

**Flygtningenævnets baggrundsmateriale**

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| <b>Bilagsnr.:</b>               | <b>699</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
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## ACCORD - Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation

Svar på forespørgsel om Den Russiske Føderation: 1) Generelle informationer om den russiske hær og om værnepligt, generalmobilisering, indkaldelse af reservister; 2) Indsættelse af værnepligtige i Ukraine; 3) Muligheder for militærnægtertjeneste; 4) Nægtelse af deltagelse i kamphandlinger, militærnægtelse, desertering; 5) Indsættelse af mænd fra Tjetjenien; 6) Er Soldatermødrene aktive? [a-11873-2]

15. april 2022

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De følgende uddrag af udvalgte kilder indeholder informationer om de ovenfor nævnte spørgsmål (alle kilder er besøgt den 15. april 2022):

### **1) Generelle informationer om den russiske hær og om værnepligt, generalmobilisering, indkaldelse af reservister**

Generelle informationer om værnepligten kan ses i følgende ACCORD-beretning fra oktober 2019:

- ACCORD - Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation: Russische Föderation: Wehrdienst und Dedowschtschina [Den Russiske Føderation; Værnepligt og Dedovtsjina], 31. oktober 2019 <https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2020484/ACCORD-2019-10-Russische+F%C3%B6derationWehrdienst+und+Dedowschtschina.pdf>
- ISW - Institute for the Study of War: Explainer on Russian Conscription, Reserve, and Mobilization, 5. März 2022 <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/explainer-russian-conscription-reserve-andmobilization>

„The Russian military is a hybrid format combining a traditional cadre-and-reserve conscript system and a contract-professional system. While the Russian Army has made efforts to professionalize its ranks, particularly in the last 15 years, it remains reliant on conscripts, both for its active-duty force and for its reserve forces in the event of general mobilization. [...]

The Russian Armed Forces conscript men semi-annually, with the fall draft lasting from October 1 until December 31 and the spring draft running from April 1 until July 15. In 2022, the Kremlin announced the spring draft early on February 18. The draft affects all men aged 18 to 27 years old, though some conscripts can be as young as 16 years old. Russian conscripts typically serve one year. The annual conscription pool of all Russian military-aged men is approximately 1.2 million people, though only about half are compelled to present themselves at their local military commissariat (voenkomat). The Russian General Staff reported conscripting 127,000 people for the fall 2021 draft and 134,000 people in spring 2021 out of 672,000 summoned men. The number of conscripts is relatively consistent year on year, with 263,000 in 2020 and 267,000 in 2019. Approximately 261,000 conscripts from 2021 are currently serving across Russian units, with the fall 2021 conscripts entering their third month of training.

New conscripts undergo a one- to two-month basic training, followed by three-to-six months of advanced training before arriving at their assigned units. Current law precludes conscripts from deploying to combat with less than four months of training; however, martial law or general mobilization could supersede the current policy, allowing for the immediate employment of new conscripts or mobilized reservists. Some of the fall 2021 conscripts are likely already serving in units fighting in Ukraine. The rapid employment of relatively untrained reservists is unlikely to materially increase Russia's combat power in Ukraine.

#### Russian Reserve

The Russian reserve has over two million former conscripts and contract servicemen on paper, but few are actively trained or prepared for war. Historically, only 10 percent of reservists receive refresher training after completing their initial term of service. Russia lacks the administrative and financial capacity to train reservists on an ongoing basis. According to a 2019 RAND analysis, Russia only had 4,000 to 5,000 troops in what would be considered an active reserve in the Western sense, meaning soldiers attending regular monthly and annual training. Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu has repeatedly stated that the Russian Armed Forces hoped to have 80,000-100,000 active reserve members.

In 2021, the Russian military started a new initiative to remedy its lack of a ready reserve, the Russian Combat Army Reserve (BARS-2021). BARS-2021 aimed to establish an active reserve by recruiting volunteer reservists for three-year contract service. BARS-2021 operated on the same principle as US and NATO reserves, where reservists actively train and are compensated. The concept of BARS-2021 was that volunteer Russian reservists would regularly participate in monthly exercises and maintain their mobilization readiness while maintaining their civilian jobs.

Local administrations began distributing information about enlisting into the Russian reserves throughout late August and early September 2021, offering significant financial incentives. Eligible reservists included soldiers younger than 42, junior officers younger than 47, colonels younger than 57, and other senior officials younger than 52. Reservists would continue training two or three times a month throughout peacetime and form their own military units. The Southern Military District (SMD) announced a goal of having a 38,000-person reserve corps of service veterans, up from 400 people. There is limited information on how many reservists returned to military service; Novokuznetsk data shows that the city planned to gain 220 reservists, but reported only recruiting 20. The Central Military District (CID) reported conducting a BARS-2022 program from January 24-26, 2022, during which the CID gained 9,000 reservists.

The Russian Armed Forces sought to create exclusively reservist units but likely did not accomplish its goals due to low engagement. The Russian Defense Ministry hoped to recruit more than 100,000 reservists starting in August 2021, but it is unlikely the Kremlin was able to achieve its goals on such a short timeline.

#### Mobilization

Current law limits mobilization of reserves to soldiers and sailors younger than 45 and officers younger than 55. Men who transferred to the reserve less than two years ago, fathers of three or more children, and those with criminal records are also exempt from mobilization under current law. The Russian State Duma adopted a bill on February 22 to strengthen general mobilization, making it mandatory for men to appear at a military commissar's office without receiving a conscription notice from regional authorities. This law will reduce the

administrative time needed to enlist conscripts if the Kremlin announces martial law. Russian independent media source Vazhnye Istoriy explained that the Russian military can activate both reservists and new conscripts during general mobilization, including those previously exempted from conscription. In the event of a general mobilization, the Russian Army will likely attempt to fill the ranks of nascent reserve units and backfill combat casualties from units already serving in Ukraine.

The Russian cadre-and-reserve units concentrated around Ukraine before the invasion almost certainly required a significant reserve call-up to fill out. As the ground offensive in Ukraine stalls, the Russian military likely faces a requirement for a new reserve call up to fill out additional units and replace individual losses in these units. There is reporting as of March 5 that 3,000 individual replacements are being mobilized across the Russian border from Kharkiv to replace combat losses in Russian units.

As early as December 2021, the Russian Committee for Soldier's Mothers claimed that newly signed reservists and contractors started deploying to units near the Ukrainian border. The Committee claimed that the new reservists arrived in Belgorod Oblast to the following units: Training Military unit in Kovrov (unit number 306616), 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (Valuyki), 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (Boguchar, Valuyki), 4th Guards Tank Division, and 2nd Guards Motor Rifle Division. US officials also note that Russian reservists will be integrated across all 120-125 battalion tactical groups following the initial invasion." (ISW, 5. März 2022)

- Reuters: Fearing martial law or conscription, some Russians try to flee abroad, 3. März 2022 <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/fearing-martial-law-or-conscription-some-russians-try-flee-abroad-2022-03-03/>

„As Russian troops slowly advanced on Ukraine's capital Kyiv on Thursday, some people back in Moscow were attempting to flee to destinations abroad that have not banned flights from Russia, stomaching soaring prices in the rush to escape. The Kremlin dismissed speculation that Russian authorities plan to introduce martial law following the invasion of Ukraine, which Moscow calls a 'special operation', or that they will stop men of fighting age leaving Russia, but some did not want to risk staying." (Reuters, 3. März 2022)

- BBC News: Ukraine conflict: Rebels declare general mobilisation as fighting grows, 19. Februar <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60443504>

„Ukraine's Russian-backed breakaway eastern territories have ordered military mobilisations amid a deadly escalation in fighting. Men of fighting age in the self-declared people's republics of Donetsk and Luhansk are being put on stand-by." (BBC News, 19. Februar 2022)

Der kunne ikke findes yderligere informationer om en generalmobilisering i Den Russiske Føderation. Der blev fundet følgende oplysninger om indkaldelse af reservister og værnepligtige i året 2022:

- TASS: [Putin orders reservist call-up], 19. februar 2022 (oversat fra BBC Monitoring, tilgængelig på Factiva)

„Russian President Vladimir Putin has signed a decree calling up Russian reservists for military training in 2022, state TASS news agency reports.

To call in 2022 citizens of the Russian Federation who are in reserve to undergo military training in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the troops of the National Guard of the Russian Federation, state security agencies and the Federal Security Service; the document published on the official portal of legal information on 18 February said.

Training assemblies for reservists are a routine event to improve the combat skills of reservists and are held annually, TASS reported. The total duration of military training for reservists cannot exceed two months. It starts with the country's president signing a decree on calling up reserve servicemen to training camps. The mobilisation department of the Defence Ministry then prepares an appropriate directive, which is sent to regional military registration and enlistment offices. They subsequently send out call-up papers to reservists. Putin signed the previous decree on reservist training in April 2021." (TASS, 19. Februar 2022)

- ISW - Institute for the Study of War: Ukraine Invasion Update 20, 30. März 2022 <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-invasion-update-20>

„The Kremlin denied reports of increased conscription on March 26 but is likely beginning a broader mobilization. Russia's Defense Ministry denied claims on March 26 that it is calling Russian reservists to military enlistment offices and instead claimed that Ukrainian intelligence is issuing fake calls imitating Russian officials. Ukraine's Main Intelligence

Directorate (GUR) stated on March 28 that Russia will begin conscription through the BARS-2021 (Combat Army Reserve of the Country) program on April 1, 2022, alongside the normal semi-annual conscription cycle on April 1 to 'conceal mass mobilization measures.' Such a recruitment drive would be unlikely to provide Russian forces around Ukraine with sufficient combat power to restart major offensive operations in the near term. Russia's pool of available well-trained replacements remains low, and new conscripts will require months to reach even a minimum standard of readiness." (15W, 30. März 2022)

- Der Spiegel: Russland beruft 134.500 Wehrpflichtige ein [Rusland indkalder 134.500 værnepligtige], 31. marts 2022

<https://www.spiegel.de/ausland/russland-beruft-134-500-wehrpflichtige-ein-a-55c10dfe-8846-4d77a674-8ccb79108f82>

'Også i dette forår indkalder Rusland 134.500 mænd i alderen fra 18 til 27 år til at aftjene værnepligt – men det har ifølge udsagn fra Moskva intet med krigen at gøre. Præsident Vladimir Putin har undertegnet en bekendtgørelse om indkaldelsen, hvad flere russiske nyhedsagenturer beretter. Den tolv måneders værnepligt for mænd mellem 18 og 27 år er i Rusland fastsat ved lov. To gange om året udstedes der i den forbindelse mødebefalinger. Indkaldelsestidsrummet varer til midt i juli. I dette forår indkalderes der ifølge Kreml noget færre mænd end i foråret 2021. Dengang blev der indkaldt 134.650 værnepligtige – 150 flere, end det nu er planlagt. Samtidig slutter den etårige værnepligt for andre russere. Der blev ikke nævnt noget tal for, hvor mange værnepligtige der udgår og bliver overført til reserven.' (Der Spiegel, 31. marts 2022)

Disse oplysninger findes også i følgende russiske artikel:

- Meduza: путин подписал указ о весеннем призыве в армию [Putin underskrev bekendtgørelsen om indkaldelsen til foråret], 31. marts 2022

<https://meduza.io/news/2022/03/31/putin-podpisal-ukaz-o-vesennem-priz-e-v-armiyu>

## 2) Indsættelse af værnepligtige i Ukraine

Meduza: 'I'm panicking — where is my child? Conscript soldiers are being sent to fight against Ukraine, their relatives say. Here's what their families told Meduza, 25. Februar 2022 <https://teduza.io/en/feature/2022/02/26/i-m-panicking-where-is-my-child>

„In mid-February, the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers started receiving calls from the parents of soldiers fulfilling their mandatory military service requirement at military units around Russia. All of the parents were saying the same thing: either their sons had been forced to sign contracts, or they'd just been sent to the territories of the military units on the border with Ukraine. Committee of Soldiers' Mothers director Olga Larkina told Meduza that in the past week, the majority of conscripts were sent to bases in Belgorod Region. Most of the parents either didn't know the number of the base their child was sent to or declined to say it for fear of harming their child. [...]

It's not against the law to move conscripts from one military base to another. 'Involving military personnel [who are undergoing mandatory military service] in exercises and other events held by the Defense Ministry on the territory of the Russian Federation is perfectly legal,' said the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers' lawyer, Alexander Latynin. Additionally, he said, conscripts who have served for less than four months can serve in other states' territories, but their participation in any combat operations is prohibited by a presidential decree. [...]

Bylaw, if a conscript is willing to enter a war under contract, he can do it after three months of military service, or even as little as one month (depending on his education level), according to lawyer Alexander Latynin. In practice, however, soldiers have been coerced into signing the contracts, their relatives say. 'Mothers are telling us that their sons have been calling them and saying they're being forced to sign contracts. We believe it's wrong to force a conscript to become a contract soldier. But how do they force them? We don't know. The parents who have gotten in touch have told us their sons were just taken by military officers, stamped, and that's it — now they're contract soldiers,' said Olga Larkina, director of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers. According to lawyer Alexander Latynin, transferring military servicemen from conscripts to contract soldiers is a long process that entails compiling a large number of documents. This procedure takes at least a month, and sometimes lasts up to three or four. For some servicemen, it even takes six months,' said Latynin. As far the mothers' reports that their sons were forced under pressure to sign military service contracts, his answer was straightforward: When they really want to and really need to, then some people, including some officials, will resort to breaking the law." (Meduza, 25. Februar 2022)

rnd - Redaktionsnetzwerk Deutschland: 'Mama, ich liebe dich': Wie Putin junge Russen an der Front verheizt ['Mor, jeg elsker dig': Hvordan Putin brænder unge russere af ved fronten], 3. marts 2022  
<https://www.rnd.de/politik/krieg-in-der-ukraine-wie-putin-n-junge-russen-an-der-front-verheiztTIOAKLIWFB3VFZFTVPTIYPMFI.html>

'Mange russiske soldater blev endnu før afslutningen af den etårige grunduddannelse tvunget til at underskrive en kontrakt som konstabel. I stedet for at deltage i militærøvelsen må de nu kæmpe i krigen. Mange mødre har i dagevis ikke hørt noget fra deres børn.

Det er fire helt enkle ord, der fortæller om angsten for at dø og krigens fortvivelse: 'Mor, jeg elsker dig.' Det var de sidste ord, den russiske soldat Pavel hviskede til sin mor i telefonen. I baggrunden kan man høre torden fra flyvemaskiner, indimellem lyder der skud. Hvordan det går ham, og hvor han befinder sig, ved hun ikke, siger hun til den sidste uafhængige avis i Rusland, 'Novaja Gaseta'.

Avisen har talt med flere mødre, hvis sønner er blevet sendt til fronten. Det er påfaldende, at det især rammer unge værnepligtige, der først lige har afsluttet deres grunduddannelse, er uerfarne og dårligt uddannede og nu bliver brændt af ved fronten. Som den 23årige Pavel, der egentlig ville være lærer i engelsk og fransk. Efter grunduddannelsen blev han efter ikke engang et år tvunget til at underskrive en toårig kontrakt med militæret. 'Hvis man ikke ville underskrive, skulle man i dagevis slæbe tunge ammunitionsbatterier – så længe, til man til sidst underskrev kontrakten', sagde hans mor. Den lovede løn har hendes søn aldrig fået, kun et tillæg på 27.000 rubler (omregnet ca. 215 euro). 'Min søn er blevet snydt', gentager hun fortvivlet igen og igen.

Dette trick fra Kremls side er åbenbart sat i system: Stadig flere mødre til unge russiske soldater møder op hos 'Soldatermødrenes Komite' i Moskva, fordi de i dagevis ikke har hørt fra deres søn. Menneskerettighedsorganisationen har gjort det til sin opgave at undersøge misforhold i den russiske hær til bunds. Mange mødre beretter, at også deres sønner er blevet tvunget til at underskrive en kontrakt. Så mange, at 'Soldatermødrenes Komite' i mellemtiden har oprettet sin egen hotline for at hjælpe soldater og deres familier efter underskrivelsen af kontrakten.

Værnepligten i Rusland varer egentlig tolv måneder. Men allerede inden da kan rekrutterne forlænge deres tjeneste og underskrive en kontrakt som konstabel. Ifølge menneskerettighedsorganisationen skal de unge russere have fået forelagt kontrakter, der er udfyldt i forvejen. De bliver ikke spurgt, men skal træde an i en kolonne og underskrive kontrakten efter tur. Denne kontrakt er en forudsætning for, at soldaterne må indsættes i militæroperationer. At de ikke engang har afsluttet grunduddannelsen, er der ingen, der kerer sig om. Putin indsætter dem i forreste frontlinje. Disse beretninger anser militæreksperter Gustav Gressel for at være en realistisk fremstilling. Mange af disse soldater har slet ikke vidst, at de marcherede i krig, sagde han i RND-interviewet. 'Kreml har hemmeligholdt denne krig for soldaterne.'

Hvor uvidende de unge russere hele tiden har været, viser sig i telefonsamtalerne med deres familier. Den 23årige Pavel havde aftjent sin værnepligt i det østlige Rusland, derpå blev han på en togtur, der varede to uger, bragt til Belarus. I begyndelsen af februar fulgte så fælles øvelser med det belarussiske militær – på det tidspunkt ringede hendes søn kort til hende en gang om dagen. Den 16. februar blev militærøvelsen erklæret for afsluttet. 'Det var det, mor, vi er færdige, vi tager hjem', husker hun sin søns ord. Men Pavel blev ikke bragt tilbage, i stedet blev militærøvelsen forlænget. Oprømt fortalte han sin mor, at der ifølge det britiske efterretningsvæsen angiveligt forestod en indmarch i Ukraine. 'De lyver alle', beroligede hun ham. Men hendes søn stod allerede på dette tidspunkt sammen med andre soldater to til tre kilometer fra den ukrainske grænse. Senere på aftenen den næste telefonsamtale med moderen: Han stod nu på ukrainsk jord, men man havde sagt til dem, at de havde overskredet grænsen til Ukraine illegalt, at de ikke mere havde noget at gøre med den russiske hær, at de var desertører. Den sidste telefonsamtale fulgte tidligt om morgenen: 'Mor, de har sat os i biler, vi kører væk, jeg elsker dig. Hvis der er en begravelse, skal du ikke straks tro på det.' Så blev kontakten afbrudt, siden har hun ikke hørt noget fra sin søn.

Mange mødre søger fortvivlet efter deres børn, henvender sig til Forsvarsministeriet og ringer til hjælpeorganisationer for at få noget at vide om, hvor deres sønner opholder sig. Flere tusinde russiske soldater er, efter hvad Ukraine oplyser, allerede døde i krigen, hundreder er blevet taget til fange. Det ukrainske Forsvarsministerium erklærede: 'Hvis Deres kære i de seneste måneder er taget på øvelse, og der ikke mere er nogen kommunikation med dem, deltager de

med stor sandsynlighed i angrebet på Ukraine.' Ministeriet tilbyder også en egen hotline, hvor slægtninge i Rusland kan finde ud af, om deres søn eller ægteemand er blevet taget til fange, og hvordan de kan sende en kort meddelelse til dem. Ukraines Forsvarsministerium har offentliggjort skræmmende videoer, hvor russiske fanger fortæller, at de egentlig var blevet sendt på militærøvelse og slet ikke ville kæmpe i Ukraine. Det drejer sig især om unge rekrutter, næppe en af dem ældre end 25 år. Mange mødre erfarer først gennem disse videoer, hvad der er sket med deres børn. I adskillige dage ytrede Rusland sig overhovedet ikke om sårede og tilfangetagne soldater fra egne rækker. Først onsdag aften omtalte det russiske Forsvarsministerium tal for sårede og dræbte soldater. Heraf fremgik, at 498 russiske soldater var blevet dræbt og 1597 såret. En tilbageførsel af ligene afviste man for ikke at skabe panik.

Soldatermødrenes Komite oversvømmes for tiden af telefonopkald og skriftlige henvendelser, beretter den russiske politiker Lyudmila Narusova over for den uafhængige fjernsynsstation Dozhd, der er blokeret i Rusland. 'De har ikke noget at tabe', siger hun om mødrene, 'de søger hvad som helst, der røber mere om deres barns opholdssted.' Nogle havde fundet ud af, at deres søn er i fangenskab, andre børn var døde. Men der var ingen mulighed for at bringe ligene til Rusland. Og ligene var endnu ikke blevet begravet. 'Omstrejfende hunde gnaver i dem, nogle er ikke engang blevet identificeret, fordi de er så stærk forbrændte.' (rid, 3. marts 2022)

Den i artiklen omtalte artikel i Novaja Gasjeta er ikke mere tilgængelig.

- BBC News: Ukraine: Mother of Russian soldier asks 'Whose door should I knock on to get my child back?', 8. März 2022 <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60604952>

„A US Pentagon briefing on Friday suggested that a significant number of the men fighting in Ukraine are conscripts, and that might account for their inexperience and lack of awareness about what they were expected to do.

But it appears the men's belief - that they were simply on drills rather than being sent into combat - was not unique to conscripts. Like Marina's grandson Nikita - and many of the other men whose relatives we spoke to - Galina's son Nikolai began as a conscript, but was now a contracted soldier." (BBC News, 8. März 2022)

- Reuters: Russia acknowledges conscripts were part of Ukraine operation, some are POWs, 9. März 2022 <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-acknowledges-conscripts-were-part-ukraine-operation-some-taken-prisoners-2022-03-09/>

„Russia's defence ministry acknowledged on Wednesday that some conscripts were taking part in the conflict with Ukraine after President Vladimir Putin denied this on various occasions, saying only professional soldiers and officers had been sent in. The ministry said that some of them, serving in supply units, had been taken prisoner by the Ukrainian army since the fighting began on Feb. 24. Citing Putin's spokesman Dmitry Peskov, the RIA news agency said Putin had ordered military prosecutors to investigate and punish the officials responsible for disobeying his instructions to exclude conscripts from the operation. Some associations of soldiers' mothers in Russia had raised concerns about a number of conscripts going incommunicado at the start of what Kremlin calls a 'special military operation' in Ukraine, suggesting they could have been sent to fight despite a lack of adequate training." (Reuters, 9. März 2022)

Lignende informationer findes også i følgende russiske artikel:

- Meduza: «Обнаружились несколько фактов присутствия»: Минобороны РФ признало участие срочников в «спецоперации» в Украине [Der blev opdaget et par kendsgerninger vedrørende deres tilstedeværelse: Det russiske Forsvarsministerium indrømmede værnepligtiges deltagelse i 'specialoperationen' i Ukraine], 9. marts 2022 <https://meduza.io/news/2022/03/09/minoborony-rf-priznalo-uchastie-srochnikov-v-spetsoperatsii-v-ukraine>
- Sag es Gordejewa [Sig det til Gordejewa]: Валентина Мельникова: «Требовать от этих людей невозможно ничего» // «Скажи гордеевой» [Walentina Melnikowa: ['Disse folk kan man ikke kræve noget af // Sig det til Gordejewa], 23. marts 2022 (tilgængelig på youtube) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vq7bAYFi-i-E>



Valentina Milnikova fra Unionen for Ruslands Soldatermødres Komiteer udtalte sig i et interview med Jekaerina Gordejewa i marts 2022 på følgende måde om værnepligtiges deltagelse i angrebet på Ukraine (arbejdsoversættelse ACCORD):

'- Hvad ved vi om dem, der nu deltager i denne militæroperation? Drejer det sig om kontraktsoldater eller om værnepligtige? Eller er det begge dele?

- Det er alle, som de har fået fat på. Tilsyneladende kan der også være soldater blandt dem, der er blevet indkaldt i november, begyndelsen af december. De er meget hurtigt blevet taget i ed, næsten allerede inden for to uger, selv om deres grunduddannelse varer mindst en måned, og de er meget hurtigt blevet sendt til disse uddannelsessteder, nogle i nærheden af Rostov, andre i nærheden af Voronezj, andre igen i nærheden af Belgorod og Kursk, hvor der findes store brigader og faktisk også disse uddannelsessteder. Sådanne soldater er der også imellem dem. Men denne fremgangsmåde er ikke ny. I året 1996 blev der udstedt en bekendtgørelse, at værnepligtige først skulle kunne deltage i kamphandlinger efter seks måneder og kun inden for rammerne af en kontrakt. Dengang samlede de politiske officerer de værnepligtige og sagde til dem, nøjagtig som i 2014, at de skulle skrive en erklæring om, at de ville være kontraktsoldater. Det gjorde mange, andre gjorde det ikke. Men de, der ikke gjorde det, blev alligevel sendt ud til kamphandlinger.' (Sag es Gordejewa [Sig det til Gordejewa], 23. marts 2022, tidskode 42.17-43.28)

Hele videoen kan nu tilgås med engelske undertekster.

- ZDF - Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen: Russische Wehrpflichtige in Angst vor Einsatz [Russiske værnepligtige bange for at blive indsat], 3. april 2022

<https://www.zdf.de/nachrichten/pa-nora-ma/weh-rpflicht-ein-berufung-sorge-ukra-ne-krieg-russla-nd100.htm>

'I indkaldelseskampagnen i år er meget anderledes end ellers. Den russiske regering vil forpligte 134.500 mænd til militærtjeneste – målet ligger dermed inden for de sædvanlige rammer. Spørgsmålet er imidlertid præcist, hvad disse mænd kan forvente under deres etårige værnepligt. Der er meget, der tyder på, at de hurtigt kunne lande i et kampområde og der måtte frygte for deres liv. [...]

Den russiske forsvarsminister Sergej Schoigu sagde i denne uge, at de nye rekrutter ikke ville blive sendt til frontområder eller 'brændpunkter'. Men i store dele af befolkningen er dette udsagn blevet mødt med skepsis. Mange kan endnu huske de to tjetjenienkrige i 90'erne og 2000'erne, hvor tusinder af dårligt uddannede unge soldater blev dræbt. Også hændelser forud for invasionen i Ukraine får mange berørte til at tvivle. [...]

Den aktuelle indkaldelseskampagne har kørt siden i fredags. Teoretisk set skal alle russiske mænd i alderen mellem 18 og 27 år aftjene værnepligt i et år. Hidtil har mange imidlertid kunnet undgå en indkaldelse, f.eks. af sundhedsmæssige årsager, eller fordi de har fået udsættelse på grund af en universitetsuddannelse. Især i Moskva og andre større byer er andelen af dem, der ikke aftjener værnepligt, traditionelt høj. [...]

I tidligere år har Kreml bestræbt sig på at øge andelen af professionelle soldater inden for rammerne af moderniseringen af stridskræfterne. Aktuelt befinder der sig mere end 400.000 frivillige kontraktsoldater blandt de ca. en million militærpersoner. Det er imidlertid et spørgsmål, om dette tal også vil være tilstrækkeligt i tilfælde af en længerevarende krig i Ukraine. Moskva vil før eller senere skulle beslutte: enten at kæmpe videre med et begrænset antal soldater og eventuelt ikke opnå alle de militære mål eller at indkalde yderligere mænd til militærtjeneste og dermed risikere en offentlig modstand, der ville kunne destabilisere den politiske situation. En sådan udvikling fandt sted under de russiske krige i Tjetjenien.' (ZDF, 3. april 2022)

Også den følgende russiske artikel beretter om den russiske forsvarsminister Schoigus udsagn om, at værnepligtige ikke ville blive sendt til brændpunkter:

Meduza: Сергей Войгу: призывников Не будут отправлять в «горячие точки»

[Schoigu: Værnepligtige bliver ikke sendt til brændpunkter], 29. marts 2022

<https://ted.uza.io/news/2022/03/29/sergey-shoygu-pr-nikov-ne-budut-otpravlyat-v-goryachie-tochki>

Rotonda: двух срочников из Петербурга вернули из Украины в Россию после жалоб городскому омбудсмену. Всего таких жалоб — семь [To værnepligtige fra Petersburg blev bragt tilbage til Rusland fra Ukraine efter klager til byens ombudskvinde. I alt foreligger der syv sådanne klager], 30. marts 2022

[https://t.me/rotonda\\_m ed ia/3306](https://t.me/rotonda_m ed ia/3306)



Telegram-kanalen Rotonda i Petersborg meddelte den 30. marts 2022, at to værnepligtige fra Sankt Petersborg er blevet bragt fra Ukraine tilbage til Rusland, efter at deres mødre havde klaget til byens ombudskvinde. Ifølge ombudskvinden foreligger der i alt syv klager fra slægtninge til værnepligtige, der hævdede at være blevet tvunget til at underskrive en kontrakt. (Rotonda, 30. marts 2022)

- Der Spiegel: · Der Spiegel: Das große Schweigen [Den store tavshed], 2. april 2022 (tilgængelig på Factiva)

'Hvor mange russiske soldater der har mistet livet, er der ingen der ved. I Rusland er det strafbart at angive andre tal for faldne end de officielle. Ifølge Forsvarsministeriet er der blevet dræbt 1351 russiske soldater i Ukraine. Sergej Krivenko, leder af menneskerettighedsgruppen 'Borger, hær, ret', siger, at hans team har fundet frem til 'omtrent det samme tal' ud fra offentlige kilder. Men det er 'den nedre grænse'. Han regner med flere tusind døde. Der foreligger mange flere data om savnede soldater, de burde efterprøves nøje. 'Det er ikke klart, hvem der er blevet taget til fange, og hvem der er dræbt', siger aktivisten, der har beskæftiget sig med soldaters situation i Rusland i tyve år.

Nato taler derimod om mindst 7000 russiske soldater, der har mistet livet i Ukraine, Kyiv om langt flere dræbte folk i hæren. Den kendte menneskerettighedsforkæmper og leder af Russiske Soldatermødres Komite, Valentina Melnikova, sagde for nylig i et interview med en russisk journalist, at hun anså ukrainernes angivelser for korrekte. Hun ville ikke tale om det med SPIEGEL, 'det er for farligt at tale med udenlandske medier'. Hun henviser til den skærpede retssituation.

I praksis trues enhver, der 'mållrettet' indsamler informationer om det russiske militær, offentliggør dem – og i den forbindelse får støtte fra udlandet, – med strafferetlig efterforskning og op til fem års fængsel. Den pågældende paragraf er formuleret så vagt, at den giver sikkerhedsmyndighederne et stort spillerum. Efterretningstjenesten FSB har gjort det klart, at den udlægger loven strengt. Det er ikke blot oplysninger om troppernes tilstand, men også om stemningen blandt soldaterne, der falder ind under denne lov.

Krivenkos organisation er allerede blevet erklæret for at være 'udenlandske agenter'. Websiden har han taget af nettet, han og hans kolleger rådgiver nu kun slægtninge anonymt. I de første uger af Putins indsats havde hundreder ringet til ham, især slægtninge til folk i militærtjeneste. 'Vi kan kun komme med anbefalinger, folk må nu forsvare sig selv', siger Krivenko. Det har ingen mening at kontakte den militære anklagemyndighed eller andre myndigheder, da de ofte nægter at samarbejde. Andre taler om 'den store tavshed' i Rusland: 'Mødre får penge og ordner for deres døde sønner og tier! Selv mødre til krigsfanger tør ikke at sige noget', skriver en aktivist, der ikke vil have sit navn på tryk. Alle er bange.' (Der Spiegel, 2. april 2022)

### 3) Mulighed for militærnægtertjeneste

- USDOS - US Department of State: 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Russia, 12. Mai 2021 <https://www.eco i. net/de/dokument/2051591. htm>

„Military service for men between the ages of 18 and 27 is compulsory, but the constitution provides for alternative service for those who refuse to bear arms for reasons of conscience, including religious belief. The standard military service period is 12 months, while alternative service is 18 months in a Ministry of Defense agency or 21 months in a nondefense agency. Failure to perform alternative service is punishable under the criminal code, with penalties ranging from a fine of 80,000 rubles (\$1,100) to six months in prison" (USDOS, 12. Mai 2021, Section II)

- Washington Post: As Russia drafts young men, some fear ending up on Ukraine's front line, 1. April 2022 <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/01/russia-military-army-conscripts-draft/>

„The Russian military began its spring draft Friday, aiming to sign up 134,500 conscripts and stoking fears among young men that they may end up on the front lines of the invasion of Ukraine. [...] Human rights groups and lawyers say that since Russia invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24, they have been receiving a barrage of calls from eligible men, as well as their wives, girlfriends and mothers, seeking legal help in avoiding the draft. The amount of applications is enormous, much more if compared [to previous drafts],’ said a lawyer who works with a legal group called Conscious Refusal From Military Service in Russia, which assists Russians in

navigating the laws on conscription and contract service in the armed forces. The lawyer spoke on the condition of anonymity because Russia has recently introduced new laws mandating punishment for 'discrediting' the Russian army. [...]

Under Russian law, men can refuse to join the military and seek alternative service — such as shifts at post offices, nursing homes and hospitals — for religious, ethical or political reasons.

'Many people are scared that in actual wartime conditions, the law will not work, that the military will spit on the constitution and, instead of granting them alternative service, will just immediately grab them at enlistment offices and send them right into the war zone,' the lawyer said. So far, he said, enlistment offices have continued to accept requests for alternative service." (Washington Post, 1. April 2022)

Artiklen indeholder desuden informationer om korrupte kneb i forbindelse med indkaldelse samt fritagelse eller udsættelse af militærtjeneste.

DW- Deutsche Welle: Юрист "Агоры": Закон в РФ Не запрещает отправлять призывников На войну [Jurist fra Agora: Den Russiske Føderations love forbyder ikke at sende værnepligtige i krig], 1. april 2022 <https://www.dw.com/ru/jurist-agQly-zakon-ne-zapreshhaet-otpravljat-prz-vnikov-na-voynu/a61322339>

I et interview med Deutsche Welle (DW) i april 2022 svarede juristen Alexandr Peredruk fra den russiske NGO Agora på spørgsmålet, hvad der sker, hvis en værnepligtig ikke vil aftjene sin værnepligt, og om man kan gøre krav på retten til militærnægtertjeneste, hvis man af principielle grunde nægter at tage våben i hånd. To kategorier af borgere i Den Russiske Føderation har denne ret. Små oprindelige folk, der udfører traditionelle håndværk, samt personer med overbevisninger, der afviser militærtjeneste. I den forbindelse kan det dreje sig om alle slags overbevisninger – religiøse, sekulære og andre. På spørgsmålet, hvordan en værnepligtig, der på grund af sin overbevisning ikke vil yde militærtjeneste, skal forholde sig svarede Peredruk, at han skal indgive en ansøgning til militærkommissariatet, hvori han skal redegøre for sine overbevisninger og motiver for valget af militærnægtertjeneste. Ansøgningen skal desuden være vedlagt en levnedsbeskrivelse og et bevis fra studie- eller arbejdsstedet. Militærkommissariatet leder ansøgningen videre til indkaldelseskommisionen, der afgør, om militærtjenesten kan erstattes af militærnægtertjeneste, eller om ansøgningen afvises. På spørgsmålet, om den værnepligtige skal fremlægge beviser for, at han af samvittighedsgrunde ikke vil gribe til våben, svarede Peredruk, at indre overbevisninger ifølge en afgørelse fra Den Russiske Føderations Forfatningsdomstol ikke skal bevises, men skal begrundes. Det er ikke tilstrækkeligt at meddele indkaldelseskommisionen, at man er pacifist, man skal også forklare sit værdisystem, som forbyder en at gøre militærtjeneste. Med andre ord er en kontrol af overbevisningens oprigtighed absolut tilladt. (DW, 1. april 2022)

- Meduza: Что делать, если я Не хочу в армию Инструкция «МедуЗы» — о том, как пойти На альтернативную гражданскую службу [Was tun, wenn ich nicht zur Armee will? Eine Anleitung von Meduza, wie man zum Zivildienst kommt] [Hvad skal jeg gøre, hvis jeg ikke vil ind til militæret? En vejledning fra Meduza om, hvordan man opnår militærnægtertjeneste], 5. marts 2022

<https://ted.uz. i o/featu re/2022/03/05/chto-delat-es li-ya-ne-hoch u-v-a rm ivja>

Den oppositionelle online-avis Meduza, der har sæde i Letland, stiller i marts 2022 lignende informationer til rådighed og erklærer tillige, at den føderale lov 'Om militærnægtertjenesten' klart foreskriver, hvordan værnepligtige, der vil gøre militærnægtertjeneste, skal forholde sig. I virkeligheden støder de imidlertid på mange forhindringer. I de seneste år har noget flere end 1.000 personer gjort militærnægtertjeneste, mens der hver sjette måned indkaldes mere end 100.000 mænd til militærtjeneste. Menneskeretsaktivister er af den mening, at det ringe antal af dem, der bestemmer sig for militærnægtertjeneste, beror på indkaldelseskommisionens hyppige afvisninger. Efter deres opfattelse strider disse afvisninger ofte mod loven. Værnepligtige, der beslutter sig for militærnægtertjeneste, beretter desuden, at de bliver betegnet som militærnægtere og bliver fornærmet og truet. Det er derfor vigtigt at kende sine rettigheder og ikke bøje sig for det direkte moralske tryk. (Meduza, 5. marts 2022)

Det følgende dokument fra Bevægelsen af Bevidste Militærnægtere (Dvisjenije sosnatelnysj okastsjikov an vojennoj slusjby) indeholder bl.a. vejledninger og praktiske fremgangsmåder samt spørgsmål og svar vedrørende emnet militærnægtertjeneste (kapitel 10):

- Bevægelsen af Bevidste Militærnægtere: [КаTanor материалов Движения СО] Katalog over materialer fra Bevægelsen af Bevidste Militærnægtere, uden dato [https://docs.g2gle.com/document/d/1OZNGSoPOqUEc4otDyE ic XMkoD8ynthLnFneDg\)k11/edit#hea](https://docs.g2gle.com/document/d/1OZNGSoPOqUEc4otDyE ic XMkoD8ynthLnFneDg)k11/edit#hea)

#### 4) Vægtring mod at deltage i kamphandlinger, militærnægtelse, desertering

Omfattende informationer om dette emne kan ses i følgende spørgsmålsbesvarelse fra European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) fra april 2022:

EUAA - European Union Agency for Asylum (ehemals: European Asylum Support Office, EASO): COI Query Russian Federation: Treatment of military deserters by state authorities since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine (1 February 2022 - 4 April 2022) [Q24-2022], 5. April 2022 [https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/locat1/2070967/2022\\_04\\_Q24\\_EUAA\\_COI\\_Query\\_Response\\_Russia\\_Treatment\\_of\\_military\\_deserters\\_by\\_state\\_authorities.pdf](https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/locat1/2070967/2022_04_Q24_EUAA_COI_Query_Response_Russia_Treatment_of_military_deserters_by_state_authorities.pdf)

- Reuters: Several Russian servicemen seek help avoiding Ukraine war - lawyers, 30. März 2022 <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-national-guard-idAFKCN2LR20E>

„Several Russian servicemen are seeking legal help to avoid being sent to fight in the war in Ukraine, two lawyers said, after 12 members of Russia's National Guard were fired for refusing to go. Lawyer Mikhail Benyash said around 200 people had been in contact to ask what they should do in a similar situation. Pavel Chikov, another Russia-based lawyer, wrote on Telegram that there were 'analogous stories from Crimea, Novgorod, Omsk, Stavropol... The workers are appealing for legal help.'"

Reuters could not independently confirm the rush for legal help. The National Guard did not immediately reply to an emailed request for comment. [...]

On Feb. 25, a day into the invasion, a National Guard commander in the southern Krasnodar region and 11 men from his company refused to follow an order to cross the border to Ukraine, Chikov wrote in an earlier post. The group said the order was illegal because they didn't have their international passports and because their main job description was confined to Russia, Chikov wrote. They believed they would be breaking the law by going abroad as part of an armed group.

Reuters could not independently verify the account.

The servicemen were fired, the lawyers said, and went on to file a wrongful dismissal lawsuit. On Tuesday, however, only three of the 12 proceeded with their claim, according to Benyash, who is representing them." (Reuters, 30. März 2022)

Meduza: 'Refusing to kill people isn't a crime' The Russian National Guard is firing officers who refuse to join the war in Ukraine, 30. März 2022 <https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/03/30/refusing-to-kill-people-isn-t-a-crime>

„On March 24, Pavel Chikov, a lawyer from the international human rights organization Agora, reported that 12 Russian National Guard officers from Krasnodar who were participating in military exercises in Crimea had refused to follow their commander's orders to join the war in Ukraine. The officers were subsequently fired, though they've challenged the decision in court and are seeking to have their employment reinstated. Meduza spoke with Krasnodar-based lawyer Mikhail Benyash, who's representing the officers in court, about the case and its possible consequences.

When and under what conditions were your clients fired?

— On February 25, [Rosgvardia, the Russian National Guard] was getting ready to send my clients to Ukrainian territory, but they refused to leave Crimea. A review was initiated. On March 1, they received contract termination orders due to their failure to carry out orders. They thought about it and decided to go through the courts to get their employment reinstated. 12 people have reached out to us so far, but a lot more have been fired.

Are there legal grounds for reinstatement? To what degree were they required to take part in the 'special military operation'?

— If there was an armed conflict, an emergency situation, or martial law, the terms of the contract could be changed without their consent for six months. But we don't have an armed conflict or a war, it's just a 'special military operation.' The law doesn't say anything about that. You can go there [as a Rosgvardia officer], but only if you agree to it. [...]

So if your clients manage to get their employment reinstated, is it possible that this will set a precedent, and that other contract officers will start refusing to take part in the 'special military operation' en masse?

— They're already refusing en masse. It's just that they used to be afraid that what they were doing was illegal. And now they'll know there's a legal basis for this. [...]

Are administrative charges used to discourage these kinds of refusals?

— In our case, they've been scared off by the publicity. But with other soldiers from other cities, they use charges to pressure them. Deputy officers, special department. They scare them with [charges of] 'betraying the Motherland.' But they're all bark. It's purely to scare them.

Can you give an estimate of the scale of the refusal?

— I'm hearing from people all over the country, from Siberia to the North Caucasus. Why there, exactly?

— They want to hear from the person who's going to court. That means I must know what's allowed and what's not.

So the wave of messages came after you got started helping the Rosgvardia officers.

— Yes.

Can you give an estimate of the number of requests you've gotten?

— In the range of 200. One person generally reaches out on behalf of a group and asks whether they can get their jobs in the service back. I tell them that from a legal perspective, they should be able to. But given what's going on here in Russia, we'll have to see." (Meduza, 30. März 2022)

Det følgende dokument fra Bevægelsen af Bevidste Militærnægtere (Dvisjenije sosnatelnysj okastsjikov an vojennoj slusjby) indeholder bl.a. vejledninger og praktiske fremgangsmåder samt spørgsmål og svar vedrørende emnet krig, herunder også en vejledning for værnepligtige, der vil værgе sig mod en udsendelse til Ukraine, såvel som svar på spørgsmålet, om en officer kan nægte at blive udsendt til Ukraine (kapitel 21):

- Bevægelsen af Bevidste Militærnægtere: [КаTanor материалов Движения СО] katalog over materialer fra Bevægelsen af Bevidste Militærnægtere, uden dato [https://docs.google.com/document/d/11DZNGSoPOgUEc4otDyEciXMkqD8vnthLnFneDaJklI/edit#hea\\_ding=h.srel4ifuk4e7](https://docs.google.com/document/d/11DZNGSoPOgUEc4otDyEciXMkqD8vnthLnFneDaJklI/edit#hea_ding=h.srel4ifuk4e7)
- BFA statsdokumentation: Anfragebeantwortung der Staatendokumentation zu Russische Föderation: Desertion [Statsdokumentationens besvarelse af spørgsmål om Den Russiske Föderation, desertering], 29. marts 2022 (kræver login) [https://www.ecof.net/en/file/local/2071246/RUSS\\$M MIL Desertion 2022 \(3 29 KE.odt](https://www.ecof.net/en/file/local/2071246/RUSS$M MIL Desertion 2022 (3 29 KE.odt)

En spørgsmålsbesvarelse fra BFA Staatendokumentation fra marts 2022 indeholder følgende sammenfatning af en oplysning fra den østrigske ambassade i Moskva af 17. marts 2022:

'Af den i det følgende citerede kilde fremgår, at desertering er strafbar i henhold til den russiske straffelov art. 338. Jo længere handlingen ligger tilbage, desto mere usandsynligt synes en straf at være. Desertører under Anden Verdenskrig, der meldte sig mellem 1962 og 1995, slap i visse tilfælde for straf. Derimod blev eksempelvis soldater, der deserterede i 1995 eller 2008 senere af domstole idømt fængselsstraf på 2 til 3 år i henhold til art. 338 i straffeloven. 'Desertering' defineres i henhold til art. 338 i straffeloven og forudsætter hensigten om varigt at forlade den militære enhed eller stedet for militærtjenesten eller at unddrage sig militærtjenesten. Forseelsen kan begås af militært personel, der aftjener deres værnepligt, af korporaler samt reservister. Reservister kan indkaldes til militærøvelser af militærkommissariater. I året 2022 blev reservister, der var statsborgere i Den Russiske Føderation, indkaldt til gennemførelse af militærøvelser. En reservists blotte udrejse uden mødebefaling udgør ikke en desertering i henhold til art. 338. Russiske statsborgere er imidlertid forpligtet til at møde op hos militærkommissariatet inden for 2 uger for at lade sig slette af lægdsrullen, hvis de rejser ud af Den Russiske Føderation i mere end 6 måneder, eller for at lade sig registrere efter indrejse i Den Russiske Føderation. Opfyldes denne forpligtelse ikke, udgør det en forvaltningsretlig overtrædelse og kan medføre bøde på RUB 500 til 3.000 [ca. EUR 5 til 31]. En russisk statsborgers ret til udrejse kan indskrænkes for en tid, hvis han er blevet indkaldt til militær- eller militærnægtertjeneste (indtil afslutningen af militær- eller militærnægtertjenesten).

Hvis en indkaldt reservist endnu ikke har deltaget i en militærøvelse, og møder han ikke op til en øvelse, foreligger der ikke nogen desertation, men en forvaltningsretlig overtrædelse. Har den indkaldte reservist allerede deltaget i en øvelse og møder ikke op til videre tjeneste med det forsæt at unddrage sig militæret varigt, foreligger der desertation i henhold til art. 338 i straffeloven.

Straffebestemmelserne for desertation i art. 338 i straffeloven gælder kun i fredstid. Det strafferetlige ansvar for forbrydelser mod militærtjenesten begået i krigstid eller i en kampsituation er fastsat i den russiske lovgivning for krigstid. For nuværende har Den Russiske Føderations regering ikke indført krigsret. Ifølge diverse medieartikler truer der væsentlig hårdere straffe ved desertering i krigstid end de 7 eller 10 år i fredstid, nemlig op til dødsstraf. I 1996 har Rusland indført et moratorium med hensyn til dødsstraf.' (BFA Staatendokumentation, 29. marts 2022, s. 2)

Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Country of origin information report for the Russian Federation, 1. April 2021

[https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2054388/04\\_2021\\_MinBZ\\_NL\\_COI\\_report\\_Russian\\_Federation.pdf](https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2054388/04_2021_MinBZ_NL_COI_report_Russian_Federation.pdf)

„Evasion or refusal to take part in military service and alternative military service is classified as a crime in the Criminal Code, as is desertion and leaving the barracks without authorisation. The law does not provide for an interim cessation of military service or a transition to alternative military service. Refusal or evasion of military service is punishable by large fines or detention.

In practice, however, according to one confidential source, conscription objectors are usually punished with fines, as they often involve first-time offences. This information could not be verified by other sources. Conscription objectors that are charged with fraud are subject to detention. Some groups are at higher risk. For example, according to the same confidential source and media reports, Jehovah's Witnesses were denied the right to choose alternative military service. In response to the conscientious objection they expressed, they were prosecuted for attempting to evade military service through fraud because their conscientious objection was alleged to be not real. In such cases, they must serve long prison sentences in accordance with Article 339 of the Criminal Code. Little is known about other groups that are discriminated against in this regard.

To help prevent evasion of military service, employers have been obliged to report since February 2019. They must report to the government if they discover that their employees or candidates for a position are obliged to take part in military service but have not yet reported to the local office of the military service authority. They must also proactively remind their employees that they are obliged to report for military service. If a company does not comply with this obligation, the director of the company can be fined an administrative fine of one thousand roubles. Despite the low amount of the fine, employers want to avoid fines due to the possible legal consequences." (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1. April 2021, S. 4647)

„Evasion of military service is punishable with a fine of 2 million roubles (equivalent to approximately EUR 22,514, according to [xe.com](https://www.xe.com) on 10 December 2020) or seizure of earnings for eighteen months, or community service of 2 years or imprisonment for up to two years (see Article 328 of the Criminal Code). Circumvention of military service by transferred military personnel is punishable with a fine of up to 80,000 roubles (equivalent to approximately EUR 900, according to [xe.com](https://www.xe.com) on 10 December 2020) or seizure of earnings for six months, or community service of up to 480 hours or detention for a maximum of six months (see Art. 328, paragraph 2 of the Criminal Code). Leaving the military premises without authorisation is punishable by detention of six months or one year in a military prison. Penalties for professional soldiers are higher (see Art. 337 of the Criminal Code). Desertion is punishable by seven years in detention or ten years for group desertion or armed desertion (see Article 338 of the Criminal Code). Simulation of a disease or other types of fraud to evade military service is punishable by compulsory military service of one year or detention of up to seven years (see Article 339 of the Criminal Code)." (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1. April 2021, Fußnote 284)

##### **5) Indsættelsen af mænd fra Tjetjenien (indkaldelse, hvem kæmper i de tjetjenske bataljoner, indsættelse af frivillige**

- Caucasian Knot: Ramzan Kadyrov expresses his readiness to send fighters to Ukraine, 25. Februar 2022 <https://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/58347/>

„Vladimir Zelensky, before he became the former president of Ukraine, should apologize to Vladimir Putin for the military conflict, states Ramzan Kadyrov. Today, the leader of Chechnya has gathered about 12,000 Chechen law enforcers and militaries on a square in Grozny. [...] Today, in Grozny, the combat readiness of the personnel of the law enforcement bodies of Chechnya has been checked, and more than 12,000 military personnel have taken part in the inspection, the 'Grozny TV Company reports. About 70,000 law enforcers from Chechnya are ready to voluntarily go to Ukraine, Ramzan Kadyrov has stated as quoted by the TASS. The leader of Chechnya has noted that so far no decisions on the transfer of the law enforcers have been made.” (Caucasian Knot, 25. Februar 2022)

Caucasian Knot: Kadyrov reports about sending a new detachment of volunteers to Ukraine, 25. März 2022

<https://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/58611/>

„Chechen volunteers, including members of the Kadyrov family, left for Ukraine, reports Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov. The 'Caucasian Knot' has reported that on March 17, Ramzan Kadyrov announced that a thousand volunteers from Chechnya had gone to participate in the special military operation in Ukraine, and Apti Alaudinov, an aide to the leader of Chechnya in the power bloc, headed them. On March 16, Alexander Khodakovsky, the commander of the 'Vostok' (East) battalion of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) of the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR), criticized Chechen law enforcers for poor training. However, after a meeting with State Duma member Adam Delimkhanov, Alexander Khodakovsky said that the first impression about the level of training of the Chechen law enforcers was erroneous. Since the beginning of the special military operation, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov regularly posts video reports from unit commanders. Units of Chechen fighters in Ukraine play a supporting role by conducting clean-ups out and combing the area, experts explain.” (Caucasian Knot, 25. März 2022)

- New Lines Magazine: Chechens Fighting Chechens in Ukraine, 3. März 2022  
<https://newlinesmag.com/reportage/chechens-fighting-chechens-in-ukraine/>

„It is unknown how many soldiers Kadyrov has sent to Ukraine, but the number is significant. Most reports indicate approximately 10,000 have been deployed; the highest figures range up to (a highly improbable) 70,000. More are being actively recruited, too: A source in Grozny provided a video on Feb. 25 that shows thousands of men being gathered and equipped for duty in Ukraine.” (New Lines Magazine, 3. März 2022)

- Caucasian Knot: Factbox: Kadyrov's fighters in Ukraine, 2. März 2022  
<https://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/58385/>

„What units are in the territory of Ukraine

In Ukraine, the 141st Special Motorized Regiment 'Sever' (North) (commanded by Magomed Tushaev); the battalion 'Yug' (South) (under command of Khusein Mezhidov) and the OMON (riot police) unit'Akhmat-Grozny (commanded by Azor Bisaev) have been noticed. The total strength thereof is about 1200 servicemen.” (Caucasian Knot, 2. März 2022)

- Kamil Galeev: Thread, 17. März 2022  
<https://twitter.com/kamilkazani/status/1504585734212055076>

„Now who fights in Putin's army? Well, that's pretty easy to answer. Most of file and rank of the Russian army are either current or former conscripts. They are young guys from small towns and usually underprivileged background. Richer, more privileged ones would dodge the draft. [...] Those who get into the army are usually from poor families & small towns. Because richer/smarter/educated ones dodge it. Then these conscripts who don't know their rights will be persuaded, pressured or just forced to sign a contract and become **контрактники** professional soldiers. [...] In the ethnic dimension it's even more interesting than that. With ethnic Russians quickly depopulating, minorities provide disproportionally high share of young draftable males. And I'm not talking about Kadyrov's troops. Chechnya is a vassal kingdom of Kadyrov in personal union with Russia. It's not an integral part of Russia and its troops are not part of Russian army. Chechen conscript don't go to Russian army, they go to its 'Chechen regiments' which are led by and personally loyal to Kadyrov. Once again - Kadyrov's troops can have whatever BS bureaucratic labels - 'army', 'police', 'FSB', etc. But being classified as parts of these branches of Russian regulars they're obedient only to their warlord.” (Galeev, 17. März 2022)

- Yandex Zen: Где и как сегодня чеченцы служат в российской армии, почему из Нечни такой небольшой призыв [Hvor og hvordan tjetjenere i dag gør tjeneste i den russiske hær, hvorfor antallet af indkaldte fra Tjetjenien er så lavt], 10. marts 2022

<https://zen.yandex.ru/tegia/chechnya/gde-i-kak-segodnia-chechency-ljat-v-rossiiskoi-armii-pochemu-iz-chechni-takoi-nebolshoi-prz-v-6229e214164c08490d37eee4>

Yandex Zen forklarer i en artikel fra marts 2022, at indkaldelsen af mænd fra Tjetjenien er blevet udsat i 1994 og hidtil ikke er blevet genindført i fuldt omfang. Ganske vist er tjetjenere fra andre regioner i Rusland blevet indkaldt til hæren og bliver stadig indkaldt. Mænd fra Tjetjenien udgør i dag ved indkaldelsen en begrænset kvote; der er ikke flere end 500 per indkaldelseskampagne. En væsentlig del af dem bliver i Tjetjenien og gør tjeneste i Nationalgardens enheder 'Syd' og 'Nord', i den hurtige specialaktionsgruppe 'Achmat' og i andre enheder. I 2018 er kun 70 ud af 500 indkaldte blevet sendt til andre regioner i Den Russiske Føderation, der ikke ligger langt fra Tjetjenien. Ifølge artiklen er højtstående generaler i Moskva imod den fulde indkaldelse af tjetjenere. Ramsan Kadyrov arbejder imidlertid på at ændre denne situation, og det er ikke udelukket, at indkaldelsen af tjetjenere vil blive genindført i fuldt omfang efter de seneste begivenheder. (Yandex Zen, 10. marts 2022)

- New Lines Magazine: Chechnya's Fight Club Joins Putin's War, 23. März 2022  
<https://newlinesmag.com/reportage/chechnyas-fight-club-ib-joins-putins-war/>

„At the start of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Ramzan Kadyrov — the tyrant at the helm of Russia's Chechnya region and ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin — gathered his troops in the main square of the region's capital Grozny in a show of combat readiness. With Kadyrov dressed in a khaki-green outfit with a matching tactical belt and a pair of military-themed Prada boots, a menacing smile crept across his bearded face as he made a defiant promise to seize Kyiv. We once again gathered to show that we fully support the decision of the supreme commander-in-chief [Putin]. And we will not let you down. We will fulfill any order. [We] have prepared, are preparing and will always prepare,' Kadyrov said in his address on Chechen state TV.

The footage showed Kadyrov flanked by some of the most powerful men in Chechnya, including Adam Delimkhanov, a member of the Russian Parliament and formerly on Interpol's wanted list for plotting an assassination, and Abuzayed Vismuradov, a decorated general and Kadyrovs right-hand man, who was sanctioned by the United States government in 2019 for his role in Chechnya's purge of sexual minorities. He is also in charge of Kadyrovs mixed martial arts (MMA) empire. [...] Known by his nom de guerre 'Patriot,' Vismuradov is the president of the Akhmat MMA fight club — a combat sports training facility and fight organization funded by Kadyrov — and the man responsible for overseeing thousands of Chechen men as they train to become professional fighters. Behind Vismuradov stood Abdulkerim Edilov, a former MMA fighter who competed for the popular U.S.-based Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC) before becoming the vice premier of Chechnya. And though Edilov was not among those deployed to Ukraine, he stood armed with a machine gun and a tactical vest packed with extra ammunition. [...]

Much like other strongmen before him, Kadyrov uses sport to distract from well-documented human rights abuses, a process known as sportswashing. In Kadyrovs case, these alleged crimes include a deadly crackdown on LGBTQ+ people in Chechnya that resulted in torture and summary executions, as well as a recent string of assassinations and abductions targeting Chechen dissidents living abroad. Kadyrov also uses sport, and especially combat sports, to socialize Chechen youth. By elevating Chechen fighters to an elite social status, lavishing them with luxury goods and cars, and propagating the idea that proficiency in combat sports such as MMA is part of the ideal Chechen manhood, Kadyrov has popularized the sport and created a pool of fighters, ready at his disposal for combat. [...]

Of the thousands of Chechen men who train at Kadyrovs Akhmat MMA facilities, only a handful go on to become full-fledged professional fighters representing their republic. Many of those who don't make the cut go on to join military and police regiments in Chechnya, including the Terek SWAT forces (controlled by Vismuradov), as well as the so-called Kadyrovtsy paramilitary units infamous for committing widespread human rights abuses such as kidnapping, forced disappearances and murder. And while the Kadyrovtsy are mostly used as tools of domestic oppression, they are occasionally deployed to war zones such as Syria and Ukraine, where they go on to commit countless war crimes.

Known as Kadyrovs private militia, the Kadyrovtsy is considered to be one of the most feared organizations in Russia. The militia has previously worked as death squads to eliminate Chechen dissidents, opposition members and Kadyrovs enemies. At Kadyrovs discretion, the Kadyrovtsy also act as an extension of Putin's military forces, having previously been deployed to fight alongside pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine's Donbas region following the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and in Syria in 2016. [...]



While Ushukov continues to fight professionally, it is possible that several of his Akhmat MMA training partners will be utilized as soldiers in Russia's war in Ukraine. Kadyrov has allegedly deployed thousands of troops to Ukraine and promised that another 70,000 'volunteers' are ready to join the fray. Among those who are reportedly tasked with selecting troops for deployment is Vismuradov, in yet another connection between KadyroVs MMA institution and his state-funded war machine." (New Lines Magazine, 23. März 2022)

- Intellinews: Russia's Chechen speartip in Ukraine, 8. März 2022 <https://www.intellinews.com/russiq-s-chechen-speartip-in-ukraine-237314/>

„In the current offensive, the Kadyrovtsy have been employed in a leading assault role. They have been particularly involved in the fighting west of Kyiv, near Hostomel Airport, which was attacked by Russian paratroopers on the first day of the war and has since become a major battleground on the capital's western approaches.

Open source investigators have identified and geolocated videos of one Kadyrov commander, Husein Mezhidov, operating in the area. Mezhidov heads a battalion of the Special Rapid Response Forces (50BR) of the Chechen Republic, one of the top units under KadyroVs command. His troops have been heavily engaged in battles in the suburbs of Irpin and Bucha for over a week, with some reports that Mezhidov himself was even killed in the fighting. Another top Kadyrovtsy commander, Anzor Bisaev of the Grozny OMON (riot police) detachment, has also been seen extensively in the area.

Other reports suggest, meanwhile, that the new recruits being gathered are hardly well motivated participants, and instead are more like press-ganged conscripts. One local source in Grozny, who attended the mass recruitment rally on February 25 and spoke to several participants, gave his insight on their condition.

'I didn't see much enthusiasm in their eyes, and I don't think that they're very happy to go [to Ukraine],' said the Grozny local, who cannot be named for security reasons. 'I don't think they're well trained, because many of them were very young. [Most of] those who have military experience are now already quite old,' he said. The material incentives for these recruits are not high, either. 'Chechen soldiers are regularly underpaid or not paid at all,' said the Grozny source. 'Quite a few Chechens who fought in Syria [for Russia/Kadyrov] were not paid. Their salaries are being depreciated constantly, and inflation is significant. Their families [have to] pay for their food more and more,' he said.

Escaping military service in KadyroVs Chechnya, meanwhile, is extremely difficult, if not impossible. 'One [serviceman] I talked to said that if he wanted to resign, he had to submit his resignation tender,' said the Grozny source. 'But his superior would not accept it. If the guy then tried to quit without this, he would be prosecuted as AWOL [away without leave] and would be sent to prison,' he said.

And the soldiers themselves become financially tied to the Kadyrov government. 'Before [they begin their service], KadyroVs officials would make them sign loan papers in the bank,' said the Grozny source of the Chechen recruits. 'Of course, these guys would not get those loans, but they would have to pay the amounts they signed for. So even if they wanted to try and leave, they would have no money [to repay the fake loans],' the source said." (Intellinews, 8. März 2022)

ORF - Österreichischer Rundfunk: Putins Mann fürs Grobe mit tragender Rolle [Putins mand til det grove med central rolle], 30. marts 2022 <https://orf.at/stories/3256468/>

'Allerede kort tid efter krigens begyndelse havde Kadyrow højlydt bekendtgjort sin støtte til krigen – og tilsagt sin berygtede specialenhed, Kadyrowzys, hjælp. [...] Kadyrow skal i mellemtiden have været i Ukraine to gange: I midten af marts angav han at have besøgt sine tropper nord for Kyiv. På trods af videoer og fotografier er der blevet rejst tvivl om, hvorvidt han rent faktisk havde været der.

Den tjetjenske magthaver ser åbenbart en chance i Ukrainekrigen til at styrke sin magt og anseelse, idet han beviser sin loyalitet over for Putin – som han stadig er afhængig af. Helt siden han er kommet til magten, er hans rolle som 'skræmmebillede' en stadig trussel mod Putins fjender', siger ruslandsekspernten Konstantin von Eggert til al-Jazeera. 'Kadyrow har mange års erfaring med såkaldte 'udrensningsaktioner', og hans soldater ville kunne indsættes som et psykologisk værktøj mod fredelige ukrainere', siger Alexander Kwachadse, forskningsstipendiat ved den Georgiske Stiftelse for Strategiske og Internationale Studier, til The Guardian: 'Den implicite trussel lyder: Hvis I ikke overgiver jer, kan den samme skæbne ramme jer, som ramte fredelige byer i Georgien og Tjetjenien. [...]

Kadyrows angivelige frontbesøg skal vel opretholde de tjetjenske styrkers ry. For den faktiske kampindsats synes at stå i kras modsætning til deres pr. Allerede i de første krigsdage blev en ca. 400 mand stor specialstyrke slået tilintetgørende nær ved lufthavnen Hostomel i nærheden af Kyiv. Der var rygter i omløb om, at Ukraine havde fået hemmelige oplysninger fra Rusland om styrkens landing. Den berygtede general Magomed Tuchajew skal være blevet dræbt, hvilket den tjetjenske regering dementerer på det kraftigste. Ifølge flere medieberetninger og militære iagttagere er de tjetjenske tropper næsten ikke at finde i den forreste front. Flere pro-russiske seperatistledere har ifølge al Jazeera's beretning beklaget sig over, at de næsten heller ikke deltager i belejringen af Mariupol, til dels fordi deres udrustning er ubrugelige hertil. Andre eksperter fremfører som argument, at specialtropperne ganske vist har erfaring med at undertrykke civilbefolkningen, men er uerfarne i 'ægte' krig. [...]

I modsætning til de russiske soldater har de tjetjenske tropper mobiltelefoner med, poster på sociale netværk og betegner konflikten som 'krig'. Der berettes desuden om stridigheder mellem russiske tropper og tjetjenske enheder. Disse er især beskæftiget med at hverve yderligere soldater fra deres hjemland med deres postings, som de ifølge beretninger lover 1.000 dollar om måneden. Af mobildataene kan aflæses, at de faktisk ikke befinder sig i det område, der kæmpes om, men for det meste befinder sig 20 kilometer bag frontlinjen, siger Kwachadse i 'The Guardian'. En video, der skulle underbygge troppernes styrke, er ifølge ukrainske oplysninger også blevet flere dusin soldaters skæbne: Ved hjælp af billederne kunne lejren lokaliseres, og den blev angrebet.' (ORF, 30. marts 2022)

- Riddle: How Kadyrov is financing war efforts in Ukraine, 21. März 2022 <https://rid1.io/en/how-kadyrov-is-financing-war-efforts-in-ukraine/>

„In the Russian re-invasion of Ukraine, Ramzan has mobilized the [Akhmat Kadyrov] Fund for three purposes: 'charity,' propaganda, and war. [...]

Domestically, the AKF is assisting the families of troops partaking in the invasion. Kavkazskii Uzel's source says families are given fifty thousand rubles (\$ 440). Kadyrov reported that they will receive between 20 and 100 thousand rubles (\$ 175 to \$ 878), in a 'continuation' of the policy of providing fifty thousand rubles. He also claimed to be providing direct food assistance as well. [...]

More significantly, Kadyrov has offered several sizable bounties, to be paid out of the AKF. The bounties were the first announced usage of Ramzan's personal slush fund. The first round of bounties on 25 February included \$ 5000 for killing a 'national battalion' fighter (members of the Azov, Aidar, Sheikh Mansur and Dzhokhar Dudayev battalions, as well as regular soldiers), \$ 20,000 for destroying an infantry fighting machine, and \$ 30,000 for eliminating a tank. The next round, issued 3 March, upped the stakes. These offered \$ 500,000 per head for the commanders of the Azov and Dzhokhar Dudaev battalions and the regular soldiers. Kadyrov has running feud with Azov, and Adam Osmayev, the Dzhokhar Dudaev Battalion's commander, has survived multiple assassination attempts against him over the past almost decade," (Riddle, 21. März 2022)

## 6) Er Soldatermødrene aktive?

Der findes flere organisationer med lignende navne.

- For forældre til værnepligtige og soldater: **Peruoi: Москва** [Region: Moskva], uden dato (a) <https://soldiersparents.org/region/moscow/>

Den ovenfor anførte side oplister følgende organisationer med et tilsvarende navn i Region Moskva:

Unionen af Ruslands Soldatermødres Komiteer (ansvarlig sekretær: Valentina Melnikova)  
- **Союз комитетов солдатских матерей России**

Ruslands Soldatermødres Komite (forkvinde: Olga Larkina) - **Комитет солдатских матерей России** - samt Moskva-afdelingen af Ruslands Soldatermødres Komite (forkvinde Anna Romanova) - **Московское отделение Комитета солдатских матерей России**

- Foreningen 'Soldatermødrenes Komite' (forkvinde: Svetlana Golub) - **Ассоциация «Комитет солдатских матерей»** (For forældre til værnepligtige og soldater, uden dato (a))

Siden nævner desuden yderligere menneskerettighedsorganisationer, der tager sig af forældre til værnepligtige og soldater i Region Moskva.

For forældre til værnepligtige og soldater: **Peruoi: Санкт-Петербург** [Region: Sankt Petersburg], uden dato (b)

<https://soldiersparents.org/region/saint-petersburg/>

For Sankt Petersburg oplister siden Soldatermødrene i Sankt Petersburg (forkvinde: Ella Poljakova) - «Солдатские матери Санкт-Петербурга» - samt Sankt Petersburg-afdelingen for Ruslands Soldatermødres Komite (forkvinde Inns Tjergina) - Санкт-Петербургское отделение Комитета солдатских матерей России -. (For forældre til værnepligtige og soldater, uden dato (b))

Redaktionsnetzwerk Deutschland nævnte i den ovenfor anførte artikel fra marts 2022 følgende:

md - Redaktionsnetzwerk Deutschland: 'Mama, ich liebe dich': Wie Putin junge Russen an der Front verheizt [Mor, jeg elsker dig': Hvordan Putin brænder unge russere af ved fronten], 3. marts 2022

<https://www.rnd.de/politik/krieg-in-der-ukraine-ne-wie-putin-junge-russen-an-der-front-verheiztT10AKLTIWFB3VFZFTVPTIYPMFI.html>

'Stadig flere mødre melder sig hos Moskvas 'Soldatermødres Komite', fordi de i dagevis ikke har hørt fra deres søn. Menneskerettighedsorganisationen har gjort det til sin opgave at undersøge misforhold i den russiske hær til bunds. Mange mødre beretter, at også deres sønner er blevet tvunget til at underskrive en kontrakt. Så mange, at 'Soldatermødrenes Komite' i mellemtiden har oprettet en egen rådgivnings-hotline for at hjælpe soldater og deres familier efter underskrivelsen af kontrakten.' (rnd, 3. marts 2022)

- Sag es Gordejewa [Sig det til Gordejewa]: Валентина Мельникова: «Требовать от этик людей невозможно ничего» // «Скажи гордеевой» [Valentina Melnikowa: 'Disse folk kan man ikke kræve noget af' // Sig det til Gordejewa], 23. marts 2022 (kan ses på youtube)  
[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vq7bAYFi-I\\_E](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vq7bAYFi-I_E)

I det ovenfor citerede interview med Jekaerina Gordejewa fra marts 2022 udtalte Valentina Melnikova fra Unionen for Ruslands Soldatermødres Komite sig. (Sag es Gordejewa, 23. marts 2022)

- FAZ - Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: FAZ - Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: 'Russland hält sich nicht ans Kriegsrecht' [Rusland overholder ikke krigens love], 2. marts 2022 (kan ses på Factiva)

'Valentina Melnikova fra Ruslands 'Soldatermødre' kræver en humanitær våbenstilstand, hvor der foregår en udveksling af fanger og faldne.  
Et interview.

Får Deres frivillige netop nu mange opkald fra russiske familier, der formoder, at deres sønner, fædre og ægtemænd er i Ukraine?

Ukrainerne har offentliggjort lister over faldne og tilfangetagne russiske soldater. De, der finder deres slægtninge på disse lister, ringer til vores komiteer. Men vi kan ikke hjælpe disse mennesker: Dertil måtte Rusland annoncere en humanitær våbenstilstand, i det mindste indstille beskydningen og bombardementerne en kort tid. Der burde foregå en udveksling, hvor den russiske og den ukrainske side udveksler ligene af faldne og tilfangetagne. Men en sådan våbenstilstand er der ikke.

Kan De nævne et tal for, hvor mange mennesker der nu henvender sig til 'Soldatermødrene'?

Ærlig talt, det kan jeg ikke vurdere. En del af opkaldene er anonyme. Adskillige mennesker går også til vore kontorer i regionerne, især i områderne Volgograd og Nisjni Novgorod, for mange af de faldne kommer ifølge beretningerne derfra. [...]

Er der mange russere, der søger deres slægtninge via den ukrainske side 'Søg dine slægtninge', der er blevet blokeret i Rusland?

Den, der kan åbne den, ser på den. Og hvis der er nogen, der henvender sig til os, sender vi dem links til de ukrainske lister. Der står der mange navne. Vi har hverken tid, kræfter eller folk til selv at søge. Vores store opgave består nu i at skrive officielle breve, til præsidenten, til den militære statsanklager, så at der endelig kan blive forkyndt en humanitær våbenstilstand.' (FAZ, 2. marts 2022)

Også den oven anførte artikel fra Meduza fra februar 2022 nævner Soldatermødrene (Meduza, 25. februar 2022), ligesom artiklen fra Reuters fra marts 2022 gør det (Reuters, 9. marts

- ARD -Allgemeiner Rundfunk Deutschland: Russland: Die Eltern der Soldaten [Russland: Soldaternes forældre], 17. marts 2022 <https://daserste.ndr.de/pa/norama/archiv/2022/Russland-Die-Eltern-derSoldaten,soldateneltern100.html>

'Fra menneskerettighedsorganisationen 'Soldatermødrenes Komite' i Moskva erfarer vi: Som Rafik Bachmanuklow er det gået mange soldater. Organisationen oplyser soldater og deres slægtninge om deres rettigheder. Indtil nu har 'Soldatermødrene' ufortrødent kritiseret misforhold i den russiske hær og har heller ikke ladet sig skræmme af repressalier. Men siden der blev vedtaget en ny medielov i Rusland, er også de tilbageholdende med offentlige udtalelser. Vi får skriftlige udtalelser, som vi kun må offentliggøre uden navn:' (ARD, 17. marts 2022)

AI - Amnesty International: Amnesty International Report 2021/22; Zur weltweiten Lage der Menschenrechte [Om menneskerettighedernes situation globalt]; Rusland 2021, 29. marts 2022 <https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2070266.htm>

'I september 2021 offentliggjorde den indenlandske efterretningstjeneste FSB en omfangsrig liste med emner, der ikke mere var klassificerede som hemmelige, men som dog medførte en kategorisering som 'udenlandsk agent', hvis en person skulle beskæftige sig med dem. Listen omfattede emner fra forbrydelser i hæren til forsinkelser i rumfartsprogrammer. Menneskerettighedsorganisationen Soldatermødre i Skt. Petersborg, der har været aktiv i tre årtier, meddelte derpå, at den indstiller sine aktiviteter vedrørende brud på menneskerettighederne.' (AI, 29. marts 2022)

Lignende oplysninger findes også i følgende artikel:

- RFE/RL - Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Russian NGO Defending Conscripts' Rights Ceases Activities, Fearing Persecution, 6. Oktober 2021 <https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2061621.htm>

EUAA - European Union Agency for Asylum (ehemals: European Asylum Support Office, EASO): COI Query Russian Federation: Treatment of military deserters by state authorities since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine (1 February 2022 - 4 April 2022) [Q24-2022], 5. April 2022 [https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2070967/2022\\_04\\_Q24\\_EUAA\\_COI\\_Qum\\_Response\\_Russia\\_Treatment\\_of\\_military\\_deserters\\_by\\_state\\_authorities\\_RSjE](https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2070967/2022_04_Q24_EUAA_COI_Qum_Response_Russia_Treatment_of_military_deserters_by_state_authorities_RSjE)

„In the correspondence with EUAA on 19 March 2022, a human rights defender based in Russia said they had 'no information about military deserters held or prosecuted in Russia'. The source further mentioned that the Soldiers' Mothers' movement was 'almost inactive' at the time of the correspondence; and, while some groups were 'trying to provide consultations for the conscripts,' the source was 'not aware of any legal services provided to the soldiers.' (EUAA, 5. April 2022, S. 11)

#### **ecoi.net summary:** III

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