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COI QUERY RESPONSE – Afghanistan

Major legislative, security-related, and humanitarian developments

1. Legislative developments

On 4 January 2026, the de facto government issued a ‘Criminal Procedure Code for Courts’. There was no public announcement of the new code.¹ The Afghan human rights organisation, Rawadari, was the first organisation to report on it, and by that made it public.²

The new Code contains 119 articles, and some stand in contradiction with international human rights standards.³ The Code makes reference to ‘slaves’ and ‘masters’ in several instances and some sources suggest it indirectly authorises slavery.⁴ For example, Article 15 outlines that the type of punishment (prescribed or discretionary) is to be ruled depending on ‘whether the criminal is free or a slave’, and Article 4(5) authorises a ‘master’ [*badaar*] to enforce discretionary punishment (*tazir*).⁵ Moreover, Article 9 divides society into four social categories: ‘scholars’, ‘the elite’, the ‘middle class’ and ‘the lower class’. It further states that legal consequences are to be determined by social status rather than the crime itself, with punishments worsening with the lower social standing of the convict. For example, while a religious scholar would be punished by being given ‘advice’, those from the lower class may be sentenced with corporal punishment and imprisonment for the same crime.⁶ In an interview with BBC Afghan Service, as reported by the Afghanistan Analyst Network (AAN), a Taliban spokesperson ‘implicitly’ place de facto government officials in the ‘nobles category’ as he said that ‘this category was not limited to government officials, but could include *sadat*, (descendants of the Prophet), tribal elders and other influential figures.’ The AAN further noted that the references to slavery must be ‘particularly troubling’ for the Shia Hazara community who have a ‘more recent, family memories of enslavement’ under King Abdul Rahman Khan’s reign at the end of the nineteenth century.⁷

¹ Diplomat (The), Taliban Introduce New Criminal Code in Afghanistan, 27 January 2026, [url](#)

² GIWPS, The Taliban’s New Criminal Regulation Legalizes Slavery, Violence, and Repression of Women, 30 January 2026, [url](#)

³ Rawadari, Press Release Regarding the Implications of the “The Criminal Procedure Code for Courts” Issued by the Taliban, 21 January 2026, [url](#), p. 1; GIWPS, The Taliban’s New Criminal Regulation Legalizes Slavery, Violence, and Repression of Women, 30 January 2026, [url](#)

⁴ Rawadari, Press Release Regarding the Implications of the “The Criminal Procedure Code for Courts” Issued by the Taliban, 21 January 2026, [url](#), pp. 1, 3; GIWPS, The Taliban’s New Criminal Regulation Legalizes Slavery, Violence, and Repression of Women, 30 January 2026, [url](#)

⁵ Rawadari, Press Release Regarding the Implications of the “The Criminal Procedure Code for Courts” Issued by the Taliban, 21 January 2026, [url](#), p. 3

⁶ Rawadari, Press Release Regarding the Implications of the “The Criminal Procedure Code for Courts” Issued by the Taliban, 21 January 2026, [url](#), p. 3; GIWPS, The Taliban’s New Criminal Regulation Legalizes Slavery, Violence, and Repression of Women, 30 January 2026, [url](#)

⁷ Clark, K., Inside the Islamic Emirate’s Penal Code: Crime, punishment and authority in Afghanistan, 26 February 2026, AAN, [url](#)



Rawadari noted that *inter alia* Article 18 prescribes flogging very extensively’ and ‘without clear limitations’, which constitutes an expansion of such punishment by law according to their analysis.⁸

Rawadari further noted that the Code is incompatible with fair trial standards, and lacks references to the rights of accessing a defence lawyer, remaining silent, or receiving compensation. Moreover, ‘the Code has not specified minimum and maximum penalties, and by eliminating the process of independent investigation in proving criminal acts and instead has instituted “confession” and “testimony” as the primary means of proving guilt’. According to Rawadari’s analysis this ‘significantly heightens the risk of torture, serious abuse and widespread violations of the rights of the accused’.⁹

Some of the articles highlighted by Rawadari includes articles that ‘legalise[s] and formalise[s] discrimination against religious minorities’ and significantly narrow civic space, including:

- **Article 2 (8)**, only describes followers of the Hanafi school of thought as Muslims, while those following other Muslim branches or other religions are referred to as ‘heretics’.
- **Article 2 (11)**, a ‘rebel’, i.e. someone who ‘strives to spread corruption’, ‘cannot be reformed without being put to death’. According to Rawadari, this article grants the de facto judicial institutions and branches of the de facto state ‘broad and dangerous authority to kill opponents, critics, and human rights activists’ without a fair trial.
- **Article 2 (14)**, states that for *hudud* crimes and blood money crimes, only attention should be paid to ‘the crime itself’ and not to the ‘personality of the perpetrator’. According to Rawadari, this article indicates that the mental state, capacity and intent of the perpetrator is not to be taken into account, which violates fair trial principles.
- **Article 4 (6)**, states that all Muslims ‘whenever they witness sinners committing a sin, are permitted to proceed with their punishment’. According to Rawadari, this article grants ordinary citizens, the morality police and Taliban-aligned clerics to punish others.
- **Article 13**, calls for the destruction of ‘places or [moral] corruption’, without defining the term.
- **Article 14**, stipulates that it is permissible to kill those who ‘defend false beliefs contrary to Islam’ or ‘invite others to such beliefs’, with the permission of ‘the Imam’ [according to the AAN this is to be understood as the state in this context¹⁰].
- **Article 17 (2)**, stipulates that mockery and ridicule of Islamic rulings is punishable with two years’ imprisonment, without defining the terms ‘mockery’ and ‘ridicule’.
- **Article 19**, states that if a person commits an act that has been prohibited by the Supreme Leader, ‘they are deemed criminal and deserving of punishment’. Rawadari

⁸ Rawadari, Press Release Regarding the Implications of the “The Criminal Procedure Code for Courts” Issued by the Taliban, 21 January 2026, [url](#), p. 4

⁹ Rawadari, Press Release Regarding the Implications of the “The Criminal Procedure Code for Courts” Issued by the Taliban, 21 January 2026, [url](#), p. 1

¹⁰ Clark, K., Inside the Islamic Emirate’s Penal Code: Crime, punishment and authority in Afghanistan, 26 February 2026, AAN, [url](#)



noted that such permissible acts that are currently prohibited includes women's education.

- **Article 23 (2)**, states that 'Those who insult the Taliban leaders' will be punished with 20 lashes and six months imprisonment
- **Article 24**, states that 'if a person witnesses or has knowledge of "subversive" meetings and activities of "opponents of the regime", but does not take action against them herself/himself or does not inform the relevant Taliban departments, he/she is criminal' and may be sentenced to two years' imprisonment.
- **Article 26**, states that followers of the Hanafi school of thought are not permitted to abandon their belief, which may be punished with two years' imprisonment. Rawadari cautioned that this article place Salafists and Ahl-e-Hadith at heightened risk to face arbitrary arrest, trail and punishment.
- **Article 40**, states that any person present at a 'gathering of corruption', including those being there involuntarily, is 'considered complicit in the act of "corruption" and deemed punishable', without defining the term 'corruption'.
- **Article 59**, criminalises dancing and watching dancing.¹¹

In the interview with BBC Afghan Service, a Taliban spokesperson assured that the articles on individuals leaving their faith do not apply to Shia Muslims or non-Muslims who 'have adhered to their religion from the beginning', and that the 'system has accepted them' and 'has no issue with them'.¹² The AAN noted that many key wordings in the Code lack a definition, including of 'heretics', 'spreaders of disorder', 'those who persist in disorderly behavior', and 'wrongdoers' that can all be handed down the death penalty, as well as 'innovators' (those 'whose beliefs run contrary to those who associate themselves with the sunna and the larger community of Sunni Muslims').¹³

Articles on violence against children include:

- **Article 30**, prohibits physical forms of violence against children by teachers that result in 'bone fracture', 'torn skin' or 'bodily bruising'. According to Rawadari this indirectly legitimises other forms of abuse of children.
- **Article 48**, 'states that a father may punish his 10 years old son when the child is acting against his own interest, such as for abandoning prayer and other matters'¹⁴

Articles on domestic violence include:

¹¹ Rawadari, Press Release Regarding the Implications of the "The Criminal Procedure Code for Courts" Issued by the Taliban, 21 January 2026, [url](#), pp. 1–3

¹² Afghanistan, de facto authorities, Transcript of the Recent Interview of Zabihullah Mujahid, Spokesman of the IEA with BBC, 30 January 2026, [url](#)

¹³ Clark, K., Inside the Islamic Emirate's Penal Code: Crime, punishment and authority in Afghanistan, 26 February 2026, AAN, [url](#)

¹⁴ Rawadari, Press Release Regarding the Implications of the "The Criminal Procedure Code for Courts" Issued by the Taliban, 21 January 2026, [url](#), p. 5



- **Article 5 (4)**, states that a husband may carry out discretionary punishments (*tazir*).¹⁵
- **Article 32**, states that if a husband beats a woman with a stick resulting in severe injury such as ‘a wound or bodily bruising’ and she can prove it before a judge, the husband will be sentenced to 15 days imprisonment. Rawadari noted that no other forms of physical, psychological or sexual violence against women are explicitly prohibited in the Code.
- **Article 34**, ‘states that if a woman repeatedly goes to her father’s house or that of other relatives without her husband’s permission and does not return home despite her husband’s request, the woman and any member of her family and relatives who has prevented her from going to her husband’s house are deemed criminal and will be sentenced to three months’ imprisonment’.¹⁶

Article 60 moreover prescribes penalties for homosexual individuals and instructs judges to issue two years’ imprisonment to someone who has committed a ‘homosexual act’, and in the case of a ‘habitual homosexual’, the person may be sentenced to death if authorised by the state.¹⁷

2. Implementation of *sharia*

On 2 December 2025, another public execution of a man convicted of murder was carried out in Khost City.¹⁸ According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), this was the twelfth judicially sanctioned public execution since the Taliban takeover in 2021.¹⁹ UNAMA further reported that the de facto authorities have continued to carry out judicially sanctioned corporal punishment in public ‘on a weekly basis’. In the period 1 October–31 December 2025, 287 individuals were flogged according to UNAMA’s records, including 253 men, 30 women, three boys and one girl.²⁰

On 18 February 2026, the de facto Minister of Communications publicly stated that male doctors are to be considered a *mahram* when treating female patients, which would allow them to examine women.²¹ However, on 23 February 2026 the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan published a report on women’s and girls’ access to health, in which it was found that they need a *mahram* in many provinces to be able to be seen by a male doctor, in addition to adhering to the *hijab* requirement. Moreover, many

¹⁵ GIWPS, The Taliban’s New Criminal Regulation Legalizes Slavery, Violence, and Repression of Women, 30 January 2026, [url](#)

¹⁶ Rawadari, Press Release Regarding the Implications of the “The Criminal Procedure Code for Courts” Issued by the Taliban, 21 January 2026, [url](#), p. 5

¹⁷ AAN, AAN’s unofficial translation of the Penal Code for Courts, 26 February 2026, [url](#); Clark, K., Inside the Islamic Emirate’s Penal Code: Crime, punishment and authority in Afghanistan, 26 February 2026, AAN, [url](#)

¹⁸ AP, Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers carry out public execution in sports stadium in eastern city, 2 December 2025, [url](#)

¹⁹ UNAMA, Update on the human rights situation in Afghanistan: October – December 2025 Update, 8 February 2026, [url](#), p. 4

²⁰ UNAMA, Update on the human rights situation in Afghanistan: October – December 2025 Update, 8 February 2026, [url](#), p. 4

²¹ Amu TV, Taliban minister says male doctors are ‘mahram’ to female patients, 18 February 2026, [url](#)



women and girls could only communicate with the doctor indirectly through their *mahram*.²² The same source noted ‘multiple reports of women being unable to access medical care, including urgent care, because they did not have a *mahram*’. In some cases, this had led to a female patient delivering her baby in front of the hospital gate, and an unaccompanied woman being turned away when seeking care for her young son, which eventually led to the child’s death. The UN Special Rapporteur further noted that ambulance services were ‘frequently inaccessible to women without a *mahram*; with some male operators refusing to speak to women at all’.²³ In the period October–December 2025, UNAMA also reported on de facto officials from the de facto Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (MPVPV) making unannounced visits to healthcare facilities in the provinces Kandahar and Uruzgan to ensure that women without *mahrams* (including patients and healthcare staff) were not allowed to enter.²⁴

Le Monde reported from health clinics in Paktia Province, where women were allowed to be treated by male doctors, and also to enter and travel to the clinics unaccompanied as long as they were within a 72 km radius from their homes. Many women patients were however frustrated by the fact that only male doctors were available, as they ‘felt more comfortable speaking to a woman about certain issues’.²⁵

3. Security situation

This section contains conflict data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED)²⁶ and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP).²⁷ Conflict data from these sources covers the period 1 December 2025–20 March 2026.

General conflict data

In the period 1 December 2025–20 March 2026, ACLED recorded 347 events in total – 108 battles, 156 events involving explosions or remote violence, and 83 events involving violence against civilians.²⁸ In the same period, UCDP recorded 153 events and 360 civilian deaths, although cautioning that the data is preliminary amid the conflict with Pakistan and that the

²² UN Human Rights Council, Report on women’s and girls’ right to health in Afghanistan, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, Richard Bennett, 23 February 2026, [url](#), para. 52

²³ UN Human Rights Council, Report on women’s and girls’ right to health in Afghanistan, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, Richard Bennett, 23 February 2026, [url](#), para. 37

²⁴ UNAMA, Update on the human rights situation in Afghanistan: October – December 2025 Update, 8 February 2026, [url](#), p. 3

²⁵ Le Monde, The challenge of medical access in rural Afghanistan: ‘Before the clinic was set up, we used to give birth at home, and three or four women died every month’, 25 January 2026, [url](#)

²⁶ ACLED, The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project - Bringing clarity to crisis, n.d., [url](#). For more information on ACLED data and how it is used by the EUAA, see the [EUAA COI Report Afghanistan - Country Focus 2026](#)

²⁷ UCDP, About UCDP, n.d., [url](#). For more information on UCDP data and how it is used by the EUAA, see the [EUAA COI Report Afghanistan - Country Focus 2026](#)

²⁸ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 1 December 2025 to 20 March 2026, as of 25 March 2026, [url](#)



records of civilian deaths recorded during this period might increase.²⁹ A provincial breakdown of events is provided in [Annex 1. Provincial breakdown of events](#).

Cross-border incidents involving Pakistan

The conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan has re-escalated anew, following a period of heightened tensions and a stalled peace process.³⁰ Although a ceasefire was established in November 2025³¹ after intense clashes in mid-October 2025,³² it remained fragile and Pakistan reserved its right to strike across the shared border in response to attacks by the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP).³³ Sporadic clashes continued to be reported after the ceasefire.³⁴

The ceasefire was ultimately broken on 21 February 2026, when Pakistan carried out airstrikes on alleged TTP targets in Afghanistan.³⁵ The Associated Press (AP) reported on Pakistani airstrikes hitting targets in the Nangarhar Province, killing 70 ‘militants’ according to Pakistan, while the Afghan de facto authorities stated that various civilian areas were hit, including a *madrassa* and private homes.³⁶ According to TOLONews, 17 people died in this airstrike.³⁷

On 25 February 2026 cross-border clashes erupted in the districts of Nazyan, Dur Baba³⁸ and Achin³⁹ in Nangarhar Province, as well as in the border areas of Torkham and Tirah.⁴⁰ Following these clashes, on 27 February 2026, the Pakistani Minister of Defence announced on social media that the country’s ‘patience has run out’ and declared ‘open war’. Pakistan carried out airstrikes in Kabul City, and cities in Kandahar, and Paktya on the same day.⁴¹ Further Pakistani airstrikes were reported on 28 February 2026, including in Kabul City⁴² and in the provinces of Khost,⁴³ Kandahar,⁴⁴ and at Jalalabad airport (Nangarhar Province).⁴⁵

²⁹ EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 1 December 2025 to 20 March 2026, provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 24 March 2026

³⁰ International Crisis Group, Pakistan: Responding to the Militant Surge on the Afghan Border, 27 February 2026, [url](#)

³¹ International Crisis Group, Pakistan: Responding to the Militant Surge on the Afghan Border, 27 February 2026, [url](#)

³² ACAPS, Afghanistan, Conflict escalation affecting multiple provinces since 21 February 2026, 3 March 2026, [url](#), p. 1

³³ International Crisis Group, Pakistan: Responding to the Militant Surge on the Afghan Border, 27 February 2026, [url](#)

³⁴ ACAPS, Afghanistan, Conflict escalation affecting multiple provinces since 21 February 2026, 3 March 2026, [url](#), p. 1

³⁵ International Crisis Group, Afghanistan and Pakistan Trade Fire as Conflict Takes a Dangerous Turn, 20 March 2026, [url](#)

³⁶ AP, Pakistan claims to have killed at least 70 militants in strikes along the Afghan border, 23 February 2026, [url](#)

³⁷ Al Jazeera, ‘Open war’: Pakistan and Afghanistan’s Taliban claim major casualties, 27 February 2026, [url](#)

³⁸ TOLONews, Clashes Erupt Along Hypothetical Durand Line After Pakistan Airstrike, 25 February 2026, [url](#);

Khaama Press, Clashes Reported in Nangarhar Border Areas With Pakistani Forces, 25 February 2026, [url](#)

³⁹ Khaama Press, Clashes Reported in Nangarhar Border Areas With Pakistani Forces, 25 February 2026, [url](#)

⁴⁰ TOLONews, Clashes Erupt Along Hypothetical Durand Line After Pakistan Airstrike, 25 February 2026, [url](#)

⁴¹ Al Jazeera, ‘Open war’: Pakistan and Afghanistan’s Taliban claim major casualties, 27 February 2026, [url](#); ACAPS, Afghanistan, Conflict escalation affecting multiple provinces since 21 February 2026, 3 March 2026, [url](#), p. 1

⁴² Reuters, Afghanistan fires at Pakistani jets over Kabul as conflict intensifies, 1 March 2026, [url](#); Amu TV, Taliban official claims their forces crossed border into Pakistan, 2 March 2026, [url](#)

⁴³ Hasht-e Subh, Three Civilians Killed, 23 Injured in Pakistani Airstrikes in Khost, 28 February 2026, [url](#)

⁴⁴ Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Report Bombings in Parts of Kandahar and Civilian Casualties, 28 February 2026, [url](#)

⁴⁵ France 24, Pakistan denies Afghan claims that it captured pilot after crash in Jalalabad, 28 February 2026, [url](#)



In the period 1 March–12 March 2026, there were close to daily reports of airstrikes and cross-border clashes.⁴⁶ Some examples include 1–2 March 2026, according to the journalist-run platform The Khorasan Daily, citing the Afghan de facto Ministry of Defence, cross-border fire was reported from 25 different locations in 24 hours,⁴⁷ along the shared borders in the provinces Kunar, Nangarhar and Khost.⁴⁸ On 5 March 2026, Pakistani airstrikes reportedly hit multiple locations in Kandahar City,⁴⁹ and the Afghan de facto authorities announces that Afghan operations took place in several southern and southeastern provinces.⁵⁰

According to a UN OCHA report covering the period 26 February–3 March 2026, ten provinces were impacted by airstrikes and border clashes, including: Kabul, Kandahar, Khost, Kunar, Laghman, Nangarhar, Nuristan, Parwan, Paktya and Paktika. This included armed clashes between Afghan de facto security forces and the Pakistani military in the provinces Khost, Kunar, Nangarhar, Paktia and Paktika provinces. Airstrikes also hit targets in Gardez (Paktya Province), Jalalabad (Nangarhar Province), Kabul, Kandahar and Mehtarlam (Laghman Province), while ‘drone strikes, anti-aircraft gunfire and explosions’ took place ‘across multiple provinces, including Kabul City and Jalalabad, where the airport and a police station were hit on the morning of 1 March [2026]’. As of 4 March 2026, UN OCHA noted that hostilities appeared to be ‘concentrated along border areas’, and described Spin Boldak and Takta Pul (Kandahar Province) as ‘high-risk areas’ for humanitarian staff.⁵¹ In a report by covering the period 6–17 March 2026, UN OCHA noted that hostilities had intensified and expanded geographically, with at least ten provinces being impacted by Pakistani airstrikes, artillery, mortar and drone attacks. The same source noted that major urban areas had been increasingly impacted, which had been driving up displacement figures.⁵²

⁴⁶ See for example: The Khorasan Diary [X], posted on: 3 March 2026, [url](#); Le Monde, Pakistan-Afghanistan : explosions à Kaboul alors que les affrontements continuent, 3 March 2026, [url](#); Khaama Press, Pakistan once again strikes Afghanistan’s Paktia province, civilian homes reported hit, 4 March 2026, [url](#); The Khorasan Diary [X], posted on: 5 March 2026, [url](#); Khaama Press, Kabul claims 30 Pakistani soldiers killed in border clashes, 6 March 2026, [url](#); Ariana News, Several Pakistani soldiers killed in Afghan operations along the Durand Line, 6 March 2026, [url](#); The Khorasan Diary [X], posted on: 7 March 2026, [url](#); Kabul Now, Pakistan Attacks Four Afghan Provinces, Causing Major Damage and Civilian Casualties, Taliban Say, 7 March 2026, [url](#); Khaama Press, Pakistan missile strike sparks fire at Torkham market, traders report heavy losses, 8 March 2026, [url](#); The Khorasan Diary [X], posted on: 8 March 2026, [url](#); The Khorasan Diary [X], posted on: 9 March 2026, [url](#); The Khorasan Diary [X], posted on: 10 March 2026, [url](#); Pajhwok News, Pakistan fires hundreds of shells at 4 Afghan provinces in 24 hours: Fitrat, 11 March 2026, [url](#); The Khorasan Diary [X], posted on: 11 March 2026, [url](#); Khaama Press, Pakistani Artillery Attacks Kill Civilians in Khost and Kunar, Reports, 12 March 2026, [url](#)

⁴⁷ The Khorasan Diary [X], posted on: 3 March 2026, [url](#)

⁴⁸ The Khorasan Diary [X], posted on: 2 March 2026, [url](#)

⁴⁹ The Khorasan Diary [X], posted on: 4 March 2026, [url](#)

⁵⁰ Ariana News, Afghan Defense Ministry claims retaliatory strikes on Pakistani forces along Durand Line, 5 March 2026, [url](#)

⁵¹ UN OCHA, Afghanistan Situation Update #1: Humanitarian Impact of Afghanistan-Pakistan Military Escalation (5 March 2026), 5 March 2026, [url](#), pp. 1–2

⁵² UN OCHA, Afghanistan Situation Update #2: Humanitarian Impact of Afghanistan-Pakistan Military Escalation (18 March 2026), 18 March 2026, [url](#), p. 1



Kabul City was reportedly hit by airstrikes on 1 March 2026.⁵³ According to the New York Times fighting resumed in the evening ‘with heavy anti-aircraft fire heard in central Kabul’.⁵⁴ Bagram Air Base located north of Kabul City in Parwan Province was also hit by a Pakistani airstrike on 1 March 2026.⁵⁵ Further airstrikes on Kabul City were reported on 2 March 2026.⁵⁶ On 12 March 2026, according to International Crisis Group, Pakistani airstrikes hit targets in Kabul, as well as in Kandahar and Paktia,⁵⁷ and on 13 March 2026, TOLONews reported on areas in the outskirts of Kabul City (Pul-e Charki, District 21) being attacked by Pakistani fighter jets. A private home was destroyed, killing four civilians. The village Hanzala Abad was also attacked, and more than 16 residential houses in the village were destroyed, as well as 30 shops and 10 vehicles.⁵⁸

On 13–15 March 2026, Kandahar was hit by airstrikes as reported by International Crisis Group.⁵⁹ TOLONews reported on a civilian airport being hit during the night to 14 March 2026, which injured two civilians working at the airport and caused damage to a fuel depot belonging to Kam Air worth over USD 600 000.⁶⁰ On 14 March 2026, according to UN OCHA, a Pakistani airstrike hit Kabul City and killed four civilians and injured 14 civilians.⁶¹

On 16 March 2026, Pakistani airstrikes hit multiple locations across Afghanistan, including a drug rehabilitation centre in Kabul City,⁶² killing 400 civilians and injuring over 250 civilians according to the de facto authorities.⁶³ These figures have not yet been verified.⁶⁴ ‘Local officials in Kunar’ also told TOLONews that the Pakistani military had fired 160 shells at in the past 24 hours in the districts of Nari, Dangam, Shultan, Manogai and Sakanom, although no casualties or financial damage had been reported.⁶⁵ On 18 March 2026, local de facto authorities told TOLONews, that Kundar Province had experienced an additional 124 rocket attacks in the past 24 hours, hitting the districts Sheltean, Sarkan, Nari, Maogai, as well as central Kunar (Asadabad).⁶⁶ International Crisis Group noted that this was the fifth time Pakistan bombed Kabul City since October 2025, and that hostilities appeared to have abated

⁵³ New York Times (The), Pakistan Strikes Bagram Air Base, Escalating ‘Open War’ With Taliban, 2 March 2026, [url](#); Amu TV, Taliban official claims their forces crossed border into Pakistan, 2 March 2026, [url](#)

⁵⁴ New York Times (The), Pakistan Strikes Bagram Air Base, Escalating ‘Open War’ With Taliban, 2 March 2026, [url](#)

⁵⁵ New York Times (The), Pakistan Strikes Bagram Air Base, Escalating ‘Open War’ With Taliban, 2 March 2026, [url](#)

⁵⁶ Afghanistan International, Taliban Confirms New Pakistani Airstrikes On Kabul, 2 March 2026, [url](#)

⁵⁷ International Crisis Group, Afghanistan and Pakistan Trade Fire as Conflict Takes a Dangerous Turn, 20 March 2026, [url](#)

⁵⁸ TOLONews, Pakistani Airstrike on Kabul Home Martyrs Four Family Members, 13 March 2026, [url](#)

⁵⁹ International Crisis Group, Afghanistan and Pakistan Trade Fire as Conflict Takes a Dangerous Turn, 20 March 2026, [url](#)

⁶⁰ TOLONews, Attack on Kam Air Fuel Depot in Kandahar Causes Over \$600,000 in Damage, 14 March 2026, [url](#)

⁶¹ UN OCHA, Afghanistan Situation Update #2: Humanitarian Impact of Afghanistan-Pakistan Military Escalation (18 March 2026), 18 March 2026, [url](#), p. 1

⁶² UN OCHA, Afghanistan Situation Update #2: Humanitarian Impact of Afghanistan-Pakistan Military Escalation (18 March 2026), 18 March 2026, [url](#), p. 1

⁶³ TOLONews, Over 400 Martyrs in Pakistani Airstrike on Kabul Rehabilitation Center, 17 March 2026, [url](#); International Crisis Group, Afghanistan and Pakistan Trade Fire as Conflict Takes a Dangerous Turn, 20 March 2026, [url](#)

⁶⁴ UN OCHA, Afghanistan Situation Update #2: Humanitarian Impact of Afghanistan-Pakistan Military Escalation (18 March 2026), 18 March 2026, [url](#), p. 1

⁶⁵ TOLONews, Around 7,500 Families Displaced in Kunar Due to Pakistani Artillery Fire, 16 March 2026, [url](#)

⁶⁶ TOLONews, Pakistan’s Rocket Attacks Displace Thousands in Kunar, 18 March 2026, [url](#)



after the incident (as of 20 March 2026).⁶⁷ Meanwhile, UN OCHA stated that by 18 March 2026 there were no signs of the conflict abating.⁶⁸

Pakistani and Afghan de facto authorities announced temporary ceasefires on 18 March 2026, amid Eid al-Fitr.⁶⁹

TOLOnews reported on shelling resuming in Kunar Province despite the temporary ceasefire, with more than 100 rockets being launched into the province in 20–22 March 2026, citing local de facto authorities.⁷⁰ Most strikes reportedly hit the districts of Marawara and Nari.⁷¹ On 24 March 2026, when the local de facto authorities stated that Nari District had been hit by 17 shells in the past 24 hours, and 7 additional shells in Manura area.⁷² Khaama Press reported on resumed clashes in Zabul Province on 24 March 2026 amid the end of the ceasefire.⁷³

Most events recorded by ACLED within the reference period of this query update were recorded in provinces bordering Pakistan along the Durand line, as well as in Kabul. Event details of the dataset suggest that most of the Pakistani and Afghan de facto military forces were behind the majority of recorded events (105 respectively 115 events). In 94 events civilians were being targeted (indicated as ‘actor 2’ in the dataset).⁷⁴ A provincial breakdown of events is provided in [Annex 1. Provincial breakdown of events](#).

⁶⁷ International Crisis Group, Afghanistan and Pakistan Trade Fire as Conflict Takes a Dangerous Turn, 20 March 2026, [url](#)

⁶⁸ UN OCHA, Afghanistan Situation Update #2: Humanitarian Impact of Afghanistan-Pakistan Military Escalation (18 March 2026), 18 March 2026, [url](#), p. 1

⁶⁹ TOLOnews, Temporary Ceasefire Eases Afghanistan-Pakistan Tensions During Eid, 19 March 2026, [url](#); Al Jazeera, Pakistan and Afghanistan agree to temporary Eid al-Fitr ‘pause’ in conflict, 18 March 2026, [url](#)

⁷⁰ TOLOnews, Pakistan Fires Over 100 Rockets into Kunar During Ceasefire, 22 March 2026, [url](#)

⁷¹ TOLOnews, 72 Rocket Attacks Reported in Kunar Amid Ceasefire Breach, 20 March 2026, [url](#)


⁷² TOLOnews, 8,000 Families Displaced in Kunar Amid Pakistani Shelling, 24 March 2026, [url](#)

⁷³ Khaama Press, Clashes Resume in Zabul Province as Pakistan–Afghanistan Ceasefire Ends, 24 March 2026, [url](#)

⁷⁴ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 1 December 2025 to 20 March 2026, as of 25 March 2026, [url](#)



Chart 1. ACLED data covering the period 1 December 2025 – 20 March 2026



Source: EUAA chart based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 1 December 2025 to 20 March 2026, as of 25 March 2026, [url](#)

Impact on civilians

Amid hostilities in the period 26 February–3 March 2026, UN OCHA recorded 56 civilian deaths and 129 injuries, and the displacement of 16 370 families in Paktya (7 000), Kunar (3 000), Khost (2 500), Nangarhar (2 500), Paktika (470), and Nuristan (400). A total of 23 370 families lived in displacement (about 163 590 people), which included 7 000 families that were displaced after the earthquake in Kunar in late August 2025. About 3 640 of these families faced secondary displacement as they were evacuated or received evacuation orders from informal settlements in Kunar Province. They were forced to return to their areas of origin.⁷⁵ On 4 March 2026, the IOM issued a statement in which it noted that nearly 66 000 people being displaced in eastern and southeastern Afghanistan due to the conflict with Pakistan.⁷⁶

In a report covering the period 6–17 March 2026, UN OCHA further noted that major urban areas had been increasingly impacted, and that displacement continued with reports indicating that 115 000 people (about 16 400 families) had been displaced, and more than 300 shelters across 75 villages being destroyed or severely damaged. UNOCHA further reported that the de facto authorities had ordered ‘pre-existing IDPs across seven displacement sites in Kunar Province’ to return to their areas of origin in Chawkay and Nurgal districts.⁷⁷ Also recent returnees were reportedly evacuated from a camp near Torkham after three civilians were

⁷⁵ UN OCHA, Afghanistan Situation Update #1: Humanitarian Impact of Afghanistan-Pakistan Military Escalation (5 March 2026), 5 March 2026, [url](#), pp. 1–2

⁷⁶ IOM, IOM Warns of Humanitarian Impact of Afghanistan–Pakistan Border Escalation, 4 March 2026, [url](#)

⁷⁷ UN OCHA, Afghanistan Situation Update #2: Humanitarian Impact of Afghanistan-Pakistan Military Escalation (18 March 2026), 18 March 2026, [url](#), p. 1



killed and seven injured in a strike near another camp, according to an Afghan de facto official.⁷⁸ It is, however, not clear where those evacuated have been relocated.⁷⁹

According to local media outlet TOLONews, quoting ‘official figures’, around 7 500 families being displaced in different districts along the border in Kunar Province due to artillery fire from Pakistani forces. The article was published on 16 March 2026, and did not provide a time reference for the displacements. One victim told TOLONews, that he had been in displacement for twelve days.⁸⁰

Humanitarian organisations have been affected by movement restrictions along the Durand Line, which has inter alia suspended World Food Programme (WFP) operations leaving 160 000 people without food assistance⁸¹ in the provinces Helmand, Kandahar, Khost, Kunar, Laghman, Nangarhar, Nuristan, Paktika, Paktya and Zabul.⁸² UNOCHA reported on 9 000 students being without schooling ‘due to disruption to learning facilities’ and also on health and nutrition services being disrupted or suspended.⁸³

Airstrikes and military confrontations have also damaged civilian infrastructure,⁸⁴ including health facilities and humanitarian sites.⁸⁵ According to UN OCHA, reporting on 5 March 2026, eight nutrition sites had been closed in the provinces Khost, Kunar and Nangarhar. Moreover, humanitarian actors had been relocating staff, from the ‘high-risk areas’ Spin Boldak and Takta Pul, and also from Torkham. Humanitarian access to provide emergency food assistance remained ‘constrained’ in some areas, including Paktika, due to the hostilities. Moreover, ‘at least 20 health facilities across eastern, southeastern and southern border provinces have been closed or had services suspended, including at the Omari Returnee Reception Centre at the Torkham border, as well as health facilities in Takhta Pul district, Kandahar; Lalpura district, Nangarhar; Dand Patan district, Paktia; and border districts in Khost.’⁸⁶ An International Organization for Migration (IOM) transit centre was also damaged by clashes⁸⁷ in Nangarhar Province.⁸⁸ In a statement issued on 4 March 2026, the IOM also stated that border operations

⁷⁸ New York Times (The), No Clear Endgame in the Conflict Between Afghanistan and Pakistan, 28 February 2026, [url](#)

⁷⁹ ACAPS, Afghanistan, Conflict escalation affecting multiple provinces since 21 February 2026, 3 March 2026, [url](#), p. 3

⁸⁰ TOLONews, Around 7,500 Families Displaced in Kunar Due to Pakistani Artillery Fire, 16 March 2026, [url](#)

⁸¹ ACAPS, Afghanistan, Conflict escalation affecting multiple provinces since 21 February 2026, 3 March 2026, [url](#), p. 1

⁸² UN OCHA, Afghanistan Situation Update #1: Humanitarian Impact of Afghanistan-Pakistan Military Escalation (5 March 2026), 5 March 2026, [url](#), pp. 1–2

⁸³ UN OCHA, Afghanistan Situation Update #2: Humanitarian Impact of Afghanistan-Pakistan Military Escalation (18 March 2026), 18 March 2026, [url](#), p. 2

⁸⁴ IOM, IOM Warns of Humanitarian Impact of Afghanistan–Pakistan Border Escalation, 4 March 2026, [url](#); UN OCHA, Afghanistan Situation Update #1: Humanitarian Impact of Afghanistan-Pakistan Military Escalation (5 March 2026), 5 March 2026, [url](#), pp. 1–2

⁸⁵ UN OCHA, Afghanistan Situation Update #1: Humanitarian Impact of Afghanistan-Pakistan Military Escalation (5 March 2026), 5 March 2026, [url](#), pp. 1–2

⁸⁶ UN OCHA, Afghanistan Situation Update #1: Humanitarian Impact of Afghanistan-Pakistan Military Escalation (5 March 2026), 5 March 2026, [url](#), pp. 1–2

⁸⁷ ACAPS, Afghanistan, Conflict escalation affecting multiple provinces since 21 February 2026, 3 March 2026, [url](#), p. 1


⁸⁸ IOM, IOM Warns of Humanitarian Impact of Afghanistan–Pakistan Border Escalation, 4 March 2026, [url](#)



at Torkham and Bahramcha had been suspended ‘due to security concerns, restricting humanitarian access and the delivery of assistance’.⁸⁹

As mentioned, within the reference period of this query update UCDP recorded 153 events and 360 civilian deaths, although cautioning that the data is preliminary amid the conflict with Pakistan and that the records of civilian deaths recorded during this period might increase.⁹⁰

Chart 2. UCDP data on ‘civilian deaths’ covering 1 December 2025 – 20 March 2026



Source: EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 1 December 2025 to 20 March 2026, provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 24 March 2026

Other reports on conflict data

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) published a report of civilian casualties amid cross-border violence in Afghanistan in October–December 2025. In this period UNAMA documented 613 casualties in Afghanistan (70 civilian deaths and 478 injuries), which were attributed to Pakistani military forces. This constituted the highest level of civilian casualties attributed to Pakistani military forces in Afghanistan since UNAMA initiated its systematic documentation in 2011, and it can be contrasted to the second highest figure from 2020 when 158 casualties were recorded. Most casualties were recorded in the period 10–17 October 2025, in border areas in the provinces of Paktya, Kunar, Helmand, Kandahar, Khost, Kabul and Paktika.⁹¹ On 15 October 2025 alone, UNAMA documented 457 civilian casualties (35 killed, 422 injured), and 89 % were recorded in the district of Spin Boldak in Kandahar Province amid an armed clash between the Afghan de facto security forces and Pakistani military forces. Heavy weaponry was used by both sides, including artillery and mortar fire, throughout the day killing 17 civilians and injuring 346 civilians. Some civilians also had their

⁸⁹ IOM, IOM Warns of Humanitarian Impact of Afghanistan–Pakistan Border Escalation, 4 March 2026, [url](#)

⁹⁰ EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 1 December 2025 to 20 March 2026, provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 24 March 2026

⁹¹ UNAMA, Cross-border civilian casualties in Afghanistan: October–December 2025, February 2026, [url](#), pp. 2–3



homes destroyed, including in aerial attacks carried out by Pakistani military forces.⁹² Also after the ceasefire was signed on 15 October 2025 UNAMA has documented civilian casualties from cross-border incidents and airstrikes in border areas, including 15 civilians killed and 13 injured in November 2025, and at least 8 deaths and 9 injured in December 2025.⁹³

Impact on trade and infrastructure

The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan remains closed for trade since mid-October, stranding vehicles on both sides⁹⁴ and bringing trade between the countries 'to a halt'.⁹⁵ Also medicine import has been impacted as the Afghan de facto authorities have urged importers to stop importing medicine from Pakistan.⁹⁶ Many Afghans reportedly struggle to buy 'basic medicine' as over 70 % of medicines used in Afghanistan was imported from Pakistan, according to Deutsche Welle.⁹⁷

UN OCHA reported on damages to civilian infrastructure, including a telecommunications tower in Paktia Province being destroyed, the Kam Air fuel depot in Kandahar, and 150 shops by Torkham border crossing. UN OCHA further noted that Torkham and Spin Boldak border crossing suffering 'substantial damage' and that humanitarian partners have suspended operations since early March 2026. Also the Iran transit route has ceased to be an alternative transit route for humanitarian partners amid the escalating conflict in Iran and the wider region.⁹⁸

Airport traffic has also reportedly been impacted by security-related disruptions, although Kabul International Airport remained operational as of 5 March 2026.⁹⁹

Activity of groups resisting the Taliban

As reported by Afghanistan expert Antonio Giustozzi, by 2025 'the threat of the various insurgencies (ISKP, National Resistance Front (NRF), the [Afghanistan] Freedom Front and smaller groups) had significantly receded in most parts of the country'.¹⁰⁰ The de facto police therefore 'relied only sparingly on checkpoints, setting them up when needed, based on intelligence reports and specific crises'. However, in some districts affected by activities of insurgent groups, every single village was being patrolled on a weekly or sometimes daily

⁹² UNAMA, Cross-border civilian casualties in Afghanistan: October–December 2025, February 2026, [url](#), p. 3

⁹³ UNAMA, Cross-border civilian casualties in Afghanistan: October–December 2025, February 2026, [url](#), pp. 5–6

⁹⁴ UN OCHA, Afghanistan Situation Update #1: Humanitarian Impact of Afghanistan-Pakistan Military Escalation (5 March 2026), 5 March 2026, [url](#), p. 2

⁹⁵ NPR, Pakistan-Afghanistan border closures paralyze trade along a key route, 10 February 2026, [url](#)

⁹⁶ Japan Times (The), Bitter pill: Taliban government shakes up Afghan medicine market, 17 February 2026, [url](#)

⁹⁷ DW, Afghan drug shortage looms as Taliban ban Pakistani imports, 6 December 2025, [url](#)

⁹⁸ UN OCHA, Afghanistan Situation Update #2: Humanitarian Impact of Afghanistan-Pakistan Military Escalation (18 March 2026), 18 March 2026, [url](#), p. 1

⁹⁹ UN OCHA, Afghanistan Situation Update #1: Humanitarian Impact of Afghanistan-Pakistan Military Escalation (5 March 2026), 5 March 2026, [url](#), p. 1

¹⁰⁰ Giustozzi, A., From insurgency to Government: How the Islamic Emirate polices Afghanistan, AAN, January 2026, [url](#), p. 15



basis, including Mir Bacha Kot in Kabul Province where the NRF reportedly operated, and Nurgal in Kunar Province where the reportedly ISKP operated.¹⁰¹

The UN Secretary-General report states that from 1 November 2025–31 January 2026, armed opposition groups continued to pose no threat to the de facto authority's territorial control. The UN Secretary-General noted reports of 36 incidents out of which 14 could be verified involving the AFF, NRF, the National Mobilization Front, the Islamic Liberation Movement of the People of Afghanistan and the Afghanistan Liberation Movement, in the provinces Badakhshan, Balkh, Faryab, Herat, Kunar, Kunduz, Kabul, Kandahar, Logar and Panjshir. As noted by the source, these incidents included 'sporadic rocket and hand grenade attacks and shootings on checkpoints and convoys of the de facto authorities'.¹⁰²

Among the events recorded by ACLED within the reference period of this query update event details suggest that the actors behind the data included unidentified armed groups (30 events), the AFF (15), and the NRF (13). Events involving these actors were recorded in various provinces, including: Kunduz (8 'battles', 5 'explosions/remote violence'), Kabul (2 'battles', 4 'explosions/remote violence', 4 'violence against civilians'), Badakhshan (2 'explosions/remote violence', 3 'violence against civilians'), and Herat (5 'battles'), Faryab (1 'battles', 1 'explosions/remote violence', 2 'violence against civilians'), Kandahar (3 'violence against civilians'), Helmand (2 'violence against civilians'), Nangarhar (1 'battles', 1 'explosions/remote violence'), Parwan (1 'explosions/remote violence', 1 'violence against civilians'), Takhar (1 'battles', 1 'explosions/remote violence'), Baghlan, Bamyán, Ghazni, Ghor, Kapisa, Laghman, Paktika, Uruzgan (1 'violence against civilians' respectively), Jowzjan (1 'battle'), and Panjsher (1 explosion/remote violence').¹⁰³

UCDP data suggests that 33 civilian deaths were connected to events involving resistance groups and unidentified armed groups. 6 civilian deaths were attributed to an attack involving the ISKP.¹⁰⁴ This entailed an explosion at a Chinese restaurant in Kabul City on 19 January 2026, in Shahr-e-Naw District. AP reported on seven having been killed and 'dozens more' having been wounded in the attack.¹⁰⁵ ISKP claimed responsibility for the attack.¹⁰⁶

4. Humanitarian situation

Significant numbers of Afghans continued to return, including many being forced to do so, from neighbouring Pakistan and Iran. According to UNHCR, nearly 150 000 Afghans had returned in 2026, as of 13 February, bringing the total of returns to about 5.4 million since

¹⁰¹ Giustozzi, A., From insurgency to Government: How the Islamic Emirate polices Afghanistan, AAN, January 2026, [url](#), pp. 15–16

¹⁰² UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 27 February 2026, [url](#), para. 19

¹⁰³ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 1 December 2025 to 20 March 2026, as of 25 March 2026, [url](#)

¹⁰⁴ EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 1 December 2025 to 20 March 2026, provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 24 March 2026

¹⁰⁵ AP, Explosion in a restaurant in Afghan capital kills at least 7 and injures a dozen more, 19 January 2025, [url](#)

¹⁰⁶ UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 27 February 2026, [url](#), para. 20



October 2023. The high influx of returnees has caused a rapid population growth in Afghanistan.¹⁰⁷

WFP reported in February 2026 that humanitarian needs across Afghanistan remained ‘extremely high’, with 17.4 million people in urgent need of food assistance – while WFP may only support 2 million.¹⁰⁸ As reported by ACAPS the cross-border conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan,¹⁰⁹ as well as the escalating conflict in Iran and the Middle East has ‘compounded the shortage of basic goods, constraints on humanitarian logistics, and rising prices across Afghanistan’.¹¹⁰ Although no data is yet available,¹¹¹ the source projects that the closure of the Durand line for trade will impact food prices nationwide in Afghanistan and further worsen national food insecurity levels. Pakistan has been the primary source of Afghan staple food imports (60 %), and eastern and southern provinces are particularly vulnerable to a continued trade blockage as there are limited alternative supply routes and generally weak purchasing power, as reported by ACAPS.¹¹²

5. Reported targeting of former government officials and ANDSF members

In the period 1 October–31 December 2025, UNAMA continued to document the targeting of former civilian government officials and former ANDSF members, including 28 instances of arbitrary arrest and detention, and seven instances of torture and ill-treatment. UNAMA also recorded 14 killings for former ANDSF members. Some individuals subjected to arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial killings included former civilian government officials and ANDSF members returning from Iran and Pakistan. For example, on 9 December 2025, two men with links to the former government were shot dead by unknown perpetrators after having recently returned from Iran, one was a former official of the Ministry of Interior while the other was the cousin of a former Deputy Chief of Police.¹¹³

¹⁰⁷ UNHCR, UNHCR seeks support for solutions as 5.4 million Afghans return since late 2023, 13 February 2026, [url](#)

¹⁰⁸ WFP, WFP Afghanistan Country Brief, February 2026, 20 February 2026, [url](#)

¹⁰⁹ ACAPS, Afghanistan, Conflict escalation affecting multiple provinces since 21 February 2026, 3 March 2026, [url](#), p. 4

¹¹⁰ ACAPS, Afghanistan, Localised vulnerability analysis: Behsud, Kot, and Sukh Rod districts, Nangarhar province, 25 March 2026, [url](#), p. 7

¹¹¹ ACAPS, Afghanistan, Localised vulnerability analysis: Behsud, Kot, and Sukh Rod districts, Nangarhar province, 25 March 2026, [url](#), p. 7

¹¹² ACAPS, Afghanistan, Conflict escalation affecting multiple provinces since 21 February 2026, 3 March 2026, [url](#), p. 4

¹¹³ UNAMA, Update on the human rights situation in Afghanistan: October – December 2025 Update, 8 February 2026, [url](#), p. 4

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Annex 1. Provincial breakdown of events

Table 1 contains ACLED data and UCDP data covering the period 1 December 2025–20 March 2026 to provide an update of the conflict data presented in [EUAA COI Report Afghanistan - Country Focus 2026](#).

Table 1. Provincial breakdown of events 1 December 2025–20 March 2026

Province	Events (ACLED)				Civilian deaths (UCDP)
	Total	Battles	Explosions/ remote violence	Violence against civilians	
Badakhshan	13	7	2	4	1
Badghis	0	0	0	0	1
Baghlan	3	1	0	2	0
Balkh	4	0	0	4	0
Bamyan	2	0	0	2	1
Daykundi	0	0	0	0	0
Farah	0	0	0	0	10
Faryab	8	1	1	6	3
Ghazni	3	0	0	3	0
Ghor	1	0	0	1	0
Helmand	5	1	0	4	2



Province	Events (ACLED)				Civilian deaths (UCDP)
	Total	Battles	Explosions/ remote violence	Violence against civilians	
Herat	15	6	0	9	1
Jawzjan	3	2	0	1	4
Kabul	36	2	25	9	156
Kandahar	29	12	12	5	10
Kapisa	2	0	0	2	1
Khost	31	18	12	1	33
Kunar	46	7	34	5	26
Kunduz	14	8	5	1	1
Laghman	6	0	3	3	0
Logar	1	0	0	1	0
Nangarhar	49	21	27	1	37
Nimroz	0	0	0	0	1
Nuristan	9	3	6	0	3



Province	Events (ACLED)				Civilian deaths (UCDP)
	Total	Battles	Explosions/ remote violence	Violence against civilians	
Paktika	27	5	16	6	23
Paktya	20	11	7	2	8
Panjsher	5	0	3	2	0
Parwan	6	0	2	4	3
Samangan	0	0	0	0	0
Sar-e Pul	0	0	0	0	0
Takhar	5	1	1	3	3
Uruzgan	1	0	0	1	0
Wardak	0	0	0	0	2
Zabul	3	2	0	1	0
Unidentified	-	-	-	-	30
Total	347	108	156	83	360

Source: EUAA table based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 1 December 2025 to 20 March 2026, as of 25 March 2026, [url](#); EUAA table based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 1 December 2025 to 20 March 2026, provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 24 March 2026.

Annex 2. Conflict data on selected provinces

For the development of a Country Guidance update on Afghanistan the EUAA COI Sector has been requested to provide further details on ACLED data on events codified as ‘violence against civilians’ in the provinces Kabul, Badakhshan, Baghlan, Kunduz and Takhar within the longer reference period **1 October 2024–20 March 2026**.

Kabul Province

ACLED codified 89 events as ‘violence against civilians’. Event details provided in the data set suggest that 81 of these involved the Afghan de facto military or police forces, and the de facto MPVPV. 8 events involved ‘unidentified armed groups’ as the perpetrating actor (‘Actor 1’). Based on the comments provided in the dataset events codified as ‘violence against civilians’ in which the de facto authorities were the perpetrating actor were almost exclusively based information published by Afghan media in exile, and inter alia involved several arrests (at least 48). Victim profiles included former ANDSF members (about 14 arrests and also 4 killings), perceived critics and journalists, individuals not conforming with *sharia* restrictions, and family members of former ANDSF members. Also one case concerned a former civil government official being killed. Although the motives were unclear in many cases some victims reportedly had a connection to Panjsher Province (at least 10 cases of arrests, and 2 killings) which has a recent history of armed resistance against the Taliban. In one case, a civilian was killed with the explicit motive of having been accused of collaborating with anti-Taliban groups. About 6 events concerned individuals being punished with flogging, and in 8 cases civilians were being killed by de facto authorities or suspected de facto authorities. Remaining cases concerned various situations of de facto officials subjecting civilians to beatings and other abuse.¹¹⁴

Badakhshan Province

ACLED codified 40 events as ‘violence against civilians’. Event details provided in the data set suggest that 33 of these involved the Afghan de facto military or police forces, while 7 events were attributed to unidentified armed groups. Based on the comments provided in the dataset events codified as ‘violence against civilians’ in which the de facto authorities were the perpetrating actor were almost exclusively based information published by Afghan media in exile as well as some undisclosed sources, and inter alia involved civilians being killed (9 events) by de facto officials, the motives were often unclear and sometimes involved seemingly personal disputes. Civilians were also beaten and injured by shooting (7 events) by de facto officials using excessive force in their official capacity or in seemingly personal disputes. In one case a young female student was moreover gang-raped and killed by de facto officials. In 3 events civilians were beaten amid the de facto authorities’ enforcement of *sharia*, and in 2 cases civilians were flogged. In 6 events former ANDSF members or former police officers were killed. 3 events concerned arrests with unknown motives.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 1 December 2025 to 20 March 2026, as of 25 March 2026, [url](#)

¹¹⁵ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 1 December 2025 to 20 March 2026, as of 25 March 2026, [url](#)



Baghlan Province

ACLED codified 10 events as ‘violence against civilians’. Event details provided in the data set suggest that 6 of these involved the Afghan de facto military forces, while 2 events were attributed to the ISKP and 2 events were attributed to unidentified armed groups. Based on the comments provided in the dataset the 6 events codified as ‘violence against civilians’ in which the de facto authorities were the perpetrating actor were almost exclusively based information published by Afghan media in exile as well as one undisclosed source, and inter alia involved the de facto authorities shooting dead a shepherd accusing him of being an NRF member following clashes between the de facto authorities and the NRF, in another case following clashes with the NRF civilians assaulted and beat residents in Nahreen District. One event concerned, two civilians were arrested and tortured for unknown reasons in Khost Wa Firing District, and one event concerned three civilians were detained and tortured in Gozaraghan-e-Noor District ‘for being outside at night’. The two remaining events concerned individual de facto officials severely injuring civilians in a private dispute and for unknown reasons.¹¹⁶

Kunduz Province

ACLED codified 8 events as ‘violence against civilians’. Event details provided in the data set suggest that 7 of these involved the Afghan de facto military forces, while 1 event was attributed to unidentified armed groups. Based on the comments provided in the dataset the 7 events codified as ‘violence against civilians’ in which the de facto authorities were the perpetrating actor were almost exclusively based information published by Afghan media in exile as well as one undisclosed source, and concerned the arrest of a female journalist, the arrest of a former local uprising members, an attack against Uzbek civilians to seize their land, two events concerning flogging, and the abduction and rape of a teenage boy.¹¹⁷

Takhar Province

ACLED codified 30 events as ‘violence against civilians’. Event details provided in the data set suggest that all of these events involved the Afghan de facto military and police forces. Based on the comments provided in the dataset the event data was almost exclusively based on information published by Afghan media in exile as well as undisclosed sources, and inter alia involved civilians being arrested (3 events), subjected to flogging (3 events), being extrajudicially killed for alleged crime (2 events), killed in private disputes or amid crime (3 events) and for unknown reasons (2 event). There were also details of civilians being beaten (6 event). One event concerned a former ANDSF member being killed, another event concerned a family member of a former police being arrested, and one former ANDSF member being beaten. Two events concerned former civil government officials being arrested. One event concerned the destruction of homes of Tajik and Uzbek residents, and in

¹¹⁶ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 1 December 2025 to 20 March 2026, as of 25 March 2026, [url](#)

¹¹⁷ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 1 December 2025 to 20 March 2026, as of 25 March 2026, [url](#)



other event the de facto authorities opened fire against civilians opposing the seizure of irrigated pastureland. In two separate events de facto officials raped two girls, and one of them was subsequently killed. In the other case an elderly woman was killed amid the rape of a 13-year-old girl. In one case a person was arrested on accusations of being a member of the ISKP.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁸ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan, data covering 1 December 2025 to 20 March 2026, as of 25 March 2026, [url](#)