated by the IDP response due to the scale of the needs, however, this may be to the detriment of the refugee response.

Possible Developments

- **Major disease outbreak:** Displacement and water supply issues during the summer months aggravate the health situation and triggers a spike in polio, cholera or measles cases in various hotspots, including Dohuk, Nineveh and/or Baghdad. Measles is endemic in the Mosul region, where many IDPs originate, and the region also reported very low immunisation rates in recent polio campaigns. A full-fledged humanitarian response is hampered by insecurity and poor levels of acceptance by armed groups, particularly in areas outside Baghdad and the KR-I.
- **Increasing violence and displacement:** Civilian casualties spike as Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) launch a counter attack on IS held areas. Displacement increases and the ISF restricts movement towards Baghdad and the south, leaving IDPs to flee towards the KR-I and rural areas around Mosul. Access continues to be a major challenge for aid agencies outside the KR-I. While IS could attempt an attack on Baghdad, it is more likely to push towards strongholds in Abu Ghraib on the outskirts of the capital.
- **Closed internal borders:** Overwhelmed by the number of IDPs and weary of hosting a significant population of Iraqi Arabs, the KRG closes and reinforces its borders with central Iraq and heavily restricts IDP entry. IDP camps around Mosul increase, however, the humanitarian response is weak due to access challenges. Tensions between the KR-I and Baghdad reach a new high as Kurdish forces assert their authority in a number of highly disputed territories, not least the oil rich Kirkuk. The GoI does not transfer budget support, leaving public sector workers unpaid and few KRG resources to respond to the new influx or the infrastructure costs in the Syrian refugee camps.

Operational constraints

- The proliferation of checkpoint along the main roads, particularly those north of Baghdad, are likely to delay the transit of basic goods and inhibit movement by aid agencies. ([WHO 2014/06/18](#))
- The security situation in Anbar province and the takeover of Al Qa'im by anti-government groups has obstructed access to Al Obaidy camp. UNHCR has pre-positioned 2 months' supplies of basic aid and NFIs for the camp population but as of late June, reported a break in the pipeline. Some aid agency caravans have reportedly been ransacked in the absence of any security personnel. ([UNHCR 2014/06/20](#))
- Local authorities in Dohuk governorate have expressed its preference for IDPs to reside in camps in the KR-I rather than in urban areas and are

prioritising camp-based responses. In addition, local authorities are discouraging aid agencies from providing any cash assistance as they expect the Gol's Bureau of Displacement and Migration (BDM) to provide IQD 300,000 (USD 25) per month for a 6 month period. [\(PI 2014/06/26\)](#)

- Changes in the inspection requirements for imported food are expected to lead to up to 2 weeks' delay in food distributions in refugee camps in Erbil governorate. [\(UNHCR 2014/06/23\)](#)
- Protests and tensions resulting from the release of a report on GBV led to the closure of access to camps in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah for aid agencies over multiple days in May. [\(PI 2014/05\)](#)
- Gawilan camp continues to be problematic, although the exact reasons remain unclear. On 21 March, there was a violent confrontation between refugees and security forces, which led to the withdrawal of civilian authorities in the camp. The presence of the Kurdish gendarmerie, known as the *zerevani*, as the sole authorities in the camp during April and May led to heightened tensions and aggression. [\(UNHCR 2014/05/06, UNHCR 2014/04/13, REACH 2014/05\)](#)
- The refugee response in the KR-I has largely focussed on camp populations, which make up about 30-40% of the registered refugee population. However, in some camps such as Domiz, up to 30% of registered camp residents are believed to be residing outside the camp. [\(UNHCR 2014/03, WFP 2014/03/24\)](#)
- Local authorities have been hesitant about providing substantial housing assistance in non-camp settings. In Erbil, the authorities have reportedly been trying to pass legislation that halts NFI assistance to non-camp refugees. [\(PI 2014/01/20\)](#)

Data limitations

- As the refugee response in the KR-I is led by the local authorities in each governorate, policies and programming between Dohuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, the 3 major refugee hosting governorates, vary significantly. Furthermore, there is poor coordination between humanitarian actors working in the KR-I and Baghdad, with institutions, including aid agencies treating the two areas as separate countries. As a result, there is no cohesive country-wide picture of the needs, particularly in non-camp areas in the KR-I and across Iraq outside the KR-I due to high levels of insecurity and the limited presence of aid agencies.
- Many refugees registered in the camps are actually living in urban areas, leading authorities in Domiz camp to conduct a verification exercise. Many aid agencies conduct needs assessments unilaterally and coordination structures and information sharing are generally weak in the KR-I, with few assessments published.

The following assessments on Syrian refugees have been finalised or are underway in the second quarter of 2014:

- REACH finalised an assessment of livelihoods and vulnerability assessment of refugees residing in the camps.
- A UN Women report on gender based violence (GBV). [\(UN Women 2014/05\)](#)
- UNHCR reported that a rapid assessment of Gawilan camp was conducted in April, however, there was no access to the final report. [\(UNHCR 2014/05/06\)](#)
- A multi-sector needs assessment, by REACH, of non-camp refugees across the 3 governorates in the KR-I is expected to be published in July.
- A REACH/UNHCR survey of refugees residing in the camps regarding their intentions to stay or leave the camp, as well as channels for mass communication targeting refugees is underway.

An information kit, including general camp profiles detailing the humanitarian response in each camp, as well as camp health profiles are published on a regular basis. However, there is still a lack of comprehensive information on the refugees in urban settings, where 60-70% of the refugees are hosted.

The lack of comprehensive mapping showing the location of the refugees outside of the camps makes assessing their needs and delivering services exceedingly difficult. Unlike other countries in the region hosting Syrian refugees, assessment reports and meeting minutes from the KR-I humanitarian structures are not widely shared through the UNHCR Syria response portal, although UNHCR recently started to develop an assessment registry.

The following assessments on the recent wave of Iraqi IDPs have been completed or are underway:

- IOM is implementing its Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) to monitor displacement throughout Iraq
- Joint protection assessments led by UNHCR covered Duhok, Erbil, Ninewah and Sulaymaniyah governorates
- REACH governorate and town factsheets on the displacement situation in Dohuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah governorates

Extensive information gaps exist on Iraq, including:

- Recent census data and/or sex and age disaggregated data
- The number of IDPs and returnees registered by the Ministry of Displacement and Migration
- Information on coping mechanisms of the affected population, particularly in areas outside the KR-I

- Functionality of health facilities, particularly hospitals, and water infrastructure
- Monitoring of commodity prices

Displaced

Registered refugees

- According to UNHCR as of 1 April, there are 250,000 Syrians in Iraq, of which approximately 225,500 are registered or awaiting registration. ([UNHCR 2014/06/15](#))
- Between April and June, there were very few arrivals as the primary border crossing used by refugees, Peshkapour, has been closed since April 10.

Returnees

- From May to mid-June, an estimated 1,900 registered Syrian refugees voluntarily returned to Syria but there were no reported reasons for their return. Since 2013, over 46,500 Syrians, of which 29,300 were registered as refugees with UNHCR, have returned to Syria. Those who have returned to Syria, particularly single males, are often barred from re-entry.
- Over 6,400 refugees from Al Obaidy camp in Al Qa'im have returned to Syria since 2012. This does not include an estimated 300 families who were reported to have returned in June due to IS's takeover of Al Qa'im. The reported reasons for those returning from Al Obaidy camp include improvements in the situation in Abu Kamal, the Syrian border town across from Al Qa'im and the overall lack of assistance in the camps, including insufficient access to education and health care and inadequate food baskets. ([UNHCR 2014/06/09](#), [UNHCR 2014/06/23](#), [UNAMI 2014/06/26](#))

Humanitarian needs and concerns

Protection

- Due to the decentralised structure of the KRG, the 3 governorates have different policies towards Syrian refugees and Iraqi IDPs, leading to uneven implementation of protection and services and a lack of clarity on how to deal with those moving across governorates.
 - For Syrian refugees, policies regarding the issuance of residency permits which permit refugees to work legally are quite disparate and have a significant impact on refugees' well-being. Dohuk governorate has been issuing resident permits regularly, compared with Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, which had halted registration for much of the past

year. In April, UNHCR gained agreement from officials in each governorate to resume issuing residence permits in June and standardise application procedures, however at the end of June, the registration process had yet to start. ([UNHCR 2014/05/06](#), [UNHCR 2014/05/22](#), [UNHCR 2014/06/23](#))

- For Iraqi IDPs, there is a lack of clear policies on entry to the KR-I by Kurdish authorities and the regulations vary by governorate, as well as by entry checkpoint. Many single males have reportedly been denied access into the KR-I and internal security concerns appears to dominate decisionmaking. Much of the population of Khazir transit camp is reportedly made up of IDPs who have not been allowed to enter the KR-I. In addition, entry permits vary, with some IDPs receiving 7 day permits which must be renewed while others are allowed to stay indefinitely. There were also reports of identity documents being confiscated by Kurdish authorities. ([PI 2014/06/29](#), [PI 2014/06](#))
- Iraq's non-Sunni communities, including Shi'as, Christians, Shabak and Yazidis have been affected by the conflict and reportedly targeted by IS. The Turkmen city of Tal Afar was captured on 22 June and 2,000-3,000 families reported fled. Within the KR-I, minorities are not expected to face major protection issues compared to other IDP groups, although in other areas of Iraq, it is likely that they will face difficulties finding refuge. It has been reported that IDPs and Sunni communities in Baghdad have experienced intimidation by Shi'a militias and the ISF. ([PI 2014/06/12](#), [ECHO 2014/06/17](#))
- The main border crossing for Syrian refugees, Peshkapour, has remained closed for commercial and refugee transit (except some Syrians who wanted to return to Syria) since 10 April. The KRG also gained control of the Rabia'a/Yaroubiyeh border crossing which has remained closed since August 2012. In June, some humanitarian assistance was permitted to enter eastern Syria. According to WFP, 'hundreds' of IDPs waiting to enter Iraq are residing in Malikiyah, in Al Hasakeh governorate, and food assistance for 760 people has been dispatched. Due to IS's gains in northern Iraq and its symbolic ploughing through the border barrier, it is likely that unofficial movements, including of displaced Syrians, will increase between Iraq and Syria. ([WFP 2014/06/14](#), [PI 2014/05](#), [UNHCR 2014/06/09](#), [UNHCR 2014/06/23](#))
- The 4 Syrian refugee camps in Erbil governorate (Basirma, Darashakran, Kawergorsk and Qushtepa) are full, however, relatives of refugee residents continue to arrive to the camps and seek shelter. The local authorities view these arrivals as visitors and are not conducting registration, through which they would be able to access basic assistance within the camp. Similarly, in Arbat transit camp in Sulaymaniyah governorate in April, UNHCR reported that some non-camp refugees began to move into the camp before construction was completed. ([UNHCR 2014/06/09](#), [UNHCR 2014/04/13](#))

- Returnees to Syria who then attempt to re-enter the KR-I reportedly faced challenges in registering with KRG authorities who questioned their need for refugee protection. In April, it was reported that single men in particular were not allowed to re-register. ([UNHCR 2014/04/13](#))
- There are major concerns with the prevalence of GBV affecting Syrian refugee women, which are likely to affect Iraqi IDPs as well. A UN Women report found that:
 - 1 in 5 women surveyed reported that they were offered money for sex.
 - 1 in 10 women surveyed stated that men (from refugee communities, host communities, local authorities and aid agencies) had tried to coerce them into sexual relationships.
 - The main perceived cause of violence against women among respondents of both genders was poverty, followed by the need to maintain the family's honour.
 - 51% of men surveyed believed in the use of 'honour killings' when a female has lost her virginity before marriage ([UN Women 2014/05](#))
- Furthermore, the findings on GBV in the UN Women report are supported by frequent GBV reports from refugee camps. In a 2 week period in May, 21 cases of GBV were reported in Domiz camp and in Basirma camp and there were 7 cases of early marriage involving girls between 13-17. Reported reasons for early marriage included economic hardships and lack of opportunities for girls. ([UNHCR 2014/06/09](#))
- The publication of the GBV report by UN Women in May set off controversy and significantly increased tensions between refugees, host communities, KR-I authorities and aid agencies. The report, which covered sensitive issues in traditional societies and was released with minimal consultation with operational actors and affected communities, led to several protests organised in camps in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah governorates. Although refugees were the main participants of the protests, it was suggested that local authorities may have been involved. While gender based violence was already a major concern in the KR-I, humanitarian actors are concerned that the backlash against aid agencies may make it even more challenging for GBV survivors to access assistance and justice.
- There is little published information available on stateless Kurds from Syria and the unique protection concerns they might face in Iraq. Reliable sources report that there are no barriers for stateless Kurds to enter the KR-I as long as they are considered 'genuine' asylum seekers, however, they may face challenges in accessing civil documentation due to their lack of identity cards. One source reported that services could generally be accessed with UNHCR registration documents, but stateless persons face significant

difficulties in obtaining residency permits without identity documents. ([PI 2014/05](#))

Livelihoods and food security

- Many IDPs are residing with host communities, however, they are the most difficult group to identify and may often be neglected for assistance. According to IOM, host families reported that they are running low on food supplies. IDPs in Erbil report resorting to negative coping mechanisms, including skipping meals. Iraq's Public Distribution System (PDS), a ration of basic food commodities, is available to all Iraqis, however some IDPs may face challenges in transferring their registration to new locations. ([IOM 2014/06/11](#), [PI 2014/07/01](#))
- REACH assessments on livelihoods in camp and a multi sector assessment in non-camp areas found that:
 - Non-camp refugees generally had better access to income in the 30 days prior to the assessment. While access to work varied significantly across camps, only 47% reported receiving an income, compared to more than 75% in non-camp settings. Women have very little access to income generating activities with only 3-8% able to reporting an income. Only 20% of those in the camps reported that they were able to meet their essential needs, while this ranged between 59-79% among non-camp refugees.
 - Within the camps, the 3 main factors affecting access to livelihoods were: 1) proximity to labour markets, which are located in urban centres 2) density of aid actors' presence as it was associated with cash for work activities and 3) access to residency/work permits. As a result, the majority of households in Domiz, Kawargorsk, Qushtepa, Akre and Arbat camps reported an income compared to 36% or less of households in Basirma, Darashakran and Gawilan camps.
 - Aid activities are a primary source of income across camps, which are not available to refugees in non-camp settings. Camp refugees also reported more diverse sources of income, such as cash transfers from aid organisations, the selling of aid, and commercial activities within the camp, compared to non-camp refugees. However, non-camp refugees generally reported higher incomes than camp refugees. The average non-camp monthly incomes ranged from IQD 530,000 to 688,000 (USD 455 to 590) compared to IQD 425,000 (USD 365) in the camps. ([REACH 2014/05](#), [REACH 2014/04](#))

Education

- The MSNA for non-camp refugees found that:

- There are significant disparities in children's school attendance between governorates and genders. In Dohuk and Sulaymaniyah, more than 40% of girls and boys are attending schools, but in Erbil, it is less than 20%. The primary reason for lack of attendance across all 3 governorates was the lack of money. The lack of absorption capacity of schools was not noted as a significant issue in Dohuk or Erbil but was reported among 10% of households in Sulaymaniyah.
- Syrian refugee households are generally well educated. About half of all households reported that secondary school was the highest level of education attained by a family member and over 10% for university level education. The proportion of uneducated households was relatively low, except in Sulamaniyah with 12% of households reporting no formal education. [\(REACH 2014/04\)](#)

WASH

- With IS and opposition groups in control of a number of areas along Iraq's major rivers and with potential capture of the Haditha Dam, the withholding or release of water could be used as a weapon against the GoI and downstream civilian population, as seen in Abu Ghraib in April. [\(Telegraph 2014/06/21, Al Sharq al Awsat 2014/06/24, WSJ 2014/06/22\)](#)
- Mosul's water supplies may be at risk with unclear reports on whether the water infrastructure and treatment are functioning. According to the UN, local water authorities only have water treatment supplies for 1 month. [\(IOM 2014/06/11, UNAMI 2014/06/15\)](#)
- In the refugee camps, KR-I authorities halved the amount of water provided per person from 100L to 50L in some camps in recent months. While water provision is still well above international standards, it is contributing to tensions among refugees, particularly as demands increase in the extreme summer months. [\(UNHCR 2014/04/13, UNHCR 2014/05/06\)](#)

Shelter/NFI

- According to coordinated assessments of IDPs fleeing to the KR-I, shelter is the top priority. The vast majority of IDPs are reportedly staying with host families and in hotels and are relying on their own savings, however, about 7% of assessed IDPs reported having no support. About 20% are staying in transit camps and it appears that the KRG is advocating for all IDPs to reside in camp settings. 99% of IDPs residing in Erbil report that they will only be able to cover their current accommodations for a 1 week period. If a significant number of IDPs shift to rented accommodations, rental prices are likely to go up and evictions of vulnerable families are likely to occur by landlords seeking higher fees. [\(PWG 2014/06, PI 2014/06, UNAMI 2014/06/15\)](#)
- 4 IDP camps in the KR-I have been set up:

- Khazir camp, located just outside the KRG entry checkpoint, houses an estimated 2,000 people. As of late June, there was no security presence in the camp, which could leave the IDPs extremely vulnerable to violence and criminality. In addition, aid distributions were not properly organised with IDPs reporting different levels of assistance. [\(PI 2014/06\)](#)
- Garmawa camp and 2 other camps in Dohuk governorate reportedly host 70,000 IDPs. The UN reported that 570 IDPs resided in Garmawa camp. [\(UNAMI 2014/06/26\)](#)
- It appears that the KRG is moving towards a camp-based approach and requesting aid agencies to channel support to the camps, although such a policy would present a number of protection issues. Some of the camps are not within the KR-I's borders, although the KRG has claimed and administered many of these areas prior to the latest crisis. [\(PI 2014/06\)](#)
- Insecurity and battles over oil refineries in Iraq have led to fuel shortages throughout the country, including the KR-I, and there are reports of hoarding and long lines at gas stations. The fuel shortage is likely to drive an increase in costs of all goods and transport in the coming months and will likely further exacerbate electricity cuts, which are already a common occurrence across Iraq. This will have a negative effect on health facilities as well as the polio immunisation campaigns, which rely on cold storage. [\(AJE 2014/06/29, BBC 2014/06/20, WHO 2014/06/18\)](#)
- The vast majority of non-camp refugees are residing in accommodations, some of which are shared with other families, rented from private landlords. Refugees pay an average of IQD 292,000 (USD 250) each month, with little variation across governorates. While most renters in Dohuk have a written agreement, the vast majority in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah do not, leaving them vulnerable to evictions and lack of secure tenure. Most refugees were satisfied with the quality of the accommodations. [\(REACH 2014/04\)](#)
- Many of the existing refugee camps, particularly Domiz and those in Erbil governorate are at capacity or overcrowded. About 1/3 of the 74,200 refugees registered in Domiz is residing outside the camp, however, the camp remains congested with an estimated 1,800 families sharing tents. Overcrowding has also been caused as a source of significant stress among refugee households. Given the KRG's budget issues, it is unlikely that additional resources will be available to expand or establish new camps since the GoI has halted budget payments to the KR-I in March. [\(WSJ 2014/05/23, UNHCR 2014/06/09, UNHCR 2014/04/13, UNHCR 2014/06\)](#)

Health

- The mass displacement occurring throughout Iraq is likely to aggravate the spread of communicable diseases, including polio, measles and cholera and further stretch Iraq's health capacities. Both measles and cholera are

endemic in the area and the latest immunisation campaign in Mosul reached about 30% of the targeted areas. The outbreak of polio continues to be a major concern in Iraq, as an additional 2 cases have been found in the second quarter, in addition to the first case confirmed in February. One case was confirmed in the same area of northern Baghdad as the first case; another case was reportedly found in Dohuk in a Syrian refugee child but has not been publicly disclosed. (IRIN 2014/03/24, Jordan Health WG 2014/05/29, PI 2014/06/12, WHO 2014/06/18)

- Health facilities in Mosul are under significant pressure due to shortages in medicines and supplies, electricity, fuel and clean water. Many health staff are unable to reach facilities, further stretching the response and similarly, many people are also likely facing difficulties in accessing health service. 1 hospital has been closed due to an explosion. As of mid-June, indicators reported by the Directorate of Health show that the health situation are within a normal range. (WHO 2014/06/18)
- Prior to the June displacement crisis, the majority of non-camp refugees, ranging from 75% to 92%, did not report facing difficulties in accessing health services, however it is expected that the IDP influx will overwhelm the KR-I's health capacities. Among those that faced challenges, most reported that cost was the main barrier, followed by a lack of relevant services. Other assessments and health organisations reported that refugees experienced discrimination and poor treatment by health staff. According to 1 health agency, the health capacity is not strong and in particular, the hospital referral system is very weak. As a result of low capacity, lack of resources and discrimination, refugees are being asked to pay for services which should be free or are unnecessarily referred to private clinics. International assistance to the KR-I's public health services is quite limited, with most agencies engaged solely in the provision of medicine and supplies. (REACH 2014/04, UN Women 2014/05, PI 2014/05)

Egypt

Displaced

Syrian registered refugees and awaiting registration	137,995
Palestinian refugees from Syria	6,000
Syrian returnees	Unknown
Syrian migrants	Unknown

Non displaced

Host communities affected by the Syria crisis	Unknown
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Source: [UNHCR 2014/06/23](#), [UNRWA 2014/05/25](#)



Key Issues

- The army chief, Abdul Fatah Al Sisi was elected President on 29 May. Despite the political turmoil witnessed since the beginning of the uprising in January 2011, Al Sisi's era is expected to bring some stability to the country. However, serious progress on the economy remains elusive due to huge public debt, a weak Egyptian pound, high unemployment and poverty rates and low investment levels. Host communities suffer from the lack of livelihoods and access to basic services, as do the refugees.
- Protection concerns for Syrian refugees remain paramount as they are subjected to verbal attacks, scapegoating and threats in the media, arbitrary arrests, detention and, in some cases, refoulement to Syria. Despite the relative decrease in detentions compared to 2013, especially for acquiring residency, the Government of Egypt (GoE) continues to unlawfully arrest refugees for illegal emigration and release most of them afterwards. Some political prisoners have remained in custody since July 2013, with no or little information available on their status. As of 3 June, Egypt had detained 519 additional refugees from Syria and was holding 102 at police stations on the Mediterranean Coast, according to UNHCR.
- Refugees are attempting to flee by boat towards Europe, facing the risk of drowning if their boat capsizes. On 22 May, the Italian Navy assisted 488 people (including 247 Syrians) to shore in Sicily after their ship experienced serious difficulties.
- Restrictions on the entry of Syrians, in place since July 2013, and the political turmoil in Egypt have considerably limited the number of new entries into the country. According to UNHCR, 1,170 refugees de-registered with UNHCR in the beginning of 2014. As of 23 June, the number of registered refugees was 137,995, a 2% increase from end of March.

- It is very difficult for Syrians to obtain a residency permit in Egypt. Those who leave the country cannot easily return – to do so they would have to obtain a visa before re-entry, which is rarely provided to Syrians by Egyptian embassies.

Possible Developments

Ongoing economic challenges: Despite the new presidential elections, the economic conditions of host communities and refugees remain extremely challenging. Poverty and unemployment rates remain high and Syrians, who continue to face discrimination and harassment, are unable to meet their basic needs. To escape economic hardship in Egypt, people continue to seek refuge abroad.

Protection concerns remain alerting: A period of semi-stability results in some improvements for Syrian refugees. The negative sentiments of host communities towards refugees subside. Despite the decrease in arrests and detentions compared to July 2013, protection concerns remain a major concern as refugees increasingly attempt to reach Europe by boats, particularly during the calmer sailing summer months. Detentions for illegal migration continue and human rights' violations do not come to an end during the new military ruling.

Political Analysis

- The Egyptian presidential election took place on 26 May and was extended to 27 May. The army chief Al Sisi won the election with a reported 93% of votes. He promised to put security and the restoration of the country's struggling economy at the top of his agenda. However, in an economy suffering from corruption, high unemployment, and a widening budget deficit coupled with an ongoing threat from insurgent groups, Al Sisi is not expected to take the tough measures needed to restore healthy economic growth. ([BBC 2014/05/27](#), [Reuters 2014/05/29](#), [Al-Jazeera 2014/06/17](#), [xinhuanet 2014/07/16](#))
- Since July 2013, following the ousting of Morsi, Syrians have not been permitted to travel to Egypt without obtaining a visa and security clearance prior to travel. Visas have been near impossible to obtain as the Egyptian embassy in Damascus is not fully functioning. Since Morsi's ousting, national sentiment has turned against Syrian refugees. Those who took part in Muslim Brotherhood demonstrations have particularly been subjected to harassment and abuse. ([Dailynewsegypt 2014/05/07](#), [Amnesty 2014/06/12](#))

Operational Constraints


- The work of humanitarian in Egypt has been further hindered by a severe lack of funding. UNHCR's funding requirement for Syrian refugees in Egypt is USD 168,824,040; however, as of 12 June, only 10% of this figure had been achieved, falling below the regional average of 36% achieved funding. The GoE has been accused of blocking the transfer of foreign funds to non-governmental organisations (NGOs). ([Dailynewsegypt 2014/05/07](#), [RRP6 2014/03/21](#), [UNHCR 2014/06/12](#), [refintl 2014/05/08](#))
- Egypt's political upheavals, along with national policies that obstruct the work of NGOs, have left Syrian refugees with little assistance or visibility. There are major information gaps and the few available assessments make it difficult to get an updated or clear picture of the refugees' humanitarian needs.

Data limitations

- Up-to-date data on the location and needs of both refugees and host communities is severely lacking. There are no camps and most refugees are living in sprawling urban areas, where it is difficult to identify those in need, particularly in comparison to impoverished Egyptians and other non-Syrian refugees. Towards the end of March, an inter-agency joint assessment was published, the surveys for which were carried out in November 2013. The previous available report was released in June 2013 and used data collected in February 2013. ([UNHCR 2014/03/24](#))


Displaced

- Registration:** As of 23 June, there were 137,995 registered Syrian refugees in Egypt, of which 49% are female. The number of registered refugees as of 3 April was 135,300, an approximately 2% increase in 2 ½ months. According to UNHCR, this increase is primarily caused by unregistered cases being registered rather than by new arrivals. Those seeking registration are often doing so because they have finally depleted their resources and are in need of assistance. ([UNHCR 2014/06/18](#), [UNFPA 2014/04/30](#))
- Places of origin and destination:** The majority of refugees in Egypt originate from Damascus and Rural Damascus. Most of them are scattered in urban neighbourhoods, mainly in Greater Cairo, Alexandria and Damietta and are able to access public education and health



services. ([UNHCR 2014/03/20](#), [UNHCR 2014/06/15](#), [UNICEF 2014/05/19](#))

- Limited new entries:** The GoE has restricted the entry of Syrians since July 2013 and the political turmoil in Egypt has considerably limited the number of new entries into the country. 51% of registered Syrians arrived in Egypt through a transit country; of those, 76% passed through Lebanon, 12% through Jordan, and 12% through others other countries. ([UNHCR 2014/05/26](#))
- De-registrations:** In the first 3 months of 2014, 5,520 Syrians registered as refugees while 1,711 people closed their cases with UNHCR. While some refugees were closing their case in order to renew their passports in Egypt, many were reportedly closed in order to leave Egypt for Turkey, Lebanon or Jordan. ([WFP 2014/04/15](#))
- Unregistered Refugees:** By the end of 2013, the GoE estimated that there were around 750,000 Syrians in Egypt, an increase from 300,000 in July 2013. To get an estimate of the unregistered refugees, we subtract the number of registered refugees from the GoE figures. Accordingly, it is estimated that there are around 612,200 unregistered refugees in Egypt (750,000 minus the registered refugees). ([Plan 2014/05/20](#), [Alquds 2013/12/11](#))
- Palestinian refugees from Syria:** According to Human Rights Watch, the Palestinian Embassy in Cairo has registered 6,834 Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS) who arrived in Egypt between December 2012 and October 2013. PRS residing in Egypt are not only stateless, but are also without any international body to assist them. While PRS fall under UNHCR's mandate, the GoE has prevented UNHCR from registering or assisting them in any way. Abusive policies towards PRS, disguised as state security measures, have been reported throughout 2013 and in early 2014,. PRS have also been attempting to emigrate illegally to Europe and are exposed to the same discrimination as Syrians. ([Jadaliya 2014/01/28](#), [WFP 2014/05/27](#))



Refugee needs and concerns

Protection

- After policies pertaining to Syrians and their legal situation in Egypt changed in July 2013, authorities have placed Syrians under greater scrutiny and there have been incidents of Syrians being arrested, detained, and deported for not having a valid residency permit. Due to these hostilities and restrictions, UNHCR witnessed a surge of Syrians coming forward to register

as refugees, many of whom had been resident in the country for some time. At the same time, there has also been an increase in requests among registered Syrians to close their files as they seek to leave Egypt. Many Syrians living in Egypt have also made illegal attempts to enter Europe. There have been limited Syrian rivals in Egypt since July 2013, with an average of 225 persons arriving a month, down from nearly 15,000 in the month of June 2013. New registrations are still taking place in 2014, but at a slowing rate.

- According to a joint assessment conducted in November 2013 and published in March 2014, the main protection issues were related to the new and more stringent visa requirements and difficulty in obtaining residency permits. There were also growing security concerns due to arrests and deportations of some refugees. Since July 2013, Egyptian airport officials have denied entry to at least 476 Syrians and returned them to Syria, in violation of the international legal prohibition against refoulement. ([UNHCR 2013/11](#), [Amnesty 2014/06/10](#))
- **Low levels of registration and difficulties in obtaining residency:** Some Syrians find the UNHCR registration system very difficult. Few others are not highly interested in registering due to the limited assistance available, particularly in accessing legal residency, which is a high priority for Syrian refugees. Those who do not have residency have no access to essential services such as healthcare. Registered Syrians are advised not to leave the country, because their re-entry to Egypt cannot be guaranteed. (PI 2014/06/20, [savethechildren 2014/01/24](#), [madamasr 2013/09/17](#))
- **Illegal assemblies prohibited:** On 10 June, the Cairo Criminal Court sentenced 13 Syrians in absentia to 5 years in a high security prison. The charges against them include illegal assembly, disturbing public order, and compromising security during a protest against President Assad outside the Syrian Embassy. ([Dailynewsegypt 2014/06/11](#))
- **Ongoing detentions and releases:** As of 3 June, UNHCR reported that Egypt had detained 519 additional refugees from Syria and was holding 102 at police stations on the Mediterranean Coast. UNHCR reported a marked decrease in detentions and deportations since 2013. From August through December 2013, Egypt arbitrarily detained over 1,500 refugees from Syria, including 250 children, many of whom had sought to emigrate irregularly to Europe. The authorities forced over 1,200 to leave Egypt and some were forced to return to Syria with the threat of indefinite detention. . ([Dailynewsegypt 2014/06/11](#), [Dailynewsegypt 2014/05/07](#), [Amnesty 2014/06/10](#))
- In May, a ship aiming to reach the Italian coast had disembarked from Egypt near Alexandria. The authorities started arresting those attempting to emigrate illegally. UNHCR was aware of 96 Syrians who were arrested for attempting to irregularly depart Egypt on this boat and were in detention in Alexandria and its surrounding governorates. Egyptian authorities have conducted regular releases of people from detention shortly after their arrest

in May. Those released are mostly families, children, elderly and those with relatives in Egypt. Egyptian authorities are reportedly issuing 3-month residency permits to Syrians who are being released. ([UNHCR 2014/ 05/30](#), [UNHCR 2014/ 05/30](#), [UNICEF 2014/05/19](#))

- On 14 April, the Egyptian authorities arrested around 140 Palestinian and Syrian refugees trying to emigrate to Europe. Although these refugees reportedly had valid residency permits to stay in Egypt and UNHCR registration cards, they had sold all their personal belongings to pay several thousand dollars to people smugglers for the trip. Many were subjected to ill-treatment and detention in custody while attempting to seek safety and security. ([Monitor 2014/04/21](#), [Amnesty 2014/04/25](#))
- **Increase in boat departures:** Over 3 days from 5 June, the Italian navy rescued more than 5,000 people who had attempted the perilous journey across the Mediterranean by boat. Most of the passengers were Syrian and Egyptian. The Government of Italy reported the number of migrant arrivals at over 39,000 so far in 2014. On 22 May, the Italian Navy assisted 488 people (including 247 Syrians) to shore in Augusta (Sicily) after 2 ships experienced serious difficulties. New attempts to reach Europe by sea are expected through the summer when seas are calm. ([UNHCR 2014/ 05/30](#), [UNHCR 2014/06/06](#))
- **Child labour:** 198 children were identified as working or begging in streets (75% girls) in Cairo. They live with their parents or close relatives and return home before dark. Most of the children and their mothers are involved in begging or petty trade. ([UNICEF 2014/05/19](#))
- **Gender-based violence (GBV):** UNFPA reported an increased number of GBV cases. These have been linked to the political turmoil which was accompanied with heightened security issues associated with the elections and the increased tensions between Syria refugees and the host communities. ([UNFPA 2014/04/30](#))

Livelihoods and Food Security

- **Economic challenges and lack of livelihoods:** Egypt's precarious political and economic situation has been preventing Syrian refugees from obtaining much-needed services. The Egyptian unemployment rate has soared to 25% this year, according to the World Bank. With the deteriorating economic conditions in the country, host communities and Syrian refugees have been increasingly finding it difficult to survive. Finding good work that ensures a living, even in the informal market, remains a major challenge for refugees. While their income is very limited, refugees' expenditure is rising. The cost of food and rent has been rising steadily in recent years. ([refintl 2014/05/08](#))
- According to a November 2013 assessment, published in March 2014, the average Syrian household's income was between EGP 800 – 1,500 (USD 115 – 215) while their spending is on average EGP 2,500 (USD 360). Food is

the highest expenditure for families and rent comes in second; EGP 1,200 and EGP 850, respectively. ([WFP 2014/05/26](#), [Monitor 2014/03/10](#), [UNHCR 2013/11](#))

- **Increasing global prices:** Since January 2011, Egypt has witnessed a rise in the cost of basic commodities, food and fuel. The energy crisis has seen an increase in power outages, which is set to worsen over the summer. Recently, the World Bank has raised concerns over the increase in global food prices, which rose by an average of 4% during the first quarter of 2014, driven by rises in wheat and maize prices. In Egypt, however, increasing wheat prices, a staple of the Egyptian diet, is not expected to have a significant impact on vulnerable people as bread is subsidised by the GoE. Rising wheat prices will increase GoE food subsidy costs rather than causing reduced consumption. ([Dailynewsegypt 2014/05/07](#), [WFP 2014/06/10](#))

Health

- In April, the Ministry of Health and Population (MoHP) conducted a polio vaccination campaign targeting Egyptian and non-Egyptian children under 5. Approximately 14.5 million children were immunized out of 11,950 Syrian children. This represents a small increase in the number of beneficiaries by around 500 children from the previous round of immunisation in December 2013. ([UNICEF 2014/05/19](#))
- In November 2013, a UN joint assessment of 600 families, found most households reported having 1 or more family member with health needs. The most common chronic diseases among Syrian refugees are cardiovascular disease (27%), followed by diabetes mellitus (12%). Many types of healthcare services and medicines require at least partial payment by the patients. ([UNHCR 2013/11](#), [refintl 2014/05/08](#))

Education

- 8,013 Syrian children were reported to having enrolled in primary schools in areas of high Syrian refugee concentration in 5 governorates in Egypt in May 2014. According to the joint assessment conducted by UN organizations and partners in November 2013, 43% of Syrian refugee children are not attending schools. The high drop-out rate is caused by various factors. The biggest barrier to schooling is the lack of space in public schools. Education also requires money such as school fees, supplies, uniforms, and transportation costs which are not easily afforded by families. Language barriers and parent' safety concerns have also been additional factors. ([UNHCR2014/03/24](#), [UNHCR 2014/04/07](#), [UNICEF 2014/05/19](#))
- Many Syrian students dropped out of schools and universities, while others were detained during the wave of Syrian arrests and detentions which started in July 2013. Between the end of March and the end of April, 136 children were detained by Egyptian authorities while attempting to emigrate illegally

with their families. They were all released in early May. ([Monitor 2014/04/21](#), [UNICEF 2014/05/19](#), [refintl 2014/05/08](#))

Annex A- Information gaps

- **Information gaps:** Egypt is still the country with the least available information on Syrian refugees. Locations, needs and numbers of Syrian refugees and of the host communities are severely lacking. Very few assessments are conducted sporadically and these become outdated after a period of time. In March 2014, an inter-agency assessment was published on information collected from November 2013. ([UNHCR 2014/03/24](#))
- Data is also lacking on the situation of Syrian refugees in Iraq, namely in the governorates of Dohuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah where most of the Syrian refugees are staying. There is no cohesive country-wide information on humanitarian needs. While information is regularly published on camp health profiles and on the humanitarian situation in refugee camps such as Domiz and Gawilan, information is still extremely limited on Urban areas where 60-70% of refugees are hosted. The lack of comprehensive mapping showing the locations of refugees outside camps increases the difficulty of needs assessments and aid distribution.
- There is a lack of information on the number of returnees from host countries and their reasons for return.
- Other gaps include:
 - Number of Syrians denied entry by the GoJ on the Syrian-Jordanian borders and in Jordanian airports.
 - Number of Syrians denied entry or having lost their refugee status by the GoL after the issuance of a warning by the GoL that refugees will lose status if they cross back into Syria.
 - Number of Palestinian refugees not permitted into Lebanon.
 - Number of Syrians deported from Egypt.
 - Information on secondary displacement of refugees in host countries in search of livelihood opportunities and security (especially Egypt).
 - Number of Syrian workers in host countries and their working conditions.
 - Number of those arrested in host countries.
 - Income sources of refugees, as well as access and availability to goods in the market.

Information Sources in 2014:

- In the absence of coherent and reliable media reports, we mainly rely on humanitarian reports published by NGOs, INGOs and government agencies to come up with a comprehensive analysis on the humanitarian situation in Syria.

- The health information system regularly publishes statistics on morbidity and mortality per geographical parts of Lebanon. Of the 166 Private Healthcare Systems (PHS) and Mental Health and Psychological Support (MHPSS) Centers supporting Syrian refugees, around 20% currently report into this system.
- Amnesty International published a report in May on refugee health needs in Lebanon. The report focused exclusively on Syrian refugees disregarding other refugees (PRS) and did not include information on Syrian refugees receiving care outside the UN system, through other relief networks.
- In February, The International Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) published a report on mapping the education response to the Syrian crisis inside Syria and in host countries.
- As a follow up to the 2013 Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees (VASyR), UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP are conducting a second round of assessments for the 2014 VASyR. In cooperation with 11 other partners, data is being collected in 5 regions of Lebanon.
- The International Crisis Group produced a review in April on the situation of Syrian Refugees in Turkey, based on AFAD data and interviews the Group carried out on the ground. ([ICG 2014/04/30](#))
- In April 2014, the International Labor Organization (ILO) published reports on child labor among Syrian refugees in Jordan and on the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on the Jordanian labor market. ([ILO 2014/04/30](#))

Other reports have been published by INGOs such as REACH, UNHCR, UN Women, ICG, ILO, Oxfam, Handicap International, HelpAge International, CARE and UNRWA and NGOs (specifically in Turkey), as well as by government agencies; mostly reports relating to refugee numbers.

Annex B – Definitions Humanitarian Profile

Affected

The number of affected refers to people affected by the violence in Syria. The number of affected can be divided in two groups: those non-displaced and those displaced.

Non-Displaced

The **non-displaced** include all those within Syria that have been, directly or indirectly, affected by the conflict, including those who have been injured, have lost access to essential services, and those whose vulnerability has increased due to the impact of the unrest on livelihoods and access to essential services (OCHA 2012/06/05).

In addition, this group includes the **host** community, the people who are part of a community or family receiving affected people. Due to the stress placed on the host families and communities, they are considered part of the humanitarian caseload. As there is currently no information available on the needs of the host community, this group is currently excluded from this humanitarian profile.

Displaced

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are those persons or groups of persons who are residing in Syria but who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict. (OCHA 2004)

Refugees and Asylum Seekers are those who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside Syria, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country. (UN 1951).

For the purpose of this document, the category 'refugees' includes those registered, awaiting registration as well as those unregistered – despite the fact that unregistered Syrians are technically not refugees as their refugee status has not been established. Within this group, the Iraqi and Palestinian refugees are in a specifically vulnerable position, both within Syria as outside.

Others of Concern - Persons who have been displaced by the emergency and form part of the humanitarian caseload, but do not fall into either of the above categories (e.g. migrants, returnees).

Other definitions

In this report the term 'opposition forces' is used to refer to all armed groups and individuals engaged in armed conflict against the Government of Syria.

Previous SNAP reports

• Regional Analysis for Syria	January 2013 – June 2014
• Thematic reports	
Aleppo governorate Profile	April 2013
Legal Status of Individuals Fleeing Syria	June 2013
Impact of the conflict on Syrian economy and livelihoods	July 2013
Syrian border crossings	September 2013
Assessment Lessons Learned	September 2013
Lebanon baseline data	October 2013
Cross-border movements of goods	December 2013
Relief actors in Syria	December 2013
Jordan baseline data	December 2013
Palestinians from Syria	February 2014
Idleb governorate Profile	June 2014
• Scenarios	February/September 2013
All reports can be found on: http://www.acaps.org/en/pages/syria-snap-project	

Forthcoming SNAP reports

• RAS (Part I and Part II)	Start October 2014
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Map data sources

Administration: OCHA Common Operational Datasets. Syria IDP camps: U.S. Department of State HIU, WFP. Syria IDP movements: WFP. Iraq IDP camps: REACH. IDP Refugee camps: U.S. Department of State HIU. Informal tent settlements: UNHCR. Refugees: UNHCR. Infrastructure: Global Energy Observatory, OCHA, WFP. Conflict incidents: UNMAS. Border crossings: SNAP. Iraq conflict: Institute for the study of war.

How to use the RAS

This report is divided into three sections:

- The regional overview summarises the whole report into one page, highlighting the key issues and developments of the last month.
- Part I focuses on the situation in Syria, firstly by outlining the issues on a country level and afterwards, in more depth, on a sectoral level.
- Part II deals with the host countries Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Iraq, and discusses the main humanitarian issues related to the crisis.

The RAS is intended as a reference document and the different parts and components can be read separately, according to information needs. While those working in a host country or a specific governorate might only be interested in small parts of the report, individuals working on a regional level can benefit from reading all sections.

The information in blue contains explanatory notes on the structure of this report while the information in red boxes outlines SNAP's analysis.

How to quote this document

The Syria Needs Analysis Project is established to support the humanitarian response by providing an independent analysis of the humanitarian situation of those affected by the Syrian crisis. We support the communication of humanitarian needs and agree to them being used by other organisations to this end. Please note that most information is derived from secondary data and the original source should be quoted when this information is used. The original source can be found at the end of a paragraph and whenever possible, the hyperlink to this source has been made available. All information which is not sourced is based on SNAP's own analysis and should be quoted as such.

Should you wish to reproduce the maps or other information within this document, kindly use [this link](#), to agree to the copyright terms and conditions.

Methodology – This desk study presents estimations of scale, severity and likely impact of a disaster. It aims to inform decision making for preparedness and emergency response and intends to complement and integrate assessment-related data from other agencies. Feedback to improve the RAS is welcome (snap@acaps.org).

Disclaimer – Information provided is provisional as it has not been possible to independently verify field reports. As this report covers highly dynamic subject, utility of the information may decrease with time.

References – ACAPS and MapAction would like to thank all organisations that have provided input to this report. Please note that all sources which are available online are hyperlinked (underlined, in brackets). Information sourced as 'PI' refers to personal interviews with persons unknown to the SNAP project. Information sourced as a 'Trusted Source' refers to information received from an actor known and trusted by the project.

