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1 ISF to retake Tel Afar, PMUs redirect offensive to western Ninewa desert. Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) moved to encircle Tel Afar on November 22, causing around 3,000 Sunni families to flee the city southwest towards Syria and north to Kurdish-held territory. PM Abadi announced on November 23, however, that the Iraqi Army and Police would recapture Tel Afar, relegating the PMUs to recapture ISIS-held terrain in desert areas in western Ninewa, including Baaj. The PMUs, in turn, moved west along the Tel Afar-Sinjar highway, coming into contact with Peshmerga units east of Mount Sinjar on November 23. PMUs in the desert south of Sinjar moved in parallel with the northern units, likely aiming to approach Baaj from the south.

9 ISF recaptures several villages in Shirqat district. The 17th Iraqi Army (IA) Division and Sunni tribal fighters began operations on November 29 to recapture villages on the eastern bank of the Tigris river from where ISIS has been crossing the river to Shirqat to carry out attacks. The brigade from the 17th IA Division originate from Baghdad.

8 Security forces foil VBIED attack in southwestern Ramadi. The Interior Ministry announced on November 19 that the 12th Anbar Emergency Police Battalion foiled an ISIS truck VBIED attack in Hudood al-Tamim in southwestern Ramadi, marking the first report of a VBIED, detonated or cleared, in central Ramadi since its recapture in February 2016.

7 ISIS kills 74 in VBIED truck attack targeting Shi'a pilgrims in Babil Province. A tanker VBIED carrying ammonium nitrate detonated on November 24 at a gas station in al-Shumali sub-district, east of al-Hilla, the capital of Babil Province, killing 74 people and wounding 24 others. The VBIED targeted a bus carrying Iranian and Pakistani pilgrims leaving Karbala for Arbaeen. ISIS claimed the attack.

6 CoR passes Popular Mobilization Act, institutionalizing militias as part of ISF. The Council of Representatives (CoR) met and passed the Law for the Legal Protections of the Popular Mobilization (PMU Act) on November 26, granting Popular Mobilization units the same rights and financial benefits as members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).

2 ISF makes limited gains in northern Mosul neighborhoods, continue expansion in eastern neighborhoods. The ISF reported that they gained control of several northern neighborhoods from November 22 - November 30 and continue to make slow progress in several eastern neighborhoods. The ISF has failed to make any significant advances to fully clear southern neighborhoods. ISIS continues to use Mosul's remaining civilians for defense, which is significantly slowing the ISF's progress in the city.

3 Sunni tribal militias face increasing accusations of human rights violations near Mosul. A Human Rights Watch (HRW) report stated that the Sunni Sabawi tribal militia arrested and beat male civilians in villages east of Qayyarah in late October after ISIS retreated. This is the second report charging the Sabawi tribe with human rights violations against other Sunnis. The report also claimed that one of the Sunni tribal militias recruited around 10 minors as fighters from IDP camp south of Erbil.

4 ISIS attempts major attack in Samarra. Five ISIS militants, at least three of whom were wearing Suicide Vests (SVESs), infiltrated the shrine city of Samarra in Salah al-Din Province on November 28 where they clashed with security forces near a checkpoint in the old city. Two attackers reportedly detonated, killing four people, showing ISIS's ability to attack highly-secured city centers despite losses in terrain. Security forces repelled the remaining attackers and enforced a curfew in the city. Security officials stated that the attackers infiltrated the city by crossing the Tigris River from the west bank. The Ministry of Interior ordered a police battalion from Wasit Province to deploy to Samarra to reinforce the city.

5 Three VBIEDs detonate in northern and eastern Baghdad. A Vehicle-Borne IED (VBIED) detonated in the neighborhood of Jamaliya in eastern Baghdad on November 28. Two VBIEDs also detonated in the neighborhoods of Ur, in northern Baghdad, and Hayy al-Mashatal, in eastern Baghdad, respectively, on November 23.



● Major Cities	☒ Coalition	● Anti-ISIS Iraqi Sunni Tribes	☒ SVES
☒ Major Clash	● ISF	● Iraqi Shi'a Militias	☒ VBIED
☒ Airstrikes	● ISIS	☒ Demonstration	☒ Failed S/VBIED

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The Iraqi Council of Representatives (CoR) passed a law on November 26 that solidifies the Popular Mobilization, the majority of which are Shi'a militias with a history of sectarian violence, as a permanent security institution in Iraq. The Popular Mobilization Act, passed primarily through the efforts of Shi'a and Kurdish parties, grants qualified Popular Mobilization Units the same rights and financial benefits as members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Sunni political leaders and parties, however, rejected the law as a serious blow against national reconciliation efforts and called for its reversal. The law's current language does not address the structure of this new security institution or clarify which Popular Mobilization units, which includes several Sunni units, would be inducted into it. As it stands, the CoR will need to pass successive laws or amendments regarding the Popular Mobilization's structure, raising a concern that the Shi'a parties' dominance in the CoR will sway the structure to favor Shi'a militias. The law could benefit Sunnis if it legitimizes the use of local Sunni militias and tribal forces as security forces in majority Sunni provinces, thereby acting as an alternative to the National Guard Law, a key piece of legislation which Sunnis sought as reconciliation efforts but Shi'a parties blocked. National Alliance chairman Ammar al-Hakim and Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr both called for the form of the Popular Mobilization to be non-partisan and inclusive, but sectarian Iranian proxy militias, who already dominate both the PMUs' leadership and the CoR, are positioned to benefit from the law the most. A legitimized Popular Mobilization will result in a sectarian security force funded by the Iraqi government but responsive to Iranian advisers, which will further alienate Sunnis from the Iraqi Government.