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Letter dated 5 October 2021 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia, and in accordance with paragraph 34 of Security Council resolution 2551 (2020), I have the honour to transmit herewith the final report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia.

In this connection, the Committee would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Geraldine **Byrne Nason**

Chair

Security Council Committee pursuant to
resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia



**Letter dated 16 September 2021 from the Panel of Experts on
Somalia addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee
pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia**

In accordance with paragraph 34 of Security Council resolution 2551 (2020), we have the honour to transmit herewith the final report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia.

(Signed) Richard **Zabot**
Acting Coordinator/arms expert

(Signed) John Peter **Hazenberg**
Armed groups/natural resources expert

(Signed) Ahmed **Himmiche**
Armed groups expert

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Humanitarian expert

(Signed) Matthew **Rosbottom**
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Summary

Al-Shabaab remains the most immediate threat to the peace, security and stability of Somalia. Despite ongoing efforts by Somali and international forces to curb Al-Shabaab's operational capacity, the group's ability to carry out complex, asymmetric attacks in Somalia remains undiminished. By exploiting the profound political differences that manifested in a prolonged period of uncertainty and heightened tension in 2021, Al-Shabaab remains poised to sustain the pace of its operations in Mogadishu, as well as in the federal member states, in the medium to long term.

To that end, the Panel of Experts on Somalia commends the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states for resolving the political impasse but remains concerned by an asymmetry of interests between their leaders that Al-Shabaab will continue to exploit. The 27 May 2021 agreement is a positive step towards the holding of elections. However, there remain unaddressed political tensions that brought about the country's descent into armed confrontations that almost crippled Somalia after violence broke out in the capital in April 2021.

While efforts of the international community have sought to iron out political creases, the underlying, possibly irreconcilable clan and self-interests among political elites will continue to benefit Al-Shabaab. The group, therefore, remains a symptom of the ongoing political conflict – not the root cause – and all parties involved in Somalia must realign their priorities to overturn the very local conditions that allow Al-Shabaab to be successful.

The political difficulties of Somalia are occurring against the backdrop of broader regional instability and discord. The alliance between Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia represents a strategy to reshape the politics of the region. The Panel will continue to investigate the ramifications on peace and security in Somalia, specifically the role of Eritrea-trained Somali recruits, the majority of whom remain in Eritrea, but some of whom have returned to Somalia to provide unspecified security functions. Beyond politically-driven instability, the region continues to be challenged by environmental and health emergencies, such as droughts, floods and coronavirus disease (COVID-19), exacerbating already critical humanitarian needs.

During the reporting period, Al-Shabaab continued to administer large areas of central and southern Somalia and exert its influence over areas where security forces are deployed, making it challenging for security forces to clear and hold towns under Al-Shabaab control. In this manner, Al-Shabaab retained its freedom of movement, allowing it to conduct ambushes and lay improvised explosive devices, hampering the deployment of public services and administration. In one case, attempts by Somali forces to halt Al-Shabaab expansion in Galmudug have yet to result in any gains on the ground.

The revised Somali transition plan paves the way to a progressive handover of full security responsibilities to the Somali National Security Forces by the end of 2023. However, its implementation remains at a standstill as the additional Somali Police and regional security forces are still expected to replace Somali National Army units as holding forces in Lower Shabelle.

Investigations into Al-Shabaab's domestic revenue generation continue to show that the group generates enough revenue to sustain its insurgency for the foreseeable future. The Panel assesses that Al-Shabaab remains in a healthy financial position and is entrepreneurial in nature. Al-Shabaab derives its revenue through a range of extortion methods, including the illicit taxation of agriculture, vehicles, goods and livestock. This illicit taxation is collected through a network of checkpoints that Al-Shabaab relies on for the collection of much of its revenue. The group continues

to assert its ability to collect extortion money throughout central and southern Somalia, including from areas not under its direct control, such as Mogadishu.

Al-Shabaab utilizes the domestic banking system to deposit and store funds, without institutional preference. Cash money, however, is the predominant means for the group's financial mobilization, with the majority of deposits and withdrawals of money made in cash. The Federal Government of Somalia has taken steps to strengthen the Somali financial sector in order to combat terrorism financing through legislation and oversight, such as the financial disruption development programme. However, the lack of enforcement of the Mobile Money Regulations of 2019 and the deficiency of reporting and investigations into Al-Shabaab's finances remain as barriers to degrading the group's revenue generation system.

Regarding weapons and ammunition management, the Federal Government of Somalia, in November 2020 and February 2021, invited the Panel to assist in a joint technical assessment of the Halane armoury in Mogadishu and to assess the challenges posed by the high-explosive rounds of ammunition stored there. Beyond the management of high-explosive ammunition, the Federal Government of Somalia has still to implement an accountable weapons and ammunition tracing system for all Somali security forces, in accordance with Security Council resolution [2551 \(2020\)](#).

Al-Shabaab, political unrest and clashes between rival clans continue to greatly affect the security of civilians in Somalia. From January to July 2021, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) recorded 708 civilian casualties, mostly attributed to Al-Shabaab. By 1 August 2021, there were nearly 3 million internally displaced persons in Somalia, 537,000 of whom had fled their homes between January and July 2021 alone, with conflict-related displacement accounting for over 70 per cent of the cases. Al-Shabaab used forced displacement as collective punishment for populations resisting its authority. Displacement was also the result of political instability, particularly in Gedo Region and in and around Mogadishu.

The insecurity generated by active conflicts, the proliferation of weapons and armed actors also affected humanitarian operations, including through lack of access and restrictions on how and where these operations can occur. While Al-Shabaab continues to be responsible for the highest number of violations of international humanitarian law involving the targeting of civilians, there were several reports of human rights violations perpetrated by federal and regional security forces. Also, clan militias were responsible for a number of abuses, including killings, abductions and the destruction of civilian property. Concerningly, reports of conflict-related sexual violence and child recruitment by different armed actors are on the increase.

Efforts by the Federal Government of Somalia, Jubbaland and the international community have ensured that charcoal exports have remained on hold over the reporting period. Political pressure on both the export and import sides, monitoring and surveillance, including by international naval forces, have combined to provide strong deterrence. However, networks for the export of Somali charcoal remain in place and a variety of political and security actors stand to benefit from any potential future sales. Therefore, existing stockpiles around Kismayo, which have a wholesale value of approximately \$40 million, continue to pose a threat to peace and security.

While charcoal exports have remained on hold, the effects of charcoal production are beginning to manifest in broader climate and environmental security challenges. In some cases, Al-Shabaab has already begun to exploit the impact of climate change by providing communities with protection from flooding, acting as a service provider to communities that receive little support from the Government. These developments may lead to new challenges on how to address insecurity in Somalia.

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* Circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.

I. Introduction

A. Mandate

1. The present report contains the findings of the Panel of Experts on Somalia covering the period from 16 December 2020 to 6 September 2021. An overview of the Somalia sanctions regime, mandate, appointment of the Panel and countries visited during the reporting period can be found in annex 1.

B. Methodology

2. The Panel endeavours to ensure compliance with the standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions in its report of December 2006 (see [S/2006/997](#)) and the Secretary-General's bulletin on information sensitivity, classification and handling ([ST/SGB/2007/6](#)). The evidentiary standards and verification processes include:

- (a) Collecting information on events and topics from multiple sources, where possible;
- (b) Collecting information from sources with first-hand knowledge of events, where possible;
- (c) Identifying consistency in patterns of information and comparing existing knowledge with new information and emerging trends;
- (d) Obtaining physical, photographic, audio, video and/or documentary evidence in support of the information collected;
- (e) Analysing satellite imagery, where applicable.

3. Additionally, the Panel, in accordance with paragraph 28 of the report of the Informal Working Group, provided the opportunity to all parties to review, comment and respond during the report drafting process, where and when necessary.

4. The Panel has committed itself to maintaining and fostering its relationship with the Federal Government of Somalia to ensure cooperation and transparency in fulfilling its investigative mandate, within the framework of applicable methodological standards.

II. Acts that threaten the peace, security and stability of Somalia

A. Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiin (Al-Shabaab)

Overview

5. Al-Shabaab remains the greatest threat to the peace, security and stability of Somalia, exploiting the void left by the inability of the Federal Government of Somalia to effectively govern its entire territory. An analysis of the operations conducted by the group during the reporting period shows that Al-Shabaab maintained a high level of adaptability and mobility, the capacity to coordinate activities in different parts of Somalia and the ability to exert its coercive influence beyond the territories under its direct control.

6. Through its continued use of violent extremist tactics, Al-Shabaab employs several methods to control the population, influence political outcomes and perpetuate a climate of fear across central and southern Somalia. Some of these

methods include administrative control of large areas; hit-and-run attacks on towns and military positions where security forces have an established presence; exploitation of clan competition and use of divide-and-rule tactics to expand its influence; and the interdiction of main supply routes and the blockade of villages to prevent the arrival of resources. Al-Shabaab also continued to instil fear through assassinations and the use of improvised explosive devices and mortar attacks in key cities and towns such as Mogadishu, Baidoa, Galkayo and Jowhar.

Update on Al-Shabaab membership and structure

7. The Panel continues to update information on Al-Shabaab's structure and identify potential leadership changes to deepen its understanding of the organization. Ahmed Diriye, also known as Sheikh Ahmed Umar Abu Ubaidah (SOi.014), continues to serve as Al-Shabaab's emir. His last audio message was released by Al-Shabaab-affiliated media during Eid al-Adha celebrations on 21 July 2021, where he provided a narrative explaining the group's vision for Somalia.¹

8. Of the 18 individuals listed by the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia in accordance with paragraph 14 of Council resolution 1844 (2008), 8 are suspected to still be active within Al-Shabaab's leadership.² Annex 2.1 provides an update on the Al-Shabaab leadership and network, as well as new members identified by the Panel.

9. On 26 February 2021, the Committee added to its list Abukar Ali Adan (SOi.018), Maalim Ayman (SOi.019) and Mahad Karate (SOi.020).³ The Panel also noted that the United States of America had added three individuals to its Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List who could meet the designation criteria under resolution 1844 (2008): (a) Mohamed Abdullahi Osman (a.k.a. Engineer Ismail); (b) Al-Shabaab spokesperson Ali Mohamed Rage (a.k.a. Ali Dhere); and (c) Al-Shabaab operational planner and a Kenyan national, Abdikadir Mohamed Abdikadir (a.k.a. Ikrima).⁴

10. During the reporting period, the Panel noted claims by the Somali National Army that it had arrested or neutralized a number of Al-Shabaab senior operatives.⁵ The Panel also took note of Al-Shabaab propaganda, released via audio and video mediums, that highlighted the group's decision to execute some of its members for spying (see annex 2.2).⁶

Areas under Al-Shabaab's direct control

11. During the mandate period, the Panel has monitored reports on Al-Shabaab activities and identified areas under its direct control,⁷ including most towns in Jamame District, Lower Juba; Jilib, Bu'ale and Sakow in Middle Juba; parts of Baardheere in Gedo; towns located in southern Dinsor and Burhakaba Districts in Bay Region; Adale and Adan Yabal in Middle Shabelle; and El Dher, El Bur and Harardhere in Galmudug. The Panel also examined audiovisual evidence that showed Al-Shabaab administering public ceremonies to large audiences in several of the

¹ See text of his speech at <https://shahadanews.com/?p=14077>.

² See <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/751/materials/summaries>.

³ See <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/751/materials>.

⁴ See <https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions>.

⁵ Somali National Television reported names of alleged senior Somali National Army operatives who had defected or had been arrested or killed. The Panel sent a letter to the Federal Government of Somalia requesting further information on 3 September 2021.

⁶ Execution by Al-Shabaab courts of 28 individuals in 2020 and 29, including one female, in 2021.

⁷ Analysis of Al-Shabaab media reports corroborated by confidential security reports.

above-mentioned locations.⁸ The Panel did not note any ground operations by the Somali National Army or international forces inside areas directly controlled by Al-Shabaab, apart from a number of air strikes by the United States from 16 December 2020 to late January 2021.⁹ Annex 2.3 displays a map of areas controlled by the group.

Al-Shabaab tactics in areas with militia resistance

12. In areas where Al-Shabaab failed in or decided against pursuing direct control, mostly because of the deployment of Somali or international forces and/or the resistance of clan militia, it conducted interdiction operations along main supply routes or punished locals and traditional leaders to attempt to compel them to support its fight against security forces.

13. In Hudur, Bakool Region, and Luq, Gedo Region, Al-Shabaab maintained a blockade on the movement of goods and ambushed, on several occasions during the reporting period, trucks or motorbikes coming with goods from the border with Ethiopia.¹⁰

14. Al-Shabaab also imposed blockades on commercial trucks around Jowhar, Middle Shabelle, from 18 to 28 February 2021. Al-Shabaab lifted the blockade after its agreement with the business community in Fidow, 25 km north-east of Mahaday, following the abduction of 15 businessmen.¹¹

15. When Al-Shabaab faced resistance from clan militia, such as from the Leeysan sub-clan in Bay and Bakool, and the Galjel sub-clan in Lower Shabelle, where protection by security forces was limited, the group abducted elders and evicted several villages, forcing the population to displace (see annex 5.1).

16. Al-Shabaab was able to exert its influence in eastern parts of Middle Shabelle and southern parts of Galmudug. In February 2021, Al-Shabaab also began to fill the vacuum left by the demobilization of Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a.¹² During the reporting period, Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a elements, whom the Federal Government of Somalia planned to integrate into the security forces, in Middle Shabelle have been used in the fight against Al-Shabaab on limited occasions. Al-Shabaab continued to punish villages affiliated with Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a and their elders.

Al-Shabaab tactics in areas controlled by government or international forces

Direct and indirect fire attacks

17. The Panel recorded 1,047 attacks on the Somali National Army, federal member state and international forces mainly in Jubbaland, South-West State, Hirshabelle and Galmudug.¹³ All reported attacks were hit-and-run or mortar attacks on security force

⁸ Executions in Jilib, Sakow and Qunyo Barrow were public. Prayers for Eid al-Adha on 20 July 2021 were with a large public in the presence of Al-Shabaab in Bu'ale, El Bur and Jilib; see footage on webpages for 20 and 21 July 2021 at <https://calamada.com/category/sawirro/>.

⁹ United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) press releases, December 2020–January 2021.

¹⁰ The Panel recorded eight cases of ambushes of trucks and motorbikes travelling to Hudur and four travelling to Luq from the border with Ethiopia. In most of the cases, the travellers were killed and the goods taken to Al-Shabaab's neighbouring strongholds. Details are available in the "incident database" covering 16 December 2020 to 31 August 2021, on file with the Secretariat.

¹¹ Security report corroborated by interviews with local sources.

¹² The Somali National Army disarmed Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a elements in February 2020, after clashes initiated by disagreements about the election of the President of Galmudug (see www.voanews.com/africa/somalias-sufi-muslim-leaders-surrender-government). Two Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a religious leaders in Egypt and Turkey informed the Panel in July 2021 that they would be willing to reach an agreement with the Federal Government of Somalia that would allow their militia to have the capability to fight Al-Shabaab.

¹³ Details are available in the "incident database" covering 16 December 2020 to 31 August 2021, on file with the Secretariat.

bases or ambushes and improvised explosive device attacks on military convoys. During the reporting period, Al-Shabaab deployed vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices on three occasions, allowing it to overwhelm security forces momentarily in Awdheegle, on 3 April 2021, and in Daynuunay and Wisil, on 9 and 27 June 2021, respectively. The lack of proper force protection infrastructure at forward operating bases and transport equipment for conventional Somali National Army forces made them vulnerable to Al-Shabaab attacks. Rudimentary defence-in-depth measures at some forward operating bases and the movement of ill-equipped troops (neither armoured vehicles nor explosive ordnance disposal capabilities) increased the death toll following Al-Shabaab attacks and ambushes. Al-Shabaab attacks during the reporting period are detailed in annex 2.4. Additionally, annex 2.5 highlights some vulnerabilities of Somali National Army bases.

Al-Shabaab attempts to expand territorial control in Galmudug

18. During the reporting period, the Panel noted Al-Shabaab's expansion of territory in and near Hobyo District, Galmudug. By taking advantage of the fragile political situation at both the national and regional levels and exploiting clan dynamics in this region, the group captured Baadweyne and subsequently attempted to take control of Wisil.

19. Sources from Baadweyne, Wisil, Galkayo and Mogadishu told the Panel that the Qubeys sub-clan had been targeted by Al-Shabaab for over a year before surrendering Baadweyne to the group on 14 April 2021.¹⁴ This date also marked the withdrawal of the Twenty-first Division of the Somali National Army from Baadweyne.¹⁵ According to these accounts, the local Al-Shabaab element, led by Abdishakur Deeq (Haber Gedir/Saad), the Al-Shabaab *wali* of Mudug Region, was "determined to capture the area, possibly in the attempt to clear access to the sea for the group".¹⁶

20. In July 2021, the Somali National Army and Galmudug forces launched operations against Al-Shabaab strongholds in Qey'ad, Baadweyne and Omaad. On 20 July 2021, the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) conducted its first air strike since 19 January 2021 in support of these Somali forces.¹⁷ Al-Shabaab has continued to conduct hit-and-run attacks using suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices against Somali National Army bases established in the liberated towns, as well as improvised explosive devices to delay and prevent reinforcements.¹⁸

Interdictions along main supply routes

21. Al-Shabaab remains the main threat to freedom of movement along the main supply routes in central and southern Somalia because of the group's persistent use of improvised explosive devices and ambush attacks. The Panel recorded 99 improvised explosive device incidents and 44 ambushes targeting Somali National Army and international forces along the main supply routes, especially in the vicinity of Marka District between Janale and Bullo Mareer, and around Gololey between Balad and Beledweyne. Some of the improvised explosive devices were installed along main supply routes patrolled by security forces to divert trucks to roads under Al-Shabaab control for the purpose of collecting taxes. On 14 April 2021, a minibus transporting 20 passengers was hit by an improvised explosive device in the vicinity

¹⁴ Security reports, December 2020–April 2021, and interviews with representatives of the Haber Gedir and Qubeys clans, May and June 2021.

¹⁵ Security reports, April 2021, and interviews with local sources, April and May 2021.

¹⁶ Interviews with representatives of the Haber Gedir and Qubeys clans, May and June 2021.

¹⁷ AFRICOM conducted two additional air strikes on 23 July and 1 August 2021 (see www.africom.mil/media-gallery/press-releases).

¹⁸ Attack on Amara on 24 August 2021.

of Gololey, 10 km north of Balad. The Panel also noted several ambushes, some of which targeted traders attempting to supply goods to localities under blockade, such as Hudur, Bakool Region.

Al-Shabaab attacks in population centres

22. In population centres such as Benadir, Kismayo and Baidoa, Al-Shabaab attacked mainly soft targets, seeking psychological and sensational media effects, necessary for the group to show its capabilities, to intimidate and force individuals to comply with its demands. Table 2 of annex 2.4 shows attacks on civilian objects in population centres.

23. The Panel recorded 270 incidents attributed to Al-Shabaab in the 17 districts of Benadir Region during the reporting period, including assassinations, hit-and-run attacks on government positions and grenade, improvised explosive device and mortar attacks.¹⁹ The most effective attacks were two complex attacks in Mogadishu and Bosaso. Al-Shabaab demonstrated its capability to plan and infiltrate security lines as none of these major attacks were foiled by intelligence and security forces. The attacks are listed in table 3 of annex 2.4.

Afrik Hotel attack

24. On 31 January 2021, Al-Shabaab launched a complex attack against the Afrik Hotel, located north of Aden Adde International Airport in Mogadishu. The Afrik Hotel attack was the first complex attack in Mogadishu since the 16 August 2020 attack at the Elite Hotel. The incident illustrated Al-Shabaab's continued ability to perpetrate vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attacks inside Mogadishu.

Bosaso prison attack

25. On 4 March 2021, Al-Shabaab fighters launched a complex attack on the central prison of Bosaso, Puntland, to free prisoners. The preparation and sophistication of the attack by Al-Shabaab exposed the security forces in terms of equipment and readiness. Annex 2.6 provides more details on this attack and the measures taken by Puntland authorities to address the security deficiencies.

Cross-border operations and regional influence

Kenya

26. Al-Shabaab continues to pose a significant threat to Kenya by conducting hit-and-run attacks against Kenyan security service installations, as well as civilians, along the border with Somalia. Since the start of the Panel's current mandate, Al-Shabaab has conducted at least six attacks along the border, the majority of which targeted Kenyan security service personnel.²⁰ However, the civilian population also remains under threat. Specifically, the Panel learned that Al-Shabaab is reportedly collecting livestock as a form of zakat payment, as well as beginning to test its ability to extort local businesses in and around Mandera town.²¹

Djibouti

27. On 27 March 2021, Al-Shabaab released a message to the people of Djibouti, describing the country as the "centre of enemy plots", calling on the country's citizens to overthrow the Government and warranting attacks on American and French

¹⁹ Analysis of media reports corroborated by United Nations confidential security reports.

²⁰ Confidential United Nations reports, January–August 2021.

²¹ Telephone interviews with elders from Mandera and Wajir Counties between May and July 2021.

interests.²² The audio message featured Al-Shabaab emir Diriye vilifying the President of Djibouti, Ismaël Omar Guelleh, for the reported economic damage he caused to the country and criticizing him for allowing foreign militaries, namely the United States and France, to be based inside Djibouti. Moreover, Diriye urged sympathetic Djiboutians to carry out lone wolf attacks. The Al-Shabaab message came two weeks before Mr. Guelleh was re-elected as President.²³

B. Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant faction in Somalia

28. The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) faction in Somalia remains intent on conducting operations in northern Somalia. However, most operations during the reporting period had limited impact and occurred in a confined area of Bari Region, Puntland. Despite a successful attack by ISIL on Balidhidin town, Qandala District, Bari Region in mid-August 2021, as well as some attacks against security forces in June and July near the Golis mountains, Puntland Security Forces operations targeting the group have reportedly impeded its ability to mount more impactful operations.²⁴ From May to July 2021, the Puntland Security Forces conducted at least four counter-ISIL operations, mainly in Bari Region, allegedly killing 20 ISIL fighters and destroying an ISIL-affiliated location in Amayra, near Timirshe, approximately 140 km south-east of Bosaso.²⁵ In its 2019 report, the Panel assessed that the group may comprise of approximately 340 militants but, on the basis of the recent alleged losses, the Panel believes that the number has further decreased.²⁶

C. Relations between the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states

Federal Government of Somalia and Jubbaland administration

29. During the reporting period, political relations between the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states remained volatile. Electoral processes were the primary source of the tensions. Specifically, election-related clashes in Gedo since January 2021 are yet another manifestation of centre-periphery tensions that have plagued Somali politics over the past several years. In a reflection of 2020, events in Gedo in 2021 have had the multiple effects of casualties and internal displacement, localized armed build-ups, diversion of military resources away from operations against Al-Shabaab and provision of space for armed groups to exploit in their favour.²⁷ Cohesion between the Federal Government and the federal member states is important as Al-Shabaab retains the ability to exploit ruptures between the federal and regional authorities.

Armed confrontation in Gedo

30. The struggle for control of Gedo between the Federal Government of Somalia and Jubbaland escalated in Belet Hawo in January 2021, causing humanitarian consequences and delays in the electoral calendar. Violent clashes broke out on 25 January 2021 between Somali National Army troops based in Belet Hawo town and Jubbaland forces led by the then Jubbaland Security Minister, Abdirashid Janan,

²² Available from <https://ok.ru/video/2283995728443>.

²³ Djiboutian authorities confirmed to the Panel on 14 June 2021 that this threat from Al-Shabaab did not affect the elections.

²⁴ See Garowe Online, “ISIS seizes key area in Somalia’s Puntland after battle”, 19 August 2021.

²⁵ Confidential security reports and interviews with Puntland authorities, 2–3 August 2021.

²⁶ S/2019/858 and S/2019/858/Corr.1, paras. 56–59, and multiple sources with access to the rank and file within the group.

²⁷ S/2020/949, paras. 73–76.

resulting in civilian casualties, destruction of civilian property and displacement.²⁸ The March 2021 agreement between the Federal Government and Janan de-escalated tensions but did not address the root causes of disagreement with Jubbaland's leadership. Federal Government forces continue to control the region,²⁹ as the Prime Minister, Mohamed Hussein Roble, announced that he would be responsible for security in Gedo during the electoral period, together with a reconciliation commission that included all federal member states minus Jubbaland.³⁰

D. Insecurity generated by renewed clan violence

31. During the reporting period, the Panel noted an increasing level of armed clan violence closely associated to competition over resources and power struggles and exacerbated by the ongoing electoral process in several Somali regions, particularly Galgaduud, Hiraan, Mudug, Sanaag and Bari. These conflicts added instability and insecurity to already fragile areas and generated notable humanitarian consequences, including civilian casualties, destruction of civilian property, displacement and obstruction of humanitarian assistance. Al-Shabaab exploited clan divisions to serve its aims, particularly in Mudug and Hiraan, supporting specific clan interests and fuelling further violence.³¹ In some instances, Somali National Army members were also targeted because of their clan affiliation. For example, on 13 January 2021 in the Balambal area, Galmudug, eight Somali National Army soldiers from the Haber Gedir/Ayr clan were killed in an ambush by Marehan militiamen as revenge for the previous killing of seven Somali National Army soldiers from the Marehan clan by Haber Gedir/Ayr militia on the Balambal-Guriel road on 9 December 2020.³²

32. From January to August 2021, the Panel recorded 118 incidents of clan conflict, particularly revenge killings and abductions, which left 80 dead and 170 injured.³³ The Panel noted 22 incidents of kidnappings to force compensation for previous killings.³⁴ In Sool Region, clashes between clan militias from the Dhulbahante/Jaamac Syaad and Dhulbahante/Ugaadhyahan sub-clans over the control of water reservoirs in Dhabar-Dalul, near Hudun town, left 15 killed and 30 injured.³⁵ At the time of writing, negotiations were still ongoing to solve this dispute.

E. Security sector

Somali transition plan review

33. The revised Somali transition plan was issued by the Federal Government of Somalia in February 2021, including an outline of the security priorities during the transition period until 2023. This transition plan reiterates its support for an African Union-led transition mission beyond 2021 that allows the Somali National Security

²⁸ See Hiiraan Online, "Fresh fighting breaks out in Belet-Hawo, Somalia says Kenya behind it", 25 January 2021.

²⁹ Currently, the Panel assesses that there are at least 700 forces loyal to the Federal Government of Somalia in Gedo, mainly composed of the Turkish-trained "Gorgor".

³⁰ Interview with sources in Kismayo, June 2021.

³¹ Security reports on file with the Panel and interviews with members of the Galjel, Marehan and Haber Gedir clans, March–June 2021.

³² Security report, January 2021.

³³ Media and security reports on file with the Panel corroborated by interviews with local sources, January–August 2021.

³⁴ Between January and March 2021, on the Beledweyne-Dhusamareb road, 19 people were kidnapped and, in two instances, payments totalling \$100,000 were disbursed to secure release. Interview with sources from Beledweyne, April 2021, and security report.

³⁵ Interview with sources in Hudun, April 2021.

Forces to progressively assume full responsibility for security in Somalia by the end of 2023.

34. While Operation Badbaado I led to some successes,³⁶ the second phase is at a standstill.³⁷ State police units are still expected to be deployed to Lower Shabelle to replace the Somali National Army as holding forces and move towards civil administration. However, only a few regional security forces (Darawish) and police recruits from South-West State (state police) have been trained, equipped and deployed to hold the liberated areas, but not in significant numbers as to take over from the Somali National Army.³⁸

35. The Federal Government of Somalia has to report on the implementation of the Somali transition plan by the end of October 2021, in accordance with Security Council resolution [2568 \(2021\)](#).

Coordination mechanism

36. In its 2020 report, the Panel recommended that the Federal Government of Somalia lead strategic coordination through regular high-level meetings with international and regional partners and express its needs regarding the development of the Somali National Security Forces.³⁹

37. Under the revised Somali transition plan, a strategic steering committee has been established under the direction of the President of Somalia, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed Farmajo, to serve as the strategic decision-making body to monitor progress and ensure the implementation of the transition plan. In addition, the strategic steering committee will oversee the integrated concept of security sector reform, which combines military, rule of law, stabilization and preventing/countering violent extremism aspects. In view of this, the Comprehensive Approach to Security Executive Group has been renamed the Security and Justice Committee, still co-chaired by the Prime Minister and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia and placed under the supervision of the strategic steering committee.⁴⁰

38. The Panel expects the Security and Justice Committee to be the appropriate forum for the Federal Government of Somalia to express its needs, allowing international partners to coordinate their support. It is also the hope of the Panel that the Committee will allow the Federal Government to supervise and manage the delivery of support, other than military equipment and armament, for the development of the Somali National Security Forces.

Fragmentation of security forces

39. During the reporting period, the Panel noted at least two election-related events that prompted the mobilization of militias and exposed fissures within the Somali National Army. On 19 February 2021, Federal Government of Somalia forces closely aligned with the President attacked his opposition at a demonstration.⁴¹ On 25 April 2021, amid protests in Mogadishu against the extension of the President's term, gunfire erupted between hundreds of opposition-aligned elements of the Somali

³⁶ [S/2020/949](#), para. 102.

³⁷ The second phase of Operation Badbaado is aimed at securing the main supply routes to further expand Somali National Security Forces control in Middle Shabelle.

³⁸ Exchange of information with UNSOM senior staff members, August 2021.

³⁹ [S/2020/949](#), para. 167.

⁴⁰ Exchange of information with the Federal Government of Somalia in June 2021 and with UNSOM senior staff members in August 2021.

⁴¹ Confidential United Nations report, February 2021.

National Army and those loyal to the Government.⁴² The latter event also resulted in the displacement of approximately 60,000 to 100,000 people from Mogadishu.⁴³ While the Prime Minister eventually brokered a deal to quell the tensions on 6 May 2021,⁴⁴ these episodes have exposed wider fissures within the security sector, which may potentially create security vacuums that Al-Shabaab can exploit in the future.

40. The Panel also received reports on attempts by National Intelligence and Security Agency officials, as well as regional police officials, to silence criticism against the Federal Government of Somalia by current and former political opposition leaders and suppress freedom of speech.⁴⁵ Additionally, the Panel is aware of at least one case involving a missing Agency official who disappeared under suspect circumstances (see below).

Ikran Tahlil Farah

41. The Panel is investigating the disappearance on 26 June 2021 of Ikran Tahlil Farah, a 25-year-old woman with close links to the leadership of the National Intelligence and Security Agency in Mogadishu. According to interviews with family members, Ms. Tahlil last made contact with her family before a meeting with Agency officials.⁴⁶ Moreover, family members told the Panel that Ms. Tahlil had reported receiving direct threats from Agency officials. Ms. Tahlil's family lodged a formal complaint before the Prosecutor General of the Armed Forces and the Court of the Armed Forces and a report was compiled accordingly on 24 July 2021.⁴⁷ The Panel sent a letter to the Federal Government of Somalia on 13 August 2021 on this issue.

42. On 2 September, the National Intelligence and Security Agency publicly claimed that Ms. Tahlil had been abducted by Al-Shabaab, which the group vehemently denied in a swift counter-response on 3 September.⁴⁸ On 4 September, the Prime Minister issued a 48-hour ultimatum to the Chief of the National Intelligence and Security Agency, Fahad Yasin, to explain the circumstances surrounding the reported death of Ikran Tahlil.⁴⁹ The Chief replied on 5 September, inviting the Prime Minister to attend a Somali National Security Council meeting to receive a briefing on the case of Ms. Tahlil.⁵⁰ On the same day, the Prime Minister fired Fahad Yasin and appointed former Chief of the Agency, Major General Bashir Mohamed Hame, as the interim head of the Agency.⁵¹ On 6 September, the President weighed in and stated that the Prime Minister's decision to sack Fahad Yasin was illegal and unconstitutional and allowed Fahad Yasin to remain in his position in charge of the Agency.⁵²

⁴² Interviews between 19 and 29 April 2021 with several security sources with direct knowledge of the situation in Mogadishu.

⁴³ Security, media, humanitarian and human rights reports, February and April 2021, corroborated by interviews with local sources, February and April 2021. See also https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/HC%20statement_surge%20in%20displacement%20Mogadishu%2028%20April%202021%20Final.pdf and <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/apr/21/somalias-rival-factions-spread-across-mogadishu-as-they-jockey-for-power>.

⁴⁴ See Abdi Sheikh (Reuters), "Anti-president Somali soldiers to return to barracks after reaching deal – spokesman", 6 May 2021.

⁴⁵ Interviews with members of the Somali Journalists Syndicate and security and public media reports, January–July 2021.

⁴⁶ Closed circuit television footage obtained by the Panel shows Ms. Tahlil entering a car outside her residence at 20:03 local time.

⁴⁷ See <https://twitter.com/SomaliGuardian/status/1431655638388678667?s=20>.

⁴⁸ Al-Shabaab press office statement, 3 September 2021. See also <https://calamada.com/xarakada-al-shabaab-oo-iska-fogeysay-dilka-ikraan-tahlil-warbixin/>.

⁴⁹ Official announcement by the Prime Minister, 4 September 2021.

⁵⁰ Official statement by the National Intelligence and Security Agency, 5 September 2021.

⁵¹ Official statement by the Office of the Prime Minister, 5 September 2021.

⁵² Communiqué from Villa Somalia, 6 September 2021.

Muktar Robow

43. Since his arrest by Ethiopian and Somali forces in December 2018, Muktar Robow remains under house arrest by the National Intelligence and Security Agency in Mogadishu.⁵³ The Panel received multiple reports from Somali political and security officials that shared details of Robow's current living conditions, assassination attempts on the former South-West State presidential candidate and his June 2021 hunger strike as a result of what he claims to be an illegal detention by the Agency.

44. Robow is one of a few former Al-Shabaab members who has publicly condemned the group.⁵⁴ Additionally, after Robow's arrest, the Federal Government of Somalia continued to pay his militia approximately \$20,000 per month to fight Al-Shabaab, but these payments ended in 2019.⁵⁵

Recruitment of a new, Federal Government of Somalia-aligned security unit

45. Since 2019, the Federal Government of Somalia has recruited at least 929,⁵⁶ but possibly up to 5,000, Somalis to receive unspecified military training in Eritrea.⁵⁷ Family members and sponsors of some recruits told the Panel that the recruitment process was conducted opaquely, with the Federal Government telling some families that recruits would receive training in Turkey or Qatar.⁵⁸ An example of a redacted registration form used to register these recruits can be found in annex 2.7 (strictly confidential).⁵⁹ This new unit, reportedly called "Dufaan",⁶⁰ remains disconnected from the current Somali security architecture and the Panel found neither information on the unit's structure nor plans by the Government to integrate the unit into existing security elements in accordance with the February 2021 Somali transition plan or the Government's periodic reports.

46. On 12 June 2021, the Prime Minister appointed a five-member committee to investigate the complaints of families who claimed their relatives were missing and likely in Eritrea.⁶¹ The letter Mr. Roble sent to announce the formation of the committee is contained in annex 2.7 (strictly confidential). Neither Mr. Roble's newly appointed committee nor the broader Federal Government of Somalia have made an official announcement on the status of these soldiers. On 9 August 2021, the Panel sent a letter to the Federal Government regarding the investigation but has not yet received a response.

47. According to three sources whom the Panel interviewed, at least 450 of the total number of recruits sent to Eritrea have returned to Somalia and are operating under

⁵³ See Abdi Sheikh (Reuters), "Somalia arrests ex-Islamist militant running for regional presidency", 13 December 2018.

⁵⁴ Jeffrey Gettleman, "An ex-Shabaab leader surrenders in Somalia, officials say", *The New York Times*, 13 August 2017.

⁵⁵ Interview conducted with Federal Government of Somalia security official in Nairobi on 2 August 2021.

⁵⁶ According to documents obtained and reviewed by the Panel, as well as interviews with the families of recruits and other security officials with inside knowledge of the creation of this unit from May to August 2021.

⁵⁷ In an interview with Dalsan TV on 13 August 2021, National Security Advisor, Abdisaid Ali, stated that the Federal Government of Somalia had sent 5,000 recruits to Eritrea.

⁵⁸ Interviews with family members of at least a dozen recruits, August 2021.

⁵⁹ The ages, addresses and clan affiliations of 929 recruits, as well as information on each recruit's sponsor or referee, are on file with the Secretariat.

⁶⁰ *Dufaan* translates into "tornado" or "strong wind" in English.

⁶¹ The committee members include the Defence Minister, Hassan Hussein Haji; the Interior Minister, Muktar Hussein Afrah; the Ambassador of Somalia to Ethiopia, Abdullahi Ahmed Jama Ilkajiir; the Chief of Defence Forces, Odowaa Yusuf Rageh; and Spokesperson of the Office of the Prime Minister, Mohamed Ibrahim Moalimuu.

an opaque command and control structure, possibly having an unidentified role in the April 2021 electoral clashes in Mogadishu.⁶² The Panel has no corroborated information on the recruits participating in the fighting in Tigray, Ethiopia.⁶³

F. Maritime security

48. During the reporting period, the Panel noted one corroborated maritime security incident along the Somalia coast. On 13 August 2021, an attack occurred off the coast of Middle Shabelle, where a skiff opened fire on the passenger/roll-on-roll-off *Anatolian* (IMO No. 9005869, registered in Turkey) while en route to Mogadishu. The vessel was able to proceed to Mogadishu and delivered military equipment destined for the Somali National Army. Additional details are provided in annex 2.8.

III. Al-Shabaab finance and public financial management

A. Overview

49. Al-Shabaab continues to derive its revenue from a variety of domestic sources. The group's illicit taxation network remains its most lucrative revenue stream. Secondary funding streams are derived from the group's illicit zakat collection, illicit *infaq*,⁶⁴ kidnap for ransom and service charges.⁶⁵ This sophisticated domestic revenue generation mechanism gives the group autonomy with regard to expenditure without having to rely on funding from outside Somalia.

50. There are four main areas of illicit taxation and income generation:

(a) Agriculture (*dalag beeraha*): illicit taxation of farms and farming produce, on land, at checkpoints and for export;

(b) Vehicles (*gadiid*): illicit taxation on transiting vehicles. Transit taxation fees depend on the type of vehicle and length of the journey undertaken; registration fees for vehicles are also levied;

(c) Goods (*badeeco*): illicit taxation of goods being transported. The amount paid depends on type and quantity; import and export charges are levied at ports and border crossings;

(d) Livestock (*xoolo*): illicit taxation on the sale of livestock, primarily cattle, camels and goats, at local markets.

51. The Panel's examination of Al-Shabaab's financial system confirms that the group utilizes domestic financial institutions, bank accounts and electronic mobile money services to facilitate the safe storage and onward transfer of revenues generated. However, the group still relies heavily on cash flows, with deposits and withdrawals being made predominantly in cash.⁶⁶ Collection methods vary depending on the type of taxation, with cash payments predominantly used for transiting vehicles

⁶² Interviews with existing and former Federal Government of Somalia security officials, 1–8 August 2021.

⁶³ Of note, in 2018, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia signed a cooperation agreement, formally entitled the Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Cooperation between Ethiopia, Somalia and Eritrea (see <https://igad.int/press-release/1940-igad-welcomes-the-signing-of-the-joint-declaration-on-the-comprehensive-cooperation-between-ethiopia-eritrea-and-somalia>).

⁶⁴ Voluntary financial contribution to support fighters.

⁶⁵ The Panel is currently investigating attempts by Al-Shabaab to extend its illicit taxation to professional categories in Mogadishu, including doctors, teachers and university professors.

⁶⁶ Investigations conducted by the Panel during 2021.

while cash deposits into a specified bank account are used for larger payments by businesses.⁶⁷ Mobile money is the quickest and most accessible form of money transfer for both Al-Shabaab and the individual paying.

52. The Panel assesses that the group remains in a healthy financial position due to its organized revenue generation system and is entrepreneurial in nature with regard to investments.⁶⁸

53. As Somalia continues its transition to formal financial systems, all financial operators can expect to be exploited by Al-Shabaab, which has consistently operated a flexible business model without institutional preference. The Panel's investigations have focused on the means Al-Shabaab uses to operate, detailing the specific *modus operandi* it employs, to enable a fuller understanding of the group's illicit revenue generation.

B. Al-Shabaab revenue generation

Illicit "taxation" at checkpoints

54. One of Al-Shabaab's main sources of income comes from the taxation of vehicles and goods transiting through Somalia. This taxation is collected through various checkpoints. The Panel estimates that Al-Shabaab operates around 100 checkpoints throughout the country. This network of checkpoints consists of permanent, semi-permanent and mobile facilities, giving Al-Shabaab the ability to adapt collection methods according to the current situation on the ground. Some of these checkpoints, such as the Kamsuma Bridge, 30 km south of Jilib, are key revenue generators for Al-Shabaab. Key centres of revenue accumulation are often aligned with the specific geographical locations of checkpoints. For example, the finance office for Sakow is located at the checkpoint on the road to Baardheere, just north of the city centre.⁶⁹

55. From March to July 2021, the Panel interviewed six truck drivers who transported goods throughout Somalia but predominantly within South-West State, Benadir and Jubbaland. All reported that Al-Shabaab operates a wide network of checkpoints throughout areas it controls and also government-held areas where the group has an active presence. From Kismayo to Dhoolbe, for example, a driver would pass through three Al-Shabaab checkpoints.⁷⁰ Payment would be made at the first checkpoint and a receipt issued that would then allow safe passage through Al-Shabaab territory. The receipt is retained for inspection at the next checkpoint to avoid another payment. If exiting areas of Al-Shabaab administration, vehicles are required to pay again when returning. Checkpoint payments are predominantly made using mobile money transfer or in cash (United States dollars). Vehicles are required to be registered with Al-Shabaab and a one-off payment to the group is necessary to receive a registration document, which must be retained within the vehicle for inspection by Al-Shabaab.⁷¹ The Panel has noted the amount of fields recorded on Al-Shabaab receipts, which gives it a large database of information on the movement of vehicles, goods and people through areas under Al-Shabaab administration.⁷²

⁶⁷ Interviews with businesses and drivers during 2021.

⁶⁸ Confidential reports reviewed by the Panel in February and April 2021.

⁶⁹ Confidential report seen by the Panel, February 2021.

⁷⁰ Checkpoints located at: (a) Yaaq Buulle; (b) between Bibi and Berhani and (c) Caglibax (mobile), approximately 0°15'11.7"N 41°59'00.4"E.

⁷¹ The registration fee ranges from \$100 to \$500 depending on the type of vehicle.

⁷² Receipts obtained by the Panel from various sources within Somalia during the current mandate period.

56. The interviewees emphasized that avoiding Al-Shabaab checkpoint taxation is not possible due to the extensive network of informants who gather information for the group and instil fear in the population. If drivers try to avoid payment by taking an alternative route, they are reported and issued a non-negotiable fine.⁷³

57. Checkpoint security varies and is dependent on the level of Al-Shabaab control in the area where the checkpoint is located. For example, the checkpoint in Bu'ale, Middle Juba Region, is manned by receipt writers due to the group's direct control over the town. However, a checkpoint bordering a government-controlled or disputed area will employ much greater security and manpower. The checkpoint at Basra, Lower Shabelle, a disputed area that frequently changes hands, has reportedly around 30 *hisbah*⁷⁴ providing security.

58. The Panel has investigated Al-Shabaab's main income generators from checkpoint taxation and found that checkpoints located at Kamsuma Bridge, Lower Juba; Fay Yusuf, Lower Shabelle; and Idale, in Bay Region, are some of Al-Shabaab's most profitable checkpoints, due to their strategic locations along main supply routes.⁷⁵ The Kamsuma Bridge checkpoint sees on average 30 trucks pass in a 24-hour period.⁷⁶ Using an average taxation of between \$500 and \$1,000 per truck, the revenue generated from this checkpoint by Al-Shabaab would equal between \$15,000 and \$30,000 per day. Annex 3.1 (strictly confidential) displays the network of Al-Shabaab checkpoints operating within Somalia.

Zakat extortion

59. Zakat (alms collection), one of the five pillars of Islam, is an annual religious obligation to pay a specific percentage of a person's wealth to the poor. Zakat is usually levied at an annual rate of 2.5 per cent on the accumulated net wealth of an individual or business. Al-Shabaab continues to exploit the religious obligation of zakat to further justify its "extortion" of the population. The Panel has noted that Al-Shabaab collects zakat twice a year on agriculture and once a year on business and livestock.

60. During the mandate period, the Panel has conducted interviews with business owners based within Somalia and internationally who made forced zakat payments to Al-Shabaab. One interviewee stated that Al-Shabaab contacted him by telephone with regard to zakat payments due and ordered him to present himself at a meeting in Afgooye, Lower Shabelle Region, in March 2021.⁷⁷ The business owner travelled to Afgooye to meet Al-Shabaab members and negotiate the amount to be paid; this negotiation took 10 days and resulted in an assessment of over \$100,000 in zakat payment to the group. The assessed amount was based on the annual turnover and size of the business, showing that Al-Shabaab was in possession of an assessment of the business's size and assets.⁷⁸

61. After the negotiations, the business paid instalments to Al-Shabaab totalling over \$120,000. These payments were made in cash into a mobile money wallet. Al-Shabaab simply provided a name and telephone number to facilitate the payment.⁷⁹

⁷³ Fines are dependent on type of vehicle; for a truck, the fine could be double the normal tax of its load.

⁷⁴ Al-Shabaab's police arm.

⁷⁵ Telephone interviews with drivers from January to May 2021 and confidential reports reviewed.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Interviews with trading companies from January to June 2021.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Mobile money allows unbanked individuals to use their phones as a bank account: to deposit, withdraw and transfer money using their mobile handset, "know your customer" regulations do not currently apply as with bank accounts.

The Panel reviewed two separate receipts, which totalled over \$120,000, paid into a mobile money wallet, an area of commerce where regulations are not yet enforced within Somalia. This marks a change in collection method from the payments made into domestic bank accounts noted by the Panel in its 2020 report.⁸⁰

Extortion in Somali ports

62. In its 2020 report, the Panel highlighted Al-Shabaab's extortion of businesses and individuals operating at Mogadishu port, which is facilitated through a network of infiltration, allowing access to manifests that provide information on businesses' imports and exports.⁸¹ The Panel provided a case study of Al-Shabaab revenue collection within Mogadishu port, identifying a combination of mobile money and domestic bank accounts used by the group for the collection and onward movement of extortion payments. Ports represent fertile income generation venues for Al-Shabaab. The group is not only extorting the imports and exports shipped but also the transit of goods through arterial routes to and from the ports and the businesses operating therein.

63. Evidence obtained by the Panel during 2021 shows that Mogadishu port extortion continues for the import, export and transit of goods through the port facility. In addition, new bank accounts have been set up for the collection of illicit taxes by Al-Shabaab.⁸²

64. In early 2021, an international business imported approximately 8,000 tons of food supplies into Mogadishu port. Ten days after the importation, Al-Shabaab contacted the business in Mogadishu by telephone and ordered the business to make an illicit taxation payment in excess of \$30,000 to the group for the goods imported, which it calculated based on a rate of \$4 per ton, regardless of the commodity imported. Al-Shabaab informed the business that it was in possession of the company's cargo information within Mogadishu port and then made the extortion request.⁸³

65. A separate receipt reviewed by the Panel from another import of over 6,000 tons of household goods by a business importing into Mogadishu port showed that the business incurred similar illicit taxation by Al-Shabaab at the same rate. Thus, Al-Shabaab demanded over \$25,000, which was deposited into the same account. The two receipts reviewed by the Panel show the two cash deposits made into a domestic Somali bank account totalling over \$55,000.⁸⁴

66. Investigations during the mandate period have revealed a similar extortion operation in effect within Kismayo port. The port serves southern Somalia from within Jubbaland. Al-Shabaab was driven out of Kismayo militarily in 2012 but maintains the ability to extort individuals and businesses.

67. Extortion within Kismayo port is calculated by container, with Al-Shabaab charging a rate of \$80 for a 20-foot container and \$160 for a 40-foot container. Four vessels were noted by the Panel within Kismayo port during July 2021, with one carrying 285 containers.⁸⁵ At an average price of \$120 per container and with 285 containers arriving in July, Al-Shabaab would generate revenue of \$34,200 from the taxation of containers.⁸⁶

⁸⁰ S/2020/949, paras. 17–21.

⁸¹ Ibid., paras. 12–16.

⁸² Interviews with trading companies from January to June 2021.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Interviews with companies, September 2021.

⁸⁵ Telephone interviews with businesses in Kismayo from March to July 2021.

⁸⁶ Not including income generated from the taxation of the goods within the container.

68. The Panel understands that the Kismayo business community has asked the Jubbaland authorities to act against Al-Shabaab's access to businesses' information and their extortion.⁸⁷ Al-Shabaab still extorts the commodity within the container at a fixed rate and the Panel will conduct further investigations to ascertain the rates of commodity taxation within Kismayo port.

69. Annex 3.2 (strictly confidential) displays all Al-Shabaab documents and receipts.

C. Al-Shabaab exploitation of mobile money

70. The mobile money market remains the most predominant method of moving money in Somalia; however, the regulations remain unenforced.⁸⁸ The use of mobile money platforms is vital for Al-Shabaab's financial mobility and the use is widespread. Currently, mobile money service providers are not compelled to provide information to investigating authorities on mobile money accounts, emphasizing the importance of effective enforcement of mobile money regulations to combat Al-Shabaab financing.⁸⁹

71. On 27 February 2020, the Central Bank of Somalia issued the first mobile money licence to Hormuud Telecommunications, a significant step towards the regulation of mobile money service providers, with a second licence issued to Somtel Communications in June 2021.⁹⁰ However, the Panel understands that, despite the issuance of the licences, mobile money service providers have been granted a two-year reprieve by the Central Bank of Somalia to implement the Mobile Money Regulations of 2019.⁹¹ This two-year grace period is written into the Mobile Money Regulations of 2019. Specifically, the third schedule, Regulation 6, section (v), grants mobile money service providers two years to bring about compliance with the Regulations and any aspect of their operations with which they feel they are not currently compliant.⁹²

72. Failing to comply with any provision of existing anti-money-laundering/combating the financing of terrorism law and regulations, including anti-money-laundering/combating the financing of terrorism reporting requirements and information-sharing with the competent authorities within the sixth schedule of the Mobile Money Regulations of 2019 incurs a penalty fine of \$40,000, enforced by the Central Bank of Somalia.⁹³

Barriers to enforcement of the Mobile Money Regulations

73. Few Somalis possess identification documents, with over 77 per cent of the population lacking an official proof of identity.⁹⁴ Identification is key, and the ability to prove identity is needed for controlled participation in social, political and economic life. In its 2020 report, the Panel highlighted Al-Shabaab's ability to obtain

⁸⁷ Telephone interviews with businesses in Kismayo from March to July 2021.

⁸⁸ In 2018, the World Bank reported that approximately 155 million mobile money transactions, worth \$2.7 billion, were recorded in Somalia each month and that mobile money had superseded the use of cash in Somalia, with over 70 per cent of adult Somalis using mobile money services regularly.

⁸⁹ S/2018/1002, annex 2.4, and S/2020/949, paras. 29 and 38.

⁹⁰ See <https://twitter.com/CBSsomalia/status/1365686469613006854>.

⁹¹ Telephone interview with Somali financial mentors, March 2021.

⁹² Hormuud Telecommunications has embarked on the Global System for Mobile Communications Association mobile money compliance framework.

⁹³ In 2018, the World Bank noted 155 million mobile money transactions worth \$2.7 billion reported every month.

⁹⁴ See World Bank, Identification for Development (ID4D) Dataset. Available at <https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/identification-development-global-dataset>.

identification documents to open bank accounts.⁹⁵ Various officials, Somali financial institutions and businesses have highlighted to the Panel the importance of a robust Somali national identification document rollout.⁹⁶ First, personal identification is needed to allow appropriate know-your-customer verification of financial transactions. Second, the registration of all SIM cards with associated identification is vital to allow the verification of mobile phone users to combat the financing of terrorism. In November 2020, the Somali lower house passed the national identification document authority bill subsequently signed by the President, a first step towards the Somali national identification document.⁹⁷

D. Federal Government of Somalia and international measures to counter Al-Shabaab financing

74. Paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution [2551 \(2020\)](#) refers to the development of a financial disruption plan, led by the Federal Government of Somalia, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Panel. The first stage of the financial disruption development programme is now complete, with 15 participants predominantly from the Financial Reporting Centre attending the 12-week course from April to July 2021.

75. A senior-level briefing to showcase the financial disruption development programme, the outcomes achieved, the wider benefits of financial disruption and the future road map initially planned for August 2021 has been postponed to late 2021.

76. Following the disruption training, UNODC has continued to support the Financial Reporting Centre by providing information technology equipment.⁹⁸ The next step will include the installation of i2 Analyst's Notebook and goAML software on computers based at the Centre to enhance the analytical capabilities of the Centre.

77. The Somali financial system initiative, which supports the Federal Government of Somalia by providing an interface between Somali private sector financial institutions, Somali authorities and the international community, continues to move towards the implementation stage. The World Bank will implement the project and is awaiting sign-off from the Central Bank of Somalia and the Ministry of Finance to begin the work. The aim of the initiative is to unlock international investment and correspondent banking relationships in Somalia by improving the integrity of the financial sector, corporate governance standards, risk management and compliance safeguarding against terrorist financing and illicit financial flows.

78. The National Compliance Forum, chaired by the Somali Financial Reporting Centre, is a mechanism aimed at improving coordination, information-sharing and trend monitoring with relevant interlocutors. The Forum meets quarterly, bringing together entities from the public and private sector, including the Anti-Corruption Commission, the Somali Bankers Association, a Somali remittance association, DADSOM (the Somali ID authority), banks, money transfer bureaux and mobile money service providers.

⁹⁵ [S/2020/949](#), para. 30.

⁹⁶ One security source noted in an interview that “we don’t know who is Al-Shabaab, I sit down for tea with someone and I do not know if they are Al-Shabaab or not”.

⁹⁷ In November 2020, the Somali House of the People passed the national identification document authority bill subsequently signed by the President.

⁹⁸ Computers and associated software were delivered to the Financial Reporting Centre in July 2021.

E. Public financial management

79. In March 2020, Somalia reached a decision point in the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative. In March 2021, the International Monetary Fund granted additional assistance to Somalia under the Initiative, covering the country's debt service obligations to the Fund for a further year until March 2022.⁹⁹

80. On 29 June 2021, the World Bank signed an agreement for the \$40 million Somalia Education for Human Capital Development Project to support Somalia in rebuilding its education system, with a focus on educating young girls.¹⁰⁰ This is part of a wider investment of over \$445 million in project grant agreements with the World Bank signed by the Minister of Finance of Somalia.¹⁰¹

81. A review by the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force of the financial infrastructure of Somalia will occur in 2024, relating to the implementation of anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist financing standards.

IV. Arms embargo

A. Military equipment in Al-Shabaab possession

82. The Panel has documented arms, ammunition and military equipment used by or seized from Al-Shabaab during the current mandate period. They include military equipment used by Al-Shabaab during the Bosaso prison attack and military equipment shown in Al-Shabaab-released videos.

83. The Panel notably identified a 60mm mortar round, with characteristics consistent with 60mm M73 HE manufactured in 2016 in Serbia and exported the same year to Saudi Arabia.¹⁰² The same type of mortar round was fired by Al-Shabaab on 17 February 2020 in the direction of the United Nations compound within Aden Adde International Airport.¹⁰³ Some grenades used are the same type of grenades that were captured from Al-Shabaab in March 2018 by the Uganda People's Defence Forces, as well as those used by Al-Shabaab during the Sahafi Hotel attack on 9 November 2018 and during the attack in Manda Bay, Kenya, on 5 January 2020.

84. An M4 assault rifle has been identified; to the knowledge of the Panel, this represents the first time an M4 rifle (5.56 × 45mm) has been seen in the hands of Al-Shabaab. The Panel also identified military equipment previously delivered to the Federal Government of Somalia (type 56-2 and armoured personnel carrier). Detailed information and pictures are presented in annex 4.1.

85. Recalling the importance of full cooperation by the Federal Government of Somalia in this field, the Panel expects the Federal Government to facilitate access to military equipment that the Federal Government and other security forces may have captured from Al-Shabaab in 2021, in accordance with paragraph 32 of resolution 2551 (2020).

⁹⁹ See www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2021/04/01/Somalia-Enhanced-Heavily-Indebted-Poor-Countries-Initiative-Request-for-Additional-Interim-50330.

¹⁰⁰ See www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/06/29/girls-in-somalia-to-benefit-from-enhanced-access-to-education.

¹⁰¹ See <https://twitter.com/DrBeileh/status/1410217800535314434>.

¹⁰² Official letter sent to Saudi Arabia on 10 June 2021 requesting assistance in order to understand at which point in its chain of custody this ammunition was diverted into the illicit sphere. The response is still pending at the time of writing.

¹⁰³ S/2020/949, annex 4.1.

B. Compliance by the Federal Government of Somalia with obligations under the partial lifting of the arms embargo

Weapons and ammunition management

86. As requested by the Security Council in paragraph 34 of its resolution [2551 \(2020\)](#), the Panel has provided its first thematic report to the Committee, entitled “Supporting the development of the Somali weapons and ammunition management system: observations from the implementation of the arms embargo regime”. The paragraphs below outline the key points of that report.

87. The Panel has been unable to examine logbooks from Halane Central Armoury since 25 August 2018 and is thus not in a position to fairly assess the progress of the Federal Government of Somalia in registering weapons since then.¹⁰⁴ Notwithstanding this, annex 4.2 provides an overview of existing weapons and ammunition management procedures and potential for improvement.

88. In order to address the risk posed by rocket-propelled grenade high-explosive rounds stored in Halane Central Armoury,¹⁰⁵ the Federal Government of Somalia initiated a joint technical assessment of the armoury, inviting the Panel and other international partners in November 2020 and February 2021. A full assessment has been drafted by the joint technical assessment team.¹⁰⁶ A letter was sent by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Federal Government of Somalia on 29 July 2021 to offer support in enabling the transfer of serviceable rocket-propelled grenade rounds to a location that poses minimal risk to the population and key infrastructure and to propose technical expertise to dispose of the unserviceable rounds.¹⁰⁷

89. A functional prototype weapons and ammunition management database has been developed by the joint verification team for first use within the Somali Police Force in Mogadishu, providing a secure online search capacity incorporating notification details and characteristics of weapons and ammunition delivered. The implementation of such a database, which has still to be extended to all Somali National Security Forces, is crucial for the Federal Government of Somalia to establish a national weapons registration system, including an electronic registry that shows which military units are in possession of which weapons, in accordance with resolution [2551 \(2020\)](#). Annex 4.3 shows how such a weapons and ammunition management database could be integrated within a Somali-owned weapons and ammunition management system.

Notifications of weapons and ammunition deliveries

90. Since the submission of the Panel’s 2020 final report ([S/2020/949](#)) on 28 September 2020, seven consignments of weapons and ammunition were delivered from Turkey to the Federal Government of Somalia. Annex 4.4 (strictly confidential) displays the details of notifications linked to these consignments.

91. The Panel and the joint verification team continue to update a comprehensive database pertaining to weapons and ammunition officially imported by the Federal Government of Somalia since the partial lifting of the arms embargo in 2013.¹⁰⁸ According to this database, the Federal Government has officially received approximately 26,000 weapons and 80 million rounds of ammunition, including

¹⁰⁴ During its last visit to Halane Central Armoury on 10 February 2021, the Commander told the Panel that logbooks were stored at the Ministry of Defence.

¹⁰⁵ [S/2020/949](#), para. 102.

¹⁰⁶ On file with the Secretariat.

¹⁰⁷ On file with the Secretariat.

¹⁰⁸ [S/2020/949](#), para. 105.

around 70,000 RPG-7 rounds, since 2013.¹⁰⁹ Annex 4.5 (strictly confidential) displays the breakdown of the consignments of weapons and ammunition received.

Notification from Bulgaria of a substantive shipment of military equipment

92. On 13 January 2021, a notification from Bulgaria dated 30 December 2020 was circulated to the Committee. This notification referred to a consignment of weapons and ammunition, including high-explosive ammunition and items listed in annex A to resolution 2551 (2020), subject to the Committee's approval that were to be delivered in mid-January 2021. The consignment was valued at \$270 million.¹¹⁰

93. Upon receiving a copy of the notification, the Somali National Security Advisor sent a letter to the Committee on 19 January 2021 asking to pause the delivery. The Advisor indicated to the Panel that the delivery of the consignment had not been communicated or coordinated with his office and that the Federal Government of Somalia planned to audit the purchase.¹¹¹ However, the Panel learned that Bulgaria had notified the Permanent Mission of Somalia to the United Nations about the shipment in September 2020.¹¹²

94. Preliminary evidence gathered by the Panel shows that the negotiations regarding the purchase started at the end of 2019 and were conducted by the State Minister of Defence, Mohamed Ali Haga.¹¹³ This case revealed internal dysfunctions within the Federal Government of Somalia, bringing out the crucial question of the oversight of importation of weapons and ammunition. The Panel hopes that the Federal Government will share the outcome of the audit related to this consignment once finalized.

Delivery of a shipment of military trucks without notification

95. The Panel has received information about a passenger/roll-on-roll-off ship, *MV Birken* (IMO No. 7305772), that delivered a total of 44 "Kamaz" military-type trucks to the port of Mogadishu on 30 April 2021. The Panel noted that this vessel departed Istanbul, Turkey, on 15 April 2021, sailed via the Suez Canal to anchorage in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on 19 April 2021 and berthed in Mogadishu from 30 April to 1 May 2021 before proceeding to Karachi, Pakistan. The Panel addressed an official letter on 8 June 2021 to the shipping company, İstanbullines Lojistik, based in Turkey, to determine the compliance of this delivery with the arms embargo requirements (see pictures in annex 4.6).

Standardized template for notifications

96. In line with a recommendation issued in the report of the joint verification team attached to the periodic report of the Federal Government of Somalia dated 4 February 2021, notifications of weapons, ammunition and military equipment should follow agreed templates in order to ensure that all requested information is provided with a sufficient level of detail. These templates are aimed at being initially filled by the

¹⁰⁹ Based on Federal Government of Somalia and Member State notifications submitted to the Committee, combined with information provided by the Federal Government's weapons and ammunition management focal point and the joint verification team.

¹¹⁰ Interview with the general manager of Kalandor Ltd., the Bulgaria-based shipping company, on 3 February 2021. It was not possible for the Bulgarian authorities to share a copy of the contract with the Panel for confidentiality reasons.

¹¹¹ Telephone meeting with the National Security Advisor on 14 January 2021.

¹¹² Communication dated 11 September 2020, prior to notifying the Committee, from the Permanent Mission of Bulgaria to the United Nations to the Permanent Mission of Somalia to the United Nations, on file with the Secretariat.

¹¹³ End-user certificate signed by the State Minister (on file with the Secretariat) and confirmation during meeting with the State Minister on 10 February 2021 and telephone interview with his former Directorate-General on 11 February 2021.

supplier and at assisting the Federal Government in properly managing the requested military equipment (e.g. registration, storage and tracing). Annex 4.7 shows a proposal for standardized templates.

Periodic reports of the Federal Government of Somalia pursuant to paragraph 37 of resolution 2551 (2020)

97. In paragraph 37 of resolution 2551 (2020), the Security Council requested the Federal Government of Somalia to report to the Council on the structure, composition, strength and disposition of its security forces, and the status of regional and militia forces, incorporating the notifications regarding the destination unit in the Somali National Security Forces or the place of storage of military equipment upon distribution.

98. On 1 February 2021, the Federal Government of Somalia sent its first periodic report to the Committee, as requested in paragraph 37 of resolution 2551 (2020). The second periodic report was expected on 1 August 2021 but was transmitted to the Committee only on 19 August 2021.¹¹⁴ These reports include information related to the notifications of weapons imports, a review of the Somali transition plan and an overview of the security situation. Additionally, these reports include a section on the management of weapons and ammunition and the report of the joint verification team. Mandatory notifications of the destination for imported arms and ammunition and current force disposition have not been incorporated in these reports, however.

99. The Committee, following a recommendation from the Panel, has invited the Federal Government of Somalia to convey its concerns and its needs for clarification with regard to the existing requirements of the Federal Government's periodic reports, especially those linked to the notifications of destination units of military equipment and to the structure, composition, strength and disposition of its security forces.¹¹⁵ The Federal Government has still not responded to the Chair's letter. The Panel has no concerns about removing these requirements provided that the Federal Government can prove its ability to maintain command and control over its security forces.

C. Compliance by Member States and international organizations with the arms embargo

Puntland Maritime Police Force

100. In its 2020 report, the Panel reported a delivery of military equipment to the Puntland Maritime Police Force based in Bosaso, Puntland, by a military transport aircraft operated by the United Arab Emirates without any notification.¹¹⁶ This lack of transparency is prejudicial to the Force's further development and potential contributions from international partners, even if the Force represents a significant security capability in the fight against extremist armed groups and against weapons and ammunition smuggling and piracy.

101. In order to strengthen the implementation of the arms embargo, the Panel travelled to the United Arab Emirates on 8 July 2021 to provide to government officials there all necessary clarifications on the requirements under the arms embargo regime in supporting the security forces of Somali federal member states. The Panel also met with the leadership of the Puntland Maritime Police Force and the Office of the President of Puntland on 2 August 2021 to better understand their operational

¹¹⁴ To the Panel's knowledge, this second report was, however, sent on time (on 31 July 2021) by the Office of the National Security Advisor of Somalia to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.

¹¹⁵ Letter sent in December 2020, on file with the Secretariat.

¹¹⁶ S/2020/949, paras. 107–108.

needs and how they can proceed with requests to Member States in accordance with the requirements of the sanctions regime.

102. As a matter of fact, the Committee received on 13 August 2021 a notification pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution [2551 \(2020\)](#) from a Member State to supply weapons and ammunition to the Puntland Maritime Police Force. The Panel hopes that the provision of military equipment to federal member states will from now on be done in full compliance with the requirements of the arms embargo regime.¹¹⁷

African Union Mission in Somalia

103. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Federal Government of Somalia jointly drafted a standard operating procedure on the management of recovered small arms and light weapons that was presented to the international community during an online event on 17 February 2021. This standard operating procedure builds on an existing set of international documents and instruments.¹¹⁸

104. The standard operating procedure endeavours to present the necessary data collection and record-keeping associated with seized equipment and the method to share information in full transparency with partners. All records of recovered weapons are to be included in the periodic report of the Federal Government of Somalia to the Security Council and in the quarterly report of AMISOM to the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, which is also transmitted to the Security Council for information. All records are intended to be logged in a centralized database managed at AMISOM headquarters and the Office of the National Security Advisor of Somalia. Records will be either copied into the register of captured weapons and ammunition spreadsheet or downloaded using the mobile data collection application of the Federal Government of Somalia.¹¹⁹

105. The standard operating procedure will enable AMISOM to fulfil its obligations as set out in paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution [2182 \(2014\)](#).¹²⁰ Improved information-sharing by the Federal Government of Somalia and AMISOM, if correctly implemented, will greatly strengthen the Panel's opportunity to assess the origin of Al-Shabaab weapons, ammunition and equipment.

D. Illicit flow of weapons into Somalia

USS *Winston Churchill* seizure

106. On 14 February 2021, the USS *Winston Churchill* (DDG 81) seized armament from two dhows off the eastern coast of Somalia.¹²¹ In order to determine the origins

¹¹⁷ Notifications under paragraph 11 (a) of Security Council resolution [2111 \(2013\)](#) of weapons and ammunition for security units outside the command and control of the Federal Government of Somalia have been made on very rare occasions. It was reported in document [S/2019/858](#) and [S/2019/858/Corr.1](#), paras. 120–122, how regional administrations in Somalia had received arms and ammunition in circumvention of the arms embargo over the course of at least a decade.

¹¹⁸ See the document entitled “Harmonized AMISOM/FGS standard operating procedure on the management of recovered small arms and light weapons”, on file with the Secretariat.

¹¹⁹ Based on Fulcrum application (see [S/2020/949](#), para. 103).

¹²⁰ In that paragraph, the Security Council requested the Somali National Army and AMISOM to document and register all military equipment captured as part of operations or in the course of carrying out their mandates, including recording the type and serial number of the weapon and/or ammunition, photographing all items and relevant markings and facilitating inspection by the Panel of Experts of all military items before their redistribution or destruction.

¹²¹ Media release from United States Central Command on 16 February 2021, available from www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-View/Article/2504027/winston-s-churchill-seizes-illicit-weapons-from-two-dhows-off-somalia/.

of this consignment and its intended destination, the Panel has requested the assistance of the Government of the United States.¹²² While the Panel's request to the United States is still pending, initial indications are that crews and dhows have been released and the arms disposed of (see annex 4.8 (strictly confidential)).

USS *Monterey* seizure

107. On 6 and 7 May 2021, the USS *Monterey* (CG 61) seized armament from a stateless dhow in the north of the Arabian Sea.¹²³ The cache of weapons included dozens of anti-tank guided missiles, thousands of type 56 assault rifles and hundreds of machine guns, sniper rifles and rocket-propelled grenade launchers.¹²⁴

108. Detailed information from the navies of Member States conducting inspections of vessels is crucial for the Panel and the Committee to better understand the flow of illicit weapons into Somalia (see recommendations).

Yemen-Puntland arms smuggling networks

109. Puntland authorities shared with the Panel four documented cases of seizure of weapons and ammunition from smugglers along the coast of northern Somalia that occurred in May and July 2021. For example, on 28 July 2021, the Puntland Maritime Police Force managed to seize military equipment that had been unloaded from a dhow in the Mareero area, 10 km east of Bosaso. The shipment, reportedly intended for Al-Shabaab, was composed of thousands of ammunition rounds and dozens of weapons. One alleged smuggler was arrested, and his Global Positioning System displayed various waypoints on the coasts of Yemen and northern Somalia. The cases are presented in annex 4.8 (strictly confidential).

V. Improvised explosive device components ban

Improvised explosive device components

110. The lack of post-blast analysis during this mandate period did not allow the Panel to assess any new trend regarding components used in improvised explosive devices.¹²⁵ However, visual investigations continue to indicate that Al-Shabaab is using a home-made explosive mixture, combining nitroglycerin (high-explosive), potassium nitrate (oxidizer) and charcoal (fuel). Similarly, the periodic use of harvested explosives is assessed to have continued.¹²⁶

111. No significant changes have been observed in the majority of improvised explosive device components in 2021 relative to preceding years. The type of initiator used continues to be commercial electric detonators, with imagery showing the frequent use of C-DET branded detonators.¹²⁷ The design of improvised explosive device containers (often purpose-built) remained relatively consistent with previous years, as has the use of 12-volt motorcycle batteries and cell phones serving as the power source. Available information pertaining to improvised explosive device

¹²² Official letter dated 22 February 2021.

¹²³ Media release from the United States Navy Office of Information dated 8 May 2021.

¹²⁴ Exchange of information with United States authorities in August 2021.

¹²⁵ Email exchanges with the Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center in August 2021: restrictions resulting from the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic prevented access to samples of improvised explosive devices.

¹²⁶ Reports and exchange of information with the Mine Action Service of the United Nations in Somalia in 2021.

¹²⁷ S/2020/949, paras. 116–118.

switches indicates the continued use of cell phones, learning code receivers, motorcycle alarms and pressure plates throughout 2021.¹²⁸

Exportation to Somalia of items listed in annex C to Security Council resolution 2498 (2019)

112. The Panel continues to assess the exportation of items listed in annex C based on the UN Comtrade Database, and more specifically components used in the manufacture of home-made explosives by Al-Shabaab: potassium nitrate and sulfuric and nitric acids.¹²⁹ From latest updated records from UN Comtrade,¹³⁰ the Panel noted the substantive volumes of nitric and sulfuric acids exported to Somalia, confirming the trend observed in 2020.¹³¹ In 2019 and 2020, more than 2,000 tons of sulfuric acid (commodity code 2807) and more than 230 tons of nitric acid (commodity code 280800) were exported to Somalia. The Panel also noted that nearly 160 tons of potassium nitrate (commodity code 283421) had been exported to Somalia in 2019 and 2020, which constitutes a new trend compared to previous years.¹³² The Panel is currently assessing, with the support of Member States, the industrial demand for these items in Somalia for the purposes of a general investigation into the sourcing of improvised explosive device components.

Seizure of a shipment of potassium nitrate under investigation

113. On 26 August 2021, the Committee received a letter from a Member State related to a seizure in late 2020 of a shipment of almost 100 tons of potassium nitrate destined for Somalia. This is the first time that the Committee has been informed, in accordance with paragraph 28 of resolution 2551 (2020), of an investigation regarding items listed in annex C to the same resolution. The Member State has assured the Panel of its cooperation in sharing, in due time, the results of the ongoing investigation.

Military court hearings concerning the importation of potential components of explosives

114. On 6 June 2021, the military court of the Somali National Army released a video of a hearing related to a case of illegal importation of dual-use chemicals into Somalia. According to the information gathered by the Panel at this stage,¹³³ the case involved several Somali citizens, reportedly businessmen, who were accused of having participated in the importation of equipment and chemical components that could potentially be used for the production of explosive materials in Somalia. During the hearing, documents were presented relating to a 12-foot container of potassium nitrate, in addition to glycerin, sulfuric acid and acetone, among other things. These serve as dual-use chemicals that could be used to produce home-made explosives valued at \$32,000. At this stage, it is unclear to the Panel whether these goods arrived in Somalia. The Panel continues to monitor this case with input from Federal Government of Somalia officials.

¹²⁸ Reports from the Mine Action Service in Somalia.

¹²⁹ S/2020/949, paras. 116–117.

¹³⁰ Available from <https://comtrade.un.org/data/> (accessed on 5 September 2021).

¹³¹ S/2020/949, para. 121.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Video of extracts of the trial issued by the Somali National Army Radio site, available from <https://m.facebook.com/watch/?v=955313561903172>, and media report, available from https://horndispatch.com/five-in-somali-military-court-over-alleged-plot-to-use-fertiliser-explosives/?_thumbnail_id=2165.

Delivery of a second shipment of ammonium nitrate fuel oil

115. In 2020, the Panel reported on the delivery and use of a first shipment of 165 tons of ammonium nitrate fuel oil to Puntland for the construction of the port of Garacad.¹³⁴ On 24 December 2020, TTN Group İnşaat, the Turkish-based supplying company, was granted approval by the Federal Government of Somalia to import a second shipment of 165 tons of ammonium nitrate fuel oil to Somalia, according to Puntland authorities.

116. According to the latest report on the use of ammonium nitrate fuel oil emanating from Puntland authorities and the shipping documentation,¹³⁵ this second shipment – 160 tons of ammonium nitrate fuel oil – was delivered to Bosaso port on 12 March 2021 and arrived at the storage location in Jariban on 17 March 2021. Around 90 tons of ammonium nitrate fuel oil from the initial 160 tons of this second shipment had been used by July 2021. According to additional information received by the Panel, one berth has been finalized and the construction of the second berth should commence in mid-September, which will necessitate the delivery of a third shipment of ammonium nitrate fuel oil.¹³⁶

117. Puntland authorities reassured the Panel that strict security procedures and safety measures were still followed to ensure the protection of the storage site, with the support of 260 guards from the Puntland Security Forces. The Panel is exploring the feasibility of an on-site inspection with the Federal Government of Somalia and federal member state authorities, and with the Mine Action Service of the United Nations in Somalia.

VI. Violations of international humanitarian law involving the targeting of civilians

A. Al-Shabaab

Continued forced displacement of populations

118. At the time of writing, there were 2,968,000 internally displaced persons in Somalia. A total of 537,000 people fled their homes between January and July 2021 alone, with conflict-related displacement accounting for over 70 per cent of the cases (389,000).¹³⁷ During the reporting period, the Panel documented new¹³⁸ waves of forced displacement by Al-Shabaab in South-West State and Galmudug, resulting in over 11,000 families leaving their homes.¹³⁹ Displacement was triggered by some communities' defiance of Al-Shabaab's authority and administration. Similar scenarios unfolded in seven incidents of forced displacement monitored by the Panel, with Al-Shabaab targeting members of the communities and issuing an ultimatum to

¹³⁴ S/2020/949, paras. 122–123.

¹³⁵ On file with the Secretariat.

¹³⁶ Exchange of information with the Office of the President of Puntland, August and September 2021.

¹³⁷ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees figures, available from the “Somalia Population Dashboard – July 2021” (see <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/88146>).

¹³⁸ In its 2020 final report, the Panel described similar patterns of forced displacement (see S/2020/949, annex 7.2).

¹³⁹ Interviews with displaced members of the Galjel, Leysan and Rahanweyne communities, January–July 2021; interviews with non-governmental organizations and United Nations agencies, February, March, April and May 2021; and humanitarian assessment reports, January, February, March and April 2021.

the entire population to vacate their villages.¹⁴⁰ More information on these incidents is provided in annex 5.1.

Abduction, detention, torture and execution of civilians

119. Al-Shabaab continued to perpetrate the abduction and detention of civilians as punishment for defying its orders or to force allegiance to the group. During its current mandate period, the Panel documented 13 incidents of abduction perpetrated by Al-Shabaab involving 155 civilians, including community elders, businessmen and youths.¹⁴¹

120. Punitive abductions, detentions and executions were key features of Al-Shabaab's enforcement of economic blockades, of directives against the commercialization of prohibited goods, such as khat and charcoal, and of the group's attempts to expand its territorial control, as witnessed in Galmudug and Hirshabelle. For example, in Bay, on 28 January 2021, 28 men were abducted from their farms around Dinsor and brought to Yakbaraway, an Al-Shabaab stronghold located around 60 km south of Dinsor. They had defied the order of the group prohibiting all commercial and farming activities serving Dinsor.¹⁴² The Panel noted mass executions carried out by Al-Shabaab on 27, 28, 29 and 30 June 2021 that resulted in the deaths of 24 alleged spies and government collaborators in Middle Juba and Bay Regions.¹⁴³ These followed the executions of 21 convicted Al-Shabaab members by Puntland on 27 June 2021.¹⁴⁴

121. Interviews conducted by the Panel with victims of abduction who had been detained by Al-Shabaab in Buulo Fulay and Idale, two Al-Shabaab strongholds in Bay Region, evidenced the use of torture and other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment against both female and male civilians detained by the group.¹⁴⁵

Child recruitment, abduction and indoctrination

122. During the reporting period, the Panel noted that when active conflicts were registered, there was a corresponding spike in child recruitment cases, such as in Middle Shabelle, Gedo and Hiraaan. This is consistent with data gathered by the United Nations country task force on monitoring and reporting, showing an overall increase in instances of child recruitment compared to 2020.¹⁴⁶ Al-Shabaab was the main perpetrator of cases verified by the task force, but the Panel also received reports implicating clan militias, possibly due to communities' armed mobilization linked to the revival of clan conflicts, particularly in Beledweyne District.

123. Interviews conducted by the Panel in May and June 2021 with members of displaced communities from Abal, Dondardiir and Faraatiyow, three rural villages located around Hudur, Bakool Region, highlight how they were demanded by Al-Shabaab to volunteer children between the ages of 12 and 15 to Al-Shabaab. Others displaced from Mady-waraabi village, Hudur District, around the same period told the Panel that several children from their village had been forcefully recruited by

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Security reports, January-August 2021; and interviews with local sources, January-August 2021.

¹⁴² Interview with two sources in Dinsor, 29 and 30 January 2021.

¹⁴³ Media and security reports, June 2021.

¹⁴⁴ See www.voanews.com/africa/somalia-executes-militants-amid-deadly-attack.

¹⁴⁵ Interviews conducted in Baidoa on 7, 8 and 9 June 2021.

¹⁴⁶ From 1 January to 30 June 2021, the country task force on monitoring and reporting recorded an increase in verified instances of recruitment and use of child soldiers compared to the same period in 2020. A total of 631 children were recruited and used, while another 348 were abducted, reportedly for recruitment purposes. The majority of cases, 487 (77 per cent), were attributed to Al-Shabaab.

Al-Shabaab around February 2021 and taken to military training camps in Labatanjirow, near Baidoa.¹⁴⁷

124. The Panel also received reports of group abduction of youths from madrasas. For example, two incidents of group abduction of children took place in the framework of Al-Shabaab's attacks on schools in Hiraan and Bay Regions, with a total of 35 boys abducted and forcefully recruited.¹⁴⁸ The Panel also received reports of Al-Shabaab elements approaching school and madrasa teachers in rural areas in Lower Shabelle and Jubbaland and imposing directives on the curricula.¹⁴⁹ Some communities interviewed noted attempts by Al-Shabaab to influence and subvert the madrasas by replacing teachers.¹⁵⁰ Although this is not a new development, the interest of Al-Shabaab in madrasas highlights the group's use of education centres as an entry point for the indoctrination and affiliation of youths.

B. International actors

Civilian casualties resulting from air and ground operations by international forces and unclaimed strikes

125. During the reporting period, the Panel recorded the use of air strikes in Jubbaland and Galmudug by international forces, with reports of civilian casualties arising in three instances. From 16 December 2020 to 6 September 2021, the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) publicly acknowledged that it had conducted 14 air strikes. Reports of civilian casualties emerged for two AFRICOM air strikes, which took place, respectively, in Qunyo Barrow, Middle Juba, on 1 January 2021 and Jamame, Lower Juba, on 19 January 2021. The Panel took note of the periodic civilian casualties assessments conducted by AFRICOM, which by 20 August 2021 had closed all pending cases. The assessment conducted by AFRICOM acknowledged that the strike on 1 January 2021 had resulted in three civilian casualties. However, allegations concerning the strike on 19 January 2021 were assessed by AFRICOM as unsubstantiated.¹⁵¹

126. The Panel is currently investigating air strikes that took place between 3 and 4 June 2021 in El Adde and Hisa-u-Gur, Gedo Region, Jubbaland, and resulted in six casualties and damage to civilian objects. Photographic evidence obtained by the Panel showed remnants of two guidance sections of air-to-surface missiles with characteristics similar to air-to-surface missiles manufactured by a Member State. The Panel took note of a press statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Somalia dated 4 June 2021, attributing the air strikes to the Kenya Defence Forces.¹⁵² The Panel sent official communications to Somalia, Kenya and the possible manufacturing Member State, as well as to AMISOM, to identify the party responsible for the strikes. Kenya denied possessing this type of weapon. Additional information is provided in annex 5.2.

127. The Panel noted reports of four additional drone strikes between 29 January and 17 February 2021 in Bakool, Middle Shabelle, Middle Juba and Lower Shabelle for which no party has publicly claimed responsibility yet.¹⁵³

¹⁴⁷ Interviews with displaced community leaders in May 2021.

¹⁴⁸ Country task force on monitoring and reporting data for January–June 2021.

¹⁴⁹ Interviews with community leaders from Gedo, Bay and Bakool, April, May and June 2021.

¹⁵⁰ Interviews with members of the Banaaney community, January 2021.

¹⁵¹ See www.africom.mil/pressrelease/33972/us-africa-command-civilian-casualty-assessment-quarterly-report-3rd-quarter-2021.

¹⁵² See <https://www.mfa.gov.so/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Kenya.pdf>.

¹⁵³ See https://airwars.org/civilian-casualties/page/2/?type_of_strike=air&start_date=2020-12-16&country=somalia&belligerent=us-forces&end_date=2021-08-26.

128. The Panel also recorded reports of civilian casualties, notably 10 killed, including two children, and five injured following ground operations by AMISOM on 6 February 2021 in Mushaani village and on 10 August 2021 in Golweyn, Lower Shabelle. At the time of reporting, the Panel is still gathering information on the latter incident, which preliminary accounts indicate could have been an indiscriminate attack in retaliation for an Al-Shabaab ambush on an AMISOM patrol. The Panel noted that AMISOM announced in a press release, issued on 11 August 2021, that it had launched an official investigation into the incident in Golweyn.¹⁵⁴ In parallel, the Ministry of Defence of Somalia pledged, on 12 August 2021, to carry out an investigation into the allegations of indiscriminate fire and bring those responsible to justice.¹⁵⁵ On 20 August 2021, the President of Uganda, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, publicly acknowledged the incident and mentioned that those responsible had been arrested and would be prosecuted.¹⁵⁶ The Panel wrote an official correspondence to AMISOM concerning the two incidents. At the time of reporting, a response was pending.

C. Sexual and gender-based violence

129. The Panel noted an annual increase in reports of sexual and gender-based violence in Somalia from several sources.¹⁵⁷ Interviews carried out by the Panel during the mandate period highlighted that cases of sexual violence against children, survivors' access to health care, stigmatization and impunity hampering efforts to stem violations were main concerns.¹⁵⁸ Al-Shabaab activity and an inadequate number of female protection monitors¹⁵⁹ further impinged on the protection of survivors. In one case recorded on 15 February 2021 in Dinsor, the Panel learned that a 12-year-old rape survivor could not receive medical care because of the movement restrictions imposed by Al-Shabaab.¹⁶⁰

130. The southern regions of Somalia, namely Bay, Bakool, Gedo and Middle Juba, where a variety of armed actors roam freely, particularly in rural areas, but also Hiraan, where clan conflicts were on the rise throughout 2021, recorded the highest numbers of conflict-related sexual violence cases involving child victims.¹⁶¹ The Panel notes that, although perpetrators of incidents of sexual and gender-based violence remain largely unidentified, federal and regional security and police forces were responsible for 23 cases.¹⁶² Additional considerations on this topic can be found in annex 5.3.

VII. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance

131. A volatile security environment contributed to the steady deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Somalia, where 5.9 million people are in need of assistance.¹⁶³ A variety of armed actors, primarily Al-Shabaab, continue to pose

¹⁵⁴ Available from <https://twitter.com/amisomsomalia/status/1425531317366759425?s=09>.

¹⁵⁵ See <https://twitter.com/ModFederal/status/1425604858887950344?s=09>.

¹⁵⁶ See <https://twitter.com/Mogdashi3/status/1428289579203899392?s=08>.

¹⁵⁷ Interviews with community activists and women's rights organizations, January–July 2021; and data from the United Nations country task force on monitoring and reporting, UNSOM and the camp coordination and camp management cluster complaint and feedback mechanism.

¹⁵⁸ Interviews with humanitarian and women's rights organizations, January–July 2021.

¹⁵⁹ Female protection monitors are part of the prevention and response mechanism on sexual and gender-based violence.

¹⁶⁰ Interview with sources based in Dinsor, February 2021.

¹⁶¹ Data from the country task force on monitoring and reporting, January–June 2021.

¹⁶² Unidentified armed men accounted for 67 per cent of the cases recorded.

¹⁶³ Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan, 2021.

obstacles to the full, safe and unhindered delivery of and access to humanitarian assistance, particularly across southern and central Somalia. Besides insecurity created by Al-Shabaab activities, violent clan dynamics also affected humanitarian operations, including threats linked to the selection of beneficiaries and staff of non-governmental organizations, abductions and car jackings motivated by clan affiliation, resulting in the interruption and disruption of humanitarian programmes.¹⁶⁴

132. As a positive development, the Panel recorded no new abductions of humanitarian staff by Al-Shabaab during the reporting period,¹⁶⁵ and noted a broad decline in attacks targeting humanitarian personnel.¹⁶⁶ However, humanitarian operations continue to be affected by access restrictions and general insecurity, limiting the oversight capability of humanitarian actors and creating an enabling environment for abuses, including diversion and misappropriation.

133. The Panel received allegations of incidents of diversion and duplication of beneficiaries in Dinsor, a town under Al-Shabaab blockade. The investigation highlighted that nutrition assistance and other types of aid continue to be manipulated in the context of local power dynamics. The Panel also took note of a recent report highlighting the difficulties minority groups in Somalia face in gaining access to aid, perpetuating patterns of exclusion, discrimination and marginalization.¹⁶⁷

VIII. Natural resources

A. Implementation of the charcoal ban

134. The Panel did not record any major export of charcoal from Somalia during its current mandate. The last substantial export was recorded in August 2018.¹⁶⁸ Effective measures implemented by Member States with charcoal destination markets, improved political messaging by the Federal Government of Somalia and restrictions by the Jubbaland authorities at export points continued to contribute to the suppression of the charcoal trade. The active monitoring of the charcoal trade by international partners, including the Combined Maritime Forces, Operation Atalanta of the European Union Naval Force and UNODC also serves as a deterrent to the trade.

135. However, stockpiles worth more than \$40 million in wholesale value are export-ready in Lower Juba. While charcoal exports have been temporarily interrupted, the Panel received multiple reports of pressure on charcoal traders to realize the financial value of existing charcoal stockpiles. The stockpiles represent an immediate risk, as a future export would result in a substantial financial inflow to a range of stakeholders and may have political and security implications, affecting relations between the Federal Government of Somalia and the Jubbaland administration. Annex 6 includes charcoal stockpile imagery from June 2021, the latest available imagery.

¹⁶⁴ Table summarizing the incidents recorded by the Panel during the mandate period on file with the Secretariat.

¹⁶⁵ Two cases of abduction remain open concerning, respectively, an international staff member of the International Committee of the Red Cross kidnapped in Mogadishu in 2018, and two Cuban doctors abducted from Mandera, Kenya, in 2019.

¹⁶⁶ From 1 January to 30 June 2021, the Panel recorded 24 incidents involving non-governmental organizations, compared with 28 during the same period in 2020. However, none of the 24 instances were critical incidents or targeted attacks.

¹⁶⁷ Claire Thomas and George Otieno Opiyo, "Minority inclusion learning review of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland: Programmes in the Horn of Africa", July 2021.

¹⁶⁸ [S/2019/858](#) and [S/2019/858/Corr.1](#), para. 169.

Stockpile analysis

136. The volume of charcoal ready for export at the stockpile locations in Kismayo and Buur Gaabo stands between 600,000 and 900,000 bags (15,000 to 22,500 tons). Analysis carried out from February to July 2021 examined available satellite imagery of the primary charcoal stockpile locations found at Buur Gaabo and Kismayo. The analysis found that the volume of charcoal stockpiles did not significantly change from late 2020, which was corroborated by independent satellite analysis.¹⁶⁹

137. However, in early 2021, the Panel observed a declining amount of charcoal in Barawe, according to satellite imagery.¹⁷⁰ Amounting to roughly 700–800 bags or approximately \$10,500–\$12,000, this stockpile vanished in late January.¹⁷¹ The economics of exporting 700–800 bags to international markets does not make financial sense because the cost of exporting the bags far outweighs the value of the bags themselves. However, charcoal may be sold to domestic markets that the Panel is currently unaware of.

Export

138. While there has been no recent evidence of charcoal exports from Somalia, the charcoal trade still offers a strong economic incentive to traders as wholesale prices continue to rise in export destinations.¹⁷² The Panel received accounts of pressure on charcoal traders to recommence the export of charcoal.¹⁷³ A major export of charcoal would also likely result in a resumption of charcoal production to replenish the export stockpiles.

B. Growing threat of Al-Shabaab exploiting the impact of climate change

139. During the reporting period, the Panel interviewed several individuals to learn more about the impact of charcoal production on broader climate and environmental security challenges faced by Somalia. From these interviews, the Panel learned that the vulnerability of Somalia to the impact of climate change is projected to increase due to its dependency on its natural resources. This, coupled with the human-caused degradation of natural resources due to charcoal production, has increased its vulnerability to drought and desertification, leading to a marked reduction in food security.¹⁷⁴ One interviewee reported that Somalia had experienced a 73 per cent reduction in forest cover, which leads to flooding and desertification.¹⁷⁵ These changes affect and contribute to conflicts between farmers and herders, as well as displacement. Moreover, anticipating spikes in heat and drought conditions, one interviewee involved in environmental security projected significant increases in flooding throughout central and southern Somalia in the next 20 to 30 years.¹⁷⁶

140. In some cases, Al-Shabaab has already begun to exploit the impact of climate change, possibly leading to challenges for Member States on how to address insecurity in Somalia. The Panel learned that Al-Shabaab had provided communities

¹⁶⁹ Analysis conducted by UNODC for the Panel of Experts.

¹⁷⁰ Interview with source with first-hand access to charcoal traders in Barawe and Kismayo, June 2021.

¹⁷¹ Confidential aerial imagery from Barawe between November 2020 and early February 2021.

¹⁷² As at August 2021, the wholesale price of charcoal in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, was \$100 per bag, compared with \$80 per bag in 2020 and \$50 per bag in 2019.

¹⁷³ Telephone interview with industry source in Dubai on 18 June 2021.

¹⁷⁴ Interviews with United Nations officials from March to May 2021.

¹⁷⁵ Interview with United Nations official, March 2021.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

along the northern part of the Shabelle River with protection¹⁷⁷ from flooding, acting as service provider to communities that receive little support from the Government.¹⁷⁸

141. The Panel will continue to investigate and report to the Committee on the near-, medium- and long-term challenges associated with climate change faced by Somalia. However, the recommendations below begin to address some of the immediate steps that Somalia can implement to attempt to reverse the adverse effects of charcoal production. For example, a genuine focus on building awareness and compelling Somalia to seek out alternative energy sources, the use of fuel-efficient cooking stoves, supporting alternative livelihoods and resource-sharing agreements for those currently dependent on the country's natural resource base must be prioritized.

C. Reported Somali gold exports highlighting lack of regulation

142. In a review of the United Nations International Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade), the largest global repository of international trade data, the Panel found a substantial increase in the amount of gold¹⁷⁹ being exported from Somalia to the United Arab Emirates between 2015 and 2019.¹⁸⁰ Typically, trade data available on UN Comtrade will show a correlation between “reporter” and “partner” countries. For example, in the table below, the United Arab Emirates is listed as the reporter because it voluntarily reported its gold imports from Somalia to the United Nations. However, UN Comtrade shows no records of gold exports from Somalia to the United Arab Emirates during the same period.

Reported gold imports to the United Arab Emirates from Somalia, 2015–2019

<i>Year</i>	<i>Trade flow</i>	<i>Reporter</i>	<i>Net weight (kg)</i>	<i>Value (US dollars)</i>
2015	Import	United Arab Emirates	1 097	37 761 873
2016	Import	United Arab Emirates	1 687	58 448 983
2017	Import	United Arab Emirates	2 782	100 075 261
2018	Import	United Arab Emirates	3 440	127 674 252
2019	Import	United Arab Emirates	4 257	173 862 500

Source: United Nations International Trade Statistics Database.

143. The Panel's interest in Somali gold exports stems from several interviews with regionally-based gold traders, all of whom said, when shown the figures in the table above, that Somalia did not have a formal gold mining industry and that the increase in reported imports by the United Arab Emirates possibly suggested that Somalis were using gold to move wealth out of Somalia, given the fact that there was no import duty on gold in the United Arab Emirates.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁷ According to a local clan elder, Al-Shabaab distributed basic food items to help families to sustain the impact of flooding in Johwar and Balad, Middle Shabelle.

¹⁷⁸ See Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Climate, peace and security fact sheet: Somalia”, 3 February 2021. Available from www.sipri.org/news/2021/sipri-and-nupi-form-cooperation-inform-un-security-council.

¹⁷⁹ The definition used in UN Comtrade is metals; gold, non-monetary, unwrought (but not powder).

¹⁸⁰ See UN Comtrade database. Available at <https://comtrade.un.org/data> (accessed on 2 August 2021). No data available for 2020 or 2021.

¹⁸¹ See Marcena Hunter and others, *Illicit Gold Markets in East and Southern Africa* (Geneva, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, May 2021).

144. The same gold traders said that the majority of gold that was exported from Somalia originated from other regional destinations before being brought illegally into the United Arab Emirates. Additionally, the gold traders interviewed by the Panel mentioned that small-scale and artisanal gold mining operations did exist in northern Somalia, but the output was nowhere near the level of reported imports by the United Arab Emirates, almost certainly suggesting a larger, regionally-based illicit enterprise.

D. Maritime dispute

145. The maritime dispute between Kenya and Somalia concerns an area of over 100,000 km² in the Indian Ocean. The dispute has fuelled tensions between Kenya and Somalia, creating a space for Al-Shabaab to exploit.¹⁸² In mid-March 2021, Kenya withdrew from the maritime border case with Somalia before the International Court of Justice after describing the “perceived bias and unwillingness of the Court to accommodate requests for the delay of the hearing as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic”.¹⁸³ Somalia rejected attempts by Kenya in early August 2021 to resolve the dispute diplomatically, noting that the Court must provide the final verdict on the case.¹⁸⁴ The case remains pending with the Court.

IX. Recommendations

A. Al-Shabaab

146. The Panel recommends that the Security Council:

(a) Require the Federal Government of Somalia and international forces operating in Somalia to share on a regular basis with the Committee and the Panel the status of listed individuals, including those who have been neutralized in operations or who have defected;

(b) Require the Federal Government of Somalia to include in its periodic reports to the Council the list of towns under full control of Al-Shabaab and those that have been liberated during the reporting period.

B. Al-Shabaab finance

147. The Panel recommends that the Security Council decide that the Federal Government of Somalia shall include in its periodic report to the Committee an update apprising it of the progress of the Financial Reporting Centre and including, where appropriate, an aggregate summary of suspicious activity reports submitted by domestic financial institutions, investigations undertaken by the Centre and specific actions taken to counter the financing of terrorism.

148. The Panel recommends that the Committee commend the Federal Government of Somalia on the signing of the national identification document bill and encourage the development of a unique Somali identification document as a matter of priority, which will allow access to government services, financial access and voting and improve financial compliance and countering the financing of terrorism.

¹⁸² S/2019/858 and S/2019/858/Corr.1, para. 106.

¹⁸³ See Al-Jazeera, “Kenya-Somalia maritime boundary dispute explained”, 14 March 2021.

¹⁸⁴ See The Maritime Executive, “Somalia rejects diplomatic resolution of maritime dispute with Kenya”, 10 August 2021.

C. Arms embargo

149. The Panel recommends that the Security Council:

(a) Extend the provision of paragraph 15 of resolution 2182 (2014) (reflected in paragraph 23 of resolution 2551 (2020)) to authorize Member States' navies to inspect vessels which they have reasonable grounds to believe are carrying to Somalia improvised explosive device components in violation of the improvised explosive device components ban;

(b) Decide to reinforce the provisions previously set out in paragraph 20 of resolution 2182 (2014) by adding that the written report to the Committee must include proper documentation and pictures of all military equipment or improvised explosive device components seized and by allowing the Panel to conduct visual inspections of seized military equipment whenever and wherever possible.

150. The Panel recommends that the Committee:

(a) Update, with the assistance of the Panel, Implementation Assistance Notice No. 2, dated 8 May 2019, including the latest requirements pertaining to the arms embargo regime and the notification templates;

(b) Encourage international and regional partners to coordinate their efforts to support the strengthening of Federal Government of Somalia bodies in charge of implementing the arms embargo regime in sponsoring, for example, consultants in the Office of the National Security Advisor and in the Permanent Mission of Somalia to the United Nations, in order for the Federal Government to better manage the requirements related to the arms embargo regime.

D. Violations of human rights and international humanitarian law

151. The Panel recommends that the Security Council remind the Federal Government of Somalia and all international forces involved in the conflict in Somalia to conduct their military operations in Somalia in accordance with international humanitarian law and urge them to increase transparency and accountability by acknowledging responsibility for military operations carried out in Somalia and conducting prompt and full investigations when reports of civilian casualties resulting from their operations arise.

152. The Panel recommends that the Committee:

(a) Encourage the Federal Government of Somalia to strengthen the protection of education from attacks by adopting a national policy that sets out clear and specific actions for the implementation of commitments outlined in the Safe Schools Declaration,¹⁸⁵ to which Somalia has adhered;

(b) Encourage the Federal Government of Somalia to expand human rights-related training into the education of security and police personnel, covering specific areas such as human rights during investigations, arrest and detention and the use of force, press freedom and sexual and gender-based violence, and call upon Member States to support these efforts accordingly.

¹⁸⁵ The Safe Schools Declaration is an intergovernmental political agreement that outlines a set of commitments to strengthen the protection of education from attack and restrict the use of schools and universities for military purposes. It seeks to ensure the continuity of safe education during armed conflict. See <https://ssd.protectingeducation.org/>.

E. Charcoal ban

153. The Panel recommends that the Security Council uphold the existing charcoal ban.

154. The Panel recommends that the Committee welcome steps taken by the Federal Government of Somalia and Jubbaland authorities to block the large-scale export of charcoal and encourage further dialogue among the Federal Government, Jubbaland authorities and private entities to reduce the risk of future charcoal exports deriving from the presence of large charcoal stockpiles at export points in Jubbaland.

F. Impact of climate change

155. The Panel recommends that the Security Council include in its next resolution on Somalia language relevant to highlighting Al-Shabaab's ability to exploit the impact of climate change as a threat to peace and security.

156. The Panel recommends that the Committee:

(a) Encourage the Federal Government of Somalia to take a more proactive approach to environmental mediation¹⁸⁶ in conflict-affected areas that are also prone to flooding or other environmental shifts;

(b) Encourage a common understanding of the impact of climate change across government, including developing approaches to conflict analysis, risk management and climate projections.

¹⁸⁶ Environmental mediation involves the ownership, management and use of natural resources.

Annex 1: Mandate and appointment of the Panel of Experts

The mandate of the Panel of Experts on Somalia (“the Panel”) is contained in paragraph 30 of Security Council resolution 2551 (2020). The Panel’s mandate includes the tasks as set out in paragraph 13 of resolution 2060 (2012) and updated in paragraph 41 of resolution 2093 (2013), paragraph 15 of resolution 2182 (2014), paragraph 23 of resolution 2036 (2012) and paragraph 29 of resolution 2444 (2018) as they relate to Somalia.

In accordance with paragraph 34 of resolution 2551 (2020), the Panel provided the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia with a midterm update on 14 May 2021. The Panel submitted its first thematic report to the Committee on 10 August 2021.

The Panel, composed of six experts, was appointed by the Secretary-General in his letter S/2020/1199, dated 11 December 2020. On 26 April 2021, the Panel’s Coordinator and maritime / regional expert, Ms. Natascha Hryckow, resigned from her position. On 28 April 2021, Mr. Richard Zobot, arms expert, was appointed Acting Coordinator for the remainder of the mandate.

The Covid-19 pandemic hampered the Panel’s ability to travel to Member States, including Somalia. However, the Panel managed to travel to Djibouti, Iraq, Kuwait, Somalia, Switzerland, Turkey and United Arab Emirates during the mandate.

In addition, General Assembly resolution A/RES/67/254 regarding the 16-day advance booking of tickets, has resulted in a Secretariat policy of requiring a prior notice of 25 calendar days for any Panel travel, with waivers to the rule granted under exceptional circumstances. Due to the unique nature of the Panel’s work within the UN system, which requires significant flexibility in meeting with existing sources as well as identifying new ones, satisfying this travel requirement is often challenging.

Annex 2.1: Mapping of Al-Shabaab network

1. Update on Al-Shabaab leaders listed by the Committee

The Panel is mandated to assist the Committee in compiling narrative summaries of reasons for listing individuals and entities designated by the Committee. Accordingly, the Panel gathered information on listed individuals to update their status. The 1844 Sanctions list currently contains the names of 18 individuals and one entity.¹ Of the 18 listed individuals, eight are reportedly still active within Al-Shabaab. The other 10 include:

- Fares Mohamed Mana'a (SOi.008) – this individual was listed for violation of the arms embargo on Somalia (no association with Al-Shabaab in the reasons for listing);
- Hassan Dahir Aweys (SOi.002) arrested in Somalia in 2013;
- Hassan Mahat Omar (SOi.009) arrested in Kenya in 2014.

Seven operatives are presumed dead, see table 1 below.

Table 1 List of individuals under sanctions presumed deceased

1. Serial	2. Name	3. Date of death, location
4. SOi.003	5. Hassan Abdullah Hersi Al Turki	6. May 2015, Somalia
7. SOi.004	8. Ahmed Abdi Aw Mohamed	9. May 2020, Somalia
10. SOi.006	11. Bashir Mohamed Mahamoud	12. Feb 2020, Somalia
13. SOi.010	14. Omar Hammami	15. Sep 2013, Somalia
16. SOi.011	17. Aboud Rogo Mohammed	18. Aug 2012, Kenya
19. SOi.012	20. Abubaker Shariff Ahmed	21. Apr 2014, Kenya
22. SOi.016	23. Ahmad Iman Ali	24. Mar 2019 Somalia

The Panel recommends the Committee update the list to reflect the status of the seven individuals presumed dead after confirmation by Somalia and Kenya.

2. Update on Al-Shabaab leaders identified during the reporting period

The Panel is mandated to compile, refine and update information on the draft list of those individuals and entities that potentially meet the listing criteria for possible future measures by the Security Council. The Panel has therefore gathered information on Al-Shabaab senior operatives that could meet the designation criteria under resolution 1844 (2008).² These include the three individuals below as well as senior leaders in table 2, in charge of administering areas under full or partial control as head of *Wilaya*, an administrative unit or region:

1. Hussein Ali Fiidow: head of political administration and regions (similar to a Ministry of Interior);
2. Ali Mohamed Rage Cali Dheer, spokesperson;
3. Abdulaziz Abu Musaab, military spokesperson.

Table 2: List of Al-Shabaab wilaya governors

	Wilaya	Name of governor	Predecessor
1	Banadir	Muse Abdi Arrale	
2	Bay and Baqool	Abdullahi Moalim Gedow Aden Abukar	
3	Galgaduud	Abu Khalid	

¹ See <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/751/materials>.

² Designation criteria are defined in paragraph 8 of resolution 1844 (2008) and have been updated by paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of resolution 2002 (2011); paragraph 23 of resolution 2036 (2012); paragraph 3 of resolution 2060 (2012); paragraph 43 of resolution 2093(2013); and paragraph 50 of resolution 2444 (2018).

4	Gedo	Adan Sahal Abu Turaab	Abdirahman Abu Mohamed Filow (before Feb 2020)
5	Hiran	Guled Abu Nabhan	
6	Juba	Mohamed Abu Abdalle	
7	Lower Shabelle	Mohamed Abu Usama	
8	Middle Shabelle	Abaas Abuu Muhamed Khaliif Ade	Sheikh Yusuf Kaba Kutukade (before Sep 2020)
9	Mudug	Sheikh Abu Adnan	

The Panel also identified a list of senior religious preachers used by Al-Shabaab for their propaganda and narrative for the use of violent extremism. The following individuals have participated in East Africa Jihad conference.³

- 1 Hassan Yaqub Ali;
- 2 Ismael Harun;
- 3 Ibrahim Sheikh Ali. Nur (Sha'irul Islam);
- 4 Sultan Ben Mohamed Al Mohamed;
- 5 Sheikh Mohieddine;
- 6 Nabadoon Mohamed Ahmed Guled (Fartag);
- 7 Mohamed Bashshar Abelkrim;
- 8 Sheikh Jamea Abdussalam Warsame;
- 9 Sheikh Ahmad Abdullahi Arab.

3. Clan elders' affiliation with Al-Shabaab

In order to ensure affiliation by force of some Somali clan elders to the group, Al-Shabaab organizes ceremonies for the appointment of 13 *Nabadoon*, *Sultans*, *Ugas* and *Wabar*.⁴ During these ceremonies Al-Shabaab provided the selected elder with a vehicle, an AK 47 rifle, a copy of the Quran and the group's flag to demonstrate the allegiance of the clan to the cause. The latest ceremonies occurred in Jamaame, Lower Juba, on 4 January 2021, and in Jalalaqsi, Hiran, on 24 January 2021 (see figures 1 and 2). Table 3 shows the dates of appointments by Al-Shabaab of the 13 clan elders during 2020 and 2021. Figure 3 shows *clan affiliation and localities of traditional elders appointed by Al-Shabaab during 2020 and 2021* as well as the clan they represent, and AS administrative authorities present during each ceremony.

Figure 1. Appointment of Abdirahman Ali Abdi as sultan of the Jareerweyne clan in Boriini, Jamaame, Lower Juba, on 4 January 2021

³ Conference that took place from 13 to 18 March 2020 with the presence of Al Shabaab leaders to discuss the principles and guidelines on Jihad in Somalia and East Africa. Five subjects were debated during the conference including the Constitution of FGS, elections in Somalia, operations against international forces in Somalia, the situation of Islam in East African and the non-Islamic laws applied by FGS. A communique comprising 14 points was issued on 18 Mars 2020. the video of the conference is available at <https://ok.ru/video/2320030042671>.

⁴ Traditional authority referring to elders playing the role of clan peace makers in charge of resolving disputes between individuals inside a clan or between communities from different clans. The elder is identified as *Nabadoon*, *Sultans*, *Ugas* or *Wabar* depending on the region.



Figure 2. Appointment of Omar Wabar Abdi Wabar Mohamed as Wabar of Baada Adde sub-clan in Jalalaqsi, on 24 January 2021




Source: <https://calamada.com/sawirro-beesha-baada-cadde-oo-wabar-cusub-caleyma-saaratay/>

Table 3. List of traditional elders appointed by Al-Shabaab during 2020 and 2021

Date	Clan	Name
Jan-20	Eelay	Abdulkadir Sheikh Abdiasis Sheikh Abdullahi
Jan-20	Luway clan	Sultan Abdiwahid Moalim Hassan
Jan-20	Habas-Guul sub-clan	Ugas Mohamed Ugas Ahmed Shide
Feb-20	Wacaysle clan	Daud Hassan Adan
Mar-20	Sheekhaal clan	Ali Osman Rorow
Aug-20	Owbakar Gabane sub-clan	Moalim Hussein Abdulle Hayow (Hussein Faraweyne)
Aug-20	Boqolhore clan	Not named
Aug-20	Geedle sub-clan	Maalim Hussein Madey Hassan
Sep-20	Hassan Muse sub-division	Sheikh Mumin Mohamed Qoorey
Sep-20	Mudulod clan	Abdifatah Hassan Mohamed
Oct-20	Sade Clan	Abdiweli Hassan Madobe
Jan-21	Jareerweyne	Abdirahman Ali Abdi
Jan-21	Baada Adde	Wabar Omar Wabar Abdi Wabar Mohamed

Source: Panel based on media associated with Al-Shabaab

Figure 3. Clan affiliation and localities of traditional elders appointed by Al-Shabaab during 2020 and 2021



Source: Panel using I2 analyst notebook.

4. Reported neutralised Al-Shabaab operatives

The Panel has gathered information on Al-Shabaab operatives identified as being neutralized by Somali forces or declared by Al-Shabaab as martyrs. Table 4 below includes the names of Al-Shabaab senior operatives arrested or killed by Somali security forces. The Panel sent an official communication to the FGS on 3 September 2021, requesting additional information on these individuals and the possibility to interview those that are in custody. Al-Shabaab, in one of its latest propaganda videos, showed the names and photos of 20 of its leaders and preachers dead or killed in operations, see table 5⁵. Figure 5 shows Al-Shabaab senior operatives network including listed individuals and those presumed deceased.

Table 4. Reported deceased Al-Shabaab operatives

Ser	Name	Date of neutralization	Status Location
1	Ibrahim Moalim Abdi <i>alias Ibrahim Ganey</i>	September 2020	Killed between Bardale and Awdnile
2	Mohamed Abdi Subiye <i>alias Toosow</i>	4 July 2021	Killed in Darussalam, Addale district
3	Nuh Dhagool	16 July 2021	Killed in Aliyow Barow, Balcad district
4	Dulaby Ismael	22 July 2021	Surrendered in Qaycad, Mudug
5	Ali Mohamed Aden	25 July 2021	Arrested in Janaale
6	Jibril Said Ali	3 August 2021	Arrested in Amara, Mudug
7	Idris Abdullahi Maalim <i>alias Food'ade</i>	11 August 2021	Surrendered in Daynunay, Baidoa
8	Asad Sharif Abukar	12 Aug 2021	Defected in Awdheegle, Lower Shabelle
9	Abdirizak Mohamed Abdi Jimale	22 August 2021	Sentenced by Somali military court

Source: Panel from media affiliated to FGS such as Somali national TV at <https://sntv.so/> and Somali National Armed Forces at <https://www.xds.gov.so/>.


Table 5. Al-Shabaab senior leaders declared as martyrs

Ser	Name
1	Abdulaziz Al Afghani
2	Abdulkadir Usman aka Komandos, killed in an airstrike between late 2020 early 2021
3	Abu Ilyas Abdulhamid
4	Abu Rawi Al Seyari
5	Abwan Yussef Dhegey
6	Ali Hareed; killed by US airstrike
7	Asaad Khan al Baluchi, killed in Afmadow battle in 2012
8	Faruq al Muhajir
9	Hassan Abshir Walalow
10	Ibrahim Adam Ibrahim
11	Ibrahim Hajiyo
12	Jaber Abdullahi Diriye
13	Mohamed Ismail
14	Muhamad Dulyadeyn;

⁵ See <https://ok.ru/video/2417603316443>.

- 15 Muhssin al Muhajir
 - 16 Said Al Muhajir
 - 17 Salad Abdi Hassan, killed in an airstrike during 2019 or 2020
 - 18 Salah Nuh Ismail *alias Salah Badbado*
 - 19 Sharif Abdinur
 - 20 Sheikh Muhamad Maalim Hassan
-

Figure 4: Status of Al-Shabaab listed individuals and senior operatives



Annex 2.2: Annex 2.2 - List of individuals executed by Al-Shabaab

The Panel noted that Al-Shabaab courts have continued to issue and implement its rulings in public, in areas under its administration in Central and Southern Somalia. Al-Shabaab punishments include flogging for alleged sexual conduct, hand amputation for stealing as well as execution for spying. There was no change in the trend of execution for spying between 2021 and 2020 with the execution of 29 individuals during the reporting period and 28 in the same period in 2020, see table 1 and 2 below. The Panel however noted mass executions on 27, 28, 29 and 30 June 2021 with the killing of 24 individuals in Sakow, Jilib, Buula Fulay and Kunyoo Barow, see table 1. This mass execution followed the execution by Puntland, on 27 June 2021, of 21 individuals convicted of being members al-Shabaab.⁶

Table 1 Individuals executed by Al-Shabaab courts in 2021 for spying

Date	Location	Ser	Name, age	Accused of spying for
03/03/2021	Jilib, Middle Juba ⁷	1	Abukar Hassan Mohamed	
		2	Mahad Abdi Qadir Adam Mahad Qadoole	
		3	Hassan Mohamud Mohamed Hassan Dheere	
		4	Ahmed Abdi Abdillaahi Salmaan	
		5	Maalim Abukar Mohamed Alasow	
27/06/2021	Sakow, Middle Juba ⁸	6	Umar Abdikader Hirale (Umar Kojo), 36	USA
		7	Abdi Hassan Ahmed, 29	USA
		8	Fatum Umar Abkow, Female 36	USA
		9	Ibrahim Umar Ali alias Ibro Bandi, 55	USA
		10	Saddam Usmaan Mahamed, 21	USA
		11	Aweys Hassan Haji Mahamed (Aweys Yao), 36	USA
28/06/2021	Jilib, Middle Juba ⁹	12	Abdarahman Ahmed Mahamed (Warsame), 35	UK and ISIS
		13	Sa'ad Musa Haji Dahir, 45	USA/FBI
		14	Abdo Mad Abo, 47	USA/CIA
		15	Abdulle Umar Mahamud (Farjito) ¹⁰ , 35	
		16	Abdilkader Adan Hassan, 49	
29/06/2021	Buula Fulay, Bay ¹¹	17	Mohamed Ali Mohamed (Mad Nagaay), 39	USA
		18	Sanbur Ukurow Hassanow, 38	USA/CIA
		19	Hassan Abdulkadir Mohamed (Hassan Buuhow), 39	USA/CIA
		20	Ibrahim Hassan Mohamed, 27	Washington State
		21	Ahmed Mohamed Sheikh Ibrahim (Boorow), 26	USA/CIA
30/06/2021	Kunyoo Barow, Lower Shabelle ¹²	22	Alas Ali Abdulle, 51	USA/CIA
		23	Abdiwahid Abdullahi Diriye (Arabi), 25	Somalia
		24	Abdulkadir Mohamed Abbaw (Bombiste), 33	USA/CIA
		25	Abu Abdinur Fanaay (Weershe), 35	USA/CIA
		26	Omar Abdirahman (Omar Dooyow), 36	USA/CIA
		27	Hassan Abdulqadir Omar (Beerow), 37	USA/CIA
		28	Abukar Abdi Omar (Baseey), 31	USA
		29	Jeylani Mayow (Sheekhuna), 41	USA/CIA

⁶ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57630144>.

⁷ <https://calamada.com/dhageysomagacyo-jawaasiis-lagu-toogtay-fagaaraha-jilib/>.

⁸ <https://calamada.com/koox-jawaasiis-ah-oo-galabta-lagu-laayay-sakow-magacyada/>.

⁹ <https://calamada.com/jawaasiis-u-shaqeynayay-maraykanka-iyoo-ingiriiska-oo-maanta-lagu-dilay-jilib/>.

¹⁰ Association with Abu Bakre Bissi and Bili Mahmud Ajli.

¹¹ <https://calamada.com/shabakad-jawaasiis-ah-oo-madaxyada-looga-guray-buula-fulay/>.


¹² <https://shahadanews.com/?p=13753>.

Table 2 Individuals executed by Al-Shabaab courts in 2020 for spying

Date	Location	Ser	Name, age	Accused of spying for
04/01/2020	Buq'aqable, Hiran ¹³	1	Abdi Qadir Hassan Adam, 25	FGS
		2	Abdi Aziz Ahmed Mohamud, 28	FGS
		3	Farah Ali Jibril, 29	Mahas Militia
01/04/2020	Bu'ali, Middle Juba ¹⁴	4	Abdi Aziz Hasan Heybe, (Bensal)	USA
		5	Mohamed Daud Guliye (Jeey)	FGS
		6	Ismail Sheikh Mad Hassan (Mualim Bisbis)	USA
		7	Hasan Ibrahim Mohamed (Gidame)	FGS
		8	Hussein Mualim Hassan (GBS)	USA
		9	Shueyb Abdi Rashid Ibrahim (Dhagey)	Kenya
29/04/2020	El Buur, Galgaduud ¹⁵	10	Ahmed Nurow Mohamed Herow, 23	SW
		11	Bashir Mohamud Dhagool, 22	USA
		12	Bishar Ahmed Abdulle Holow, 50	USA
15/05/2020	Jamaame, Lower Juba ¹⁶	13	Mahamada Idow Adam (Tareeso),	FGS
		14	Adam Abdullahi Haji Adam Borow	FGS
		15	Osman Abdulle Afrah	FGS
		16	Hassan Hafow Saney	Jubaland
		17	Ali Madkeerow (Qoryooley)	South West
		18	Hilowle Bashir Adam	South West
22/08/2020	El Adde, Gedo ¹⁷	19	Dini Abdiqadir Mohamed	USA
		20	Issa Osman Guelleh	Ethiopia
		21	Adan Hassan Mohamed	FGS
		22	Abdiaziz Hassan Abdi	FGS
05/09/2020	Sakow, Middle Juba ¹⁸	23	Mohamed Aden Hassan (Mohamed Kheyr), 51	USA and UN
		24	Osman Farah Dhaqane, 27	
		25	Ali Abdirahman Abdi, 33	
		26	Abdi Sahal Dhabbar (Abdi Harqi), 57	
26/09/2020	Buq'aqable, Hiran ¹⁹	27	Abbas Mohamed Osman	Spying
		28	Ahmed Mohamed Abikar	SNA

¹³ <https://www.allbanaadir.org/?p=139621>.¹⁴ <https://calamada.com/jawaasiis-lagu-toogtay-goob-fagaara-ah/>.¹⁵ <https://calamada.com/dhageysomagacyo-jawaasiis-u-shaqeynayay-mareykanka-oo-lagu-dilay-magaalada-ceelbuur/>.¹⁶ <https://calamada.com/jawaasiis-lagu-toogtay-fagaaraha-degmada-jamaamemagacyo/>.¹⁷ <https://calamada.com/dhagayso-jawaasiis-u-shaqaynayay-maraykanka-oo-lagu-laayay-gedo-magacyada/>.¹⁸ <https://somalimemo.info/articles/13567/koox-jawaasiis-ah-oo-lagu-dilay-fagaare-kuyaal-degmada-Saakoow-Akhriso-xog>.¹⁹ <https://calamada.com/dhagayso-jawaasiis-iyoo-askar-lagu-dilay-wilaayada-hiiraan-magacyada/>.

Annex 2.3: Areas administered and areas partially controlled by Al-Shabaab in Southern and Central Somalia



Annex 2.4: List of Al-Shabaab attacks

The panel recorded 1047 attacks attributed to Al-Shabaab during the reporting period using confidential UN security reports some of which corroborated by open sources and witnesses. Al-Shabaab associated media claimed a larger number of attacks and an exaggerated number of casualties. The Panel did not use the statistics of attacks to analyse trends over time but rather to identify areas of operations of Al-Shabaab and tactics used by the group. The geographic pattern of Al-Shabaab attacks was as follow:

- Attacks in Banadir districts: 270;
- Attacks on security forces outside Banadir: 678;
- Attacks on main supply routes (MSR): 44 ambushes and 99 IED attacks.

Al-Shabaab mainly used hit and run attacks on SNA and international bases which lasted few minutes and without casualties most likely seeking a psychological effect in order to demoralize troops. Some of these attacks used mortars and RPGs. The Panel noted only a limited number of operations used by al-Shabaab to hold or capture towns or overrun military bases. These operations were executed using suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) and fighters according to the table 1 below:

Table 1. Al-Shabaab operations to hold, capture or overrun military bases

Date	Location	Objective
21/1/21	Baadweyne, Mudug	Town controlled
4/3/21	Bossaso Prison, Puntland	Prisoners freed
3/4/21	Awdheegle, Lower Shabelle	To overrun base
9/6/21	Daynunay, Bay region	Base overrun
27/6/21	Wisil, Mudug	Town not controlled
24/8/21	Aamara, Mudug	Town retaken from SNA and Galmudug forces

The most effective tactics by al-Shabaab to target security forces and Government officials was through the use of Person-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (PBIED) and vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED). Most of these attacks occurred in civilian sites and produced a large number of civilian casualties. Table 2 provides a list of PBIED and VBIED attacks on civilian sites soft targets throughout Somalia.

Table 2. PBIED and VBIED attacks on civilian sites in Somalia

Ser.	Date	Location	Type	Target
1	18/12/20	Galkayo, Mudug	PBIED	Government officials at Stadium
2	2/1/21	Lafoole, Afgoye	PBIED	Turkish Engineers
3	31/1/21	Waberi, Mogadishu	SVBIED	Gen. Mohamad Nur Galal at Hotel Afrik
4	5/3/21	Hamarjajab, Mogadishu	SVBIED	Lul Yemeni Restaurant
5	5/3/21	Wajid, Bakool	PBIED	Khat Market

6	3/4/21	Shangaani, Mogadishu	PBIED	Coffee restaurant
7	10/4/21	Berdaale, Baidoa	PBIED	Governor (survives)
8	14/4/21	Gololey, Middle Shabelle	IED	Minibus (20 Passengers)
9	15/6/21	Wadajir, Mogadishu	PBIED	SNA recruits at Gen Dhagabadan base
10	2/7/21	Shibis, Mogadishu	PBIED	Restaurant
11	30/7/21	Kismayo, Jubbaland	MIED	Bus transporting soccer team
12	10/8/21	Baadweyne, Mudug	IED	Vehicle transporting IDP returnees
13	19/8/21	Shangani, Mogadishu	PBIED	Restaurant

Source: Panel

4. Within Banadir districts where Al-Shabaab presence is not visible, the group was able to conduct its covert operations through the use of assassination, IED attacks, few mortar attacks and low scale hit and run attacks at the periphery of the region. The Panel recorded 270 of such attacks in Banadir districts mostly on security forces and Government officials. Table 3 and figure 2 show that the concentration of attacks is larger in the outer districts where security presence is lower.

Table 3. Attacks in Banadir districts

Ser	District	Total	Assassination	IED	Grenade	Mortar	Attack	Remark
1	Abdiaziz	1		1				
2	Bondhere	1	1					
3	Daynile	63	28	11	15		9	
4	Dharkenley	19	9	4	5		1	
5	Hamar-Jajab	2		2				
6	Hamar-Weyne	1		1				
7	Hodan	32	10	11	11			
8	Howl-Wadag	21	10		9		2	
9	Huriwa	29	8	4	7		10	
10	Kahda	3	1	1			1	
11	Karan	29	13	4	9		3	
12	Shangani	2		2				
13	Shibis	4	1	3				
14	Waberi	1					1	Hotel Afrik
15	Wadajir	21	11	4	1	5		Mortar IAIA
16	Wardhigley	11	5		3	2	1	Mortar Villa Somalia

17	Yaqshid	30	10	8	9	3
Total		270	107	56	69	7
						31

Source: Panel

The Panel recorded during the reporting period, 678 attacks on Somali and international forces in 54 locations in Southern and Central Somalia outside Banadir, as shown in table 4 below. The Panel believes that the number actual attacks is very likely to be bigger due to the lack of reporting of incidents in some areas. The largest numbers of attacks occurred in Janaale in Lower Shabelle and Xudur in Bakool with 42 and 44 attacks respectively. Figure 1 and 2 show the repartition of these attacks in a map.

Table 4 Number of Al-Shabaab attacks on Somali and International forces outside Benadir (see figure 2)

Location	Nb of attacks	Location	Nb of attacks	Base Location	Nb of attacks
Afgoye	30	Buulow Colow	8	Km60	12
Afmadow	4	Buur Hakaba	8	Lafoole	18
Aqabduco	10	Buurdhuubo	5	Luuq	9
Arbacow	21	Ceel Dheere	5	Mahaday	19
19Awdheegle	24	Ceel Waaq	7	Makuudo	7
Awdiinle	6	Celasha Biyaha	26	Beled Hawa	3
Bacad	15	Danaow	13	Mashalaaye	4
Baidoa	28	Dhobley	3	Qansax Dheere	17
Barawe	11	Dhusamareb	7	Qoryoley	16
Bardhere	12	Dinsoor	20	Sabiid	14
Barrire	18	Dolow	2	shalambod	8
Barsanguni	20	Gololey	7	Tabta	6
Beledweyne	10	Golweyn	12	Ted	6
Bilis Qoqani	6	Halgan	3	Wajid	20
Biyo Cadde	4	Jalalqsi	15	Wanlweyne	3
Bulobarde	11	Janaale	42	Xaj Cali	3
Buufow	7	Jowhar	13	Xudur	44
Buulo Mareer	19	Kismayo	13	Yonton	4
Total	256	Total	209	Total	213

Source: Panel

S/2021/849





Figure 2. Attacks on Somali and International bases in Lower Shabelle and all attacks in Mogadishu districts (map No 4617.10)



Annex 2.5: Vulnerabilities of SNA bases

Annex 2.5: Vulnerabilities of SNA bases

The lack of adequate force protection for static security made SNA forces vulnerable to repetitive hit-and-run attacks on their bases by Al-Shabaab. The Panel gathered pictures showing force protection challenges faced by SNA in their Forward Operating Bases (FOBs). Figures 1 and 2 show the lack of compound security in Daynunay and Goof Gaduud FOB, 8 kilometres southeast and 30 kilometres northwest of Baidoa respectively.

Figure 1. Daynunay FOB, November 2020



Source: Confidential.

Figure 2. Goof Gaduud Burray FOB, November 2020



Source: Confidential.

Annex 2.6: Bosaso prison attack

Conduct of the attack

On 4 March 2021, at around 23:00 local time, Al-Shabaab launched a complex attack on the central prison in Bosaso, Puntland, to free prisoners from the facility.²⁰ The attack was supported by operations outside the prison to block road access to the facility and prevented prison officers from providing reinforcements (see figure 1).²¹ Al-Shabaab gained access to the prison by breaching the eastern wall (see figure 2) and, once inside, the group released prisoners associated with Al-Shabaab before releasing the remaining non-Al-Shabaab-affiliated prisoners.

According to the Puntland Custodial Corps, Al-Shabaab took prisoners who were former Somali Police and Somali Armed Force officers, as well as prisoners with links to the Islamic State, as hostages.²² Information received by the Panel indicates that 337 prisoners escaped, of which 83 were convicted Al-Shabaab operatives, including four high ranking officials.²³ At least one prisoner tied to Al-Shabaab was scheduled to be executed the following day.²⁴ Additionally, among the 337 escapees, were four prisoners, convicted by the Supreme Court of Seychelles in 2021 for having committed acts of piracy.²⁵

Twelve prisoners were subsequently recaptured in the following hours. The recapture of other fugitives was hampered by the fact that prisoners were dressed in civilian attire, making detection difficult.²⁶

Nine security forces—three prison officers, five Puntland Intelligence and Security Agency officers and one Puntland Maritime Police Force officer—died during the attack.²⁷

Figure 1: Extract of the Map showing where the roads were blocked by the attackers (in red squares).



Source: Confidential

²⁰ Confidential report from an international security company operating in Puntland, March 2021.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Confidential UN report, March 2021.

²³ List on file with the Panel.

²⁴ Confidential source.

²⁵ The four prisoners are: Abdirhaman Adam Abdirhaman, Abdullahi Ibrahim Roble, Farad Ahmed Jama and Mohamed Dahir Omar.

²⁶ Confidential report from a Puntland security institution, March 2021.

²⁷ Available at <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Statements/shabaab-official-warsame-speaks-on-bosaso-central-prison-operation-vows-more-raids-to-come.html>.

Figure 2: Hole blasted into the eastern prison wall.



Source: Confidential

Measures taken by Puntland authorities to address the security deficiencies

The preparation and sophistication of the attack by Al-Shabaab exposed weaknesses in the security forces' equipment and readiness. For example, the prison lacked personal identification information, such as photographs or fingerprints, for each prisoner; had no defensive plan or sufficient weapons and ammunition to counter the attack or basic equipment to communicate during the attack; and the prison staff subsequently failed to properly implement crime scene management measures.²⁸

In response, the President of Puntland convened an emergency security meeting resulting in the immediate establishment of a Joint Operation Coordination Centre (JOCC) in Garowe intended to improve coordination between security elements. Puntland also established regional JOCCs in Bosaso and Galkayo.²⁹

The military equipment used by Al-Shabaab and retrieved in the aftermath of the attack is displayed in annex 4.1.

²⁸ "After-action review" from Puntland Security Forces report obtained by the Panel.

²⁹ The JOCC has been established on 31 March 2021. The JOCC operational design note is on file with the Secretariat

**Annex 2.7: Recruitment of a new, FGS-aligned, security unit
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)**

Annex 2.8: Maritime attack on a vessel off-shore from an Al-Shabaab controlled area

The Panel received information that the Passenger/Ro-Ro Anatolian vessel (IMO 9005869), registered in Turkey and operated by Mavi Deniz Tasimaciligi, was victim of an attack by a skiff off the coast of Somalia, on 13 August 2021, while on its way from Fethiye, Turkey to Mogadishu, Somalia. According to its captain the vessel was shot at from a skiff with RPGs and small arms (see figure 4).

The Panel noted that the vessel's automatic identification system (AIS) track showed that the vessel was almost stationary for about 24 hours less than 1,000 meters off the Somali coast in an area controlled by Al-Shabaab. That area is not patrolled by Somali security forces and Al-Shabaab has a stronghold 30 kilometres inland in a locality named Ali Gaudud (coordinates: 3°10'42"N, 46°26'9"E). The Panel sent an official correspondence to the vessel's operating company seeking clarification on the circumstances of the attack and the reasons behind its position close to an area controlled by Al-Shabaab.

Figure 1: Track between 2 and 17 August 2021.




Figure 2: Position of the vessel on 12 August 2021 at 6:31 UTC.




Figure 3: Position of the vessel on 12 August 2021 at 6:31 UTC and 13 August 2021 at 4:58 UTC.




Figure 4: RPG's impact on the vessel.



**Annex 3.1: Network of Al-Shabaab checkpoints within Somalia
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)**

**Annex 3.2: Al-Shabaab financial receipts and documents (STRICTLY
CONFIDENTIAL)**

Annex 4.1: Military equipment in the possession of Al-Shabaab

1. Military equipment used by Al-Shabaab during the Bosaso Prison attack

- Figure 1 displays a casing of a recoilless rifle ammunition, with characteristics consistent with an 84mm L-45 Carl-Gustaf ammunition, manufactured in Sweden in 1977. A tracing request has been sent to Sweden. Despite thorough investigation done by Swedish authorities, it has not been possible to determine whether the specific ammunition was manufactured in Sweden, or elsewhere under license.³⁰

Figure 1: Casing of a recoilless rifle ammunition.



Source: Security operators in Bosaso.

- Figure 2 displays a casing of a 60mm mortar round, with characteristics consistent with 60mm M73 HE manufactured in 2016 in Serbia by Krusik factory, lot number 08. The same type of mortar rounds was fired by Al-Shabaab on 17 February 2020 in the direction of the UN compound within AAIA.³¹ A tracing request has been sent to the Republic of Serbia. The Government of Serbia further informed the Panel that this round was exported in 2016 to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The end-user certificate associated with the export stipulates that the item would not be re-exported or transferred to any other party without the consent of the Serbian authorities. So far, no request for approval to re-export the above-mentioned mortar round has been addressed to the Serbian authorities.³²

The Panel has further sought the assistance of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in order to better understand the circumstances under which this ammunition ended up with Al-Shabaab.³³

³⁰ Official correspondence from Swedish authorities dated 4 May 2021.

³¹ See S/2020/949, annex 4.1.

³² Official correspondence from Serbian authorities, dated 6 May 2021.

³³ Official correspondence dated 10 June 2021. At the time of writing, response still pending.

Figure 2: Casing of 60mm mortar round



Source: Security operators in Bosaso.

- Figure 3 displays the ignitor cap of a hand grenade with characteristics consistent with UZRGM grenade manufactured by factory 583 in 1970 in Leningrad, USSR. The same type of grenades were captured from Al-Shabaab in March 2018 by the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) and used by Al-Shabaab during the Sahafi hotel attack on 9 November 2018 and during the Manda Bay attack on 5 January 2020.³⁴ The date of manufacture makes it too old to be traced.

Figure 3: Ignitor cap of a hand grenade.



Source: Security operators in Bosaso.

- Figure 4 shows a cartridge of a round calibre 5.56x45mm ammunition with characteristics similar to NATO calibre ammunition manufactured by LC (Lake City factory) in the US, dated 2010. This ammunition is used in assault rifles like M16 or M4. The unknown lot number makes it impossible to trace this item.

³⁴ See S/2019/858, annex 2.6 and S/2020/949, annex 4.1.

Figure 4: Round of NATO calibre 5.56x45mm ammunition.



Source: Security operators in Bosaso.

- Cartridge cases related to ammunition from different calibres (7.62x39mm, 7.62x54mm, and 14.5x114mm) were also found with headstamps markings that were, to the Panel's knowledge, never documented before in Somalia.
- Two AK-pattern assault rifles have also been retrieved, with none of the serial numbers matching any database available to the Panel.

2. Al-Shabaab-released videos showing military equipment

- On 29 January 2021, Al-Shabaab released a video documenting its preparation to attack Camp Simba in Manda Bay, Kenya.³⁵ The Panel has identified some military equipment that complement or confirm the identifications mentioned in last year's report.³⁶ Figure 5 shows a militant using an assault rifle M4.

³⁵ Available from <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Statements/shabaab-video-documents-preparation-conduct-of-raid-on-u-s-naval-base-in-manda-bay.html>.

³⁶ See S/2020/949 annex 4.1.

Figure 5: Al-Shabaab militant using an assault rifle M4.



Source: Screen capture from the video.

- Figure 6 shows a type 56-2 rifle, bearing the FGS markings of the SNA weapons “SO XDS-2017”.

Figure 6: Type 56-2 rifle, bearing the FGS markings.



Source: Screen capture from the video.

- Figure 7 shows a light machine gun with characteristics consistent with Type 80 (PKM-type, 7.62x54mm) manufactured in 2017 by Factory 26, Jianshe Machine Tool Factory in Chongqing, PRC. Without a legible serial number, the Panel was not able to trace it.

Figure 7: Light machine gun.



Source: Screen capture from the video.

- On 12 April 2021, Al-Shabaab released a video highlighting its operations in Kenya and Somalia.³⁷ The Panel identified military equipment previously delivered to the FGS. Figure 8 shows an armoured Personnel carrier (APC) exposed to media by Al-Shabaab. This APC is part of the shipment of 68 APCs delivered by Qatar on 17 January 2019.³⁸

Figure 8: Armoured Personnel carrier.



Source: Screen capture from the video.

³⁷ Available from http://sitemultimedia.org/video/SITE_Shabaab_Frontiers_Glory6B.mp4.

³⁸ Official notification dated 29 January 2019.

Annex 4.2: Weapons and ammunition management

Weapons and ammunition management policy

National WAM Strategy

The national WAM strategy has been developed through a collaborative process between Somali government institutions. The change of Prime Minister and ongoing challenges in the electoral process have prevented the document from being formally signed. The aim of the national WAM strategy, which took into account inputs and comments from international partners, is to provide strategic guidance to implement an efficient WAM at the Federal and FMS levels. Management of storage sites and inventory control to an international standard will contribute to the foundations of an effective and efficient WAM system.

Coordination with FMS (Regional Security Offices)

Regional security offices (RSOs) were established in 2017 in the Federal Member States (FMS) to improve the coordination between FGS and FMS officials on security-related issues. The RSOs are an initiative of the FGS, with links to the Office of the National Security Advisor. The RSOs have already played an essential role in reviewing and ensuring FMS support of the Somali Transition Plan (STP).³⁹

WAM Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)

In addition to the nine SOPs in force at Halane Central Armoury,⁴⁰ the FGS has drafted an SOP related to weapons and ammunition management, codifying the procedures that the Somali National Army should follow from importation of weapons and ammunition to distribution to the units. This SOP was formally adopted in October 2020 by the Cabinet of Ministers but has not been officially translated into English at this stage. This SOP is structured around the main WAM pillars: procurement of weapons and ammunition, registration, and distribution.

WAM procedures and implementation

Implementation of the WAM system should encompass all its aspects, from registration to distribution to the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF) units and individuals. Some projects, detailed below, have been launched to allow an effective tracking mechanism, but some gaps remain. The setup of a full system will take time and require a strong willingness, at both political and SNSF units' levels.

Registration, record-keeping and tracing of weapons and ammunition

A digital weapons register based on a mobile phone data collection application called Fulcrum⁴¹ has been successfully deployed within the Somali Police Force (SPF) by the FGS Joint Verification Team (JVT). The system was piloted by the SPF in March 2020

³⁹ Meeting with the NSA on 24 June 2021 and exchange of information with UNSOM senior staff members, August 2021.

⁴⁰ In May 2018, the SNA issued a set of nine standard operating procedures for weapons and ammunition management at Halane Central Armoury. These SOPs deal with general procedures, procedures for weapons, procedures for ammunition and explosives, accounting of weapons and ammunition, marking of weapons, destruction of weapons and ammunition, transport of weapons and ammunition, reception and documentation procedures, and captured weapons.

⁴¹ See S/2020/949, annex 4.2 strictly confidential.

and then fully deployed in Mogadishu in November 2020 and in Galmudug in August 2021 . On 6 September 2021, 5,637 weapons from the SPF have been recorded (4,414 in Banadir and 1,223 in Galmudug).⁴² All information on these SPF-owned weapons have been added in the functional prototype WAM database developed by the JVT. The JVT assesses that this system has the potential to be used across the Somali security forces at both the National and Federal Member State levels

A complete WAM system would be composed of three elements: the data capture mechanism (Fulcrum), the national WAM database, and a dashboard for external reporting. The necessity of a central national database system established at the federal level for imports, stock records, and records of issue and receipt of weapons to the security forces has been clearly expressed in the draft Somali National WAM policy. The setup of such a database still requires significant development and resources to enable a robust sustainable tracing system.⁴³

The full implementation of Somalia's WAM system will feed a national database enabling inventory management, internal and external reporting, procurement planning, distribution, disposal planning and weapons tracing. Although still a pilot project, early engagement across the security sector would support a coherent and integrated approach, maximising both efficacy and return on investment. The implementation of such a system is key for monitoring the requirements of the current arms embargo regime and will also be instrumental in building the capacities of the FGS to control flows of weapons and ammunition in the aftermath of a possible lifting or further easing of the arms embargo regime.

Weapons marking

In 2014, the Security Council requested Member States to support the efforts of the Federal Government of Somalia to start a weapons marking process.⁴⁴ A total of eleven weapons marking machines have been donated to Somalia (November 2020 update), although the current functioning of all machines is not known to the Panel.⁴⁵ The three most recent machines (Schmidt Styliner Mk III model) were shipped to Somalia in October 2020. One marking machine was delivered to Garowe, while the other two have been assigned to other FMS.⁴⁶ Marking machines in the possession of FMSs will be useful to mark the weapons in the possession of the FMS security forces and of the clan communities.

The weapons marking process has been consistently implemented by the personnel at Halane. The FGS periodic report to the Security Council dated 2 October 2019 indicates that, as of June 2019, a total of 20,240 weapons had been marked, including imported weapons and weapons already present before the partial lifting of the arms embargo in 2013. All weapons legally arriving in Somalia must be marked, and information on marked weapons is to be entered into a marking database (information displayed in Halane Logbooks). Inter-agency marking teams have been established and trained since 2015 by JVT, UNMAS and Mines Advisory Group (MAG). A written standard operating procedure on marking was issued by the FGS in May 2018 (SOP 5: Marking of Weapons).

⁴² Direct information from the JVT.

⁴³ The JVT estimates a further \$200,000 dollars for database development and start-up costs. In addition, a commitment of staff from the Somali Security Forces and International Mentors are required.

⁴⁴ See S/PRST/2014/9.

⁴⁵ See S/2017/924, para. 136.

⁴⁶ The recipient FMS for the two machines remain to be determined by the ONS.

Safe storage and stockpile management

The enhancement of safe storage and stockpile management remains a priority for the FGS, as demonstrated by the setup of the Joint Technical Team in charge of the Joint Technical Assessment and the commitment to proceed to a proper refurbishment of Halane and the building of an alternate explosive storage site (see above).

This particular assessment of Halane must be extended to the whole of Somalia in order to assess current storage conditions and capacities; as well as future needs of the SNSF. An assessment of weapons and ammunition storage facilities at both FGS and FMS levels is underway. Obtaining a quantitative and qualitative assessment of all weapons and ammunition storage facilities across Somalia will allow the FGS to have a precise and complete mapping of storages and stockpiles used by SNSF. It will also enable the FGS to assess the SNSF's operational needs in line with the storage capacities, and subsequently the necessary support needed from international partners.

Distribution process

The distribution process follows official guidelines issued by the FGS (WAM SOPs and Halane SOPs) and practices.⁴⁷

In particular, the SOP "Reception and Documentation Procedures at Halane Armoury" stipulates that electronic detailed records must be maintained for each weapon entering the Halane facility. Such a distribution system, along with a tracing system, would constitute a solid pillar of the WAM foundations.

Disposal of weapons and ammunition

Halane SOP 6 sets out the procedures for destruction of SNSF weapons and ammunition.


Destruction of weapons is to take place at the Halane Armoury. The location and the status of the shearing machine in Halane remains unknown. For the disposal of ammunition, no destruction site has been specified in this SOP. The order to dispose of weapons and ammunition must emanate from the Chief of Defence Forces, and records are to be kept at Halane. The Panel has never seen a report regarding disposal of weapons or ammunition. Indication of disposal of weapons and ammunition should also be reported in the WAM national database.

⁴⁷ Any distribution of weapons and ammunition from Halane Central Armoury to SNSF units should follow an order from the Chief of Defence Staff, confirmed by voucher receipt from Halane Central Armoury and acknowledgment of receipt by the field units.

Annex 4.3: Integration of the WAM database into a Somali-owned WAM system

Once the WAM database prototype has been extended to all SNSF, it will aim at being integrated into a full Somali-owned WAM system as presented in figure 1. Such a system will give to the FGS a full oversight of its owned weapons and ammunition, in abidance with UN Security Council requirements.

Figure 1: Complete WAM system to be implemented



Source: JVT/FGS and Panel

**Annex 4.4: Notifications of weapons and ammunition (STRICTLY
CONFIDENTIAL)**

**Annex 4.5: Consignments of weapons and ammunition since 2013
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)**


Annex 4.6: Unnotified shipment of military trucks

Figure 1: Passenger/Ro-Ro ship MV Birden (IMO 7305772) at the port of Mogadishu on 30 April 2021. The detailed photo of the hull shows the remains of the painted name of the shipping company İstanbullines.



Source: Confidential

Figure 2: Unloading of military trucks in Mogadishu on 30 April 2021.



Source: Confidential

Annex 4.7: Suggested standardized templates for notifications of weapons, ammunition and military equipment

In order to ensure that all advance and post-delivery notifications are provided with sufficient level of details, the Joint Verification Team (JVT) recommended that notifications should follow a standardized template.⁴⁸

In collaboration with the JVT, the Panel further adapted this template to fulfil the requirements listed in the Guidelines of the Committee for the conduct of its work,⁴⁹ proposing additional entry fields of information. The three different lists displayed below indicate the mandatory contents that must appear in each notification: one for weapons, one for ammunition, and one for military equipment, as listed in annexes A and B of resolution 2551 (2020). These templates will initially be completed by the supplier, assisting the FGS in properly managing the requested military equipment (e.g., registration, storage, tracing, etc.). These templates aim at being included in the updated Implementation Assistance Notice No.2.

Table 1: Template for weapons

- ITEM TYPE
- MANUFACTURING COUNTRY
- MANUFACTURER
- YEAR OF MANUFACTURE
- CATEGORY
- MODEL
- CALIBRE
- FULL SERIAL NUMBER
- GOVERNMENT MARKING
- DESIGNATED END USER
- MEANS OF TRANSPORT FOR THE SUPPLY
- EXPECTED DATE OF DELIVERY TO SOMALIA (OR DATE OF EFFECTIVE DELIVERY)
- PLACE OF DELIVERY
- PLACE OF STORAGE

Table 2: Template for ammunition

- ITEM TYPE
- MANUFACTURING COUNTRY
- MANUFACTURER
- YEAR OF MANUFACTURE
- CATEGORY
- TYPE OF AMMUNITION
- CALIBRE
- LOT / BATCH NUMBER (AMMUNITION)
- QUANTITY IN BOX / CRATE
- BOX / CRATE NUMBER

⁴⁸ FGS periodic report dated 4 February 2021.

⁴⁹ Available at <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/751/guidelines>.

- EXPIRY DATE
- DESIGNATED END USER
- MEANS OF TRANSPORT FOR THE SUPPLY
- EXPECTED DATE OF DELIVERY TO SOMALIA (OR DATE OF EFFECTIVE DELIVERY)
- PLACE OF DELIVERY
- PLACE OF STORAGE

Table 3: Template for military equipment other than weapons and ammunition

- ITEM DESCRIPTION
- MANUFACTURING COUNTRY
- MANUFACTURER
- YEAR OF MANUFACTURE
- MODEL
- QUANTITY
- UNIQUE IDENTIFYING NUMBER (SERIAL NUMBER)
- ITEM NUMBER (ORDINAL NUMBER)
- ADDITIONAL NOTES
- DESIGNATED END USER
- MEANS OF TRANSPORT FOR THE SUPPLY
- EXPECTED DATE OF DELIVERY TO SOMALIA (OR DATE OF EFFECTIVE DELIVERY)
- PLACE OF DELIVERY
- PLACE OF STORAGE

**Annex 4.8: Illicit flow of weapons and ammunition to Somalia
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)**

Annex 5.1: Forced displacement of population

As of July 2021, there were 2,968,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Somalia. 537,000 people had fled their homes between January and July 2021 alone, with conflict-related displacement accounting for over 70 per cent of the cases (389,000).⁵⁰

During the reporting period, the Panel documented new waves of forced displacement of populations in South West State and Galmudug, following ultimatums issued by Al-Shabaab, with over 11,000 families forced to leave their homes. The cases documented show an aggressive campaign of forced displacement inflicted by Al-Shabaab upon communities, at times as collective punishment. In the context of these attacks, the Panel also documented instances of destruction of civilian objects essential to the survival of the civilian population, including water wells and livestock. The circumstances triggering these attacks against entire communities can be grouped under four different categories:

- 1) Communities' perceived affiliation or collaboration with the Federal Government of Somalia and/or international forces;
- 2) Economic rivalry;
- 3) Community resistance to Al-Shabaab attempts to impose its authority and administration, including through mobilization of clan militia; and
- 4) Communities' defiance to Al-Shabaab's directives – such as those imposing blockades on certain enclaves;

Communities' perceived affiliation or collaboration with the Federal Government of Somalia and/or international forces – the case of populations living near “liberated areas”

Al-Shabaab compelled entire communities to displace in retaliation to military and territorial losses of the group. The order to displace was triggered by the perceived collaboration of these communities with Federal or Regional authorities or the facilitation of SNA and AMISOM military operations. For example, on 26 December 2020, the Al-Shabaab administration for Lower Shabelle based in Ugunji,⁵¹ gathered the elders of seven villages in Marka district and gave an ultimatum to the residents, to vacate their villages within 48 hours. Over 1,400 households (approximately 10,000 people from the Rahanweyn and Garre clans) were forced to abandon Buulo Dhuro, Daariyow, Falkooni, Farange, Gaarilow, Kamirow, and Shufeer (see figure 1 for a breakdown of displacement) and displace to Buufow Bacaad and Mogadishu.⁵² Sources within the affected communities told the Panel that Al-Shabaab accused these displaced communities of having collaborated with AMISOM and SNA forces after these recovered Marka in March 2020.⁵³

Even when communities moved to Government-controlled areas harassment by Al-Shabaab continued, highlighting the capacity of the group to exert its influence on

⁵⁰ See UNHCR data about displacement in Somalia, available from <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/88146>.

⁵¹ The regional Al-Shabaab administration for Lower Shabelle has moved from Janaale to Ugunji, 7 kilometres northeast of Janaale (coordinates 1°52'24"N, 44°43'21"E) following the SNA military operation to liberate Janaale.

⁵² Humanitarian reports, January 2021.

⁵³ Interviews with community leaders from the affected villages, humanitarian and security sources, January, February, March and April 2021.

communities beyond the territories it directly administers. The IDPs displaced in Buufow Bacaad were required during the month of April 2021 to provide financial “support” to Al-Shabaab in Ugunji in the amount of 4.5 US\$ per 4,000 square meter of land owned.⁵⁴

Beside this instance of collective punishment, during the mandate the Panel noted several incidents where Al-Shabaab retaliated against the population in areas “liberated” but subsequently retaken by the group. These incidents underscore the urgent need to assess the impact of military operations on civilians beyond their immediate outcome, particularly where security, governance and stabilization efforts are not integrated with military operations.

Figure 1: Map of the displacement from Buulo Dhuro, Farange, Shufeer, Daariyow, Kamirow, Falkooni, Gaarilow, with number of households impacted.



Source: Panel using Google Earth.

Economic rivalry – the case of Galjaeel militias challenging Al-Shabaab’s illegal taxation business on Main Supply Routes (MSRs)

Al-Shabaab retaliated against entire communities when the group’s economic interests and illicit revenue generation sources were challenged by competing clans. This took place at the beginning of January 2021, when the Al-Shabaab faction controlling Shoole Mareer; Jama'ada Dheenta and El Bashiir checkpoints north of Wanla Weyne, in Lower Shabelle, clashed with Galjaeel militias over the control of the lucrative illegal taxation of commercial traffic on the northern corridor of the Afgoye-Wanla Weyne MSR. The humanitarian consequences were notable, with civilians becoming victims of forced displacement and retaliatory attacks in Wanla Weyne district, and others suffering the impact of the temporary suspension of commercial traffic.⁵⁵

The clashes originated when passenger and commercial transports started avoiding the Galjaeel militia-controlled checkpoint near Bali Doogle SNA camp in Wanla Weyne, due

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ According to security reports obtained by Panel some 150 lorries suspended deliveries along the Afgoye- Wanla Weyne corridor

to the abusive and predatory behaviour of these militias.⁵⁶ Interviews conducted by the Panel with drivers of commercial and passenger vehicles indicate that civilians were subjected to repeated incidents of assault, robbery, extortion and SGBV.⁵⁷ When drivers opted to pass via the Afgoye-Toratoow road controlled by Al-Shabaab, Galjaeel militias retaliated. On 9 January 2021, Galjaeel militias in Yaaq Biri Weyne hijacked and set alight three commercial trucks as a punishment and warning for other commercial truck owners not to reroute the traffic to the Al-Shabaab-controlled checkpoints (see figure 2 and 3). Other accounts gathered by the Panel indicate that the commercial trucks were targeted as they were transporting goods intended to Al-Shabaab controlled areas.⁵⁸ The Panel could not independently verify these claims.

Figure 2 and 3: Commercial trucks burned by the Galjaeel militia in Yaq Bari Weyne



Source: Confidential

The conflict between Al-Shabaab and Galjaeel militias rapidly escalated when the Galjaeel clan elders refused to compensate the owners of the burned trucks. On 14 February 2021, Al-Shabaab forcibly displaced around 1,500 Galjaeel households from the villages of Yaaq Biri Weyne, Gobaanle, Yaaq Doomaar, Beyley, Saaweyn, Guulow, Madah-Madoobe, Kab-Harag, Afyuur, Belet Amiin, and Leego, giving them 24 hours notice to vacate their homes.⁵⁹ The majority of the displaced communities moved to Wanla Weyn, Afgooye and

⁵⁶ According to accounts that the Panel could not corroborate, the militias had established the checkpoint near Bali Dogle with the consent of the SNA and were used as a buffer against Al-Shabaab. These accounts are however consistent with claims gathered during interviews conducted by the Panel with Galjaeel militia members and commanders active in neighboring areas, such as Jowhar, Hirshabelle in May 2021.

⁵⁷ Interviews with three truck drivers and one commercial driver in Mogadishu, February and March 2021. The Panel corroborated one incident of rape perpetrated by Galjaeel militias in Bali Doogle area on 19 December 2020. Accounts of local sources interviewed between March and April 2021 further indicated that at least nine other cases of rape had taken place in the previous six months, with women from minority clans, notably from Elay and Shanta Alemood, targeted by armed men from the Galjaeel clan and in SNA uniform. The Panel was not able to corroborate these other nine cases.

⁵⁸ The trucks were loaded with charcoal and other goods and were allegedly directed to Bay, Bakool and Gedo. Confidential security report January 2021.

⁵⁹ Humanitarian reports, February 2021. Interviews with displaced communities as well as representatives of the Galjaeel community, February, April and May 2021.

Mogadishu.⁶⁰ In addition, Al-Shabaab killed a man and a woman in Yaaq Biri Weyne after suspecting them to have collaborated with the Galjaeel militias who set fire to the trucks, burned down some 50 pastoral dwellings (see figure 4 below) and looted around 100 camels belonging to the Galjaeel community.⁶¹ On 17 February 2021, Galjaeel militias shot and killed two men from the Rahanweyn clan in Jiir Kulow grazing area near Bali Doogle, blaming the victims' clan for supporting the expansion of Al-Shabaab in Yaaq Biri Weyne.

Figure 4: Galjaeel pastoral settlement burned by Al-Shabaab



Source: Confidential

The Panel noted further punitive displacement imposed by Al-Shabaab also to other communities in the area in connection to the conflict with the Galjaeel. On 4 February 2021, Al-Shabaab evicted approximately 500 Shanta Aleemood households from Eel Garaare, Shiidaad, Uuli Barbaar and Umar Degaaye after accusing them of allowing Galjaeel herders to water their livestock at their water points.⁶²

Community resistance to Al-Shabaab attempts to impose its authority and administration, including through mobilization of clan militia – the continued targeting of the Leysan

In its 2020 final report, the Panel described forced displacement as collective punishment of the community in Toosweyne, Bay region.⁶³ During the Panel's current mandate, a new

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Interview with members of the Galjaeel displaced community, February 2021

⁶² Security reports, February 2021.

⁶³ See S/2020/949, Annex 7.2

wave of IDPs from Toosweyne arrived in Berdale following the issuance of a deadline, on 5 April 2021, by Al-Shabab to completely vacate the village.

On 7 April 2021, Al-Shabab entered Toosweyne, abducted an unconfirmed number of youths and beat women and elderly.⁶⁴ Humanitarian assessments conducted by NGOs in April 2021 recorded that over 6,500 households (39,630 individuals), 70 per cent of whom were women and children, had arrived in Berdale district from Toosweyne (see figure 5).⁶⁵ Consistent with the information gathered by the Panel from sources within the displaced community, humanitarian partners in Berdale identified 89 IDPs from Toosweyne with physical injuries following the crackdown and the use of force by Al-Shabab, and 141 households who were not aware of the whereabouts of their children after the 7 April attack.⁶⁶

Figure 5: Toosweyne displaced communities



Source: Confidential

Local sources interviewed by the Panel identified the Al-Shabab faction responsible for harassing the Leysan community in Toosweyne as being led by the Berdale District Commissioner for Al-Shabab, Mohamed Omar Mohamed. Sources interviewed during the Panel's previous mandate had provided consistent information.⁶⁷

Sources from the Leysan community interviewed by the Panel, consistently reported that Al-Shabab is targeting the Leysan community in several areas of South-West State, including Bay, Bakool and Lower Shabelle, because the clan is strongly associated to Muktar Robow⁶⁸, a former senior Al-Shabab leader who defected from the group in 2012, and because the community has mobilized its clan militias in support of the Federal Government forces' fight against Al-Shabab.

Accordingly, during its current mandate the Panel documented two other instances of forced displacement of villages inhabited by the Leysan community in Huddur district,

⁶⁴ Interviews with members of the Leysan community in Berdale, Baidoa and Mogadishu, April, May and June 2021.

⁶⁵ Humanitarian assessment report, April 2021.

⁶⁶ Ibidem.

⁶⁷ See S/2020/949, Annex 7.2

⁶⁸ After his defection from Al-Shabab in 2012, Muktar Robow Ali reportedly remained hidden in Huddur area, where he originates from, together with his men who had also defected from Al-Shabab. Muktar Robow surrendered to the government in 2017 after secret negotiations. He was arrested in December 2018 by Ethiopian and Somali forces after manifesting interest in running for the Presidential position in South-West State and remains under house arrest in Mogadishu.

Bakool region, namely Abal, Dondardiir, and Faraatiyow villages, and Qoryooley and Kunturwarey districts, in Lower Shabelle, namely Awjabe, and Majiido villages in April and May 2021.

Communities' defiance to Al-Shabaab's directives imposing blockades on government-controlled towns – the case of Huddur district

Al-Shabaab has imposed several blockades on towns under government control, including Diinsor, in Bay, and Huddur, in Bakool region, creating *de facto* enclaves. In these areas the Panel has consistently recorded incidents of abduction, destruction of civilian property, and executions.⁶⁹ During the Panel's current mandate, Al-Shabaab continued to restrict access to Huddur using punitive abductions and detention to enforce its economic blockade as well as its directives against the commercialization of prohibited goods, such as khat and charcoal. For example, along the corridor connecting Huddur, to the Ethiopian border, between March and June 2021 alone, Al-Shabaab ambushed eight khat dealers, killing three of them and injuring three others, and confiscated their merchandise.⁷⁰

On 2 June 2021, the Panel recorded the forced displacement of four villages around Huddur, namely Mady-waraabi and Gaabaany inhabited by the Hadame clan, and Sarag, and War Galoole, inhabited by the Luwaay clan.⁷¹ Sources within the displaced communities from Mady-waraabi told the Panel that, during the night of 1 June 2021, several Al-Shabaab members stormed the village and ordered the community to leave by the following morning. The reason for this eviction was that Al-Shabaab accused the two communities of the above-mentioned villages to repeatedly disregard the ban on commercial activities around Huddur. More than 900 households were displaced on 2 June 2021 to Huddur (see figure 6).⁷² However, there were reports warning of Al-Shabaab's threats of eviction and forced displacement already taking place in the area since the end of May 2021, with a total estimate of 1,488 households evicted from 14 villages by 2 June 2021.⁷³

Interviews with the displaced community from the Hadame clan highlighted how this community had been frequently harassed by Al-Shabaab with illegal taxation and child recruitment. For example, in February 2021 several children from their village were forcefully recruited by Al-Shabaab and taken to military training camps in Labantanjirow, near Baidoa, and Qeydar-eddy, on the way to El-Berde.

⁶⁹ See S/2020/949, Annex 7.1

⁷⁰ Security reports, March to June 2021

⁷¹ See <https://twitter.com/BaidoaU/status/1400087128864866311?s=19>, as well as interviews with members of the displaced community in Huddur, 10 June 2021.

⁷² Interviews with members of the displaced community in Huddur, 10 June 2021.

⁷³ Humanitarian alert report, 2 June 2021

Figure 6: Communities displacing to Huddur



Source: Confidential

Annex 5.2: Incidents in the Gedo region resulting in civilian casualties and damage to civilian objects


During the night of 3 to 4 June 2021, at around 23:30 Somalia local time, the town of El Adde, located in Gedo region, Jubbaland State, was allegedly hit by two explosive ordnances. In the immediate aftermaths of the explosion, social media reports of an airstrike resulting in six civilian casualties emerged. A 34-year-old woman died on the spot, while her four months old child succumbed to his injuries on 4 June 2021. Additionally, four other children of the victim, aged between 2 and 12 years, sustained various injuries and were evacuated on 4 June 2021, first to Belet Hawo and then flown to Mogadishu to receive medical assistance.

The same night of 3 to 4 June, at around 00:30 Somalia local time, Hisa-u-Gur, in Gedo region, was also allegedly hit by explosive ordnances. As a result, a telecommunication installation, was destroyed, causing the temporary disruption of telecommunication services in an area of around 30 square kilometres.

The Panel received audio-visual and photographic material, allegedly gathered from the sites of these incidents, and interviewed victims, relatives of the victims and witnesses of the incidents in El Adde and Hisa-u-Gur.

Photographic material examined by the Panel (see figure 6.2.2 below) show remnants of two guidance sections of air to surface missiles (ASM), with characteristics similar to ASM used with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and produced by a Member State.

Figure 6.2.1: Remnants of guidance sections of air to surface missiles (ASM) allegedly found on the sites of the airstrikes in El Adde and Hisa-u-Gur



Source: confidential

The Panel took note of a press statement from the Somali Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Somalia, dated 4 June 2021, attributing the incidents of 3 June 2021 in El Adde and Hisa-u-Gur to Kenyan Defence Forces.⁷⁴ The Panel further noted a

⁷⁴ See <https://ms-my.facebook.com/MofaSomalia/posts/press-statement-for-immediate-releasemogadishu-somaliajune-04-2021the-federal-go/923440298234342/>.

press release, dated 5 June 2021, by AMISOM stating that it was conducting an investigation into the incident.⁷⁵

Accordingly, AMISOM replied to an official communication of the Panel on 17 June 2021, stating that no helicopter under AMISOM command and control was involved in the alleged airstrikes in El Adde and Hi-u-Gur.

On 17 July 2021, the FGS provided, via an official communication addressed to the Committee, additional evidence of the damage in the area.

The Panel sent two official communications to Kenya on 21 June and 9 August 2021 respectively. Kenya replied on 19 August 2021, denying possession of the type of ASM reportedly recovered in the areas of the strikes

On 14 July 2021, the Panel also sent a letter to a Member State, identified as the manufacturer of ASM with characteristics similar to those of the remnants recovered in the areas of the strikes, seeking its support to confirm the make of the ASM and potential users involved in operations in Somalia. The Member State denied having provided such a type of military asset to any of the troop contributing countries involved in the conflict in Somalia.

⁷⁵ See <https://amisom-au.org/2021/06/amisom-statement-on-reported-airstrikes-in-gedo-region/>

Annex 5.3: Considerations on sexual and gender-based violence related to the conflict in Somalia

The Panel noted an increase in reports of sexual and gender-based violence in Somalia as compared to 2020.⁷⁶ Interviews carried out by the Panel during its current mandate highlighted a number of concerns including the persistence of cases of sexual violence against children, lack of survivors' access to health care, as well as stigma and impunity hampering efforts to combat violations.⁷⁷ Humanitarian access restrictions due to insecurity and an insufficient number of female protection monitors⁷⁸ were also indicated as obstacles to the protection of survivors.

Prevalence of cases and under-reporting concerns

During its current mandate the Panel received 20 allegations of rape incidents, all involving women, from various locations in South-West State⁷⁹ and documented one case in Lower Shabelle and three in Bay. However, an accurate assessment of prevalence of cases remains difficult due to possible under-reporting, particularly linked to victims being discouraged by stigma attached to rape, and impunity. In one incident of rape perpetrated by Galjaeel militias near Bali Dogle on 19 December 2020, the victim, a 22-year-old woman from a minority clan, explained to the Panel: "Women from my clan cannot move safely in this area. There are checkpoints in Warmaxan, Tixsiile, Leego, Jiir Kulow, and women from my clan are targeted by other clans' militia and SNA from other clans. It is because of clan conflict and lack of justice that most of the cases in this area are not reported. There are no [justice] mechanisms that can support the victim".

Further interviews conducted by the Panel between March and April 2021 indicated that at least nine other cases of rape had taken place in the same area in the previous six months, with women from minority clans, notably Elay and Shanta Alemood, targeted by armed men from the Galjaeel clan or in SNA uniform.⁸⁰ The Panel was not able to independently corroborate these specific cases, because no official complaint was lodged by the victims and lack of medical reports. However, interviews with drivers of commercial passenger vehicles operating along the Afgoye-Wanlaweyne corridor confirmed that civilians were victims of repeated incidents of assault, robbery, extortion and SGBV perpetrated by militia manning illegal checkpoints along the road.⁸¹

According to data of the Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting (CTFMR), the southern regions of Somalia, namely Bay, Bakool, Gedo and Middle Juba, where a variety

⁷⁶ Data from the Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting on Children and Armed Conflict (CTFMR) for the period January-June 2020 and 2021, data from the Camp Coordination and Camp Management Complaint and Feedback mechanism January-August 2021, SG report on Somalia, interviews with community activists and women's rights organizations, January-July 2021. The CTFMR links this variation in reported cases to the increased number of monitors at the community level and strengthened linkages with service providers and community networks as compared to previous years.

⁷⁷ Interviews with humanitarian and women's rights organizations, January-July 2021.

⁷⁸ Protection monitors are part of the prevention and response mechanism on SGBV. As members of the community, they are the first entry point for data collection and monitoring of incidents and therefore represent an essential element of any community-based prevention and response intervention on SGBV.

⁷⁹ Interviews with local community elders in Baidoa, Marka, Wanla Weyne, Afgoye, Bufo Bacad, January to April 2021, and analysis of humanitarian and media reports, January to August 2021.

⁸⁰ Interviews with local community elders in Wanlaweyne area, March and April 2021.

⁸¹ Interviews with three truck drivers and one commercial driver in Mogadishu, February and March 2021.

of armed actors operate, recorded the highest numbers of conflict-related sexual violence cases involving child victims.⁸²

That Panel notes that various efforts by the humanitarian community in Somalia are underway to facilitate reporting, although these might not be specific only to SGBV. For example, the Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) cluster established a standardized complaints feedback mechanism (CFM) in July 2020 with the objective of uniformly capturing key complaint data which can be analyzed by humanitarian partners. Their monthly reports highlight main IDP complaints for locations where CCCM partners are active, allowing follow-up. Among the data captured by the CFM are also complaints related to the occurrence of SGBV incidents. Also, the CTFMR has noted a positive correlation between the increasing number of protection monitors and the number of incidents verified by the CTFMR members. However, the number of female monitors remains low, mainly due to security and access concerns.⁸³ The monitoring work demands constant movement to monitor and document incidents, and men have more freedom of movement and are less exposed to certain security risks in Somalia, particularly in areas that are not controlled by the Government.

SGBV in areas controlled by Al-Shabaab

The CTFMR reported an increase in documented cases of forced and early marriage perpetrated by Al-Shabaab.⁸⁴ The occurrence of these violations in areas controlled by Al-Shabaab is consistent with information gathered by the Panel during interviews with sources in Marka and Janaale, Lower Shabelle.⁸⁵ Forced and early marriage and denial of education, according to these accounts, was prevalent in Janaale when Al-Shabaab was in control of the town. The Panel was also informed that women who lived in Janaale while their husbands lived in areas controlled by the Government were regularly harassed by the group.⁸⁶ A community and women's activist interviewed by the Panel further reported that, even after the liberation of Janaale by Government forces in March 2020, women were reticent to disclose accounts of incidents which occurred under Al-Shabaab administration, as they were afraid of retaliation from the group, highlighting that Al-Shabaab was still monitoring the town and retains some control over the territory.⁸⁷

Al-Shabaab affiliated media released occasional reports of corporal punishment inflicted on women for contravening the group's directives in terms of dressing and behaviour.⁸⁸ The corroboration of these cases remains extremely difficult due to access restrictions to the areas controlled by the group. However, Panel interviews with civilians who had been detained in Idale and Buulo Fulay, two Al-Shabaab strongholds in Bay region, evidenced the use of torture and other cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment against both female and male civilians detained by the group.⁸⁹

⁸² CTFMR for the period January to June 2021.

⁸³ CTFMR working group discussion, August 2021.

⁸⁴ Comparative data from cases verified by the Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting (CTFMR) for the period January-June 2020 and January-June 2021.

⁸⁵ Interviews with members of the communities affected by forced displacement and local sources in Baidoa and Marka district, January, February and March 2021.

⁸⁶ Ibidem.

⁸⁷ Interview with women's right activist, March 2021.

⁸⁸ See <http://www.amiirnuur.com/?p=10733>.

⁸⁹ Interviews conducted with sources in Baidoa on 7, 8 and 9 June 2021.

Assistance to survivors

Response mechanisms⁹⁰ are in place to assist survivors of sexual violence cases, although there are gaps linked directly to insecurity and lack of access to certain areas of Somalia.⁹¹ In certain cases, victims were not able to access available services, especially where facilities were far or families were afraid of repercussions/stigmatization.⁹² According to the CTFMR, 77 per cent of the cases involving child victims verified between January and July 2021 received a response. However, the Panel is aware that some of the victims cannot receive adequate post rape response management as many of the health facilities, particularly in rural areas or where access and security restrictions exist, have inadequate Gender-Based Violence services.⁹³ These constraints were confirmed in a case corroborated by the Panel in Diinsor, an area under Al-Shabaab's blockade. On 15 February 2021, the Panel learned that specialized medical care for a rape survivor, a 12-year girl, was not available and travelling to the nearest medical centre was discarded by the family of the victim in order not to contravene Al-Shabaab's directives and avoid stigma.⁹⁴

Challenges to accountability

Accountability for rape and other SGBV incidents remains low. This is mainly due to the fact that in most cases perpetrators are not identified.⁹⁵ The CTFMR data for January-June 2021 for example, shows that in 67 per cent of the incidents verified, the perpetrator was unidentified. However, there are also other concerns that the Panel noted during its current mandate, notably cases where the attitude of police forces towards rape cases was dismissive and the resort to traditional mechanisms to solve these incidents at times without the victims or family of the victims' consent. In one incident monitored by the Panel, a journalist was arrested by the police in Abudwak town, Galgadud region, on 29 January 2021, for reporting on the case of a mother protesting the settlement of her daughter's rape and murder case through compensation.⁹⁶ While the elders of both clans had agreed to pay compensation, the mother demanded that the rapists be brought to justice. The journalist was freed later on the same day of his arrest without charge.⁹⁷ In another case in Baidoa, involving the rape and murder of two children on 7 April 2021, the father of the two victims reported to the Panel his frustrations at the repeated attempts by the police in Baidoa to dismiss the rape case, notwithstanding a death certificate clearly mentioning the crimes.⁹⁸

⁹⁰ These include medical assistance, Post Exposure Prophylaxis, transportation and/or Psycho-social support.

⁹¹ CTFMR working group discussion, August 2021, interviews with women's activists, March, April and June 2021.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ CTFMR working group discussion, August 2021, interviews with women's activists, March, April and June 2021.

⁹⁴ Interviews with sources in Dinsor, February 2021.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ See https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=750049465933269&id=204196037185284


⁹⁷ See <https://sjsyndicate.org/2021/02/11/sjs-condemns-recurring-violent-targeted-attacks-on-journalists-ingalmudug-puntland-hirshabelle-and-mogadishu/>

⁹⁸ Interviews with the father of the two victims, July and August 2021. Documentary evidence, including the death certificate issued by the Bay Regional Hospital, related to the case of Abdimuncim Sheikh Aweys Abdullahi, 9 years old, and Aamina Sheikh Aweys Abdullahi, 8 years old.

Annex 6: Charcoal stockpile analysis

Satellite Analysis: Kismayo

Figures 1 and 2: Satellite imagery revealed no fluctuations across all stockpile locations in Kismayo and Buur Gaabo. For example, the images below, from 29 December 2020 and 31 May 2021, respectively, show no changes to the Dalcadda Charcoal Site in Kismayo, Lower Juba, Somalia.



Source: Confidential.

Satellite Analysis: Barawe

Figures 3 and 4: Analysis revealed some fluctuation in Barawe in 'area 4', highlighted in yellow, between 22 May and 16 June 2021. However, the approximate number of bags removed is difficult to assess based on the quality of the images and the manner in which the bags are organized.



Source: Confidential.



Source: ©2021 DigitalGlobe