

Document #2088013

IRB – Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (Author)

Venezuela: Pro-government groups (also known as colectivos), including the Tupamaros [also known as the Revolutionary Tupamaros Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupamaro, MRT)]; their areas of operation, objectives, activities, and relationship with the government, including instances of collusion; whether these groups operate under a unified command and the nature of cooperation among the different cells throughout the country (2021–January 2023)
[VEN200954.E]

Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

1. Overview

According to an article published on openDemocracy, an "independent international media platform" based in the UK (openDemocracy n.d.), the term colectivos is used as a "catch-all" and can refer to social organizations, grassroots groups, or armed civilians, including "civilian officials, criminal gangs, parapolice or paramilitary groups, or a mixture of all of the above" (2020-07-03). Similarly, in correspondence with the Research Directorate, a senior investigator with InSight Crime, a media organization and think tank focused on organized crime in the Americas (InSight Crime n.d.), noted that colectivos is an "incredibly broad term and covers an incredibly broad range of groups" (Senior Investigator 2023-01-20). The same source further noted that while "some" groups are "identifiable," others are formed for a "specific purpose" and then disband; the exact number of colectivos is therefore unknown (Senior Investigator 2023-01-20). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a professor at a US university with expertise in Venezuela stated that the term colectivo is "incredibly flexible" and is "[s]ometimes" used interchangeably with "gang" as it is "often ... difficult to distinguish" between the two (Professor 2023-01-20).

A report from InSight Crime states that the members of colectivos are "armed civilians that act as paramilitary groups and receive support from the government"; they have become "de facto law enforcement" in some neighbourhoods and use this territorial control to engage in criminal activities

(2021-03-02). Sources describe colectivos as "irregular, state-affiliated armed groups" (Freedom House 2022-02-24, Sec. B3) or "pro-government gang militias" (US 2022-05-10). The US Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) report on Venezuela notes that colectivos "self-identify as socialist, anti-capitalist [and] 'anti-imperialist'," and are willing to use weapons to defend Chavismo [1] (US 2022-05-10). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, an assistant professor of political science at the University of South Carolina Aiken, whose research focuses on Venezuela, defined colectivos as "pro-government armed groups that have used force to support and increase the status of the Venezuelan regime" with "many" using violence to strengthen President Nicolás Maduro's regime (Assistant Professor 2022-12-28). According to a report from the International Crisis Group (Crisis Group), supporters of Chavismo view colectivos as "social auditors" who monitor the Bolivarian revolution and assist in implementing government policies in their neighbourhoods (2020-02-20, 7). According to the Venezuelan Program for Education and Action on Human Rights (Programa Venezolano de Educación Acción en Derechos Humanos, PROVEA), a Caracas-based NGO (PROVEA n.d.a), [translation] "[n]ot all" colectivos are paramilitary groups; some do "cultural or community" work and form collaborative relationships with other colectivos (PROVEA n.d.b).

In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a Crisis Group senior analyst for the Andes region stated that there "may be hundreds" of colectivos varying in size, "firepower," and involvement in criminal activities; some are unarmed community groups and others, "typically" found in "urban slums," are armed, pro-government groups (Senior Analyst 2023-01-10). The Senior Investigator noted that organizations grouped under the colectivos umbrella will differ in actions and objectives: some colectivos have a clear core structure, leadership and area of operations, others are "very small," covering only "a few blocks," and still others are formed "ad hoc" at the behest of "local power structures" (e.g., state officials or pro-government militants) to perform a certain task, such as intimidating protesters or opposition politicians (2023-01-20). According to an article by Alejandro Velasco, an associate professor at New York University who has written a book on Venezuelan politics (New York University n.d.), published in *Espacio Abierto*, a peer-reviewed journal from the University of Zulia in Venezuela (Universidad del Zulia n.d.), there are three types of colectivos:

1. The first type of colectivo is well-organized, with roots in the 1960s guerrilla movements. These groups do community work and guard against criminal gangs in their neighbourhoods, which "gives them legitimacy – with exceptions." They are "autonomous" from the government and have "clashed" with and criticized it for its corruption.
2. The second type formed "at the height of Chavismo" (2007–2012) and are modeled on the first type but are "more loyal to Chavismo" and "therefore less autonomous." These groups "lack a strong and independent ideological base" and, facing "scarcer" resources since Maduro's presidency, "some" have resorted to crime.
3. The third type, called "'disguised' colectivos," emerged around 2014 as part of a "repressive" police initiative that employed "intimidation and shock tactics" in "opposition-controlled" regions. These groups are "properly part of the government but ... act in name and tactics like armed civil groups, dress[ing] as civilians and riding in motorcycle groups" (Velasco 2022-03-12).

1.1 Tupamaros

According to sources, the Tupamaros are a political party (Assistant Professor 2022-12-28; Senior Analyst 2023-01-10; Senior Investigator 2023-01-20) and do not "consider themselves" a colectivo (Senior Analyst 2023-01-10) or are "not really" a colectivo anymore (Senior Investigator 2023-01-20). The Senior Analyst indicated that the Tupamaros seek "political power through elected office" and that group members have been elected to municipal and federal office in the past (2023-01-10). Sources

report that five (Venezuela n.d.) or seven (Assistant Professor 2022-12-28) members of the Tupamaro party are currently elected members (*diputados*) of the National Assembly (Venezuela n.d.; Assistant Professor 2022-12-28), of a total of 277 members (Assistant Professor 2022-12-28). According to the Senior Analyst, "for a time" the security chief for the Caracas metropolitan authority was a Tupamaro (2023-01-10).

The Senior Investigator stated that the Tupamaros are an armed group but no longer control territory (2023-01-20). Sources indicated that they did not set aside their weapons when they became a political party (Senior Analyst 2023-01-10) or that they are both an armed community group and a political party (Professor 2023-01-20) or that they are "a political party with an armed wing" (Netherlands 2020-06, 78). However, the Professor noted that not all members of the political party are also members of the armed group (2023-01-20). Sources reported that the Tupamaros have "connect[ions]" with "rural armed groups as well as foreign guerrilla or 'terrorist' organisations" (Senior Analyst 2023-01-10) or with the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) and Venezuelan security forces (Assistant Professor 2022-12-28). The Assistant Professor indicated that the group has "sophisticated weapons (e.g., portable rifles of Russian origin (AK), M4, and tear gas grenades)," which suggests ties with the government, with other armed groups receiving government support, or with foreign armed groups (2022-12-28). According to an article from Infobae, a Spanish-language online news outlet from Argentina (*The Washington Post* 2016-06-08), the Tupamaros have links to [translation] "micro-trafficking" of drugs and training in paramilitary techniques (Infobae 2020-01-11).

The information in the following paragraph was provided by the Assistant Professor:

The Tupamaro group's goals are political and they "appear to" target "high-ranking politicians or individuals." The Tupamaros are "primarily based" in the 23 de Enero parish in Caracas, though they "have regional coordinators with a presence in other states" as well. The group recruits new members from the 23 de Enero neighbourhood. "Most" new members grew up together and "often" have family ties. To walk safely in the 23 de Enero district, an individual must have protection from the Tupamaros (Assistant Professor 2022-12-28).

According to the Infobae article, the group is headquartered in Caracas, although it also operates in Lara state; the Sucre de Catia parish [which borders 23 de Enero] in Caracas is a [translation] "stronghold" of the Tupamaro (2020-01-11). The Senior Analyst indicated that the group began in Caracas but now also has a "significant presence" in Mérida (2023-01-10). A 2022 report from Transparencia Venezuela, the country chapter of Transparency International [2] (Transparencia Venezuela n.d.), notes that the Tupamaros operate in the states of Barinas and Mérida (Transparencia Venezuela 2022-06, 12, 23).

2. Areas of Operation

According to a 2020 report from Transparencia Venezuela, as of 2020 there were [translation] "around 8,000 men" in colectivos across the country (2020-07, 11). According to the Senior Investigator, colectivos have "some level" of activity throughout "much" of the country (2023-01-20). The Assistant Professor stated that colectivos control a "vast territory," including both urban and rural areas, but are not present in all 23 states (2022-12-28). In contrast, the Professor stated there is "no reliable evidence" of colectivos in rural areas (2023-01-20). The same source further stated that colectivos are "neighbourhood-based organizations" that "rarely" spread beyond where they were formed (Professor 2023-01-20).

The Senior Investigator noted that the Caracas metropolitan area is a "hub" for colectivos and that the state of Lara is also an "epicenter" (2023-01-20). The Professor stated that colectivos "are highly associated with western Caracas," "principally" the Catia neighbourhood and "more recently" La Vega and Antímano as well, though "there is some evidence" to suggest they have developed in other urban areas (2023-01-20). A 2018 InSight Crime report explains that in 2011, the government "dismantled" the Caracas Metropolitan Police, "abdicate[ing]" security duties in the 23 de Enero district and "some other parts" of Caracas to the colectivos (2018-05-25, 29). According to a report on Venezuela published by the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "all" the most visible, pro-government colectivos operate in 23 de Enero (Netherlands 2020-06, 78). These include

- Revolutionary Freedom Movement Carapaica (El Movimiento Revolucionario de Liberación Carapaica)
- La Piedrita
- Tupamaros
- La Coordinadora Simón Bolívar
- Alexis Vive [Travesía]
- Tres Raíces (Netherlands 2020-06, 78–79).

The Assistant Professor stated that colectivos have an "important presence" in the Capital District and the state of Miranda, "as well as [in] border states or states known for illicit activities," including Bolívar, Falcón, Zulia, Táchira, Trujillo, Apure, and Lara (2022-12-28). Transparencia Venezuela notes that colectivos operate in nine states: Amazonas, Apure, Barinas, Lara, Mérida, Nueva Esparta, Táchira, Yaracuy, Zulia (2022-06, 3, 4, 9, 11, 19, 22, 26, 28, 31, 34). According to the Infobae article, the following armed groups are operational in the associated state:

- Caracas: Tupamaro, La Piedrita, Alexis Vive, Frente Motorizado Bolivariano, Colectivo [Frente] 5 de Marzo
- Zulia: Colectivo Sin Nombre
- Miranda: Frente Motorizado Bolivariano
- Lara: Tupamaro, Colectivo Ali Primera 4F
- Bolivar: Mersuv
- Táchira: Frente Motorizado Bolivariano
- Apure: Federación Regional de Motorizados Revolucionarios del Estado Apure (2020-01-11).

3. Activities

According to Freedom House, colectivos "routinely commit acts of violence against civilians, particularly at antigovernment protests, and carry out government-backed voter intimidation efforts" (2022-02-24, Sec. B3). According to a 2020 UN Human Rights Council fact-finding mission report on Venezuela, citing an interview with a former military general, President Maduro will send colectivos to "silenc[e]" opposition activists through "intimidat[ion]" (UN 2020-09-15, para. 223). The same report, which looks at the period from 2014 to 2020, indicates that "in some cases" colectivos coordinated with state security forces to serve as "crowd control" during protests and that colectivos were responsible for "several" protester deaths (UN 2020-09-15, para. 224). The Senior Analyst stated that

colectivos "have been utilised" to "dispers[e]" and "discourag[e]" opposition protests (2023-01-10). According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), since 2014, alongside government security forces, colectivos have "repeatedly attacked" protesters, "including with violent raids, brutal beatings and point-blank range shootings" (2023-01-12). According to Transparencia Venezuela, they [translation] "attack," "intimidate" and "shoot at" anti-regime protesters; they also "intimidate and threaten" opposition members and supporters during elections (2020-07, 11). However, the Professor noted that "most" media sources "greatly exaggerate" the "presence and power" of colectivos at protests (2023-01-20).

HRW notes that, according to "local groups," colectivos enforced lockdowns during COVID-19, "beating and torturing" individuals who did not comply (2021-01-13). A report from the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which looked at the period from 1 June 2020 to 30 June 2021, states that during April 2021 student protests against the lack of personal protective equipment for health care workers, colectivos "intervened violently and intimidated students" (UN 2021-10-21, para. 15).

The Senior Analyst stated that colectivos have been "increasing[ly] involv[ed] in criminal activities" and that new groups have emerged with "an essentially criminal nature" and "little interest" in community development or politics; colectivos are "increasingly" operating with the goal of gaining money and power (2023-01-10). However, the Senior Investigator noted that "not all" colectivos are involved in criminal activities and it is the "more powerful" groups in Caracas that are involved in "more serious" crime (2023-01-20).

The Infobae article states that some colectivo members are in charge of Local Supply and Production Committees (Comité Local de Abastecimiento y Producción, CLAP) (2020-01-11). The UN fact-finding mission report indicates that, according to "[s]everal former military" sources interviewed, the National Coordinator of the CLAP program also heads colectivos in Caracas and the state of Táchira (UN 2020-09-15, para. 222). A report from the International Federation for Human Rights (Fédération internationale pour les droits humains, FIDH) and PROVEA indicates that colectivos are responsible for distributing CLAP food aid bags in 23 de Enero (FIDH & PROVEA 2022-03, 53). The same source states, citing FIDH source interviews, that the colectivos "divert" some of these food parcels to be sold in other areas and sellers are charged a fee to participate (FIDH & PROVEA 2022-03, 53).

Sources report that, in Caracas, colectivos have taken over private properties, ["often" (Senior Investigator 2023-01-20)] with approval from local authorities (El Diario 2020-06-20; TalCual 2020-12-23; Senior Investigator 2023-01-20). An article from El Diario, a Venezuela-based news source (El Diario n.d.), cites the leader of the Front in Defence of Northern Caracas (Frente de Defensa del Norte de Caracas) [3] as stating that such property appropriations have multiple advantages:

1. [The colectivos] benefit economically, because they can subsequently rent out the spaces and take goods from the businesses.
2. [The government] benefits politically, because they ensure a [translation] "larger Chavista presence" at "strategic points of the city."
3. They serve as "a sort of thank-you [from authorities] to the colectivos for their support of the dictatorship" (El Diario 2020-06-20).

Media sources, citing the Front in Defence of Northern Caracas, report that in the Caracas municipality of Libertador there were 53 illegal occupations of property in 2020 (NIUS 2021-01-30; TalCual 2020-12-

23). Articles from 2021 cite the Front in Defence of Northern Caracas as indicating that there were [[translation] "at least" (El Diario 2021-12-21)] 92 attempted property invasions in Caracas that year and that in 20 percent of cases, police officials participated (El Diario 2021-12-21; TalCual 2021-12-21).

4. Relationship with the Government

According to Velasco, "the dynamic between colectivos and the government is one of mutual but unstable dependence": "when the government has lost legitimacy" it needs help from colectivos, but in "times of relative political calm" it "goes on the offensive against colectivos ... in order to reassert its command and control" (2022-03-12). The same source notes that the "majority" of colectivos "identif[y] with" the government, but the degree of support for the regime "var[ies] greatly" (Velasco 2022-03-12). The 2018 InSight Crime report states that "government control of the colectivos has weakened, if not evaporated in many cases" and that while "[many]" colectivo members still "rever[e]" Chávez, they have "only scorn for Maduro," seeing him as having "betray[ed]" "revolutionary principles" (2018-05-25, 31). The Senior Investigator stated that "some" colectivos receive direct government funding and assist public officials by fulfilling "state functions" (2023-01-20). The same source also noted that "some" colectivos have a "formal" relationship with the government with "overlap[ping]" leadership, while others have a more informal relationship, particularly for "more obscure and criminal activity" (Senior Investigator 2023-01-20). Similarly, the Senior Analyst stated that the government publicly acknowledges its "reliance" on colectivos but the specifics of the arrangements made with these groups are not made public; "[s]ometimes" colectivos or individual members "cross an undefined line and come into direct conflict with government interests" with actions such as killings or threats (2023-01-10). According to UN fact-finding mission report, there are

reasonable grounds to believe that colectivos were directly involved in several arbitrary killings, and that these arbitrary killings occurred either with facilitation of, or the participation of officials of various state agencies. (UN 2020-09-15, para. 2077)

The UN fact-finding mission report also notes that the colectivos have met with the president and other "high-level political authorities" "on various occasions" and that ministers have provided colectivos with "'guidelines'" (UN 2020-09-15, para. 218). According to an article in the Caracas Chronicles, a Venezuela-based independent news source (Caracas Chronicles n.d.), human rights advocates describe colectivos as "parallel security structures that counterbalance the Armed Forces" (Caracas Chronicles 2020-02-21). The Senior Analyst noted that colectivos are "general[ly] ... political enforcers," with members or groups "sometimes" serving as bodyguards for governing party politicians (2023-01-10). The Senior Investigator stated that there is "evidence [to] sugges[t] cooperation" between "powerful" government officials and criminals (2023-01-20). According to sources, colectivos "typically" have "impunity" from legal action (Senior Analyst 2023-01-10) or have [translation] "complete impunity, with clear support from high-level government authorities" (Transparencia Venezuela 2020, 12).

The Assistant Professor stated that colectivos have "the power and the means to intimidate" government employees who are of a lower rank or who support the opposition (2022-12-28). The same source further noted that while some politicians and government employees are also members of colectivos, employees are not "obligated to act as colectivos" (Assistant Professor 2022-12-28). Similarly, the Senior Investigator stated that there is an "overlap" between "local government" and colectivo membership, but that they are not aware of cases in which government employees are "explicitly obliged to participate" in the colectivos (Senior Investigator 2023-01-17). The Professor stated that there is "no evidence to suggest that government employees" are obliged or "even invited to participate in the colectivos" (2023-01-20). The Senior Analyst indicated that government employees

are not "pressured" to become members of colectivos but noted that they "may" experience pressure to "participate in militia activities" (Senior Analyst 2023-01-10). The Senior Investigator stated that in "many" regions there are links between colectivos and government and in these areas, if a person is unwilling to work with these groups, "they are unlikely to get a position [in government] to start with or they will not stay in position for a very long time" (Senior Investigator 2023-01-17).

4.1 Relationship with the Opposition

The Senior Investigator stated that, to some extent, colectivos mobilize against the opposition because they fear facing "political persecution" were the opposition to take power; however, the "main factor" driving this mobilization is that they are committed to protecting their own interests, which are tied to the current regime (2023-01-20). The Senior Analyst noted that the relationship between colectivos and the opposition is one of "mutual distrust and fear" (2023-01-10). The Assistant Professor stated that the opposition views colectivos as "paramilitary units or para-policy enforcers" and the colectivos view the opposition as "the adversary they need to repress" (2022-12-28). A 2015 article by Crónico Uno, a Spanish-language digital news outlet based in Caracas (SembraMedia n.d.), cited by the Assistant Professor, noted that according to 23 de Enero residents, colectivos know who in the neighbourhood is not pro-government and [translation] "observe them," including by tapping their phones (Crónico Uno 2015-05-07). The same article notes that 23 de Enero residents who are openly supportive of the opposition are [translation] "threatened" and that the way to "stay alive" is to stay silent (Crónico Uno 2015-05-07). The Senior Analyst stated that individuals who criticize the government "might" face reprisal from colectivos in the form of denial of services, physical punishment or even death (2023-01-10).

A 2020 InSight Crime article notes that in 2019, colectivos "violently" dispersed opposition protests (2020-01-18). The Dutch report, citing a confidential source, describes an incident in which colectivos armed with rocks, guns and Molotov cocktails "attacked" journalists and National Assembly members from the opposition, with five cars containing members being "severely damaged" (Netherlands 2020-06, 35). An article from Agence France-Presse (AFP) describing the same incident, states that opposition party members and journalists shared photos and videos of the incident, identifying the perpetrators as colectivos (2020-01-15). However, according to Crisis Group, members of colectivos who were in the vicinity at the time of the incident claimed they had "nothing to do with the violence" (2020-02-20, 8).

4.2 Relationship with State Authorities

Sources note that colectivos work with state security forces (Crisis Group 2020-02-20) or that there is an "overlap" between the two (Senior Analyst 2023-01-10). Crisis Group states that "many" members are also "part of the official Venezuelan civilian militia, an adjunct of the armed forces" (2020-02-20). According to confidential sources interviewed for the Dutch report, the National Guard (Guardia Nacional Bolivariana, GNB) is under orders to "take no action against the colectivos" and "regularly" works with colectivos to "suppres[s]" protests; a third confidential source interviewed stated that a GNB unit was ordered to give their weapons to a colectivo in Caracas (Netherlands 2020-06, 78, 82, 74). However, in an article by Rebecca Hanson and Verónica Zubillaga [4], Hanson states that while Venezuela's Special Actions Forces (Fuerzas de Acciones Especiales, FAES) specifically have become [translation] "more and more interconnected" with "some" colectivos, non-FAES agents in general see colectivos as a "threat" (Hanson & Zubillaga 2022).

According to Velasco, Venezuela's armed forces generally have a "negativ[e]" view of colectivos, despite the groups' "close ties" with "other components of the repressive state apparatus" (2022-03-

12). The same source states that the armed forces have "tumultuous relationships" with colectivos and see them as "usurpers of their functions" (Velasco 2022-03-12).

5. Resources and Funding

According to the Senior Analyst, sources of funding for colectivos vary by location and it is "unclear" how much money is received from the government (2023-01-10). Sources note that government funding has "dried up" (InSight Crime 2020-01-18) or "less and less" government funding is being received in cash (Assistant Professor 2022-12-28). Instead, sources report that colectivos re-sell government food parcels (Senior Investigator 2023-01-20; Senior Analyst 2023-01-10) or control the distribution of food aid from the government, charging "high price[s]" (Assistant Professor 2022-12-28). The Senior Investigator added that colectivos are also given control of gas stations and the distribution of cooking gas cylinders (2023-01-20). The UN fact-finding mission report, citing former military officials interviewed, states that colectivos are hired to run government social programs in order to "channel" government money to them as "payment for their 'services'" (UN 2020-09-15, para. 219). Sources note that colectivos may also engage in the following activities:

- Extortion (Infobae 2020-01-11; Senior Analyst 2023-01-10)
- Drug trafficking (Senior Analyst 2023-01-10; Infobae 2020-01-11; Transparencia Venezuela 2022-06, 23)
- Kidnapping (Infobae 2020-01-11)
- Fuel trafficking (Transparencia Venezuela 2022-06, 23)
- Weapons trafficking (Infobae 2020-01-11)
- Car theft (Assistant Professor 2022-12-28).

6. Cooperation of Different Cells

According to the Executive Director of Foro Penal, an organization working on behalf of political prisoners in Caracas, colectivos and "other irregular paramilitary groups" are one of the five units of the security forces, with the others being the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (Servicio Bolivariano de Inteligencia Nacional, SEBIN), the General Directorate of Military Counterintelligence (Dirección General de Contrainteligencia Militar), the National Bolivarian Armed Forces (Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana) and the FAES; these "control one another, carrying out repression and keeping each other in check" (*Jane's Country Risk Daily Report* 2021-01-27).

The Assistant Professor indicated that each colectivo has a leader and controls a certain territory (2022-12-28). The same source further stated that colectivos "common[ly]" fight over control of territory or weapons but "may" work together to quell anti-government protests (Assistant Professor 2022-12-28). Similarly, the Senior Analyst noted that they do "collaborate" but that there are also rivalries over territorial control or "illicit earnings" which manifest in "feuds and gunfights" (2023-01-10). Citing confidential source interviews, the Dutch report notes that there is no "national network [of colectivos] with a clear hierarchy and command structure" and "some" colectivos fight each other for territorial dominance (Netherlands 2020-06, 81). According to the Professor, colectivos are guided by unifying principles but remain separate groups that cooperate "infrequently"; there is no unified command (2023-01-20).

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be,

conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

Notes

[1] Chavismo is a "radical left-wing ideology" (US 2022-05-10) or a "left-wing populist" movement (Crisis Group 2020-02-20) associated with the former Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez (US 2022-05-10; Crisis Group 2020-02-20).

[2] Transparency International is an independent, non-governmental, not-for-profit organization based in the US that aims to "stop corruption and promote transparency, accountability and integrity at all levels and across all sectors of society" (Transparency International n.d.).

[3] The Front in Defence of Northern Caracas (Frente en Defensa del Norte de Caracas) is a group of residents and business owners who advocate for the right to private property (Frente en Defensa del Norte de Caracas 2021-07-18).

[4] Rebecca Hanson is a professor in the Department of Sociology and Criminology & Law at the University of Florida and Verónica Zubillaga is an associate professor at Universidad Simón Bolívar in Caracas (Hanson & Zubillaga 2022).

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Associated documents

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Venezuela : information sur les groupes progouvernementaux (aussi connus sous le nom de colectivos), y compris le Mouvement révolutionnaire des tupamaros (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupamaro – MRT); leurs zones d'activités, objectifs, activités et relations avec le gouvernement, y compris des incidents de collusion; information indiquant si les groupes agissent sous un commandement unifié et information sur la nature de la coopération entre les différentes cellules à l'échelle du pays (2021-janvier 2023) [VEN200954.EF] (Response, French)

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