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Letter dated 14 January 2020 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Panel of Experts on the Sudan has the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 2 of Council resolution [2455 \(2019\)](#), the final report on its work.

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#) concerning the Sudan on 27 December 2019 and was considered by the Committee on 10 January 2020.

The Panel would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

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Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan

Summary

The present report covers the period from March to December 2019. The Panel has continued to monitor developments in Darfur and in the region in accordance with its mandate.

Following the political changes in the Sudan, the peace process in Darfur has entered a new phase, involving most of the armed movements, with the exception of Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW). Various challenges have been encountered during the peace process, partly because of conflicting external influences on the armed movements and the Government of the Sudan. These influences have delayed the choice of venue, mediator and modalities for the peace process.

The regional situation has mainly remained unchanged, and, to a certain extent, has been conducive to stability and peacebuilding in Darfur. All the neighbouring States have expressed support for the peace process. South Sudan and Chad, in particular, have helped to facilitate talks between the Government of the Sudan and the Darfurian movements.

Although there have not been any large-scale outbreaks of violence, the security situation in Darfur has been characterized by an increase in localized security incidents, including intercommunal skirmishes; militia attacks on civilians; tensions in major camps for internally displaced persons; clashes in Jebel Marra between the security forces, allied militias and SLA/AW, as well as within SLA/AW itself; and several attacks on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and humanitarian agencies. In Jebel Marra, SLA/AW has been able to build capacity as a result of new financing.

The Darfurian armed groups operating in Libya have significantly bolstered their military capability by acquiring new equipment and engaging in recruitment on a large scale. They have participated in various clashes and military operations alongside Libyan warring parties. The presence of Darfurian armed groups in South Sudan is now residual, as the South Sudanese authorities no longer provide them with any meaningful support. In the present report, the Panel has documented a system of extortion and detention that has been put in place by SLA/AW in South Sudan and targets the Darfurian diaspora.

Various human rights violations and abuses continued unabated. Acts of rape and other forms of sexual and physical violence were a common occurrence and were often used as tactics to prevent communities from gaining access to their farms and from engaging in other livelihood activities. Such violations and abuses were compounded by the lack of medical, psychosocial and other support available to survivors. Security forces of the Government of the Sudan continued to perpetrate human rights violations, which points to a lack of professionalism and a culture of impunity. Militias continued to represent a security threat to many communities, including to internally displaced persons. The Panel has documented human rights abuses committed by SLA/AW in Jebel Marra, which have resulted in new and secondary displacement of civilians. Challenges remained with respect to the return of internally displaced persons and refugees to their places of origin.

During the reporting period, the Government of the Sudan has continued to routinely violate the arms embargo by transferring weapons to Darfur, justifying such transfers on the grounds of security imperatives. Armed groups and militias in Darfur have continued to source weapons within the Sudan. The borders between the Sudan

and neighbouring countries have remained porous, enabling a range of cross-border criminal activities that have had an impact on security and stability in Darfur and in the region.

On account of a lack of cooperation between the Government of the Sudan and other Governments in the region, the monitoring and implementation of the travel ban and asset freeze have remained a challenge. Mercenary and smuggling activities in Libya have remained the main source of financing for Darfurian armed groups. SLA/AW, the only active rebel group inside Darfur, has suffered a loss of tax revenues because of factional infighting and tensions in the camps for internally displaced persons. However, during the reporting period, it has increased its finances through gold mining activities in south-eastern Jebel Marra.

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* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.

I. Introduction

1. As requested in Security Council resolution [2455 \(2019\)](#), this is the final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan, which was established in resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#) and renewed in resolution [2455 \(2019\)](#). Full details of the Panel's mandate are found in annex 1.
2. After the appointment of its members, the Panel met in New York in April 2019 to brief the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#) on its programme of work. The Panel provided an interim report, which it presented to the Committee on 16 August 2019. It also provided two quarterly updates to the Committee, as requested in paragraph 2 of resolution [2455 \(2019\)](#).
3. In pursuit of its mandate, the Panel met various interlocutors (including representatives of Governments, Darfurian civil society and Darfurian armed movements) in Belgium, Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Kenya, the Netherlands, Norway, Qatar, South Sudan, Switzerland, Uganda, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.
4. During the reporting period, the Panel faced several challenges which prevented the Panel from travelling to the Sudan and therefore from conducting its investigations extensively. Travel by Panel members to the Sudan was limited to a mission by the Coordinator to accompany the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#) and her delegation during her official visit to Khartoum and Darfur from 10 to 15 November 2019. The travel of members of the Panel to the Sudan was hampered by the non-issuance of visas by the Sudan, security advisories issued by the Department of Safety and Security in May and June 2019 and the United Nations budgetary cuts.
5. In New York, in April and August 2019, the Panel had positive engagements with Member States, including bilateral meetings with the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations. The Panel expresses its appreciation for the support provided by the Secretariat and Member States during the reporting period.

II. Methodology

6. The Panel worked in full conformity with the best practices and methods recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (see [S/2006/997](#)). It has collected information on possible violations of the sanctions regime from multiple sources. The experts engaged various interlocutors, including the Government of the Sudan, leaders of armed movements, internally displaced persons, refugees, the African Union, the League of Arab States, the European Union and United Nations bodies.
7. In view of the restricted access to the Sudan, including Darfur, during its mandate, the Panel focused on meetings with sources outside the Sudan, conducting phone interviews, exchanging correspondence with interlocutors, monitoring open sources and cross-checking available information wherever possible. The Panel has retained terms such as “tribe” and “nomads” and personal and place names as provided by the various sources. Such usage does not necessarily reflect the views of the Panel.
8. Many interlocutors have applied the term “militias” to State security forces other than the Sudanese Armed Forces, such as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Central Reserve Police. The Panel defines militias as armed groups that do not have any official status.

III. Peace process

9. Throughout the reporting period, the peace process in Darfur has been influenced by the following factors:

(a) the general political developments in the Sudan before and since the ousting and arrest of the former President, Omar al-Bashir;

(b) the local protests and non-violent political activities in Darfur organized by the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), the Sudanese Professionals' Association, resistance committees and armed movements;

(c) the involvement of regional and other external actors, which has affected the positions of the armed movements with respect to the modalities of the peace process.

A. Dynamics of the peace process

10. In the first few months of 2019, the peace process stalled because of political developments in the Sudan. In April 2019, the armed movements lost their major adversary, namely the former President, Mr. al-Bashir, and his administration. The Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces officially joined the revolution and formed the Transitional Military Council, ousting Mr. al-Bashir.

11. The new Sudanese authorities, the Transitional Military Council and the new Government of the Sudan (the Sovereign Council led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Council of Ministers led by Abdalla Hamdok) have contacted all the armed movements. General Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, known as "Hemetti", was appointed as head of the Transitional Military Council committee in charge of the peace process. In July 2019, he launched the Sudanese initiative for peace and reconciliation.

12. Reacting to proposals by the authorities in Khartoum, the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF), comprising, inter alia, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minawi (SLA/MM) and the Sudan Liberation Army/Transitional Council (SLA/TC), held talks with the Transitional Military Council in Abu Dhabi. In June and July 2019, SRF and the Forces for Freedom and Change met in Addis Ababa to discuss the situation in the Sudan. SLA/AW and the Gathering of the Sudan Liberation Forces (GSLF),¹ which signed an alliance pact on 30 June 2019, accused the Transitional Military Council of hijacking the revolution.

13. On 17 August 2019, the Transitional Military Council and the Forces for Freedom and Change signed a joint declaration in Khartoum. In accordance with the declaration, during the first six months of the transitional period the federal authorities and the armed movements should reach a peace agreement to end the decade-long war in the Sudan. SLA/AW rejected the agreement between the Transitional Military Council and the Forces for Freedom and Change, viewing it as an elite pact at the expense of protesters and marginalized areas of the Sudan.

14. Through international mediation (South Sudan, Ethiopia, Egypt, other regional and interested States, the African Union and the United Nations), SRF and the new Sudanese authorities started formal discussions regarding the resumption of the peace talks. The first round of meetings took place in Juba in October 2019.

¹ Also known as the Sudan Liberation Force Alliance (SLFA).

15. SLA/AW declined the invitation to take part in the Juba meetings. Nevertheless, the final declaration mentioned the participating movements and SLA/AW as “signatories”. Any additional movements would take part in further rounds of meetings only if the listed forces agreed to it. That condition led to protests by the factions that did not participate in the meetings held in Juba.

16. Regional tensions between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, on the one hand, and between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, on the other, made it more difficult for the Darfurian movements to decide on the venue for the next rounds of meetings with the Government of the Sudan, as well as creating difficulties for the movements in reaching a joint position on the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. A proposed venue (Abu Dhabi, Doha, Juba or elsewhere) could not easily be agreed upon by the armed movements, which had received material and financial support from various regional sponsors. The African Union and the United Nations did not take a formal position on the issue of the venue but supported the efforts of South Sudan as the new *de facto* mediator.

17. Ongoing divergences within SRF and within the international community led to a delay in the organization of the second round of meetings with the new Government of the Sudan. Eventually, the South Sudanese mediator postponed the second round, scheduled to take place in Juba on 21 November, until 10 December 2019. Consultations in Juba were ongoing at the time of the submission of the present report.

18. The representation of internally displaced persons and refugees in the current peace process will be an important issue for the long-term resolution of the conflict. The various components of SRF still claim to have a constituency in the camps for internally displaced persons and refugees, but they have in fact lost influence there and are only now trying to regain it. Even SLA/AW, which used to have strong support in many camps for internally displaced persons, has incrementally lost influence there over the past few years. The new SLA/AW dissidents (see para. 59 below) have vowed to place the issue of internally displaced persons at the centre of their platform but are still in the process of organizing themselves, and, to date, are not part of the Sudanese Revolutionary Front or the peace process.

B. Status of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur and related institutions

19. The status of the Doha Document remains unclear. For some movements, such as SLA/MM, the Doha Document is no longer relevant, following the political changes in the Sudan. JEM continued to see the Doha Document as the basis of the peace process, especially in the absence of new United Nations and African Union resolutions on the matter.

20. The commissions stemming from the Doha Document were already weak or inactive in 2018.² Since the changes in Khartoum, the role of these commissions has remained negligible, even though some state commissions continued their work. For instance, according to the Panel’s sources, in 2019 the Commission for Voluntary Repatriation in North Darfur registered eight collective demands for the repatriation of about 56,000 internally displaced persons to the localities of Kuma, Kutum, Kabkabiyah, Tawilah and Umm Barru. Given the prevailing economic and financial situation, the Commission could not obtain funding from the Government of the Sudan and did not receive external support for such repatriation efforts. As a result, the returnees went back to these localities on their own.

² See [S/2019/34](#), para. 12.

21. The movements that signed the Doha Document and subsequently participated in the Government of Mr. al-Bashir, such as the Liberation and Justice Movement and JEM/Dabajo, have been excluded from the current political transition. However, they have retained their political influence among Darfurians and have remained in contact with the non-signatory movements. On 16 December 2019, JEM/Dabajo signed a memorandum of understanding with SLA/MM in Juba, with the objective of coordinating their activities during the peace process.

C. Intercommunal reconciliation

22. Intercommunal reconciliation efforts involving local government and traditional authorities continued, but tensions between various communities have remained high, especially between nomads and sedentary communities regarding land use (see sect. VIII below).

IV. Regional dynamics

A. Overview

23. The regional dynamics remained largely positive and favourable to the peace process in Darfur, except for in Libya, where the conflict between the Libyan National Army and the Government of National Accord forces continued throughout the reporting period.

24. After the political changes in Khartoum, the African States agreed in June 2019 to the temporary suspension of the membership of the Sudan in the African Union. The cancellation was lifted in September 2019, when the new Government of the Sudan and the Sovereign Council were formed. The African Union contributed to the talks between the authorities in Khartoum and the revolutionary forces, including the armed movements.

25. The League of Arab States also contributed to the peace process by holding meetings with the delegations of Darfurian armed movements and other Sudanese political forces at its headquarters in Cairo.

B. Egypt

26. The relations between the Sudan and Egypt have developed in a generally positive direction. Egypt supported the peace process in Darfur and hosted the SRF meeting in Ayn Sukhnah in September 2019, taking the Doha Document as the basis for future talks. It also saw the need to scale up the UNAMID police or humanitarian components.

27. In May 2019, the Government of Egypt informed the Panel about the volatility of the situation in the Sudan and the risk of the conflict spilling over the Sudanese-Libyan border. The Government of Egypt noted its concern that Darfur may become a gathering point for terrorist fighters coming to the Sudan and neighbouring States.

C. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia

28. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have supported the new Sudanese authorities. The major concern of the United Arab Emirates is that the Sudan should

not become a safe haven for terrorism or transnational crime, including arms smuggling and human trafficking through Darfur.

29. Some Darfurian movements, such as SLA/MM, have established good working relations with the United Arab Emirates and support choosing Abu Dhabi as a possible venue for the next rounds of peace talks with the Sudanese authorities.

D. Qatar

30. Since April 2019, there has been tension in the relationship between Qatar and the Sudan. In June 2019, the Government of Qatar informed the Panel that it was reassessing its participation in the implementation of the Doha Document. Since the agreement between the Transitional Military Council and the Forces for Freedom and Change and the formation of the new Government of the Sudan, the relations between Qatar and the Sudan have improved. Some armed movements, and primarily JEM, have retained good contacts with Qatar and support choosing Doha as a possible venue for the next rounds of peace talks.

E. Chad

31. The situation in Chad – which is always important because of its location across the border from Darfur – remained generally stable, but tense, with a few armed incidents occurring between Chadian rebel groups and the security forces. Chad and the new Government of the Sudan are trying to maintain the good cooperation that existed before the regime change in the Sudan.

32. Chadian officials informed the Panel in September 2019 that, owing to the political developments in the Sudan and the ensuing security vacuum in Darfur, there was a growing inflow of weapons from Darfur, which had exacerbated the intercommunal conflicts in eastern Chad. However, the Panel's interlocutor in the Chadian part of the Joint Chad/Sudan Border Monitoring Force stressed that the joint force remained firmly in control of the border, except the zone adjacent to Libya.

33. The Government of Chad supported the peace process and the talks between the Sudanese authorities and the armed movements. In June 2019, Chad officially hosted the meeting between the Transitional Military Council, represented by General Hemetti, and the armed movements SLA/MM and JEM. In November 2019, the delegation of JEM went to N'Djamena and the refugee camps in eastern Chad, where it organized mass rallies.

F. Eritrea and Ethiopia

34. Since April 2019, the new Sudanese authorities and the Government of Eritrea have maintained good relations. The Government of Eritrea expressed its support for the peace process in the Sudan, including Darfur. A few Darfurian groups belonging to the armed movements have stayed inactive in Eritrea for many years.

35. Relations between the Sudan and Ethiopia have remained cordial. Ethiopia acted as a facilitator during the talks between the Transitional Military Council and the civilian forces represented by the Forces for Freedom and Change and SRF. In October 2019, Ethiopia was one of the regional States that attended the first round of the formal meetings in Juba between the Sudanese authorities and the armed movements.

G. South Sudan and the Central African Republic

36. The situation in these neighbouring States remained generally unchanged. According to the findings of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic, during the reporting period there were increased flows of arms and fighters from Darfur to the Central African Republic, as former factions of the Séléka coalition have increasingly recruited from Darfurian communities from the border areas.³

37. The Government of South Sudan has been very active as a mediator in the Sudanese peace process. Both the Government of the Sudan and the armed movements spoke about the “brotherly relations” between the Sudan and South Sudan. The Darfurian diaspora, including the armed movements, has continued to play an important role in the economy of South Sudan.

38. Sporadic incidents led to a new flow of refugees from the Central African Republic to the adjacent areas of South Darfur. The number of South Sudanese refugees in Darfur has remained extremely high, provoking tensions and security incidents with the local population.

H. Libya

39. During the reporting period, the Libyan National Army, supported by some of the Darfurian armed groups, established its control over practically all of the southern areas of the country. Establishing such control, however, did not mean the effective occupation of all those territories, where various criminal and armed groups continue to operate. There have been conflicting reports on the role of Sudanese security forces in the ongoing Libyan conflict (see para. 72 below).

V. Conflict dynamics in Darfur

A. Security trends

40. Although Darfur has remained stable overall, the security situation during the reporting period has been characterized by the proliferation of localized security incidents in several parts of the region. That trend seems to have continued since the appointment of the Council of Ministers in August 2019.

41. There have been frequent incidents between local communities and the security forces. Many protests have, for instance, resulted in violence. National intelligence offices were attacked by protesters in several places, such as Nyala, Zalingei, Golo and Adikong (near El Geneina), prompting a reaction by the security forces. In one such incident in Zalingei on 11 April 2019, the security forces killed seven protesters while a crowd vandalized the local premises of the General Intelligence Service (GIS, formerly the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS)).

42. The political developments in Khartoum have aggravated local intercommunal tensions between communities in Darfur. Such tensions in Deleij (Central Darfur) culminated in clashes that claimed an estimated 17 casualties in early June 2019.⁴ Similar tensions could be observed in the Kutum region (North Darfur).

43. Armed clashes over land use that pit internally displaced persons and returnees against nomads have been on the rise in recent months throughout Darfur and are

³ Exchanges with the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic.

⁴ See unamid.unmissions.org/unamid-dispatches-assessment-mission-deleij-central-darfur-following-communal-clashes.

partly attributable to the security forces' focus on Khartoum. The frequent use of firearms in these incidents indicates that the weapons collection campaign launched in August 2017 has been far from comprehensive, particularly in rural areas (see sect. VIII).

44. Leadership struggles within SLA/AW have resulted in fierce competition for the control of camps for internally displaced persons, causing an upsurge in tensions and violence in major camps such as Kalma (South Darfur) and Hamadiya (Central Darfur). In particular, Kalma, the biggest camp for internally displaced persons and the one most opposed to the Government of the Sudan, has been destabilized by repeated clashes between two rival factions of internally displaced persons. A total of 16 people were killed in the fighting on 13 April and 5 people were killed on 1 June. Sources indicate that weapons, such as a 14.5 mm machine gun and a rocket-propelled grenade, were used in the fighting, which highlights the large-scale presence of weapons in the camps.

45. The Government of the Sudan and SLA/AW announced unilateral ceasefires. In 2019, there were no large-scale military operations by the Government of the Sudan in Jebel Marra, but skirmishes between SLA/AW and the security forces continue to occur in several zones, including the Golo area. Clashes between two rival SLA/AW factions,⁵ led by the commanders Mubarak Waldook and Saleh Borso, have continued in the Daya area (Central Darfur). The two groups have engaged in attacks on local villagers supporting the rival faction, with reports of killings and rapes. Fighting in Jebel Marra displaced thousands of civilians during the reporting period.

46. Several incidents targeted international agencies and non-governmental organizations, partly because of local frustration about the decrease in humanitarian assistance. The closure of some UNAMID team sites as part of the mission's withdrawal has led to local stakeholders competing for the control of the assets handed over by UNAMID. Civilians and some bodies of the security forces resented the fact that the Rapid Support Forces took over certain former UNAMID premises.⁶ These tensions have escalated into looting of the El Geneina team site by local civilians and members of the security forces on 14 and 15 May, amid disagreements between UNAMID, the acting governor of West Darfur and the local communities about payments for the land occupied by UNAMID and the handover of the team site.

47. The discovery of gold in new places has triggered localized tensions, as rebels, security forces and militias compete for control. In Kidineer (Kidingir), in the East Jebel Marra locality, an incident between miners and members of the Sudanese Armed Forces between 28 and 29 September 2019 resulted in the killing of two civilians and the looting of the market by Sudanese Armed Forces soldiers. Recently, intercommunal tensions have also increased in the Kutum area (North Darfur), where a militia leader, turned Rapid Support Forces officer, An-Nur Ahmad "Guba", reportedly tried to take control of a local goldmine for himself.⁷

48. The goodwill and efforts of the new Government of the Sudan and most of the armed movements have resulted in some positive outcomes in Darfur:

(a) The public and free presence of political representatives of the armed movements in Darfur, including in the camps for internally displaced persons;

⁵ See S/2019/34, para. 46.

⁶ The Transitional Military Council first handed the UNAMID premises to the Rapid Support Forces, but subsequently, after public criticism, reversed this decision. Later, new decrees handed the former team sites to various health and educational institutions.

⁷ On "Guba", see S/2017/1125, annex V.

(b) The official end of censorship and more conspicuous respect for freedom of speech and media in the five states of Darfur;

(c) Official contacts between the armed movements and the State authorities, including the acting governors.

B. Case study: incidents in the East Jebel Marra, Alwehda and Mershing localities (South Darfur)

49. As an illustration of the security dynamics highlighted above, in the East Jebel Marra, Alwehda and Mershing localities of the northern part of South Darfur, tensions remain high on account of:

(a) Intermittent fighting between government forces and SLA/AW in Jebel Marra, as well as between SLA/AW and defecting groups;

(b) The discontent and public protests of the internally displaced persons;

(c) Seasonal conflicts between farmers and herders involving returnees from the camps for internally displaced persons;

(d) Tensions in connection with artisanal mining and a recent gold rush in the area;

(e) New displacement of civilians.

50. During the reporting period, SLA/AW, which has retained its presence in the mountainous areas, accused the Government of the Sudan of carrying out attacks on farms and preventing civilians from going to markets. The Government of the Sudan, on the other hand, accused SLA/AW of criminal activities such as cattle rustling.

51. From August to October 2019, there was a surge in criminal incidents in the area. In one of these incidents, some gunmen attacked a lorry of passengers who were returning to Mershing from the Kidineer market. The driver was killed, two people were injured and the robbers seized 350,000 Sudanese pounds, telephones and property from the passengers. In another incident, three gunmen attacked girls who were returning from the farms to the Teiga camp for internally displaced persons west of Mershing. The attackers seized one 14-year girl and repeatedly raped her.⁸

52. On 12 September 2019, the acting governor of South Darfur, Major General Hashim Khaled Mahmoud, spoke about the need to secure the roads between Kidineer, Layba, Jabra and Mershing and to build temporary mobile towers in the direction of the Kidineer mining area. The governor ordered security reinforcements to be sent to the locality.⁹

53. On 15 September 2019, at Jebel Talang south of Mershing, two gunmen wearing Rapid Support Forces uniforms tried to rob a student of his mobile phone and then killed him. After that incident, protesters from the Mershing camp for internally displaced persons went to the police station and the office of the General Intelligence Service (GIS, formerly NISS). One protester was shot dead and two were wounded. The next day, the internally displaced persons came back to the General Intelligence Service office and demanded the arrest of the killers. This time, two people were killed and two were wounded, which led to the burning of the police station and the

⁸ "Lorry driver killed in South Darfur armed robbery", *Dabanga*, 6 September 2019, see www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/lorry-driver-killed-in-south-darfur-armed-robbery; "School girl gang-raped in South Darfur", *Dabanga*, 25 August 2019, see www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/school-girl-gang-raped-in-south-darfur.

⁹ "South Darfur and the Sudan Mineral Resources Company discuss mining problems", *Suna*, 12 September 2019.

General Intelligence Service office. A joint security force and a local rescue team arrested two alleged killers.¹⁰ The violence in Mershing triggered a series of solidarity rallies in Nyala.

54. The state authorities also introduced a ban on commercial vehicle traffic to Jebel Marra, leading to a severe fuel, food and consumer goods crisis in the area. In one such incident on 18 October 2019, herders came with their livestock and clashed with the farmers in the Martal area, firing shots into the air. One child was wounded and the farmers fled. On the same day in the Fallujah area, 11 herders attacked a farm, where they beat and severely injured the farmer and stole his donkey and other possessions.¹¹

55. Conflicts also occurred among the pastoralists. On 1 October 2019, four gunmen on camels attacked the Mukhtar Yousef settlement. They kidnapped two shepherds and took 45 lambs and 38 cows. Pursued by the herders, the rustlers opened fire, seriously wounding one person, and fled with the abducted children and livestock.¹²

56. On 17 and 18 October 2019, the Sudanese Armed Forces blamed SLA/AW for two attacks on its positions. SLA/AW argued that no such attacks took place, but that it was the national armed forces which had attacked the positions of the armed movement. In early November, SLA/AW clashed in the Sabun elFagur area with a defecting faction, reportedly allied with the security forces. Both groups sustained several casualties.

C. Armed groups in Darfur: Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid

57. During the reporting period, the grip of Abdul Wahid Nur on SLA/AW and support among internally displaced persons for the movement were both significantly eroded. Owing to new sources of financing, the group's military capability in Jebel Marra has been bolstered.

1. Growing leadership challenges: Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid and internally displaced persons

58. In 2019, Abdul Wahid Nur has increasingly been challenged both from within the movement and by internally displaced persons. Divisions within SLA/AW and disagreements among internally displaced person organizations about his leadership style and strategy have broken out into the open. In March 2019, major leaders of internally displaced persons, who until then had been aligned with SLA/AW, formed a new organization for internally displaced persons, the Darfurian Internally Displaced Person and Refugee Camps Administration, and on 25 March issued a statement denouncing Abdul Wahid (see annex 2).

59. In coordination with the new organization, on 1 May 2019, a group of major SLA/AW political representatives and commanders issued a declaration on the suspension of Abdul Wahid's chairmanship (see annex 3). The signatories appointed Ahmed Ibrahim Yusuf "Kazinski" as transitional chairman. Since then, they have

¹⁰ "Arrests after fatal South Darfur shooting", *Dabanga*, 19 September 2019, see www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/arrests-after-fatal-north-darfur-shooting; Panel's sources in South Darfur.

¹¹ "Darfur child, farmer injured in Jebel Marra herder violence", *Dabanga*, 20 October 2019, see www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/darfur-child-farmer-injured-in-jebel-marra-herder-violence.

¹² "Young Darfur shepherds abducted, livestock stolen in Jebel Marra raid", *Dabanga*, 3 October 2019, see www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/young-darfur-shepherds-abducted-livestock-stolen-in-jebel-marra-raid.

focused on rebuilding the organization and establishing contacts with SLA/AW splinter groups, with the objective of reuniting all SLA/AW factions.

60. Abdul Wahid has tried to reassert his position by mobilizing his supporters in camps for internally displaced persons. That approach has given rise to violent tensions between various groups of internally displaced persons. In Kalma, a group loyal to Abdul Wahid, led by Yacoub Fore and Osman Terlin, clashed with members of the new Darfurian Internally Displaced Person and Refugee Camps Administration, led by youth organizer Idriss Durbenja. According to most sources, Abdul Wahid has only retained pockets of supporters in Kalma and Hamadiya.

2. Increased armed capability

61. In early 2019, a significant goldfield was discovered in an area controlled by SLA/AW in Torroye (between the villages of Feina and Kidineer, south-eastern Jebel Marra). According to various rebel sources, as a result of the revenue generated from the mining operations (see para. 157 below), the movement has been able to strengthen its military capability by acquiring new weapons and ammunition from local militias and engaging in a recruitment drive. In recent months, a training centre for new recruits has been set up in the Torontonga area, led by Brigadier General Abdul Jabar. According to rebel sources, it is currently hosting about 150 trainees, recruited from among former fighters and internally displaced persons.

D. Rapprochement between General Hemetti and Darfurian armed groups

62. According to various rebel leaders interviewed by the Panel, as part of the peace discussions in Juba and elsewhere, General Hemetti and his entourage have tried to attract Darfurian armed groups and other Darfurian leaders to their side by presenting to them a narrative of Darfurian common interest. In this narrative, all Darfurians, Arabs and non-Arabs, General Hemetti and rebels should unite to take power in Khartoum against “jellaba” elites who have dominated Sudan since independence, in order to bring an end to decades of the marginalization of Darfur.

63. Some rebel leaders have been sensitive to this approach and have nurtured positive relations with General Hemetti. The sultan of the Fur community, Ahmed Ayoub Ali Dinar, has also visibly opted for an alliance with General Hemetti, and is working to facilitate a rapprochement between General Hemetti and leaders of the Fur community. The Panel considers that political mobilization along the line dividing Darfurians and northern elites could have destabilizing consequences on the transition in the Sudan, including Darfur.

VI. Darfurian armed groups in Libya¹³

64. During the reporting period, the Darfurian groups increased their military capability in Libya significantly, by acquiring new equipment (mostly from the Libyan National Army) and engaging in large-scale recruitment. They participated in several military operations on various Libyan sides. While the groups were initially reluctant to join the fighting in Tripoli between the Libyan National Army and forces affiliated with the Government of National Accord, some elements have recently moved towards the Tripoli front.

¹³ The information in section VI is based on interviews with commanders of Darfurian rebel groups.

A. Mapping of the groups

65. The SLA/MM military force, including approximately 250–300 armed Landcruisers and more than 1,000 fighters, is in Libya, where it remains the largest Darfurian rebel group and continues to side with the Libyan National Army. The force is currently operating in three locations:

(a) Ra's Lanuf (known as the "oil crescent" zone), where elements are led by commanders Abbas Khawaja and Mansour Yahia Ramadan and are based in the vicinity of oil installations;

(b) Hun military airport (Jufrah region), which it helps the Libyan National Army to control;

(c) Zillah area (Jufrah region), where it resides in farms, under the leadership of commander Omar Tokosha.

66. The force is led by General Commander Juma Mohamed Haggar and his deputy Jabir Ishag. The other most important commanders are operations commander Faysal Saleh and Ismail Wad Habouba. While Juma Haggar is very loyal to Minni Minawi, Jabir Ishag, who is the most influential commander on the ground, is more autonomous.

67. SLA/TC, which is an SLA/AW splinter group, has the bulk of its military forces (approximately 50 armed vehicles) in Libya, where it is led by General Commander Saleh Jebel Si and aligned with the Libyan National Army. While the force was operating under the wing of SLA/MM, it has recently split from it and now has its own base.

68. GSLF continues to be the second largest Darfurian rebel group in Libya, with more than 100 armed vehicles. The force is mostly based in the Hun area (south-west of the town) and in Waw al-Kabir (southern Libya). Aboud Adam Khater is the head of the force, while Security Secretary Mohamed Abdallah Ali, Ahmed Abu Tonga and Musa "Com'Groupe" are the other major commanders. GSLF continues to side with Khalifa Haftar, which GSLF justified by claiming that they both have a joint interest in fighting extremism in the region.¹⁴

69. SLA/AW has a growing force comprising approximately 90 armed vehicles in Libya, led by SLA/AW Chief of Staff Yusif Ahmed Yusif "Karjakola". Karjakola acts largely independently from Abdul Wahid, in an opportunistic manner. While Karjakola was siding with anti-Haftar forces until late 2018, he is now aligned with the Libyan National Army. His group is known for being involved in the smuggling of cars to North Darfur and Chad. Karjakola's force works closely with GSLF, with which SLA/AW has signed a series of cooperation agreements.

70. JEM has a small force in southern Libya, led by commander Abdel Karim Cholloy. Since the operation conducted by the Libyan National Army in southern Libya (see para. 79), JEM has been based in the area of Qatrun and has maintained a low profile. As a result of Cholloy's tribal connections with the Tubu, JEM cooperates closely with anti-Haftar Tubu forces. The Panel is aware that, in recent months, the group considered aligning itself with Khalifa Haftar, so as to be on the same side as the other Darfurian groups. According to the Panel's sources, however, the group has not yet made such a move.

71. Musa Hilal Abdalla Alnsiem's supporters who fled to Libya after his arrest, mostly Mahamid Arabs, have so far failed to organize properly and establish their own structures, although they continue to operate under the banner of the Sudanese

¹⁴ Meeting of the Panel with GSLF, 20 July 2019.

Revolutionary Awakening Council (SRAC). While most of these individuals were residing with JEM in southern Libya, many have recently sided with the Libyan National Army in Jufrah.

72. Libyan and other media outlets have reported allegations of the presence of Rapid Support Forces in Libya, fighting on the side of the Libyan National Army, in particular in the Jufrah region.¹⁵ In a contract signed in June between a lobbying firm based in Canada and General Hemetti, on behalf of the Transitional Military Council, it was stipulated that the firm would try to obtain funding from the Libyan National Army for the Council in return for the Council's military help in Libya (see annex 4). The Panel has no credible evidence of the presence of Rapid Support Forces in Libya, and the Panel's sources remain unaware of any such presence. It is worth noting that many Arabs from Darfur and Chad who fight in Libya as individual mercenaries for the Libyan National Army and other groups, including in Jufrah, hail from the same tribes as the majority of Rapid Support Forces personnel.

B. Libyan partners

73. Among the units of the Libyan National Army, the 128th battalion, led by commander Hassan Maatuq al-Zadma (see figure I), is currently a key partner of SLA/MM and GSLF. The battalion, headquartered in the Jufrah region, has been hosting SLA/MM and GSLF forces in Hun for several months and is regularly cooperating with them in joint military operations.

Figure I

Photograph of Hassan Maatuq al-Zadma, commander of the 128th battalion of the Libyan National Army



Source: confidential.

74. In the Zillah area, local pro-Haftar leader Hilal Musa Bouamoud al-Zawawi, known by the Darfurian groups as Sheikh Hilal (see figure II), continues to host Darfurian groups and to coordinate between them and the Libyan National Army.

¹⁵ See www.aljazeera.net/news/politics/2019/7/24/السودان-الإمارات-استخدام-أجواء-السودان-مهام-عسكرية-حميدتي.

Figure II
Photograph of Hilal Musa Bouamoud al-Zawawi



Source: confidential.

75. In Waw al-Kabir, Tubu commander Ali Mohamed “Wujij” (see figure III), who sides with the Libyan National Army and controls the military airport, hosts Darfurian groups, in particular GSLF, and coordinates with them.

Figure III
Photograph of Ali Mohamed “Wujij”



Source: confidential.

76. Hassan Keley, also known as Hassan Musa, a Tubu leader from southern Libya, remains the main coordinator between Darfurian rebels, JEM in particular and

Karjakola's group in the past, and forces in Tripoli and Misratah fighting against the Libyan National Army. In a confidential audio communication, SLA/MM Deputy Commander Jabir Ishag highlights Keley's role as a broker for the Darfurian groups (see annex 5).

C. Military operations

1. Clashes with Chadian rebels

77. Around 10 January, an SLA/MM, GSLF and SLA/TC joint force of approximately 70 vehicles drove from Jufrah to the Kouri Bougoudi gold-mining area, at the border between Chad and Libya, following intercommunal clashes in which Darfurian Zaghawa miners in the area were targeted (most members of SLA/MM and GSLF also hail from the Zaghawa community). SLA/MM Deputy Commander Jabir Ishag, for SLA/MM, and commander Jamal Mitle, for GSLF, led the convoy. The goal of the operation was to gather information on the incidents and bury the victims.

78. On 12 January, the convoy was ambushed by the Chadian rebel group, the Conseil de commandement militaire pour le salut de la République (CCMSR). The Darfurian groups lost 13 fighters and some equipment in the fighting (see figure IV). CCMSR claims that, after the fighting, the Darfurian force took shelter in the Wour military base of the Chadian army and received logistical support from the Chadian military there, before returning to Jufrah. In an audio statement circulating on social networks among the Zaghawa community, one of the Darfurian rebel leaders provides details of the incident (see annex 6).

Figure IV

Photograph of a car belonging to Darfurian rebels that was captured by CCMSR during clashes on 12 January



Source: CCMSR

Note: see "SLA" marking on the door.

2. Operation conducted by the Libyan National Army in southern Libya

79. Between mid-January and February, the Libyan National Army conducted a large-scale military operation in southern Libya. SLA/MM and GSLF units, deployed from their bases in Jufrah in coordination with the 128th battalion of the Libyan

National Army, played a leading role in the operation. On the opposite side, JEM supported the Tubu-dominated forces, which resisted the Libyan National Army offensive. In the clashes that occurred in Godwa and Murzuk in particular, SLA/MM and GSLF forces and JEM forces fought each other and suffered significant losses, both in terms of equipment and personnel. JEM in particular lost several high-profile commanders, such as Mohamed Musa (Cholloy's right-hand man), Bashir al-Haj and Ahmed Nureddine Idriss (in charge of logistics). After the operation, SLA/MM and GSLF forces returned to Jufrah, while JEM dispersed in the southern border area.

3. Fighting in Tripoli

80. The Darfurian groups were initially reluctant to participate in the Libyan National Army "Flood of dignity" operation in western Libya that began in April 2019. There are two main reasons for their reluctance. First, after the Libyan National Army conducted its operation in the south in January and February, relations between the Darfurian groups that sided with the Libyan National Army and the Army itself deteriorated. The groups felt that the Army was not rewarding them properly in terms of financing and equipment for their massive contribution to the operation, to the extent that, in March, SLA/MM offered its services to the anti-Haftar forces in Misratah. In a confidential audio communication, SLA/MM Deputy Commander Jabir Ishag describes those negotiations with forces fighting against the Libyan National Army, which ultimately failed (see annex 5). Second, in the light of the new impetus in the peace talks with the new Sudanese authorities (see para. 12), the groups aimed to preserve their military force as much as possible and avoid losses, and therefore tried to avoid engaging in the war in Tripoli. The groups continued to protect the strategic areas of Jufrah and the "oil crescent" zone for the Libyan National Army while the Army units pushed towards Tripoli.

81. The situation has changed recently. During the week of 25 November, a GLSF convoy of several dozen armed vehicles moved from Jufrah towards the Tripoli front, through Beni Walid and Tarhunah. At the time of writing, it remained to be seen whether other Darfurian groups, SLA/MM in particular, would join them.

D. Arms

1. Provision of military equipment by the Libyan National Army

82. According to various rebel sources, after SLA/MM General Commander Juma Haggar, SLA/AW Chief of Staff Karjakola, GSLF head Aboud Adam Khater and SLA/TC General Commander Saleh Jebel Si visited the Libyan National Army in Benghazi, Libya, in July and August, the Libyan National Army provided SLA/MM, around 20 August, with approximately 60 new vehicles (Toyota Landcruisers and Hilux), which were not armed. The delivery of the cars, taken to the Hun military airport, was part of a deal between SLA/MM and the Libyan National Army to secure the group's support for the Army.

83. In a video of an SLA/MM military parade released by the group in August 2019,¹⁶ several types of armoured personnel carriers can be seen, in particular Spartan (see figure V), Puma (see figure VI) and Cougar (see figure VII) vehicles produced by the Streit Group. A source in SLA/MM said to the Panel that these personnel carriers were given to the group in 2016 and 2018 by the Libyan National Army as a reward for its participation in two military operations conducted by the Army in the "oil crescent" zone. This was confirmed to the Panel by other sources in the movements.

¹⁶ See www.facebook.com/MiniArkoMinawiy/videos/424811324794123/.

Figure V
Extract of a Streit Group Spartan vehicle from an SLA/MM video



Source: SLA/MM.

Figure VI
Extract of a Streit Group Puma vehicle from an SLA/MM video



Source: SLA/MM.

Figure VII
Extract of a Streit Group Cougar vehicle from an SLA/MM video



Source: SLA/MM.

84. Some of these armoured personnel carriers given by the Libyan National Army in 2016 were later used by SLA/MM in its failed attack on North Darfur from Libya in May 2017 (see [S/2017/1125](#), paras. 66–68). The provision of military vehicles to an armed group operating in Darfur may constitute a violation by the Libyan National Army of the sanctions regime pursuant to resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#). Darfuri military commanders operating in Libya also informed the Panel that the Libyan National Army had provided Darfuri movements that supported the Army with various types of weapons, including 14.5-mm and 12.7-mm machine guns and anti-aircraft guns.

2. Battlefield captures

85. In a video released in May, SLA/MM displays a T-55 tank (see figure VIII) and several infantry fighting vehicles of the BRM-1/BMP-1 type (see figure IX). An officer of the group confirmed to the Panel that SLA/MM captured these vehicles during a recent battle. The captures are unlikely to provide the group with any significant military gain. The tank featured in the video is an old model and in a poor state, and its gun is unlikely to work properly. The same can be said about the infantry fighting vehicles, which therefore can only be used as armoured personnel carriers; however, SLA/MM has too few of the vehicles to possibly gain any tactical advantage.

Figure VIII
Extract of a T-55 tank from an SLA/MM video



Source: SLA/MM.

Figure IX
Extract of a BRM-1/BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicle from an SLA/MM video



Source: SLA/MM.

E. Recruitment

86. During the reporting period, the Darfurian groups in Libya engaged in large-scale recruitment. For example, SLA/MM released a video in May 2019, shot in Libya according to various sources, to celebrate the graduation of a group of trainees. In

particular, recruitment significantly intensified in the second part of 2019, for two main reasons: first, according to several sources, following the aforementioned meetings in Benghazi with the Libyan National Army in July and August (see para. 82), the Darfurian groups agreed to provide the Army with several hundred new fighters; second, progress in the peace process with the Government of the Sudan has enticed the movements to recruit more and more members so as to have stronger claims in future security arrangements.

87. This recruitment drive was conducted in several places and with several constituencies. For example, the Panel is aware of SLA/MM recruitment networks in the Zaghawa community of North Darfur, as well as in the Darfurian refugee camps in Chad. Several military commanders based in Libya also confirmed to the Panel that a large number of recruits came from the community of Darfurian artisanal miners working at gold-mining sites at the border between Chad and Libya, in Kouri Bougoudi in particular. Many miners are former members of the Darfurian armed groups, and as a result of the difficult living conditions at the mines, including intercommunal clashes, some miners were tempted to join the groups as an alternative. Rebel sources informed the Panel that the groups had recruiting agents in the mines and in the Libyan town of Umm al-Aranib, where miners frequently go for rest and supplies. In the audio statement in annex 6, a rebel leader confirms that the Darfurian gold miners in Kouri Bougoudi were being recruited by the movements.

VII. Darfurian armed groups in South Sudan

88. Several groups continue to have a residual military presence in South Sudan. The Panel is not aware of any military engagement by these groups during the reporting period. One of these groups, SLA/AW, continues to run a detention and extortion system targeting part of the Darfurian diaspora.

A. Justice and Equality Movement and dissidents of the Movement

89. JEM and the Sudanese Revolutionary Council, a JEM dissident group, still have small military forces in Lol State. JEM has a force of approximately 100 fighters near Kata led by commander Omda Taher and military intelligence head Salah al-Bahati, while the Sudanese Revolutionary Council has approximately 200 fighters near Boro Medina, led by General Abdulrahman Arbab Hamid (Secretary for Military Affairs).

90. During the reporting period, JEM and the Sudanese Revolutionary Council in Lol State kept a low profile. The conflict between the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)¹⁷ and the Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO) rebels has reduced significantly in recent months, as illustrated by the signing of the memorandum of understanding between Governor of Lol State, Rizig Zakaria Hassan, and SPLA-IO in Raja on 17 January 2019. This improvement in the local security situation means that the two Darfurian groups, who usually join the SPLA military operations in the area against the SPLA-IO rebels and their local allies, have not engaged in any fighting in 2019 and have not received of late any meaningful financial or logistical support from the local SPLA forces and the Governor. In order to earn a living, the groups have engaged in farming and trade activities (see para. 168). The groups continue to liaise with the Governor and help him with his personal security.

91. Several rebel sources reported to the Panel that, after meetings in Juba between General Hemetti and Sudanese Revolutionary Council Chair Bahar Karama, it was

¹⁷ Also known as the South Sudan People's Defence Forces.

agreed by the two parties that the movement would join the Government of the Sudan and that its military force would be integrated into the Rapid Support Force. To that end, according to the rebel sources, the Rapid Support Forces sent a convoy transporting spare parts of vehicles and fuel from the Sudan towards the Raja area of South Sudan for the Sudanese Revolutionary Council, so that the group could cross into the Sudan. However, the convoy was stopped by the South Sudanese authorities in the Abyei border area. To date, the group remains in Boro Medina.

B. Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid¹⁸

92. SLA/AW has maintained a constant military presence in South Sudan since 2011. SLA/AW activities in the country are organized in two main areas: Pariang County and Juba. An SLA/AW military force named Secular Sudan Division is based in Pariang County. Led by Major General Abdullah Haran, who is the SLA/AW Deputy Chair, the Secular Sudan Division rotates between several bases in the County. At the time of writing, the military force was located in two bases: near Biu (led by Haran) and on the southern bank of White Lake/Jaw (led by Haran's acting deputy, Brigadier General Musa Aradib), near the border with the Sudan. It also had two farms, one near the town of Pariang and another near the town of Biu. It comprised approximately 110 fighters and 37 armed Landcruisers.

93. During the reporting period, SLA/AW had a team in Juba, in charge of coordinating the group's affairs and of liaising with the relevant South Sudanese authorities. Sultan Adam Fur, a well-established traditional leader for the Darfurian Fur community (the main constituency for SLA/AW) in Juba, played a pivotal role, gathering support for the group in the Fur local diaspora, including through money collection. Adam Haroun "Ortega", Major Abdulhafiz Mohamed "Serra" and Mohamed Ismail Aba managed the group's operations, while Captain Musa Ahmed Mohamed was the military coordinator with SPLA. The movement has a safe house in the Guedelee neighbourhood.

94. SLA/AW had poor relations with the SPLA special operations desk, which is in charge of the support for the Sudanese rebel groups (see [S/2019/34](#), paras. 111–113). However, the group has managed over the years to establish durable, opportunistic partnerships with some members of the South Sudanese security apparatus and some local stakeholders. In Pariang County, the group has anchored its presence by building mutually beneficial relations with local elites from the Dinka community of Pariang, such as SPLA General Deng Mayik, who was leading the SPLA operations in the County. During the civil war of 2013–2015, the group supported the SPLA and Dinka tribespeople against the SPLA-IO rebels in the County; in return, some Dinka community leaders helped the Secular Sudan Division by granting it lands to establish its bases and farms. In particular, SPLA colonel and prominent businessman Simon Lueth Tor, a Dinka from Pariang, has become a key SLA/AW ally.

95. In Juba, SLA/AW has built good working relations with some individuals in the security forces, in particular some SPLA military intelligence officers. The group buys off the loyalty of these individuals with money and services. For example, the Panel is aware that Major General Abdullah Haran offered a truck to a top military intelligence officer and paid for the medical treatment abroad of an SPLA general's relative. SLA/AW utilizes these informal networks, which parallel and bypass the formal channel of communication of the special operations desk, to facilitate its operations in South Sudan, in particular to protect its businesses and target dissidents.

¹⁸ The information in section VII.B is based on the Panel's interviews with SLA/AW officials in South Sudan.

96. In 2018, the Panel documented the involvement of SPLA military intelligence officers in the kidnapping of Secular Sudan Division Deputy Commander Abbas Khamis (S/2019/34, annex 10). A similar incident occurred on 19 December 2018 in Nimule (on the border with Uganda), when some SPLA officers arrested three prominent members of SLA/TC (an SLA/AW splinter group) on behalf of SLA/AW to hand them over to Major General Abdullah Haran. The attempt failed and the three SLA/TC members were released after the special operations desk intervened.

97. The Secular Sudan Division has not engaged in military operations against the Government of the Sudan since 2013. It has not participated in the South Sudanese internal conflict since 2015. SLA/AW in South Sudan is now focused on generating revenue through commercial activities (see paras. 161–166).

C. Detention system and related crimes of the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid in South Sudan¹⁹

98. In order to sustain its presence in South Sudan and the South Kordofan State of the Sudan, SLA/AW set up a system of extortion and detention targeting Darfuri civilians, under the overall leadership of Major General Abdullah Haran. The group routinely engages in various abuses, including kidnapping, theft of properties, killings, torture and other forms of ill-treatment, and forced labour. The group is currently holding approximately 70 prisoners (including civilians and SLA/AW fighters) in two prisons near Jaw and near Biu.

99. After arriving in South Sudan around 2012, SLA/AW began collecting money from Darfuri civilians living in South Sudan and South Kordofan, in particular from the Fur community, in order to finance its activities in those two areas. In a meeting in Juba, Abdul Wahid formed a committee for this purpose, led by Brigadier General Osman Haroun. The detention practices of the armed group have derived from this taxation policy.

100. The Panel interviewed several individuals – all Fur traders in South Sudan and South Kordofan – who had been detained for several years by SLA/AW, from 2012 onwards. They provided similar and consistent accounts, which were also confirmed to the Panel by former officers of the Secular Sudan Division. The interviewees indicated that they had been approached by SLA/AW members who had given them two options: either give money to the movement (up to \$5,000 were requested) or enrol in the SLA/AW military force. A few days after they refused both options, some were kidnapped from their homes by SLA/AW fighters during the night and others were arrested by local SPLA members and handed over to SLA/AW. SLA/AW members seized their personal property, which the SPLA members sometimes split with complicit SPLA officers.

101. After their capture, the individuals were held prisoner by SLA/AW at various locations across South Sudan and South Kordofan, following the Secular Sudan Division's movements. Initially, in 2012 and 2013, they were held at various SLA/AW military bases in South Sudan (for example, near Raja, Bentiu, Wau and Pariang). Later, in 2014 and 2015, they were held in South Kordofan (including in Hayban, Mushtarka, Jurba and Amdulu). Since 2015, they have been held in Pariang County (including in Adiej, Biu and Jaw). Detention conditions varied across locations. The prisoners were always chained. In Hayban, they were held in deep holes in the ground, chained to a tree or in cells made of thorny shrubs, and in Adiej they were held in

¹⁹ The information in section VII.C is based on the Panel's interviews with former detainees of SLA/AW and top officials of SLA/AW in South Sudan.

containers. Some civilians have remained in captivity since they were captured by SLA/AW in 2012 or 2013.

102. The prisoners were subjected to various forms of ill-treatment. SLA/AW soldiers frequently beat and whipped them with iron bars and sticks. The soldiers denied them access to medical treatment, basic hygiene and food. On occasion, the prisoners did not receive food for several days. They were not allowed to communicate with their families. These conditions remain in place for those still in captivity.

103. The prisoners were also subjected to forced labour. Since 2015, SLA/AW forces prisoners to work on the armed group's farms in Pariang County. While SLA/AW members manage the farms, the prisoners are forced to work there without financial compensation. They are therefore an essential asset to the group's commercial farming operations. This system of forced labour remains in place to date. At the time of writing, several dozen prisoners were working on the armed group's farm near Biu.

104. The Panel is aware of at least seven prisoners who were killed by SLA/AW:

- (a) Ahmed al-Taher "Mamouria" was beaten to death in Hayban in 2014;
- (b) Mohamed Taher was beaten to death in Mushtarka in 2014;
- (c) "Jalhak" was shot dead in 2015 after escaping from Adiej;
- (d) Bakhit Ismail Mubarak was killed in 2016 after escaping from Adiej;
- (e) Mohamed Ibrahim was beaten to death in the Malakal area in 2012;
- (f) Osman, a SLA/AW member, was beaten to death in the Bentiu area in May 2016 because he was suspected of sympathizing with dissidents;
- (g) Mohamed Khawaja, a SLA/AW member, was killed in Pariang in December 2018 after deserting the group.

105. Some other prisoners died while in custody. Abbas Abdallah Abdulrahman was killed in an air strike carried out by the Government of the Sudan on an SLA/AW base in Mushtarka in 2013. Mubarak "Ganja" was killed in a car accident in 2015 while SLA/AW was transporting him and other prisoners from South Kordofan to Pariang by truck.

106. Major General Abdullah Haran is the overall commander of the group's detention system. Under Haran, the military police, headed by Lieutenant Ahmed Nyangding, is managing the prisons. Several victims interviewed by the Panel were kidnapped by Brigadier General Osman Haroun, while one was kidnapped by military police Lieutenant Adam Dakay. South Sudanese SPLA General Gabriel Gai, now with the rebel SPLA-IO movement, assisted SLA/AW in the kidnapping of some victims. According to eyewitnesses, Dakay and former head of military police Major Saad Adam were directly involved in some of the above-mentioned killings (see annex 7 for photographs of these commanders).

D. Relations between the groups and the Government of South Sudan

107. As a result of its rapprochement with the Sudan and decreased financial capacities, the Government of South Sudan is currently providing the Darfurian groups with very limited assistance. The SPLA special operations desk now has limited capability and acts mostly as a liaison office. The replacement in early 2019 of Major General Akol Majok Nyigan by his deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Denis Lomoro, as head of the desk indicates that the relationship with the Darfurian rebels is currently not an issue of importance for SPLA.

108. As a result of the involvement of South Sudan in the peace process in the Sudan, all major Darfurian rebel leaders travelled to Juba extensively during the second part of 2019, which provided them with opportunities to try and sort out internal issues with their military forces and to sort out their relations with SPLA. For example, confidential sources informed the Panel about two letters sent in October 2019 by JEM Chair Gibril Ibrahim to the SPLA military intelligence concerning JEM affairs in South Sudan. The first letter contained a request for SPLA assistance to help JEM to recover the vehicles and weapons taken by Abdulrahman Arbab when he left JEM. The second letter contained a request for an intervention by the military intelligence to recover 900 uniforms imported by the movement into South Sudan, held by the Government of South Sudan.

VIII. International humanitarian law and human rights

A. Overview

109. During the reporting period, Darfur experienced relative stability, with no large-scale armed confrontations. Nevertheless, localized tensions, violence targeting internally displaced persons and returnees and sexual and gender-based violence continued. As highlighted below, these incidents resulted in severe injuries, loss of life and damage and destruction of property. Several internally displaced persons experienced multiple displacements while trying to seek safety and protection from clashes inside of camps or from sporadic fighting between government forces and SLA/AW and SLA/AW splinter groups in parts of Jebel Marra. Their multiple displacements left them vulnerable and further exposed them to risks of sexual assault and violence. The direct targeting of civilians, in violation of the principles of distinction and proportionality, constitutes serious breaches of international humanitarian law, for which parties responsible must be held accountable. Delays in the formation of a new Government had an impact on the implementation of numerous policies in Darfur, including on the return of internally displaced persons and refugees as part of ongoing initiatives to find durable solutions, the exercise of which is now stalled.

110. Ambiguity in the way in which political developments in Khartoum would improve the situation in Darfur prompted a number of protests that lasted several days. Despite the long-term displacement of internally displaced persons and the large number of refugees, the Government of the Sudan has not implemented durable solutions that would allow returns in safety and dignity. The alarming rate of security incidents, most of which have not been investigated, propelled internally displaced persons to repeat calls for the enhancement of security measures. Waves of protests swept across Darfur, with the underlying message being the need to address the harsh socioeconomic realities facing communities. Protesters expressed concerns over the lack of proper representation by armed movements, including on issues of justice and accountability. While sentiments prevail that these movements only represent their communities, there is a risk of future conflicts inside the camps for internally displaced persons.

111. In Nyala, during protests in November over living standards and the lack of commodities, fuel and transportation, the security forces were accused of using excessive force, resulting in the death and injury of demonstrators. These protests prompted the Sovereign Council to visit Nyala and hold meetings to assess the damage and defuse the crisis.

B. Rape and sexual and gender-based violence

112. In farms and locations near camps for internally displaced persons, incidents of rape and physical assault of women, girls and boys were widely reported by local sources. In general, the identification of perpetrators remains one of the barriers to pursuing justice and accountability. Survivors described the perpetrators as groups of armed men, mostly herders, while some other perpetrators were identified as members of the security forces. In most cases, perpetrators who were identified were not arrested. In addition to being raped, some survivors were subjected to more violence, including beatings. For example, in one incident on 28 June in Tabit (North Darfur), a group of three women, including two adolescents, and one man was attacked by three armed men on camels. The man and woman (both in their 40s) were beaten and chased away, while the two teenage girls, aged 15 and 18, were beaten and raped. One of the assailants cut off parts of the 18-year-old's labia and clitoris. The particularly vicious character of this assault is likely to have a significant dire impact on the survivors, as well as on other women and girls in the community.

113. In the Tawilah locality (North Darfur), where many such incidents have occurred in recent months, groups of women were gang-raped and severely beaten on 28 October near their farms in Shangil Tobaya, leaving some of them with knife wounds. On 7 November, two internally displaced women were attacked on their farm in Martal by a group of armed men described as Arab herders. One of the women was assaulted and raped after trying to prevent cattle from grazing on her crops; the other was beaten with sticks and injured. The incident was reported to the Sudan Police Force in Tawilah, who inspected the scene from which the perpetrators had fled, leaving behind their animals. No suspects were arrested. The patterns of incidents are indicative that rape is increasingly used in the fight between nomads and farmers over access to land in several areas in Darfur.

114. Statistics from confidential government sources indicated that case files numbered 120 between April and September. However, this figure is very likely to be on the low side, as societal barriers inhibit the reporting of rape cases owing in part to a lack of awareness, stigma and fear of further victimization.

115. Moreover, survivors do not receive adequate treatment owing in part to distances from medical facilities, and, when they do have access to treatment, post-exposure prophylaxis kits are not readily available. In addition to being provided with timely and appropriate medical assistance, including psychosocial support, effective investigation and prosecution are indispensable to curbing practices and lifting the culture of silence. Authorities often have limited capacity in bringing perpetrators to justice, thereby fuelling impunity.

C. Children and armed conflict

116. Sexual violence against children is among the six grave violations against children in armed conflict (as stipulated in Security Council resolution [1612 \(2005\)](#)) on which the Panel gathered reports. Local sources reported that the rape of a 12-year-old girl by armed men in Golo (Central Darfur) on 5 October was the third rape case of underage girls in the area in one day. In a separate incident, a widely disseminated video recording by local activists showed two girls, aged 11 and 13, narrating their ordeal after being raped in Nertiti (Central Darfur) by persons that they identified through their uniform and insignia as members of the Rapid Support Forces. Both survivors were injured and hospitalized. One of the girls' mothers lamented that it would have been better for her daughter to have been killed than being defiled and left worthless among her peers. Such sentiments highlight the challenges survivors

face, compounded by the absence of a safe space for survivors and the lack of support for children as part of accountability measures.

117. The burning of farmland by armed herders in the Guldo locality (Jebel Marra) on 25 November (see figure X) caused residents to flee from the area. While the local school was not directly targeted, the incident had a significant impact on the 250 boys and girls attending the school who were displaced with their families (see figure XI).

Figure X

Photograph of farms set on fire on 25 November 2019 by armed militias in the Guldo locality



Source: local human rights monitors.

Figure XI

Photograph of the Guldo school after the attack by armed militias



Source: local human rights monitors.


118. Security forces were implicated in an attack against civilians on 7 November near Saraf Omra (North Darfur). Local sources stated that the indiscriminate shooting of civilian homes resulted in the injury of six boys aged between 13 and 15, who were hospitalized (see figures XII and XIII).

Figure XII
Photograph of children injured owing to shooting by security forces near Saraf Omra, 7 November 2019



Source: confidential.

Figure XIII
Photograph of an injured child receiving treatment after the shooting near Saraf Omra



Source: local sources.

119. SLA/AW remains one of the entities listed as a party to the conflict but denies claims of the recruitment and use of children. During a meeting with the Panel in June, Abdul Wahid stated that the children among his forces were orphans to whom assistance was being provided. The verification of such reports has not been possible. It may be recalled that SLA/AW has not signed an action plan in line with relevant Security Council resolutions to end and prevent grave child rights violations.

D. Violations by security forces

120. During the reporting period, various components of the security forces (namely, the Sudanese Armed Forces, the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudan Police Force) were accused of committing various human rights violations, including torture, extrajudicial killings, rape and excessive use of force. Local sources informed the Panel that, in November, four women survived an attempted sexual assault by members of the Rapid Support Forces in Kutum village (North Darfur). One of the survivors was severely injured on the head and hospitalized after she fought back. A 25-year-old internally displaced woman was raped at gunpoint on 27 October by a soldier of the Sudanese Armed Forces from the Golol military base in Nertiti, who was subsequently arrested and detained.

121. Various sources reported that Rapid Support Forces unlawfully detained four men from the Qubbah area in Ed Daein city (East Darfur) and subjected them to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in July, leading to the death on 16 July of one of the detainees, a 19-year-old boy, in the Ed Daein teaching hospital. The incident followed orders from a senior officer of the Rapid Support Forces for the arrest of the men on accusations of stealing a mobile phone. Thereafter, demonstrators who had gathered in front of the house rented by the Rapid Support Forces were shot at, but they broke through and set the house on fire in retaliation. In a rare, welcome development, the security committee of East Darfur condemned the incident and the State Prosecutor charged seven soldiers of the Rapid Support Forces with murder.²⁰

122. In another incident, local sources accused members of the Rapid Support Forces of torture, leading to the death of one of several detainees, following a sweep of arrests of activists from the Kalma camp (South Darfur) and other localities.

123. Local sources informed the Panel that eight people in Nyala were seriously injured and scores of civilians lost consciousness when the Sudan Police Force used live ammunition and tear gas to clear the sit-in that had been held outside the army headquarters since 6 April. One man died on 5 May as a result of gunshot wounds he sustained during the break-up of the protests.

124. Following an attack on 5 September in Golo (Jebel Marra), a 36-year-old man was killed and three other civilians were injured by persons alleged to be Rapid Support Forces personnel. On 18 September, local youths and activists organized a vigil demanding the arrest and prosecution of the perpetrators. Five of the youths were arrested and detained by the Rapid Support Forces. The local commander of the Rapid Support Forces threatened to arrest demonstrators demanding their release.

125. In several cases, no action was taken against the security forces involved in the shootings and other violations. Authorities must always allow a safe environment for peaceful protests and ensure that those responsible for acts of torture and unlawful use of force are investigated. Despite the prevalence of violations, the level of impunity remained high.

E. Abuses by groups of the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid

126. During fighting between the Government of the Sudan and SLA/AW and infighting within SLA/AW, some SLA/AW groups committed various violations and abuses against civilians, such as killing and maiming, including of women and children, which also resulted in new displacements and loss of livelihood. According to a joint report by UNAMID and the Office of the United Nations High

²⁰ “11 dead this week in Darfur violence”, *Dabanga*, 16 July 2019.

Commissioner for Human Rights,²¹ in May 2019, clashes between various SLA/AW factions (between commanders Salah Borso and Mubarak Waldoock, as well as between SLA/AW and the splinter group SLA/Peace and Development) led to the displacement of nearly 1,500 civilians to Golo and surrounding villages. Internally displaced persons reported that several villages were burned and civilian property was looted, including livestock and farm produce. They also reported incidents of sexual violence and rape of women and children. Host communities have been severely constrained in having to share their limited resources. The situation of affected communities was made more dire as a result of limited humanitarian assistance, outbreaks of diseases and a lack of food, water and medical supplies.

F. Intercommunal violence

127. Darfurian communities have witnessed relative stability in some areas, prompting returns. In November, various sources, including local media, reported that 20,000 people had returned to five different villages in Tawilah and in Sortoni (North Darfur), where leaders of Arab nomads stated that they and internally displaced persons were cohabiting and resolving their differences peacefully. However, root causes of the Darfur conflict, including security threats, disputes over land ownership and competition for scarce resources, continued, impeding a significant number of returns of internally displaced persons in most areas of Darfur. Myriads of incidents between nomadic and agrarian communities accounted for the majority of deadly intercommunal clashes. In many incidents, internally displaced persons claiming legitimate ownership of their lands and trying to return to them were harassed, threatened, chased away and assaulted, and sometimes killed. Women and girls were sexually assaulted and raped.

128. This volatile environment has resulted in internally displaced persons and returnees being caught in the cyclical nature of “exploratory” relocations to their original homes and hastened retreats in which individuals return to the camps or experience secondary displacements. For communities of internally displaced persons faced with shrinking food rations and humanitarian support, the situation worsens their plight, as sources of income and livelihood are significantly affected.

129. Victims among internally displaced persons and returnees generally describe the perpetrators as “Arab nomads”, some of whom are heavily armed. Of grave concern are reports that some perpetrators are supported by the Rapid Support Forces in the commission of these criminal acts. Local monitors documented numerous such incidents. For example, on 31 October a displaced man and his teenage daughter were killed on their farm by four armed shepherds riding camels and wearing military uniforms. According to sources, the perpetrators were members of the Rapid Support Forces in the Tawilah locality. Following the incident, the Public Prosecutor requested that the government of North Darfur State issue a warrant for their arrest and the removal of the Rapid Support Forces and militias from the area. The Panel was informed that the government had not responded to requests to investigate attacks by militias.

130. In a similar incident, local sources reported that unprovoked attacks by armed pastoralists on four villages in the Central Darfur locality of Almukjar on 28 September led to the displacement of 3,000 individuals when their villages were looted and burned. A 32-year-old man was killed and eight other victims were injured, including women and girls. On 21 October, hundreds of residents from four villages

²¹ UNAMID/Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Report on human rights abuses committed by the Abdul Wahid faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement and splinter groups in Darfur: January 2018–August 2019”.

in the Graida locality (South Darfur) were displaced after they were attacked and looted when armed men, allegedly supported by the Rapid Support Forces with weapons and vehicles, raided their villages. The victims were beaten, markets and homes were looted, and residents were ordered at gunpoint to leave the villages immediately. As a result of the incidents, during which a captain of the Sudanese Armed Forces was killed by the perpetrators, hundreds of families who had left the camps for internally displaced persons to cultivate their farms were forced to flee to Umm Kerfa. Thereafter, the attackers released livestock on the farms, intentionally destroying crops and creating a difficult humanitarian situation for the victims. The violence in Graida led to contradictory statements from farmers, nomads, security forces and the government of South Darfur State and to protests.

131. The weak rule of law in Darfur fuels the commission of such attacks. The Panel was informed that, in many cases, victims repeatedly called upon authorities to intervene and expel the pastoralists to enable them to cultivate their farms. Victims also generally demanded that they be compensated, provided with basic services and have access to infrastructure. They also complained that authorities had not put in place comprehensive policies to address the concerns of internally displaced persons and returnees. The new Government seems to have acknowledged the need to address the situation. On 3 December, the Minister of Cabinet Affairs, Omar Manis, called for measures to enhance security and expand the presence of regular forces in the agricultural areas in Darfur to protect the harvest and reduce aggressions, after a series of assassinations of farmers by armed herders.²² According to media sources, on 4 December, a combined security force intervened to stop fighting between farmers and herders in the Kutum locality and seized all the camels that had destroyed the farms.²³ Subsequently, a committee from the State physically assessed the damage and ordered that compensation be paid before the camels were to be returned. It is hoped that such timely interventions will be replicated in other cases and will serve as a future deterrent.

G. Humanitarian needs, gaps and challenges

132. Communities have been affected by the continuing blockade of humanitarian actors by the Government of the Sudan since 2009. Ten years down the line, there have been no tangible changes in the lifting of restrictions, and few humanitarian actors are permitted to operate. Since the World Food Programme reprioritization of humanitarian assistance in 2015, internally displaced persons have continued to criticize the policy and have accused international organizations of not fully meeting their needs. This process, coupled with the biometric registration of internally displaced persons, has significantly cut down the number of internally displaced persons deemed eligible for humanitarian assistance.

133. During the reporting period, in several localities in Darfur, there were widespread outbreaks of waterborne diseases and other ailments such as measles, which can have a devastating effect on communities living in very close quarters. Reports, including from humanitarian organizations, indicate that dozens of people died, including children. As a result of the absence of necessary personnel and equipment and the lack of or very high cost of medicines, adequate treatment has not been provided.

134. With support from the United Nations, the Government of the Sudan has made strides in the clearance of mines and unexploded ordnance. However, communities stress the need for further operations following isolated yet devastating incidents. For

²² Article by Kush News of 3 December 2019, available at <http://kushnews.net/2019/12/214962>.

²³ Article by Kush News of 4 December 2019, available at <http://kushnews.net/2019/12/215154>.

example, on 18 August, three family members on their way to their farm in Mornei (West Darfur) were victims of a landmine explosion that resulted in the death of the two brothers and the injury of their sister.²⁴

H. Disarmament

135. The proliferation and use of arms continued to prompt calls by communities for a more comprehensive disarmament and weapons collection campaign. Despite past disarmament initiatives, hardened attitudes remain, and communities are left vulnerable. In response to heightened insecurity, new measures were adopted by the new Government. In September, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan launched a disarmament campaign in Nyala and vowed to arrest and hold accountable all those who threatened the security of the people.²⁵ However, such initiatives have been met with challenges. For example, on 17 November, gunmen riding motorcycles in the Um Dukhun locality (Central Darfur) shot at security forces during a disarmament operation, injuring one officer of the Sudanese Armed Forces.

I. Challenges to durable solutions

136. In line with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons, in 2018 the Government of the Sudan announced a programme for the return of internally displaced persons that provided them with three options: returning to their places of origin, resettling elsewhere in the country or integrating into the places to which they had been displaced. On 5 November 2018, the Governor of North Darfur officially launched the transformation of the Abu Shawk, Salam and Zamzam camps in North Darfur into fully serviced residential districts. The first phase was to include the resettlement of approximately 45,000 families who would be granted 300 to 400 m² of land and an ownership certificate. These programmes were suspended following the political developments in Khartoum.

137. Despite those initiatives, the continuing violence targeting internally displaced persons and communities has left many to question how they will be able to return to their places of origin in safety and dignity. According to local sources, many internally displaced persons are fearful of exploring the option of resettling in other places because of security threats and the lack of infrastructure and basic services. In addition, integration into their current places of residence is also challenging as they continue to lack food, medicines, drinking water and other basic services for which they need humanitarian support. Leaders of internally displaced communities stated that there had also been outbreaks of diseases in various areas of conflict and that the Government of the Sudan had talked about dismantling the camps without addressing their main concerns and without carrying out the process of rehabilitation of the war-ravaged areas. Furthermore, the issue of new settlers in some of the areas needs to be addressed. The internally displaced persons also demand that the Government of the Sudan address the issues of land ownership, one of the main root causes of the conflict.

²⁴ “Two brothers dead, sister maimed in West Darfur UXO blast”, *Dabanga*, 19 August 2019.

²⁵ “Campaign of disarmament in Darfur”, *Dabanga*, 29 September 2019.

J. Justice and accountability

138. Transitional justice measures, which are essential to ensuring accountability, are not in place, and there are no guarantees of non-recurrence, reconciliation and reparations. Demands for justice and accountability are growing, yet Darfurians fear that those who bear the greatest responsibility for violations, including security forces, are unlikely to be held accountable. At the core of any transitional justice initiative is the need for engagement with the affected populations to better identify their needs for more viable and lasting solutions.

139. Many sources, in particular internally displaced persons and the Fur community, have also expressed serious concerns at the appointment of both General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and General Hemetti, given their alleged involvement in past human rights violations in the Darfur conflict. The situation in Darfur needs a major paradigm shift to reduce violence in the region, enhance security and end human rights violations. Similarly, the need to re-establish State presence in Darfur, alongside institutional and other reforms to address gaps in the effective dispensation of law and order and to improve access to justice, cannot be overstated.

IX. Border control and customs

A. Background

140. Cross-border challenges in Darfur, in particular various smuggling activities and arms flows, have persisted since the beginning of the conflict. Numerous national and regional initiatives have been launched in an attempt to address those challenges. Compared with the other border areas in Darfur, the border with Chad has been the most stable (see [S/2019/34](#), para. 38). The Joint Chad/Sudan Border Monitoring Force, deployed in 2010, has been reasonably successful in enhancing stability in the border areas in Darfur, to the extent that it has become a model for cross-border collaboration in the region. However, challenges remain, as illustrated by the aforementioned arms flows from Darfur to Chad in 2019 (see para. 32). Despite all these regional and national efforts, institutions and departments responsible for border management in Darfur have remained weak. As a result, opportunistic criminal groups, as well as armed groups, have continued to operate across the borders. The border with Libya remains vulnerable to various cross-border activities, including arms flows in both directions, because insufficient forces have been deployed to these largely desert areas.

B. Relevant institutions and challenges

141. Since their formation, the Rapid Support Forces have been largely deployed to the border areas in Darfur. To a large extent, they have been the buffer for border control at the border with Libya and have seconded the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Joint Chad/Sudan Border Monitoring Force at the border with Chad. At the peak of the protests in Khartoum in April 2019, many Rapid Support Forces were deployed from Darfur to the capital and other main cities, resulting in a reduced presence of these forces along the Darfur borders. In a meeting with United Nations entities in November 2019, the Panel was informed of the gap created by the departure of the Rapid Support Forces, in particular in the areas around the border with Libya. However, some elements of the Rapid Support Forces themselves have been accused

of being involved in cross-border smuggling, of migrants in particular.²⁶ In its final report for 2018, the Panel made a recommendation that the Government of the Sudan complete the full transformation of the Rapid Support Forces into a professional, inclusive and accountable force, in accordance with the Rapid Support Forces Act (S/2019/34, para. 191).

142. Customs, the primary agency at a given border, has limited presence in the border areas in Darfur. Several recommendations on strengthening the capacity and capability of border management have been made by the Panel in the past (see S/2019/34, para. 199). This lack of institutions hampers the capacity of the Government of the Sudan to limit ongoing, illegal flows of goods and services to and from Darfur.

143. The Government of the Sudan has launched several campaigns to address the cross-border smuggling of, for example, vehicles. The challenge has always been the capacity of the Government to carry out this work thoroughly and consistently and its capability to maintain those efforts over time. Various sources and observers stated to the Panel that this challenge was largely due to a half-hearted effort on the part of the Government.

144. The problem of border control is not unique to Darfur but is rather a regional issue, as illustrated by the establishment in 2016 of the regional operational centre in Khartoum, aimed at addressing transnational crime in the region. The regional nature of these challenges makes their resolution along Darfur borders even more difficult.

X. Arms

A. Prevalence of arms

145. The prevalence of arms in Darfur, mostly due to the large-scale distribution of weapons to proxy militias by the Government of the Sudan in the early years of the conflict, is a well-known, ongoing issue. It is also a source of instability in the region, as some armed groups based in neighbouring countries, such as the Central African Republic and Libya, obtain weapons in Darfur. In Darfur, small arms continue to be used by militias and other opportunistic criminal gangs to cause instability and insecurity, including to commit various violations, such as sexual and gender-based violence and attacks on staff of international non-governmental organizations and UNAMID property.

146. In August 2017, the Government of the Sudan initiated a robust process of weapons collection. For a time, these efforts reduced the level of armed incidents in Darfur, in particular in main cities. The process has since been stopped, and armed incidents have been reported across Darfur. The new authorities have acknowledged repeatedly the seriousness of the problem. In addition to the collection of the weapons themselves, a reinforcement of law and order institutions in Darfur is necessary, so that civilians can rely on security forces for their protection and can stop considering that they have to ensure their own security by carrying firearms.

²⁶ Jérôme Tubiana, Clotilde Warin and Gaffar Mohammad Saeneen, *Multilateral Damage: the Impact of EU Migration Policies on Central Saharan Routes*, Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael”, September 2018.

B. Supply and transfer of arms

147. The Panel has received several reports of the supply of arms, ammunition and vehicles to the Government of the Sudan during the reporting period. According to various sources, a number of countries, including from the region, have been linked to this supply of military material. In paragraph 10 of its resolution 1945 (2010), the Security Council required that the sale or supply of arms and related material to the Sudan not prohibited by resolutions 1556 (2004) and 1591 (2005) was made conditional upon the provision of end-user documentation. In paragraph 2 of its resolution 2455 (2019), the Council required the Panel to report on the implementation and effectiveness of paragraph 10 of resolution 1945 (2010). The Panel notes with concern that no end-user documentation regarding the aforementioned supplies was submitted to the Committee during the reporting period.

148. During the reporting period, the Panel received reports of the transfer by the Government of the Sudan of military material to Darfur. In the absence of the Committee's approval, as provided for in paragraph 7 of resolution 1591 (2005), read in conjunction with paragraph 3 (a) (v) of the same resolution, this transfer of arms and military equipment to Darfur is a violation of the relevant provisions of the arms embargo. The Government of the Sudan does not deny violating the arms embargo and justifies it by the need to protect its territory. The Government of the Sudan made no requests for exemptions during the reporting period.

149. During the reporting period, there was no evidence of any large-scale transfer of arms to the armed groups based in Darfur. However, as reported in paragraphs 82–85, the Darfurian groups in Libya continued to arm themselves. This represents a threat to the stability in Darfur, as these groups may at one point try to return to Darfur with their weapons.

150. In the light of the most recent developments, including the UNAMID drawdown, and the need to have stronger institutions that will guarantee the rule of law, the prevalence of weapons in Darfur and the effectiveness of the arms embargo remain issues of concern for the Panel.

XI. Travel ban and asset freeze

A. Implementation by Member States

151. The Panel continues to monitor the implementation of the asset freeze and travel ban measures imposed by the Security Council in paragraphs 3 (d) and 3 (e) of resolution 1591 (2005) and has written to the Member States concerned to seek information on this issue.

B. Implementation by the Government of the Sudan

152. The Government of the Sudan has in the past not submitted its implementation report on the travel ban and asset freeze. In November 2014, the Government expressed its inability to implement the asset freeze. In June 2017, October 2018 and July 2019, the Panel requested the Government to provide an update on its position regarding the implementation of the asset freeze. The Government has not provided a response on the subject. Two of the designated individuals, namely, Musa Hilal Abdalla Alnsiem (SDi.002) and Gaffar Mohammed Elhassan (SDi.001), are present in the Sudan, with Musa Hilal being in the custody of the Government of the Sudan.

C. Ongoing travel ban investigations

153. In 2014, 2017, 2018 and in July 2019, the Panel requested the Government of Chad to examine certain instances of possible travel ban violations committed by Musa Hilal and Jibril Abdulkarim Ibrahim Mayu (SDi.004), relating to their visits to Chad since being listed. No response was received from the Government of Chad.

154. Sources have indicated that Jibril Abdulkarim Ibrahim Mayu is present intermittently in Chad and is engaged in various illicit activities, such as smuggling.

XII. Financing of armed groups

155. Libya remains the main source of financing for the Darfurian armed groups. Most Darfurian armed groups, namely, SLA/MM, SLA/AW, JEM, SLA/TC, GSLF and Musa Hilal's supporters, are present in Libya and are profiting from the political situation and the civil war in the country. As support from South Sudan has diminished, the country is no longer an attractive option for the Darfurian armed groups and only small groups operate there. SLA/AW is the only rebel group that has maintained a significant presence inside Darfur, with its activities concentrated in the Jebel Marra area. In 2019, SLA/AW found a new significant source of financing as a result of gold exploitation.

A. Armed groups in Darfur

1. Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid

156. Over the past few years, the main source of financing for this movement in Darfur has been the taxes imposed on the residents of the camps for internally displaced persons and the taxes imposed in the territories in Jebel Marra under its control.²⁷ As Abdul Wahid's leadership is being increasingly challenged in the camps, it has become more difficult to collect the taxes imposed on the internally displaced persons. As a result of the military operations conducted by the Government of the Sudan since 2016, SLA/AW has lost control of several territories and markets. The agricultural and commercial activities in the area controlled by SLA/AW have also suffered. The members often resort to rustling cattle from the Arabs to support themselves.

157. In 2019, SLA/AW in Jebel Marra found a new, large-scale source of financing as a result of the exploitation of the Torroye gold mine. After gold was discovered, thousands of civilians gathered at the site and engaged in artisanal mining. Several prominent SLA/AW commanders, such as Abdulrazig Turti and Zunoon Abdelshafi (see [S/2019/34](#), paras. 48–52), were deployed to the site to supervise the mining operations and organize the taxation of miners. According to miners interviewed by the Panel, SLA/AW is collecting approximately 25 per cent of the revenues generated by the miners and has therefore been able to make considerable money.

158. The stones are extracted from the Torroye mines and brought in trucks to Kidingir, where the gold is further processed and extracted by primitive artisanal methods (see figure XIV). This artisanal gold (see figure XV) is usually bought by traders from Nyala.

²⁷ For a detailed description of the taxation system administered by SLA/AW in Darfur, see [S/2019/34](#), paras. 61–63.

Figure XIV
Photograph of artisanal gold-mining in Kidingir



Source: local miner.

Figure XV
Photograph of gold found in Torroye



Source: local miner.

159. The Government of the Sudan has become increasingly concerned about the strengthening of SLA/AW as a result of these gold-mining operations and has tried to curb this new source of financing for the group. After the incident in Kidingir between the army and miners in September (see para. 47), the acting Governor of South Darfur issued a decree in October 2019 to stop all forms of mining in the Mershing, East Jebel Marra and Alwehda localities, including Kidingir. He stated that the area, where 270 kg of gold had been produced in two months, had become a security threat to the entire region of South Darfur.²⁸ The decree resulted in the closure of the mining

²⁸ See <https://www.darfur24.com/2019/10/05/>.

operations in Kidingir (see annex 8). At present, gold ore from Torroye is being processed and sold in Feina and Dar al-Salam villages, and SLA/AW continues to make a profit from such operations.

2. Arab militias

160. Various Arab militias are operating in Darfur and are engaged in criminal activities, such as reported kidnappings for ransom, human trafficking, the smuggling of weapons and drugs and cattle rustling. Arab groups, including some of Musa Hilal's supporters, have emerged as the chief providers of arms and ammunition for SLA/AW in Jebel Marra.

B. Armed groups in South Sudan

1. Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid

(a) Business activities

161. SLA/AW is present in South Sudan and is engaged in business activities, mainly agriculture and transportation. SLA/AW also collects contributions from the Fur traders operating in South Sudan.

162. According to various former SLA/AW operatives interviewed by the Panel in South Sudan and Uganda, SLA/AW commander in South Sudan Abdullah Haran manages his various businesses in close cooperation with the local Dinka elites in Pariang, in particular businessman Simon Lueth Tor and General Deng Mayik. In a symbiotic relationship, SLA/AW provides security and protection to the local Dinka against attacks from the Nuer, while the local Dinka elites provide farmland, cattle and goats to SLA/AW for commercial purposes.

163. The cultivation of onion, tomatoes, sorghum and greens is carried out in the area of Pariang. According to an SLA/AW source, 478 tons of onions were cultivated in 2018. The agricultural produce is sold in the local markets of Wau, Bentiu, Yida and Juba and also exported. The aircraft belonging to Simon Lueth Tor is often used to transport agricultural produce to Juba, especially during the rainy season.

164. SLA/AW is also engaged in the maintenance and upkeep of approximately 100 cattle and 300 goats in the Pariang region.

165. SLA/AW is running a transportation business and has 11 trucks in its possession (see figure XVI). The transportation business is managed by Mohamed Adam, Abdallah Rockero and Salah Babikir. These trucks are used to transport goods between Juba, Wau, Bentiu, Pariang and Yida. One truck can generate a net income of up to \$11,000 per month.

Figure XVI
Photographs of SLA/AW trucks in Juba, 7 November 2019



Source: confidential.

166. SLA/AW also collects contributions from the Fur traders conducting business in South Sudan. Sultan Adam Fur, based in Juba, is in charge of this operation. The proceeds from the business operations in South Sudan, transferred out through informal money transfers (*hawala*), are shared by Abdul Wahid and Abdullah Haran and used to provide for their respective families and maintain their establishments, as well as the Kampala office of SLA/AW.

(b) *Memorandum of agreement between Abdul Wahid and a South Sudanese business entity*

167. During the investigations, the Panel was informed of a past agreement between SLA/AW and a South Sudanese business entity, wherein SLA/AW was supplied with 25 Landcruisers, two trucks, spare parts, food and miscellaneous supplies. Although the total amount negotiated directly by Abdul Wahid was for \$4.1 million, equipment and material worth \$3.47 million were supplied to SLA/AW. SLA/AW defaulted on the payment and the rest of the material was not supplied. In April 2014, a renegotiated memorandum of agreement²⁹ was signed between Abdul Wahid and the South Sudanese business entity, wherein Abdul Wahid agreed to pay a surcharge of \$1 million for every year that the contract amount was not paid (see annex 9). The contract amount remains outstanding. Recovery proceedings have been initiated in courts in South Sudan and Uganda.

2. **Factions of the Justice and Equality Movement**

168. In South Sudan, JEM and the Sudanese Revolutionary Council, a JEM dissident group, have been providing security and operational support to the Governor of Lol State, Rizig Zakaria Hassan, in and around Raja town, for which they receive limited financial assistance in addition to ammunition, uniforms and supplies. In order to earn a living, the two groups have started to engage in trading activities, sometimes as civilians. They engage in farming and transport goods, such as sugar, oil and onions, from Wau and Aweil to Raja and Boro Medina, which they sell on the local markets.

C. **Armed groups in Libya**

1. **Mercenary activities**

169. The various Darfurian armed groups are present in Libya as mercenaries and seek to strengthen themselves by gaining money, arms and equipment. The alignment of these groups with various Libyan factions is usually based on convenience, and they have occasionally switched sides. All the Darfurian groups have benefited from the vehicles, weaponry and other supplies, as well as the financial support, provided by the Libyan factions.

170. Payment to the armed groups depends on the understanding that they have with the Libyan armed groups. Often, a group of 10 fighters is provided with a vehicle and arms by the Libyan side. The payment for attacking and seizing new installations and property is higher than that for guarding the installations. After a successful attack, the fighters are allowed to retain the vehicles and property that they seize. Brokers pay up to \$3,000 for a new fighter to join one of the Libyan factions.

171. According to a source, SLA/MM fighters receive a monthly salary of 1,500 Libyan dinars, while officers receive 2,500 Libyan dinars. Salaries are sometimes disbursed intermittently. For example, between September 2018 and August 2019, only five monthly salaries were paid. General Commander Juma Haggag and his deputy Jabir Ishag obtain the money, mostly from the Libyan National Army, and pass it on to Colonel Abdou Dekles, in charge of budget issues. Dekles hands over the salaries to each fighter, in cash.

2. **Criminal activities**

172. The Panel has been informed that, besides being mercenary fighters for the various Libyan factions, Darfurian armed groups are also engaged in the provision of

²⁹ Obtained from a confidential source with past links to SLA/AW.

protection and safe passage to migrant traffickers, the kidnapping of migrants for ransom and the smuggling of arms, drugs and cars. These activities are often carried out in association with the local criminal groups operating in Chad and Libya.

173. In particular, most Darfurian armed groups are engaged in the smuggling of cars from Libya to Chad and Darfur. The groups are paid by Sudanese car dealers to escort convoys of civilian cars from areas controlled by the Libyan National Army to the borders with Chad and the Sudan, where the cars are sold. Some of these cars are transported on trucks, while some are driven. The groups are usually paid 3,000 Libyan dinars for each car in the convoy. The main smuggling routes are: (a) from Kufrah, to Jebel al-Uwaynat, to Malihah or Omdurman (the Sudan); (b) from Umm al-Aranib, to Kouri Bougoudi, to Zouarké (Chad); and (c) from Buzaymah, to Tazirbu, to Sara, to Amdjarass (Chad).

XIII. Recommendations

174. The Panel recommends that the Committee:

(a) Urge the Government of the Sudan to fully cooperate with the Panel, in particular with regard to the issuance of visas and access to Darfur, in order for the Panel to effectively carry out its mandate;

(b) Encourage the Government of the Sudan to disarm and hold accountable all militias operating in Darfur, as stipulated in resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#);

(c) Encourage the Government of the Sudan to complete the full transformation of the Rapid Support Forces into a professional, accountable and inclusive force, in accordance with the Rapid Support Forces Act;

(d) Support the efforts of the Government of the Sudan aimed at the full integration of former fighters;

(e) Encourage and support the efforts of the Government of the Sudan to enhance the capacities of law enforcement and justice delivery institutions across Darfur, including in the rural areas where its presence is weak or absent;

(f) Encourage the Government of the Sudan to develop gender-balanced, victim-centred transitional justice processes aimed at contributing to sustainable peace, reconciliation and justice in Darfur;

(g) Encourage the Government of the Sudan to continue engaging with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict in order to develop a plan to implement the proposed joint communiqué between the United Nations, partners and the Government of the Sudan;

(h) Encourage the Government of the Sudan to achieve durable intercommunal reconciliation, in particular between farmers and nomadic communities, by focusing on preventive approaches rather than ad hoc reactions.

175. Recalling past recommendations on the subject, the Panel reiterates that the Committee may wish to request the Government of the Sudan to implement the asset freeze on designated individuals and entities.

176. The Panel recommends that the Security Council:

(a) Provide leadership, in collaboration with the African Union, in order to fast track the peace process in Darfur, which could include a resolution on the mediation and the venue of the talks;

(b) Encourage the parties to the peace process to ensure the representation of internally displaced persons and refugees, including women's organizations from internally displaced and refugee communities, in the peace talks;

(c) Support the cooperation between the Sudan and regional States, including enhancing joint border forces with a focus on the prevention of arms and human trafficking;

(d) Encourage the Government of South Sudan to take measures against the illegal acts committed on its territory by SLA/AW and its commander Abdullah Haran, in particular the group's detention system;

(e) Urge the Libyan warring factions to stop cooperating with the Darfurian armed groups and providing them with financing and military equipment.

177. The Panel recommends that the United Nations, as one of the members of the Implementation Follow-Up Commission of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, as stipulated in paragraph 480 of the Doha Document, encourage the inclusion of the signatory movements to the agreement in the political transition.

178. The Panel recommends that the United Nations country team and UNAMID support the Government of the Sudan in its efforts to improve the socioeconomic conditions of local populations and, in line with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons, to facilitate the return of internally displaced persons and refugees.

Annex 1 — Mandate

In paragraph 7 of resolution [1556 \(2004\)](#), the Security Council mandated all states to take the necessary measures to prevent the sale or supply, to all non-governmental entities and individuals, including the Janjaweed, operating in the states of North Darfur, South Darfur and West Darfur, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territories.

In paragraph 8 of the resolution [1556 \(2004\)](#), the Council further mandated all states to take the necessary measures to prevent any provision to the non-governmental entities and individuals identified in paragraph 7, by their nationals or from their territories of technical training or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the items listed in paragraph 7.

In paragraph 7 of its resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#), the Council extended the arms embargo to include all parties to the N'Djamena Ceasefire Agreement and any other belligerents in the aforementioned areas in Darfur.

In its resolution [2035 \(2012\)](#), the Council extended the reference to the three states of Darfur to all the territory of Darfur, including the new states of Eastern and Central Darfur created on 11 January 2012.

The enforcement of arms embargo was further strengthened, in Paragraph 10 of the resolution 1945, by imposing the condition of end user documentation for any sale or supply of arms and related materiel that is otherwise not prohibited by resolutions 1556 and 1591.

In paragraphs 3 (d) and 3 (e) of resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#), the Council imposed targeted travel and financial sanctions on designated individuals (the listing criteria were further extended to entities in resolution [2035 \(2012\)](#)), to be designated by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#), on the basis of the criteria set out in paragraph 3 (c) of that resolution. In its resolution [1672 \(2006\)](#), the Council designated four individuals.

The Panel operates under the direction of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#). The mandate of the Panel, as set out in resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#), is:

- a- To assist the Committee in monitoring implementation of the arms embargo;
- b- To assist the Committee in monitoring implementation of the targeted travel and financial sanctions; and
- c- To make recommendations to the Committee on actions that the Security Council may want to consider.

In its resolution [2340 \(2017\)](#) and preceding resolutions, the Security Council also requested that the Panel:

- d- Report on the implementation and effectiveness of paragraph 10 of resolution [1945 \(2010\)](#) in quarterly updates;
- e- Continue to coordinate its activities, as appropriate, with the operations of the UNAMID, with international efforts to promote a political process in Darfur, and with other Panels or Groups of Experts, established by the Security Council, as relevant to the implementation of its mandate;
- f- Assess in its first and final reports;
- g- Progress towards reducing violations by all parties of the measures imposed by paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution [1556 \(2004\)](#), paragraph 7 of resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#) and paragraph 10 of resolution [1945 \(2010\)](#);

- h- Progress towards removing impediments to the political process and threats to stability in Darfur and the region;
- i- Violations of violations of international humanitarian law or violations or abuses of human rights, including those that involve attacks on the civilian population, sexual and gender-based violence and violations and abuses against children; and
- j- Other violations of the above-mentioned resolutions;
- k- Provide the Committee with information on those individuals and entities meeting the listing criteria in paragraph 3 (c) of resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#);
- l- Continue to investigate the financing and role of armed, military and political groups in attacks against UNAMID personnel in Darfur, noting that individuals and entities planning, sponsoring or participating in such attacks constitute a threat to stability in Darfur and may therefore meet the designation criteria provided for in paragraph 3 (c) of resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#); and
- m- Investigate any means of the financing of armed groups in Darfur.

Annex 2 — Statement by the Darfuri IDPs and Refugee Camps Administration (25 March 2019)

Darfuri IDPs and Refugee Camps Administration
Statement

25 March 2019

With reference to our statement issued on 22 March 2019, regarding the abolition of role of Coordinators of IDPs and Refugees and the suspension of activities of the United People's Front - UPF inside the camps.

We intend to separate between IDPs and Refugees from the UPF. We reaffirm our steadfastness to reach our goals of achieving everlasting peace in Darfur and restoration of rule of law and sustain life of dignity for Sudanese people regardless of their race, religion, culture or political background.

1. We the undersigned leaders of the IDPs and Refugees camps, call upon all members of Sudan Liberation Movement and Army – SLM/A led by Abdel Wahid Mohammad Al Nur, to abide by the following in order to prevent crimes and illegal activities committed by some members who are directed by Abdolwahid which severely impacts lives in the camps.

2. We condemn by the strongest terms the illegal deeds committed by Adam Rujal in the IDP camps, we are well aware of the nature of dealings and coordination between Adam Rujal and Abdel Wahid and the instructions to implement criminal plans inside the camps.

We confirm Adam Rujal work in trade in Hila Beida, northeast of Zalingei and lives free of any governmental harassment, therefore we warn the IDPs and Refugees against dealing with Adam Rujal as he does not represent the IDPs and refugees Administration and to disregard any statements issued by Adam Rujal or Abdul Wahid Mohammad Nur, who has failed to manage his movement militarily, politically and organizationally. Abdul Wahid has become a major threat to our just cause.

3. We request that the IDP and refugee camps to be under the direct supervision of the UNHCR and the United Nations authority until the crisis is resolved and peace is restored.

4. We are calling upon all organisations working in Darfur to disregard all statements issued by Adam Rojal, he his not authorized by the IDPs and Refugees Administration to speak on their behalf. Any enquiries for information about IDPS and Refugees should be obtained from IDPs and Refugees Administration issued by the undersigned camps Chiefs.

5. We call upon the United Nations, the Security Council the International Criminal Court, the European Union, the African Union Peace Security Council, the Troika, the Embassies of States that respect human rights to clearly condemn the crimes committed by Abdel Wahid and his military personel inside the IDP and Refugee camps.

We are appealing to the UN from within our camps to take care of our issues, especially in the area of protection, the resumption of the flow of relief humanitarian aid, the rapid return of international organizations to carry out their duties and put an end to the policies which seek to settle foreigners in our lands that we were force to flee.

6. Darfuri IDPs and Refugee camps Administration is in the process of election of new leaders, after Abdel Wahid Mohammed Al Nor has distanced himself from Darfur for a very long time, but continues his manipulations, elimination policies and bias to his family, taking money by force from IDPs and uses agents to commit crimes in the camps.

7. Finally we reaffirm our adherence to our just rights and our support for the popular revolution that has become a reality and we believe together we could stop the bloodshed in Darfur by uprooting the genocidal regime.

Signed by:

Darfuri IDPs and Refugee Camps Administration

1/ Sheikh : Ali Abdulrahman Altahir Chief Administrator of IDPs and Refugees

Kalma camp.

2/ Sheikh Salih Issa Mohamed General Secretary of IDPs and Refugees Administration

Kalma camp.

3/ Idris Abdallah Mohamed Head of Youth of IDPs and Refugees

Kalma Camp.

4/ Khadega Abdallah Abaker Head of IDPs and Refugees Women Association

Kalma Camp

5/ Sabir Rudwan Chief of Center (1)

6/ Abduljabar Mohamed Hussein Chief of Center (2)

7/ Ibrahim Ahmed Abdallah Chief of Center (3)

8/ Salah Abdulgadir Hassan Chief of Center (4)

9/ Mussa Bahar Adam Chief of Center (5)

10/ Omda Adam Sharaf el-din Omer Chief of Center (6)

11/ Issa Adam Ahmed Chief of Center (7)

12/ Zakaria Idris Hassan Chief of Center (8)

13/ Guma'a Bakhit Hamid Chief of Center (9)

14/ Abdallah Mohamed Suliman Chief of Educational council in Kalma Camp.

15/ Mussa Ishag Ahmed Chief of Drieg Camp in Nyala.

16/ Seif el-din Adam Mussa Salih Chief of Bleil Camp - Nyala.

17/ Mohamed Ahmed Abdulrahman Chief of Utash Camp.

18/ Ahmed Mohamed Hassan Chief of Al- Salam Camp

19/ Mohamed Ibrahim Chief of Al-Neem Camp Eastern Darfur

20/ Adam Ahmed Issa Chief of Demna Camp

21/ Nouredin Ishaq Mahmoud Chief of Sekelly Camp.

22/ Mousa Nasr Aldin Ibrahim Ahmed Chief of Mousa Camp.

23/ Mohamed Seneen Mohamed Chief of Demarcated Sakelly Camp.

24/ Gumma Bakhit Hamid Chief of IDPs 2013/2014

25/ Adam Internet Chief of Kabkabiya Camps

Sheikh Ali Abdulrahman Altahir

Chief of IDPs Camps Administration

26/03/2019 Nyala

alisheikhali60@gmail.com

Mobile: 00249916899162

Annex 3 — Statement by the SLA High leadership Council freezing the powers of Abdul Wahid Nur (1 May 2019)



**SUDAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT
HIGH LEADERSHIP COUNCIL**



In order to preserve the cohesion and unity in the early years, we have exercised wisdom and patience and concealed all our organizational differences with the movement's president so as not to give the enemy an opportunity to strike at our unity and internal cohesion. We continued this struggle by urging the members to concentrate all our efforts to defeat the regime, as it is a necessary step and an important entry point to bring down the rest of the system that has been perpetuated for thirty years in all corrupt civil state institutions and armed criminal militias of Janjaweed and Rapid Support Force that committed the most heinous crimes against the people and our homeland Darfur.

Throughout two-and-a-half-year of consultations between the founders and the factions of the movement and the continuous communication and coordination with our friends and supporters who are concerned from the international community, especially the permanent members of the Security Council, the special envoys of Britain, France and Germany, the UN Security Council Panel of experts, UNAMID, and after the verification of serious damage and crimes attributed by the Chairperson of the movement, we provide the following example:

First:

The issuance of serious decisions affecting the lives of individuals and groups, such as elimination of and issue death sentences without trial as a result of difference of opinion, which took the lives of a large number of people such as ordering to murder of the Deputy Director of Administration of the Internally displaced Persons and refugees currently Al Shafi Abdullah Abdul Karim and also ordered the assassination of Major General Abbas Khamis in Juba, and recently the massacre took place in Kalma camp on 11th April 2019, resulted in sixteen dead and dozens wounded of the innocent displaced residents of the camp.

Second:

The Chairperson of the movement continued to adopt fatal decisions that affect the interests and legitimate rights of the members of the movement and the IDPs, disregard the constitutional rules of the movement and its leaders and institutions. These wrong decisions served the agenda of the regime, forgetting the enormous sacrifices made by the people of Darfur and ignoring the scale of the crisis and the grave consequences that left millions of victims who paid dearly for their Freedom and dignity. Thus, violating the Constitution, which he himself signed and which we have sworn to respect and invoke, thus losing the organization's effectiveness and ability to meet the challenges.


Third:

The destruction of the military sector completely and the prevention of support and training preoccupied with his self-interest and false media statements, and worked to dismantle the trained and organized military units under the leadership of the incompetent and weakened and create strife and distinction between the honorable army leaders using a policy of divide and ignite the wars of internal



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SUDAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT HIGH LEADERSHIP COUNCIL



weakness and exhaustion, opening the door of penetration, Among them resorting to the system and accepting the margin of power to escape its tyranny.

Fourth:

Neglecting the building of the movement's institutions and ignoring the qualification and training of members as a pillar of the organization's power and prevent the provision of scholarships for victims of genocide Although the movement enjoyed in earlier times excellent relations with international and regional educational institutions.

Fifth:

The chairperson Abdul Wahid dealt with comrades in the organization and with the liberation movements and opposition political parties and with the diplomatic entities and representatives of organizations, which led many comrades to escape away from the tyranny of the chairperson and many of them declared their dissent from the movement and formed their own independent organizations and make other organizations alienated from any alliances that include Sudan Liberation Movement / Army SLM/A led by Abdul Wahid, which made the movement in complete isolation and pariahs from the national political alliances of oppositional groups and parties on the same struggle.

First:

The higher leadership council and founders

1. Mohamed Zakaria Yahia Arabab Vice Chairman and member of higher leadership council.
2. Ahmed Ibrahim Yousif Secretary of Foreign Affairs and member (HLC)
3. Hafiz Yousif Hamoda Secretary of Political Affairs and member (HLC)
4. Ali Hamid Mohamed Secretary for IDPs and Refugees member (HLC)
5. Salaheldin Abakar Abuelkhairat member of (HLC)
6. Eiman Abuelgasim Saifeldin
7. Mohamed Haroon bosh
8. Mohamed Yousif Ahmed (Hamadi)
9. Eng.Abdulgabar Yahia (Jabra)
10. Abu Huraira Ahmed Ismail Abakar
11. aziza Ibrahim
12. abbs hamedelinl elshater



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
Second:

Field commanders of (SLA) in other areas

1. Major General Haroon Abdulkarim (Frank) former commander of division four
2. Major General Abbas Khamis (BAO) second commander of Secular Sudan Division
3. Major General Mustafa Nasreldin Tombor vice cheff of stuff mobilization and former Military spokesperson.
4. Major General Dauod Sidiq
5. Brigadier Ameer Ahmed Tarbush Commander (MI) Secular Sudan Division
6. Brigadier Osman Khalil Adam Commander of administration (presidency)
7. Colonel Mohamed Adam abakar (Mirisela) Commander in Secular Sudan Division
8. Major Adam Abakar Commander communications Secular Sudan Division
9. Captain Alrasheed Salih Financial Administration Secular Sudan Division
10. First Lieutenant Hamad Abdeen Revolutionary mobilization Secular Sudan Division.


Third:

1. General Administration of IDPs and Refugees which include all the IDPs Camps in Darfur total of 153 camps with all its sectors (women ,youth etc..) and the Refugees in neighbouring countries.
2. Representatives of the Refugees (Chad)
 - a. Ismail Mohamed Abdulmajeed
 - b. Idris Adam Ibrahim
 - c. Dawood Abdulrasul Khamis
 - d. Abdulaal Alfadil Alshaikh
 - e. Alfatih Younis
 - f. Aisha Mohamed Abdulrahman
 - g. Nabil Mohamed Abdalla
 - h. Dr.Mohamed Adam Sharafeldin
 - i. Jawahir Ibrahim Abdulrasul
 - j. Aisha Hussain Bukur
 - k. Abdulraziq Yousif Mohamed
 - l. Yahia Mohamed Isaac
 - m. Gada Ahmed Mohamed
 - n. Mohamed Alobied Abdalla
 - o. Zakaria Yagoub Khamis
 - p. Hawa Zakaria Mohamed
 - q. Hussain Mohamed Bukur
3. Representatives of Refugees in East Africa
 - a. Yasir Abdulhalim Adam Tanzania
 - b. Husna Idriss Kenya
4. Asaad Abdalla Ahmed Representatives of the Refugees in central and west Africa.



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Fourth:

Representatives of Internal Offices

1. Central Darfur office
Mr.S.A.H
2. South Darfur Office
Mr. K.K.F
3. North Darfur Office
Mr.A.M.A
4. East Darfur Office
a.Mamoun Wadi Mamoun
b. Mr. N.A.Y
5. National Capital Office
a. Mr. A. M. A
b. Mr. D.A.S
c. Mr. H.K.A
6. Eastern Region Mr. A.M .D
7. Kordofan Region Mr.D.M.A
8. Northern Region
a.Mr.DR. S.B.M
b. Mr. Y. A. R

Fifth:

Civil Society

1. Representative of internal civil society Mr. H. A .SH
2. Representative civil society in diaspora Mrs. Maha Alhadi Tebaiq

Sixth:


Representatives of the Movement in diaspora

1. Representatives of the Movement in Middle East
a. Idriss Mohamed Arbab
b. Khalid Adam Ahmed
2. Representative of the Movement in USA Dr.Omar Abakar
3. Representatives of the Movement in EU
a.Ali Abulkarim Hussain
b.Salma Ibrahim
c.Altai Abdurahman Abdalla



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- d. Isamil Adam Ahmed
- e. Abdulkarim Abakar Adam
- f. Mohamed Isaac bukor
- g. Hasabalkarim Ahmed Abulkarim
- h. Yasin Ahmed
- i. Nureldin Aldoma

4. Representatives of the Movement in Gulf of Arab countries

- a. Salaheldin Adam Mohamed Shuaib
- b. Eng. Mohamed Mohamed Abduljaleel

5. Representative Canada

Abdalla Musa Ali Bakheit

Seventh:

Representative of Students and Youth

- a. A.R.T
- b. B.A.A
- c. Advocate A. A.A

May 1, 2019



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Annex 4 — Extract of the contract between the Transitional Military Council (TMC) and Dickens & Madson Canada, Inc., signed by General Hemetti on behalf of the TMC and Ari Ben-Menashe on behalf of the company on 7 May 2019, received by US NSD/FARA Registration Unit on 17 June 2019

obtain funding and equipment for the Sudanese military. We will strive to obtain funding for your Council from the Eastern Libyan Military Command in exchange for your military help to the LNA (Libyan National Army).

**Annex 5 — Confidential audio communication by SLA/MM Deputy commander
Jabir Ishag (obtained by the Panel in March 2019)**

Translated from Arabic

Hello. How are you? Well, God willing, and perfectly fine, God willing.

This is Major General Jabir Ishag [speaking about] the matter that we agreed upon before 2016, we reached an agreement with Hassan Musa's group and the people from the Chadian [opposition], who were in Ras Lanuf, and in Zalla and Marada. We said that we would withdraw. After the withdrawal, that agreement was not implemented. They did not give us any money or what we were owed — no supplies and no money. That is one thing. The second thing is that an agreement was reached in 2018, in the time of Al-Fadil and at the time of the events in the oil fields. They gave us two millions, but they did not give us the rest, because there was an outstanding dispute between us and the group of Abu Sarafhada. That is why, if there is an agreement, the people [involved should] implement the agreement before doing these other things, because these are the second and third times, and I am not staying. The people will not accept this.

Annex 6 — Audio statement by GSLF Chairman Taher Hajer on clashes in Libya between Darfur rebel groups and CCMSR Chadian rebel group (January 2019)

Translated from Zaghawa

We are going for our interests, we are not going to target anyone but we are going for our people and nothing can stop us and by these manners we have sent our convoys. Like I told you, Bashir is our operation commander and all the guys are with him and from our convoy namely are : Juvon, Haroun Abu Takeiy etc etc. While they are on their way, they have been attacked from behind and immediately two cars from the convoy have been burned down which belong to convoy of Jabir and five our fighters were killed. Those five who were dead are : 1- Mubarak showaleish - driver of Saleh Boldogos, 2- Idriss Shitana with Alsadig Duba from our convoy. Five fighters immediately passed away on the spot and two other were injured and they too passed away two days later. Myself, Mr Abdallah and the rest of leadership circle remain at the headquarters and anyone who is searching for accurate information, then what I told you is the whole truth. We sent a joint force for this operation, with others, not ourselves alone, and neither group of Minni alone but there are other people with us and their efforts and contributions must be recognised as well and thanks to them. Saleh Jebel Si, Abudulrazik Group Side of Tarada and the prisoner Nimir's group are with us. All its a joint operation and the total number of cars is around 70 vehicles. All the different groups have contributed equally and it was part of our previous agreement in which we have all agreed that any further operation whether is here or away must be carried out by collective action. It's not good to deny or hijack efforts of other people and of course other groups are with us and our main intention is to save our Zaghawa people who are being targeted. And that is why we are going there and it's not nice to brag that only our movement has done the job on the ground and ultimately our main mission is to rescue our Zaghawa people. This initiative has started from within our two movements and we have already discussed this matter previously. The issue concerning those people who are like mice addicted to digging for gold. We have already advised them before that they either come and join us for quest of revolution or either return to the country but they are stubborn people. So our convoy is heading there to advise them about the dangers which are posed by Tubu and Gorane.

Annex 7 — Commanders of SLA/AW's Secular Sudan Division involved in SLA/AW's detention system in South Sudan

- 1) Major General Abdullah Haran, head of the Secular Sudan Division and SLA/AW Deputy chair**



- 2) Lieutenant Ahmed Nyangding, head of Military Police**



3) **Major Saad Adam, former head of Military Police**




4) **Brigadier General Osman Haroun**




5) **Lieutenant Adam Dakay, Military Police**




Annex 8 —Decree No. 81 of Year 2019 by the Acting Wali of the State of South Darfur, banning all forms of artisanal mining in the northern localities of the State (East Jebel Marra –Mershing – al-Wehda). 3 October 2019.






Annex 9 — Memorandum of Understanding between SLA/AW and a South Sudanese company



NOW THIS AGREEMENT WITNESSES as follows:-

1. The Client acknowledges that as a result of its default in payment aforementioned, the Company has suffered Bank penalty interest payments.
2. The Client acknowledges that the Company has so far supplied assorted items worth **USD 3,470,000 (United States Dollars Three Million four hundred and seventy million only)** (herein after referred to as the "Contract amount"), leaving a balance of **USD 630,000 (United States Dollars Six hundred and thirty thousand only)** worth of items unsupplied as itemized in **schedule B**.
3. Both Parties agree that the items listed in schedule B that are unsupplied shall not be supplied anymore and shall not form part of the contract amount
4. Both parties agree that there shall be a surcharge of **USD 1,000,000 (United States Dollars One Million only)** for every year that the contract amount is not paid by the Client. The parties further acknowledge that this surcharge shall be to cater for the interest penalties the Company is facing as a result of delayed payments.
5. For avoidance of doubt, both Parties agree that the surcharge shall commence from **January, 2012** until payment in full.
6. If the performance of this Agreement or any obligation under it is prevented, restricted or interfered with by reason of circumstances beyond the reasonable control of the party obliged to perform it, the party so affected upon giving prompt notice to the other party shall be excused from performance to the extent of the prevention, restriction or interference, but the party so affected shall use its best endeavors to avoid or remove the causes of non-performance and shall continue




Handwritten signatures and a circular stamp. The stamp contains the text "THE SEN SUBARRE SECURIA" and the date "08 APR 2014".

performance under this Agreement with the utmost dispatch whenever such causes are removed or diminished.

7. The Company hereto undertakes during or at anytime after this expiration of this Agreement to keep confidential and bind its employees, representatives and agents to keep confidential any information concerning the service and in particular but not limited to any information relating to the Client.
8. This document contains the entire agreement between the Client and Company in regard to supply of assorted items, It supersedes all earlier conduct and documents of the parties in connection with supply of the items under the Agreement
9. All disputes or differences whatsoever that shall at any time hereafter whether during the continuance in effect of this Agreement or upon its determination arise between the parties hereto touching or concerning the contract or the construction or the effect of the rights duties or liabilities of the parties hereto any of them under or by virtue of this Agreement ,or otherwise as to the subject matter hereof shall where the parties consent be referred to a single arbitrator to be agreed upon by the parties hereto.
10. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with South Sudanese law and the Client irrevocably submits to the jurisdiction of the South Sudanese Courts.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF both parties hereto have hereunto set their respective signature on the day, month and year first above written.




4

Signed for and on behalf

SUDAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT/ARMY

CHAIRMAN AND COMMANDER IN CHIEF

ABDOL WAHID MOHAMED AHMED ALNOUR

SUDAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT - SLM

CHAIRMAN

07 APR 2014

In the presence of

Mohamed Zakaria

NAME

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS

In the presence of

Abdellatif Abdelrahman

NAME

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS

In the presence of

NAME

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS

[Signature]

[Signature]

SOUTHERN SUDANESE ASSOCIATED FORCES

08 APR 2014

5

In the presence of

[Signature]
SIGNATURE OF WITNESS

Signed for and on behalf

[Signature]

ED

[Signature]

DIRECTOR

[Signature]
DIRECTOR
SOUTHERN SUDAN ASSOCIATE
08 APR 2014

In the presence of

[Signature]
PHILLIP ANJANG NGONG

WITNESS

[Signature] *[Signature]* *[Signature]* *[Signature]*




SCHEDULE A

	Items	Quantity	Price USD	Total USD
1.	Sugar	2000	110	220,000
2.	Wheat Flour	2000	80	160,000
3.	Cooking Oil	5000 jerry cans	50	25,000
4.	Beans	2000 sacks	65	130,000
5.	Assorted medicines			100,000
6.	salt			10,000
7.	Plastic mats(nimra)	2000	20	40,000
8.	Onions	500	130	65,000
9.	(4WD) pickups	25	55,000	1,375,000
10.	Trucks	2	70,000	140,000
11.	spare parts	Assorted	100,000	100,000
12.	Lubricants			10,000
13.	Tahniyya			20,000
14.	Sorghum	1000	50	50,000
15.	Laundry Soap	1000 cartons	25	25,000
16.	Blankets	1000	20	20,000
17.	Mosquito nets	2000	10	20,000
18.	dates	200 sacks	150	30,000
19.	Utensils & Packets			10,000
20.	Cash advance			1,330,000
	Total			4,100,000 USD

Handwritten signatures and a circular official stamp of the Sudanese Ministry of Health and Welfare.

SCHEDULE B

	Items	Quantity	Price USD	Total USD
1.	Assorted Medicines			100,000
2.	Onions	500	130	65,000
3.	5 (4WD) Pickups		55,000	275,000
4.	2 Trucks		70,000	140,000
5.	Tahniya			20,000
6.	dates	200 sacks	150	30,000
	Total			630,000 USD



ASSOCIATED ADVOCATES
13 APR 2014