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Twenty-second report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da'esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat

I. Introduction

1. In adopting its resolution [2253 \(2015\)](#), the Security Council expressed its determination to address the threat posed to international peace and security by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant¹ (ISIL, hereinafter referred to as “Da’esh”)² and associated individuals and groups and requested that the Secretary-General provide an initial strategic-level report on the threat, followed by updates every four months. In its resolution [2734 \(2024\)](#), the Council requested that the Secretary-General continue to provide, every six months, strategic-level reports that demonstrate and reflect the gravity of the threat posed by Da’esh to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat, particularly that reflect the impact of these efforts. It further requested that the latest biannual report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to resolutions [1526 \(2004\)](#) and [2253 \(2015\)](#) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities be annexed to the present report.

2. The present report is the twenty-second such report.³ It was prepared by the Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), with the input of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and in close collaboration with the Monitoring Team and other United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact entities.

3. The threat posed by Da’esh increased steadily since the previous report, becoming more complex and intensifying in multiple theatres. Da’esh and its affiliates continued to recruit foreign terrorist fighters and raise funds opportunistically while increasing the effective use of technologies such as digital currencies and unmanned aircraft systems. The United Nations, including through its Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact, continued to support Member States in their efforts to address the threat, in accordance with the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and relevant Security Council resolutions.

¹ Listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115).

² In line with General Assembly resolution [75/291](#).

³ See [S/2016/92](#), [S/2016/501](#), [S/2016/830](#), [S/2017/97](#), [S/2017/467](#), [S/2018/80](#), [S/2018/770](#), [S/2019/103](#), [S/2019/612](#), [S/2020/95](#), [S/2020/774](#), [S/2021/98](#), [S/2021/682](#), [S/2022/63](#), [S/2022/576](#), [S/2023/76](#), [S/2023/568](#), [S/2024/117](#), [S/2024/583](#), [S/2025/72](#) and [S/2025/496](#).



II. Threat assessment

A. Overview and evolution of the threat

4. The threat posed by Da'esh and its affiliates intensified across multiple theatres, notably in West and Central Africa, the Sahel and South Asia. The threat was multipolar, increasingly complex and changing rapidly, with the Central Sahel area (including the border areas of Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger, as well as the Lake Chad Basin areas) suffering the most. Foreign terrorist fighters continued to be drawn to, and to coalesce across, a range of theatres. Da'esh maintained access to revenues and continued opportunistic fundraising, relying on unlawful taxation and kidnapping for ransom. Virtual assets continued to be increasingly used to evade detection. Simultaneously, Da'esh continued efforts to build cybercapabilities, including by appealing globally to cyberexperts to join their ranks.

5. Member States continued to hold a range of views regarding the identity of the Da'esh leader, Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi. Some Member States maintained their assessment that Abdulqadir Mumin (not listed), head of the Karrar "office" in East Africa, is the group's overall leader. Mumin has remained largely isolated as a result of sustained counter-terrorism pressure by Somali authorities.

6. In Somalia, the threat presented by Da'esh was significantly reduced due to continued counter-terrorism efforts carried out by national security forces in conjunction with regional and international partners. Following recent counter-terrorism operations, which resulted in the killing of significant numbers of fighters, the arrest of more than 180, and the reintegration of local Somali fighters into their clans, Da'esh in Somalia is currently estimated to have approximately 200–300 fighters. Outward movement of foreign terrorist fighters of Middle Eastern origin from Puntland to Yemen via the Gulf of Aden was reported by regional Member States.

7. Da'esh increased its propaganda coverage of its attacks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mozambique. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Allied Democratic Forces (not listed) continued to pose a substantial threat.

8. West Africa and the Sahel remained a major concern of Member States as Da'esh affiliates, such as Islamic State Sahel Province (not listed), continued to consolidate its presence. In the Lake Chad Basin, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) (QDe.162), operational mostly in Cameroon, Chad, the Niger and Nigeria, became more prominent as intensified counter-terrorism operations weakened other Da'esh affiliates in the Middle East and Somalia. Member States reported the elevation of Abu Bakr ibn Muhammad ibn Ali al-Mainuki (not listed), head of the Furqan "office", to Da'esh core leadership, with some suggesting that he might have replaced Abdallah Makki Muslih al-Rafi'i (alias Abu Khadija) as head of the "general directorate of provinces" after Abu Khadija's death in March 2025.⁴ In a bid to strengthen territorial control in north-east Nigeria, ISWAP entrenched its positions across the central and southern areas of Borno State in August, reinforcing its Gargash and Sambisa bases. ISWAP also intensified raids against isolated communities in the Far North Region of Cameroon and the Lac Province of Chad.

9. The Al-Qaida affiliate Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (QDe.159) remained the dominant group in the Sahel. Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (QDe.163) had a smaller presence in Mali but remained active in the Niger, its primary area of operations. Attacks by Islamic State in the Greater Sahara were smaller in scale and asymmetrical, targeting security forces and civilians. In the

⁴ See [S/2022/576](#) and subsequent reports.

Niger, the Tillabéri, Tahoua and Dosso regions saw sustained activity by Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, while Ménaka and Tessit in Mali recorded attacks. In late 2025, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara and Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin clashed over territorial dominance, marking the end of the détente between the two groups established earlier in 2025.

10. In the Syrian Arab Republic, the security situation remained fragile. Da'esh cells continued to operate across the country, conducting attacks primarily against security forces, particularly in the north and north-east, including one attack on coalition forces jointly led by the Syrian Arab Republic and the United States of America. The group sought to incite sectarian tensions to undermine national authorities, including by organizing attacks on places of worship. It continued to maintain an estimated 3,000 fighters across Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, the majority of whom were based in the Syrian Arab Republic. While the Syrian desert region remained of strategic importance, it no longer constituted the primary stronghold of Da'esh. The President of the Syrian Arab Republic, Ahmad Al-Sharaa, was also assessed to be a priority target. In 2025, five assassination attempts against the President, the Minister of the Interior and the Minister for Foreign Affairs were foiled. Al-Sharaa was targeted in Aleppo and Dar'a by Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah (not listed), a group assessed as being a front for Da'esh, providing Da'esh with plausible deniability and improved operational capacity. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic joined the international counter-Da'esh coalition in November. The coalition reported conducting several large-scale air strikes on positions across the Syrian Arab Republic affiliated with Da'esh.

11. In Iraq, Da'esh remained under sustained counter-terrorism pressure from Iraqi authorities, limiting the group's capacity for large-scale operations. In 2025, Da'esh attacks in Iraq were at an all-time low. The group nevertheless persisted as a threat by exploiting instability in the neighbouring Syrian Arab Republic.

12. Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan (ISIL-K) (QDe.161) and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan continued to pose a significant concern and threat amid fragile regional relations. ISIL-K remained under sustained counter-terrorism pressure from the de facto authorities; however, it retained a potent operational capability and demonstrated continued intent to conduct operations abroad. While the number of attacks carried out by ISIL-K declined in the reporting period, the group maintained the ability to rapidly replenish its ranks, including through online recruitment. The group was active primarily in northern Afghanistan, particularly in Badakhshan Province, as well as in areas near the border with Pakistan. It expanded its network of cells, continuing to project threats at the regional and international levels. ISIL-K also intensified its use of aggressive propaganda in Central Asian languages, broadening its target audience, and sought to exploit issues such as the war in Gaza to advance recruitment and financing efforts.

13. In terms of access to weapons, Da'esh continued to see benefit in enhancing technologies such as unmanned aircraft systems, which it has identified as a growth area. Unmanned aircraft systems have enhanced the group's ability to carry out coordinated and simultaneous attacks, with collaboration and knowledge-sharing happening across combat zones. In West Africa, ISWAP is increasing its cache of unmanned aircraft systems through commercial importation of relevant parts that are later reassembled.

14. There was a discernible increase in the effective use of other new technologies by Da'esh, as well as other terrorist groups, which manifested in two principal ways. First, Da'esh and its affiliates increasingly exploited commercial satellite communication systems, enabling low-cost, rapid and relatively secure communications in remote areas. Second, there was more proficient and higher-

quality use of artificial intelligence, primarily for propaganda purposes. Da'esh and its affiliates demonstrated growing sophistication in integrating artificial intelligence tools and visual effects into efforts to radicalize to terrorism and recruit. While not a step change in operational capability, the increase in the effective use of new technologies underscored the expanding challenge that artificial intelligence poses to international counter-terrorism efforts.

B. Situation of suspected Da'esh members and their family members in conflict zones

15. As of December, more than 25,740 individuals, including approximately 14,930 Syrian nationals, 2,320 Iraqi nationals and 8,480 third-country nationals from approximately 59 different countries, remained in the Hawl and Rawj camps in the north-east of the Syrian Arab Republic for their alleged links or family ties to Da'esh. Thousands more remained in other detention centres. More than 60 per cent of the camp populations consisted of children, of which 71% were under the age of 12 and 7% were under the age of 5. Most of those children remained unable to return to their communities or countries of origin and were unlawfully detained without trial or judicial review process, without any meaningful access to legal remedy.

16. Humanitarian assistance continued to be severely limited by reduced levels in foreign aid and underresourced in the camps. Living conditions at the Hawl and Rawj camps remained dire, with limited services and inadequate shelter. Systematic insecurity, violence and human rights violations were observed, including enforced disappearances, arbitrary detention, incommunicado detention, gender-based violence and sexual exploitation and lack of access to water, food, healthcare and education.

III. Updates on responses to the evolving threat

17. The United Nations continued to support Member States in addressing the threat posed by Da'esh, including through capacity-building and technical assistance in areas such as countering the financing of terrorism, the use by terrorist groups of new and emerging technologies and the reintegration of individuals associated with Da'esh and other terrorist groups. The United Nations continued to produce research and evidence-based policy guidance to inform efforts by Member States.

18. In October, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate supported the Counter-Terrorism Committee's open briefing to commemorate the Directorate's twentieth anniversary, which brought together representatives from Member States and international and regional organizations, as well as civil society and members of the Directorate's Global Counter-Terrorism Research Network. The discussion contributed to advancing common understanding of the impact of the Directorate's work and lessons learned, as well as trends and developments in terrorism and counter-terrorism, including recommended measures to counter Da'esh.

A. Addressing the situation of suspected Da'esh members and their family members in conflict zones

1. Repatriation efforts

19. Despite a decrease in the number of repatriations since the previous reporting period, Member States continued with their efforts to repatriate individuals stranded in camps and in detention and other facilities in the north-east of the Syrian Arab

Republic. The Government of Iraq reportedly repatriated more than 2,400 Iraqi citizens from the Hawl and Rawj camps.

20. The United Nations, in partnership with the Government of Iraq, supported civil documentation for Iraqi nationals accommodated at Amal Rehabilitation Centre (formerly Jeddah-1 camp) following their return from camps in the north-east of the Syrian Arab Republic. By October, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) had facilitated more than 3,430 applications for national identity cards, with more than 3,170 cards issued.

21. In September, UNOCT provided technical support to the Government of Iraq in organizing the High-level International Conference on the Repatriation of Persons from Al-Hol, Surrounding Camps and Places of Detention to strengthen advocacy and exchange good practices in repatriating individuals associated with terrorist groups. More than 350 participants, including 31 ministers and senior officials from Member States, were in attendance. United Nations and other experts recommended that Member States ensure accountability for crimes and justice for victims of terrorism, particularly women and children, including through targeted support for victims of sexual violence.

22. From August to December, the European Union-United Nations Global Terrorism Threats Facility, implemented by UNOCT, equipped 60 Iraqi security personnel with specialized skills to manage voluntary repatriations from Hawl camp using victim-sensitive and culturally responsive approaches.

23. In October, the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) published a study on gendered experiences of arbitrary detention of women, men and children in Hawl camp,⁵ providing recommendations for the broader United Nations system in addressing their varying circumstances and needs. The study was aimed at supporting a human rights-based, gender-responsive policy and programmatic approach to addressing the situation of indefinite detention of women, men and children currently held in Hawl camp.

2. Prosecution and investigation

24. The United Nations continued to support Member States in strengthening rights-based legal and institutional frameworks for the investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences. In August, UNOCT, in partnership with IOM and the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, organized a workshop in Baghdad with Iraqi counter-terrorism judges and prosecutors, alongside international experts, to exchange good practices on the investigation and prosecution of members of terrorist organizations in compliance with suspects' rights. In December, UNOCT brought together Iraqi officials and their foreign counterparts for a workshop in Istanbul, Türkiye, on international cooperation to strengthen accountability for Da'esh crimes.

25. From July to October, UNOCT strengthened the capacity of 22 law enforcement officials from Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria and Somalia to collect, analyse and use digital, financial and intelligence information in complex terrorism cases that may involve Da'esh while upholding human rights and due process standards.

26. In Uganda, the Global Terrorism Threats Facility mentored key stakeholders and enhanced the capacity of trainers from the Uganda Police Force and the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions. In October, the Facility handed over specialized digital forensics equipment to the Government of Kyrgyzstan and concluded an eight-

⁵ Available at www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2025/10/understanding-the-lives-of-the-women-men-and-children-of-al-hol-camp.

month package of advisory and mentoring assistance to strengthen capacities for terrorism-related investigations and prosecutions. In Tajikistan, the Facility conducted a needs analysis as the basis for support to the Ministry of Justice to enhance capacities in digital forensics for terrorism-related investigations and prosecutions in line with international standards and human rights norms.

27. In Nigeria, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) handed over a refurbished evidence storage facility to the Plateau State Police Command of the Nigeria Police Force, the sixth such facility enhanced by UNODC. In July, the Federal High Court rendered 44 convictions of individuals suspected of having committed a terrorism offence; UNODC contributed to reducing the Court's backlog by supporting the deployment of defence lawyers from the Legal Aid Council to conduct pretrial interviews in detention sites. At the regional level, the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) and the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel continued their advocacy efforts in support to the Lake Chad Basin Commission's Multinational Joint Task Force, which plays a critical role in bringing alleged ISWAP members to justice.

3. Rehabilitation and reintegration

28. The United Nations sustained its support to Member States to address challenges in the rehabilitation and reintegration of former returnees, including limited access to legal support and other services. Strategic coordination of rehabilitation and reintegration efforts was strengthened under the Global Framework for United Nations Support on Syrian Arab Republic/Iraq Third Country National Returnees, including through the technical working group co-led by IOM, UNICEF and the Government of Iraq. The Rehabilitation and Transitional Task Force contributed to enhancing coordination on service delivery at the Amal Rehabilitation Centre.

29. The United Nations supported returning Iraqi children and their families by providing comprehensive and holistic rehabilitation services in line with the best interest of the child as the primary consideration and including psychosocial care, legal aid, vocational training and family reintegration. Support by IOM to the Amal Rehabilitation Centre benefited more than 6,500 individuals. It also helped to enhance coordination with the Ministry of Migration and Displacement and the Office of the National Security Adviser of Iraq, accelerated clearance procedures and enabled verified households to depart from the Centre more quickly.

30. UNODC provided technical assistance to the Government of Iraq on the management of high-risk prisoners and the prevention of radicalization to terrorism in prisons. It also supported the development of guidance on psychosocial assessments of children deprived of liberty in the context of counter-terrorism, including child returnees from the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as of a national road map to support the rehabilitation and reintegration of juvenile detainees previously associated with terrorist groups.

31. In Africa, the United Nations supported Member States to enhance their reintegration capacities, including by promoting community dialogue to reduce stigma and recidivism. In Kenya, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) partnered with the National Counter-Terrorism Centre to train 35 civil society representatives and 44 psychologists on rehabilitation and psychosocial support for nearly 500 returnees, including young people. In Somalia, UNDP-led workshops in Mogadishu and Kismaayo promoted the community reintegration of 100 former members of terrorist groups.

B. International and regional cooperation

32. The United Nations continued to strengthen cooperation with Member States and international and regional organizations on counter-terrorism, with a focus on Africa, Central Asia and South and South-East Asia. Technical assistance was provided by the Global Terrorism Threats Facility to the Governments of Iraq, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Nigeria, Somalia, Tajikistan, Togo and Uganda, at their request and based on needs identified by the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate. This support strengthened national capacities to detect, prevent, respond to and investigate terrorist threats across diverse security contexts.

33. In October, UNDP co-hosted a regional workshop in Nairobi with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development at its Centre of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, bringing together 47 stakeholders from Kenya, Somalia and South Sudan. The workshop contributed to strengthening regional early warning and response system capacities and helped to embed the countering of violent extremism conducive to terrorism into peacebuilding frameworks.

34. UNODC enhanced international and regional cooperation to prevent and counter-terrorism and related crimes. In the Lake Chad basin region, UNODC supported consultations among the Governments of Cameroon, the Central African Republic and Chad to enhance cross-border coordination on the screening, prosecution and reintegration of persons associated with Boko Haram. It also collaborated with the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights of Chad to produce a compendium of international instruments and legislation, providing practitioners with an essential reference tool to advance international cooperation in terrorism-related cases.

35. UNOCA continued its cooperation with the Lake Chad Basin Commission on the revision of the territorial action plans that will guide the implementation of the revised Regional Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience Strategy for Areas Affected by Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin Region, adopted by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on 10 June 2025.

36. The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law launched an intelligence oversight working group for South and South-East Asia to facilitate peer-to-peer exchanges to improve the roles, responsibilities, independence and effectiveness of oversight and accountability mechanisms in the counter-terrorism context. The meeting of the Working Group brought together approximately 50 officials from Indonesia, Maldives, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand, officials of oversight bodies beyond the region and civil society representatives to foster international cooperation.

37. In October, UNOCT organized the Global Parliamentary Conference on Counter-Terrorism and Prevention of Violent Extremism in Istanbul, Türkiye. Over 150 in-person participants and leading international experts from 55 countries attended the conference and produced a report with a consolidated set of recommendations to strengthen legislative coherence, improve compliance with international law, enhance oversight of counter-terrorism policies and reinforce international and inter-parliamentary cooperation.⁶

⁶ Available at <https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/en/publication/global-parliamentary-conference-counter-terrorism-and-prevention-violent-extremism>.

C. Coordination and coherence across United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact entities

38. The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact, which comprises 46 entities, advanced technical and tailored support to Member States, including at a regional level, through enhanced coordination to support efforts to prevent and counter terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism, in line with the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. During the reporting period, the Counter-Terrorism Compact working groups held more than 15 meetings addressing counter-terrorism priorities, facilitated coordination on regional capacity-building initiatives, particularly in Africa, and advanced joint technical guidance and methodologies in areas such as border security management and critical infrastructure protection. At the request of the Government of Iraq, the Counter-Terrorism Compact Working Group on National and Regional Counter-Terrorism Strategies conducted a technical review of the draft national counter-terrorism strategy of Iraq for the period 2026–2030, providing recommendations to strengthen community resilience, human rights protections, gender-responsive measures, alignment with international legal frameworks, and mechanisms for international cooperation.

39. In December, within the framework of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights launched guidance⁷ on ensuring that measures to counter the financing of terrorism are risk-based, proportionate and implemented in a manner compliant with international law.

D. Supporting the victims of Da'esh

40. The United Nations continued to empower victims of terrorism as agents of change towards the building of meaningful and tailored support to victims and survivors worldwide. On 21 August, the International Day of Remembrance of and Tribute to the Victims of Terrorism, the Secretary-General acknowledged the difficulties faced by victims of terrorism and emphasized the need to amplify victims' voices, not just as recipients of assistance, but also as experts and peacebuilders. UNOCT organized two global forums and peer-to-peer exchanges, on 1 July and 3 September, to continue to operationalize the Victims of Terrorism Associations Network. These forums resulted in the development of victim-centred counter-terrorism approaches, including those addressing the risk of the stigmatization of victims in the media.

41. A regional conference on victims of terrorism in Africa, held by the Government of Morocco in Rabat, on 2 and 3 December, with the support of UNOCT, brought together high-level officials and victims of terrorism from across the African continent. UNOCT facilitated the participation of African members of the Victims of Terrorism Associations Network, allowing for direct peer connections among African victims and highlighting their expertise as peacebuilders and practitioners of counter-terrorism and peacebuilding.

42. In Burkina Faso, UNODC supported the operationalization of the National Road Map for Victims of Terrorism to help the transitional government to transition from the planning phase to active implementation. UNODC also supported the Government of Iraq in the development of a compendium of rights and support mechanisms for

⁷ Available at https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil.ctc/files/hr_cft_guidance_november_2025.pdf.

victims of terrorism and convened an expert meeting in Vienna in December, in cooperation with UNOCT, to initiate the development of a practical guidance document to support Member States in designing, coordinating and implementing comprehensive, rights-based assistance plans for victims of terrorism.

E. Border management and law enforcement

43. The United Nations continued to support efforts by Member States to prevent terrorists from acquiring and using weapons. UNOCT delivered technical support that enhanced the capacities of 269 officials from seven Member States in Africa, Central Asia, Latin America and the Middle East to implement Security Council resolution [2370 \(2017\)](#). These officials strengthened their capabilities to prevent, detect and counter the acquisition and use by terrorists of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons and their precursors, as well as small arms and light weapons, improvised explosive devices and unmanned aircraft systems and their components.

44. During the reporting period, the Integrated Border Stability Mechanism for West Africa, a United Nations-led multi-partner effort delivered jointly by UNOCT, IOM, UNODC and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), strengthened international and regional cooperation in West Africa and the Sahel, achieving tangible progress in border security coordination, including through the completion of a joint baseline assessment with the participating countries – Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, the Niger, Senegal and Togo. Conducted in close collaboration with national authorities and regional partners, the assessment directly informed targeted technical assistance. Phase II of the Mechanism was launched in July.

45. In September, on the margins of the sixty-ninth general conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, UNOCT, the Government of Morocco, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and UNODC held a high-level side event to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Attended by more than 200 representatives of Member States and international organizations, the event highlighted the continued importance and complementarities of these instruments and efforts made to achieve universal adherence and full implementation, with support provided by IAEA, UNOCT and UNODC.

46. In October, UNODC supported the adoption of the revised Lomé Recommendations on Preventing and Countering the Acquisition and Use of Improvised Explosive Devices by Terrorist Groups in West Africa.⁸

47. As part of the United Nations Countering Terrorist Travel Programme and in collaboration with implementing partners, including the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, UNODC, the International Civil Aviation Organization, INTERPOL and IOM, UNOCT strengthened the capacities of 90 beneficiaries and partner countries in the field of advance passenger information and passenger name records, in line with international law standards and human rights principles. The Programme expanded its number of partners, with Tunisia and Yemen joining the initiative, while cooperative agreements were established with the Governments of Armenia and Eswatini, broadening the global network for countering terrorist travel.

⁸ Available at https://www.thegctf.org/Portals/1/Documents/Framework%20Documents/2025/LomeRecs/GCTF_LomeRecs_EN.pdf?ver=Y4BvXacw-GjrV8nmw24zg%3D%3D.

48. In the first three quarters of 2025, the seven Member States currently using the United Nations-owned goTravel software processed 63 million passengers, reinforcing its role as an essential tool for effective and efficient threat identification. In the Philippines, goTravel was operationalized through the Advance Passenger Information System Operations Center of the Bureau of Immigration, enabling the collection and analysis of passenger data to identify suspected foreign terrorist fighters. In Côte d'Ivoire, with UNODC support under the Countering Terrorist Travel Programme, authorities adopted a decree related to advance passenger information and systems for the exchange of passenger name record data.

49. The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate published a report⁹ to raise awareness among Member States of the risk of the exploitation of maritime borders for terrorist travel, providing guidance on how to address this emerging vulnerability.

50. As part of a global programme led by UNOCT and involving the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) and the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations, the United Nations provided technical assistance to Kyrgyzstan, Mauritania, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to support the development of operational models for the protection of their vulnerable targets against terrorist attacks. The Executive Directorate supported Member States' efforts to protect vulnerable targets from terrorism through the publication, in partnership with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, of a trends report containing updates on the threats and gaps relating to critical infrastructure protection.¹⁰

F. Countering the financing of terrorism

51. United Nations, in close cooperation with the Financial Action Task Force and Financial Action Task Force-style regional bodies, entities continued to support Member States in their efforts to counter the financing of terrorism. UNOCT continued its global engagement with Financial Action Task Force-style regional bodies and, in close cooperation with the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, continued to gather good practices for the development of an addendum under the Office's virtual asset initiative and continued to ensure support for the coherent implementation of the Algeria Guiding Principles,¹¹ in partnership with the Federal Financial Monitoring Service of the Russian Federation (Rosfinmonitoring).

52. UNOCT supported Member States in Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East with regional capacity-building initiatives and training on countering the financing of terrorism, including through collaboration with the Islamic Military Counter-Terrorism Coalition, the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center and the Guardia di Finanza of Italy.

53. In September, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate published a trends report highlighting gaps across African countries in implementing the key provisions of Security Council resolutions regarding the countering of the financing of terrorism.¹² On the basis of assessment visits conducted on behalf of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, as well as of reports by the Financial Action Task

⁹ Available at www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil.ctc/files/final_maritime_security_and_api_pnr.pdf.

¹⁰ Available at www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil.ctc/files/cted-osce_trends_report_online_fin.pdf.

¹¹ S/2025/22, annex.

¹² Available at www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil.ctc/files/op_35_report_2025.pdf.

Force and Financial Action Task Force-style regional bodies, and in consultation with the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, the report contributed to informing the design of United Nations technical assistance and capacity-building projects.

54. UNODC continued to support Member States in West and East Africa to strengthen national frameworks with a focus on inter-agency coordination, implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions, financial investigation skills and links between terrorism and organized crime, as well as on the need to prevent the abuse of non-profit organizations and informal economies for the purposes of terrorist financing.

G. Impact of information and communications technologies and new technologies on counter-terrorism

55. As part of the CT TECH+ initiative launched in 2024, UNOCT supported the efforts of the Governments of Iraq, Ghana, Nigeria and Uzbekistan to develop comprehensive policy approaches to new technologies. In collaboration with INTERPOL, UNOCT continued to support Member States' counter-terrorism entities in acquiring new skills to conduct investigations online, including on the dark web and of virtual assets, and to use artificial intelligence. As a result, nine Member States, four of them in Africa, established core capabilities in the use of new technologies for counter-terrorism investigations.

56. The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, with UNODC and in coordination with UNOCT, organized an expert group meeting in Nairobi focusing on the implementation of Security Council resolution [2713 \(2023\)](#). A total of 70 officials from East African countries and other stakeholders attended the event, enhancing their understanding of law enforcement and building their capacity to implement community-level activities, including those related to the identification of threats and the strengthening of national capacities to detect and disrupt the use of the Internet, social media and video games by terrorist groups, including Da'esh and Al-Shabaab in Somalia. The Executive Directorate also published a report on terrorist exploitation of children¹³ and partnered with the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism to raise awareness about ongoing challenges faced by Member States in addressing the increasingly advanced digital methods developed by terrorist networks to target children worldwide.

57. UNODC built the capacities of Member States to address the terrorist exploitation of technology, including digital platforms, artificial intelligence and unmanned aircraft systems, and other emerging threats in South and South-East Asia and organized an expert group meeting for East African countries on detecting and disrupting terrorists' use of technology.

H. Countering terrorist narratives and engaging with communities to prevent and counter violent extremism conducive to terrorism

58. In November 2025, UNOCT, in partnership with UNICRI, launched a report on violent extremism and the exploitation of gaming in Africa.¹⁴ UNDP scaled up efforts to prevent violent extremism conducive to terrorism and to counter terrorist narratives

¹³ Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, "Growing alarm as terrorist exploitation of children rapidly evolves, outpacing Member State responses", CTED trends alert, October 2025.

¹⁴ UNICRI and UNOCT, *Level Up: Gaming and Violent Extremism in Africa*, (Turin, 2025).

in East Africa by promoting inclusive messaging and amplifying alternative narratives in the media, contributing to strengthened community resilience and institutional capacity across Kenya, South Sudan and Somalia. These interventions advanced survivor-informed approaches, elevated youth leadership and leveraged digital platforms to disseminate peace messages and counter violent extremist propaganda.

IV. Observations

59. The threat posed by Da'esh intensified steadily during the reporting period. While counter-terrorism efforts have curtailed the group's activities in Iraq and Somalia, the threat remains dynamic and diverse across multiple regions. While counter-terrorism efforts in Iraq led to a significant decrease in the number of attacks carried out by Da'esh, the group poses a persistent threat to the country. Da'esh cells continue to operate across the Syrian Arab Republic, where the group remains intent on actively exploiting security vacuums and uncertainty. By exploiting armed conflict, political instability and weak governance, Da'esh continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security, posing grave challenges to human rights and development. Addressing this persistent threat requires comprehensive, whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches that are rooted in the rule of law and fully compliant with international human rights norms and standards.

60. The situation in parts of Africa remains particularly concerning, with Da'esh affiliates asserting control over vast areas in West Africa and the Sahel. The continued territorial expansion of terrorist activity further exacerbates instability and undermines national efforts to address complex security, human rights and development challenges. In some countries, the activity of Da'esh affiliates has resulted in significant casualties, large-scale population displacements and loss of livelihood, as well as repeated interruptions of humanitarian assistance, in particular in remote and frontier areas. The gravity of the situation demands that regional Member States exercise political ownership to forge unified, coherent and joint responses to critical challenges. In that regard, I urge the Member States of the Lake Chad Basin Commission to preserve the cohesion of its Multinational Joint Task Force, which plays a critical role in countering Da'esh. The United Nations will continue to collaborate with Member States, as well as with the African Union and subregional organizations, to address the threat of terrorism on the continent.

61. I remain gravely concerned about the dire situation in Hawl and Rawj camps and other facilities in the north-east of the Syrian Arab Republic, where thousands of individuals, most of them women and girls, still face insecurity and human rights violations, as well as limited access to humanitarian assistance. The acute lack of basic services, the high risks of violence, including sexual and gender-based violence, arbitrary detention and the absence of education not only represent a humanitarian catastrophe and a violation of international human rights law, but also provide fertile ground for terrorist groups, such as Da'esh, to exploit and radicalize individuals to terrorism. I continue to call on Member States with nationals in these facilities to boost their efforts to facilitate the safe, voluntary and dignified repatriation of all those individuals in line with Member States' obligations under international law, including the requirement to treat the best interests of the child as a primary consideration.

62. While advances in technology offer opportunities and promise for counter-terrorism, I am alarmed by the increasing use by terrorist groups, including Da'esh, of new and emerging technologies for terrorism. I call upon Member States to strengthen collaboration with the United Nations to address this challenge and to promote the responsible use of new technologies for counter-terrorism in compliance

with international law, including through the provision, upon request, of targeted capacity-building and technical assistance.

63. The United Nations, through its Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact, will continue to support Member States in implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and relevant Security Council resolutions. I call upon Member States to strengthen their cooperation with the United Nations to ensure the delivery of timely, needs-driven and effective assistance, especially to countries on the front line of efforts to prevent and counter terrorism.

Annex

Thirty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution [2734 \(2024\)](#) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities

The report was issued as document [S/2026/44](#).
