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# Summary of Stakeholders' submissions on Pakistan*

## Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

## I. Background

1. The present report was prepared pursuant to Human Rights Council resolutions 5/1 and 16/21, taking into consideration the periodicity of the universal periodic review. It is a summary of 43 stakeholders' submissions[1] to the universal periodic review, presented in a summarized manner owing to word-limit constraints.

## II. Information provided by stakeholders

### A. Scope of international obligations[2] and cooperation with international human rights mechanisms and bodies[3]

2. A number of submissions recommended that Pakistan become a party to ICCPR-OP1, ICCPR-OP2, OP-ICESCR, ICPPED, ICRMW, OP-CAT, OP-CRC-IC, OP-CEDAW, OP-CRPD, the Rome Statute of the ICC, the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, Protocol to Prevent, Supress and Punish Trafficking in Persons especially Women and Children, and ILO Convention No. 189 on domestic workers.[4]

3. Amnesty International (AI), International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), National Commission for Human Rights Pakistan (NCHR), Scholars at Risk Network (SAR), Joint Submission 12 (JS12) and Joint Submission (JS17) recommended that Pakistan extend a standing invitation to special procedures.[5] Joint Submission (JS11) recommended that

* The present document was not edited before being sent to United Nations translation services.

Pakistan prioritise country visits by Special Procedures with pending requests and ensuring timely reporting to Treaty Bodies and responses to communications from Special Procedures, and implementation of recommendations made by these mechanisms.[6]

## B. National human rights framework[7]

4. Joint Submission 8 (JS8) stated that Pakistan had developed no proper follow up plans for implementation of previous UPR recommendations.[8] NCHR recommended taking necessary measures to disseminate them and ensuring their effective implementation through an independent monitoring body.[9]

5. JUBILEE noted that, in May 2015, the Government had authorized NCHR to conduct inquiries on human rights violations, however, had not provided it with budget.[10] Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW), International Human Rights Committee (IHRC7), Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), and Joint Submission (JS20) expressed concern about the limited mandate of the Commission to investigate human rights violations involving the armed forces and security agencies.[11]

6. NCHR and JS8 recommended establishing the long awaited independent National Commission on the Rights of the Child.[12]

7. NCHR stated that, after the 18th Amendment to the Constitution in 2010, a bulk of responsibilities with regards to human rights had been transferred to the provinces. However, their mandates often overlapped and created confusion.[13]

8. JS11 noted that, in 2014, the Supreme Court had ordered the establishment of a National Council for the Rights of Minorities. However, no representatives of minority groups had been consulted in the process of its establishment, and it was yet to be formally established.[14]

9. Concerning including human rights education in school curricula[15], Joint Submission (JS13) stated that there was a need to expedite its process and involve National and Provincial Human Rights Commissions and human rights experts from religious minorities.[16]

## C. Implementation of international human rights obligations, taking into account applicable international humanitarian law

### 1. Cross cutting issues

*Equality and non-discrimination*[17]

10. Joint Submission 5 (JS5) stated that discrimination against religious minorities was embedded in several laws and the Constitution. Though some legislative measures did exist to support minorities, effective implementation of such measures in practice had been lacking.[18]

11. Muslims for Progressive Values (MPV) stated that blasphemy legislation bolstered and sustained societal attitudes of discrimination against religious and ethnic minorities. Such laws provided a legal and institutional platform for non-state actors to discriminate against them.[19]

12. JS13 noted a lack of political participation of religious minorities.[20] JS11 stated that the Constitution limited the posts of President, Prime Minister and Speaker of National Assembly to Muslims.[21] ADF International expressed similar concern.[22]

13. JS5 indicated that five per cent of government positions were reserved for minority groups. However, the only type of employment allocated for minorities were generally low skilled janitorial jobs.[23] Joint Submission 14 (JS14) and Joint Submission 17 (JS17) expressed similar concern.[24]

14. JS13 noted that Hindus and Christians were suffering discrimination in an Islamic society. Furthermore, Dalits fell victim to caste-based discrimination. Thus, Scheduled Castes/ Dalits suffered double or intersecting forms of discrimination.[25]

15. Concerning recommendations to combat discrimination against religious minorities and castes[26], JS13 stated that Pakistan had not taken specific actions aimed at eliminating the practice of discrimination against Scheduled Castes, eradicating their poverty and deprivation of basic necessities, including health, and prohibiting their forced conversion.[27]

16. Joint Submission 9 (JS9) noted that the Hindu minority was particularly affected by oppressive national laws and discrimination.[28] Most bonded labourers in Sindh belonged to the Hindu minority, mainly belonging to the Scheduled Castes.[29]

17. Joint Submission 7 (JS7) stated that, due to the criminalization of homosexuality in the Penal Code, LGBTIQ individuals were reluctant to reveal their sexual orientation and identity. The Supreme Court granted transgender people the right to vote and attain a National Identity Card in 2011, but this had not been translated into legal and policy remedies to guarantee their rights.[30] Joint Submission 15 (JS15) reported that transgender people, in particular transgender women, faced harassment, mistreatment and exclusion from society.[31]

18. Kaleidoscope Australia Human Rights Foundation (KHRF) recommended that Pakistan: decriminalise consensual same-sex sexual relations; introduce laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status in all areas of public life; introduce legislation recognising the rights of same-sex couples, including the right to marry and parenting rights; and codify the recent fatwa recognising marriage, inheritance and funeral rights for transgender people into binding legislation.[32]

*Development, the environment, and business and human rights*[33]

19. Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) stated that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) was being implemented against the express will of the local indigenous population. It noted the collateral air pollution and the Government's secrecy around the project. In Sindh, stakeholders had not been involved at any stage of the project. In Balochistan, people were suffering from land grabs and enforced displacement due to CPEC-related projects.[34]

*Human rights and counter-terrorism*[35]

20. Concerning recommendation on the reform of the judiciary[36], Human Rights Watch (HRW) indicated that Pakistan had approved the functioning of secret military courts empowered to try civilians and impose the death penalty in terrorism-related cases for a period of two years.[37]

21. Ahmadiyya Muslim Lawyers Association (AMLA), CSW and IHRC7 stated counter-terrorism authorities had used the framework of the National Action Plan to arrest and prosecute vulnerable Ahmadis as "terrorists" under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1997.[38]

22. AI noted allegations of arbitrary arrest and detention in connection with counter-terrorism operations. The Protection of Pakistan Act, 2004 allowed for preventive detention for up to 90 days and for law enforcement officials to carry out searches without a warrant and to arrest people without judicial approval for a range of offences.[39]

23. Privacy International indicated that the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016, drafted to combat terrorism, utilised such overly broad language that it weakened the right to privacy and potentially criminalised freedom of expression.[40]

24. Organization for Defending Victims of Violence (ODVV) stated that there were still reports of drone attacks killing civilians.[41]

## 2. Civil and Political Rights

*Right to life, liberty and security of person*[42]

25. UNPO regretted that the decision of Pakistan to lift the moratorium on the death penalty in December 2014 contravened repeated recommendations made by many states.[43] Joint Submission (JS4) stated that, while originally the moratorium had been lifted only for terrorism cases, in March 2015, Pakistan had extended the resumption of executions for other offences, such as kidnapping and drug-trafficking.[44]

26. The Child Rights International Network (CRIN) noted that, since Pakistan had lifted its moratorium, it had carried out the death penalty for child offenders.[45] JS4 stated that lack of birth registration remained a major obstacle to juvenile justice. The police often recorded the age of the accused on the basis of a cursory visual assessment.[46]

27. JS4 also indicated that Pakistan had no legislative provision that expressly protected people with psycho-social disabilities from the death penalty.[47]

28. Front Line Defenders (FLD) stated that brutal sectarian violence and numerous killings of human rights defenders in Balochistan had forced most NGOs to close their offices. Human rights defenders working to defend the rights of women in the tribal areas faced the highest risks.[48]

29. Joint Submission 6 (JS6) indicated that extra-judicial killings often came after prolonged enforced disappearance[49] and that the victims in Sindh were mostly political activists.[50] FLD noted that human rights defenders working on issues of minority rights, religious freedom and land-grabs were at increased risk of enforced disappearance.[51] JS12 stated that media workers reporting on national security issues were particularly at risk.[52]

30. HRCP and HRW stated that Pakistan had accepted a recommendation to specifically criminalize enforced disappearances in the Penal Code[53], however, that it had failed to uphold that commitment.[54] JS11 and ICJ made similar observations.[55]

31. HRCP stated that Pakistan had enacted new legislation that facilitated the perpetration of enforced disappearances, including Action in Aid of Civil Power Regulation 2011 and the Protection of Pakistan Act 2014, which had the impact of legalising forms of secret, unacknowledged, and incommunicado detention.[56]

32. HRCP continued that, despite accepting recommendation 122.114[57] to take effective measures against enforced disappearances by strengthening the Commission of Inquiry, Pakistan had failed to strengthen and allocate sufficient resources to the Commission.[58] Furthermore, despite the acceptance of recommendations to reinforce its efforts to fight impunity regarding cases of enforced disappearance recommendations[59], Pakistan had failed to make efforts to bring perpetrators of enforced disappearances to justice at all levels.[60]

33. JS6 reported that, depending on the source, official numbers of the cases of enforced disappearances varied. Many instances went unreported because of fear of repercussions for the victims or those who reported their disappearance.[61]

34. JS11 noted that confessions obtained through torture were the basis upon which the anti-terrorism courts were handing down death sentences.[62] ICJ, JS4, and JS11 indicated

that, despite its obligations under CAT to enact an anti-torture law, Pakistan had not done so.[63]

35. AI indicated that domestic law did not provide for an independent mechanism to monitor the conditions of prisons. Those awaiting trial were mixed with convicted prisoners, and many of the country's jails were overcrowded.[64]

*Administration of justice, including impunity and the rule of law*[65]

36. JS11 stated that the criminal justice system had completely collapsed. The Government had outsourced the entire judicial process to the military. This was the third time that military courts had been established, citing unusual circumstances; however, this was the first time that military courts had been established through a constitutional amendment to silence any dissent from the Supreme Court.[66] JS11 recommended that Pakistan ensure the abolition of the military courts and parallel justice system in the form of *jirgas*.[67]

37. JS4 stated that many death penalty cases were heard by the anti-terrorism courts under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. JS4 and William S. Richardson School of Law at University of Hawaii (UH Law School) indicated that these courts explicitly imposed multiple curtailments on a defendant's right to a fair trial.[68]

38. ICJ stated that the proceedings before military courts fell far short of national and international fair trial standards: judges were part of the executive branch of the State and continued to be subjected to military command; the right to appeal to civilian courts was not available; the right to a public hearing was not guaranteed; a duly reasoned, written judgment was denied; the procedures of military courts, the selection of cases to be referred to them, the location and timing of trial, and details about the alleged offences were kept secret; the right to legal counsel of choice was denied; and a very high number of convictions were based on "confessions" without adequate safeguards against torture and ill treatment.[69] ICJ furthermore indicated that, in March 2017, Parliament had once again passed legislation to renew the jurisdiction of military courts to try civilian terrorism suspects in secret trials for another two years.[70]

39. FLD stated that the use of the judicial system against human rights defenders was widespread. Fabricated charges of blasphemy had been used repeatedly against human rights defenders.[71]

40. HRW indicated that no progress had been made concerning supported recommendation 122.118[72] and 122.119[73] on bringing to justice perpetrators of attacks on journalists and introducing strong legislation prohibiting such attacks.[74]

41. Concerning recommendations to ttake measures to prevent discrimination and violence against religious minorities and bring those responsible to justice[75], JS13 stated that, religiously motivated violent incidents were increasing, however, that the law enforcement agencies rarely investigated such incidents.[76]

42. JS6 noted the culture of impunity in cases of enforced disappearances and extra-judicial killing. Many of the crimes had been committed in broad daylight, by uniformed security personnel, or by men arriving in police vehicles.[77] JS4 stated that torture was still accepted as an inevitable part of law enforcement and that perpetrators of torture were granted virtual impunity.[78]

43. ICJ stated that the Torture, Custodial Death and Custodial Rape (Prevention & Punishment) Bill, 2014, provided that, where a complaint of torture was made against members of the armed forces or intelligence agencies, the Federal Investigating Agency must first "seek directions" from the Federal Government before launching an

investigation. According to ICJ, this proposed provision attempted to shield security agencies from criminal proceedings and impeded victims' right to remedy.[79]

*Fundamental freedoms and the right to participate in public and political life*[80]

44. Joint Submission 16 (JS16) stated that Pakistan had not fully implemented recommendations to promote media and civil society, bring the perpetrators of attacks on journalists to justice, and enact legislation to stop such incidents.[81] JS12 indicated that Pakistan had failed to implement the recommendations relating to civil society space but rather imposed more restrictions.[82]

45. HRW stated that, during the second cycle UPR, Pakistan had agreed to ensure accountability for violent attacks on religious minorities. Pakistan had also agreed to adopt measures to prevent the abuse of blasphemy laws, and halt forced conversions. Nevertheless, since 2012, religious minorities had faced sharply increased insecurity and persecution, such as attacks on Shia mosques and Sufi shrines and against Ahmadis and Christians.[83]

46. ODVV indicated that, despite the fact that the Constitution guaranteed the minority rights to freely practice their religion, religious minorities faced discrimination in both law and practice.[84] JS11 stated that Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus, and Hazara Shias were not allowed to openly profess their beliefs; their properties and even graves were not exempted from being vandalized by fundamentalists.[85]

47. CSW noted that the Shia community had faced systematic persecution in the form of sectarian violence.[86] AI and ODVV noted that the Hazara Shia community in Quetta continued to be targeted.[87]

48. CSW stated that anti-Ahmadi legislation defined the Ahmadi profession of faith as "anti-Islamic".[88] IHRC7 also noted that it was an offense if an Ahmadi believed and expressed his/her true belief that s/he was Muslim.[89] The 2nd amendment to the Constitution declared that Ahmadis were non-Muslims despite their own belief.[90]

49. MPV noted that the Penal Code prohibited Ahmadis from self-identifying as Muslim and participating in Islamic culture and worship with a sentence of three years in prison and a fine. However, the societal ramification of such institutionalized discrimination was often much more egregious. Ahmadis were often violently persecuted and sometimes murdered by non-state actors.[91]

50. AMLA indicated that Pakistan required every citizen applying for a passport to declare his/her faith. If a person wished to declare himself/herself Muslim, s/he must declare that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Qadiani, founder of Ahmadiyya, was an imposter. Pakistanis who wished to obtain a National Identity Card were required to make a similar declaration. The passport declaration prevented Ahmadis from performing Hajj.[92]

51. According to JS9, the incidence of forced conversion and marriage of non-Muslim girls had noticeably increased.[93] CSW indicated that such incidents were prevalent in Sindh province. Hindu and Christian girls and women were systematically targeted by Muslim men, kidnapped, converted to Islam and married to the abductor or third party without their informed consent.[94]

52. CSW, Nonviolent Radical Party Transnational Transparty (NRPTT), JUBILEE, JS5 and JS14 noted that, due to massive pressure from conservative and extremist Islamic groups, the Sindh Assembly had retracted a bill against forced conversions in 2016 (Criminal Law (Protection of Minorities) Act).[95]

53. UNPO stated that Pakistan had made no effort to comply with numerous recommendations to modify/repeal blasphemy laws.[96] ICJ indicated that Pakistan had also

accepted two recommendations on preventing the abuse of the blasphemy laws, however, failed to address them in law or in practice.[97]

54. ADF International stated that blasphemy laws were interpreted widely and had been applied to people speaking out against Islam or its prophets.[98] AI indicated that Ahmadis and Christians had been attacked and killed following a mere allegation of blasphemy.[99]

55. Joint Submission (JS18) noted that, in March 2017, the Islamabad High Court had ordered the Interior Ministry to scrutinize the internet to remove all instances of 'blasphemous content' online 'even if it meant blocking all access to social media platforms'.[100]

56. SAR noted violence against professors and higher education institutions under the blasphemy law.[101] JS18 stated that there was a strong concern of growing online and offline surveillance over progressive and liberal academics, and literary figures, due to which many resorted to self-censorship.[102]

57. JS18 indicated that Pakistan did not implement previous recommendations 122.75[103], 122.101[104] and 122.118[105] to promote civil society and the media, protect the right to life and freedom of expression of human rights defenders, and bring to justice perpetrators of attacks on journalists.[106] JS20 stated that recommendations from last UPR to decriminalize defamation had not been implemented.[107]

58. JS8, JS16 and JS20 noted that freedom of speech and expression was guaranteed as a fundamental right under Article 19 of the Constitution; however, the limitations permitted under this provision were broad, vague, prone to abuse and not recognised by international human rights law.[108]

59. JS20 reported about censorship of broadcast channels and programmes by the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority, which lacked sufficient procedural safeguards.[109] Joint Submission 10 (JS10) stated that broad definitions and unclear procedures under the Penal Code, Anti-Terrorism Act and other laws regulating artistic expression enabled arbitrary, abusive and disproportionate interpretation and application of the laws.[110] JS3 recommended amending the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016 to decriminalise dissent and restrict criminalisation to hate speech.[111]

60. JS12 reported that the police could refuse to give a permit to organise an assembly if they believed that it could cause a breach of the peace. In October 2016, police carried out mass arbitrary arrests and fired tear gas and rubber bullets at protestors supporting the opposition Tehreek-e-Insaf party. On 31 October 2016, the leaders of the party were arrested for one day. In response to the protests, the Federal Government banned all public gatherings in Islamabad for two months.[112]

61. AI noted that a new policy for the regulation of international NGOs, announced in October 2015, gave powers to the Ministry of Interior to review their registration based on their funding sources and the nature of their programmes. All international NGOs had been directed to re-apply for registration; however, many were still awaiting the outcome of their applications.[113] JS12, JS14 and JS16 expressed similar concern.[114]

62. JS12 indicated that Pakistan had demonstrated its hostility towards human rights defenders through official interventions at the United Nations. In December 2015, Pakistan was one of the states that voted against the General Assembly resolution on human rights defenders.[115]

63. AMLA stated that Ahmadis were denied the right to freely and fairly vote in local, provincial and national elections.[116] CSW indicated that Ahmadis had to declare themselves as non-Muslims in order to vote.[117] HRCP stated the Ahmadis had, for decades,

disassociated from elections, resulting in Ahmadis having no representation, be it national, provincial or district level.[118] IHRC7 expressed similar concern.[119]

*Prohibition of all forms of slavery*[120]

64. Concerning developing a clear implementation and monitoring plan for the abolition of bonded labour[121], JS13 stated that bonded labour was widespread, particularly in agriculture and brick making, and the majority of victims were Scheduled Caste Hindus, Christians and Sikhs.[122]

65. JS13 added that, following the 18th amendment to the Constitution in 2010, Sindh, Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces had adopted Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 2015. However, the Government had failed to secure a single conviction of the bonded labour perpetrators.[123] NRPTT expressed similar concern.[124]

*Right to privacy and family life*[125]

66. JS18 noted that the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act posed a serious threat to the right to privacy, as it legitimized the State's ability to access digital communications of citizens, retain service provider's specified data for a minimum of one-year and share it with foreign governments and agencies.[126] Digital Rights Foundation (DRF) expressed similar concern.[127]

67. PI recommended that Pakistan take measures to ensure that its State security and intelligence agencies respect the right to privacy; ensure that all interception activities comply with the principles of legality, proportionality and necessity; and ensure that they are subject to independent oversight mechanisms.[128]

68. JS5 noted the adoption of the Hindu Marriage Bill, which aimed at protecting Hindu marriages and family rights.[129] UNPO noted that Sindh also passed a law that finally recognised Hindu marriages.[130]

69. JS17 stated that the Christian Divorce Act, 1869 and Christian Marriage Act, 1872 had not been reviewed for nearly 150 years. These laws were not only stringent, but also inconsistent with the standards of gender equality in marriage.[131]

70. UNPO noted that Canada and Austria had recommended Pakistan to prevent underage and forced marriage as well as forced conversion through marriage, however, that these recommendations had not been implemented. In 2016, due to immense pressure form the Council of Islamic Ideology, the National Assembly had withdrawn a bill stipulating the minimum age for marriage to be increased to 18.[132]

71. Joint Submission 2 (JS2) indicated that the Sindh Assembly had adopted the Sindh Child Marriage Restraint Act, 2013, which increased the minimum age of marriage for girls to 18. However, JS13 indicated that the courts were failing to implement the Act, especially in cases concerning Hindu Dalit minors. The absence of birth registration among the Scheduled Caste Hindu community was a significant hurdle to the implementation of the Act.[133]

72. JS2 noted that, in Punjab, a Bill introducing harsh penalties for marriages below 16 years had been adopted. However, it did not raise the age of marriage for girls.[134]

## 3. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

*Right to work and to just and favourable conditions of work*[135]

73. NCHR reported that economic growth had not been equitable and a significant proportion of workers earned less than 100USD per month. It recommended ensuring the implementation of minimum wage standards.[136]

74. According to NCHR, there were no independent laws in place that instructed occupational health and safety. Incidents such as the Baldia Factory fire resulting in the death of over 200 workers and the Gedani shipbreaking incident in 2016 exemplified this problem. NCHR recommended strengthening legal provisions on occupational health and safety to make them compliant with ICESCR.[137]

75. HRCP stated that, in February 2015, the Federal Ombudsman proposed an amendment to the Protection of Women from Harassment in the Workplace Act, 2010, to extend the definition of 'workplace' to include workplaces of domestic servants and homebased workers. However, the amendment had not been adopted.[138] JS8 recommended the adoption of the long awaited Domestic Workers Bill.[139]

*Right to an adequate standard of living*[140]

76. JS8 stated that Pakistan had failed to comply with its commitments to achieve the MDGs, specifically those related to eradicating child poverty, achieving universal primary education, reducing mortality rates and improving maternal health. Pakistan's social indicators had consistently failed to match its economic progress. There were still no specific plans of action in place to achieve the SDGs. There was no involvement of the CSOs in the process of monitoring its progress.[141]

*Right to health*[142]

77. NCHR indicated that the Government spent barely 0.42 per cent of the GDP on health and recommended immediately raising the GDP allocation on health.[143]

78. JS8 recommended that legislation be adopted at the federal and provincial levels to make immunization compulsory.[144] It also recommended prioritizing policies and programmes on nutrition, vaccination, and health workers to reduce maternal, neonatal, and child mortality and making sufficient budgetary allocations.[145]

79. JS7 noted marked gender inequalities in access to education and health care. Most of the schools in the rural areas did not have a toilet, which made it nearly impossible for girls to attend school once they started menstruating, hence increasing the drop out ratio. Social norms enforcing segregation between males and females restricted mobility of unmarried young girls, limiting their access to basic health care.[146]

*Right to education*[147]

80. NCHR stated that less than two per cent of the GDP was allocated to education.[148] Joint Submission 19 (JS19) indicated that almost one in every five children of primary school age was not in school. Insufficient domestic prioritisation and financing continued to undermine the realisation of the right to education.[149]

81. Concerning recommendations on the right to education[150], JS19 stated that the situation had not improved, especially within the context of access to quality education for all, regardless of social class, gender or ethnicity.[151]

82. JS19 stated that the growth of privatization of education with the support of State and bilateral international donors threatened to further infringe upon the realization of the right to education.[152]

83. JS17 stated that recommendations on reviewing public school curricula to eliminate prejudice against minorities[153] had not been implemented.[154] JS14 indicated that the curriculum was religiously and gender biased and historically distorted, inciting intolerance and prejudice.[155]

### 4. Rights of specific persons or groups

*Women*[156]

84. UNPO indicated that support for eliminating gender inequality remained low and that the recommendations by Germany, Australia and others to adequately fund and empower the National Commission on the Status of Women had not been implemented.[157]

85. UNPO stated that Sharia law was still being applied in combination with civil law, which resulted in a continued devaluation of women's testimony in court and the denial of child custody after divorce.[158]

86. HRCP stated that recommendations on violence against women and domestic violence[159] had been partially implemented, as the Punjab Protection of Women against Violence Act, 2016 had been passed into law in March 2016.[160]

87. HRCP noted the adoption of the Offences in the Name or Pretext of Honour Act 2016 and Anti-Rape Law. However, HRCP and ODVV indicated that the law had many loopholes[161] which left room for perpetrators to escape punishment.[162] UH Law School also noted continuous challenges that could prevent honour killing convictions, such as underreporting, lack of evidence, and a perceived religious justification.[163]

88. JS5 stated that minority women were doubly subject to discrimination for being a woman and a minority. Minority women of lower castes are particularly vulnerable to kidnapping and forced conversion.[164]

89. AI stated that access to justice remained difficult for women. Police officers and lawyers often encouraged survivors of violence to reach "out-of-court" settlements. Female officers made up less than one per cent of the police force.[165] UNPO also stated that, as of 2016, no effort had been made to address repeated recommendations to introduce mandatory gender sensitivity trainings for police officers.[166]

90. HRW stated that women had been denied the right to vote in various parts of the country. In May 2015, during a parliamentary by-election in Lower Dir District in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, none of the eligible 50,000 women in the constituency had voted after warnings reportedly broadcast on mosque loudspeakers.[167]

91. DRF noted that there was a stark gender gap in the usage and ownership of mobile phones. Internet was shut down in highly security areas like Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Balochistan. However, women were not able to travel to internet cafes because of their gender.[168] Furthermore, "eVAW" was increasing with the proliferation of digital communication. This included online violence, such as harassment in digital spaces, and offline violence as a result of online activity.[169] JS16 expressed similar concern.[170]

*Children*[171]

92. JS8 recommended taking legal and administrative measures to remove obstacles to birth registration, particularly for vulnerable children in society, e.g. sex workers' children,

children in street situations, children with variant abilities and orphans, and harmonizing laws related to birth registration across the country.[172]

93. Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children (GIEACPC) noted that corporal punishment of children was not fully unlawful in any settings and recommended its prohibition in all settings, including the home, throughout the territory.[173]

94. JS2 reported that children working in small hotels, restaurants and in the deep-sea fishing and transport industries were among the most susceptible to sexual exploitation. Unlike female prostitution, the sexual exploitation of boys was more visible. More freedom of movement allowed to boys put them at higher risk. Boys were reported to be sexually abused also in schools or madrassas. Transgendered children were also at heightened risk.[174]

95. JS8 indicated that the absence of recognition of child domestic labour as a worst form of child labour made it very difficult to produce a precise estimate of its scale and impact.[175]

96. JS2 noted that most children were trafficked domestically, mainly from rural and other poor areas to urban areas.[176]

97. CRIN and JS8 noted the enactment of the Criminal Laws (Second Amendment) Act, 2016 whereby the minimum age of criminal responsibility had been increased from seven years to ten years in the Penal Code.[177]

98. HRCP stated that the amendments to the Army Act 1952 had not expressly excluded juveniles from trial before military courts.[178] JS8 noted that the Protection of Pakistan Act 2014 gave it an overriding effect over other laws, including the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance of 2000, which prohibited the preventive detention of children below 15 years of age.[179]

*Persons with disabilities*[180]

99. Concerning working for the welfare of persons with disabilities[181], HRW indicated that the implementation of CRPD was very slow. As state party, Pakistan was obliged to provide adequate health care, support, and procedural adjustments to enable people with disabilities to participate in the judicial process. Yet adequate safeguards for them had not been put in place. Some individuals with physical or psychosocial disabilities were on death row in very difficult conditions, including in solitary confinement.[182]

*Minorities and indigenous peoples*[183]

100. UNPO indicated that Pakistan had not recognized non-religious minorities, such as the Sindhi, Balochi or the indigenous predominantly Shia peoples of Gilgit-Baltistan.[184]

101. Cultural Survival (CS) stated that many indigenous peoples lived within the borders of Pakistan, yet the Government refused to acknowledge them and referred to them as ethnic minorities. The Koochis, Rebari, Bakarwal, Kehal, Jogi, Kabootra, Sanyasi and Kalash were indigenous peoples in Pakistan.[185]

102. CS continued that, while Pakistan had yet to recognize the Kalash as indigenous peoples, the Government did recognize Kalasha as a separate religion.[186] However, Kalasha was constantly under threat as attempts were made to voluntarily and forcibly convert the Kalash to Islam.[187]

103. CS indicated that, as of August 2012, there were nine Kalasha primary schools, funded partly or fully by non-profit organizations. In these schools, children were taught the Kalasha language and about Kalasha religion and culture. However, there were no

secondary schools teaching in the Kalasha language or about Kalasha religion and culture.[188]

*Refugees and internally displaced persons*[189]

104. AI was concerned that refugees were being repatriated to a third country, which continued to experience conflict and instability, possibly in violation of the prohibition of non-refoulement. Those left behind faced an uncertain future and harassment by the authorities.[190]

105. Joint Submission 1 (JS1) noted that the military operation *Zarb-e-Azb* in 2014 in northwest of Pakistan, had resulted in over one million displaced people in 2015. It indicated that a lack of a national IDP policy had serious implications for the fulfillment of basic human rights of IDPs.[191] JS1 also stated that IDPs from FATA were marginalized, as most legal frameworks were not applicable to them, further compounding violations of their rights, particularly women.[192]

*Notes*

[1] The stakeholders listed below have contributed information for this summary; the full texts of all original submissions are available at: www.ohchr.org.
*Civil society*
*Individual submissions:*

| | |
|---|---|
| ADF International | ADF International, Geneva (Switzerland); |
| AI | Amnesty International, London (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland); |
| AMLA | Ahmadiyya Muslim Lawyers Association, Washington DC (United States of America); |
| CRIN | The Child Rights International Network, London, (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland); |
| CS | Cultural survival, Cambridge, Massachusetts (United States of America); |
| CSW | Christian Solidarity Worldwide, New Malden (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland); |
| DRF | Digital Rights Foundation, Lahore (Pakistan); |
| FLD | Front Line Defenders, Dublin (Ireland); |
| GIEACPC | Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children, London (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland); |
| HRCP | Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Lahore (Pakistan); |
| HRW | Human Rights Watch, Geneva (Switzerland); |
| ICJ | International Commission of Jurists, Geneva (Switzerland); |
| IHRC7 | International Human Rights Committee, London (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland); |
| JUBILEE | Jubilee Campaign, Fairfax, Virginia (United States of America); |
| KHRF | Kaleidoscope Australia Human Rights Foundation, Clayton (Australia); |
| MPV | Muslims for Progressive Values, Los Angeles (United States of America); |
| NRPTT | Nonviolent Radical Party, Transnational Transparty, Rome (Italy); |
| ODVV | Organization for Defending Victims of Violence, Tehran (Iran, Islamic Republic of); |

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| PI | Privacy International, London (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland); |
| SAR | Scholars at Risk Network, New York (United States of America); |
| UH Law School | William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii, Honolulu (United States of America); |
| UNPO | Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, The Hague (Netherlands). |

*Joint submissions:*

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| JS1 | **Joint submission 1 submitted by:** Women's Regional Network, FATA Commission of Human Rights, Khwendo Kor, Academia, Noor Education Trust, Human Development Organization Doaba, EVAW Alliance, Community Awareness and Resource Development, Democracy Reporting International, Provincial Civil Society Network, Community Rise Programme, Shirkat Gah, FATA Lawyers Forum, Strengthening Participatory Organization, The Hawwa Lur, Peshawar Singh Sewa Society, Society for Rural Development, Legal Awareness and Advocacy Services, FATA NGOs' Alliance, The Rising Hope, Blue Veins, Aurat Foundation, National Youth Organization, Diocese of Peshawar, South Asia Partnership-PK, Media, Faith Friends Welfare Organization, FATA Youth Empowerment and Development Association. Takara Qabilee Khwendy, and Women Action Forum Peshawar; |
| JS2 | **Joint submission 2 submitted by:** ECPAT International and Pakistan Paediatric Association; |
| JS3 | **Joint submission 3 submitted by:** RSF-RWB and Freedom network (Pakistan); |
| JS4 | **Joint submission 4 submitted by:** Reprieve, World Organisations Against Torture (OMCT), Justice Project Pakistan (JPP), and World Coalition Against the Death Penalty (WCADP); |
| JS5 | **Joint submission 5 submitted by:** Global Human Rights Defence and Human Rights Focus Pakistan (HRFP); |
| JS6 | **Joint submission 6 submitted by:** World Sindhi Congress and Asian Legal Resource Centre; |
| JS7 | **Joint submission 7 submitted by:** The Sexual Rights Initiative, Rahnuma Family Planning Association of Pakistan on behalf of Right Here Right Now Alliance, Pakistan; |
| JS8 | **Joint submission 8 submitted by:** Child Rights Movement; |
| JS9 | **Joint submission 9 submitted by:** Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization and World Sindhi Congress; |
| JS10 | **Joint submission 10 submitted by:** Freemuse and Shirkat Gah; |
| JS11 | **Joint submission 11 submitted by:** Asian Legal Resource Centre, Women In Struggle for Empowerment (WISE), World Sindhi Congress (WSC), and The Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO); |
| JS12 | **Joint submission 12 submitted by:** CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation; |
| JS13 | **Joint submission 13 submitted by:** International Dalit Solidarity Network and Pakistan Dalit Solidarity Network; |
| JS14 | **Joint submission 14 submitted by:** The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, the Center for Legal |

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| | Assistance, and Settlement, and the Christian Conference of Asia; |
| JS15 | **Joint submission 15 submitted by:** Forum for Dignity Initiatives-FDI, Blue Veins. Forum for Dignity Initiatives, Dareecha Male Health Alliance, Dostana Male Health Alliance, GIA Foundation, Humraz Male Health Society, HYPE- Multan and Karachi Network, Khawaja Sira Society, NAZ Pakistan, Pireh Male Health Society, Sub Rang Society, Transaction, Wajood, Dr.Fahad Abbasi, Maya Zaman, and Inaya Zarakhel; |
| JS16 | **Joint submission 16 submitted by:** Bytes for All, Pakistan (B4A), Association for Progressive Communications (APC), Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA), Aurat Foundation (AF), Association of Women for Awareness and Motivation (AWAM), Association for Women's Awareness and Rural Development (AWARD), Center for Social Justice (CSJ), Coalition on Rights and Responsibilities of Youth (CRY), Institute of Development Research and Corresponding Capabilities (IDRAC), Media Matters for Democracy (MMFD), National Commission for Justice and Peace (NCJP), Pakhtunkhwa Civil Society Network (PCSN), Pakistan NGOs Forum (PNF), South Asia Partnership Pakistan (SAP-PK), Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), and Women in Struggle for Empowerment (WISE); |
| JS17 | **Joint submission 17 submitted by:** Centre for Social Justice, Association for Women's Awareness and Motivation (AWAM), Awami Workers Party, Blue Veins, Bolo Bhi, Bytes for All (B4A), Catholic (National) Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP), Christian Study Centre (CSC), Democratic Commission for Human Rights Development (DCHD), Pakistan Institute of Labour Education and Research (PILER), Punjab Union of Journalists (PUJ), Rights Now Pakistan, South Asia Partnership-Pakistan, and Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI); |
| JS18 | **Joint submission 18 submitted by:** Bytes for All, Pakistan, Media Matters for Democracy, Ending Violence against Women and Girls (EVAWG) Alliance, Association for Progressive Communications, Vision Pakistan, and Neengar Society; |
| JS19 | **Joint submission 19 submitted by:** Pakistan Coalition for Education, with support of the Global Initiative for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Asia South Pacific Association for Basic and Adult Literacy (ASPBAE), Childs Rights Movement Pakistan (CRM), Society for Protection of the Rights of the Child (SPARC), Bonded Labour Liberation Front (BLLF), Pakistan Institute of Labour Education and Research (PILER), Pakistan Fisher folk Forum (PFF), Community Development Organization (CDO), Workers Education and Research Organization (WERO) and Program on Women's Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (PWESCR)-Pakistan; |
| JS20 | **Joint submission 20 submitted by:** Article 19, Pakistan Press Foundation (PPF), and IFEX. |
| *National human rights institution:* | |
| NCHR | National Commission for Human Rights Pakistan, Islamabad |

(Pakistan).

[2] The following abbreviations are used in UPR documents:

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|---|---|
| ICESCR | International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; |
| OP-ICESCR | Optional Protocol to ICESCR; |
| ICCPR | International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; |
| ICCPR-OP 1 | Optional Protocol to ICCPR; |
| ICCPR-OP 2 | Second Optional Protocol to ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, |
| CEDAW | Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; |
| OP-CEDAW | Optional Protocol to CEDAW; |
| CAT | Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; |
| OP-CAT | Optional Protocol to CAT; |
| CRC | Convention on the Rights of the Child; |
| OP-CRC-IC | Optional Protocol to CRC on a communications procedure; |
| ICRMW | International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families; |
| CRPD | Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; |
| OP-CRPD | Optional Protocol to CRPD; |
| ICPPED | International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. |

[3] For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/22/12, paras. 122.1, 122.2, 122.3, 122.4, 122.5, 122.6, 122.7, 122.8, 122.9, 122.10, 122.11, 122.12, 122.15, 122.77, 122.78, 122.79, 122.80, and 122.81.

[4] AI, p. 7 / CSW, para. 3 / HRW, p. 4 / ICJ, para. 24 / ODVV, para. 17 / MPV, p. 8 / NCHR, pp. 5-6 / UNPO, para. 9 / JS2, p. 7 / JS6, p. 10 / JS8, paras. 18, 19 and 21 / JS10, para. 68 / JS11, paras. 9.a., 37.b, and 47.a. / JS16, para. 87 / JS17, recommendation 13 / JS18, para. 44.

[5] AI, p. 7. / ICJ, para. 24. / NCHR, p. 4. / SAR, para. 32 / JS12, p. 15.

[6] JS11, paras. 9(b) and 9(c).

[7] For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/22/12, paras. 122.16, 122.23, 122.42, 122.43, 122.44, 122.45, 122.46, 122.47, 122.48, 122.49, 122.52, 122.55, 122.63, 122.64, 122.65, 122.69, 122.70, 122.73, 122.94, and 122.152.

[8] JS8, para. 2.

[9] NCHR, para. 3.1.

[10] JUBILEE, p. 3.

[11] CSW, para. 5 / IHCR7, para. 3 / HRCP, para. 15 / JS20, para. 18.

[12] NCHR, p. 6. / JS8, para. 6.

[13] NCHR, p. 3.

[14] JS11, para. 26. See also JS17, para. 48.

[15] A/HRC/22/12, para. 122.152 (Palestine). For position of Pakistan, see A/HRC/22/12/Add.1, para. 4.

[16] JS13, p. 10.

[17] For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/22/12, paras. 122.17, 122.18, 122.38, 122.87, 122.96, 122.154, and 122.158.

[18] JS5, p. 2.

[19] MPV, para. II.I.

[20] A/HRC/22/12, para. 122.158 (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya). For position of Pakistan, see A/HRC/22/12/Add.1, para. 4.
JS13, p. 9.

[21] JS11, paras. 30.

[22] ADF International, p. 1.

[23] JS5, p. 9.

[24] JS14, para. 8 / JS17, para. 49.

[25] JS3, p. 3.

[26] A/HRC/22/12, paras. 122.87 (Iraq), 122.92 (Holy See), 122.121 (Thailand), 122.156 (Canada). For position of Pakistan, see A/HRC/22/12/Add.1, para. 4.

[27] JS13, pp. 4, 7 and 9.
[28] JS9, para. 6.
[29] JS9, para. 10.
[30] JS7, paras. 21-23.
[31] JS15, para. 3. See also HRW, p. 5.
[32] KHRF, paras. 7.1 (a)-(d).
[33] For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/22/12, paras. 122.17 and 122.18.
[34] UNPO, paras. 21-22.
[35] For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/22/12, paras. 122.165.
[36] A/HRC/22/12, para.122.109 (Russian Federation). For position of Pakistan, see A/HRC/22/12/Add.1, para. 4.
[37] HRW, p. 4.
[38] AMLA, para. 12 / CSW, para. 21 / IHRC7, para. 17.
[39] AI, p. 4.
[40] PI, para. 14.
[41] ODVV, para. 11.
[42] For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/22/12, paras. 122.17, 122.18, 122.19, 122.20, 122.98, 122.99, 122.100, 122.114, and 123.1.
[43] UNPO, para. 12.
[44] JS4, para. 5.
[45] CRIN, pp. 1 and 5.
[46] JS4, para. 22.
[47] JS4, para. 30.
[48] FLD, para. 2.
[49] JS6, para. 9.
[50] JS6, para. 12.
[51] FLD, para. 15.
[52] JS12, para. 4.5.
[53] A/HRC/22/12, para. 122.20 (France). For position of Pakistan, see A/HRC/22/12/Add.1, para. 4.
[54] HRCP, para. 12. / HRW, p. 4.
[55] JS11, p. 7 / ICJ, para. 8.
[56] HRCP, para. 17.
[57] A/HRC/22/12, para. 122.114 (Germany) (Sweden). For position of Pakistan, see A/HRC/22/12/Add.1, para. 4.
[58] HRCP, para. 14.
[59] A/HRC/22/12, paras. 122.111 (Switzerland) and 122.115 (Belgium). For position of Pakistan, see A/HRC/22/12/Add.1, para. 4.
[60] HRCP, para. 15.
[61] JS6, paras. 5-7.
[62] JS11, para. 25.
[63] ICJ, para. 12 / JS4, para. 12 / JS11, para. 34.
[64] AI, p. 5.
[65] For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/22/12, paras. 122.17, 122.18, 122.32, 122.56, 122.101, 122.109, 122.110, 122.112, 122.113, 122.115, 122.116, 112.117, 122.118, 122.119, 122.120, and 122.157.
[66] JS11, para. 48.
[67] JS11, para. 56.a.
[68] JS4, para. 42. / UH Law School, para. 17.
[69] ICJ, para. 6.
[70] ICJ, para. 7. See also AI,p. 3.
[71] FLD, para. 20.
[72] A/HRC/22/12/, para. 122.118 (Norway). For position of Pakistan, see A/HRC/22/12/Add.1, para. 4.
[73] A/HRC/22/12/, para. 122.119 (Austria). For position of Pakistan, see A/HRC/22/12/Add.1, para. 4.
[74] HRW, pp. 2-3.
[75] A/HRC/22/12, paras. 122.113 (Norway) and 122.157 (Slovakia). For position of Pakistan, see A/HRC/22/12/Add.1, para. 4.

[76] JS13, p. 8.
[77] JS6, para. 10.
[78] JS4, para. 35.
[79] ICJ, para. 16.
[80] For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/22/12, paras.122.17, 122.18, 122.27, 122.28, 122.29, 122.30, 122.31, 122.32, 122.33, 122.38, 122.75, 122.101, 122.112, 122.113, 122.121, 122.124, 122.125, 122.126, 122.127, 122.155, 122.156, and 122.157.
[81] A/HRC/22/12/, paras. 122.75 (Mauritania), 122.101 (Australia). 122.118 (Norway). For position of Pakistan, see A/HRC/22/12/Add.1, para. 4. JS16, para. 12.
[82] JS12, para. 1.4.
[83] HRW, pp. 1-2.
[84] ODVV, para. 9.
[85] JS11, paras. 27-28.
[86] CSW, para. 18.
[87] AI, p. 6 / ODVV, para. 10.
[88] CSW, para. 20.
[89] IHRC7, para. 7.a.
[90] IHRC7, para. 7.a.
[91] MPV, para. I.IV.
[92] AMLA, p. 22.
[93] JS9, para. 11.
[94] CSW, para. 31.
[95] CSW, paras. 28 and 32. / JUBILEE, p. 3 / NRPTT, para. 11 /JS5, p. 5 / JS14, para. 6.
[96] UNPO, para. 18.
[97] ICJ, para. 17.
[98] ADF International, para. 12.
[99] AI, pp. 3-4. See also CSW, paras. 9 and 12 / JUBILEE, p. 5 / JS5, p. 3.
[100] JS18, para. 21.
[101] SAR, paras. 3-4.
[102] JS18, para. 23.
[103] A/HRC/22/12, para. 122.75 (Mauritania). For position of Pakistan, see A/HRC/22/12/Add.1, para. 4.
[104] A/HRC/22/12, para. 122.101(Australia). For position of Pakistan, see A/HRC/22/12/Add.1, para. 4.
[105] A/HRC/22/12, para. 122.118(Norway). For position of Pakistan, see A/HRC/22/12/Add.1, para. 4.
[106] JS18, para. 3.
[107] JS20, para. 15.
[108] JS8, para. 4 / JS16, para. 17 / JS20 para. 6.
[109] JS20, para. 30.
[110] JS10, para. 1.
[111] JS3, p. 2. See also AI, p. 5 / JS11, para.11.
[112] JS12, paras. 5.3-5.4.
[113] AI, p. 5.
[114] JS12, para. 2.6. / JS14, p. 5 / JS16, para. 49.
[115] JS17, para, 3.8.
[116] AMLA, pp. 3 and 5.
[117] CSW, para. 24.
[118] HRCP, para. 26.
[119] IHRC, paras. 18-21.
[120] For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/22/12, paras. 122.15, 122.17, 122.18, 122.54, 122.60, 122.95, 122.105.
[121] A/HRC/22/12, para. 122.60 (Ireland). For position of Pakistan, see A/HRC/22/12/Add.1, para. 4.
[122] JS13, p. 6.
[123] JS13, pp. 6-7.
[124] NRPTT, para. 3.
[125] For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/22/12, paras. 122.17, 122.18, 122.102, and 122.103.
[126] JS18, para. 7.
[127] DRF, para. 34.

[128] PI, para. 38.
[129] JS5, p.5.
[130] UNPO, para. 18.
[131] JS17, para. 37.
[132] UNPO, para. 3.
[133] A/HRC/22/12, paras. 122.102 (Canada) and 122.103 (Austria). For position of Pakistan, see A/HRC/22/12/Add.1, para. 4. JS13, p. 5.
[134] JS2, para. 22.
[135] For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/22/12, paras. 122.17, 122.18, 122.74, 122.90, 122.128, 122.129, 122.130, 122.142, and 122.163.
[136] NCHR, p. 6.
[137] NCHR, p. 7.
[138] HRCP, para. 21.
[139] JS8, para. 21.
[140] For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/22/12, paras. 122.36, 122.58, 122.87, 122.129, 122.131, 122.132, 122.133, 122.135, 122.136, 122.160, 122.161, 122.162, and 122.164.
[141] JS8, para. 24.
[142] For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/22/12, paras. 122.17, 122.18, 122.68, 122.131, 122.139, and 122.163.
[143] NCHR, p. 6.
[144] JS8, para. 56.
[145] JS8, para. 57.
[146] JS7, para. 7.
[147] For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/22/12, paras. 122.58, 122.68, 122.83, 122.92, 122.131, 122.135, 122.136, 122.137, 122.138, 122.140, 122.141, 122.143, 122.144, 122.145, 122.146, 122.147, 122.148, 122.149, 122.151, 122.150, 122.153, and 122.163.
[148] NCHR, p. 6.
[149] JS19, paras. 12 and 18.
[150] A/HRC/22/12, paras. 122.83 (Spain), 122.143 (Netherlands), 122.144 (Cuba), 122.145 (Oman), 122.146 (Thailand), para. 122.147 (Japan). For position of Pakistan, see A/HRC/22/12/Add.1, para. 4 / A/HRC/8/42, para. 106/36 (Finland). For position of Pakistan, see A/HRC/8/42, para. 38.
[151] JS19, paras. 3-5.
[152] JS19, paras. 3-5.
[153] A/HRC/22/12, paras. 122.149 (Germany), 122.150 (Holy See), 122.151 (Ireland), and 122.152 (Palestine). For position of Pakistan, see A/HRC/22/12/Add.1, para. 4.
[154] JS17, para. 26.
[155] JS14, para. 9.
[156] For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/22/12, paras. 122.13, 122.14, 122.17, 122.18, 122.21, 122.22, 122.23, 122.25, 122.26, 122.35, 122.36, 122.37, 122.38, 122.40, 122.41, 122.51, 122.53, 122.61, 122.66, 122.67, 122.82, 122.83, 122.84, 122.85, 122.86, 122.87, 122.88, 122.89, 122.90, 122.91, 122.93, 122.94, 122.95, 122.96, 122.97, 122.107, and 122.108.
[157] UNPO, para. 8.
[158] UNPO, para. 6.
[159] A/HRC/22/12, paras. 122.21 (Sweden), 122.25 (Maldives), 122.107 (Egypt).
[160] HRCP, para. 18.
[161] HRCP, para. 20.
[162] ODVV, para. 16.
[163] UH Law School, para. 6.
[164] JS5, p.4.
[165] AI, p. 6.
[166] UNPO, para. 7.
[167] HRW, p. 5.
[168] DRF, paras. 11-12.
[169] DRF, para. 28.
[170] JS16, para. 57.
[171] For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/22/12, paras. 122.23, 122.39, 122.40, 122.41, 122.54,

122.59, 122.71, 122.84, 122.91, 122.106, 122.107, 122.134, 122.151, and 122.153.
172 JS8, paras. 99-100.
173 GIEACPC, pp. 1-2.
174 JS2, paras. 8-12.
175 JS8, paras. 20 and 22.
176 JS2, para. 7.
177 CRIN, p. 1. / JS8, para. 29.
178 HRCP, para. 6.
179 JS8, paras. 41-42.
180 For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/22/12, paras. 122.41 and 122.91.
181 A/HRC/22/12, para. 122.91. For position of Pakistan, see A/HRC/22/12/Add.1, para. 4.
182 HRW, pp. 6-7.
183 For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/22/12, paras. 122.41.
184 UNPO, para. 21.
185 CS, p. 2.
186 CS, p. 3.
187 CS, p. 5.
188 CS, p. 6.
189 For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/22/12, paras. 122.41 and 122.159.
190 AI, p. 7.
191 JS1, p. 9.
192 JS1, p. 10.