

Flygtningenævnets baggrundsmateriale

Bilagsnr.:	670
Land:	Den Demokratiske Republik Congo
Kilde:	Kivu Security Tracker
Titel:	The Landscape of Armed Groups in Eastern Congo
Udgivet:	februar 2021
Optaget på baggrundsmaterialet:	25. maj 2021

The Landscape of Armed Groups in Eastern Congo

Missed Opportunities, Protracted Insecurity and Self-Fulfilling Prophecies






Table of Contents

OVERVIEW	3
Ituri map	4
North Kivu map.....	5
South Kivu map.....	6
Tanganyika map	7
KEY TRENDS IN ARMED (DE-)MOBILIZATION.....	8
SHADES OF PREDATION.....	9
HOTSPOTS OF WARFARE.....	11
Minembwe: At the crossroads of the local, national, and regional.....	12
The implosion of the NDC–Rénové	13
Beni: ADF, Ebola and other threats	13
Beyond the Kivus: the situation in Ituri	15
A BROADER LOOK AT INSECURITY.....	16
CHANGES AND CONTINUITIES OF THE CONFLICT	17
METHODOLOGICAL NOTE.....	18
ANNEX: BIOGRAPHIES OF ARMED GROUPS.....	19



OVERVIEW

Conflict and insecurity continued to plague populations in the eastern Congo in 2020. Amidst a global pandemic draining humanitarian funding – only 34% of requested annual aid had reached the Congo in 2020 – conflict continues to simmer, with a [record high of 5.5 million displaced](#) across the country. Recent Kivu Security Tracker data also indicates a steep rise in killings, violent deaths and other forms of violence since the end of 2019, compared to previous years (*see graph below*).



Nonetheless, compared to previous years, we observe a decrease in the number of belligerents. Whereas in 2019, roughly 130 armed groups existed in the Kivus alone, our 2020 inventory counts around 120 across the entire eastern Congo, including North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri and Tanganyika.

This briefing dives into the key dynamics of armed mobilization and insecurity in the eastern Congo in order to better contextualize the 2020 edition of Kivu Security Tracker's armed group mapping. It distills key trends by looking at several geographical hotspots and analyzing some of the broader political and social developments that shape the contours of violence and conflict.

Armed Groups

- 1 Zaïre-FPAC
- 2 CODECO-URDPC
- 3 CODECO-FCBC
- 4 CODECO-BTD
- 5 CODECO-ALC
- 6 Chini Ya Kilima-FPIC
- 7 FRPI
- 8 Mai-Mai Alaise
- 9 Mai-Mai Simba Mangalibi
- 10 Mai-Mai Kyandenga MNLDK
- 11 Mai-Mai Barcelone

SOUTH SUDAN

MAMBASA

Mambasa

IRUMU

ARU

MAHAGI

DJUGU

Djugu

Bunia

UGANDA

Lake Albert



METHODOLOGICAL NOTE

This map is the result of extensive fieldwork throughout eastern Congo, triangulated with expert sources and Kivu Security Tracker data. Mapping non-state armed groups is, like other illicit phenomena, a sensitive task and inevitably involves imprecisions. The map shows “areas of influence” rather than absolute control. While some armed groups exert effective control over an area, others may be able to exert substantial influence over larger zones but lack full control over those areas. Hence the size of an armed group’s area does not necessarily correspond to that group’s strength.

Armed Groups

- 9 Mai-Mai Simba Mangalibi
- 10 Mai-Mai Kyandenga MNLDK
- 11 Mai-Mai Barcelone
- 12 ADF (Allied Democratic Forces)
- 13 FLEC/NG
- 14 Mai-Mai Ngolenge
- 15 Mai-Mai Uhuru OAPB
- 16 Mai-Mai Shingo Pamba
- 17 Mai Mai Mandefu
- 18 Mazembe-APASIKO
- 19 Mai-Mai Léopards
- 20 Mai-Mai UPLC
- 21 APRC
- 22 Mai-Mai Ninja
- 23 FAP (Force d'Autodéfense Populaire)
- 24 APR (Armée patriotique de Ruwenzori)
- 25 RNL
- 26 Mai-Mai Simba UPLD
- 27 Mai-Mai Simba FDS
- 28 Mai-Mai Kabidon FPP/AP
- 29 NDC-R/Guidon
- 30 Mai-Mai Jackson FMP
- 31 NDC-R/Bwira
- 32 MAC
- 33 Mai-Mai Kifuafua
- 34 AFRC
- 35 Nyatura FPDH
- 36 Amka Jeshi
- 37 Nyatura CMC
- 38 FDLR-FOCA
- 39 M23 (Mouvement du 23 Mars)
- 40 RUD-Urunana
- 41 Nyatura Turarambiwe (Rutshuru)
- 42 APCLS
- 43 Nyatura FPPH
- 44 Nyatura GAV
- 45 Nyatura APRDC (now Abazungu)
- 46 Mai-Mai Kifuafua Maachano
- 47 Nyatura Bagaruza
- 48 Nyatura Delta FDDH
- 49 Nyatura Jean-Marie (now Abazungu)
- 50 Nyatura Musheku (now Abazungu)
- 51 UPDC Kapasi
- 53 Mai-Mai Kirikicho
- 54 Nyatura Kalume



METHODOLOGICAL NOTE


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Armed Groups

- 33 Mai-Mai Kifufua
- 52 Raia Mutomboki Soleil
- 53 Mai-Mai Kirikicho
- 54 Nyatura Kalume
- 55 Raia Mutomboki Shabani
- 56 CNRD-Ubwiyunge
- 57 JKK / CCCRD
- 58 Raia Mutomboki Mungoro
- 59 Raia Mutomboki Blaise
- 60 Raia Mutomboki Bralima
- 61 Raia Mutomboki Butachibera
- 62 Raia Mutomboki Bipopa
- 63 Raia Mutomboki Hamakombo
- 64 Raia Mutomboki Lance
- 65 Raia Mutomboki Lukoba
- 66 Raia Mutomboki Ndarumanga
- 67 Raia Mutomboki Mabala
- 68 Raia Mutomboki Donat
- 69 Raia Mutomboki Walike
- 70 Raia Mutomboki Kazimoto
- 71 Raia Mutomboki Kabazimia
- 72 Raia Mutomboki Musolwa
- 73 Raia Mutomboki Charles Quint
- 74 Raia Mutomboki Kabé
- 75 Raia Mutomboki 100kg
- 76 Raia Mutomboki Kimba
- 77 Raia Mutomboki Kampanga
- 78 Raia Mutomboki Bozi
- 79 Raia Mutomboki LeFort
- 80 Raia Mutomboki Musumbu
- 81 Mai-Mai Makindu
- 82 Mai-Mai Malaika
- 83 Mai-Mai Rasta
- 84 Front national de libération
- 85 Mai-Mai Buhirwa
- 86 Mai-Mai Ilunga
- 87 Mai-Mai Kashumba
- 88 Mai-Mai Kijangala
- 89 Mai-Mai Makanaki
- 90 Mai-Mai Mbulu
- 91 Mai-Mai Issa Mutoka
- 92 Mai-Mai Ruma / Zela Mbuma
- 93 Mai-Mai Mushombe
- 94 Mai-Mai Nyerere
- 95 RED-Tabara
- 96 Mai-Mai Rushaba
- 97 Mai-Mai René
- 98 Mai-Mai Réunion FPLC
- 99 Mai-Mai Ngalyabatu
- 100 Mai-Mai Mupekenya
- 101 Twigwaneho
- 102 AFP, aka Gutabara or Android
- 103 Gumino
- 104 Mai-Mai Mutetezi FPDC
- 105 Mai-Mai Bishake
- 106 Biloze Bishambuke
- 107 Mai-Mai Yakutumba
- 108 Mai-Mai Aochi
- 109 Mai-Mai Shoshi
- 110 Mai-Mai Apa na Pale
- 111 Mai-Mai Mulumba
- 112 Mai-Mai Alida
- 113 Mai-Mai Brown
- 122 Mai-Mai Mwenyemali

Armed Groups in Eastern




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Armed Groups

- 110 Mai-Mai Apa na Pale
- 114 PERCI Nyumbaisha
- 115 Mai-Mai Elements Katadaye
- 116 Mai-Mai Fimbo na Fimbo
- 117 PERCI John Majimbo
- 118 Groupe Mazout
- 119 PERCI Kaomba
- 120 PERCI Mpululu
- 121 Mai-Mai Éléments Mutono



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
KEY TRENDS IN ARMED (DE-)MOBILIZATION

A few developments stand out. There has been an uptick in regional involvement in the eastern Congo in recent years, in particular in hotspots such as the Hauts Plateaux of South Kivu, where Burundi and Rwanda continue to wage some of their power struggles – both internal to each country and between each other. Here, as in North Kivu, where Rwanda has intervened more forcefully to target Rwandan rebels since President Felix Tshisekedi came to power in January 2019, these regional dynamics compound local conflicts over [land and resources – mixed with political and customary power struggles](#).

While regional interference is less pronounced elsewhere, other factors have entrenched insecurity: in the *Grand Nord* area (Lubero and Beni territories), activities of around two dozen smaller armed groups have been compounded by the misguided international response to the 2018–20 Ebola outbreak, which through its profligacy and hiring of armed escorts inadvertently fueled violence. In the *Petit Nord* area (Masisi, Walikale and Rutshuru territories), the rise and fall of the Nduma Defense of Congo–Rénové (NDC-R) fostered numerous realignments of alliances among local armed groups, triggering violence. In Ituri, the *Coopérative pour le développement au Congo* (CODECO) armed group, which emerged in 2017, has undone years of precarious peace, raising fears that Ituri – which hosts 1.7 million displaced people alone – will slip back into protracted instability.

In general, however, it is perhaps more important to highlight the inertia of the conflict rather than to speak of new causes or triggers. Much of the violence in the eastern Congo is driven by the need of armed groups, most of whom have existed in their current or previous incarnations for many years, to survive by extracting resources and fighting for their turf. Outside interventions to disrupt this inertia have not been successful. President Tshisekedi has not focused much of his attention on conflict in the East, and political shadow-boxing between him and his coalition partner, former President Joseph Kabila, has stymied any impetus for reform in [the security sector](#). Meanwhile, the UN peacekeeping mission is being downsized and in the [absence of functioning demobilization programs](#), the surrender of dozens of armed groups over the past two years has had little impact.


Overall, [as we have argued](#) in previous years, the conflict continues to be characterized by its dramatic fragmentation and inertia. Many of the 120 or so armed groups have either existed themselves for many years or are splinter factions of other longstanding groups. This longevity pertains in particular to the largest groups and their leadership, many of whom have been involved in violence for decades. Leaders such as Amuri Yakutumba, Guidon Shimiray, Michel Rukunda, Janvier Karairi, and Katembo Kilalo, as well as all of the leaders of foreign armed groups, are longtime veterans of armed conflict.




SHADES OF PREDATION

Despite the fragmentation, some armed groups dominate the conflict. Four armed groups – the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the *Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda* (FDLR), the *Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain* (APCLS), and the NDC-R – along with the national army account for over a third of all incidents and half of all civilians killed. The ADF is a particular threat, responsible for more killings of civilians (37%) by far than any other armed group. In the meantime, other armed groups that had long formed nexuses of conflict, such as the Rwandan FDLR and the Burundian *Front national de libération* (FNL), have diminished somewhat in importance, although regular [incursions](#) by the Rwandan and Burundian armies have contributed to (counter-)mobilization by Congolese.

① Number of civilians killed by armed actors in the Kivus, by month, June 2017-October 2020




② Number of clashes between armed actors in the Kivus, by month, June 2017-October 2020







Killings, however, do not necessarily correlate with the amount or intensity of violent confrontation in between armed groups or between them and government forces. The tables above provide an overview of violent deaths (see *graph #1*) and armed clashes (see *graph #2*) that KST has recorded for the period of June 2017 to October 2020. Doing the same exercise for the same period, limited to Beni territory, we see that one single territory drives much of the overall trend across the Kivus in terms of violent deaths (see *graph #3*) but not necessarily when it comes to armed clashes (see *graph #4*).

③ Number of civilians killed by armed actors in Beni territory, by month, June 2017-October 2020



④ Number of clashes between armed actors in Beni territory, by month, June 2017-October 2020





However, if Beni is on paper the “deadliest” area in the Kivu provinces, a look at dynamics of violent taxation shows a different picture, with a high concentration in areas such as [Masisi](#) or [Kalehe](#) territories. This is also reflected by statistics concerning incidents other than killings and clashes. Going a step further, both the density of belligerents and the proportional areas under their influence is higher in Uvira, [Kalehe](#), [Shabunda](#), Masisi – confirming [trends dating to 2017](#).

The Kivu Security Tracker produces two graphic products: a map of armed groups and an online tracker of violence. Each of these provides a different way of portraying the conflict, each with its flaws. Mapping “zones of influence” tells us little about which groups commit the most violence, can exaggerate the importance of small groups that occupy large areas, and omits government security forces. In contrast, plotting incidents can lead to the omission of actors who do not commit abuses. Neither approach tells us much about the context of or the motives behind the violence.

Other challenges involve the tracking and identification of activities difficult to record by either mapping or tracking. A prime example here is taxation, nowadays the main source of income for a majority of belligerents in the eastern Congo. Most belligerents resort to [roadblocks](#), a long-standing feature of Central Africa’s political topography, and token (“*jeton*”) systems, poll taxes to extract revenue. These kinds of taxation form one of the most pervasive forms of violence against the rural population. Only a combination of mapping exercises, incident-plotting and other types of field-based political, economic and social analysis of conflict can bridge these gaps.

HOTSPOTS OF WARFARE

Specific hotspots of conflict and violence have also shaped mobilization patterns. Adding to the aforementioned case of Beni, [the NDC–R](#) has formed one such conflict nexus, attracting allies but also galvanizing rivals against its main opponent, the *Coalition des mouvements pour le changement du Congo* (CMC), and against the various Mazembe groups in South Lubero. The group’s implosion, which began in 2020 as it split and Congolese army support declined, may set off an opposite dynamic. In Ituri, which we include in this exercise for the first time, the [evolving Djugu crisis](#) gave birth in 2017 to a new, elusive belligerent known as CODECO, which is now disintegrating into various smaller factions. Lastly, in the first of four regional areas, the *Hauts Plateaux* of South Kivu, we observe a steep escalation of violence – which is not accompanied by a significant fragmentation: while conflict actors have multiplied to some extent, key protagonists also managed to gather belligerents into broader and seemingly – even if fairly decentralized – stable coalitions. The following sections take a look at four geographic hotspots of conflict from south to north.



Minembwe: At the crossroads of the local, national, and regional


Portrayed as a sudden crisis by most international media in late 2019, the war on the Hauts Plateaux of South Kivu has been in the making since at least 2015, as local [conflicts over customary power merged with regional power struggles](#), especially in the slipstream of Burundi's 2015 political crisis. Regional involvement, coupled with opportunism by politicians on all sides, fueled [renewed debate over the purported "balkanization"](#) of the Congo in late 2019, laying the groundwork for more violence throughout 2020. Yet despite the widespread framing of the crisis as either ethnic conflict among so-called autochthonous and allochthonous populations or foreign usurpation, the [underlying reasons for violence on the Hauts Plateaux are complex and diverse](#).

In most recent incarnation of violence, stakeholders from all ethnic communities can be found in equal measure amongst victims and instigators. While armed groups recruit along ethnic lines – the Gumino mobilizing among the [Banyamulenge](#), the [Mai-Mai Yakutumba](#) and the Biloze Bishambuke drawing on Bembe, Fuliuro and Nyindu support – this is a consequence, not a cause of conflict. As in [other places marked by contested authority](#), political and military leaders in the *Hauts Plateaux* build on ethnic framings and histories of belonging to rally populations and combatants. Explanations privileging an “ethnic grid become self-fulfilling prophecies,”¹ complicating our ability to unearth the multiple causes of conflict and violence.

A closer look at the *Haut Plateaux* reveals that intracommunity tensions are as common as intercommunity ones. Skirmishes occur between armed groups purportedly defending the same (Banyamulenge) community, such as between the *Twigwaneho* – now backed by renegade Colonel Michel Rukunda – and the *Gumino*, while succession conflicts within customary entities have pitted Fuliuro or Bembe against each other. Moreover, and despite high levels of insecurity, numerous places of cohabitation between Bembe, Fuliuro, Vira, Nyindu, Banyamulenge and Mbuti still exist – even though it has ended in specific localities. Complex coalitions, often based on the logic of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” have triggered a concatenation of alliances and contributed to [antagonizing and militarizing communities and their associated armed groups](#).

The military involvement of Rwanda and Burundi has complicated this further. As parts of the Burundian armed opposition chose Uvira and Fizi as rear bases for organizing resistance, they entered into alliances of convenience in the [sprawling landscape of armed groups in the Ruzizi Plain](#). At the same time, the Burundian army (and its *imbonerakure* proxy forces) intensified their incursions on Congolese soil, often working with militia in the Ruzizi Plain. [Rwanda then backed the anti-Bujumbura forces](#), such as *Résistance pour un état de droit* (RED)-*Tabara* or the now defunct *Forces républicaines du Burundi* (FOREBU), while Rwandan opposition actors such as the Rwandan National Congress (RNC)/P5 formation or the *Conseil national pour le renouveau et la démocratie* (CNRD) and its armed wing, the *Forces de libération nationale* (FLN), were suspected to have affinities with the government in Bujumbura.

¹ See Verweijen, Judith et al. (forthcoming): *Mayhem in the Mountains. How violent conflict on the Hauts Plateaux of Fizi, Uvira and Mwenga became intractable*. Insecure Livelihoods series, Governance in Conflict network, Ghent University.



The implosion of the NDC–Rénové

For the past five years, the security situation in large parts of Walikale, Masisi, Lubero and Rutshuru – where almost half of all KST-recorded incidents took place – depended on the evolution and expansion of the Nduma Defense of Congo–Rénové (NDC–R), the armed franchise that the self-styled general, Guidon Shimiray Mwissa, created when he defected from Sheka Ntabo Ntaberi's NDC militia in late 2014. [Between 2015 and mid-2020, the NDC–R emerged as the Kivus' largest armed group in terms of territorial influence](#), with a vast track record of [human rights violations](#).

It also constituted a [formidable threat to the weakened FDLR and most of the scattered Nyatura groups in Masisi and Rutshuru](#) (in particular Dominique Ndaruhutse's CMC, a fierce ally of the Rwandan rebels). Indirectly, military pressure by the NDC–R and the Congo's and Rwanda's armies contributed to the [assassination of the FDLR's historic commander](#), Sylvestre Mudacumura, as well as to the [definitive dislodging of the CNRD](#) toward South Kivu. Yet while Guidon Shimiray – a former army officer – is in several ways a product of the FARDC's politics of using certain armed groups as proxies against others, he and his group have increasingly become a liability for the army leadership and the Kinshasa government. In early July 2020, the [NDC–R's second-in-command announced the removal of Guidon Shimiray](#), leading to the breakdown of the strikingly well-organized group, followed by waves of internecine fighting throughout the rest of 2020.

While the removal of Guidon Shimiray neatly followed the playbook of Sheka's fall in 2014 – both faced an arrest warrant and UN sanctions – it resulted in neither his total isolation nor capture: while Sheka had lost literally all his troops in 2014 and surrendered to UN troops shortly after, Guidon retained control over significant numbers of his officers and troops. However, much of the broader alliance that Guidon had built quickly fell apart, leading to greater volatility. Some NDC–R allies dwindled into insignificance and the group's erstwhile enemies began second or even third lives, as reinvigorated *Mazembe* factions in South Lubero, or the FDLR, APCLS and CMC in Masisi and western Rutshuru illustrate. Meanwhile, a range of other small armed groups – some older ones joined by new groups made up of NDC–R members who did not align with either Guidon or Gilbert Bwira, his former deputy turned rival – are competing to fill the resulting power vacuum.

Beni: ADF, Ebola and other threats

When counted exclusively in recorded cases of violent death, Beni territory remains the most violent area of the eastern Congo. Since the beginning of the “Beni massacres” in 2014, the region has had little respite except for a lull between late 2016 and mid-2017. Most recently, after a [series of deadly attacks in late 2019](#), a resurgence of massacres and killings occurred throughout 2020. While media and local authorities attribute a majority of these events to the formerly Ugandan ADF rebellion, investigations into and prosecution of specific cases are rare. In the absence of seriously triangulated evidence, UN and academic specialists continue to caution that other armed groups also contribute to the violence, that the ADF has internal divisions, and that [connections to the Islamic State should not be exaggerated](#).




Nonetheless, the ADF remains the central prism through which we can analyze insecurity around Beni. In the early 1990s, in a bid to undermine his rival Yoweri Museveni, former President Mobutu Sese Seko offered the Semuliki valley as a rear base to the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) rebellion that later merged with another Ugandan group, the ADF, which had been born out of a dispute within Uganda's Muslim community. Over the years, the group tied itself increasingly into local socio-economic life, intermarriage became frequent and local trade flourished. This merger ended in 2007, when the NALU demobilized. The ADF subsequently radicalized, although it initially remained reclusive.

Mass violence began in response to operations launched against the group by the FARDC in January 2014. The ADF's links to local society – particularly among the Nande and a range of smaller communities such as the Vuba, Tangi and Pakombe – help explain some of this violence. Finding itself under FARDC and UN pressure, the ADF reacted with violence by massacring civilians, possibly as a means of retaliating against informers and to show the government's inability to protect the population. However, it was not alone. Quickly, ADF satellite groups (e.g. Feeza's "mobile group"), [other local militia and networks around former *Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie*–Kisangani/Mouvement de libération \(RCD–K/ML\) stalwarts \(some within, others outside the FARDC\) got involved](#). [Free-rider groups reproduced the ADF's tactics while Mai-Mai self-defense group mushroomed](#) to fight back against the killers, often called "égorgeurs" (throat-slitters). This proliferation of armed actors has made it difficult to properly attribute responsibility for attacks, while entrenching violence. There were half a dozen armed groups, including the ADF, in [our 2015 mapping](#), but by 2017 there were [over 15 in the same area](#), and we counted a similar number in 2020.

In addition to this violence, Beni and Lubero were the territories most affected by Congo's tenth and deadliest Ebola outbreak, which lasted from 2018 to 2020. While the virus killed almost 2,300 people, the *Riposte*, the humanitarian operation co-led by the Ministry of Health and the World Health Organization, was [attacked at least 231 times during this period](#). This was due, on the one hand, to deep-rooted suspicions of and defiance towards external intervention, but was also because of the *Riposte's* hiring of government security forces as well as armed groups, which made it a target.² Up to a dozen armed groups are directly linked to the ways in which the *Riposte* has been rolled out, how it has militarized healthcare in the *Grand Nord*, and how it has attracted armed groups. This violence involved networks made up of existing and newly emerging armed groups, urban brokers and *Riposte* members, and thrived on the perception of the *Riposte* as a mere business for Kinshasa-based and foreign elites and on its [dismantling of the existing Congolese health system](#).

² See Congo Research Group (forthcoming): *Rebels, Doctors and Merchants of Violence. How the fight against Ebola became part of the conflict in eastern DRC*. Center on International Cooperation, New York.




Beyond the Kivus: the situation in Ituri

Perhaps the largest uptick in violence since 2017 has taken place in Ituri Province. Rooted in historical conflict and deep-seated contestation over land, local power, and identity, Ituri was a major scene of armed struggle during the Congo wars, when powerful armed groups such as the [Union des patriotes congolais \(UPC\)](#), the [Front nationaliste et intégrationniste \(FNI\)](#) and the [Force des résistance patriotique de l'Ituri \(FRPI\)](#) confronted one another, spurred on by governments in Kigali, Kampala, and Kinshasa. While violence petered out in 2007, the underlying instability was never fully addressed, despite military intervention by the European Union, large amounts of humanitarian spending, and numerous prosecutions by the International Criminal Court. At the national and local levels, demobilization and reconciliation efforts remained incomplete, paving the way for [mobilization and a series of killings](#) beginning in late 2017. Even as the last of the Ituri's historical belligerents, the FRPI, was demobilizing, a [series of events triggered the emergence](#) of CODECO, a complex of loosely organized militia in the Djugu area.

Throughout 2018 and 2019, armed factions operating under the CODECO label went on a rampage across numerous Bahema chieftaincies and Walendu sectors, first concentrating on Djugu territory and slowly branching out to neighboring Mahagi. CODECO can trace its origins back several decades to an agricultural-religious collective led by Bernard Kakado, a local Lendu strongman and erstwhile supporter of the FRPI. Since early 2018, the label CODECO has become a trademark for a variety of Djugu groups that drew on unemployed youths and ex-combatants, many of whom are believed to hail from ex-FNI networks.

The movement initially chose to conceal its leadership and assume a low public profile, in contrast to many armed groups in the Congo but copying a strategy by belligerents in Beni and, to some extent, in the Kasai area during the 2017 crisis. Subsequent leaders Mambo Mukwake and Justin Ngudjolo, however, tried to form a more coherent movement, increasingly targeting FARDC units after a first wave of violence had focused almost exclusively on civilians. But owing to internal disagreements – and probably also outside manipulation – CODECO broke apart into around half a dozen identifiable factions, questioning each other's legitimacy and engaging in a reciprocal blame game of “press release”-type communiqués attributing responsibility for killings and attacks.

In late 2020, violence subsided to a certain degree as several CODECO factions engaged in negotiations with the army and the provincial government. Nonetheless, a serious peace process or demobilization effort has not started, and tensions remain high, as the September 2020 incursion of a CODECO faction into Bunia illustrated. In a similar fashion, the FRPI peace process – which is more advanced and has benefitted from significant government and MONUSCO backing – remains unfinished. While it has the potential to become a blueprint peace deal with strong engagement by various stakeholders, thorny questions around army integration and amnesty remain.



A BROADER LOOK AT INSECURITY

An exclusive focus on armed groups, however, would be misplaced. The Congolese army is perhaps the most important actor in the violence, based on its abuses, its complicity with some armed groups, or simply its inaction when faced with insecurity.³ While the army did carry out some large-scale operations in Beni (*Sukola I*), Ituri (*Zaruba*) and South Kivu (*Sukola II*), these were short-lived and triggered violent backlash. Beyond these brief bursts of activity, the army took largely a defensive posture. As in recent years, neither the Congolese government nor its battlefield rivals seem to have grandiose ambitions. This has led to the [perpetuation of what has been called “stable instability”](#).


[Given this somber outlook, the lack of a comprehensive vision to solve the crisis is worrisome](#). Partly due to infighting within the government coalition, security sector reforms have not advanced in 2019 and 2020.

There is, however, one particular but limited example of sustained foreign-backed reform efforts: Virunga National Park. The lessons are, however, ambiguous. Here, the targeting of armed groups with a well-equipped, foreign-trained military has helped protect wildlife, while the jobs generated by the park have helped reintegrate hundreds of ex-combatants into society. These operations, however, have at times [rankled the local population, resulting in human rights violations by park guards](#) and violent counterattacks by armed groups including the FDLR; in April 2020, 12 park guards were killed by an [armed group](#) near the park’s Rutshuru headquarters, in January 2021, another six were killed.

Any solution to the violence will require the creation of alternative livelihoods for the thousands of combatants in the eastern Congo through a demobilization program. There was some momentum in this direction during the early days of Tshisekedi’s presidency in 2019, when significant numbers of combatants in the Kivus and Kasais came forward to volunteer for demobilization, motivated by the promise for political change under the new president. Along with other factors, this led to a momentous drop in the number of armed groups active in the Kivus.

And yet this wave of surrenders has thus far not been followed by reviving the national demobilization program – [one of the eastern Congo’s biggest missed opportunities](#) in a long time. Combatants regrouped in the Kivus’ two main transit centers – Mubambiro in North Kivu and Nyamunyuni in South Kivu – ended up either being sent to the Kamina and Kitona FARDC bases for army integration, returning en *bloc* to their former fiefdoms, or defecting one-by-one to try to make a living in cities, often as motorcycle taxi drivers or security guards. Other armed groups or individual combatants did not even reach Mubambiro or Nyamunyuni but simply hid or sold their weapons and returned to civilian life. This kind of [self-demobilization has always been a widespread phenomenon](#), even if largely ignored by key donors. Toward the end of the year, in a bid to overcome the void left by the stalled third [national DDR program](#), donors and government institutions began discussing a new, decentralized, and community-centered approach.

3 UN Joint Human Rights Office (2020): Human rights violations documented in provinces affected by conflict. United Nations, Kinshasa.



These debates are ongoing, with numerous competing ministries and government agencies vying for funds, [complicating the process](#).

Finally, the main peace broker in the Congo, the UN peacekeeping mission (MONUSCO), finds itself on the margins of the conflict. [Today, in contrast to its critical role from 1999 to 2006, the mission is](#) politically marginalized and largely confined to providing military support to the government and reporting on human rights abuses. Within the security sector, its impact is largely limited to its deterrence effect, particularly in and around major urban centers. Despite the aggressive mandate under which its Force Intervention Brigade operates, MONUSCO has not been willing or able to carry out large-scale counterinsurgency operations.

CHANGES AND CONTINUITIES OF THE CONFLICT

As the eastern Congo completes a quarter century of conflict, armed mobilization is undergoing a calibration effect at multiple levels. Society has become increasingly militarized, with military elites deeply invested in the conflict and the economies that it produces. These economies are varied and often very sophisticated, ranging from poll taxes to roadblocks to the racketeering of palm oil, gold, and cacao. Meanwhile, the number of armed actors seems to be stabilizing, albeit at a very high level of fragmentation. Regional interference has decreased from its peak during the 1996-2003 and 2006-13 periods; while neighboring countries still intervene, they do so in order to maintain influence, not to foment secession or coups, and in much less obvious fashion.

Armed groups themselves display a great diversity of interests and objectives. While most of them still recruit along ethnic lines and have few ambitions to extend their influence outside their core zones of interest, they all articulate a variety of motivations for their actions, ranging from economic survival, to the pursuit of dignity and respect, to self-defense and ethnic antagonism. Some armed groups make a point of broadcasting themselves on social media, while others excel in camouflaging themselves and hiding their traces. This highlights the operational and political flexibility of conflict actors, but also stresses the dogged challenges ahead for President Tshisekedi's administration and its international and civil society partners.



METHODOLOGICAL NOTE

Mapping non-state armed groups is, like many other illicit phenomena, a sensitive task and will inevitably involve imprecisions. New armed groups pop up every month, and their deployments are in constant flux. Our aim is to stimulate a conversation about the complexity of the conflict and armed group activity in the eastern Congo. We welcome comments and criticism; indeed, this will help us improve the next, updated version.

This map is the result of extensive fieldwork conducted by a network of researchers based throughout eastern Congo, triangulated with the continuous mapping of violence by the Kivu Security Tracker team. Moreover, the map has benefited from several rounds of internal and external reviews by experts on conflict dynamics in this region.

The map depicts “areas of influence” rather than absolute control. While some armed groups exert effective control over an area, others may be able to exert substantial influence over larger zones but lack full control over those areas. Influence consists of the frequent deployment of troops and the ability to carry out significant attacks. Hence the size of an armed group’s area does not necessarily correspond to that group’s strength.

Moreover, we do not include all armed actors. The groups included in this mapping have the following qualities: a) they have a differentiated organizational structure and an identity, b) they seek to assert some form of control over a geographic area, c) they refer to some – genuine or pretended – ideology, and d) and they employ violence regularly as a technique of governance.

While banditry continues to thrive in parts of the Kivus, we do not consider such gangs armed groups. Nonetheless, we included actors ranging from micro-militias with no more than 20 combatants to large, sophisticated groups such as the FDLR.

For short biographies of each group, see annex below, for the interactive version of the 2020 map, visit the [Kivu Security Tracker website](#) or the interactive version of the 2020 map.



ANNEX: BIOGRAPHIES OF ARMED GROUPS

No.	NAME	BIOGRAPHY
1	Zaire-FPAC (Front populaire d'autodéfense en Ituri)	The Zaire-FPAC armed group is made of members of almost all communities in northern Ituri (Hema, Alur, Nyali, Mambisa, Ndo-Okebo) and emerged in response to the violence committed by CODECO. With its political branch, known as P5 (not to be confused with the Rwandan opposition), it aims to resist CODECO. Starting as a loosely defined self-defense militia, the group has become more formalized since mid-2020 and is suspected to be backed by key political leaders in Ituri.
2	CODECO-URDPC (Union des Révolutionnaires pour le Développement du Peuple Congolais)	The URDPC is the largest armed group to emerge from the CODECO militia's fragmentation following the killing of erstwhile leader Justin Ngudjolo in March 2020 by the FARDC. During this period CODECO split and transformed into several militias due to internal discord and the strategic ambition to evolve into new formations, escaping command responsibility and liability issues, but also to position themselves for negotiations with the government. Its key commanders are Songa Mbele, Désiré Londroma and Bassa Zukpa.
3	CODECO-FCBC (Forces contre la balkanisation du Congo)	The FCBC is an armed group that emerged from the CODECO militia's fragmentation following the killing of erstwhile leader Justin Ngudjolo in March 2020 by the FARDC. During this period CODECO split and transformed into several militias due to internal discord and the strategic ambition to evolve into new formations, escaping command responsibility and liability issues, but also to position themselves for negotiations with the government.
4	CODECO-BTD (Bon Temple de Dieu)	The BTD is an armed group that emerged from the CODECO militia's fragmentation following the killing of erstwhile leader Justin Ngudjolo in March 2020 by the FARDC. During this period CODECO split and transformed into several militias due to internal discord and the strategic ambition to evolve into new formations, escaping command responsibility and liability issues, but also to position themselves for negotiations with the government.
5	CODECO-ALC (Armée de Libération du Congo)	The ALC is an armed group that emerged from the CODECO militia's fragmentation following the killing of erstwhile leader Justin Ngudjolo in March 2020 by the FARDC. During this period CODECO split and transformed into several militias due to internal discord and the strategic ambition to evolve into new formations, escaping command responsibility and liability issues, but also to position themselves for negotiations with the Congolese government. Its key commander is Justin Gbesi aka "Le Petit Loup de la Montagne."
6	Chini Ya Kilima-FPIC (Front des Patriotes Intégrationnistes du Congo)	The FPIC is made up of mainly young Bira and said to have political demands as a result of having been omitted from the list of members of the current Bamanisa government. It also wants to reclaim the land occupied by Hema in Irumu territory.



No.	NAME	BIOGRAPHY
7	FRPI (Force de Résistance Patriotique de l'Ituri)	The FRPI, made up of Lendu Bindi youths, is an armed group in Ituri. Created in 2002 as a result of community conflicts between the Hema herding people and the Lendu farming people, it claims to defend the community interests of the Lendu. Several negotiations between the central government and the FRPI have failed, but a new disarmament process is currently underway, although it remains marred by tensions between the FRPI and FARDC.
8	Mai-Mai Alaise	This Mai-Mai group is led by “Alaise,” a poacher with origins in Kisan-gani. Created in 2017, it engages in taxation and pillages near mines and parks and is close to several Simba factions.
9	Mai-Mai Simba Mangalibi	Since independence in 1960, Mai-Mai Simba has been used an umbrella term for nationalist armed groups. Different groups, linked by little more than a vague reminiscence of Mulelist Mai-Mai ideology that challenged the central government in the 1960s, claim this denomination today. By 2020, at least three geographically discernible groups used the “Simba” label: in Bafwasende territory, in Tshopo Province, led by the successors of Paul Sadala (aka “Morgan”), who are known as Manu and Mangalibi; in Walikale territory, North Kivu Province, led by Luc Yabili; and in Maniema, led by General Mando Mazeri (the so-called Forces Divines Simba). While Morgan’s group has become infamous for poaching and killing okapis, Mando is one of the few active militia leaders in Congo with direct connections to the Simba mobilization in the 1960s. Mangalibi is a younger brother to Sadala Morgan and Manu.
10	Mai-Mai Kyandenga MNLDK (Mouvement National pour la Libération Durable du Kongo)	Kambale Kyandenga used to be a fisherman in Kyavinyonge. In 2002, legend says, he reeled in a package that contained a flower, a diamond, a stick, a dollar bill, a Bible and a Koran. This reportedly gave him customary powers and attracted other group leaders, including Fabien Mudoghu. Later, his acquaintance with Kilalo Katembo of the ULPC helped him become a traditional doctor with the Mai-Mai Simba branch of Paul Sadala (aka Morgan). In 2011, he joined the FOLC (Front Œcuménique pour la Libération du Congo) armed group of Kava wa Seli (a former APC officer) in Beni territory. After Kilalo left Morgan’s group in Ituri Province to return to the Butembo area and set up his own Mai-Mai group, Kyandenga joined him and was tasked with developing an ULPC faction near Beni. He collaborated with a priest known as Bernard to recruit local youth west of Mbau. This group of around 300 combatants claims to protect the local population and their land. Kyandenga also collaborated with other Mai-Mai groups in Beni-Lubero as a witch doctor, before creating his own group, the MNLDK (Mouvement National pour la Libération Durable du Kongo), in 2019, after his escape from the military prosecutor’s cell in Beni, in November 2018. The current MNLDK headquarters is located in the Otomabere area, in Ituri. Since June 2020 the MNLDK has deployed in different localities of Beni territory, in North Kivu Province, including in the form of allies acting independently.

No.	NAME	BIOGRAPHY
		These include Matabishi Jackson alias Prof with his “Shingo Pamba” group in Mabalako area; “Mille Tours”-RNL based in Vihya/Vurondo; and the Mai-Mai Mandefu under “Drago” in Mughulungu, Bashu chiefdom.
11	Mai-Mai Barcelone	Led by Mumbere Baraka Lolwako, son of Lolwako Pokopoko, this group emerged 2019 in northern Beni. Baraka was one of the leaders of Mai-Mai Corps de Christ in 2016 and 2017.
12	ADF	The ADF are an armed group that originally emerged in opposition to the Ugandan government before transforming into an Islamist, Congo-based movement after the merger of the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) and the ADF under the leadership of Jamil Mukulu. Over the past 15 years, its main camps have been in the Rwenzori Mountains and Semuliki Valley in Beni territory. The ADF is a secretive organization with strict internal discipline. It has strong historical ties to other armed groups in the area, including those led by former members of Mbusa Nyamwisi’s Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-Kisangani/Mouvement de libération (RCD-K/ML) and local customary chiefs, including those of the Vuba and Pakombe communities. In 2014, the FARDC launched the Sukola I operation against the ADF, leading to the destruction of many of its camps and the deaths of hundreds of its combatants and dependents. In 2015, its leader Jamil Mukulu was arrested in Tanzania and extradited to Uganda, leaving the group under the command of Seka Musa Baluku. While the group has not suffered substantial splits, its units operate largely independently across a large area. The group has been involved in many of the massacres around Beni since late 2013, often in collaboration with local armed groups and members of the FARDC. Their current strength and structure are unclear.
13	FLEC/NG (Front de Libération à L’Est du Congo/Nouvelle Génération)	The FLEC/NG is a small UPLC-allied militia in the Beni area, led by a commander known as Lwanga.
14	Mai-Mai Ngolenge	The Ngolenge are a small UPLC-allied militia in the Beni area, led by Burairi, a former commander of Jackson’s Mai-Mai group.
15	Mai-Mai Uhuru OAPB (Organisation d’Autodéfense pour la Paix à Beni)	The OAPB is a group of young Mai-Mai from Oicha and its surroundings, who claim to defend populations against the massacres in the Beni area. Their main target is the ADF and they claim to have 300 elements, led by Commander Kasereka Muhasa Uhuru.
16	Mai-Mai Shingo-Pamba	On 3 September 2020, Mai-Mai commander Matabishi Kakuhi Jackson alias Prof Kitwa declared that he had left the Kyandenga group (MNLDK) to form his own, Shingo-Pamba. It set up its headquarters in Mabalako and Malekesa (12 km west of Cantine and Aloya), on the border between Beni and Lubero territories. Matabishi Prof and his approximately 70 combatants are accused of several attacks against the Ebola Riposte in Beni area.



No.	NAME	BIOGRAPHY
17	Mai-Mai Mandefu	Mai-Mai Mandefu are based northeast of Mabalako. Rooted in earlier mobilization including the RNL of Lolwako Pokopoko in the 1990s, this group emerged 2019 under the leadership of Nzirunga and Aminata, formerly in the UPLC. Nzirunga is from the same family as Fabien Mudoghu, who led the Mai-Mai Front de Résistance Populaire de Lubwe-Rwenzori (FRPL-R). in the 2000s. Under pressure from the FARDC, the group has recently moved its bases away from Mabalako, Drago “Ougandais” being a key commander.
18	Mazembe-APASIKO (Alliance des Patriotes pour le Salut Intégral du Kongo)	The Mazembe-APASIKO are a group that recruits mainly from Lubero territory and is now based in Mamingi, west of Kalunguta. The leader of the group is David Kiboko, grandchild of Fabien Mudoghu, the former leader of the Front de Résistance Populaire de Lubwe-Rwenzori (FRPL-R). He was trained by Kyandenga. Kiboko was a customary official from 2003 and 2012 before joining Jules Vwiranda in the Mai-Mai Kasithu. After Vwiranda’s death he created this new group with Kishya in 2019. The APASIKO have around 120 elements, some of which are former Mai-Mai Nzirunga who emerged from the erstwhile Kasindiens. Alphonse Nzirunga is a former combatant of Fabien Mudoghu’s. In September 2016, his former movement, Mai-Mai Nzirunga, allied with Mai-Mai Corps du Christ and deployed to Kabasha, before moving to Kalau (east of Beni) and Nzirunga’s native Bashu chiefdom. Since June 2017, Mai-Mai Nzirunga has been based near Kyavinyonge and operating relatively independently from other armed groups, despite earlier collaboration with the ex-Mai-Mai Muhima and a Mai-Mai group led by Jackson Muhukambuto. Some Mai-Mai Nzirunga combatants have recently called themselves Mai-Mai Malaika (“angel” in Swahili); until 2020 Nzirunga himself led the Mai-Mai Mandefu group. They are not linked to the Mai-Mai Malaika led by She Assani in Fizi and Shabunda territories.
19	Mai-Mai Léopards	The first Léopards group was created in Muhola (30 km west of Butembo) in 2016 and was led by Kakule Endaniluhi. It claims to fight against the Kabila government and Rwandan infiltration. It moved from Muhola Mountain to the Graben in August 2017. Another group emerged under Muthundo, a former member of the Mazembe movement, who had been arrested and detained in Beni Prison. After he escaped during the Kangbayi prison break in June 2017, he joined Nzirunga’s Mai-Mai group and began operating in Kanyihunga. In September 2017, he separated from Nzirunga and began calling his group of around 40 combatants Mai-Mai Léopards, similar to Endaniluhi’s Mai-Mai group based nearby. Since 2019, a new Léopards faction has emerged under commanders Mutsuva Kikongo and Fabrice.
20	Mai-Mai UPLC (Union des Patriotes pour la Libération du Congo)	Founded by veteran rebels Katembo Kilalo and Mambari Bini Pélé (alias Saperita), the Union des patriotes pour la libération du Congo (ULPC) is a Mai-Mai group in Beni territory. Kilalo is a former combatant and healer in Lafontaine’s and Paul Sadala’s armed groups, while Saperita has been a member of local militia groups as well as an FARDC officer.

No.	NAME	BIOGRAPHY
		Since its creation in 2016, under Kakolele's influence, the group has forged short-lived coalitions with Mazembe factions in Lubero territory and claims to defend the Nande against ADF attacks. Upon its creation, it was composed of the Mai-Mai Kilalo (Kilalo, Mayani, Kyandenga), who organized the attack on Goma airport in July 2015; the FAP, which Kakule Liso had created in Oicha after having been trained with Lafontaine, Corps de Christ, and the OAPB of Uhuru, which Kilalo asked to remain deployed in Oicha, and others. The MNR of John Mahangaiko Apipawe and Olivier Balembe, functions as a communication cell of the UPLC, Kilalo is the key doctor of the group; Saperita and Mayani the military instructors. In December 2016, the ULPC attacked MONUSCO in Butembo and killed a peacekeeper. In 2017, the UPLC reportedly participated in attacks around Beni town, probably together with other Mai-Mai groups. A group called Mouvement national des révolutionnaires (MNR) claimed responsibility for attacks around Beni in mid-2017 but this name appears to have been propagated only on social media and is not recognized by either the ULPC or other Mai-Mai. The UPLC is now based in Kalunguta (Beni-Butembo road), after having been based in Kipese since 2016. Since 2018, several commanders have defected, including current armed group leaders Jean-Baptiste Kyandenga, Matabishi Jackson, Saperita Kitelemire (who left the group 2019 to come back in 2020), Mille Tours, and Drago. Some of them have remained staunch allies. Since 2019, the core UPLC group was led by Kakule Liso (coordinator) and Kambale Mayani (commander) and is in the process of joining the army but continues to recruit. In late 2020, Liso was kicked out of the group and was killed by mob justice a few months later.
21	APRC (Armée du Peuple pour la Reconstruction du Congo)	The APRC is a small UPLC-allied militia in the Beni area, led by Kambale Defao.
22	Mai-Mai Ninja	The Mai-Mai Ninja are a small UPLC-allied militia in the Beni area, led by Kambale Aziza.
23	FAP (Force d'Autodéfense Populaire)	The FAP is a small UPLC-allied militia in the Beni area, led by Kasereka Ngesera.
24	APR (Armée patriotique de Ruwenzori)	The APR is a small UPLC-allied militia in the Beni area, led by Meso.
25	RNL (Résistance Nationale Lumumbiste aka « Mille tours par seconde »)	With roots in the former Mai-Mai Vurondo and the more recent Corps de Christ group, the RNL Mille tours par seconde is a newly established Mai-Mai faction based near Butembo and allied with the Kyandenga group. The Corps du Christ armed group was created in 2016 amidst a new wave of armed mobilization around Butembo in response to massacres in Beni territory. Claiming the name of a long-standing Christian sect based around Mont Carmel, this Mai-Mai group formed under the leadership of David Maranatha. In October 2016, his group marched into Butembo, where it deman-



No.	NAME	BIOGRAPHY
		-ded vehicles to take them to Beni to defend the population against massacres. The group attracted considerable attention among several Mai-Mai commanders who then joined the movement, including Baraka Lolwako Mumbere, son of the historic Mai-Mai leader Lolwako Pokopoko. The Corps du Christ clashed on several occasions with the FARDC, including in Butembo in December 2016. In January 2017, Kakolele Bwambale – a former leader of Mbusa’s RCD-K/ML and army commander under UN sanctions – declared himself the leader of the group on Voice of America. By mid-2017, the Corps du Christ had been pushed back to remote areas in Bashu and Rwenzori chiefdoms.
26	Mai-Mai Simba UPLD (Union des Patriotes pour la Libération et le Développement)	Since independence in 1960, Mai-Mai Simba has been used an umbrella term for nationalist armed groups. Different groups, linked by little more than a vague reminiscence of Mulelist Mai-Mai ideology that challenged the central government in the 1960s, claim this denomination today. By 2017, at least three geographically discernible groups used the “Simba” label: in Bafwasende territory, in Tshopo Province, led by the successors of Paul Sadala (aka “Morgan”), who are known as Manu and Mangalibi; in Walikale territory, North Kivu Province, led by Luc Yabili; and in Maniema, led by General Mando Mazeri (the so-called Forces Divines Simba). While Morgan’s group has become infamous for poaching and the killing of okapis, Mando is one of the few active militia leaders in Congo with direct connections to the Simba mobilization in the 1960s. The UPLD wing was created by General Michigan in the Tshopo area in order fight the ICCN in Maiko and Epulu. After Michigan’s death, Luc Yabili took over and the group began operating in Bapere, Lubero territory, and Walikale as well.
27	Mai-Mai Simba FDS (Forces Divines Simba)	Since independence in 1960, Mai-Mai Simba has been used an umbrella term for nationalist armed groups. Different groups, linked by little more than a vague reminiscence of Mulelist Mai-Mai ideology that challenged the central government in the 1960s, claim this denomination today. By 2017, at least three geographically discernible groups used the “Simba” label: in Bafwasende territory, in Tshopo Province, led by the successors of Paul Sadala (aka “Morgan”), who are known as Manu and Mangalibi; in Walikale territory, North Kivu Province, led by Luc Yabili; and in Maniema, led by General Mando Mazeri (the so-called Forces Divines Simba). This group is based around Maiko National Park, Maniema and North Kivu, and is led by General Mando Mazeri. He is one of the few active militia leaders in Congo with direct connections to the Simba mobilization in the 1960s.

No.	NAME	BIOGRAPHY
28	Mai-Mai Kabidon FPP/AP (Front Populaire pour la Paix Armée du Peuple)	The FPP/AP is a spin-off Mazembe faction that left the UPDI-Mazembe after the NDC-Renové tried to incorporate the entire Mazembe movement. It is the Mazembe wing favorable towards former Mai-Mai leader Lafontaine. The FPP/AP is led by ex-Lafontaine commanders Kabidon Kasyano and Freddy. It recruits from former Mai-Mai groups including the UPCP, Vivuya and several other Mazembe factions, and entertains links with the UPLC. As of 2020, it has become one of the most powerful armed groups in South Lubero.
29	NDC-R/Guidon (Nduma Defense of Congo–Rénové, Guidon wing)	Created by Sheka Ntabo Ntaberi, a former mineral trader in Walikale territory, Nduma Defense of Congo was one of the main Mai-Mai groups to emerge from the Nyanga community in recent years. Though its stated objectives include greater development and better working conditions for artisanal miners, Sheka's group has become notorious for serious human rights violations. It was initially based around the mining area of Bisie in central Walikale territory but quickly gravitated eastward, establishing its stronghold near Pinga, bordering Masisi territory. The NDC-R was created by Guidon Shimiray Mwissa in 2015. After consolidating power around Sheka's former strongholds in northeastern Walikale territory, Guidon's faction began attacking the FDLR and managed to gain control over numerous mining sites. In coalition with various Nande and Kobo militias under the umbrella term Mai-Mai Mazembe, including the now defunct <i>Union des patriotes pour la défense des innocents</i> (UPDI), Guidon pushed the FDLR out of most of northeastern Walikale. Most of these alliances fizzled out by mid-2017, leading to regular skirmishes between Guidon's troops and various Mazembe factions in southwestern Lubero territory. Throughout 2016, Guidon has expanded his zone of influence into southern Lubero where his group became involved in the lucrative gold trade in areas previously controlled by the FDLR and Lafontaine's <i>Union des patriotes congolais pour la paix</i> (UPCP). The NDC-R is known for extortive taxation practices and extensive recruitment of children, and has repeatedly been accused of receiving FARDC support in its military campaigns. Having tried in late 2019 to establish a larger coalition of armed groups called the <i>Réseau des Patriotes Résistants Congolais</i> (RPRC), the NDC-R split in July 2020 as Gilbert Bwira and Mapenzi Likuhe took over from Guidon. Ever since, Guidon's wing has retreated to the NDC-R's Walikale home turf and continues to clash with Bwira and the FARDC.
30	Mai-Mai Jackson FMP (Front des mouvements populaires)	In 2020, Jackson Muhukambuto, a long-time rebel and former FARDC commander, created a new militia in northern Rutshuru and southern Lubero. Having joined and left the army multiple times, Jackson has strong networks in the military and among Nande armed entrepreneurs. He previously worked with the Mai-Mai Charles Bokande and Shetani but also collaborated with the army to fight the FDLR.



No.	NAME	BIOGRAPHY
31	NDC-R/Bwira (Nduma Defense of Congo—Rénové, Bwira wing)	Created by Sheka Ntabo Ntaberi, a former mineral trader in Walikale territory, Nduma Defense of Congo was one of the main Mai-Mai groups to emerge from the Nyanga community in recent years. Though its stated objectives include greater development and better working conditions for artisanal miners, Sheka's group has become notorious for serious human rights violations. It was initially based around the mining area of Bisie in central Walikale territory but quickly gravitated eastward, establishing its stronghold near Pinga, bordering Masisi territory. The NDC-R was created by Guidon Shimiray Mwissa in 2015. After consolidating power around Sheka's former strongholds in northeastern Walikale territory, Guidon's faction began attacking the FDLR and managed to gain control over numerous mining sites. In coalition with various Nande and Kobo militias under the umbrella term Mai-Mai Mazembe, including the now defunct <i>Union des patriotes pour la défense des innocents</i> (UPDI), Guidon pushed the FDLR out of most of northeastern Walikale. Most of these alliances fizzled out by mid-2017, leading to regular skirmishes between Guidon's troops and various Mazembe factions in southwestern Lubero territory. Since 2016, Guidon has expanded his zone of influence into southern Lubero where his group became involved in the lucrative gold trade in areas previously controlled by the FDLR and Lafontaine's <i>Union des patriotes congolais pour la paix</i> (UPCP). The NDC-R is known for its extortive taxation practices and extensive recruitment of children, and has repeatedly been accused of receiving FARDC support in its military campaigns. In July 2020, Gilbert Bwira, the NDC-R's deputy commander, split from Guidon, creating its own wing, much of which immediately demobilized and regrouped in Rumangabo's army base. Led by Bwira and Mapenzi, the remaining group operates mostly in northern Masisi and engages in regular operations against the Guidon faction, alongside the FARDC.
32	MAC, ex-Guides (Mouvement d'Action pour Changement)	The initial name of this group (Guides) stems from the role its fighters played as trackers for Rwandan and Congolese troops in their 2011 offensive against the FDLR. It then transformed into an armed group of its own, taking the name Forces de défense du Congo (FDC), led by Butu Luanda, Charles Mbura, and another commander known as Madragul. They operated with relatively few combatants from the Tembo and Hunde communities and were initially based between Masisi and Walikale territories. Around 2013, some of the Guides fighters split from the FDC in order to form the Mouvement acquis au changement (Guides-MAC) under the leadership of Mbura, allegedly after a row over Luanda's cooperation with Bosco Ntaganda's M23 faction. While the FDC-Guides have disappeared, Mbura's MAC is still operating in the Walowa-Yungu area.
33	Mai-Mai Kifuafua	The Mai-Mai Kifuafua are one of the longest-standing Congolese armed groups. Set up in 2002 by self-proclaimed general Delphin Mbaenda, this group has roots in the various 1990s Tembo community armed movements. His older brother, Damiano Mbaenda, was one of the first Tembo armed group commanders, probably beginning his career around 1993.

No.	NAME	BIOGRAPHY
		Delphin Mbaenda inherited his brother's group, traditionally based in southern Masisi and Walikale between the villages of Hombo, Busurungi, and Remeka. Despite numerous internal disputes – which produced factions with leaders known as Shalio, Maachano and Limenzi Baeni – and subsequent reunifications, Delphin Mbaenda has managed to keep his group together thanks to an efficient taxation system and a reluctance to fight stronger actors, such as the FARDC, FDLR or CNDP. By 2020, Delphin Mbaenda and his allies controlled large swaths of territory in the Waloa-Loanda and Ufamando groupements in southern Walikale and Masisi territories. The group is estimated to have around 300 fighters. Its units collaborate with customary authorities and state police in their area of influence.
34	AFRC (Alliance des Forces de Résistance Congolaise)	Charles Bokande emerged as an important armed actor in northern Rutshuru territory in 2014, drawing support and recruits from the Nande community. A former combatant of Mai-Mai Jackson and later of Mai-Mai Shetani-FPC of Kakule Muhima, Charles developed efficient extortion rackets along the southern shore of Lake Edward, taxing the lucrative fishing camps. His influence extended to Nyamilima and the Ishasha border post with Uganda. Under Charles, the group is also known as <i>Alliance des forces armées de résistants patriotes Mai-Mai</i> (AFARPM). While Charles claims to protect Rutshuru's Nande population from Rwandophone armed groups, the FARDC, and rangers from Virunga National Park, the group has also frequently engaged in kidnapping and illegal cross-border trade. After Bokande's death, the AFARPM was led by "Je t'aime" before splitting into the AFRC under Karuho and smaller factions.
35	Nyatuta FPDH (Force de Défense du Peuple Hutu)	Hutu ex-NDC-R combatants led by commanders Sore and India regrouped in mid-2020 in Rumangabo to form the FPDH, which fights other Hutu armed groups, notably the CMC.
36	Amka Jeshi	Amka Jeshi emerged in May 2020 from a Kiwanja-based group of young Nande led by Kasereka Celestin. It claims to defend the Nande in northern Rutshuru against the FDLR and Nyatuta and cooperates with the FARDC, running patrols around Kiwanja.
37	Nyatuta CMC (Collectif des Mouvements pour le Changement)	Numerous Nyatuta factions operate in Masisi and Rutshuru. While the term Nyatuta (Kinyarwanda for "those who hit hard") emerged in association with armed mobilization in the Congolese Hutu community around 2011, Nyatuta groups have their roots in the armed mobilization of the early 1990s, including the <i>Mutuelle agricole des Virunga</i> (MAGRIVI) combatants, the Mongols and later the Hutu branch of the <i>Patriotes résistants congolais</i> (PARECO). Most Nyatuta groups claim to protect the Congolese Hutu population from Mai-Mai or the Congolese army. While many Nyatuta groups operate independently, some have entered into coalitions brokered by politicians or the FDLR. In late 2020, over ten Nyatuta factions were active. Some Nyatuta groups are also part of broader, though ill-defined, coalitions including the <i>Alliance des Patriotes pour la restauration de la démocratie au Congo</i> (APRDC), led by



No.	NAME	BIOGRAPHY
		lawyer Benjamin Ndikuyeze, and the <i>Coalition des mouvements pour le changement</i> (CMC), led by Dominique Ndaruhutse and Jean-Claude Habyarimana, alias Jules Mulumba. Both umbrella movements are suspected to have emerged under the influence of FDLR leaders. The CMC emerged between 2013 and 2014 after tensions between Nyatura factions led by Muchoma and Bapfakururimi, both of whom later demobilized. Domi's zone of influence is in Bukombo <i>groupe-ment</i>, in the southern Bwito chiefdom of Rutshuru territory. Domi commands a number of satellite groups, including the ex-John Love and Niyonzimana factions in Rutshuru.
38	FDLR-FOCA (Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda-Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi)	The FDLR was created in 2000 when ALiR I and II – the rebellions of troops belonging to the defeated, pre-genocide Rwandan army and various affiliated militia – merged. The impetus for the rebranding was to cast aside their association with the genocide, in which some of its leaders had been implicated. The FDLR is the political wing of the organization; the armed wing is the <i>Forces combattantes Abacunguzi</i> (FOCA). Reaching the peak of its military and economic strength in the early 2000s, the FDLR began to suffer defections, with the RUD-Urunana and the FDLR-Soki splitting off. This was followed by a series of anti-FDLR military operations conducted by the Congolese army, called <i>Umoja Wetu</i> and <i>Amani Leo</i>, although these were often hampered by FDLR-FARDC collusion. While the core leadership around the group's military commander Lieutenant-General Sylvestre Mudacumura – who has been sought on an arrest warrant by the International Criminal Court since 2012 for alleged war crimes committed in the eastern Congo – and the group's political leader Major-General Victor Byiringiro, remains intact, the FDLR lost many of its senior commanders through a series of surrenders, captures and killings. In 2016, the FDLR's most important internal split led to the creation of another breakaway faction, the CNRD-<i>Ubwiyunge</i>. Since then, the FDLR's activities have largely been limited to western Rutshuru and northern Masisi territories. While the FDLR was estimated to have around 6,500 fighters in 2008, the group's strength in 2020 was estimated to be between 500 and 1,000 fighters. The group has also lost control over most of the territory and mining areas it previously controlled. A shortage of ammunition constrains the FDLR's operational capacity. Following military pressure from the NDC-R and the FARDC, as well as the death of Mudacumura, the FDLR's strength has further diminished. In 2020, the group was led by Omega and Gaby Ruhinda and benefitted from the NDC-R split, slowly re-establishing itself in the Bwito area with the help of its main ally, the CMC.
39	M23 (Mouvement du 23 Mars)	Emanating from a long tradition of Rwandan-backed rebellions in the eastern Congo, including the RCD-Goma and the CNDP, the M23 emerged in early 2012 under the leadership of Sultani Makenga and Bosco Ntaganda. While it quickly acquired a significant fighting force, leading to its historic occupation of Goma in November 2012, the M23 was riven by internal fissures from the beginning and never managed to develop the strength of Laurent Nkunda's CNDP.

No.	NAME	BIOGRAPHY
		Following regional diplomacy and significant international pressure, the M23 left Goma after around two weeks and participated in peace talks in Kampala with the Congolese government. It split into two factions in February 2013, led respectively by Bosco Ntaganda and Sultani Makenga. With Ntaganda's group fleeing to Rwanda in March 2013, Makenga's bloc faced increasing pressure from the FARDC's commando battalions and an aggressive UN intervention brigade, eventually leading to its demise in November 2013. In early 2017, parts of the former M23 attempted a short-lived revival in Rutshuru territory. There were occasional reports of ex-M23 activity in Rutshuru and Masisi territories, but in 2020 the movement was limited to small patches around Mikenko.
40	Rassemblement Unité et Démocratie (RUD)-Urunana	The RUD-Urunana is a splinter faction of the FDLR-FOCA that emerged in 2007 following a leadership quarrel, allegedly over distribution of funds. With a few hundred combatants, Jean-Damascène Ndibabaje, aka Musare, defected to create the RUD-Urunana, which has since been active in the northern parts of Bwisha and Bwito chiefdoms in Rutshuru territory. While the RUD's military influence has gradually declined in recent years, the group has allegedly collaborated with different armed groups including the FDLR-FOCA and Congolese Hutu militias, including several operating under the Nyatura umbrella, during joint military operations and attacks on civilians. In February 2016, its leader, Musare, was killed in mysterious circumstances. Local sources allege his murder was linked to the growing rift between Hutu and Nande-based armed groups. The group still exists but its strength is marginal compared to the large areas in which it operates. In 2019, Musare's successor Jean-Michel Africa was killed in a joint FARDC/RDF raid in response to the RUD's incursion into Rwanda and its links to other Rwandan rebellions such as the RNC and FLN.
41	Nyatura Turarambiwe (Rutshuru)	Numerous Nyatura factions operate in Masisi and Rutshuru. While the term Nyatura (Kinyarwanda for "those who hit hard") emerged in association with armed mobilization in the Congolese Hutu community around 2011, Nyatura groups have their roots in the armed mobilization of the early 1990s, including the <i>Mutuelle agricole des Virunga</i> (MAGRIVI) combatants, the Mongols and later the Hutu branch of the <i>Patriotes résistants congolais</i> (PARECO). Most Nyatura groups claim to protect the Congolese Hutu population from Mai-Mai or the Congolese army. The Nyatura Turarambiwe (Kinyarwanda for "we are tired") is a Bwisha-based CMC spin-off that was initially led by "Col." Niyonzima. Not to be confused with the former Nyatura Bohoza in Masisi (a loose group that recruited from Chief Apollo's "<i>anciens ouvriers</i>" who occasionally used the slogan "<i>turarambiwe</i>") or the former Bwito-based Nyatura Turarambiwe of "Col." Bigabo (close to the APRDC and Musheku), the Bwisha-based Turarambiwe operate around the Rugari and Mikenko areas. While Niyonzima returned to the CMC, the commanders Mamba Baziyaka (anti-M23) and Bosse Mbarushimana (pro-M23) took over but split over divergent views on whether to work with M23.



No.	NAME	BIOGRAPHY
42	APCLS (Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain)	Created in 2010 out of one of the three wings of the <i>Patriotes résistants congolais</i> (PARECO), the APCLS has emerged as one of the main Mai-Mai groups in the eastern Congo. Under the command of self-proclaimed general Janvier Karairi, the APCLS maintains strongholds in northwestern Masisi territory, projecting its influence toward Kitchanga and Masisi town. Claiming to defend the interests of the Hunde population, the APCLS has engaged in a wide range of (often short-lived) alliances and confrontations with other armed actors in the area. The NDC-Sheka and M23 are the APCLS's principal enemies, while relations with the FARDC and various Nyatura groups have been unstable. The APCLS has maintained cordial relations with the FDLR over many years. The group has demonstrated significant resilience, even if its sphere of influence and troop numbers have fluctuated considerably. In 2019, a major split in the APCLS resulted in Mapenzi Likuhe defecting to the NDC-R, one of the APCLS's key enemies. With the disintegration of the NDC-R in mid-2020, the APCLS is slowly reasserting itself in parts of Masisi under Janvier Karairi, as well as a smaller independent faction led by "Col." Kambuzi at the interstices of Masisi and Walikale.
43	Nyatura FPPH (Forces pour la Protection du Peuple Hutu)	Numerous Nyatura factions operate in Masisi and Rutshuru. While the term Nyatura (Kinyarwanda for "those who hit hard") emerged in association with armed mobilization in the Congolese Hutu community around 2011, Nyatura groups have their roots in the armed mobilization of the early 1990s, including the <i>Mutuelle agricole des Virunga</i> (MAGRIVI) combatants, the Mongols and later the Hutu branch of the <i>Patriotes résistants congolais</i> (PARECO). The FPPH are made up of remnants of former Nyatura groups and the FDLR's ex-spin-off led by Soki (killed by M23) and Kasongo until around 2016. Operating mainly in Binza, Rutshuru, the FPPH engages in kidnapping and taxation.
44	Nyatura GAV (Groupe armé les volontaires)	Numerous Nyatura factions operate in Masisi and Rutshuru. While the term Nyatura (Kinyarwanda for "those who hit hard") emerged in association with armed mobilization in the Congolese Hutu community around 2011, Nyatura groups have their roots in the armed mobilization of the early 1990s, including the <i>Mutuelle agricole des Virunga</i> (MAGRIVI) combatants, the Mongols and later the Hutu branch of the <i>Patriotes résistants congolais</i> (PARECO). Most Nyatura groups claim to protect the Congolese Hutu population from Mai-Mai or the Congolese army. The Volontaires are composed of former Nyatura <i>Mouvement des résidents congolais pour un changement vital</i> (MRCCV) and <i>Force populaire pour l'unité des communautés congolaises</i> (FPUCC) combatants, as well as former elements of "Col." Kigingi. Similar to the neighboring Delta, the Volontaires are very decentralized but operate mostly in the Kibabi area near Rubaya.
45	Nyatura APRDC (Alliance des Patriotes pour la Restauration de la Démocratie au Congo, APRDC, now Abazungu)	Numerous Nyatura factions operate in Masisi and Rutshuru. While the term Nyatura (Kinyarwanda for "those who hit hard") emerged in association with armed mobilization in the Congolese Hutu community around 2011, Nyatura groups have their roots in the armed

No.	NAME	BIOGRAPHY
		mobilization of the early 1990s, including the <i>Mutuelle agricole des Virunga</i> (MAGRIVI) combatants, the Mongols and later the Hutu branch of the <i>Patriotes résistants congolais</i> (PARECO). Most Nyatura groups claim to protect the Congolese Hutu population from Mai-Mai or the Congolese army. While many Nyatura operate independently, some entered into coalitions brokered by politicians or the FDLR or negotiated locally. In 2020, over ten Nyatura factions were active. Some Nyatura groups are also part of broader, though ill-defined, coalitions including the <i>Alliance des Patriotes pour la restauration de la démocratie au Congo</i> (APRDC), led by lawyer Benjamin Ndikuyenze Bigirabagabo. It collaborates closely with the APCLS under Janvier Karairi and the CMC and allegedly adheres to a new coalition called Abazungu.
46	Mai-Mai Kifuafua Maachano	The Mai-Mai Kifuafua is one of the longest-standing Congolese armed groups. Set up in 2002 by self-proclaimed general Delphin Mbaenda, this group has roots in the various 1990s Tembo community armed movements. His older brother, Damiano Mbaenda, was one of the first Tembo armed group commanders, probably beginning his career around 1993. Delphin Mbaenda inherited his brother's armed group, based in southern Masisi and Walikale between the villages of Hombo, Busurungi and Remeka. Maachano was a deputy of Mbaenda but defected and created his own group, based in southern Masisi territory in the Ufamando groupement. Like the other Kifuafua groups, it recruits from the Tembo community. Other commanders in this group are known as Bahati and Likuda. Maachano's group demobilized and surrendered to Mubambiro in 2020, but shortly thereafter returned to its former fief.
47	Nyatura Bagaruza	Numerous Nyatura factions operate in Masisi and Rutshuru. While the term Nyatura (Kinyarwanda for "those who hit hard") emerged in association with armed mobilization in the Congolese Hutu community around 2011. Most Nyatura groups have their roots in the armed mobilization of the early 1990s, including the <i>Mutuelle agricole des Virunga</i> (MAGRIVI) combatants, the Mongols and later the Hutu branch of the <i>Patriotes résistants congolais</i> (PARECO). Most Nyatura groups claim to protect the Congolese Hutu population from Mai-Mai or the Congolese army. The Nyatura Bagaruza (or Gatuza) are a non-aligned Nyatura faction created by commander Ntuye, alias Tapis Rouge, who died in 2019. The group is now led by Kagiri and is based between Masisi center and Mianja.
48	Nyatura Delta FDDH (Forces de défense des droits humains)	Numerous Nyatura factions operate in Masisi and Rutshuru. While the term Nyatura (Kinyarwanda for "those who hit hard") emerged in association with armed mobilization in the Congolese Hutu community around 2011, Nyatura groups have their roots in the armed mobilization of the early 1990s, including the <i>Mutuelle agricole des Virunga</i> (MAGRIVI) combatants, the Mongols and later the Hutu branch of the <i>Patriotes résistants congolais</i> (PARECO).



No.	NAME	BIOGRAPHY
		Most Nyatura groups claim to protect the Congolese Hutu population from Mai-Mai or the Congolese army. This group's commander, Delta Gashamare, was a member of the <i>Patriotes résistants congolais</i> (PARECO) armed group before creating a Nyatura group in 2012 in the area south of the Masisi-Nyabiondo road, around Luke, Katoyi and Kazinga in Masisi territory. This Nyatura group is particularly decentralized, with no clear positions. Early 2020, Delta surrendered with a number of combatants, and in July, his successor Manga was killed by the FARDC. Nonetheless, the Nyatura Delta remain on standby in much of the Katoyi sector.
49	Nyatura Jean-Marie	Numerous Nyatura factions operate in Masisi and Rutshuru. While the term Nyatura (Kinyarwanda for “those who hit hard”) emerged in association with armed mobilization in the Congolese Hutu community around 2011, Nyatura groups have their roots in the armed mobilization of the early 1990s, including the <i>Mutuelle agricole des Virunga</i> (MAGRIVI) combatants, the Mongols and later the Hutu branch of the <i>Patriotes résistants congolais</i> (PARECO). Most Nyatura groups claim to protect the Congolese Hutu population from Mai-Mai or the Congolese army. This small group is located around Mpati and Busihe in northern Masisi territory. The group's leader, known as Jean-Marie Nzayimana, has allegedly adhered to a new coalition known as Abazungu.
50	Nyatura Musheku	Numerous Nyatura factions are currently active in Masisi and western Rutshuru territories. While the term Nyatura (Kinyarwanda for “those who hit hard”) emerged in association with armed mobilization in the Congolese Hutu community around 2011, Nyatura groups have their roots in the armed mobilization of the early 1990s, including the <i>Mutuelle agricole des Virunga</i> (MAGRIVI) combatants, the Mongols and later the Hutu branch of the <i>Patriotes résistants congolais</i> (PARECO). Most Nyatura groups claim to protect the Congolese Hutu population from other Mai-Mai groups or the Congolese army. The Nyatura Musheku group is a new faction that emerged around the NDC-R at the instigation of Emmanuel Munyamariba, chief of Lushebere, and has allegedly adhered to a new coalition known as Abazungu.
51	UPDC Kapasi (Union des Patriotes pour le Défense du Congo)	Formerly led by a commander called Birikoriko, the UPDC of commander Kapasi is a Mai-Mai group recruiting mostly from the Tembo community and based in the Nyamaboko area, southern Masisi.
52	Raia Mutomboki Soleil	The Raia Mutomboki of the late Cisayura is now led by a certain Soleil and based in Kalehe, within Kahuzi-Biega National Park. It has been in conflict with the group of Lance Muteya.
53	Mai-Mai Kirikicho	Led by Kirikicho Mirimba Mwanamayi, this is one of the oldest armed groups in the Kivus. Involved in armed group activity since 1992, Kirikicho is based in the hills surrounding Ziralo in Kalehe territory. This area has long been an arena for communal tensions between Tembo and Hutu communities.

No.	NAME	BIOGRAPHY
		The Mai-Mai Kirikicho recruit primarily from the Tembo community, which it claims to be defending against Hutu militias and alleged Rwandan invasions, including by Rwandophone officers of the FARDC. Over the past five years, Kirikicho's movement has often described itself as Raia Mutomboki, as it has adopted similar magical rituals to inoculate its fighters against bullets. It has engaged in fluctuating alliances with other Raia Mutomboki factions and the Mai-Mai Kifuafua, especially Maachano's group. The group's former second-in-command known as Musole left to form a Raia Mutomboki faction near Ziralo
54	Nyatura Kalume	Numerous Nyatura factions operate in Masisi and Rutshuru. While the term Nyatura (Kinyarwanda for "those who hit hard") emerged in association with armed mobilization in the Congolese Hutu community around 2011, Nyatura groups have their roots in the armed mobilization of the early 1990s, including the Mutuelle agricole des Virunga (MAGRIVI) combatants, the Mongols and later the Hutu branch of the Patriotes résistants congolais (PARECO). Most Nyatura groups claim to protect the Congolese Hutu population from Mai-Mai or the Congolese army. This group was founded by Matias Kalume Kage in the Kalehe highlands around Lumbishi. Kalume was a PARECO commander until 2009, when he was integrated into the FARDC. He became an operational commander in Uvira and was then sent to an army camp when the "regimentation" process began in 2011. Failing to obtain a position, he defected to his hometown and began mobilizing within the local Hutu community, taking advantage of local customary and communal conflicts. Kalume's group surrendered and regrouped in Nyamunyuni's base in late 2019 but shortly thereafter returned to Lumbishi due to the absence of a DDR program, and has since re-established itself.
55	Raia Mutomboki Shabani	Based since 2017 in the eastern Buloho chiefdom, this Raia Mutomboki faction absorbed in 2020 combatants from Mweeke, a former Raia Mutomboki commander, and combatants under Nshokano, a former commander in the group named Chance.
56	Conseil national pour le renouveau et la démocratie (CNRD)-Ubwiye	Led by Colonel Wilson Irategaka, the CNRD broke off from the FDLR in May 2016 after a long-standing disagreement over political issues, such as the fate of Rwandan refugees in the eastern Congo. The CNRD took over all of the FDLR's South Kivu units. In North Kivu, most of the troops remained with the FDLR, although some went to the CNRD. FOCA and CNRD units have regularly clashed since the CNRD was formed. The CNRD initially assumed a more moderate stance than the FDLR's, supporting negotiations with the Rwandan government and demanding the immediate repatriation of Rwandan refugees. This initially appeared to play in its favor, with various Nyatura groups and the FARDC supporting the CNRD against the FDLR. However, more than a year into its existence, the tide has turned, and support for the CNRD appears to have waned. Congolese authorities arrested several of the CNRD's senior officers, and the group has also suffered a significant loss of territory in North Kivu and suffered from clashes with the FDLR, CMC and NDC-R.



No.	NAME	BIOGRAPHY
		In 2019, the North Kivu-based CNRD elements tried to join their counterparts in South Kivu. In response, some South Kivu units moved towards Kalehe, while others retreated to the Hewa Bora/Kilembwe areas. Upon regrouping in Kalehe, the CNRD faced large-scale joint operations by the FARDC and RDF, resulting in the near complete dismantling of the group, with several leaders arrested and killed, and Wilson missing in action.
57	Groupe JKK / CCCRD (Coalition Congolaise pour le Changement Radical et la Démocratie)	Led by Chimpanzé Hakizimwami, the JKK group emerged 2020 in the Kalehe area and reportedly includes over 100 combatants. It is rumored to be a militia in support of former President Kabila. The group's leadership is unclear and it is occasionally referred to as CCCRD.
58	Raia Mutomboki Mungoro	This group has been based west of the Bunyakiri-Hombo road since 2013. In recent months, it has clashed several times with the FARDC and reportedly with other Raia Mutomboki factions in Kalehe, including that of Hamakombo, from which it split in 2011-12. It closely collaborates with the Shabani group.
59	Raia Mutomboki Blaise	One of the few Raia Mutomboki factions in Kabare territory, this group is led by a commander known as Blaise who represented, alongside Gaston (who was later killed), one of the two armed wings involved in the customary succession struggle in Nindja chiefdom, involving the two sons of the former chief, Marcel and Freddy. While Blaise sides with Marcel, the faction led by Lukoba (who joined the Raia Mutomboki FPP coalition of Donat) used to work for Freddy. Its key bases are in Iregabarhonyi <i>groupement</i> .
60	Raia Mutomboki Bralima	The Raia Mutomboki Bralima group operates at the edges of Kalehe and Shabunda territories.
61	Raia Mutomboki Butachibera	This group emerged 2014 north of Bunyakiri, on the border between North Kivu and South Kivu, when it separated from Shukuru's group. Its current leaders are Butachibera Mwindja and Weteshi Kabanzi. In 2018, Butachibera and Shukuru tried to reunite but the move failed, and shortly thereafter Shukuru surrendered.
62	Raia Mutomboki Bipopa	Led by Bipopa (aka Chipopa), this group is based in the highlands of Kahuzi-Biega National Park, to the north of Bunyakiri road. It forms part of the Raia Mutomboki FPP alliance under Donat.
63	Raia Mutomboki Hamakombo	Established around 2013, this is one of the best-known Raia Mutomboki groups, led by one of the original commanders of the movement in Bunyakiri, Bwaare Hamakombo. It is based west of Bulambika and Kambali in northern Kalehe territory.
64	Raia Mutomboki Lance	The Raia Mutomboki under Lance Muteya is a spin-off of the erstwhile group under Gaston and operated mainly in the Kalonge area. The group is allied to Raia Mutomboki Hamakombo.

No.	NAME	BIOGRAPHY
65	Raia Mutomboki Lukoba	The Raia Mutomboki Lukoba is based around Ciramba village in Nindja chiefdom. Like their rivals, Blaise's Raia Mutomboki, they have been involved in a local customary succession conflict, supporting Freddy against Marcel. This group recently joined the Raia Mutomboki FPP coalition under Donat. Most of the former Raia Mutomboki Nyanderema are part of Lukoba's faction, which was initially inspired by the now defunct Raia Mutomboki of Maheshe (which, in early 2017, ambushed Kahuzi-Biega National Park rangers and a French conservationist).
66	Raia Mutomboki Ndarumanga	This group is based south of Nzibira and Nyalubemba in western Walungu territory and is led by a commander known as Ndarumanga, a former Raia Mutomboki Maheshe aide who left after internal clashes. Like Maheshe's former faction, this group too has become infamous for frequent ambushes, especially on the road between Nzibira and Nyalubemba.
67	Raia Mutomboki Mabala	This Raia Mutomboki faction, located in northeastern Shabunda, was created around 2012 by Mabala Wemba Mese, a Bamuguba-Nord <i>groupement</i> native. Initially, it formed part of the coalition led by Daniel Meshe and Albert Kahasha, with Mabala collaborating with Ngandu Lundimu until breaking with him in 2014. This faction is based in Kahuzi-Biega National Park north of Iseya in northeastern Shabunda. In 2017, it was reported to join Donat's FPP coalition. Mabala himself was killed in late 2020.
68	Raia Mutomboki Donat aka FPP	This group was created in 2012 in northeastern Shabunda territory, on the edge of Kahuzi-Biega National Park. Its initiators were two FARDC defectors from the Rega community, Major Donat Kengwa Omari and Major Ngandu Lundimu, who had been sent to work with the Raia Mutomboki around Eyadema Mugugu. Initially, they formed part of the coalition led by Daniel Meshe and Albert Kahasha. Since 2018, Donat and Ngandu have been central to the loosely organized Raia Mutomboki FPP coalition.
69	Raia Mutomboki Walike	Son of the late Makombo, Walike has long worked with Mabala Wemba Mese and his father. In 2017, he surrendered to the FARDC but then quickly returned to the forest.
70	Raia Mutomboki Kazimoto	This Raia Mutomboki faction was originally created by Eyadema Mugugu in 2011 in northern Shabunda. After Eyadema's arrest in 2012, the group was taken over by Juriste Kikuni, who surrendered to the FARDC in 2015. Since then, this group has used the name Taku-lengwe, been led by Kazimoto, and has declined in importance, in part owing to internal splits such as those that created the factions led by Kikwama and Kabazimia. Kazimoto engages frequently in clashes with PNKB guards.
71	Raia Mutomboki Kabazimia	This Raia Mutomboki faction was originally created by Eyadema Mugugu in 2011 in northern Shabunda. After Eyadema's arrest in 2012, the group was taken over by Juriste Kikuni, who surrendered to the FARDC in 2015. Since then, this group has used the name Taku-lengwe, been led by Kazimoto, and has declined in importance, also due to internal splits such as those that created the factions led by



No.	NAME	BIOGRAPHY
		Kikwama and Kabazimia. Like Kazimoto, Kabazimia engages frequently in clashes with PNKB guards.
72	Raia Mutomboki Musolwa	In 2011, Rega leaders close to Musumbu (including those known as Sisawa, Charlequin, and Makombo) and under Eyadema Mugugu emerged in northern and eastern Shabunda territory. Unlike other, non-Rega factions, the role of the <i>kimbilikiti</i> spirit and concomitant initiation rites remain anchors for these Raia Mutomboki and their allies. Musolwa is an early ally of Musumbu, and later joined the late Sisawa before creating his own group, which mostly engages in mining.
73	Raia Mutomboki Charles Quint	In 2011, leaders close to Musumbu (including those known as Sisawa, Charles Quint, and Makombo) and a new branch under Eyadema Mugugu emerged in northern and eastern Shabunda territory. Unlike other, non-Rega factions, the role of the <i>kimbilikiti</i> spirit and concomitant initiation rites remain anchors for these Raia Mutomboki and their allies. Charles Quint was allied to Makombo before creating his own group around 2014.
74	Raia Mutomboki Kabé	Before creating his own group, Kabé was a member of Chondo's Raia Mutomboki until 2013. While he surrendered in 2016, parts of his group have since remained in Bamuguba-Sud.
75	Raia Mutomboki 100kg	This Raia Mutomboki group split from the faction created around 2012 by Mabala Mese and operates around the Walungu-Shabunda road. The full name of its leader, called "100kg", is unknown.
76	Raia Mutomboki Kimba	The Raia Mutomboki Kimba faction engages mostly in securing mining companies. Kimba is a former ally of Makindu and Kabazimia and now operates near the Ulindi River.
77	Rai Mutomboki Kampanga	In 2011, leaders close to Musumbu (including those known as Sisawa, Charles Quint, and Makombo) and a new branch under Eyadema Mugugu emerged in northern and eastern Shabunda territory. Unlike other, non-Rega factions, the role of the <i>kimbilikiti</i> spirit and concomitant initiation rites remain anchors for these Raia Mutomboki and their allies. Kampanga first worked alongside Musumbu and Makindu before creating his own group in 2014.
78	Raia Mutomboki Bozi	The Raia Mutomboki Bozi are a relatively new and unknown faction operating in the Baliga area of Shabunda.
79	Raia Mutomboki LeFort	This Raia Mutomboki group operates in the Bakisi chiefdom of Shabunda and has its origins in Musumbu's group. LeFort is around 45 years old and from Kiseku. In 2016, he created his own group that collaborates with Donat, Ngandu and Mabala.
80	Raia Mutomboki Musumbu	Jean Musumbu is the spiritual founder of the Raia Mutomboki (2005). In 2011, leaders close to Musumbu (including those known as Sisawa, Charles Quint, and Makombo) and a branch under Eyadema Mugugu emerged in northern and eastern Shabunda. Unlike other, non-Rega factions, the role of the <i>kimbilikiti</i> spirit and concomitant initiation rites remain anchors for these Raia Mutomboki and their allies.

No.	NAME	BIOGRAPHY
81	Mai-Mai Makindu	Makindu, a Bembe, belonged to the inner circle of Raia Mutomboki, whose founder was Jean Musumbu, but established his own group composed of former Mulumba, Yakutumba, and former Raia Mutomboki combatants, known as <i>para-commandos</i> . Makindu's group has good relations with the CNPSC and is multi-ethnic.
82	Mai-Mai Malaika	This is a relatively new armed group based in southern Shabunda and northern Fizi territories and part of Maniema Province. It is led by Sheikh Assani and linked to Raia Mutomboki leaders and the CNPSC, including Jean Musumbu. Locally, it is sometimes referred to as Raia Mutomboki Malaika. She, or Sheikh Assani hails from Kabambare. The group is heavily involved in resistance against Banro's mining operations in Namoya and Salamabila. After Assani's death in 2020, his brother Kabala allegedly took over the lead. Since 2018, a separate Malaika faction in Maniema is led by a commander known as "Souverain."
83	Mai-Mai Rasta	This Mai-Mai group emerged out of the previous Mai-Mai Aigle and regrouped former Mai-Mai as well as Congolese and Burundian bandits. The group has ties to the former Mai-Mai of Bede Rusagara and supports local chief Mbabaro.
84	FNL (Front national de libération)	FNL troops used to be the armed branch of the <i>Front national de libération</i> (FNL) that emerged out of parts of the former Burundian <i>Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu</i> (PALIPEHUTU). This is the main faction, led by former Burundian army officer and self-proclaimed general Aloys Nzabampema. It operates mostly out of the Ruzizi Plain and the <i>Moyens Plateaux</i> of Uvira territory, with occasional incursions into Burundi. Nzabampema has been regularly accused of child recruitment and his group is a major player in terms of cattle theft in the Ruzizi Plain. While it is no longer allied with Agathon Rwasa's FNL party in Burundi, this group represented the main armed opposition against the current Burundian government until 2016. That status is now in question due to the emergence of new Burundian opposition groups, Nzabampema's unclear relationship with the Burundian army, and the breakaway of Shuti Baryanka (who was later killed and replaced by Nibizi) from Nzabampema.
85	Mai-Mai Buhirwa	The Mai-Mai Buhirwa are a spin-off from Mwenyemali's group. Mwenyemali is the leader of an eponymous Fuliuro Mai-Mai group that operates mostly between Mutarule and Lemera. Like the late Karakara and Bede, it is regularly involved in cattle raids. Like former groups in the Ruzizi Plain, Buhirwa engages regularly in ambushes.
86	Mai-Mai Ilunga	Mai-Mai Ilunga split from Mushombe's group in 2018 to join Biloze Bishambuke but ended up as standalone group backed by Mtetezi and collaborating with RED-Tabara and the FNL. Its struggle was motivated by the killing of Chief Kawza in Kaniura by Gumino troops. Mushombe Muganguzi is a militia commander from Uvira territory who has been active in armed groups going back to the 1990s. He demobilized when his former commander, Rubaruba Zabuloni, integrated into the FARDC at the end of the Second Congo War in 2003. He took up arms again around 2005 to counter the mobiliza-



No.	NAME	BIOGRAPHY
		-tion around the “Group of 47” Banyamulenge leaders and later the FRF. In contrast with other Mai-Mai groups in Uvira territory, Mushombe has always been based in the Hauts Plateaux towards Itombwe Forest and Mwenga territory, close to certain positions of the FDLR (now CNRD), an occasional ally.
87	Mai-Mai Kashumba	Based in the <i>Hauts Plateaux</i> of Uvira, Kashumba leads one of the Mai-Mai groups of Ruzizi Plain of South Kivu. Kashumba is a former officer in the groups of Nakabaka, Zabuloni and Fujo. He created his own group in 2018 to create a local defense unit to fight the FNL on the army’s behalf before falling out with the FARDC. His group is close to that of Mushombe, a former colleague.
88	Mai-Mai Kijangala	The Mai-Mai Kijangala emerged around Sange in response to Burundian armed groups entering the DRC. Having begun as a local defense force, they turned into local allies of RED-Tabara before changing sides and collaborating with the Burundian army and allegedly the CNRD.
89	Mai-Mai Makanaki	Makanaki reportedly took over the majority of former Mai-Mai Fujo combatants when their former leader Fujo Zabuloni, the son and successor of late Mai-Mai leader Zabuloni Rubaruba, joined the army in 2015. His group is based in the hills overlooking the town of Uvira. Makanaki’s father was a Mulelist rebel and his group is well-connected in Uvira.
90	Mai-Mai Mbulu	Based east of the Kamanyola-Uvira road, this group has been forged by Mbulu and Bigaya, who used to be commanders in the late Bede Rusagara’s armed group. Their units are particularly famous for ambushes and cattle theft. After Bigaya had fallen ill, Mahugo allegedly took over his position alongside Mbulu.
91	Mai-Mai Issa Mutoka	This Mai-Mai group is led by Issa Mutoka, is a staunch ally to the Mai-Mai Mutetezi. It belongs to the broader Bembe Mai-Mai network, was initially formed by Ngalyabatu, and operates on the Mwenga side of Itombwe.
92	Mai-Mai Ruma / Zela Mbuma	This group emerged from the Mai-Mai N’ykirhiba and Matebura and recruits from the Nyindu community. It is currently led by Ruma and Zela Mbuma, although the latter seems to have disappeared. Founded by self-styled general and former primary school teacher Daniel Matebura to fight the <i>Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie</i> (RCD)-Goma rebellion in 1998, Mai-Mai Nyakiliba operated in the Luindi chiefdom in Mwenga territory. The group is best known for an ambush against RCD troops in Kasika, which in turn sparked the August 1998 Kasika massacre perpetrated by RCD forces, who killed hundreds, including the then-customary Chief François Mubeza. The RCD replaced Mubeza with Nyumba Mubeza in contravention of the chiefdom’s lineage rules. However, Mai-Mai N’ykirhiba claims that another member of the family, known as Sholo, was in line to succeed Mubeza.

No.	NAME	BIOGRAPHY
93	Mai-Mai Mushombe	Mushombe Muganguzi is a militia commander from Uvira territory who has been active in armed groups going back to the 1990s. He demobilized when his former commander, Rubaruba Zabuloni, integrated into the FARDC at the end of the Second Congo War in 2003. He took up arms again around 2005 to counter the mobilization around the “Group of 47” Banyamulenge leaders and later the FRF. In contrast with other Mai-Mai groups in Uvira territory, Mushombe has always been based in the <i>Hauts Plateaux</i> towards Itombwe Forest and Mwenga territory, close to certain positions of the FDLR (now CNRD), an occasional ally. His group is close to that of Kashumba, a former colleague.
94	Mai-Mai Nyerere	Nyerere’s troops are based in the <i>Moyen Plateau</i> of Runingu, north of Uvira. Together with Karakara and Mwenyemali, this group is considered one of the strongest Mai-Mai groups in Uvira territory. Nyerere has repeatedly been accused of collaborating with the Burundian FNL rebels. Nyerere Bunana is a former Mai-Mai of Nakabaka, Baleke and Zabuloni. He temporarily joined the RCD before being named colonel in the police. During the M23 crisis, he defected to create his Mai-Mai group composed of Fuliuro from Kiliba and Runingu. In 2019, he lost a number of troops when his deputy Seremba defected and later got arrested.
95	Résistance pour un état de droit (RED)-Tabara	Initially known as FRONABU- <i>Tabara</i> , this was the first Burundian group to set up a rear base in the eastern Congo following the re-election of Burundian President Nkurunziza in 2015. Linked to the militant wing of Alexis Sinduhije’s <i>Mouvement pour la solidarité et la démocratie</i> (MSD) opposition party, various RED-Tabara recruits benefitted from military training in Rwanda before crossing into the Ruzizi Plain. Increased international scrutiny over their recruitment and training in Rwanda, as well as their involvement in conflicts in the Ruzizi Plain, weakened the RED-Tabara. Nonetheless, its presence prompted the Burundian army to subcontract Congolese militias to fight them. RED-Tabara has been able to launch several operations into Burundi since 2015, including into Cibitoke and Gatumba in 2018 as well as Kibira in 2019.
96	Mai-Mai Rushaba	Mai-Mai Rushaba Aroni emerged in 2014 from the former Baleke group that confederated various Mai-Mai around Uvira. Rushaba used to also collaborate with Mai-Mai Nyerere.
97	Mai-Mai René	This is a small Mai-Mai group located in the <i>Moyen Plateau</i> overlooking Mboko. It is a member of the CNPSC coalition that established itself in 2016 after Rene Itongwa defected from the army for never having been promoted, as had been old Mai-Mai collaborators such as Nakabaka. Ever since, he has collaborated with Mutetezi, Ilunga and the Biloze Bishambuke.
98	Mai-Mai Réunion FPLC (Forces pour la libération du Congo)	This is a small Mai-Mai group that recruits from the Bembe community and is led by “colonel” Réunion wa Rusasa, a former commander in both Mayele’s and Bwasakala’s militia, who became independent in 2017. It is active in the <i>Moyen Plateau</i> overlooking Lusambo and Swima. It is known for frequent ambushes on the road between Baraka and Uvira and joined the CNPSC but also cooperates with the Mai-Mai Mupenkenya.



No.	NAME	BIOGRAPHY
99	Mai-Mai Ngalyabatu	This Mai-Mai group is led by Ngalyabatu Mangala, former deputy of Mai-Mai Kapopo (who surrendered in 2010), the son of Alunda Ma'ucha (who quit armed resistance in 2006). Ngalyabatu is a staunch ally to the Mai-Mai Mutetezi and his combatants are mostly Mai-Mai who refused to join the army.
100	Mai-Mai Mupekenya	This small Mai-Mai group occupies a small area on the Itombwe plateau in Mwenga territory. A few years ago, it was believed to operate jointly with another local militia commander called Ngarukiye. It recruits mainly from local Mbuti and Twa populations and collaborates with Ilunga and Mtetezi, often attacking Banyamulenge and their cattle.
101	Twigwaneho	The Twigwaneho are a highly decentralized Banyamulenge militia. They are a Banyamulenge self-defense movement that has appeared recently in the <i>Haut Plateaux</i> of Fizi and Mwenga territory. It mostly operates around Bijombo and maintained ties with the more organized Gumino militia. Since 2020, the group has begun merging with Makanika's AFP Gutabara rebellion. As opposed to the Gumino, the Twigwaneho used to not constantly carry guns. They operate mostly around Bijombo and Minembwe.
102	AFP–Gutabara (Alliances de fédéralistes patriotes, alias Android and Abakenya)	Created by Michel Rukundo Makanika after his latest defection from the army, this group brings together Banyamulenge from both abroad (abakenya) and the highlands (known as android). Based in the Bijabo area, the AFP was able to rally Twigwaneho and parts of Gumino and organize several successful operations against Mai-Mai groups as well as the FARDC. The group is suspected of entertaining ties with Rwanda, although certain sources suggest it may collaborate with the RNC as well.
103	Gumino	Gumino (portmanteau of <i>guma ino</i> , “stay here” in Kinyamulenge) is an umbrella term for the most recent wave of Banyamulenge armed mobilization in the <i>Hauts Plateaux</i> of Uvira and Fizi territories. Reportedly, the term emerged as Makanika and Masunzu fell out over the approach towards Rwanda in the late 1990s, and Makanika, Bisogo, Semahurungure, Nyamusaraba, Tawimbi and others decided to “stay” on. While the Gumino built upon previous Banyamulenge armed groups, including the ex-FRF and a group led by Colonel Tawimbi, as of late 2017 only a few Banyamulenge leaders played an important role. Over the past two years, the group has mostly been fighting against various Mai-Mai groups in northern Fizi. After Semahurungure's death, Nyamusharaba Shaka remains the sole leader, but Makanika's influence is reportedly on the rise, leading to a softening of the Gumino's anti-Rwanda stance.
104	Mai-Mai Mutetezi FPDC (Forces populaires pour les défenses du Congo)	Ebu Ela Kitungano Tresor, alias Mtetezi wa Seba Kibukila, is a former Yakutumba lieutenant who created his own Bembe-based militia between 2011 and 2013. Around 2016, he joined Yakutumba's CNPSC coalition, before creating his own FPDC alliance, moving operations into the Itombwe highlands and rallying numerous smaller Bembe, Nyindu and Fuliuro militias, including Ngarukiye,

No.	NAME	BIOGRAPHY
		Echilo, Aigle (see KST's 2017 mapping) and others in a bid to engage in the broader conflicts around Minembwe and the Fizi highlands. While he is believed to be close to Yakutumba's CNPSC, he has grown into a powerful actor in his own right, with five brigades deployed across the highlands linking Fizi, Uvira and Mwenga territories.
105	Mai-Mai Bishake	This Mai-Mai group is a spin-off of the group led by Ngalyabatu Mangala, former deputy of Mai-Mai Kapopo (who surrendered in 2010), the son of Alunda Ma'ucha (who quit 2006). It overlaps with and is allied to the Biloze Bishambuke group.
106	Biloze Bishambuke	The Biloze Bishambuke are a loose coalition of local militia in the South Kivu highlands, whose roots go back to Mulumba in 1998. It is led by Assani Mbokani. Recently, they have engaged in tacit alliances with Mtetezi and the CNPSC. It is closely allied to the Bishake and Shoshi groups, which are sometimes considered an integral part of Biloze.
107	Mai-Mai Yakutumba	Created by former FARDC officer William Amuri (aka Yakutumba) in 2006, the group has developed into one of the largest Congolese armed groups in South Kivu. In 2007, capitalizing on local grievances, in particular within the Bembe community, Yakutumba officially renamed the group <i>Parti d'action pour la reconstruction du Congo-Forces armées alleluia</i> (PARC-FAAL). Yakutumba has skillfully co-opted numerous smaller Fizi-based Mai-Mai groups into his coalition, including the Bwasakala and Bavon. The group also maintains support networks in Tanzania and has been known for piracy and smuggling on Lake Tanganyika. In late 2016, it revived the <i>Coalition nationale du peuple pour la souveraineté du Congo</i> (CNPSC) alliance, an earlier coalition project designed in 2013 but which had not previously materialized. In the first half of 2017, Yakutumba and his allies successfully launched a series of attacks against the FARDC, leading to a significant expansion of their influence in Fizi, extending their reach to the gold hub Misisi and major towns such as Fizi center and Baraka, as well as a serious offensive in Uvira territory in late September 2017. Before taking Uvira, however, joint FARDC-UN operations pushed them back into Fizi territory and inflicted considerable losses on the group, including on its navy on Lake Tanganyika. Although it remains on good terms with the Apa na Pale in Tanganyika and the Malaika in Maniema, Yakutumba recently lost clout in Fizi as Mutetezi and Alida became independent wings.
108	Mai-Mai Aochi	This is a Mai-Mai group based in western Fizi territory that recruits mostly from the Bembe community. It is part of the CNPSC coalition. Aochi belongs to the range of dissatisfied former Mai-Mai commanders who redefected after the so-called " <i>brassage</i> " (integration) process in 2007-08. He used to work with Alunda and Kapopo and currently collaborates with Yakutumba and Mutetezi.
109	Mai-Mai Shoshi	This is a Mai-Mai group based in western Fizi territory that recruits mostly from the Bembe community. It is part of the CNPSC coalition and has its roots in the Mai-Mai Mulumba. Having been part of the Biloze Bishambuke first, it became a group of its own in 2019 and collaborates with Mtetezi. Its leader is Jimmy Kidegi.



No.	NAME	BIOGRAPHY
110	Mai-Mai Apa na Pale	The Mai-Mai Apa na Pale are led by Mundusi, a former AFDL and RCD rebel commander. Born 1965, Mundusi is a Twa and temporarily joined the army after the Sun City Agreement during brassage. He is related to former Defense Minister Mwando Nsimba. Created in 2014, the group engaged first in mining in the Nyunzu area but also participated in army operations against Bakata Katanga around 2015. This deal helped Mundusi to get access to arms and ammunition for his group, with the support of Colonel Kabezya Tango Four, who was later suspended. Apa na Pale further evolved in 2017 alongside the creation of the CNPSC and became famous for ambushing MONUSCO troops from Benin in Nyunzu in 2017, as well as FARDC General Philémon Yav in Fizi in 2019. The movement is made up of Twa, Bembe, Babuyu and other communities. Attempts to negotiate their surrender, including by Congolese authorities and the UN, have thus far failed. His group is alleged to work closely with the CNPSC and the Malaika and has an army-like internal structure with detailed units and ranks.
111	Mai-Mai Mulumba	This is a Mai-Mai group based in western Fizi territory that recruits mostly from the Bembe community. It is part of the CNPSC coalition and led by Mulumba, a long-time ally of Yakutumba. Mulumba's group is also at the origin of the Makindu group as well as parts of Biloze Bishambuke.
112	Mai-Mai Alida	Led by Alonda Bitwa aka Alida, a former lieutenant of Yakutumba, this group emerged as standalone Mai-Mai faction in Fizi area, including the Ubwari peninsula, around October 2020.
113	Mai-Mai Brown	Led by Omari Brown, this group used to be a faction of Yakutumba's broader Mai-Mai coalition in Fizi area, South Kivu. As of 2020, it is in coalition with the Mai-Mai Apa na Pale of Mundusi and operates in the easternmost ends of Maniema territory.
114	PERCI Nyumbaisha	The PERCI (a French acronym for "civilian personnel") have existed since 2007. PERCI, formerly an expression referring to Twa "pisteurs", turned into a broader denomination more recently. This faction was founded by Luhala – killed in 2013 by the FARDC – and is now led by Twa "general" Nyumbaisha Mukalay, born in 1975. Nyumbaisha was trained by the FARDC as a proxy to help fight Kata Katanga. The group became more important and organized in 2013 after a major attack in Lwela, near Manono, where 45 Twa were killed. While the PERCI Nyumbaisha first fought Kata Katanga, they increasingly also attack FARDC units. The group announced its surrender in 2018, but this never actually happened.
115	Mai-Mai Éléments Katadaye	The Elements group have their roots in the Kata Katanga founded by Gedeon Kyungu Mutanga in 2007. They represent a Bantu part of the Kata Katanga mobilization and organize loosely from one chiefdom to another. In 2020, following Twa mobilization and the killing of Chief Mokimbo, the Elements formed around Katadaye and "bantu" combatants to strike back, with support from customary chiefs and politicians from Nyunzu. The group also collaborates with the FARDC against different PERCI groups.

No.	NAME	BIOGRAPHY
116	Mai-Mai Fimbo na Fimbo	The Fimbo na Fimbo group is led by Bitonto and operates between Kalemie and Moba along the shores of Lake Tanganyika. It is a multi-ethnic militia of around 200 members. Like the Apa na Pale, it is well-structured and has former FARDC in its ranks. In April 2019, the group lost most of its fighters after a mass surrender of more than 1,000 members. It mostly operates in Moba area.
117	PERCI John Majimbo	The PERCI (a French acronym for “civilian personnel”) have existed since 2007. PERCI, formerly an expression referring to Twa “pisteurs”, turned into a broader denomination more recently. John Majimbo is a veteran PERCI who formed his own wing in the Bayolo area after falling out with his brother Mokit Mwilambwe.
118	Groupe Mazout	This group was founded by Sensele aka Mazout in 2017, as anti-Twa violence was raging. It claims to protect the Twa in Nyemba.
119	PERCI Kaomba	The PERCI (a French acronym for “civilian personnel”) have existed since 2007. PERCI, formerly an expression referring to Twa “pisteurs”, turned into a broader denomination more recently. The Kaomba wing of the PERCI operates in Nyemba area, led by Mukalay Yumba alias Kaomba. Kaomba fled the anti-Twa violence in 2013 and set up this militia in Kalumbi in 2017.
120	PERCI Mpululu	The PERCI (a French acronym for “civilian personnel”) have existed since 2007. PERCI, formerly an expression referring to Twa “pisteurs”, turned into a broader denomination more recently. After the killing of Chief Mukimbo in January 2020 in Bayolo groupement, Mpululu Katalushi set up this PERCI group in the vacated areas, claiming to protect Twa and engaging in revenge attacks against the Bantu. Mpululu established a certain Kamuntu as new groupement chief after the former chief fled to Nyunzu.
121	Mai-Mai Éléments Mutono	This group is led by Mutono Mukambila, a Tabwa (“Bantu”) from Moba territory. Between 2016 and 2018, he emerged as a key leader of the Bantu militia fighting PERCI, having previously served in local defense forces in 2013 and 2015. His group has come to fame locally for attacking Moba in 2017, as well as killing Chief Kisimba Kabonde Kamale in 2018. These events prompted a heavy FARDC response, which failed to fully dismantle Mutono’s group. Mutono himself fled to Zambia via Pweto, but his group has remained intact. Allegedly, Mutono cooperates with the Fimbo na Fimbo of Bitonto, which has returned to the Moba area.
122	Mai-Mai Mwenyemali	Mwenyemali is the leader of a eponymous Mai-Mai group that operates mostly between Mutarule and Lemera. Like Karakara, it is regularly involved in cattle raids. In early 2017, Mwenyemali killed a well-known arms trader working for the Burundian security services and emerged as one of the Ruzizi Plain’s most powerful Mai-Mai groups until he was wounded. Since, the group largely dissipated with small units remaining operational, while many have joined the Mai-Mai Buhirwa.



The Kivu Security Tracker (KST) is a joint project of the [Congo Research Group](#), based at New York University's Center on International Cooperation, and [Human Rights Watch](#).

The goal of the Kivu Security Tracker is to map violence by state security forces and armed groups in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo to better understand trends, causes of insecurity and serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.

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This report was prepared by Christoph Vogel, Giovanni Salvaggio, Pierre Boisselet, Jason Stearns and the entire KST team. Kivu Security Tracker furthermore thanks the 12 external reviewers for their help in triangulating and verifying the data.



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