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A map of Sudan with a yellowish-brown background. The Nile River is shown in blue, flowing from the top right towards the bottom right. The Nubia Desert is labeled in the top right. Wadi Halfa is marked with a white dot in the north. Omdurman and Khartoum are marked with red circles in the south. The Nile is labeled in blue on the right side. The word 'SUDAN' is written in large, bold, black letters in the center. Below it, 'Omdurman' and 'Khartoum' are written in bold, black letters. 'Khartoum' is underlined. The Nile is labeled in blue on the right side. The word 'SUDAN' is written in large, bold, black letters in the center. Below it, 'Omdurman' and 'Khartoum' are written in bold, black letters. 'Khartoum' is underlined. The Nile is labeled in blue on the right side.

Wadi Halfa

Nubia
Des

SUDAN

Omdurman

Khartoum

Nile

Sudan: Query Response

The situation in Khartoum and Omdurman – An update (3rd version)

5 February 2020 (COI between 10 July 2018 and 10 December 2019)

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Explanatory Note

This report presents country of origin information (COI) on Sudan specifically in relation to the situation in Khartoum and Omdurman from 10th July 2018 to 10th December 2019 on issues identified to be of relevance in refugee status determination for Sudanese nationals. This report is the third update and follows Asylum Research Centre (ARC), [Query Response, The situation in Khartoum and Omdurman – An update](#) of 13 September 2018, which in turn was an update of ARC's [Situation in Khartoum and Omdurman](#) report published 9 September 2015.


ARC was instructed to research the following issues:

What are the living conditions and treatment of those persons who habitually reside in Khartoum or Omdurman, especially those who are not originally from there, focusing on:

- *Darfuri*
- *Nuba* [Note: Not to be confused with the Nubian of north Sudan]
- *Other ethnic and/or religious minorities*
- *Students, political activists, human rights activists and journalists who are not originally from these cities or who support persons not originally from there*
- *IDPs*
- *Returnees*
- *Women*
- *Children*
- *Individuals of diverse sexual orientation or gender identity*

Only COI that specifically referred to these distinct profile groups has been included unless otherwise stated. Note that a range of civilians living in Khartoum and Omdurman and persons participating in demonstrations have also been affected in the reporting period but that often sources do not specify the origin or profile of those targeted and arrested.

Also note that Greater Khartoum consists of the three towns of Khartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman. However, sources do not consistently distinguish between these and therefore when describing 'Khartoum' it should be borne in mind that they may either be referring to Khartoum the city, Greater Khartoum the tripartite area or Khartoum state. Radio Dabanga¹ provided the following infographic of Khartoum state localities:



¹ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan's govt. militia starts 'head-shaving campaign' in Khartoum North](#), 23 September 2018

It should be further noted that conducting human rights research in Sudan, including in urban settings such as Khartoum and Omdurman, can be limited as exemplified by the following sources:

- ❖ Human Rights Watch, [*Sudan: End Network Shutdown Immediately, Internet Vital for Safety, Communications in Crisis*](#), 12 June 2019
Sudan's ongoing internet shutdown is a gross violation of human rights and should be lifted immediately, Human Rights Watch said today. Disruptions to access escalated over the past week and the country is now almost entirely cut off from the internet, after forces violently attacked and dispersed protesters. The authorities should immediately restore access to the internet. It is vital for emergency communications, including information from health care providers, and to access other basic information in times of crisis [...]
The shutdown has resulted in wide-ranging harm. The outage has prevented activists and residents from reporting critical information about the volatile situation in Sudan, where government forces led by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces – known for their abusive campaigns in Darfur, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile – have reportedly continued to commit abuses following the June 3 attack [...]
Before the current shutdowns, Sudan's government had blocked access to social media platforms – including Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and the messaging service WhatsApp – intermittently between December 2018 and April 2019 [...]
- ❖ Human Rights Watch, [*Interview: Will Sudan's New Dawn Bring a Chance for Justice? Leaders Should Prioritize Justice for Protester Killings*](#), 17 November 2019
[...] Months of protests led to the ouster of Sudan's autocratic president of 30 years, Omar al-Bashir, in April [2019] this year. But even as al-Bashir was detained, demonstrations continued across the country calling for a transition to civilian rule and for peace and justice. But the government's forces turned on them, killing over a hundred in early June. East Africa director Jehanne Henry spoke to Audrey Wabwire about Human Rights Watch's new report documenting the violence against protesters, the importance of justice, and the power behind the Sudan revolution. [...]
How did you get this information? Isn't the country still closed to human rights groups?
[...] While in-country, we were cautious because Sudan's government has yet to openly welcome rights groups, but we still managed to move around and interview key witnesses. [...]
Sudan has not formally granted permission to human rights groups. Under the al-Bashir regime human rights activists and researchers would be arrested, detained, or deported. Although we are optimistic about future engagements, we are yet to see how this new government will treat human rights workers. [...]
- ❖ Reporters Without Borders, [*Sudan still awaits its press freedom revolution*](#), 3 December 2019
[...] The NISS [National Intelligence and Security Service] may be less visible on the ground but it is still very active online. Several journalists have told RSF that the "Cyber Jihadist Unit" – a troll army created in the wake of the Arab springs to monitor online content – continues to infiltrate WhatsApp discussion groups and to spread false information attacking the transitional government on social networks. Propaganda, surveillance and censorship are all still part of the methods used by the NISS [...]

The COI presented is illustrative, but not exhaustive of the information available in the public domain, nor is it determinative of any individual human rights or asylum claim. All sources are publicly available and a direct hyperlink has been provided.

A list of sources and databases consulted is also provided, to enable users to conduct further research and to conduct source assessments. Research focused on **events** between 10th July 2018 and 10th December 2019. All sources were accessed in December 2019 and January 2020.

The following reports which post-date the cut-off point have been included given that they address issues of relevance of this report:

- ❖ Radio Dabanga, [*Thousands of homeless people try to survive in Sudanese capital*](#), 21 December 2019
- ❖ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [*Sudan: Extrajudicial killing and incommunicado detention: A Report covering the events of December 13, 2018 to April 11, 2019*](#), 10 January 2020
- ❖ UNOCHA, [*Humanitarian Needs Overview*](#), January 2020
- ❖ Human Rights Watch, [*World Report 2020: Sudan, Events of 2019*](#), 13 January 2020
- ❖ UN Security Council, [*Letter dated 10 January 2019 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council \[S/2020/36\]*](#), 14 January 2020
- ❖ Radio Dabanga, [*Sudan: Victims of human rights abuse can file complaints now*](#), 14 January 2020
- ❖ Radio Dabanga, [*Sudanese Pound continues to fall, food prices rising again*](#), 18 January 2020
- ❖ Radio Dabanga, [*Interview – Elin Skaar on Sudan transitional justice: 'No victorious army has ever been prosecuted'*](#), 19 January 2020
- ❖ Christian [*Solidarity Worldwide, Christian businessman detained at airport upon return from exile*](#), 28 January 2020

This document is intended to be used as a tool to help to identify relevant COI and the COI referred to in this report can be considered by decision makers in assessing asylum applications and appeals. **This report is not a substitute for individualised case-specific research and therefore this document should not be submitted in isolation as evidence to refugee decision-making authorities.** Whilst every attempt has been made to ensure accuracy, the authors accept no responsibility for any errors included in this report.

Sources and databases consulted

Not all of the sources listed here have been consulted for each issue addressed in the report. Additional sources to those individually listed were consulted via database searches. This non-exhaustive list is intended to assist in further case-specific research. To find out more about an organisation, view the 'About Us' tab of a source's website.

Not all of the sources listed here have been consulted for each issue addressed in the report. Additional sources to those individually listed were consulted via database searches. This non-exhaustive list is intended to assist in further case-specific research. To find out more about an organisation, view the 'About Us' tab of a source's website.

Databases

[Asylos's Research Notes](#)

[EASO COI Portal](#)

[European Country of Origin Information Network \(ECOI\)](#)

[Relief Web](#)

[UNHCR Refworld](#)

News

[Afol News](#)

[All Africa](#)

[Al Jazeera](#)

[The East African](#)

[Gurtong](#)

[Inter Press Service](#)

[The New Humanitarian \[Sudan pages\]](#)

[Radio Dabanga](#)

[Radio Miraya](#)

[Radio Tamazuj](#)

[Reuters Africa \[Sudan pages\]](#)

[Sudan Tribune](#)

Sources

[28 too Many \[FGM\]](#)

[76 Crimes \[LGBT\]](#)

[Aidsmap](#)

[Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project \(ACLED\) \[Sudan pages\]](#)

[Article 19 \[Freedom of expression and information\]](#)

[Aegis Trust](#)

[African Arguments \[Sudan pages\]](#)

[African Studies Centre Leiden](#)

[Africa Center for Strategic Studies](#)

[African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes \(ACCORD\)](#)

[African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies \(ACJPS\)](#)

[Africa Review](#)

[African Union Peace and Security Council](#)

[Alliance for Child Protection in Humanitarian Action](#)

[Amnesty International \[Sudan pages\]](#)

[Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit \(ATLEU\)](#)

[Assessment Capacities Project \(ACAPS\) \[Sudan pages\]](#)
[Association for the Prevention of Torture](#)
[Atlantic Council](#)
[Atlas of Torture](#)
[Avert \[HIV/AIDS\]](#)
[Brookings Institution](#)
[Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies \[Sudan pages\]](#)
[Carnegie Endowment for International Peace](#)
[Centre for Security Governance](#)
[Centre for Strategic and International Studies](#)
[Child Rights International Network \[Sudan pages\]](#)
[Christian Solidarity Worldwide](#)
[The Christian Post](#)
[CHR Michelsen Institute \[Sudan pages\]](#)
[CIA World Factbook \[Sudan pages\]](#)
[Combatting Terrorism Center](#)
[Committee to Protect Journalists \[Sudan pages\]](#)
[Darfur Network for Monitoring and Documentation](#)
[Darfur Women Action Group](#)
[Death Penalty Worldwide \(Cornell Law School\)](#)
[Displacement Tracking Matrix \(DTM\) \[Sudan pages\]](#)
[Doctors Without Borders](#)
[The Economist Intelligence Unit \[Sudan pages\]](#)
[EASO's List of sources in its report 'Researching the situation of lesbian, gay, and bisexual persons \(LGBT\) in countries of origin'](#)
[Edge Media Network \[LGBT\]](#)
[Eldis](#)
[Enough Project](#)
[Equal Rights Trust](#)
[Eric Reeves, Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy](#)
[European Council on Foreign Relations \(ECFR\)](#)
[European Institute of the Mediterranean \(IEMed\)](#)
[Foreign Affairs \(published by Council on Foreign Relations\) \[Sudan pages\]](#)
[Freedom House – Freedom in the World 2019 \[Sudan pages\]](#)
[Frontline Defenders](#)
[Gay Star News](#)
[Global Aids Program Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation](#)
[Global Centre for the responsibility to protect](#)
[Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack \[Sudan pages\]](#)
[The Global Forum on MSM and HIV](#)
[Global Fund for Peace](#)
[Global Gayz](#)
[Global Initiative on Psychiatry](#)
[GlobalSecurity.org](#)
[Governance Social Development Humanitarian Conflict \(GSDRC\)](#)
[Hands off Cain](#)
[Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research](#)
[Hudo Centre](#)
[Humanitarian Response \[Sudan pages\]](#)
[Hudson Institute](#)
[Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust \[Sudan pages\]](#)

[Humanity & Inclusion \[formerly Handicap International\]](#)
[Human Rights Watch \[Sudan pages\]](#)
[Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan/Small Arms Survey](#)
[Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada](#)
[Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa](#)
[Institute for Economics & Peace – Global Peace Index 2018](#)
[Institute for the Study of War](#)
[Institute for War and Peace Reporting](#)
[Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre \(IDMC\) \[Sudan pages\]](#)
[Inter-African Committees on Traditional Practices](#)
[International Alert](#)
[International Bar Association](#)
[International Centre for Prison Studies](#)
[International Commission of Jurists](#)
[International Committee of the Red Cross \(ICRC\)](#)
[International Crisis Group](#)
[International Disability Alliance](#)
[International Federation for Human Rights \[Africa pages\]](#)
[International Federation of Journalists](#)
[International Freedom of Expression Exchange](#)
[International Institute for Strategic Studies](#)
[International Labour Organisation \(ILO\) \[Sudan pages\]](#)
[International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Trans and Intersex Association \(ILGA\)](#)
[International Organization for Migration \(IOM\)](#)
[International Office for Migration Sudan Mission](#)
[International Refugee Rights Initiative](#)
[International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims](#)
[International Rescue Committee](#)
[IPI Global Observatory](#)
[Jamestown Foundation](#)
[Kaleidoscope Trust \[LGBT\]](#)
[Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor](#)
[Long War Journal](#)
[Medecins Sans Frontieres/Doctors Without Borders \[Sudan pages\]](#)
[Minority Rights Group International](#)
[Minorities at Risk Project](#)
[National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism \(START\) – Global Terrorism Database \(GTD\)](#)
[Nuba Relief, Rehabilitation and Development Organization](#)
[Nuba Reports](#)
[Oakland Institute](#)
[OECD's Social Institutions & Gender Index](#)
[Open Society Foundations](#)
[Orchid Project \[FGM\]](#)
[Organization for Refuge, Asylum & Migration \(ORAM\)](#)
[Out Right Action International \[LGBT\]](#)
[Overseas Development Institute \(ODI\)](#)
[Oxfam](#)
[Peace Women](#)
[Penal Reform International](#)
[Physicians for Human Rights](#)

[Pink News \[LGBT\]](#)
[Refugees International](#)
[Rift Valley Institute](#)
[Reporters Without Borders](#)
[Right to Education](#)
[Saferworld](#)
[Save the Children](#)
[Sexual Rights Initiative \[LGBT\]](#)
[Small Arms Survey](#)
[SOGICA Database \[LGBT\]](#)
[South Kordofan Blue Nile Coordination Unit \(SKBLCU\)](#)
[Sudan Democracy First Group](#)
[Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa](#)
[Sudan Consortium](#)
[Sudan Social Development Organisation](#)
[Stop FGM Now](#)
[Their World](#)
[Transparency International](#)
[UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office \[Annual Human Rights Report 2018\]](#)
[UNAMID \(UN African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur\)](#)
[United Nations Children's Fund \(UNICEF\) \[Sudan pages\]](#)
[United Nations Committee Against Torture](#)
[United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights](#)
[United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women](#)
[United Nations Committee on Enforced Disappearances](#)
[United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child](#)
[United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities](#)
[United Nations Development Programme \(UNDP\)](#)
[United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees \(UNHCR\)](#)
[United Nations Human Rights Council](#)
[United Nations Human Settlements Programme \(UNHABITAT\)](#)
[United Nations Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan](#)
[United Nations News Centre](#)
[United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs \(UNOCHA\)](#)
[United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights \(OHCHR\)](#)
[United Nations Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict](#)
[United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime \(UNODC\)](#)
[United Nations Population Fund \(UNPFPA\)](#)
[United Nations Secretary General](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to education](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders](#)

[United Nations Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially in women and children](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences](#)
[United Nations Women](#)
[United Nations World Food Programme \(WFP\)](#)
[United States Institute of Peace](#)
[United States Congressional Research Service](#)
[United States Department of State \[Annual human rights report; annual religious report; annual child labour report; annual trafficking report; annual terrorism report\]](#)
[Unrepresented Nations and People's Organisation](#)
[Uppsala Universitet – UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia](#)
[Validity \[Mental Health\]](#)
[Waging Peace](#)
[Walk Free Foundation > The 2016 Global Slavery Index](#)
[Women Under Siege Project](#)
[World Bank \[Sudan pages\]](#)
[World Health Organisation \(WHO\) \[Sudan pages\]](#)
[Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict](#)
[World Organisation Against Torture](#)
[World Prison Brief](#)
[Women Living Under Muslim Laws](#)
[Women News Network \(WNN\)](#)
[Women's Refugee Commission](#)
[WorldWatch Monitor \[Sudan pages\]](#)

List of Acronyms

ACPJS	African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COI	Country of Origin Information
DBA	Darfur Bar Association
FCPU	Family and Child Protection Unit
FFM	Fact Finding Mission
FGM/C	Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting
FIDH	International Federation for Human Rights
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GoS	Government of Sudan
HAC	Humanitarian Aid Commission
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IPC	Integrated Phase Classification
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
LGBTIQ	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex and Queer
MICS	Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
NAD	Non-Arab Darfuri
NCCW	National Council for Child Welfare
NCP	National Congress Party or National Islamic Party
NISS	National Intelligence and Security Service
NS	National Service
NSA	National Security Act
NUP	National Umma Party
OMCT	World Organisation Against Torture
POL	Public Order Law
POR	Public Order Regime
PoW	Prisoner of War
RAC	Revolutionary Awakening Council
RSF	Rapid Support Force
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SCOC	Sudanese Church of Christ
SCP	Sudanese Congress Party
SDFG	Sudan Democracy First Group
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SIHA	Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa
SLM/A	Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
SLM-AW	Sudan Liberation Movement -Abdel Wahid
SPEC	Sudan Presbyterian Evangelical Church
SPLM/A - N	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army - North
SUDO	Sudan Social Development Organisation
UASC	Unaccompanied And Separated Children
UNAMID	African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation (Mission) in Darfur
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USCIRF	US Commission on International Religious Freedom
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation
WWW	World Watch Monitor

Preface: Protests in Sudan, particularly Khartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman from December 2018

The following section provides a brief overview of the protests in Sudan between December 2018 and April 2019 to illustrate the range of profiles of persons involved and the government's treatment thereof.

For a thorough analysis on the protests that began in December 2018 consult the Human Rights Watch report [*"They Were Shouting 'Kill Them'", Sudan's Violent Crackdown on Protesters in Khartoum*](#), 17 November 2019, *Background, Protests Since December*.

The UN Security Council report on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 4 October 2018 to 3 January 2019 noted that "On 19 December [2018] [...] protests over the rising price of bread and other food commodities took place in various states throughout the Sudan, including Khartoum, River Nile, Red Sea, North Darfur, White Nile, Northern Kordofan, Al-Gedaref and Port Sudan [...] As protesters also called on President Bashir to step down, the Government declared a state of emergency and ordered the indefinite closure of schools and colleges in the Sudan. Nevertheless, the protests continued, on 31 December [2018], including in Khartoum, where the police reportedly resorted to the use of tear gas and live ammunition to disperse the protesters [...] The protests continued in the first week of January [2019], including in Khartoum and Omdurman [*sic*]. On 10 January [2019], the Sudanese authorities announced that 22 people had been killed by that date in a series of demonstrations".²

Radio Dabanga reported that in early January 2019 Sudanese police and paramilitary forces "fired on peaceful demonstrators [...] using live ammunition and tear gas".³ According to the same article the demonstrators "chanted slogans of freedom, peace and justice, and the revolution is the choice of the people, the people want to overthrow the regime, and peaceful against the thieves. A new slogan was added: "You arrogant racist, all the country is Darfur" in a clear reference to the Sudanese rejection of the campaign of the regime against Darfuri students".⁴ Radio Dabanga also reported in the same month that police and security forces continued to "used teargas, violence and excessive force to disperse the protesters", who were chanting "slogans calling for the overthrow of the regime, and denounced the fabricated charges against a number of detained Darfuri students accused of being trained by the Mossad".⁵

A news article published by the UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner in January 2019 reported that "Credible reports of the use of excessive force, including live ammunition, by State security forces against protestors across Sudan over the past month are deeply worrying, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet said [...] The demonstrations since 19 December 2018 have taken place in a number of cities across Sudan, including [...] Khartoum [...] and Omdurman. The Government has confirmed that 24 people have died in the course of the protests, but other credible reports suggest the death toll may be nearly twice as high. Many others have been injured [...] Authorities have also confirmed that up to 6 January [2019], at least 816 people

² UN Security Council, [*African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General*](#), 14 January 2019, *para. 20*

³ Radio Dabanga, [*Sudan forces suppress new Khartoum march with live fire*](#), 1 January 2019

⁴ Radio Dabanga, [*Sudan forces suppress new Khartoum march with live fire*](#), 1 January 2019

⁵ Radio Dabanga, [*Mass response across Sudan to 'Friday of Freedom and Change'*](#), 6 January 2019

were arrested in connection with the demonstrations. Reports indicate that these include journalists, opposition leaders, protestors and representatives of civil society”.⁶

The International Federation for Human Rights reported that “Since December 19, 2018, the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) and police have carried out a mass campaign of arrests targeting human rights defenders with arbitrary arrest and prolonged detention, in some cases incommunicado, for their participation or suspected participation in protests that have broken out in different parts of Sudan, denouncing the rising cost of living and calling for President Omar Al-Bashir to step down. Human rights defenders have been arrested while at home, work, or during protests”.⁷

The same source further documented that:

During this period, 31 human rights defenders have been arrested and all, except one, remain detained to date [...]. Four have been subjected to long detention periods under the emergency law declared in some states. At least two of them have been detained more than once since December 2018. Several detainees were moved to places of detention outside their original states thus hindering access to family visits, lawyers and health care. Isolation, combined with the well-documented use by the NISS of torture and other forms of ill-treatment against detainees, particularly whilst held in unknown locations, gives rise to serious concerns for their safety [...]
Eleven of the human rights defenders currently targeted are lawyers.⁸

In addition, the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) reported that in the period between December 2018 and February 2019 it had recorded the “arbitrary arrest and detention of 116 political activists [...] for their participation or suspected involvement in the ongoing anti-government protests”.⁹ The same source further elaborated:

Authorities have targeted opposition party leaders and members who are actively involved in the ongoing protest. Many were arrested during protests and raids in private residences and party houses.
Of the 116 political activists detained, 31 are members of the Sudanese communist party, 49 are Baath Arabic party members and 36 are members of the Sudanese Congress party. The detainees are being held incommunicado by the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) at their offices in Khartoum Bahri and NISS sections attached to the various prisons across Sudan including; Omdurman women’s prison, Port Sudan prison in Red Sea state, Shala prison of North Darfur and El-Fashir prison. No charges have been brought against them. ACJPS has received reliable information that detainees have not had access to lawyer or family visits since their arrests.¹⁰

In February 2019 “Thousands of Sudanese took to the streets again in Omdurman [...] in protest against the detention of hundreds of women demonstrators”, but were met by security forces who

⁶ UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, [Reports of excessive force against Sudan protests deeply worrying – Bachelet](#), 17 January 2019

⁷ International Federation for Human Rights, [SUDAN: Serious concerns about the arrest of 30 human rights defenders in violent crackdown against peaceful protests](#), 12 February 2019

⁸ International Federation for Human Rights, [SUDAN: Serious concerns about the arrest of 30 human rights defenders in violent crackdown against peaceful protests](#), 12 February 2019

⁹ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: 116 Political Activists detained incommunicado without charge amidst violent crackdown on the anti -government peaceful protests since December 2018](#), 19 February 2019

¹⁰ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: 116 Political Activists detained incommunicado without charge amidst violent crackdown on the anti -government peaceful protests since December 2018](#), 19 February 2019

“responded to the demonstrations ‘with excessive violence’, using live ammunition, tear gas, batons and electric wires to disperse the protesters, causing many casualties”.¹¹

In its report published in April 2019 Physicians for Human Rights summarised the situation as follows and highlighted the treatment of medical personnel during the protests:

Since Sudanese protesters took to the streets in December 2018 to demonstrate against government corruption, economic mismanagement, and brutal repression, forces loyal to the government of President Omar al-Bashir have carried out massive violations of human rights. Peaceful protesters have been attacked by government security forces using disproportionate, unnecessary, and sometimes lethal force. They have been arrested and detained without charges and denied access to their families or medical care. Government security forces and police have prevented medical personnel from attending to the wounded and, in many cases, have arrested and detained these personnel, conducted incursions and attacks inside medical facilities, and targeted, injured, and even killed health workers while they have been carrying out their medical duties or participating in the protest movement. To date, police and National Intelligence and Security Services forces have entered and conducted attacks on at least seven medical facilities, arrested at least 136 health personnel, fired tear gas and other weapons into hospital wards, and closed access to medical care for patients. At the time of publication, 60 protesters had been killed by government forces (one was a practicing doctor and two were medical students).¹²

With specific reference to medical personnel, the same report found that:

News reports and direct communications note that medical personnel have been prevented from attending to the wounded and, in many cases, have been arrested and detained, or attacked inside medical facilities and targeted for carrying out their duties. National Intelligence and Security Services forces have entered medical facilities, arrested health professionals, fired tear gas and other weapons into hospital wards, and closed access to medical care for citizens [...]

Interviews with Sudanese physicians noted that doctors are being directly and intentionally targeted by government forces as a form of intimidation because “they hate us so much. They blame us for the revolution.” Another doctor stated that he takes explicit measures to avoid being targeted as a physician: “It is important that when attending the protest, you leave your identification papers or documents far away and even your phone.” A third doctor stressed the point that “I just know that being arrested as a doctor, you will be treated very differently from others.... They do not release doctors. We are more exposed to violence and assault.... This regime believes that doctors have a major role in leading the protests.” Another reported the intimidation he feels as a result of what has happened when his medical colleagues have been targeted: “I know that if a doctor gets arrested, they will be detained for a long time. I’m afraid of being a doctor in Sudan. We are all afraid.”¹³

An African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies report covering the events of 13 December 2018 to 11 April 2019 summarised that:

The peaceful protests that broke out in December 2018 were responded to by excessive use of force employing live ammunition, rubber bullets, tear gas, plastic and wooden batons and sniping from the roofs of high buildings. Shooting protesters from high buildings resulted in direct shots on the heads and upper body parts of civilians including special needs children. All these repressive measures were used in a large scale as of December 29, 2018 until April 12, 2019. Protesters were killed by direct gunshots during the protests, or crackdowns and arbitrary detention at dwellings. As a result,

¹¹ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan demos in support of women detainees](#), 11 February 2019

¹² Physicians for Human Rights, Intimidation and Persecution, [Sudan’s Attacks on Peaceful Protesters and Physicians](#), April 2019, *Executive Summary*, p. 3

¹³ Physicians for Human Rights, Intimidation and Persecution, [Sudan’s Attacks on Peaceful Protesters and Physicians](#), April 2019, *Background*, p. 4 and *Violations Against Medical Personnel*, p. 10

hundreds of men and women incurred different injuries and wounds that necessitated undergoing operations leading to the amputation of limbs in some cases. [...]

Within the mandate of the report, it has been observed that 65 civilians were killed during the period from December 14, 2018 to April 11, 2019. These victims passed away of different cause; but these causes derive primarily from ill-treatment and excessive use of force on the part of the Sudanese authorities. [...]

The African Center also documented about 2500 arrests in the country during the period covered by the report. These arrests included political activists, civilians, human rights activists, lawyers, doctors, engineers and trade union leaders. [...] During this period detainees suffered from torture and ill-treatment in incommunicado detention for long periods before allowing their relatives to see them on short visits under close vigilance by the agents of the security service.¹⁴

Human Rights Watch described that:

Following months of protests, Sudan's president for 30 years, Omar al-Bashir, was ousted in April [2019] and replaced by a military council. Following negotiations between the military leaders and opposition groups, a transitional government led by a "sovereign council" composed of military and civilian members replaced the military council in August [2019].

The periods of protests both before and after al-Bashir's ouster was marked by serious human rights violations against protesters, starting December 2018. Government security forces routinely used live ammunition against unarmed protesters, detained activists and political opponents, censored media and blocked access to the internet. After April 11, Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—the paramilitary force known for attacks on civilians in Darfur since 2013—continued the crackdowns. The bloodiest was their attack on the protesters' sit-in in Khartoum on June 3 [2019].¹⁵

Human Rights Watch also provided the following summary with regards to the protests that occurred across Sudan since December 2018, which culminated in the incident on 3rd June 2019 in Khartoum:

[...] From the beginning in December [2018], government security forces, particularly the National Security and Intelligence Service (NISS), responded to the protests with excessive force, using live bullets to disperse unarmed protesters. They rounded up thousands of protesters, opposition leaders, organizers and activists, often violently, and detained hundreds without charge for months, beating and abusing many. They censored the media by confiscating newspapers, arresting journalists, blocking social media, and shutting down or expelling foreign media [...]

[On 3rd June 2019] a large number of government forces, including the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – the paramilitary force established in 2013 which carried out highly abusive counter insurgency campaigns in Darfur, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile – surrounded the sit-in area. After an initial attempt by men in police uniforms to move a barricade, witnesses said RSF soldiers opened fire on unarmed protesters, instantly killing many. The soldiers rounded up and beat protestors, subjecting them to various abuses and humiliation, burned tents and looted and destroyed property. They also raped protesters and committed other acts of sexual violence.¹⁶

With regards to the death toll of the 3rd of June 2019 violence "Human Rights Watch was not able to ascertain the total number of those killed during the attack on June 3 [2019] and in the following days. Independent doctors' groups reported credible estimates of over 120 protesters killed between June 3 and 18 [2019] and over nine hundred injured, some severely. They also reported bodies were pulled from the Nile river, two of whom were tied to bricks showing gunshot wounds,

¹⁴ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: Extrajudicial killing and incommunicado detention: A Report covering the events of December 13, 2018 to April 11, 2019](#), 10 January 2020, Executive Summary, p.1, 1. Extrajudicial Killing, p.11, and 5. Arbitrary and Incommunicado Detention, p.20

¹⁵ Human Rights Watch, [World Report 2020: Sudan, Events of 2019](#), 13 January 2020

¹⁶ Human Rights Watch, ["They Were Shouting 'Kill Them'", Sudan's Violent Crackdown on Protesters in Khartoum](#), 17 November 2019, Summary

pointing to possible execution. Dozens were reported missing. The official death toll, 87, was widely rejected as too low”.¹⁷

The Darfur Women Action Group noted in its blog entry of 14th August 2019 that “More than 100 Sudanese are still missing from the June 3rd [2019] attacks (perpetrated by the ruling TMC) despite 11 complaints being submitted to the Khartoum North Court and a memorandum en route to the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights as well as the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights”.¹⁸ At the end of August 2019 the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) announced that “43 of the protestors who went missing during the violent dismantling of the sit-in in front of the army command in Khartoum on June 3 [2019], have been found. The spokesman for the SPA Initiative for Missing People, Musab Ajabeldoor, said [...] the bodies of four protestors listed as missing after what has become known as the Ramadan 29 Massacre, were found in mortuaries. He said that most of those found alive were traumatised by what they had seen during the break-up of the sit-in, or subjected to ill-treatment in detention”.¹⁹

In September 2019 the “formation of the first government since the military removed longtime ruler Omar al-Bashir in April [2019]” was announced by the Prime Minister, Abdalla Hamdok.²⁰ According to Al Jazeera, “The government was formed as part of a three-year power-sharing deal signed [in August 2019] [...] between the military, civilian parties and protest groups [...] According to last month’s deal, a sovereign council will preside over the first 21 months before handing over to civilian leadership for another 18 months ahead of elections”.²¹

1. Security situation, including evidence of attacks and other forms of ill-treatment of specific groups

1.1. Violence against members of specific groups

1.1.1. Darfuri

For specific information on violence against Darfuri students see [1.1.4. Students, political activists, human rights activists and journalists who are not originally from these cities or who support persons not originally from there](#) and for specific information on the arbitrary arrest and detention of Darfuri students see [1.2.4. Students, political activists, human rights activists and journalists who are not originally from these cities or who support persons not originally from there](#).

Khartoum

A joint study by the Humanitarian Policy Group and Research & Evidence Facility, who carried out field work at the end of 2017 and published its findings in August 2018, found that “Contrary to the narrative that the Darfur conflict is over and that stability is being restored, this study provides evidence of persistent and pervasive harassment (including attack, arrest and detention),

¹⁷ Human Rights Watch, [“They Were Shouting ‘Kill Them’”, Sudan’s Violent Crackdown on Protesters in Khartoum](#), 17 November 2019, *Summary*

¹⁸ Darfur Women Action Group, [Sudan’s transition between hope and skepticism](#), 14 August 2019

¹⁹ Radio Dabanga, [SPA: 43 ‘missing’ Sudan protestors accounted for](#), 29 August 2019

²⁰ Al Jazeera, [Sudan forms first cabinet since removal of al-Bashir](#), 6 September 2019

²¹ Al Jazeera, [Sudan forms first cabinet since removal of al-Bashir](#), 6 September 2019

surveillance and discrimination against Darfuris of particular ethnic groups, within Darfur and in Khartoum”.²²

A Sudanese political scientist [PS] and governance advisor for the British Council in Sudan, was recorded by the UK Home Office Fact-Finding Mission in August 2018 as stating that “Asked if there were individual factors that might affect the government’s attitude to Darfuris – such as age, how recently a person left Darfur, income, gender and education – the PS agreed these might affect the government’s attitude towards an individual. Education works both ways, may allow for more opportunity but may also raise suspicion”.²³

In contrast, Dr Ahmed Eltoum Salim, who started the European & African Centre (EAC) in Sudan, denied that Darfuris have problems from the government and stated that he “had not witnessed any discrimination in Khartoum due to a person’s ethnicity. There are human rights abuses, but Darfuris are not targeted”.²⁴ Similarly, the Second Secretary Political [PS] from the British Embassy stated that he “does not consider there is marginalisation of Darfuris within Khartoum [...] There is no overriding racism or discrimination against Darfuris”.²⁵ The first secretary of a Western Embassy told the UK Home Office fact finding mission when asked whether Darfuris were “in general at risk of arrest and detention” that he “did not have impression that in general Darfuris are targeted although it may depend on their other characteristics. It is not one factor that puts someone at risk, but several factors. For example, being a Darfuri, a Christian and a student increases the risk that the person would receive greater attention from NISS”.²⁶ A “western Country B official” who had been in Sudan for one year at the time of the interview with UK Home Office fact finding mission officials in September 2018 noted that he “was not aware of a specific profile of Darfuri who may be targeted by the GoS [Government of Sudan] but noted it was a difficult topic to discuss with local staff at the western government B’s Embassy”.²⁷

Siddig Yousef [SY], member of the central committee of the Communist Party and head of the Sudanese Solidarity Committee, told the UK Home Office fact finding mission in August 2018 that “Asked about day-to-day life for Darfuris in Khartoum and how they are treated by other Sudanese, SY thought they were treated like everyone else, no special treatment, day to day life goes on. Asked how they were treated by the government, SY considered that if there was no link with rebel groups then there would be no problem. However, the government accuses / suspects Darfuris are linked with rebels, so discriminates against Darfuris in accessing jobs, e.g. if in competition with a different tribe. Darfuris would be targeted if they took part in demonstrations. Asked if the government undertakes widespread arrests of Darfuris, SY said no. However, SY noted that if arrested, Darfuris are treated worse than other Sudanese prisoners, their hands are chained and they are blindfolded”.²⁸

²² Humanitarian Policy Group (ODI)/Research & Evidence Facility (REF), [*Darfuri migration from Sudan to Europe, From displacement to despair \(Summary\)*](#), August 2018, *Summary, Causes of migration*, p. 2

²³ UK Home Office, [*Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018*](#), November 2018, *Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, A Sudanese political scientist*, p. 109

²⁴ UK Home Office, [*Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018*](#), November 2018, *Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, Dr Ahmed Eltoum Salim*, p. 133

²⁵ UK Home Office, [*Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018*](#), November 2018, *Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, Second Secretary Political*, p. 136 and 137

²⁶ UK Home Office, [*Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018*](#), November 2018, *Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, An official of Western Embassy A*, p. 140

²⁷ UK Home Office, [*Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018*](#), November 2018, *Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, An official of Western Embassy B*, p. 154

²⁸ UK Home Office, [*Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018*](#), November 2018, *Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, Siddig Yousef*, p. 159

The UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan reported in his report covering the period 28 September 2018 to 30 June 2019 that:

Soon after the start of the major demonstrations in Khartoum and other Sudanese cities in December 2018, reports emerged of alleged acts of violent repression of protesters by Sudanese security force [...]

The Independent Expert received reports that on 25 December [2018], security forces that were deployed in large numbers across Khartoum used live ammunition to disperse crowds of protesters, resulting in multiple injuries and fatalities. Snipers reportedly used civilian premises, including schools, to target protesters. The Government spokesperson stated during a press conference held in Khartoum on 27 December [2018] that 19 people had been killed and 107 people arrested during the demonstrations. The spokesperson said that most of those arrested belonged to the Sudan Liberation Army Abdul Wahid, a Darfuri armed movement, which the movement's leader denied".²⁹

It should be noted, as highlighted by an article by Foreign Policy, that "in December 2018, the regime still described the protests as a plot engineered by Darfur rebels backed by the West", but "The protesters reacted to the regime's rhetoric with the slogan 'Kullu al bilad Darfur,' 'We are all Darfur.'" ³⁰

Maddy Crowther, Co-Executive Director of Waging Peace, published a report in January 2019 on 'Risk on return for Darfuris in Sudan' and consulted a range of organisations and individuals for it.³¹ She stated that:

Many are speaking of these protests as qualitatively different from earlier ones, including those as recent as those in January 2018, in that they have spread across the country and to all sectors of society. Nonetheless, the repressive tactics being used by the Government bear a striking resemblance to those used following the Justice and Equality Movement's (JEM) 2008 attack on Omdurman and resulting reprisal arrests of Darfuris. Namely, Darfuris are again being used as scapegoats, and accused of instigating the uprising on instructions from foreign agents. This was a fact supported by many of our report respondents, namely Huqooq's Nagla Ahmed; Olivia Bueno from IRRI; Koert Debeuf from the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy Europe (TIMEP); Mohammed El-Ansari, head of the National Umma Party UK and Ireland chapter; Osama Mahmoud from the Darfur Union in the UK; Salih Mohammed Osman from the Darfur Bar Association; Sudan expert B; NGO B; and human rights lawyer Mohaned Elnour.³²

The Waging Peace report also highlighted the following profiles as being prone to targeted attacks:

i) High profile Darfuris

Many respondents commented specifically on the number of Darfuris in positions of power in Sudan, but argued that their appointment does not mean that discriminatory attitudes no longer prevail [...]

ii) Racial vs tribal identity [...]

So PAX said, "Darfuris are certainly targeted in Sudan on the basis of ethnicity, in line with the inherent racism that underpins many of the GoS' policies." And also, "Darfuris face considerable risk in Khartoum as they are generally perceived with suspicion. Non-Arab Darfuris in particular face greater chances of persecution, NISS surveillance, arrest and detention based on the grounds of their ethnicity. It is unreasonable to assert that an individual can relocate to Khartoum from elsewhere in Sudan or internationally without heightened suspicion and persecution, due to the geographic profiling adopted by the Sudanese security services [...]"

²⁹ UN Human Rights Council, [Situation of human rights in the Sudan Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan](#), 26 July 2019, para. 29

³⁰ Foreign Policy, [How Darfur Became Sudan's Kingmaker](#), 9 July 2019

³¹ See Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019

³² Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019, 6. *Viability of internal relocation to Khartoum, a. Current protests*, p. 18

Margie Buchanan-Smith and Susanne Jaspars similarly outlined certain tribes: “The findings of our research provide strong evidence that Darfuris in Sudan are targeted on the basis of their ethnicity. Young Darfuri men, including teenage boys, from ethnic groups associated with the rebellion are particularly at risk. This applies to Zaghawa, Fur and Masalit as well as a wide range of smaller ethnic African groups such as the Tunjur and Burgo.” They concluded, “... our research study concludes that this amounts to systemic persecution of Darfuris of particular ethnic groups.”

iii) Political profile

In explaining the point, ACJPS said, “We have no any specific evidence about the mistreatment of ordinary civilians from Darfur and the Two Areas, but persons travelling from one of these conflict areas to Khartoum could experience harassment or intimidation by the authorities, especially if they were from one of the main tribes commonly affiliated to the rebel groups, this included the Fur, Massalit or Zaghawa from Darfur, or Nuba from Southern Kordofan. We had no specific evidence to indicate that persons from these tribes would be subject to targeted violence or arrest by the NISS on account of their ethnicity alone. Ethnicity is complicated, and ethnic disputes were often exploited by the government to pursue political goals. In general anyone who was suspected of political opposition against the government could be targeted, including persons from Arab tribes.”

In fleshing out who might be suspected of political opposition, ACJPS offered the following suggestions: “Lawyers, journalists and students were three of the most active political groups in Sudan and therefore particularly at risk of arrest and mistreatment by the security services. Tribal leaders and persons affiliated to youth groups, such as Girfina or Change Now, were also could be identified as possible ‘at-risk’ groups. More generally anyone who was involved in political activism against the regime risked arbitrary arrest, incommunicado detention and physical mistreatment by the NISS. They also add an interesting specific example of risk to “The activists who resist the construction of “Kajabar dam” in Northern Sudan...”. However, NGO B is keen to widen out our understanding of political profile, by taking into account the arbitrary exercise of power, discussed earlier: “It is impossible to state that Darfuris are either at risk or not at risk by virtue of residing in Khartoum. Much depends on the individuals particular circumstance such as their affiliations, their political activity and so forth. Again it is important to stress that this, in itself, does not mean that only those actively involved in politics will be targeted. Darfuris who simply find themselves in the wrong place (protests, political environment etc) at the wrong time are far more likely to experience discriminatory and violent behaviour than those deemed as “Arab”.³³

Omdurman

No COI published between 10 July 2018 and 10 December 2019 on the security situation for Darfuris in Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

Unspecified location

Maddy Crowther, Co-Executive Director of Waging Peace, published a report in January 2019 on ‘Risk on return for Darfuris in Sudan’ and consulted a range of organisations and individuals for it.³⁴ She assessed that:

The ethnicised repressive behavior of security actors extends to Khartoum [references to Khartoum refer to ‘Greater Khartoum’ throughout’, also encompassing the cities of Omdurman and Khartoum North], where certain tribes suffer discrimination due to imputed political opinion. This has been particularly obvious during current and ongoing protests across the country, which bear the hallmarks

³³ Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019, 6. *Viability of internal relocation to Khartoum, c. Surveillance*, p. 25-29 [Note that on p. 6 of her report she clarifies that “It should be noted that references to Khartoum refer to ‘Greater Khartoum’ throughout’, also encompassing the cities of Omdurman and Khartoum North”].

³⁴ See Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019

of the Government's attempt to scapegoat Darfuris following the 2008 JEM attack on Omdurman. The current protests treble the risk to any Darfuri being returned at this moment [...]

I believe there is a continued risk to Darfuris in all areas of Sudan [...] The ethnicised repressive behavior of security actors extends to Khartoum, where certain tribes suffer discrimination due to imputed political opinion. This has been particularly obvious during current and ongoing protests across the country, which bear the hallmarks of the Government's attempt to scapegoat Darfuris following the 2008 JEM attack on Omdurman. The current protests treble the risk to any Darfuri being returned at this moment. There are well-evidenced cases of post-return abuse, which indicate that ethnicity, low profile, and simply being a failed asylum seeker is enough to open a returnee up to arrest, interrogation, ill treatment, torture, or worse, on arrival.³⁵

1.1.2. Nuba

Khartoum

An August 2018 UK Home Office fact finding mission interviewed a civil society activist who works for a civil and human rights organisation.³⁶ They were reported as noting that "There is a strong presence of Darfuri students in Khartoum and they are labelled as trouble due to their perceived rebel support. There is a lot of violence, including people being shot dead, on campus at the Universities. The targets are mainly the Darfuri and the Nuba. [...] The Nuba people and Darfuris are often associated with the SPLM-N, SLM-AW and JEM – they are seen as rebels. Most cases that the organisation deals with [are] Darfuris and Nuba, to whom it provides legal aid".³⁷

Siddig Yousef (SY), member of the central committee of the Communist Party and head of the Sudanese Solidarity Committee was cited as follows, "Asked about the treatment of Darfuris by society generally, SY noted that the Nuba are treated badly, but face less societal discrimination than the Darfuris. But society generally does not treat the Darfuris and people from South Kordofan differently from other groups. But the government and NISS [National Intelligence and Security Service] treat them badly, considering them supporters of the armed groups. [...] Nuba are ill-treated by the government [in South Kordofan], also in Khartoum".³⁸

Omdurman

No COI published between 10 July 2018 and 10 December 2019 on the security situation for Nuba in Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

Unspecified location

³⁵ See Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019, 1. *Executive Summary*, p. 2 [Note that on p. 6 of her report she clarifies that "It should be noted that references to Khartoum refer to 'Greater Khartoum' throughout', also encompassing the cities of Omdurman and Khartoum North".]

³⁶ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, A civil society activist

³⁷ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, A civil society activist, p.148

³⁸ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, Siddig Yousef, p. 159

The US Commission on International Religious Freedom's report covering 2018 asserted that it "has observed continued persecution of Christians in Sudan since 2011. While some groups such as the Jehovah's Witnesses report positive experiences and the ability to worship, others experience ongoing difficulties. Christians from the Nuba Mountains are uniquely targeted, highlighting the convergence of discrimination against religious and ethnic minorities by the government".³⁹

1.1.3. Other ethnic and/or religious minorities

Khartoum

An October 2018 World Evangelical Alliance report submitted to the UN Human Rights Committee reported that "the demolition of unlicensed church buildings and the refusal to license existing buildings or build new ones leaves Christians in many areas on the outskirts of Khartoum without a place of worship".⁴⁰

According to the U.S. Department of State's 2018 Report on International Religious Freedom, "the NISS [National Intelligence and Security Service] noted the locations of churches and mosques it was tracking that were located on what the government referred to as 'unplanned areas' in Khartoum State".⁴¹

Omdurman

In October 2018 Radio Dabanga reported that:

a church belonging to the Sudanese Church of Christ (SCoC) in Omdurman has been instructed to hand-over its property to a state-appointed committee. The Omdurman police summoned the church's leader on October 8 [2018], and ordered the congregation to vacate their compound, World Watch Monitor reported. The president of SCOC, Ayoub Telyan, was also summoned. The government and the SCoC have been in a long-standing dispute over ownership of the denomination's properties, after the Ministry of Religious Affairs established a rival Land and Buildings Committee and charged it with the administration of SCOC's property. According to WWM, the SCOC represents about 220,000 of Sudan's one million Christians. The majority of the congregates come originally from the Nuba Mountains. The summons comes two weeks after the government lost a court case against the SCoC and 19 church buildings were returned to the church.⁴²

According to the U.S. Department of State's 2018 Report on International Religious Freedom "On December 28 [2018], government security forces fired tear gas and stun grenades at a group of 300-400 worshippers leaving a mosque associated with the opposition National Umma Party in Omdurman following Friday prayers. The incident occurred on the 10th day of antigovernment

³⁹ US Commission on International Religious Freedom, [2019 Annual Report: Country Reports: Tier 1 Countries \(Recommended for CPC Designation\): Sudan](#), April 2019, *Persecution of Christians* p.4

⁴⁰ World Evangelical Alliance, [Sudan: Ongoing Imprisonment and Intimidation of Church Leaders, Confiscation and Destruction of Church Property](#), 10 September 2018, *para 5*

⁴¹ U.S. Department of State, [2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: Sudan](#), 21 June 2019, *Government Practices*

⁴² Radio Dabanga, [Christians detained in South Darfur](#), 21 October 2018

demonstrations and protests of rising food prices, and activists had urged protesters to gather in large numbers following Friday prayers”.⁴³

Unspecified location

An October 2018 World Evangelical Alliance report submitted to the UN Human Rights Committee claimed that “Churches and Christians in Sudan face a variety of violations of their rights to Freedom of Religion or Belief. Pressure from state authorities takes the form of imprisonment of church leaders, confiscation and destruction of church property, and significant other intimidation forcing church leaders to flee”.⁴⁴

The US Commission on International Religious Freedom’s (USCIRF) report covering 2018 asserted that it:

[...] has observed continued persecution of Christians in Sudan since 2011. While some groups such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses report positive experiences and the ability to worship, others experience ongoing difficulties. Christians from the Nuba Mountains are uniquely targeted, highlighting the convergence of discrimination against religious and ethnic minorities by the government.

For example, security and land authorities particularly target members and evangelical church leaders of the Sudanese Presbyterian Evangelical Church (SPEC) and Sudanese Church of Christ (SCOC). During USCIRF’s meetings in 2018, evangelical leaders said that the Ministry of Guidance and Endowments has directly interfered in their church affairs since 2012. SCOC and SPEC interlocutors reported officials confiscating their papers documenting property rights. [...] Sudanese officials told USCIRF that churches were not uniquely targeted, and claimed that mosques had also been demolished for similar issues with zoning regulations. [...]

Minority Muslims also reported being dismissed from their jobs or facing other ill treatment by society and officials” and that “Interlocutors also informed USCIRF about occasional harassment of Christians by a Salafist group during Christmastime, in particular by the hanging of offensive posters.”⁴⁵

The same source further noted that “In 2018, security forces were still able to harass and arrest Christians and other minorities, sometimes arbitrarily, without consequence or respect for the rule of law”.⁴⁶ The government also repressed members of the Quranist community (Muslims who believe solely in the teaching and authority of the Qur’an) and Republican Brothers and Sisters (a movement focused on Islamic reform in Sudan), including by harassing students or demanding that they follow certain Islamic practices”.⁴⁷

The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office reported in its annual report covering 2018 that “Members of minorities in Sudan continued to suffer, with worrying limitations on religious freedoms, including restricting Christian schools opening days and reports of churches being destroyed. As well as funding ForB projects [Freedom of Religion or Belief], we maintained a regular

⁴³ U.S. Department of State, [2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: Sudan](#), 21 June 2019, *Government Practices*

⁴⁴ World Evangelical Alliance, [Sudan: Ongoing Imprisonment and Intimidation of Church Leaders, Confiscation and Destruction of Church Property](#), 10 September 2018, *para 1*

⁴⁵ US Commission on International Religious Freedom, [2019 Annual Report; Country Reports: Tier 1 Countries \(Recommended for CPC Designation\): Sudan](#), April 2019

⁴⁶ US Commission on International Religious Freedom, [2019 Annual Report; Country Reports: Tier 1 Countries \(Recommended for CPC Designation\): Sudan](#), April 2019, *Persecution of Christians p.4*

⁴⁷ US Commission on International Religious Freedom, [2019 Annual Report; Country Reports: Tier 1 Countries \(Recommended for CPC Designation\): Sudan](#), April 2019, *Persecution of Christians p.4*

dialogue with the Sudanese government on these issues and saw success in restrictions being lifted on Christian schools”.⁴⁸

According to the U.S. Department of State’s 2018 Report on International Religious Freedom, “According to church leaders, authorities continued to influence the internal affairs of churches through intimidation, harassment, and arrests of those opposed to government interference within evangelical Christian churches”.⁴⁹ Furthermore, “Christian leaders and lawyers said that gaining outright land titles remained very difficult given that the government legally owned all land, and thus the legal status of churches remained unclear” and “Furthermore, “The government continued to restrict non-Muslim religious groups from operating or entering the country”.⁵⁰

In August 2019 the East African reported that “Sudan’s Christians suffered decades of persecution under the regime of Islamist general Omar al-Bashir. Now they hope his downfall will give the religious freedom they have long prayed for. [...] Denying the Christian minority permits to build churches has been the main tool of oppression over the years. Another was the all-Islamic culture imposed by the state in schools and in the workplace, despite the former constitution’s provisions on religious freedom. [...] Copts, Catholics, Anglicans and a number of other confessions are present in the country, yet Bashir’s Islamist regime drove many of them underground”.⁵¹

Furthermore, it cited Ezekiel Kondo, Anglican Bishop of Khartoum, as stating that “The authorities felt that the churches and Christian charities supported the south’s independence”.⁵² Moreover, “The constitution adopted for the three-year transition notably omits Islam as one of the characteristics defining the state. That and the wind of democratic change in Sudan have given Christians and other minorities hope that religious plurality would be better protected in the coming phase. Sitting in his office across from his large church in central Khartoum, the prelate says ‘the state has consistently followed a strategy to weaken the Church’. In its worldwide report on religious freedom, the Aid to the Church in Need (ACN) pontifical foundation ranked Sudan in the most critical category of countries”.⁵³

In November 2019 Radio Dabanga reported that “Sudan’s Minister of Religious Affairs and Endowments, Nasreldin Mofreh says that the current arrangements to draw up the features of a new civil state aims to take care of the interests of citizens and ‘promote a sense of justice between Muslims and Christians’”.⁵⁴ Furthermore, “Mofreh referred to the commonality between Muslims and Christians as ‘owners of divine messages and the sons of one nation.’ He said that the so-called ‘Salvation Regime’ headed by ousted former president Omar Al Bashir ‘used to practice verbal and physical violence against Christians and succeeded in distributing injustice equally’”.⁵⁵

⁴⁸ UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, [Human Rights and Democracy: the 2018 Foreign and Commonwealth Office report](#), 5 June 2019, *Freedom of religion or belief*

⁴⁹ U.S. Department of State, [2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: Sudan](#), 21 June 2019, *Executive Summary*

⁵⁰ U.S. Department of State, [2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: Sudan](#), 21 June 2019, *Government Practices*

⁵¹ The East African, [Sudan’s persecuted Christians eye long-sought freedom](#), 26 August 2019

⁵² The East African, [Sudan’s persecuted Christians eye long-sought freedom](#), 26 August 2019

⁵³ The East African, [Sudan’s persecuted Christians eye long-sought freedom](#), 26 August 2019

⁵⁴ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan Religious Affairs Minister: New civil state to promote a sense of justice between Muslims and Christians](#), 28 November 2019

⁵⁵ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan Religious Affairs Minister: New civil state to promote a sense of justice between Muslims and Christians](#), 28 November 2019

1.1.4. Students, political activists, human rights activists and journalists who are not originally from these cities or who support persons not originally from there

Note that some sources have been included below which don't specifically mention the place of origin of those arrested or that they supported persons not originally from Khartoum or Omdurman. Many students, political activists, human rights activists and journalists living and working in Khartoum/ and Omdurman have also been subjected to violence in the reporting period but often sources reporting on it do not specify the origin or profile of those targeted and therefore have not been included here.

For background information on the protests that erupted across Sudan and particularly in Khartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman see [Preface: Protests in Sudan, particularly Khartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman from December 2018.](#)

Khartoum / Khartoum North - (Darfuri) students

Amjed Farif El Tayeb, researcher, political activist and spokesperson of the Sudan Change Now movement was recorded by the UK Home Office Fact-Finding Mission in August 2018 as stating that "Asked about the situation in Khartoum, AT said that Darfuri youth (students) face cruel and brutal targeting by the state and National Congress Party (NCP)- affiliated students, particularly the Jihadist Units and Jihadist battalions (formed by NCP students), who attend universities and cause problems for Darfuri students which can lead to physical harm, dismissal or stopping their studies".⁵⁶

A civil society activist interviewed by the same fact finding mission noted that "There is a strong presence of Darfuri students in Khartoum and they are labelled as trouble due to their perceived rebel support. There is a lot of violence, including people being shot dead, on campus at the Universities. The targets are mainly the Darfuri and the Nuba [...] Some students are affiliated to the security forces and are trained in the use of firearms. Darfuris are deliberately targeted".⁵⁷

Maddy Crowther, Co-Executive Director of Waging Peace, published a report in January 2019 on 'Risk on return for Darfuris in Sudan' and consulted a range of organisations and individuals for it whom highlighted the risk of particular profiles, notably Darfuri students:

iv) Students

Another key risk profile outlined by a great many of the respondents was the risks to students from Darfur.

NGO B provides good context: "Provisions in several Darfur peace agreements have stated that Darfuris should be exempt from paying tuition fees at universities for a set period in order to address the long standing discrimination and the chronic lack of development in Darfur. However, these provisions are repeatedly ignored by university officials in spite of promises leading to protests from Darfuri students. Those protesting are often arrested and ill-treated by Sudanese authorities before facing suspension or expulsion from their universities. The universities furthermore refuse to allow those who have not paid their fees to graduate or to sit their exams." [...]

Osama Mahmoud from the Darfur Union in the UK believes, "Darfur students are in numbers in many universities across the country, however, when exercising their Democratic rights of freedom of expression inside the universities and during debates or if they part take in a peaceful stands; they are beaten, imprisoned, tortured and killed."

⁵⁶ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, Amjed Farid El Tayeb, p. 102

⁵⁷ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, A civil society activist, p. 148

Some respondents, like Sudan expert A went further, and claimed students, potentially because of such activism, “are particularly watched and regularly arrested and interrogated by the security apparatus on the basis of the belief they are widely rebels or rebel supporters.” Margie Buchanan-Smith and Susanne Jaspars said, “Our research showed that Darfuri students in Khartoum are under suspicion of supporting the rebellion and face frequent arrest and sometimes torture. This happens particularly following demonstrations.” Others claimed such targeting had a long historical basis, and that in fact the risk category needed to be extended to young people in general, as they are readily assumed to be students. The Ayin Network’s Mosaab Baba said, “Non-Arab Darfuri students and young people specifically are at risk in Khartoum, due to the historic targeting by NISS, and recently RSF.” The ACJPS supported this view of NISS involvement: “ACJPS has documented cases where students in Khartoum who originated from marginalised areas of Sudan, such as Darfur or the Two Areas (Blue Nile and South Kordofan) were at increased risk of violence and mistreatment, both from the National Congress Party (NCP) student militia groups and the NISS. ACJPS had also documented cases in which students who were members of the Darfur Students Association had been subject to violence and intimidation by the regime. Often the NISS would work in collaboration with NCP student militia groups, although there was no formal organisational link, with NCP student groups often provoking a campus dispute to create a pretext for a NISS security raid, according to our documentation [sic].” [...].⁵⁸

Nagla Ahmed from Huqooq, interviewed for the January 2019 Waging Peace report, spoke about one particular incident targeting Darfuri students in December 2018:

the government launched a heavy hand campaign targeted university students from Darfur and arrested more than 45 students, killed one (Salih Yaqoub Omer) during a raid on their residents home in Aldroshab area in Bahri City, and others arrested from their house in Sinnar- Aldivaghah neighborhood in Sinnar state and Jabal Awlyaa suburb in Khartoum, among them casual workers, the authorities broadcast recorded videos on the national TV of the students confessing to the public that they trained to kill, burn and destroy public and private properties, the government accused them of being trained in Israel, following Sudan Liberation Movement SLM leader agendas and are responsible for on-going protests and the killing of people. It has been reported that these students have been subjected to torture and/or ill treatment whilst in detention to forcibly confess the government claims. Now these students are facing great risk to their lives.⁵⁹

According to Olivia Bueno from the International Refugee Rights Initiative (IRRI), one of the respondents of Waging Peace’s report: “In the context of the recent protests, Darfur colleagues in Khartoum have informed us that Darfuris have been more susceptible than others to arrest and have been particularly vulnerable to mistreatment while detained (interview with Khartoum colleague, 3 January 2018). Similar phenomena have been reported by the Sudan Democracy First Group, which has reported both on discrimination in the context of the recent protests and over the longer term”.⁶⁰ Osama Mahmoud from the Darfur Union, who also contributed to Waging Peace’s report, suggested “violence may have been used more readily against Darfuris: “shoot to kill has been used many times where students and people of Sudan from Darfur were involved. Purely due to their ethnicity, because it is less of a worry from the government point of view”.⁶¹

⁵⁸ Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019, 6. *Viability of internal relocation to Khartoum, c. Surveillance*, p. 29 [Note that on p. 6 of her report she clarifies that “It should be noted that references to Khartoum refer to ‘Greater Khartoum’ throughout’, also encompassing the cities of Omdurman and Khartoum North”].

⁵⁹ Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019, 6. *Viability of internal relocation to Khartoum, a. Current protests*, p. 19

⁶⁰ Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019, 6. *Viability of internal relocation to Khartoum, a. Current protests*, p. 19/20

⁶¹ Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019, 6. *Viability of internal relocation to Khartoum, a. Current protests*, p. 20

Mosaam Baba from the Aykin Network told Waging Peace that “RSF has taken on duties of the police, even in Khartoum. This has significantly increased the risk to youth in general, and for Darfuris in particular (familiar foes).” He earlier said, “Although the immediate physical threat to Darfuris used to be reduced in Khartoum, the violations have now become intensified due to RSF having a large presence in Khartoum”.⁶²

Non-exhaustive, illustrative violent attacks against Darfuri students

In July 2018 the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) “subjected two Darfuri students to severe beatings” in Khartoum, whilst the chairman of the Darfur University Students Association, Noah Abdallah, was “assaulted by students of the Sudan Islamic Movement” reported Radio Dabanga.⁶³

Reporting on an incident in October 2018 Radio Dabanga stated that “A number of students were detained or injured in a raid by the security service, which used teargas to disperse a crowd of protesters in El Nilein University in Khartoum”, following a speech being held by students “gathering the Darfuri student associations, that would show their solidarity with the students of El Gezira University”.⁶⁴ A few days later the same source reported that “Members of the security apparatus beat and arrested a number of Darfuri students who participated in a gathering of students at El Nilein University in Khartoum”, who had gathered to express their “solidarity with the students of El Gezira University, several of whom are still being held”.⁶⁵ Two days later some of the students were charged with “public nuisance and violation of the public safety”.⁶⁶

In January 2019 a Darfuri student was “shot dead by NISS officers during a raid on a student dorm in El Durushab [Khartoum North]”.⁶⁷ According to the same article his body was only identified after one week as “his colleagues” were arrested during the raid on the dorm where “mainly Darfuri students of the University of El Zaeem” live.⁶⁸

The New Humanitarian reported shortly after the violence of early June 2019 in Khartoum that “Some eyewitnesses described seeing RSF members storm Monday’s protest [on 3rd June 2019], forcing demonstrators to crawl as they whipped them. ‘One of them was very aggressive with me,’ said a student from Sudan University who asked to remain anonymous out of security concerns. ‘He whipped me on my back and kept telling me I was not from Sudan’.”⁶⁹

During the same attack in Khartoum on 3rd June 2019, Radio Dabanga reported that student, Jalal Dafallah, said that he and his friends were severely beaten by elements of the RSF inside the University of Khartoum [...] causing multiple fractures. He said that the militiamen seized them and shaved their heads in a distorted manner and forced them to drink sewage water while they were fasting. The militiamen also stole their mobile telephones and their money”.⁷⁰ The source did not specify the origin of the student.

⁶² Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019, 6. *Viability of internal relocation to Khartoum, b. Arbitrary exercise of power*, p. 21

⁶³ Radio Dabanga, [Darfuri students detained, beaten in Khartoum](#), 15 July 2018

⁶⁴ Radio Dabanga, [Khartoum students arrested at solidarity speech](#), 16 October 2018

⁶⁵ Radio Dabanga, [More students beaten, arrested at solidarity speech](#), 26 October 2018

⁶⁶ Radio Dabanga, [Darfuri students charged with public nuisance in Sudan capital](#), 28 October 2018

⁶⁷ Radio Dabanga, [Darfuri student killed in dorm identified after one week](#), 11 January 2019

⁶⁸ Radio Dabanga, [Darfuri student killed in dorm identified after one week](#), 11 January 2019

⁶⁹ The New Humanitarian, [Deadly protest crackdown casts shadow on Sudan’s future](#), 6 June 2019

⁷⁰ Radio Dabanga, [Violations, rapes by Sudan militiamen documented despite internet shut-down](#), 6 June 2019

Radio Dabanga reported in August 2019 that “A student member of the Arab Socialist Baath Party”, Musab Rizgallah, “was assaulted by security agents” in Khartoum North during which he “was severely beaten on all parts of his body, his head was shaved, and his cell phone was smashed, he was dumped on the street”.⁷¹ The source did not specify the origin of the student.

Two students were dismissed in August 2019 by the Aviation Academy in Khartoum “because they took part in the organisation of a silent protest in front of the academy against the killing of school students in El Obeid [North Kordofan]”.⁷² The source did not specify the origin of the student.

According to Radio Dabanga “Islamist students loyal to the National Congress Party (NCP) of ousted President Omar Al Bashir attacked student supporters of the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) at El Zaeem El Azhari University in Khartoum North” in October 2019.⁷³ No information on the origin of these students was provided in the article.

Khartoum – Journalists and media professionals (who are not originally from these cities or who support persons not originally from there)

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) reported at the end of May 2019 that the Transitional Military Council closed Al Jazeera’s Khartoum bureau “amid continuing protests in Khartoum” and also “ordered the immediate withdrawal of all work permits from the Qatari broadcaster’s journalists and other employees in Sudan without giving any reason for this sudden decision. RSF has learned that all of *Al Jazeera*’s equipment has also been seized, forcing it to suspend all activities in Khartoum”.⁷⁴

The UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan reported in his report covering the period 28 September 2018 to 30 June 2019 that “Several national and international journalists reported intimidation by security agents while covering the demonstrations in Khartoum; some, including a correspondent for CNN, were allegedly violently beaten. On 26 December [2019], the correspondent for the London-based Alaraby television network was ordered by authorities to leave the Sudan within 24 hours”.⁷⁵

In November 2019 Radio Dabanga stated that “social media activists reported they have repeatedly been harassed, threatened, and bribed by the authorities while covering events in Khartoum [...] The activist asserted that they have been offered money or a better-paying job in a commercial enterprise, in exchange for not covering events or for covering events opposing the popular uprising”.⁷⁶ The article did not specify the specific areas of origin of these social media activists.

Omdurman - (Darfuri) students

Radio Dabanga reported in January 2019 about the death of a Darfuri student shot dead by security forces whilst attending a demonstration in Omdurman: “After Friday prayer, a demonstration took

⁷¹ Radio Dabanga, [Baath Party student leader beaten-up in Sudanese capital](#), 2 August 2019

⁷² Radio Dabanga, [Sudanese university lecturers accused of encouraging protests](#), 4 August 2019

⁷³ Radio Dabanga, [Student factions clash in Khartoum](#), 21 October 2019

⁷⁴ Reporters Without Borders, [Sudan’s military council closes Al Jazeera’s Khartoum bureau](#), 31 May 2019

⁷⁵ UN Human Rights Council, [Situation of human rights in the Sudan Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan](#), 26 July 2019, para. 58

⁷⁶ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan social media activists harassed, bribed by authorities](#), 29 November 2019

place from the home of student Abdelazim Babikir in Nyala in South Darfur, who was shot dead by the security forces in [...] march in Omdurman”.⁷⁷

Omdurman – Journalists (who are not originally from these cities or who support persons not originally from there)

In October 2019 Radio Dabanga reported that a Darfuri journalist, Ahmed Abdelhameed, had been missing since earlier in the month from his family home in Omdurman.⁷⁸ According to the same article Abdelhameed worked as an “editor for the Sudanese *Rai El Shaab* daily newspaper, a reporter for *Alwan* newspaper from Nyala, capital of South Darfur, and for the Darfur Radio FM office in Nyala”.⁷⁹ His ethnic origin was not specified.

Omdurman – Demonstrators (who are not originally from these cities or who support persons not originally from there)

Investigating the human rights violations that were committed by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) against peaceful protesters during their sit-in in Khartoum and subsequent attacks including on 30th June 2019 in Omdurman, Human Rights Watch reported that “On July 29 [2019, high school students in the central town of El Obeid [North Kordofan] protested against price hikes and poor transportation [...] RSF soldiers shot at them, killing five high school students, media reported [...] On August 1 [2019], the Central Committee of Sudanese Doctors, a professional doctors’ organization, reported that four protesters were killed in Omdurman while calling for justice for the al-Obeid victims [...]”.⁸⁰ No further specifics on the origins of these protesters was provided.

Radio Dabanga reported in August 2019 that “Four people were killed and several others injured [...] when security forces shot at peaceful demonstrators” in Omdurman who took part in the “Marches of Millions for Fair Retribution. The Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) had called on Sudanese in the entire country ‘to participate heavily in the marches [...] to demand that perpetrators of crimes be brought to justice’”.⁸¹

Unspecified location – (Darfuri) students

The Sudan Democracy First Group noted in its introductory section of its October 2018 report on the treatment faced by Darfuri students in Sudanese Universities that:

There are thousands of Darfuri student in Sudanese universities, but they – especially since the outbreak of armed conflict in Darfur in 2003 – have been subjected to extraordinary and systematic authoritarian violence both inside and outside these universities. They are racially targeted for violations that include physical violence, up to and including killing; arbitrary detention; and severe torture at the hands of security officers, soldiers and the ruling party student militia. Through the arbitrariness of university administrations, which consist of staff and professors loyal to the regime, they suffer from arbitrary dismissal from study, whether temporary or permanent. The regime also employs its judicial system, which is neither independent nor impartial, as a tool of oppression.

⁷⁷ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan uprising rolls on: more mass protests planned for this week](#), 27 January 2019

⁷⁸ Radio Dabanga, [South Darfuri journalist missing in Sudan capital](#), 8 October 2019

⁷⁹ Radio Dabanga, [South Darfuri journalist missing in Sudan capital](#), 8 October 2019

⁸⁰ Human Rights Watch, [“They Were Shouting ‘Kill Them’”, Sudan’s Violent Crackdown on Protesters in Khartoum](#), 17 November 2019, *Protests and Crackdowns Continue*

⁸¹ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan protests: Four demonstrators shot dead in Omdurman](#), 1 August 2019

Students are subjected to political trials that do not respect the legal and judicial procedures necessary to ensure justice.⁸²

It further assessed that:

Darfuri students studying in Sudanese universities have been subjected to systematic persecution by government agencies. They are directly targeted with short and long-term detention, severe torture and neglect in detention centers, abductions, enforced disappearances and serious physical attacks both inside and outside university campuses. In addition, there are several cases of assassinations of these students committed by members of the formal security forces and the regime's Jihadi battalions. Also, the students' right to education is being violated through the use of administrative tools, such as arbitrary dismissal from the university denying their right to continue their studies, either temporarily or definitively, expulsion from student housing complexes, and preventing them from sitting for exams. The judicial and legal systems are also employed to violate their rights by subjecting them to unfair trials where the most basic due process protections are not available, and they are often deprived of their right to legal aid.⁸³

According to the same report, Darfuris students in Sudanese universities are subjected to the following "serious abuses by government security forces and pro-government student militias (Jihadi battalions)":

- These students are caught in the trap of criminalization by the police force which brings fabricated cases against them and subjects them to speedy and unfair trials. In most of these trials, they are denied legal aid guaranteed by the constitution, laws and judicial procedures. Thus, they receive unfair verdicts following proceedings that do not meet fair trial standards.
- Their personal and physical safety are compromised through continuous harassment by security and police services and jihadi battalions.
- They risk murder and severe physical injuries by the security forces and armed jihadi battalions.⁸⁴

In addition, the report found that "Large numbers of Darfuri students are forced to leave school, and abandon their education [...] The largest number of Darfuris who have left school are female, subjected to sexual harassment and threats of rape, as well as other forms of torture".⁸⁵

Moreover, the report highlighted that "the ruling regime always describes Darfuri students at universities as members of insurgent groups and representatives of armed movements although these students are civilians exercising their constitutional and legal rights to peaceful political expression".⁸⁶

⁸² Sudan Democracy First Group, [*Tales of the Tombstones, The Discrimination Against Sudanese Students from Darfur in Sudanese Universities, Denial of the Right to Education, Denial of the Right to Life*](#), 1 October 2018, Introduction, p. 6

⁸³ Sudan Democracy First Group, [*Tales of the Tombstones, The Discrimination Against Sudanese Students from Darfur in Sudanese Universities, Denial of the Right to Education, Denial of the Right to Life*](#), 1 October 2018, The impact of the Darfur conflict on students from the region, p. 18

⁸⁴ Sudan Democracy First Group, [*Tales of the Tombstones, The Discrimination Against Sudanese Students from Darfur in Sudanese Universities, Denial of the Right to Education, Denial of the Right to Life*](#), 1 October 2018, The nature of violations against Darfuri students in Sudanese universities, p. 25

⁸⁵ Sudan Democracy First Group, [*Tales of the Tombstones, The Discrimination Against Sudanese Students from Darfur in Sudanese Universities, Denial of the Right to Education, Denial of the Right to Life*](#), 1 October 2018, Conclusion, p. 54

⁸⁶ Sudan Democracy First Group, [*Tales of the Tombstones, The Discrimination Against Sudanese Students from Darfur in Sudanese Universities, Denial of the Right to Education, Denial of the Right to Life*](#), 1 October 2018, Political discrimination against Darfuri students in Sudanese universities, p. 53

The violations summarised in the above four excerpts are further addressed in greater detail in the October 2018 Sudan Democracy First Group report [*Tales of the Tombstones, The Discrimination Against Sudanese Students from Darfur in Sudanese Universities, Denial of the Right to Education, Denial of the Right to Life*](#).

Unspecified location – Journalists

Looking back at 2019 Human Rights Watch stated that “Since protests started in December 2018, authorities imposed even more restrictions on media, seized and confiscated newspapers, arrested journalists covering protests, shut down their offices, and blocked access to the internet”.⁸⁷

1.1.5. IDPs

No COI published between 10 July 2018 and 10 December 2019 on violence against IDPs in Khartoum or Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

Unspecified location

UNOCHA reported in its January 2020 Humanitarian Needs Overview “The evolving socio-political situation in Sudan has resulted in a concerning increase in protection risks in many parts of the country, including in some states and localities where the protection and security context had previously been stable or had improved in recent years. These risks are exacerbated by the deepening economic crisis, which has heightened exposure to abuse and exploitation among the most vulnerable, and has increased intercommunal tensions. Areas of priority concern include locations with deteriorating security environments as a result of the socio-political situation, resulting in heightened protection risks for IDPs, returnees and vulnerable residents. Locations receiving newly-displaced persons, as well as newly-accessible IDP and returnee areas with high assessed need are also prioritized for immediate and urgent interventions”.⁸⁸

1.1.6. Returnees

No COI published between 10 July 2018 and 10 December 2019 on violence against returnees to Khartoum or Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

1.1.7. Women

Khartoum

Siddig Yousef [SY], member of the central committee of the Communist Party and head of the Sudanese Solidarity Committee, told a UK Home Office fact finding mission in August 2018 that “the

⁸⁷ Human Rights Watch, [*World Report 2020: Sudan, Events of 2019*](#), 13 January 2020, *Freedom of Media*

⁸⁸ UNOCHA, [*Humanitarian Needs Overview*](#), January 2020, 1.4 Humanitarian Consequences, Sexual and Gender Based-Violence (SGBV) p.20 and 3.6 Protection, Analysis of Humanitarian Needs p.51

public order laws are against women. If a woman is not covering her head, may be oppressed, arrested and lashed – only in Khartoum state. SY thought many women are affected every day – 1000s – all women of different groups”.⁸⁹

Reporting generally on the situation for women protestors in Khartoum in March 2019 Radio Dabanga stated:

On March 12 [2019], Omdurman Women’s Prison in Sudan released a large number of young women who were held during demonstrations over the past weeks. That day the Court of Appeal in Khartoum overturned the verdicts of El Imtidad Emergency Court against nine young women. They were sentenced to one-month imprisonment and 20 lashes after being detained while demonstrating in Khartoum’s Burri district.

In a gesture to mark International Women’s Day on March 8 [2019], Al Bashir told the head of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), which has been central to the suppression of protests, to release all women who have been detained in connection with the protests.⁹⁰

Radio Dabanga reported in October 2019 on the press conference held by the head and founder of the Tea and Food Vendors Association who said: “women tea vendors who were working at the time of the break-up of the sit-in [3rd June 2019] lost all of their money and tools. Six tea sellers went missing, and one of them returned ‘in a state of psychological disorder’”.⁹¹

Investigating the human rights violations that were committed by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) against peaceful protesters during their sit-in in Khartoum Human Rights Watch reported that “Credible media reported that on May 29 and 30 [2019], security forces shot dead three more protesters, among them a pregnant woman on Nile street in Khartoum”.⁹² With regards to sexual violence occurrences during the violence, Human Rights Watch stated:

Human Rights Watch could not confirm the extent of sexual violence during the attack on the sit-in camp, but according to survivors, activists, protesters, and civil society organizations specialized in responding to sexual violence, security forces raped, gang raped, attempted to rape, and sexually assaulted female and male protesters, including medical workers. Most of those who reported their experience to civil society groups said they were raped or assaulted in the area around the mosque and university clinic and dormitory [...]

Several healthcare workers or staff of organizations aiding victims, all of whom Human Rights Watch found to be credible, provided information about rapes, which took place during the attack on June 3 [...]

Another woman, who sought help from an activist after she was attacked and then agreed to record her story on video, seen by Human Rights Watch, said RSF soldiers caught her and other women, took their clothes and phones, beat them with electrical cables, then raped them violently. “They called us prostitutes and communists,” she recalled [...]

The RSF attacked female medical personnel in some cases. For example, RSF soldiers assaulted “Laila,” a 28-year-old pharmacist, near the central clinic at the sit-in, then threatened her with rape: “[The soldier] said to me ‘we don’t want doctors here,’ They pushed and grabbed me [...] One said, ‘today is rape.’ I was so scared. They were obviously looking around to beat everyone, loot everything they find.”⁹³

⁸⁹ UK Home Office, [*Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018*](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, Siddig Yousef, p. 161

⁹⁰ Radio Dabanga, [*‘Tasqut bas!’ – Sudanese women on frontlines of protests despite prosecution*](#), 2 April 2019

⁹¹ Radio Dabanga, [*Three unidentified victims of June 3 Khartoum massacre buried in Sudan*](#), 3 October 2019

⁹² Human Rights Watch, [*‘They Were Shouting ‘Kill Them’’, Sudan’s Violent Crackdown on Protesters in Khartoum*](#), 17 November 2019, Background, Mounting Tensions

⁹³ Human Rights Watch, [*‘They Were Shouting ‘Kill Them’’, Sudan’s Violent Crackdown on Protesters in Khartoum*](#), 17 November 2019, Sexual Violence

The New Humanitarian reported shortly after the violence that “While attacks were taking place [...] there were also at least five reported rapes – two were female doctors while the others were protesters. Doctors said they were struggling to provide post-rape care including medication to prevent HIV and emergency contraception. Although it was unclear who may have raped the victims, rape has been used as a weapon of war, often by government forces and the Janjaweed militia”.⁹⁴ Speaking to BBC News, Sulaima Ishaq Sharif, who heads a trauma centre at Afhad University, observed:

she and her colleagues are treating 12 women raped on 3 June, making home visits or speaking to them on the phone, and she believes the number of victims is likely to be higher as many rapes have not been reported because of the shame associated with it and the fear of being stigmatised. For the mental health worker, the crackdown bears all the hallmarks of the Janjaweed: “I went to the sit-in area after two days because there were so many people missing. Some of the tents still had smoke coming from beneath them. ‘Everything was destroyed - it’s the same thing when you pass by villages in Darfur where they have shot and killed people and looted property, it’s the same picture.’ [...] With regard to the rapes, Ms Sharif believes it is not about the sex: ‘It’s all about degradation, humiliation and beating of the spirit. This is part of what they did in Darfur - they did it as a means, a weapon of war.’ Now it is a weapon to kill the revolution.”⁹⁵

With regards to the forcible disappearance of women, the Human Rights Watch report noted “Since the June 3 [2019] attack, families, activists and others have called on authorities to reveal the whereabouts of their missing ones. [...] In August [2019], Sudanese activists told Human Rights Watch they had confirmed 17 people were missing in Khartoum since the attack on June 3 [2019], including women working as tea or food sellers at the sit-in camp [...] However, activists point out that the real number of missing people could be higher, as some families may not have reported cases; and some of the missing may not have any family searching for them”.⁹⁶

The UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan reported specifically about the violence in Khartoum on 3 June 2019 in his report covering the period 28 September 2018 to 30 June 2019 that he “received allegations of rape and other forms of sexual violence perpetrated against both women and men during the crackdown, and information alleging that possibly hundreds of protesters were missing as of the end of June [2019]”.⁹⁷ He further noted:

The Independent Expert received allegations of dozens of instances of rape, gang rape and other forms of sexual violence against women and men that reportedly took place during the joint security operations led by the Rapid Support Forces in Khartoum on 3 June [2019] and the following days. A women’s union in Khartoum issued a statement on 24 June [2019] alleging that some 5,000 female vendors had been subjected to sexual violence and other abuses by members of the Rapid Support Forces, security forces and the military, and reported that five women who had disappeared after the 3 June [2019] violence remained missing. Human rights groups reported that women had allegedly been raped inside a clinic attached to the University of Khartoum, where they had run for safety from the security officers. It is possible that a number of other cases of rape and other forms of sexual violence went unreported, as many survivors likely did not seek medical treatment because of fear of reprisals, general insecurity in the city or limited options for medical and other assistance.⁹⁸

⁹⁴ The New Humanitarian, [Deadly protest crackdown casts shadow on Sudan’s future](#), 6 June 2019

⁹⁵ BBC News, [Rape and Sudan’s revolution: ‘They were crying and screaming’](#), 15 June 2019

⁹⁶ Human Rights Watch, [“They Were Shouting ‘Kill Them’”, Sudan’s Violent Crackdown on Protesters in Khartoum](#), 17 November 2019, *Missing and Disappeared*

⁹⁷ UN Human Rights Council, [Situation of human rights in the Sudan Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan](#), 26 July 2019, para. 40

⁹⁸ UN Human Rights Council, [Situation of human rights in the Sudan Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan](#), 26 July 2019, para. 76

Hala Al-Karib, regional Director of the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA), noted in her opinion piece published by Al Jazeera in September 2019 that on the 3rd June 2019:

[...] and the three days that followed, sexual violence was used as an efficient tool by the state's security forces to break the civilian protesters' will in an attempt to completely defeat Sudan's revolution. Many women and girls were gang-raped on the spot, while others were kidnapped and continuously raped for days elsewhere. In the worst cases of rape, victims were eventually killed and their bodies were thrown into the river.

These crimes took place at the gates of the Sudanese Army's headquarters. Some protesters ran towards the building to seek protection, but the military chose to close the gates and ignore the screams of civilians [...]

The fact that the regime's security forces felt they could commit these heinous crimes with impunity, in close proximity to Sudanese state institutions and representatives of international powers, clearly demonstrated how they lack any sense of legal responsibility or fear of accountability. Some soldiers even took videos of themselves as they assaulted and killed civilians. There were also videos showing women being fondled and women's underwear being waved in the air holstered on army canes.⁹⁹

An article published by The New Humanitarian in mid-June 2019 reported that "Life is tentatively returning to Khartoum's streets after pro-democracy campaigners abandoned a general strike this week, but Sudanese civilians are confronted by a range of challenges [...] reports of sexual harassment and assault of women and girls have grown".¹⁰⁰ The same article further noted that "A second UN official, who also asked to remain anonymous due to the sensitivity of speaking to journalists, estimated that in the 72 hours following the RSF crackdown there were likely "thousands of women and girls who have been subjected to forms of violent harassment"".¹⁰¹

In July 2019 the Sudan Consortium published a Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA) article that described sexual violence against peaceful protestors in Khartoum that took place on the 3 June 2019. It noted that:

The Sudan Doctors' Committee documented 70 cases of rape. Additionally, more cases of sexual violence and sexual harassment that took place in the aftermath of the massacre continue to be documented by women's rights and civil society organizations. To date, female students and workers, women traders and street vendors continue to report incidents of aggressive sexual harassment including grabbing and use of demeaning sexist and insulting language on the streets of Khartoum and other cities of Sudan by the RSF and Bashir /militant Islamists regime soldiers.

The sustained sexual harassment/ violence and intimidation of women as they walk the streets of Greater Khartoum on their way to work, schools or the market, can be understood as a response to, and direct attack on, the key role women have played throughout the protests that have been ongoing since December last year. The intimidation directed at women is clearly an attempt to reverse the gains they made in the occupation of public space despite the discriminatory laws and policies imposed by Bashir's regime. [...]

Women, girls and children report that they feel threatened to walk home from work or school because of the consistent harassment and grabbing by soldiers. Men who have attempted to aid some of the women themselves have also been subject to beating and have been shot at with live bullets, leading to death or serious injuries.¹⁰²

Radio Dabanga reported in June 2019 that female staff of the Ministry of Health "submitted a memorandum to the ministry's undersecretary, accusing RSF militiamen stationed in the

⁹⁹ Hala Al-Karib (Al Jazeera), [Sudan's youth showed us how to counter sexual violence](#), 5 September 2019

¹⁰⁰ The New Humanitarian, [Sudan briefing: Civilians face increasing fragility under military rule](#), 14 June 2019

¹⁰¹ The New Humanitarian, [Sudan briefing: Civilians face increasing fragility under military rule](#), 14 June 2019

¹⁰² Sudan Consortium, [SIHA: The Courageous Women of Sudan Continue to Stand Alone against the Scourge of Sexual Violence](#), 23 July 2019

neighbourhood of harassing women employees and demanding their removal. In the memorandum, signed by most of the employees of the ministry, the staff says that the militiamen are verbally harassing women entering and leaving the ministry, and making use of facilities in the building 'which has led to growing insecurity in the ministry's offices'".¹⁰³

In July 2019 the "Sima Centre for Training and Protection of Women and Children's Rights has said that its office in the Sudanese capital of Khartoum was raided [...] The outer door was broken, and the contents of the office ransacked, but initial inspection suggests nothing was stolen". The centre reportedly "warned of doing anything harmful to the safety of the centre's staff, its clients and its headquarters. It stressed that 'methods of intimidation and persecution will not prevent us from committing to our principled position to address the issues of violations and protect victims of violence of women and children'".¹⁰⁴

Omdurman

Radio Dabanga reported that in November 2019 "the Coordination of the Resistance Committees of Karari in Omdurman condemned an alleged assault on a woman and her family by an officer of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia. The coordination alleges that the RSF officer insulted and threatened a woman and her family with weapons [...] The incident was reportedly triggered when youths in the neighbourhood told one of the sons of the officer, who lives in the area, not to throw garbage into the street".¹⁰⁵

Unspecified location

According to an April 2019 Center for Strategic and International Studies article, "Women make up an estimated two thirds of protesters and have been prominent in the demonstrations, exemplified by an iconic video of student protester Alaa Salah".¹⁰⁶

A September 2019 CHR. Michelsen Institute article noted that "For nearly half a year, peaceful protesters occupied Sudan's streets in protest against the autocrats who ruled the country with an iron fist for 30 years. The vast majority of protesters were women. The Islamist security police have used sexual harassment and abuse as a strategic means to push female protesters away from the streets and back home 'where they belong'".¹⁰⁷ The same source further noted that:

Several women, particularly younger ones, have expressed fears that the security forces would use sexual violence against the protesters since the inception of the popular uprising. These fears came true on the 3rd of June as the Islamists security police and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – a paramilitary unit that grew out of the Janjaweed militia responsible for atrocities in Darfur – allegedly committed dozens of rapes. [...]

In addition to sexual abuse, female protesters have been met with other types of gender-based violence. The Islamist-military state in Sudan has made hijab mandatory and public order police have punished women who have dressed 'indecent' and 'immodest' with whipping, fines or imprisonment. The Criminal Code of 1991 mandates 'decent' clothing and behavior of both men and women. But

¹⁰³ Radio Dabanga, [RSF militiamen harass women employees in Sudanese capital](#), 22 June 2019

¹⁰⁴ Radio Dabanga, [Women and Children's Rights NGO's Khartoum office ransacked](#), 25 July 2019

¹⁰⁵ Radio Dabanga, [Militia officer assaults Omdurman woman](#), 24 November 2019

¹⁰⁶ Center for Strategic and International Studies, [Bashir's Removal Is Just the Beginning of the Sudanese Transition](#), 12 April 2019

¹⁰⁷ CHR. Michelsen Institute, [Sexual violence does not stop Sudan's women from speaking up](#), 4 September 2019

during the demonstrations, the Rapid Support Forces and Islamists security officers have torn the hijab off women's heads and cut the hair of women. "Although women wear proper clothes, they are exposed to verbal abuse and physical violence, and this they [the abusers] do with Islam as their cover," said one out of 64 female protesters that we interviewed.

The aim is to frighten female protesters and force them back home. Removing the hijab is a direct threat to female protesters that other parts of their bodies are at risk of abuse and sexual harassment.¹⁰⁸

Hala Al-Karib, regional Director of the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA), noted in her opinion piece published by Al Jazeera in September 2019 that:

In Sudan, sexual violence is a persistent problem that has roots not only in misogyny, homophobia and politics of domination but also in the state's methods of consolidating power and its unconventional and destructive reliance on the militarisation of civilians [...]

The reliance of the state on the militarisation of civilians in the form of militias has legitimised loosely organised armed groups to exert their power through violence with the aim of consolidating the power of the state. This has largely undermined the rule of law in the country, enabled dangerous state-supported militia to control land and resources, and normalised sexual violence, enslavement, rape, and the terrorisation of populations within Sudan, particularly in Darfur, South Kordofan and the Blue Nile as an extension of state power.¹⁰⁹

Note that on 29th November 2019 Sudan cancelled the Public Order law, which since its introduction in 1983 "enforced strict moral codes by prohibiting 'indecent and immoral acts'" according to Radio Dabanga.¹¹⁰ The same source further noted that "Most of the offenses relate to interactions between men and women, dancing, choice of dress, smoking, and other personal behaviour that the authorities deemed improper" and "disproportionately affected women".¹¹¹

UNOCHA reported in its January 2020 Humanitarian Needs Overview "There is limited information on overall SGBV [Sexual and Gender Based Violence] cases across Sudan. However, the risk of attacks is present across the country. [...] GBV is a key concern in Sudan, including by armed groups and within communities. Refugee and IDP women and children face heightened risk of sexual violence amid overcrowding in both IDP and refugees' camps and out-of-camp refugee locations [...] In 2019, GBV incidents were reported in Khartoum and other state capitals, following the 3 June attack on sit-in protestors".¹¹² The same source further noted:

There are 1.8 million people at risk of Gender based violence (GBV). Women and girls continue to suffer disproportionately from GBV, poverty and violations of basic rights due to insecurity; low economic status and lack of livelihood opportunities; and lack of community awareness on women's rights due to cultural and societal norms. About 55 per cent of displaced people are women and girls, with 27 per cent of those women below the age of 18. They are particularly exposed to protection risks, such as threats, harassment, and sexual violence from armed men, as they engage in daily chores such as farming and fetching water and firewood. According to available information on GBV cases in Sudan, women and girls account for over 90 per cent of survivors, and although grossly underreported, cases of sexual violence against men and boys have also been reported. FGM remains prevalent in Sudan, affecting 87 per cent of women aged 15-49 years old, and 32 per cent of girls 14 or younger.

¹⁰⁸ CHR. Michelsen Institute, [Sexual violence does not stop Sudan's women from speaking up](#), 4 September 2019

¹⁰⁹ Hala Al-Karib (Al Jazeera), [Sudan's youth showed us how to counter sexual violence](#), 5 September 2019

¹¹⁰ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan dissolves National Congress Party, repeals Public Order Bill](#), 29 November 2019

¹¹¹ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan dissolves National Congress Party, repeals Public Order Bill](#), 29 November 2019

¹¹² UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Needs Overview](#), January 2020, 1.4 Humanitarian Consequences, Sexual and Gender Based-Violence (SGBV) p.20 and 3.6 Protection, Gender Based Violence p.49

Domestic violence rates are high. According to the MICS 2014 findings, 34 per cent of women across Sudan agreed that it is permissible to be beaten by a husband. Displacement and poverty heighten cases of domestic violence, which has been reported to have increased in IDP camps as husbands demand income from wives involved in income generating activities (IGAs). Women also suffer reprisal attacks for their participation in IGAs or for their new-found mobility and voice in local communities. [...] GBV, especially sexual violence, continues to affect women and girls especially among the IDP communities. Particularly vulnerable are over 200,000 women-headed refugee households, and nearly 7,800 child-headed refugee households. Women and girls lack access to quality specialized lifesaving GBV services, such as the clinical management of rape (CMR), and psycho-social support (PSS), legal aid, case management and referral mechanisms, which are unavailable in over 90 per cent of localities in Sudan.¹¹³

1.1.8. Children

Khartoum

In July 2018 Radio Dabanga reported that “Authorities in Khartoum have freed 80 children from a container that was ready to be trafficked across the border. An official in the Public Prosecutor's Office announced that the children aged between 13 and 17, were found by the authorities in a container being prepared for trafficking at Sharjel Nil area in Khartoum. The nationalities of the children have not been publicly announced. The under-secretary of the high state security prosecutor's office, Mutasim Abdallah, said that the children have been transferred to a shelter centre in Soba in Khartoum state. Abdallah said that the victims were beaten and suffered from physical and mental traumas during their time in the containers. He said that they require medical and psychological support”.¹¹⁴

In September 2018 a Thomson Reuters Foundation article noted that “Nearly 100 human trafficking victims have been rescued in a major police operation in Sudan, including dozens of children forced to work in illegal gold mines, Interpol said [...]. Operation Sawiyan involved 200 Sudanese police officers who rescued 94 people, including 85 minors, from criminal networks in and around the capital, Khartoum, in an Interpol-led week-long crackdown last month, the global police organisation said. Many of the victims were from other African countries and believed to have been travelling toward Europe when they fell into the hands of traffickers, said Tim Morris, Interpol's executive director of police services. [...] Police found some children as young as ten handling dangerous chemicals in open-air gold mines east of Khartoum, while others were forced to beg in the city, said Interpol”.¹¹⁵

In its annual report on trafficking covering the period April 2018 to March 2019 the U.S. Department of State noted that:

As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Sudan, and traffickers exploit victims from Sudan abroad. Traffickers subject homeless children in Khartoum—including Sudanese and unaccompanied migrant children from West and Central Africa—to forced begging, forced labor in public transportation and large markets, and sex trafficking. Human rights groups observe children working in brick-making factories, gold mining, collecting medical waste, street vending, and agriculture; these children are exposed to threats, physical and sexual abuse, and

¹¹³ UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Needs Overview](#), January 2020, 1.4 Humanitarian Consequences, Sexual and Gender Based-Violence (SGBV) p.20 and 3.6 Protection, Gender Based Violence p.52

¹¹⁴ Radio Dabanga, ['80 children' released from traffickers in Khartoum](#), 24 July 2018

¹¹⁵ Thomson Reuters Foundation News, [Police found some children as young as ten handling dangerous chemicals in open-air gold mines while others were forced to beg](#), 10 September 2018

hazardous working conditions, with limited access to education or health services, making them highly vulnerable to traffickers. Criminal groups exploit Sudanese women and girls—particularly internally displaced persons or those from rural areas—in domestic work and Sudanese girls to sex trafficking.¹¹⁶

A September 2018 Radio Dabanga article noted that “Members of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Sudan’s main militia, began shaving the heads of men with ‘deviant hair styles’ in northern Khartoum. [...] The paramilitaries are shaving men by force in the districts of El Haj Yousef, El Tawidat, El Karton, and El Radmiyat, as part of ‘the fight against negative phenomena’. They are targeting youths, ‘especially those with haircuts like famous soccer players’”.¹¹⁷

UNICEF noted that “The attack on pro-democracy protesters in the Khartoum ‘sit-in’ site around the Army Headquarters on 3 June [2019] and subsequent days, led to the reported deaths of at least 19 children and the injury of another 49. Twelve child survivors of sexual violence received medical and psycho-social treatment from child protection actors according to the Child Protection sector with reports of 70 victims of rape reported by ‘The Guardian’”.¹¹⁸

An article published by The New Humanitarian in mid-June 2019 reported that “Life is tentatively returning to Khartoum’s streets after pro-democracy campaigners abandoned a general strike this week, but Sudanese civilians are confronted by a range of challenges [...] ‘Schools, hospitals, and health centres have been targeted, looted, and destroyed,’ UNICEF’s Executive Director Henrietta Fore said in a statement. ‘We have received information that children are being detained, recruited to join the fighting and sexually abused’”.¹¹⁹

Human Rights Watch noted that “The Central Committee of Sudanese Doctors, a professional doctors’ organization, said over 900 people were wounded during the June 3 attack and subsequent days of violence”.¹²⁰ Furthermore:

Human Rights Watch researchers received several accounts of the security forces beating protesters harshly with metal sticks, batons and whips. Bakheet, a 20-year-old protester, told researchers he was badly beaten by RSF soldiers who pulled him out of hiding in the Blue Nile dormitory at the University of Khartoum. [...]

‘They made us sit down in front of the dorm and beat us hard with butts of guns and sticks and pipes. We were about 20 people, including 2 small children ages 8 to 10. The beating lasted for an hour or more. They even beat the children.’¹²¹

UNOCHA noted in its January 2020 Humanitarian Needs Overview with regards to child protection:

Risks to children, such as child labor, trafficking, and physical and sexual violence – have been exacerbated by prolonged displacement; loss of property and livelihoods; and limited access to basic services as a result flash floods and localized armed conflict.

During the first half of 2019, available information suggests that some 9,338 children (45 per cent girls) were unaccompanied and separated children (UASC), with the highest numbers in Jebel Marra, Abyei,

¹¹⁶ U.S. Department of State, [US Department of State: 2019 Trafficking in Persons Report: Sudan](#), 20 June 2019

¹¹⁷ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan’s govt. militia starts ‘head-shaving campaign’ in Khartoum North](#), 23 September 2018

¹¹⁸ UNICEF, [Sudan Humanitarian Situation Report Mid-Year 2019](#), August 2019

¹¹⁹ The New Humanitarian, [Sudan briefing: Civilians face increasing fragility under military rule](#), 14 June 2019

¹²⁰ Human Rights Watch, [“They Were Shouting ‘Kill Them’”, Sudan’s Violent Crackdown on Protesters in Khartoum](#), 17 November 2019, *Beatings, Stabbings* p.33

¹²¹ Human Rights Watch, [“They Were Shouting ‘Kill Them’”, Sudan’s Violent Crackdown on Protesters in Khartoum](#), 17 November 2019, *Beatings, Stabbings* p.33

Khartoum, Red Sea, and North Darfur. This represents a 73 per cent increase compared to the same period in 2018, when only 3,500 UASC were recorded. Violence at home is reported both in IDP and returnee locations across Sudan, which indicates the need to strengthen family and community-based care for children. According to the Family and Child protection unit of the police (FCPU) over 5,000 children (30 per cent of which are girls) suffer from domestic violence, with the highest percentages in South Darfur, Blue Nile and Khartoum. Children in these states reported experiencing physical violence including violent discipline. Caregivers and children, especially adolescent boys and girls, need life skills support, quality psychosocial support or social protection services to help them cope. Since December 2018, women and adolescents were part of protests and demands for a democratic change in Sudan, particularly in Khartoum, Omdurman, and Nyala. The evolving socio-political situation

in the country resulted in an increase in protection risks for children and adolescents, including in states and localities where the protection and security context had previously been stable or had improved, such as Khartoum, Nyala, North Kordofan, West Darfur and Red Sea.¹²²

Omdurman

No COI published between 10 July 2018 and 10 December 2019 on violence against children in Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

1.1.9. Individuals of diverse sexual orientation or gender identity

Khartoum

A blog piece from the Norwegian Chr. Michelsen research institute (CMI) commented on fears of violence against the LGBTIQ community in Sudan, referring particularly to the 2018 protests in Khartoum:

The Sudanese LGBTIQ+ community still worries about being identified as being LGBTIQ+ in public, including at protests and sit-ins. There is a real danger of being harassed or attacked.¹²³

Omdurman

No COI published between 10 July 2018 – 10 December 2019 on violence against individuals of diverse sexual orientation or gender identity in Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

Unspecific location

The US Department of State reported in their annual human rights report covering events in 2018 that:

¹²² UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Needs Overview](#), January 2020, 3.6 Protection, Child Protection, p.51

¹²³ Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), [Blog from Sudan: The Sudanese revolution: A fight for LGBTIQ + rights?](#), 8 May 2019

LGBTI organizations increasingly felt pressured to suspend or alter their activities due to threat of harm. Several LGBTI persons felt compelled to leave the country due to fear of persecution, intimidation, or harassment.¹²⁴

1.2. Arbitrary arrest and detention

For information on the treatment in detention, see [1.3. Prison conditions](#).

1.2.1. Darfuri

For specific information on the arrest and detention of Darfuri students, see [1.2.4. Students, political activists, human rights activists and journalists who are not originally from these cities or who support persons not originally from there](#) and for specific information on the treatment of Darfuris whilst in detention see [1.3.1. Darfuri](#) and [1.3.4. Students, political activists, human rights activists and journalists who are not originally from these cities or who support persons not originally from there](#).

Khartoum

A joint study by the Humanitarian Policy Group and Research & Evidence Facility, who carried out field work at the end of 2017 and published its findings in August 2018, found that “Contrary to the narrative that the Darfur conflict is over and that stability is being restored, this study provides evidence of persistent and pervasive harassment (including attack, arrest and detention), surveillance and discrimination against Darfuris of particular ethnic groups, within Darfur and in Khartoum”.¹²⁵

Amnesty International expressed its concern about the “arbitrary arrest and continued incommunicado detention of 47 students of Darfur origin who were arrested in three raids on their homes in Sinnar and Khartoum states on 23 and 27 December 2018. One student, Salih Yagoub Omer, was killed during the raids. In press conferences on 23 and 28 December 2018, the government accused the students of infiltration, association with a rebel group, and of planning to kill protesters in the ongoing protests in the country. At each of the press conferences on national television, videos were aired showing the students allegedly incriminating themselves as being associated with the Sudan Liberation Movement (Abdelwahid Nour), and of planning to kill protesters and cause chaos. The circumstances around which the alleged confessions were aired and the fact that they were made without any of the students having a lawyer present suggests that the confessions may have been obtained through torture and other ill-treatment”.¹²⁶

Reporting on the same group of Darfuri students, BBC News stated that it had “uncovered evidence that Sudan's security services tried to undermine popular protests by rounding up students,

¹²⁴ US Department of State, [2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan](#), 13 March 2019, *Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons*

¹²⁵ Humanitarian Policy Group (ODI)/Research & Evidence Facility (REF), [Darfuri migration from Sudan to Europe, From displacement to despair \(Summary\)](#), August 2018, *Summary, Causes of migration*, p. 2

¹²⁶ Amnesty International, [Urgent Action: Forty-Seven students held incommunicado, one killed](#), 25 January 2019

torturing them until they admitted to violent intent, and spreading false confession videos on Facebook and state TV".¹²⁷ It further reported:

arrested under remarkably similar circumstances, was another group of Darfuri students from Khartoum and Alzaiem Alazhari universities. The students were held captive in cramped conditions and also subjected to torture, according to multiple sources who spoke to the BBC. A detainee who was imprisoned alongside them recounted the torture methods in detail, and said that a PVC hose, made rigid with a stick, was used to make the beatings more painful. One of the students from the University of Khartoum described to the BBC how their interrogators accused them of making petrol bombs, or Molotov cocktails. In fact, he claimed: "It was the first time I had ever seen a Molotov." At one point, John claims that Salah Gosh, the Director General of NISS who resigned after the 11 April [2019] coup, came to the prison in person to ask if the students were being tortured. After he left, John says that those who said they hadn't been mistreated were left alone, but any who said they were being tortured were beaten again. John said "they observed which of us was most afraid of torture", and that the security services took a group of the younger students away. Afterwards, they told John that they had been electrocuted and water-boarded, then instructed to give a statement to a camera".¹²⁸

The same BBC News article stated further: "Friends of the young men in the videos identified them and dismissed the confessions both online and in interviews with the BBC. They attested that their friends were ordinary students, peaceful young men, and had no ties to any militant groups. In fact, some of them were in groups actively opposed to militia groups in Darfur. Multiple interviewees, including a representative of Human Rights Watch (HRW), said that their ethnicity, as black Africans from Darfur, was being used against them to give the impression they were part of a violent movement".¹²⁹ Ultimately "All of the students in the confession videos were released without charge, indicating that the security services had little hard evidence against them. The Darfur Bar Association has called for the release of Darfuris who still remain in detention for political reasons".¹³⁰

According to Olivia Bueno from the International Refugee Rights Initiative (IRRI), one of the respondents of January 2019 Waging Peace's report: "In the context of the recent protests, Darfur colleagues in Khartoum have informed us that Darfuris have been more susceptible than others to arrest and have been particularly vulnerable to mistreatment while detained (interview with Khartoum colleague, 3 January 2018)".¹³¹

The UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan reported in his report covering the period 28 September 2018 to 30 June 2019 that:

Soon after the start of the major demonstrations in Khartoum and other Sudanese cities in December 2018, reports emerged of alleged acts of violent repression of protesters by Sudanese security force [...]

The Independent Expert received reports that on 25 December [2018], security forces that were deployed in large numbers across Khartoum used live ammunition to disperse crowds of protesters, resulting in multiple injuries and fatalities. Snipers reportedly used civilian premises, including schools, to target protesters. The Government spokesperson stated during a press conference held in Khartoum on 27 December that 19 people had been killed and 107 people arrested during the

¹²⁷ BBC News, [How fake news from Sudan's regime backfired](#), 25 April 2019

¹²⁸ BBC News, [How fake news from Sudan's regime backfired](#), 25 April 2019

¹²⁹ BBC News, [How fake news from Sudan's regime backfired](#), 25 April 2019

¹³⁰ BBC News, [How fake news from Sudan's regime backfired](#), 25 April 2019

¹³¹ Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019, 6. Viability of internal relocation to Khartoum, a. Current protests, p. 20

demonstrations. The spokesperson said that most of those arrested belonged to the Sudan Liberation Army Abdul Wahid, a Darfuri armed movement, which the movement's leader denied".¹³²

The report further noted: "Immediately following the removal of President al-Bashir [in April 2019], credible reports confirmed the release of hundreds of protesters and political detainees from detention facilities across the country. However, the release of dozens of Darfuri detainees, including the 23 Darfuri university students arrested in Sinar, was delayed for a few weeks".¹³³

Khartoum - Arrested protestors perceived to support the Sudan Liberation Army Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW)

The UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan reported in his July 2019 report that "Soon after the start of the major demonstrations in Khartoum and other Sudanese cities in December 2018, reports emerged of alleged acts of violent repression of protesters by Sudanese security forces. The Independent Expert received reports that on 25 December [2018], security forces that were deployed in large numbers across Khartoum used live ammunition to disperse crowds of protesters, resulting in multiple injuries and fatalities. Snipers reportedly used civilian premises, including schools, to target protesters. The Government spokesperson stated during a press conference held in Khartoum on 27 December that 19 people had been killed and 107 people arrested during the demonstrations. The spokesperson said that most of those arrested belonged to the Sudan Liberation Army Abdul Wahid, a Darfuri armed movement, which the movement's leader denied".¹³⁴

Reporting in early March 2019, "ten weeks into massive street protests in Sudan", The Jamestown Foundation noted that:

On December 28, 2018, the Sudanese government claimed to have captured armed members of Darfur's Sudan Liberation Movement of Abdel-Wahid al-Nur (SLM/A-AW rebel) group in the North Khartoum suburb of al-Droushab, over 500 miles from the group's normal operational zone in the Jabal Marra region of Darfur. Security forces broadcast footage of young detainees confessing their intention to kill protesters, destroy property, and attack public institutions. The SLM/A-AW refuted the charges, calling them "blatantly fabricated allegations" while insisting the movement's operations were confined to Jabal Marra (Sudan Tribune, December 30, 2018).¹³⁵

The cited Sudan Tribune article further noted "the Sudanese government said that the security forces clashed in al-Droushab area [North Khartoum] with armed elements of the SLM-AW before to capture them. Also, they broadcasted a video where the arrested Darfurians confess they were preparing attack public institutions, burn vehicles and kill protesters".¹³⁶

A December 2019 International Federation for Human Rights and African Center for Justice and Peace Studies report explained:

¹³² UN Human Rights Council, [*Situation of human rights in the Sudan Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan*](#), 26 July 2019, para. 29

¹³³ UN Human Rights Council, [*Situation of human rights in the Sudan Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan*](#), 26 July 2019, para. 53

¹³⁴ UN Human Rights Council, [*Situation of human rights in the Sudan Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan*](#), 26 July 2019, para. 29

¹³⁵ The Jamestown Foundation, [*A Revolution Not Like the Others: Directions in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in a Post-Bashir Sudan*](#), 1 March 2019

¹³⁶ Sudan Tribune, [*Abdel Wahid rejects accusations of committing violence during Sudan protests*](#), 30 December 2018

When protests broke out across Sudan on 19 December 2018, Omar Al-Bashir was quick to accuse Darfurians of being the main instigators, in order to discredit the movement. Some students from Darfur were arrested, allegedly interrogated, tortured, and forced to confess on television that they had participated in the protests while carrying weapons. These recent attempts once again illustrate the constant stigmatisation and marginalisation of populations from Darfur, which have been extensively employed under Al-Bashir's regime. This narrative, primarily aimed at dividing and weakening the recent protest movement, completely failed. Protests were organized throughout the country, including in Darfur, with similar demands for regime change and justice for past crimes.¹³⁷

Omdurman

No COI published between 10 July 2018 – 10 December 2019 on the arbitrary arrest and detention of Darfuris in Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

Unspecified location

The first secretary of a Western Embassy told the UK Home Office fact finding mission when asked whether Darfuris were "in general at risk of arrest and detention" that he "did not have impression that in general Darfuris are targeted although it may depend on their other characteristics. It is not one factor that puts someone at risk, but several factors. For example, being a Darfuri, a Christian and a student increases the risk that the person would receive greater attention from NISS".¹³⁸

Siddig Yousef [SY], member of the central committee of the Communist Party and head of the Sudanese Solidarity Committee, told the UK Home Office fact finding mission in August 2018 that "Asked if the government undertakes widespread arrests of Darfuris, SY said no. However, SY noted that if arrested, Darfuris are treated worse than other Sudanese prisoners, their hands are chained and they are blindfolded".¹³⁹

The January 2019 Waging Peace report also highlighted the following profiles as being prone to targeted attacks:

ii) Racial vs tribal identity [...]

So PAX said, "Darfuris are certainly targeted in Sudan on the basis of ethnicity, in line with the inherent racism that underpins many of the GoS' policies." And also, "Darfuris face considerable risk in Khartoum as they are generally perceived with suspicion. Non-Arab Darfuris in particular face greater chances of persecution, NISS surveillance, arrest and detention based on the grounds of their ethnicity. It is unreasonable to assert that an individual can relocate to Khartoum from elsewhere in Sudan or internationally without heightened suspicion and persecution, due to the geographic profiling adopted by the Sudanese security services [...]"

Margie Buchanan-Smith and Susanne Jaspars similarly outlined certain tribes: "The findings of our research provide strong evidence that Darfuris in Sudan are targeted on the basis of their ethnicity. Young Darfuri men, including teenage boys, from ethnic groups associated with the rebellion are particularly at risk. This applies to Zaghawa, Fur and Masalit as well as a wide range of smaller ethnic

¹³⁷ International Federation for Human Rights, African Center for Justice and Peace Studies, Sudan Human Rights Monitor, [Will There Be Justice for Darfur? Persisting impunity in the face of political change; Fact-finding mission report](#), December 2019, 3. Politically instigated violence remains pervasive p.30

¹³⁸ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, An official of Western Embassy A, p. 140

¹³⁹ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, Siddig Yousef, p. 159

African groups such as the Tunjur and Burgo.” They concluded, “... our research study concludes that this amounts to systemic persecution of Darfuris of particular ethnic groups [...]

Political profile

In explaining the point, ACJPS said, “We have no any specific evidence about the mistreatment of ordinary civilians from Darfur and the Two Areas, but persons travelling from one of these conflict areas to Khartoum could experience harassment or intimidation by the authorities, especially if they were from one of the main tribes commonly affiliated to the rebel groups, this included the Fur, Massalit or Zaghawa from Darfur, or Nuba from Southern Kordofan. We had no specific evidence to indicate that persons from these tribes would be subject to targeted violence or arrest by the NISS on account of their ethnicity alone. Ethnicity is complicated, and ethnic disputes were often exploited by the government to pursue political goals. In general anyone who was suspected of political opposition against the government could be targeted, including persons from Arab tribes.”

In fleshing out who might be suspected of political opposition, ACJPS offered the following suggestions: “Lawyers, journalists and students were three of the most active political groups in Sudan and therefore particularly at risk of arrest and mistreatment by the security services. Tribal leaders and persons affiliated to youth groups, such as Girfina or Change Now, were also could be identified as possible ‘at-risk’ groups. More generally anyone who was involved in political activism against the regime risked arbitrary arrest, incommunicado detention and physical mistreatment by the NISS. They also add an interesting specific example of risk to “The activists who resist the construction of “Kajabar dam” in Northern Sudan...”. However, NGO B is keen to widen out our understanding of political profile, by taking into account the arbitrary exercise of power, discussed earlier: “It is impossible to state that Darfuris are either at risk or not at risk by virtue of residing in Khartoum. Much depends on the individuals particular circumstance such as their affiliations, their political activity and so forth. Again it is important to stress that this, in itself, does not mean that only those actively involved in politics will be targeted. Darfuris who simply find themselves in the wrong place (protests, political environment etc) at the wrong time are far more likely to experience discriminatory and violent behaviour than those deemed as “Arab”.¹⁴⁰

1.2.2. Nuba

Khartoum

The CEDOCA report also cited a Sudanese academic specialised in ethnic identity, land rights and conflict analysis as stating:

Yes, people of African origins from Darfur, Blue Nile and Nuba Mountains face more discrimination based on their ethnic affiliations and or religious background namely Christians and non-Moslims. Lacking financial resources and unemployment is a result and manifestation of the discriminatory treatment despite the fact that the Constitution provides equal treatment for all citizens. Public Law Order is implemented discriminatively with focus on areas concentrated with IDPs and relatively poor residents at the outskirts of Khartoum. Women in these areas engaged in activities like brewing and alcohol making and selling, tea making and selling, and other several activities labeled as informal and illegal activities. Evidently, most of the victims of the Public Order Law are from war torn regions of the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile. [...]

Based on this analysis, the fear of the asylum seekers, from Nuba or Blue Nile origins, from facing mistreatment including lives, if they return to Khartoum, is a legitimate and justifiable concern by all standards. So the answer is certainly affirmative to your question of ‘Are they likely to encounter

¹⁴⁰ Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019, 6. *Viability of internal relocation to Khartoum, c. Surveillance*, p. 25/26 [Note that on p. 6 of her report she clarifies that “It should be noted that references to Khartoum refer to ‘Greater Khartoum’ throughout’, also encompassing the cities of Omdurman and Khartoum North”].

problems with the authorities?’ they are likely to be subjected to interrogation by authorities that involved mistreatment and tortures. YES. [...]

I strong [*sic*] believe that any attempt to persuade or force Nuba refugees or asylum seekers back home without political settlement of the Nuba question will be terribly miscalculated political decision for it certainly endangers the very lives of the returnees. Instead, they deserve protection of their Human Rights.¹⁴¹

According to Tajeldin Adam, a Sudanese journalist and safety analyst living in Belgium interviewed for the same report, “Generally speaking, people who hail from these regions (Nuba Mountains/ Blue Nile) are likely to encounter risk upon return to Sudan through Khartoum Airport. [...] To the greatest extent, and albeit this is not an officially declared policy, citizens are racially profiled and categorised into two groups: Arab and/or non-Arab. After this, they could be further questioned on the basis of the regions they come from, their tribal and political affiliations and so forth. For instance, a person who is from South Kordofan or Blue Nile and a member of the one of tribal groups who are deemed to support opposition groups could be persecuted along these lines”.¹⁴² Furthermore, the founder of a press organisation in the Nuba mountains stated “There has been several cases we have heard, in which Nuba and Darfuris were returned to Khartoum and immediately arrested and beaten. [...] The Sudan government has an extensive national security apparatus and I would not doubt if some of the people trying to immigrate are about of their security forces and they send information back to the government about who is trying to immigrate”.¹⁴³

Furthermore, according to a human rights activist who lives abroad “[...] as the issue of ethnicity is very much linked to politics, especially when it comes to the formation of rebel movements in Darfur and two areas, for instance, most of the fighters of rebel group belong to Zaghawa, Four and Masalit, while in the two areas most of the fighters who form the SPLM-N belong to Nubs [*sic*] and Angasna tribes, therefore, it is most likely that anyone from these tribe is suspected to belong to rebels or cooperating with them by way or another, and he/ she will be subject to risk of detention or torture upon his deportation to Sudan”.¹⁴⁴ The same source continued “Generally if you originated from the Nuba mountains and you are active in public issue, especially in social media you most likely faced problems in Khartoum as people from those areas are linked to the Sudan People Liberation Movement/ Army the authority in many cases use this classification to arrest and detain people even if there not affiliated to SPLM/A-N. but low-profile people might pass unnoticed, unless someone notify the authority, that they claimed asylum somewhere and their claim was rejected”.¹⁴⁵

Similarly, a January 2019 report from Maddy Crowther, co-Director of Waging Peace cited PAX, Netherlands-based peace organisation, as stating that “An individual relocating to Khartoum from the Nuba Mountains, for example, will be automatically associated with South Kordofan rebel

¹⁴¹ CEDOCA, [*COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas*](#), 22 January 2019, 2.2.1. Discriminatie en geweld: economische, etnische, politieke factoren p.42 and 2.2.2. Risico bij terugkeer p.45

¹⁴² CEDOCA, [*COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas*](#), 22 January 2019, 2.2.2. Risico bij terugkeer p.45

¹⁴³ CEDOCA, [*COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas*](#), 22 January 2019, 2.2.2. Risico bij terugkeer p.45

¹⁴⁴ CEDOCA, [*COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas*](#), 22 January 2019, 2.2.2. Risico bij terugkeer p.46

¹⁴⁵ CEDOCA, [*COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas*](#), 22 January 2019, 2.5. Studenten, activisten p.53

movements, while an individual returning from abroad will be the subject of close surveillance due to potential links with opposition groups outside Sudan”.¹⁴⁶ Furthermore:

Human rights lawyer Mohaned Elnour said, ‘As a human rights lawyer, I am fully aware of injustice that the non-Arab especially from Darfur and the two areas (Blue Nile and Nuba mountains) are facing based on their ethnicity or religion. the Islamic-Arab regime has been on the United States list of state sponsoring terrorism since August 1993. All the Nuba mountains people are African, many of them are non-Muslim. It was not an accident that most of my clients in the above-mentioned cases are from Nuba Mountains and non-Arab Darfuris.’

However, he also claimed, ‘The ethnicity is encounter and very much linked to politics, especially when it comes to the formation of rebel movements, for instance, most of the fighters of rebel groups are non-Arab Darfuris or belong to Nubs and Angasna ethnicities, therefore, it is most likely that anyone from these areas is suspected to belong to rebels or cooperating with them by way or another, and they will be subject to risk of detention and torture or even assassination upon his deportation to Sudan.’¹⁴⁷

In the same report addressing the ‘Viability of internal relocation’ to Khartoum, ‘NGO B’ was cited as stating “Darfuri tea ladies, as a case study, have routinely had their equipment confiscated and have been detained. In this example they are often accused of prostitution or espionage on behalf of the armed movements (Darfuris for the SLA factions and Nuba for the SPLA-N), accusations that derive solely on the basis of their ethnicity”.¹⁴⁸

Omdurman

No COI published between 10 July 2018 – 10 December 2019 on the arbitrary arrest and detention of Nuba in Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

Unspecified location

In January 2019 the Belgian COI Unit, CEDOCA, published a report which addressed the situation for people from the Two Areas in Khartoum.¹⁴⁹ Whilst predominantly written in Dutch, some interlocutors’ contributions were provided in English; Geir Skogseth, Sudan Analyst from the Norwegian Landinfo, was cited as stating:

“In meetings with Landinfo in Sudan, our sources have generally stated that NISS definitely has a special focus on the populations coming from the conflict areas. According to one source, NISS has a special ‘tribal branch’ dedicated to monitoring political activity among populations with origins in the periphery. Activists with origins in South Kordofan have pointed out that NISS in particular monitors four groups among Nubans: people belonging to armed groups, activists, those with higher education, and recent arrivals.

- People belonging to armed groups will face arrest if identified by NISS. This applies especially to persons who have taken up arms and people who provide practical support, but also to political supporters.

¹⁴⁶ Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019, 6. ii) *Racial vs. tribal identity* p. 26

¹⁴⁷ Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019, 6. ii) *Racial vs. tribal identity* p. 26

¹⁴⁸ Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019, 6. ii) *Racial vs. tribal identity*, vi) *Economic and social discrimination* p. 33

¹⁴⁹ CEDOCA, [COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas](#), 22 January 2019

- Activists are in focus as they are perceived as people who actively influence others to support organisations that are critical towards the regime's politics regarding the 'two areas'. The definition of activist is wide and not limited to members of political parties or the political wings of armed groups. (Activists from conflict areas belonging to civil society organisations or political parties are fairly often suspected and/or accused by NISS of supporting armed groups.)
- People with higher education (high school or more) are followed more closely than others, as they are 'potential activists' and people with influence over others within the community.
- Recent arrivals from zones with ongoing armed conflict are followed closely to keep them from sharing information about recent developments, the humanitarian situation and human rights violations committed by Sudanese armed forces or their proxies to activists reporting on the human rights situation.

What is difficult to tell, is whether NISS operatives outside the 'two areas' fine tune their monitoring to mainly include people who are known to belong to ethnic groups or other social communities that are perceived as being 'in opposition', or if they focus on people with Nuba origin in general.¹⁵⁰

The same source cited a founder of a press organisation in the Nuba mountains as stating "Since the war has started the people from Nuba, Blue Nile and Darfur have been targeted and arrested without charge and some have been tortured. Many of them have also been physically picked up off the streets, against their will, by militias and the Sudan military to fight against their own people in the areas of conflict and Yemen".¹⁵¹

1.2.3. Other ethnic and/or religious minorities

Khartoum

According to the U.S. Department of State's 2018 Report on International Religious Freedom "According to multiple sources, authorities again regularly charged and convicted Christian and Muslim women with 'indecent dress' for wearing pants and fined and lashed them".¹⁵² The same source further noted that

According to reports, the Public Order Police frequently charged women with "indecent dress" and "indecent behavior," and there were numerous court convictions. Religious leaders and government officials again reported the Public Order Police fined and lashed Muslim and Christian women on a daily basis in Khartoum for wearing pants and other dress the police considered indecent. In November the Public Order Police arrested a Coptic singer after she performed at a concert for which the organizer had not received the proper permit. The police searched the singer's private phone while she was in custody and charged her with indecent behavior because of photographs they found on her phone. A judge convicted her and sentenced her to 10 lashes and a fine of 5,000 Sudanese pounds (\$110). Authorities lashed her immediately following the conviction.¹⁵³

¹⁵⁰ CEDOCA, [COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas](#), 22 January 2019, 2.2.1. Discriminatie en geweld: economische, etnische, politieke factoren p.37

¹⁵¹ CEDOCA, [COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas](#), 22 January 2019, 2.2.1. Discriminatie en geweld: economische, etnische, politieke factoren, p.42

¹⁵² U.S. Department of State, [2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: Sudan](#), 21 June 2019, Executive Summary

¹⁵³ U.S. Department of State, [2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: Sudan](#), 21 June 2019, Executive Summary

In October 2019 Christian Solidarity Worldwide reported that “In a statement to the UN Human Rights Council on 25 September [2019], Sudan’s new Minister of Justice, Mr Nasredeen Abdulbari, outlined the programme of law reform processes, which includes the creation of a Law Reform Commission that will work closely with the legislature and the Ministry of Justice. Mr Abdulbari also announced that all public order laws have been suspended and will be repealed. These laws have been used against women, especially those from marginalised communities. However, unconfirmed reports emerged on 10 October [2019] that public order police were patrolling parts of the capital, Khartoum, stopping and harassing individuals”.¹⁵⁴

In January 2019 the Belgian COI Unit, CEDOCA, published a report which addressed the situation for people from the Two Areas in Khartoum.¹⁵⁵ Geir Skogseth, Sudan Analyst from the Norwegian Landinfo was cited as stating “In meetings with Landinfo in Sudan, our sources have generally stated that NISS [National Intelligence and Security Service] definitely has a special focus on the populations coming from the conflict areas. According to one source, NISS has a special ‘tribal branch’ dedicated to monitoring political activity among populations with origins in the periphery. [...] What is difficult to tell, is whether NISS operatives outside the ‘two areas’ fine tune their monitoring to mainly include people who are known to belong to ethnic groups or other social communities that are perceived as being ‘in opposition’, or if they focus on people with Nuba origin in general”.¹⁵⁶

Christian Solidarity Worldwide noted in an April 2019 article that “Christians have participated in the demonstrations since December 2018 and some have also been killed, including Christian student and activist Nasheed Saeed, who died in the cross fire between military officers and special security police on 8 April [2019]. However, due to the repression churches and church leaders have experienced over the last five years, an official church position on the protests had not been adopted. Of the church leaders present at the demonstrations, a number had been arrested, detained or had experienced restrictions on their places of worship since 2011. On 11 April [2019], the day after the coup, Christians stood arm in arm to protect Muslim protestors from the military while they participated in Friday prayers at the sit in”.¹⁵⁷

In January 2020 Christian Solidarity Worldwide reported that:

Sudanese Christian businessman Ashraf Samir Mousad Obid was detained at Khartoum Airport on 27 January [2020], under the orders of the General Intelligence Service (GIS).

Mr Obid was returning to Sudan for the first time since fleeing the country in 2015, following a campaign of harassment by the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS). The new security service, the GIS, had given assurances that all names previously placed on the travel restriction list had been removed, and those targeted by the former al Bashir government would be able to travel freely.

However, Mr Obid was detained at Khartoum Airport at 4pm local time. When he asked officers for the reason of his detention, he was informed that his name was on a list submitted by GIS, and that he would be given the full reasons for his arrest once he was transferred to the GIS office. After being detained for an hour and a half, Mr Obid was released, but informed that he could not leave the country, and that he would be called for a meeting with GIS at an unspecified date in the future.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁴ Christian Solidarity Worldwide, [Criminal charges against church leaders confirmed](#), 15 October 2019

¹⁵⁵ CEDOCA, [COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas](#), 22 January 2019

¹⁵⁶ CEDOCA, [COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas](#), 22 January 2019, 2.2.1. Discriminatie en geweld: economische, etnische, politieke factoren p.37

¹⁵⁷ Christian Solidarity Worldwide, [Sudan churches call for democracy and human rights](#), 16 April 2019

¹⁵⁸ Christian Solidarity Worldwide, [Christian businessman detained at airport upon return from exile](#), 28 January 2020

Omdurman

No COI published between 10 July 2018 – 10 December 2019 on the arbitrary arrest and detention of other ethnic/religious minorities in Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

Unspecified location

The US Commission on International Religious Freedom's report covering 2018 noted that "In 2018, security forces were still able to harass and arrest Christians and other minorities, sometimes arbitrarily, without consequence or respect for the rule of law".¹⁵⁹ The same source further noted that:

In August 2018, authorities dismissed the cases of and released eight SCOC [Sudanese Church of Christ] leaders who were arrested in 2017. Minority religious leaders and their lawyers have been monitored, harassed, and frequently arrested for various reasons such as proselytization or speaking out against the government, accused of criminal activity, detained, forced to defend themselves in court, fined, and released, on a repeated basis. One Muslim human rights lawyer, who advocated for non-Muslims' rights and was repeatedly arrested and harassed, was forced to flee Sudan in 2018. Some of these arrests have been due to religious leaders' protest over authorities' interference in church affairs and leadership decisions. [...]

USCIRF met with and received information about multiple individuals charged with apostasy for expressing theological views that differ from the government's preferred interpretation, particularly members of minority Muslim communities. Government officials were reluctant to acknowledge the presence of Shi'a Islam in the country, viewed Shi'a communities through a geopolitical lens as enmeshed with Iran, and infringed on their freedom of religion.¹⁶⁰

The U.S. Department of State's 2018 Report on International Religious Freedom noted that, "According to church leaders, authorities continued to influence the internal affairs of churches through intimidation, harassment, and arrests of those opposed to government interference within evangelical Christian churches".¹⁶¹

In October 2019 Christian Solidarity Worldwide reported that "criminal charges against eight leaders of the Sudanese Church of Christ (SCOC) were confirmed on 7 October [2019], a worrying development in the continuing judicial harassment of the SCOC".¹⁶² The same source further explained:

The elected president and senior leaders of the SCOC have been charged with criminal trespass and illegal possession of SCOC properties. The men were initially arrested on 23 August 2017 and accused of refusing to hand over administrative control to an unelected church committee led by Mr Angelo Alzaki and appointed by the al Bashir government.

The case against the leaders was dismissed by the court of first instance on 9 August 2018. However, the ruling was appealed, and subsequently, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court determined that a new criminal trial should proceed.

The case was re-opened in July 2019. Lawyers working on the appeal informed CSW that the evidence used to support the higher courts consisted of documents submitted by the Ministry of Guidance and

¹⁵⁹ US Commission on International Religious Freedom, [2019 Annual Report: Country Reports: Tier 1 Countries \(Recommended for CPC Designation\): Sudan](#), April 2019, *Persecution of Christians* p.4

¹⁶⁰ US Commission on International Religious Freedom, [2019 Annual Report: Country Reports: Tier 1 Countries \(Recommended for CPC Designation\): Sudan](#), April 2019, *Persecution of Christians* p.4

¹⁶¹ U.S. Department of State, [2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: Sudan](#), 21 June 2019, *Executive Summary*

¹⁶² Christian Solidarity Worldwide, [Criminal charges against church leaders confirmed](#), 15 October 2019

Religious Endowments, the body responsible for registering and regulating religious organisations in Sudan.

The SCOC is a predominantly Nuban denomination and has experienced both religious and ethnic discrimination. The experiences of the SCOC mirror those of the Sudan Evangelical Presbyterian Church (SEPC), whose land has been sold to developers by a government-backed church committee which was not constituted in accordance with church procedures.¹⁶³

1.2.4. Students, political activists, human rights activists and journalists who are not originally from these cities or who support persons not originally from there

For specific information on the treatment whilst in detention see [1.3.4. Students, political activists, human rights activists and journalists who are not originally from these cities or who support persons not originally from there.](#)

In January 2019 the African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies reported:

Since the start of the protests, human rights organisations have documented the detention of hundreds of people including opposition politicians, students, doctors, advocates, activists and journalists, university professors. The number of detained is difficult to corroborate due to access constraints. We are concerned for the physical and psycho-social well-being of those detained by NISS [National Intelligence and Security Service]. Many are detained through the use of emergency laws, which permit prolonged, if not indefinite, detention through arbitrary preventative arrest. Those detainees face inhumane and degrading treatment and torture, both of which have been widely reported by our organisations, including in the context of the current protests.¹⁶⁴

Note that most sources included below specifically mentioned the place of origin of those arrested or that they supported persons not originally from Khartoum or Omdurman. Many students, political activists, human rights activists and journalists living and working in Khartoum/ and Omdurman have also been targeted in the reporting period but that often sources reporting on their arrest do not specify the origin or profile of those targeted and arrested and therefore have not been included here.

For background information on the protests that erupted across Sudan and particularly in Khartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman see [Preface: Protests in Sudan, particularly Khartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman from December 2018.](#)

Khartoum – (Darfuri) students

Amjed Farif El Tayeb [AT], researcher, political activist and spokesperson of the Sudan Change Now movement was recorded by the UK Home Office Fact-Finding Mission in August 2018 as stating with regards to the situation in Khartoum that “Being detained is normal for activists though the treatment faced by Darfuris is worse. Some are tortured or racially abused, and women face sexual assault. Darfuri students have been killed over the last 5 years”.¹⁶⁵ The report further recorded

¹⁶³ Christian Solidarity Worldwide, [Criminal charges against church leaders confirmed](#), 15 October 2019

¹⁶⁴ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Civil society call on Human Rights Council to dispatch an independent international fact-finding mission to establish the facts and circumstance of alleged human rights abuses committed in Sudan](#), 29 January 2019

¹⁶⁵ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, Amjed Farid El Tayeb, p. 102

“Asked if all Darfuri students are at risk even if they are not politically active; AT said he thought so. NISS does not make such differentiation. It antagonizes all Darfuri students”.¹⁶⁶

A Sudanese political scientist and governance advisor for the British Council in Sudan, was recorded by the same Fact-Finding Mission in August 2018 as stating that “Students are well organised: open about their convictions, but aware of need not to expose themselves. Lots of political activity in areas around Khartoum, and young people get arrested for this activity”.¹⁶⁷

A University professor from Darfur was recorded by the UK Home Office Fact-Finding Mission in August 2018 as stating “There is a NISS presence in universities but this happens more in the political arena of student life – universities are quite politically active. The government is interested in students who are in charge of student unions, student bodies. Heard about NISS amongst staff and administrative staff, for different reasons and not just Darfuris. Faculty and administrative staff will also be monitored if they have Darfuri relatives. This enables the government to monitor what’s going on – as it’s aware that Darfuri students want to express their views and protest because of the situation in Darfur [...] The government wants to suppress freedom of expression. Heavy handedness happens when students agitate/are active. It happens frequently – scuffling, even shooting within the university campus”.¹⁶⁸

With special reference to Darfuri students, the University professor stated “All Sudanese opposition parties have their student activists, but the Darfuri students tend to be more agitative. The Fur and Zaghawa students are more active so may face more problems because they also represent the tribal make-up of the main rebel groups (JEM; and SLM-AW). Rebel movements have their own student supporters and are told to push their agenda, making Darfuri students become more agitated/violent due to the conflict so they become victims of the security forces”.¹⁶⁹

Asked whether a Darfuri student who was not active would face problems, the University professor noted “if a Darfuri student studies hard and doesn’t agitate the risk to them is very much less and they will get their grades. But that person may be subject to indirect, subtle social exclusion, just as any person would who didn’t show solidarity to the ‘group’ and may be classed as outsider”.¹⁷⁰ He added “Even a bystander at a protest might face arrest, in which case an investigation would take place and if it was established you are not an activist you would be released. But a Darfuri person arrested at the same event would have a worse time than other Sudanese”.¹⁷¹

Salih Mahmoud M Osman (SO), Deputy Chair of the Darfur Bar Association (DBA), also interviewed by the UK Home Office Fact-Finding Mission in August 2018, reported that “Asked if there were wide-scale arrests in Khartoum similar to those in 2008 following the JEM attack on Omdurman, SO noted that there are still arrests on a daily basis but not happening as it did in 2008. There is targeting of students mainly – SO has a lot of cases in the courts [...] in the past, people protesting against government policies would have been detained, tortured and killed, but now there is change

¹⁶⁶ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, Amjed Farid El Tayeb, p. 103

¹⁶⁷ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, A Sudanese political scientist, p. 109

¹⁶⁸ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, A Sudanese political scientist, p. 114

¹⁶⁹ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, A Sudanese political scientist, p. 114

¹⁷⁰ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, A Sudanese political scientist, p. 115

¹⁷¹ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, A Sudanese political scientist, p. 115

in policy. People are arrested and charged with criminal offences that often carry the death penalty, in the absence of sufficient evidence, and kept in prolonged pre-trial detention – up to 2-3 years”.¹⁷²

A December 2019 International Federation for Human Rights and African Center for Justice and Peace Studies report explained:

In Khartoum and other towns in Central Sudan, Darfurian University students were amongst those primarily targeted by NISS when the first protests broke out. Several of them were arrested and detained, including incommunicado in unknown locations. All of them were allegedly released following Al-Bashir’s overthrow.¹⁷³

Amnesty International expressed its concern about the “arbitrary arrest and continued incommunicado detention of 47 students of Darfur origin who were arrested in three raids on their homes in Sinnar and Khartoum states on 23 and 27 December 2018. One student, Salih Yagoub Omer, was killed during the raids. In press conferences on 23 and 28 December 2018, the government accused the students of infiltration, association with a rebel group, and of planning to kill protesters in the ongoing protests in the country. At each of the press conferences on national television, videos were aired showing the students allegedly incriminating themselves as being associated with the Sudan Liberation Movement (Abdelwahid Nour), and of planning to kill protesters and cause chaos. The circumstances around which the alleged confessions were aired and the fact that they were made without any of the students having a lawyer present suggests that the confessions may have been obtained through torture and other ill-treatment”.¹⁷⁴

Reporting on the protests and subsequent arrests that took place in Khartoum of Darfuri university students in December 2018, the joint report published by the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)/African Center for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS)/Sudan Human Rights Monitor reported that “In Khartoum and other towns in Central Sudan, Darfurian University students were amongst those primarily targeted by NISS when the first protests broke out. Several of them were arrested and detained, including incommunicado in unknown locations. All of them were allegedly released following Al-Bashir’s overthrow”.¹⁷⁵

In early January 2019 the African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies (ACJPS) reported:

ACJPS is seriously concerned about the targeted arrests and detention of university students of Darfuri origin by Sudanese authorities who have been paraded in front of the media and reportedly accused of being trained in Israel, having different agendas and responsible for on-going protests. It has been reported that these students have been subjected to torture and/or ill-treatment whilst in

¹⁷² UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, *Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, Salih Mahmoud M Osman, Darfur Bar Association*, p. 120/121

¹⁷³ International Federation for Human Rights, African Center for Justice and Peace Studies, Sudan Human Rights Monitor, [Will There Be Justice for Darfur? Persisting impunity in the face of political change; Fact-finding mission report](#), December 2019, 3. Politically instigated violence remains pervasive p.31

¹⁷⁴ Amnesty International, [Urgent Action: Forty-Seven students held incommunicado, one killed](#), 25 January 2019

¹⁷⁵ International Federation for Human Rights, African Center for Justice and Peace Studies, Sudan Human Rights Monitor, [Will There Be Justice for Darfur? Persisting impunity in the face of political change; Fact-finding mission report](#), December 2019, I. Civilians in Darfur continue to bear the brunt of insecurity, 3. Politically instigated violence remains pervasive, p. 31

detention. ACJPS has also documented targeted arrests and detention of individuals based on their participation or suspected involvement in the protests.¹⁷⁶

With further regards to arrests in Khartoum of those not originally from that city the same source recorded that:

On 1 January 2019, the NISS of Khartoum raided student residences located in Jabil Awlia, Southern Khartoum and arrested the following individuals:

Faisal Mohamed Zakary, (m), university student from Darfur.

Abdul Hamid Abdalla, (m), university student from Darfur.

Ibrahim Yahya, (m), university student from Darfur.

Husham Omer Elnoor, University Professor at Al-Nelieen University.¹⁷⁷

Later in January 2019 the African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies reported with specific regards to the treatment of those not originally from Khartoum that:

Of particular concern is the detention, torture and ill-treatment of Darfuri students. [...] In two other raids in Khartoum North, about 15 students were also detained. Over 50 Darfuri students have since been unconstitutionally detained. The chief of NISS later held a press conference stating that the detained students were members of an armed Darfuri movement (SLA/ Abdelwahid) that had received training from Mossaad, the Israeli intelligence agency, and that they had been sent to infiltrate the protests. Videos broadcast on Sudan TV and other government affiliated television channels showed the detained students confessing to instigating the demonstrations with clear signs of beatings and fatigue.¹⁷⁸

An African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies report covering the events of 13 December 2018 to 11 April 2019 summarised that:

Four (4) student residential units, in which university students ethnically descending from Darfur region resided, were targeted. These units were in each of Kosti, Sennar State, Ad-Durushab neighborhood in Khartoum North, Jabal Awliya in Khartoum and Al-Abassiyya in Omdurman. The number of students arrested at these units was (54) university students.¹⁷⁹

In February 2019 members of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) detained Darfuri student, Kamal El Zein, whilst he “went to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Khartoum on Sunday to register a university degree. He was told there was a problem with the national service registration, and was then handed over to members of the NISS political section”.¹⁸⁰

Omdurman – (Darfuri) students

¹⁷⁶ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan Update: Deaths in custody, continued arbitrary and incommunicado detention of peaceful protestors and obstruction of media coverage of protests](#), 9 January 2019

¹⁷⁷ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan Update: Deaths in custody, continued arbitrary and incommunicado detention of peaceful protestors and obstruction of media coverage of protests](#), 9 January 2019

¹⁷⁸ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Civil society call on Human Rights Council to dispatch an independent international fact-finding mission to establish the facts and circumstance of alleged human rights abuses committed in Sudan](#), 29 January 2019

¹⁷⁹ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: Extrajudicial killing and incommunicado detention: A Report covering the events of December 13, 2018 to April 11, 2019](#), 10 January 2020, Executive Summary p.2-3

¹⁸⁰ Radio Dabanga, [Darfur student activist held in Sudan capital](#), 18 February 2019

Radio Dabanga reported that in February 2019 armed forces “raided a dormitory for Darfuri students in El Abbasiya district in Sudan’s second city of Omdurman” and “arrested nine of them and took them to an unknown destination”.¹⁸¹

In March 2019 the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies reported on the release of 54 detainees from detention by the National Intelligence and Security Service.¹⁸² Reportedly, “Detainees were arrested for their actual or suspected participation in the ongoing anti-government protests and spent at least 2 months in the custody of NISS without charge or appearance before a court to determine the legality of their detention” and that “those released include; political activists, human rights defenders, doctors, activists, university professors and students”.¹⁸³ Among those released were Darfur University Students arrested in Omdurman:

Darfur University Students

On 6 March 2019, the NISS of Khartoum released seven of the remaining students of Shegig Karo association. The students were arrested in their hostel located in Al-Abasia neighborhood of Omdurman on 26 February 2019. Two of their colleagues were released on 27 February 2019. Those released are;

Abdullah Salish Gerbil Abakar (m)
Adam Daoud Ibrahim (m)
Eyuob Abdul Jababr Adam Aldaw (m)
Jamal Omda Yousef Khatir (m)
Mohamadien Abakar Mustafa (m).
Mohamed Ali Aiega (m).
Mubarak Arja.¹⁸⁴

An African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies report covering the events of 13 December 2018 to 11 April 2019 summarised that:

Four (4) student residential units, in which university students ethnically descending from Darfur region resided, were targeted. These units were in each of Kosti, Sennar State, Ad-Durushab neighborhood in Khartoum North, Jabal Awliya in Khartoum and Al-Abassiyya in Omdurman. The number of students arrested at these units was (54) university students.¹⁸⁵

Unspecified location – Darfuri students

Siddig Yousef [SY], member of the central committee of the Communist Party and head of the Sudanese Solidarity Committee, told the UK Home Office fact finding mission in August 2018 that “Following the Doha Peace Agreement, the government agreed to pay the fees of Darfuri students from the IDP camps. However, the government has stopped paying, and Darfuri students have

¹⁸¹ Radio Dabanga, [Nine North Darfur students held in Omdurman raid](#), 28 February 2019

¹⁸² African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: NISS releases fifty-four detainees as seventeen peaceful protestors join hundreds who remain in detention](#), 19 March 2019

¹⁸³ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: NISS releases fifty-four detainees as seventeen peaceful protestors join hundreds who remain in detention](#), 19 March 2019

¹⁸⁴ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: NISS releases fifty-four detainees as seventeen peaceful protestors join hundreds who remain in detention](#), 19 March 2019

¹⁸⁵ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: Extrajudicial killing and incommunicado detention: A Report covering the events of December 13, 2018 to April 11, 2019](#), 10 January 2020, Executive Summary, p.2

protested. Darfuri students when detained are ill-treated [...] SY observed that Darfuri students may be treated more severely, accused of supporting the Sudan Liberation Movement – Abdul Wahid”.¹⁸⁶

According to an October 2018 Sudan Democracy First Group report, Darfuri students in Sudanese universities are subjected to the following “serious abuses by government security forces and pro-government student militias (Jihadi battalions)”:

Arbitrary arrest and detention by government security services, during which they are exposed to brutal torture. Repeated detention for long periods is the norm for many.¹⁸⁷

The January 2019 Waging Peace report also highlighted the following profiles as being prone to targeted attacks:

iv) Students

Another key risk profile outlined by a great many of the respondents was the risks to students from Darfur.

NGO B provides good context: “Provisions in several Darfur peace agreements have stated that Darfuris should be exempt from paying tuition fees at universities for a set period in order to address the long standing discrimination and the chronic lack of development in Darfur. However, these provisions are repeatedly ignored by university officials in spite of promises leading to protests from Darfuri students. Those protesting are often arrested and ill-treated by Sudanese authorities before facing suspension or expulsion from their universities. The universities furthermore refuse to allow those who have not paid their fees to graduate or to sit their exams.” [...]

Osama Mahmoud from the Darfur Union in the UK believes, “Darfur students are in numbers in many universities across the country, however, when exercising their Democratic rights of freedom of expression inside the universities and during debates or if they part take in a peaceful stands; they are beaten, imprisoned, tortured and killed.”

Some respondents, like Sudan expert A went further, and claimed students, potentially because of such activism, “are particularly watched and regularly arrested and interrogated by the security apparatus on the basis of the belief they are widely rebels or rebel supporters.” Margie Buchanan-Smith and Susanne Jaspars said, “Our research showed that Darfuri students in Khartoum are under suspicion of supporting the rebellion and face frequent arrest and sometimes torture. This happens particularly following demonstrations.” Others claimed such targeting had a long historical basis, and that in fact the risk category needed to be extended to young people in general, as they are readily assumed to be students. The Ayin Network’s Mosaab Baba said, “Non-Arab Darfuri students and young people specifically are at risk in Khartoum, due to the historic targeting by NISS, and recently RSF.” The ACJPS supported this view of NISS involvement: “ACJPS has documented cases where students in Khartoum who originated from marginalised areas of Sudan, such as Darfur or the Two Areas (Blue Nile and South Kordofan) were at increased risk of violence and mistreatment, both from the National Congress Party (NCP) student militia groups and the NISS. ACPJS had also documented cases in which students who were members of the Darfur Students Association had been subject to violence and intimidation by the regime. Often the NISS would work in collaboration with NCP student militia groups, although there was no formal organisational link, with NCP student groups often provoking a campus dispute to create a pretext for a NISS security raid, according to our documentation.” [...].¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁶ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, Siddig Yousef, p. 158

¹⁸⁷ Sudan Democracy First Group, [Tales of the Tombstones, The Discrimination Against Sudanese Students from Darfur in Sudanese Universities, Denial of the Right to Education, Denial of the Right to Life](#), 1 October 2018, *The nature of violations against Darfuri students in Sudanese universities*, p. 25

¹⁸⁸ Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019, 6. Viability of internal relocation to Khartoum, c. Surveillance, p. 28/29 [Note that on p. 6 of her report she clarifies that “It should be noted that references to Khartoum refer to ‘Greater Khartoum’ throughout’, also encompassing the cities of Omdurman and Khartoum North”].]

Khartoum – Journalists (who are not originally from these cities or who support persons not originally from there)

A report from the African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies details a number of journalists targeted for arbitrary arrest in Khartoum between July and September 2018.¹⁸⁹ However whether the journalists supported persons not from these areas and the origin of these journalists was not specified.

Radio Tamazuj reported in October 2018 that four Sudanese journalists were arrested by Sudanese security forces whilst protesting “against journalists being prevented from entering the parliament to cover its session”.¹⁹⁰ In December 2018 a further “10 journalists were detained and questioned by National Security agents and were later released”.¹⁹¹ In January 2019 Sudanese authorities arrested “28 journalists as they attempted to deliver a petition protesting media censorship and repeated seizure of print-runs of a local publication to the national security and intelligence service”.¹⁹² Note: No information on the area of origin or ethnicity of those arrested was mentioned in these articles.

In January 2019 Radio Dabanga reported on the detention of “28 journalists for several hours, ahead of a planned sit-in to protest the pre-publication censorship on Sudanese newspapers” with the “NISS demand[ing] newspapers remove any news articles about the ongoing demonstrations in Sudan, as well as any columns about the events that have been taking place in Khartoum, cities and towns across Sudan in the past four weeks”.¹⁹³

Later in January 2019 the African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies (ACJPS) described that “On 15 January 2019, the NISS of Khartoum arrested 27 journalists and media professionals from the main street in the Central Khartoum as they headed for a peaceful protest that was scheduled to take place in front of the office of NISS Media Department, located in Maak Nemier Street in Central Khartoum. The aim of the protest was to demonstrate against the ongoing censorship against Algareeda newspaper by the NISS of Khartoum. Detainees were taken to the NISS political section located in Shandi bus station in Khartoum Bahri. ACJPS has been reliably informed that detainees were forced to stand for an hour while facing the wall of the parking space located inside the building. Detainees were also allegedly called liars for publishing “false news” before they were moved inside the building where they were offered water and tea. All detainees were released later that same day. [...] On 17 January 2019 at 1. 30 PM, the NISS of Khartoum arrested eight journalists and media professionals and detained them at the Northern Police station of Khartoum. Journalists were arrested while covering a protest announced by professionals committee in Khartoum”.¹⁹⁴

Omdurman – Journalists (who are not originally from these cities or who support persons not originally from there)

¹⁸⁹ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Report on: Freedom of Expression July – September 2018](#), undated [accessed 21 January 2020]

¹⁹⁰ Radio Tamazuj, [Four Sudanese journalists arrested by security in Khartoum](#), 16 October 2018

¹⁹¹ Radio Tamazuj, [10 journalists briefly detained in Khartoum](#), 27 December 2018

¹⁹² The East African, [Sudanese authorities arrest 28 journalists](#), 14 January 2019

¹⁹³ Radio Dabanga, [Journalists beaten, detained for covering Sudan uprising](#), 15 January 2019

¹⁹⁴ African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies, [Incommunicado detentions and increase in media gag amidst heavy crackdown on anti-government protests in Sudan](#), 24 January 2019

A report from the African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies detailing the period September to November 2018 documented the arrest of media professionals in Omdurman without specifying their background.¹⁹⁵ The same source also noted that:

On 12 November 2018, national security of Khartoum arrested Mr Omar Juma, a member of Darfur journalist committee from his home located in Al- Mohandisien neighborhood of Omdurman. He was released later the same day without any charges. No reasons were provided for his arrest. [...]

On 2 November 2018, NISS cancelled charity gala scheduled at the National theatre of Omdurman. The gala was organized to support the people of Terba area in jable Marra in Dafur state who recently suffered from a mud slide. NISS did not give any reasons for cancelling the charity gala.¹⁹⁶

Unspecified location – Journalists and media professionals

In November 2018 newspaper editors across Sudan were “obliged to fill-in forms for the security apparatus which include details such as tribe, skin colour, and political affiliation”, as well as “military activity, a sketch of their houses and the closest methods of access to them”.¹⁹⁷ Ashraf Ibrahim, editor-in-chief of *El Jareeda* newspaper, said in an interview with Radio Dabanga: “‘What is strange in the form is mentioning the name of the tribe, which was not required in previous forms submitted by the security service to the journalists.’ Ibrahim was surprised at being asked about the skin colour. ‘I do not know why this form was designed in this way. This information has bad connotations.’ The form includes a question about the political colour of his partner, which was also not in the previous form. The new questions added to the form make it difficult to predict what the security apparatus wants with this information, Ibrahim concluded”.¹⁹⁸

Reporters Without Borders reported in January 2019 that “The crackdown is reaching alarming levels, with RSF tallying more than 100 press freedom violations in the past month. They include 66 arrests of journalists, six cases of accreditation being withdrawn from the correspondents of foreign media (including *Al Jazeera* and the Turkish news agency *Anadolu*), and 34 seizures of newspaper issues”.¹⁹⁹

In mid-February 2019 Reporters Without Borders reported that “Yousra Elbagir, a reporter for foreign media outlets such as *CNN*, the *BBC* and *Channel 4*, says she has left Sudan after being threatened with charges carrying a possible death penalty”.²⁰⁰

An African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies report covering the events of 13 December 2018 to 11 April 2019 summarised that:

Journalists were arbitrarily detained in crackdowns on newspapers’ head offices, or during participation in protests. They were prevented from covering protests, subjected to prolonged periods of detention and physical and psychological torture, made objects of criminal Police reports, forbidden from writing and monitored in a way to bar writing opinion pieces. In this varied process of

¹⁹⁵ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: Media restrictions in September, October, and November 2018; Hisham enters his seventh month in detention without charge](#), 11 December 2018

¹⁹⁶ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: Media restrictions in September, October, and November 2018; Hisham enters his seventh month in detention without charge](#), 11 December 2018

¹⁹⁷ Radio Dabanga, [Tribe, skin colour requested in Sudan security form for journalists](#), 13 November 2018

¹⁹⁸ Radio Dabanga, [Tribe, skin colour requested in Sudan security form for journalists](#), 13 November 2018

¹⁹⁹ Reporters Without Borders, [More than 100 press freedom violations in Sudan since start of protests](#), 22 January 2019

²⁰⁰ Reporters Without Borders, [At least 79 journalists arrested in two months of protests in Sudan](#), 14 February 2019

repression, the authorities engaged in cracking down on the head offices of newspapers, violating privacy and frisking persons in search of mobile telephones. Reporters affiliated to foreign TV Channels and news agencies were arrested, made objects of malicious criminal reports, subjected to censorship in the process of approving commentators by the National Intelligence and Security Service.²⁰¹

Khartoum – Political opponents (who are not originally from these cities or who support persons not originally from there)

Radio Dabanga reported in May 2019 that “Military police seized Ibrahim El Maz Deng, a leading member of the rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), near his home in Khartoum North” and took him to an “unknown destination”.²⁰² The same article noted that the previous month JEM had called for the “release of all prisoners and detainees that were taken in the war in Darfur, Kordofan, and Blue Nile and for the release of political prisoners and activists”.

Omdurman – Political opponents (who are not originally from these cities or who support persons not originally from there)

In November 2018 Ismail El Aghbash, member of the “leadership of the Revolutionary Awakening Council led by Janjaweed commander Musa Hilal” and 10 members of the Council, including “Abdelhafiz Mohamed, director of the Peace Department, Osman Abubaker, director of El Masar Organisation for the Development of Nomads, Yagoub, Prince of the Mahameed tribe in Khartoum, Prince Abdallah Zurga, Chairman of the Mahameed Shura council in West Darfur, Mohamed Hamdan, Mohamed Nafi, Omar Jamaa and university student Mohamed Harin”, were arrested in Omdurman.²⁰³

Radio Tamazuj reported in December 2018 that Sudanese security personnel arrested 18 leaders of one of the main opposition groups, National Consensus Forces (NCF), including its head, Farouk Abu Issa.²⁰⁴ The place of origin of those arrested was not specific in the article.

Khartoum – Human rights defenders/activists (who are not originally from these cities or who support persons not originally from there)

The World Organisation Against Torture listed in its ‘List of human rights defenders arrested between December 2018 and February 2019’ for “their participation or suspected participation in protests that have broken out in different parts of Sudan, denouncing the rising cost of living and calling for President Omar Al Bashir to step down”, Mr. Salih Mahmoud Mohamed Osman, “a lawyer and, Vice-president of Darfur Bar Association, was arrested at his office in Khartoum on January 6, 2019. Mr. Salih was arrested following a statement he made on media alleging that killing of the protesters fall under crimes against humanity. Mr. Salih was earlier arrested during the January 2018 anti-austerity protests and detained for about three months before being released on March 19, 2018”.²⁰⁵

²⁰¹ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: Extrajudicial killing and incommunicado detention: A Report covering the events of December 13, 2018 to April 11, 2019](#), 10 January 2020, Executive Summary, p.2-3

²⁰² Radio Dabanga, [Leading JEM member seized in Sudan capital](#), 31 May 2019

²⁰³ Radio Dabanga, [10 Musa Hilal cadres detained in Sudan](#), 14 November 2018

²⁰⁴ Radio Tamazuj, [Sudanese opposition leaders arrested as protests continue](#), 23 December 2018

²⁰⁵ World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), [Sudan: Serious concerns after the arrest of 30 human rights defenders in violent crackdown against peaceful protests](#), 12 February 2019

In February 2019 the International Federation for Human Rights listed as one of the 31 human rights defenders arrested since December 2018 when protests broke out “Ms. Samia Argawi, a lawyer, was arrested in Atbara town of River Nile State on December 31, 2018. She was earlier detained on December 21, 2018 at Northern Police station in Khartoum where she had gone to provide legal aid to a group of student protesters who were arrested by police in Khartoum and was released later that same day”.²⁰⁶

The U.S. Department of State’s annual human rights report noted that in February 2019 “human rights activist and journalist Wini Nawal Omer was arrested with three friends at a private residence in Khartoum and charged with attempting to commit an offense, possessing alcohol, and prostitution. At year’s end their trial was ongoing. Omer was previously arrested in December 2017 for indecent dress after she attended a high profile public order hearing for 24 women arrested in December 2017 at a private residence for indecent dress”.²⁰⁷

In a February 2019 press release the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies expressed “their utmost concerns over the violent crackdown targeting human rights defenders participating in ongoing peaceful protests in Sudan”.²⁰⁸ The same source further noted that:

Several detainees were moved to places of detention outside their original states thus hindering access to family visits, lawyers and health care. Isolation, combined with the well-documented use by the NISS of torture and other forms of ill-treatment against detainees, particularly whilst held in unknown locations, gives rise to serious concerns for their safety. [...]

Salih Mahmoud Mohamed Osman, a lawyer and, Vice-president of Darfur Bar Association, was arrested at his office in Khartoum on January 8, 2019. Mr. Salih was arrested following a statement he made on media alleging that killing of the protesters fall under crimes against humanity. Mr. Salih was earlier arrested during the January 2018 anti-austerity protests and detained for about three months before being released on March 19, 2018.²⁰⁹

Omdurman – Human rights defenders/activists (who are not originally from these cities or who support persons not originally from there)

No COI published between 10 July 2018 – 10 December 2019 on the arbitrary arrest and detention of human rights defenders/activists in Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

1.2.5. IDPs

Khartoum

²⁰⁶ International Federation for Human Rights, [SUDAN: Serious concerns about the arrest of 30 human rights defenders in violent crackdown against peaceful protests](#), 12 February 2019

²⁰⁷ U.S. Department of State, [2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan](#), 13 March 2019, section 1.c. Torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment

²⁰⁸ Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: Serious concerns after the arrest of 30 human rights defenders in violent crackdown against peaceful protests](#), 12 February 2019

²⁰⁹ Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: Serious concerns after the arrest of 30 human rights defenders in violent crackdown against peaceful protests](#), 12 February 2019

In January 2019 the Belgian COI Unit, CEDOCA published a report which addressed the situation for people from the Two Areas in Khartoum.²¹⁰ According to a Sudanese academic specialised in ethnic identity, land rights and conflict analysis:

Yes, people of African origins from Darfur, Blue Nile and Nuba Mountains face more discrimination based on their ethnic affiliations and or religious background namely Christians and non-Moslims. Lacking financial resources and unemployment is a result and manifestation of the discriminatory treatment despite the fact that the Constitution provides equal treatment for all citizens. Public Law Order is implemented discriminatively with focus on areas concentrated with IDPs and relatively poor residents at the outskirts of Khartoum. Women in these areas engaged in activities like brewing and alcohol making and selling, tea making and selling, and other several activities labeled as informal and illegal activities. Evidently, most of the victims of the Public Order Law are from war torn regions of the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile.²¹¹

For additional information on the arrest and detention of Nuba women, see [1.2.2 Nuba](#).

Omdurman

No COI published between 10 July 2018 and 10 December 2019 on the arrest of IDPs in Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

1.2.6. Returnees

No COI published between 10 July 2018 and 10 December 2019 on the arrest of returnees in Khartoum or Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

1.2.7. Women

For specific information on the treatment of women in detention see [1.3.7. Women](#).

For additional information on the arrest and detention of Nuba women, see [1.2.2 Nuba](#).

Khartoum

The U.S. Department of State's annual human rights report noted that throughout 2018 "In Khartoum Public Order Police occasionally brought women before judges for allegedly violating Islamic standards. One women's advocacy group estimated that in Khartoum, Public Order Police arrested an average of 40 women per day".²¹²

The US Commission on International Religious Freedom's report covering 2018 noted that "In 2018, authorities continued to target women with arrest, harassment, and detention by applying existing

²¹⁰ See CEDOCA, [COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas](#), 22 January 2019

²¹¹ CEDOCA, [COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas](#), 22 January 2019, 2.2.1. Discriminatie en geweld: economische, etnische, politieke factoren, p.42

²¹² U.S. Department of State, [2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan](#), 13 March 2019, section 6., Women

religious laws. In particular, the enforcement of Sudan's public order laws under the 1991 Criminal Act and other state and local laws continued to uniquely impact women through criminalization of indecent dress and other offenses based on state interpretations of Islamic principles. Penalties for these offenses regularly include imprisonment, fines, and lashings, and research by Sudanese nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) has shown that women have been more likely to receive harsher penalties for some infractions than men. Determinations for arrests are at the discretion of public order police. Public order cases are common; according to Sudanese civil society actors, more than 40,000 public order cases are processed annually in Khartoum State alone".²¹³

In October 2018 Radio Dabanga reported that a Sudanese singer, Mona Magdi, was detained by "Khartoum police on the grounds of an old photo that was posted on social media sites showing her wearing trousers at a private party" prompting "Political forces, civil society organisations and women's groups condemned the trial as null, void, and blatantly targeting women's rights and personal freedoms".²¹⁴ Reporting on the same incident, the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies explained that "Article 152 of the Sudanese Criminal Act is one of the many Articles targeting women based on their dressing while in public which is always described as 'indecent dressing'. The Article does not define 'indecent dressing' and does not state who has the right to decide whether or not a person is indecently dressed".²¹⁵

In December 2018 "The Public Order Court in El Deim district Khartoum [...] handed-down fines for 13 tea vendors who were detained [...] from various parts of the capital, despite possessing permits. Tahani Abbas, activist and chair of No-To-Women-Oppression Initiative, told Dabanga Radio that the 13 tea vendors have all the required permits to practice the sale of tea and coffee, including health and service cards. She denounced police detention of the tea vendors in water-filled cells in an attempt to humiliate them, before they were fined between SDG 200 (\$4.20*) and SDG 1,000 (\$20)".²¹⁶

In January 2019 the Belgian COI Unit, CEDOCA published a report which addressed the situation for people from the Two Areas in Khartoum.²¹⁷ According to a Sudanese academic specialised in ethnic identity, land rights and conflict analysis:

Public Law Order is implemented discriminatively with focus on areas concentrated with IDPs and relatively poor residents at the outskirts of Khartoum. Women in these areas engaged in activities like brewing and alcohol making and selling, tea making and selling, and other several activities labeled as informal and illegal activities. Evidently, most of the victims of the Public Order Law are from war torn regions of the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile.²¹⁸

Similarly, the report also cited anthropologist and independent researcher at the Law Organization Science and Technology, Enrico Ille, as stating:

²¹³ US Commission on International Religious Freedom, [2019 Annual Report; Country Reports: Tier 1 Countries \(Recommended for CPC Designation\): Sudan](#), April 2019, *Persecution of Christians* p.4

²¹⁴ Radio Dabanga, [Sudanese singer arrested for 'indecent dress'](#), 22 October 2018

²¹⁵ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan charges a female musician for indecent dressing based on a social media post](#), 25 October 2018

²¹⁶ Radio Dabanga, [13 Khartoum tea vendors arrested, fined](#), 13 December 2018

²¹⁷ CEDOCA, [COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas](#), 22 January 2019

²¹⁸ CEDOCA, [COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas](#), 22 January 2019, 2.2.1. *Discriminatie en geweld: economische, etnische, politieke factoren* p.42

Due to a generally limited labor market in Khartoum, this involves precarious activities, such as petty trade and services (tea-selling) regularly attacked by police, or out-rightly illegal services, such as producing and selling alcohol, and prostitution - it is the former that is much more associated with Nuba (or non-Sudanese, such as Ethiopians and Eritreans) than with people from other regions, and regularly puts women at risk of violence and imprisonment.²¹⁹

BBC News reported in February 2019 that

a 23-year-old graduate told me [BBC journalist] how her headscarf was ripped off when she was detained on 31 January by security agents at a protest in the capital, Khartoum. "They cut the bun off my head with a razorblade and they threatened me with rape when I was taken in their truck from downtown Khartoum," Jode Tariq said" A 24-year-old related a similar incident in Khartoum earlier in January [2019]. "They cut my hair along with another woman at an unknown location used as a detention centre," Afraa Turkey said. Female journalists Shamael al-Nnoor and Durra Gambo, who were both arrested for covering the protests over the last month, said some young women they met while in custody told them they had been sexually abused by security agents. And dozens of other women thrown into jail have not been heard from since their detention.²²⁰

In March 2019 Radio Dabanga reported that "An Emergency Court in Khartoum sentenced nine women protesters to 20 lashes each on Saturday for participating in an unauthorised anti-government demonstration, according to defence lawyers. The sentence has not yet been carried out pending an appeal".²²¹

A May 2019 African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies report on the Sudanese Public Order law argued that the particular groups subjected to disproportionate enforcement of the law are: workers in the informal economic sector, 'beggars', the general public and women.²²² With regards to 'women' the report noted that:

The targeting was based on religious and political ideology aimed at separating women from men in public space through loose accusations such as indecent dressing. In October 2018, Sudanese singer, Ms. Muna Majdi Salimat was arrested by the public order police of Khartoum and charged with indecent dressing under Article 152 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1991. Ms Muna's charge was based a photo, anonymously posted on social media that showed the singer wearing a trouser and a white long-sleeved blouse. Women accused of committing sexually provocative walk, indecent dance were targeted by police and administrative campaigns in public places. On the hand, they continued to be targeted in private places, for example, vague definition of prostitution as illegal mix of women with men in one private place, making or dealing in alcohol and singing in concerts without license.²²³

Omdurman

No COI published between 10 July 2018 and 10 December 2019 on the arrest of women (due to their gender) in Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted

²¹⁹ CEDOCA, [*COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas*](#), 22 January 2019, 2.3. Vrouwen, p.48

²²⁰ BBC News, [*Letter from Africa: How 'cheating husbands' are linked to Sudan's protests*](#), 20 February 2019

²²¹ Radio Dabanga, [*Sudan Emergency Court orders nine women protesters flogged*](#), 10 March 2019

²²² African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [*Sudanese Public Order: A law designed to control people, not protect morality*](#), 9 May 2019, *Public oppression of those who work in the public street p.9*

²²³ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [*Sudanese Public Order: A law designed to control people, not protect morality*](#), 9 May 2019, *Public oppression of those who work in the public street p.9*

Unspecified location

Maddy Crowther, Co-Executive Director of Waging Peace, published a report in January 2019 on 'Risk on return for Darfuris in Sudan' and consulted a range of organisations and individuals for it.²²⁴ The report highlighted:

vi) Economic and social discrimination [...]

A further issue being that those in the informal sector are also more vulnerable to targeting by security actors [...]

Hala Al-Karib said, "Dauraias [*sic*] who are poor, students or holding entry level work or casual laborers work, living in the peripheries of the capital are vulnerable and often subjected to the National security hostility and profiled and accused of affiliation to Darfuri rebel groups.

Women Street vendors from Darfur selling tea and food are extremely vulnerable to Public Order Police sweeps, imprisonment, money extraction and harassment." This serves further as a way to "criminalize women based on their personal behavior and presence in public spaces."

NGO B agreed with this assessment: "Darfuri tea ladies, as a case study, have routinely had their equipment confiscated and have been detained. In this example they are often accused of prostitution or espionage on behalf of the armed movements (Darfuris for the SLA factions and Nuba for the SPLA-N), accusations that derive solely on the basis of their ethnicity." [...].²²⁵

In March 2019 the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies reported on the release of 54 detainees from detention by the National Intelligence and Security Service.²²⁶ Reportedly, "Detainees were arrested for their actual or suspected participation in the ongoing anti-government protests and spent at least 2 months in the custody of NISS without charge or appearance before a court to determine the legality of their detention" and that "those released include; political activists, human rights defenders, doctors, activists, university professors and students".²²⁷ Among those released were 36 women, which gives an illustration of the range of profiles of women arrested across Sudan (location of arrest not always specified):

Women detainees released on 8 March 2019.

Adia Alzibagi, a political activist. She was arrested on 25 December 2018.

Amal Azain, advocate and human rights defender. She was earlier released but was rearrested again on 4 March 2019.

Amal Jabralla, a human rights defender, doctor and member of Sudanese Communist party central committee. She was arrested on 25 December 2018.

Amani Hasabo, the chairperson of Sudanese Congress Party (SCP) of Eltahir in North Darfur. She was arrested on January 11, 2019 and subjected to a 6 months detention under the emergency law.

Amani Iris, a political activist and member of Sudanese Baath Party. She was arrested on 22 December 2018 from Baath Arabic Party house located in Omdurman while attending a meeting organized by Sudanese consensus alliance. She was transferred on unknown date from NISS political section to Omdurman Women's prison.

Amna Mohamed Bashir

²²⁴ See Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019

²²⁵ Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019, 6. *Viability of internal relocation to Khartoum, c. Surveillance*, p. 33 [Note that on p. 6 of her report she clarifies that "It should be noted that references to Khartoum refer to 'Greater Khartoum' throughout', also encompassing the cities of Omdurman and Khartoum North".]

²²⁶ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: NISS releases fifty-four detainees as seventeen peaceful protestors join hundreds who remain in detention](#), 19 March 2019

²²⁷ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: NISS releases fifty-four detainees as seventeen peaceful protestors join hundreds who remain in detention](#), 19 March 2019

Aziza Awad, member of No repression against Women. She was arrested on 25 December 2018 from Khartoum while participating in a protest.

Buthina Al-Kharasani, member of central committee of the Sudanese Communist party. She was arrested on 25 February 2019.

Egbal Hassan, member of emergency street initiative of Port Sudan in Red Sea State. She was arrested for second time on March 6 2019. NISS informed her family who had gone to visit that she was transferred to Khartoum.

Eithar Khalil, a doctor.

Faiza Ibrahim Nooud, member of central Committee. She was arrested on 26 January 2019.

Gada Samir Abaro, a doctor

Hadia Hasaballa, a lecturer at Al-Ahfad university for Girls in Omdurman. She was arrested on 21 February 2019 during a peaceful Protest.

Hanadi Fadul, an advocate and human rights defender. She was arrested on 20 December 2018 from Wad Madani town of Al-Jazeera State and was transferred on unknown date to Khartoum where she was detained incommunicado in the NISS section attached to Omdurman Women's prison.

Hanan Hassan Algadi, member of Sudanese Women Union. She was arrested on 25 December 2018 from Khartoum.

Hanan Mohamed Noor, a political activist and member of Sudanese Women Union. She was arrested on 22 December 2018 from Baath Arabic Party house located in Omdurman while attending a meeting organized by Sudanese consensus alliance. She was transferred on unknown date from NISS political section to Omdurman Women prison.

Haram Iris Mukhtar, member of emergency street initiative in Port Sudan, Red Sea State. The mother of three was arrested and transferred to Khartoum on an unknown date.

Howida Mohamed AL Hassan (f), she was arrested on 5 January 2018

Ihasan Fagiri, a human rights defender was arrested on 25 December 2018.

Iman Mustafa, an activist

Khalda Sabir Hassan, a political activist and teacher. She was arrested on 28 January 2019 from Port Sudan in Red Sea State, Eastern state.

Leimia Babakir Mohamed Babkir. She was arrested on March 6, 2019 from Jabra neighborhood in Khartoum.

Manahi Salah, an activist.

Manal Al- Awal, an activist.

Marwa Alifakir Razan Ahamed, civil society activists.

Mounira Said Ali, a political activist and member of Sudanese Baath Party. She was arrested on 22 December 2018 from Baath Arabic Party house located in Omdurman while attending a meeting organized by Sudanese opposition alliance. She was transferred on unknown date from NISS political section to Omdurman Women's prison.

Nadin Alsir, an activist

Najda Mansour Adam, an advocate and member of Sudanese Communist Party. She was arrested on 25 December 2018 from Khartoum while participating in a protest.

Nehal Elteyeb Abdul Hadi, a pharmacists and human rights defender was arrested on 3 January 2019 from Khartoum.

Nora Obid, she was arrested on 15 January 2019 from Omdurman, Sabrein.

Rana Abdul Gafar (m), an advocate and human rights defender was arrested on 31 December 2018 from Khartoum. She has previously provided legal aid services to Mr. Husham Mohamed Ali, also known as "Wad Galiba", a blogger who was detained in February 2018 by Saudi Arabia authorities and deported to Sudan where he is being detained by NISS officials.

Sara Abdul Monim, am activists

Sara Ali Abdullah, a doctor

Sara Ibrahim Hassan, a lecturer at the Technical University of Omdurman. She was arrested on March 7, 2019.

Sumia Salih Kashif, member of Women initiative, she was arrested on 7 March 2019 in Khartoum.

Tamador Alturefi, a doctor.²²⁸

²²⁸ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: NISS releases fifty-four detainees as seventeen peaceful protestors join hundreds who remain in detention](#), 19 March 2019

In the same month, March 2019, women detained in Omdurman women's prison entered a hunger strike to protest the oppression and arbitrary detention of women".²²⁹

Reporting generally on the situation for women protestors, an April 2019 article by Radio Dabanga highlighted that "According to people speaking to Radio Dabanga, women have been detained and harassed, threatened or beaten, under the provisions of the State of Emergency in Sudan [...] Dozens of women have been sentenced to flogging as a result of prosecution".²³⁰

A May 2019 African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies report on the Sudanese Public Order law described that "Upon studying the application of the public order laws, it revealed that there is a systematic targeting of women in the public space, through the trappings which is encouraged by the legal provisions".²³¹ The same source further described that:

The historical background of the rules of Public Order Law is characterized by the practice of raid arbitrary arrest, stop and search, property and house search, violation of the rights of detainees, summary trials, intimidation, financial exploitation through fines and confiscations. These characteristics, reveals the common nature of the Public Order Law which aim to achieve the political goals of the ruling authority, that is striving to control the behavior of women and men in their private and public lives. In the sense that the Public Law in Sudan is consistent with the ideology of "Islamization of the society", which require reinforcing the rule of political ideology. The Public Order Law advocates the necessity of the law to preserve chastity and virtue and preserve the individual and society according to the perceptions of the state "the ruling regime".²³²

The report argued that the particular groups subjected to disproportionate enforcement of the Public Order Law are: workers in the informal economic sector, 'beggars', the general public and women.²³³ With further regards to women the source described:

Women accused of committing sexually provocative walk, indecent dance where targeted by police and administrative campaigns in public places. On the hand, they continued to be targeted in private places, for example, vague definition of prostitution as illegal mix of women with men in one private place, making or dealing in alcohol and singing in concerts without license. In view of the Sudanese political, economic and social unbalanced development and lack of development, all of these factors contribute to conflict as central government tend to resolved conflicts by military interventions specially when it turned to political and armed movements claiming a share of wealth and powers. The impact of conflict and economic crises is manifested in a steady increase in the numbers of women employed in occupations performed in streets due to poverty. The government intervention came under pretext to organise their work but, it ironically exploited them for financial gain that goes to government departments.²³⁴

²²⁹ Radio Dabanga, [Women detainees in Sudan on hunger strike – Al Bashir promises release](#), 10 March 2019

²³⁰ Radio Dabanga, [‘Tasgut bas!’ – Sudanese women on frontlines of protests despite prosecution](#), 2 April 2019

²³¹ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudanese Public Order: A law designed to control people, not protect morality](#), 9 May 2019, Abstract p.2

²³² African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudanese Public Order: A law designed to control people, not protect morality](#), 9 May 2019, *The political Objectives of the Public Order Law*, p.6

²³³ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudanese Public Order: A law designed to control people, not protect morality](#), 9 May 2019, *Public oppression of those who work in the public street*, p.9

²³⁴ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudanese Public Order: A law designed to control people, not protect morality](#), 9 May 2019, *Public oppression of those who work in the public street*, p.9

1.2.8. Children

For background information on the protests that erupted across Sudan and particularly in Khartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman, including how it affected young Sudanese see [Preface: Protests in Sudan, particularly Khartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman from December 2018](#).

Khartoum

In March 2019 Radio Dabanga noted that “At least 530 people have been prosecuted via the Emergency Courts in Sudan during the first two weeks of March. [...] Judge Ashraf Abdelbagi of the Emergency Court in eastern Khartoum, sentenced a woman and her daughter to a month’s suspended prison sentence for attempting to prevent police from arresting her nephew, who was accused of participating in the demonstrations. [...] Emergency Courts have been established to deal with cases related to the State of Emergency proclaimed in Sudan. The number of reported cases prosecuted under the Emergency Law in Khartoum, Nile River state, El Gezira, Red Sea state, and El Gedaref, has risen to 163. In the period from February 28 to March 14, 530 people were accused. According to legal sources, 150 of them were convicted 243 were acquitted. Seven minors were conditionally released into the care of their families, while 137 defendants remain under judicial procedures”.²³⁵

In September 2019 Radio Dabanga reported that “Activists staged a protest in front of El Awsat Criminal Court in Khartoum during the trial of nine youths of Burri El Lamab district (Khartoum) yesterday, who were arrested after the violent break-up of the sit-in in front of the army command on June 3. The resistance committee of El Lamab said in a statement that several of the detainees are minors. It accused the security services of extracting confessions from some of the detainees under torture”.²³⁶

Omdurman

No COI published between 10 July 2018 – 10 December 2019 on the arbitrary arrest and detention of children in Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

1.2.9. Individuals of diverse sexual orientation or gender identity

No COI published between 10 July 2018 – 10 December 2019 on the arbitrary arrest and detention of individuals of diverse sexual orientation or gender identity in Khartoum or Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

1.3. Prison conditions

Khartoum / Khartoum North – general detention conditions

The U.S. Department of State’s annual human rights report covering 2018 noted that “NISS [National Intelligence and Security Service] holding cells in Khartoum North prisons were known to local

²³⁵ Radio Dabanga, [Lawyers: 530 cases referred to Sudan’s Emergency Courts in two weeks](#), 20 March 2019

²³⁶ Radio Dabanga, [Khartoum vigil to demand release of activists](#), 11 September 2019

activists as “the fridges” due to the extremely cold temperatures and the lack of windows and sunlight”.²³⁷

Radio Dabanga reported in January 2019 of the release of two activists “from the NISS detention centres near the Shendi bus station and Kober prison in Khartoum North after they had spent 33 days in detention camps on charges of working against the voluntary return of refugees” following their arrest in refugee camps in Chad.²³⁸ They told Radio Dabanga that “they had been subjected to torture and ill-treatment in [...] Shendi” and one of the activists “pointed out that they were severely beaten with electric cables, subjected to water spray and sleep on the floor, along with verbal abuse, accusing them of planning destructive action inside the camps and obstructing the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons to their villages. He said the security detention centres in Khartoum were overcrowded and were subjected daily to torture and mistreatment”.²³⁹

During the same month, Radio Dabanga also reported on the detention of “28 journalists for several hours, ahead of a planned sit-in to protest the pre-publication censorship on Sudanese newspapers”.²⁴⁰ One of the journalists, Bahra Abdelmunim, “reports to have seen mistreatment of detainees while they were in the detention centre near the Shendi bus station in Khartoum North in the evening. ‘NISS members [...] forced them to stand on the wall without speaking, amid a stream of verbal abuses. Me and fellow journalist saw through the window on the first-floor side the torture of the detainees in the outer garden without hearing screams, begging or groans, because of the beatings’”.²⁴¹

Writer and journalist Faisal Mohamed Saleh, one of the journalists who were arrested before and during the protest marches in Khartoum in early January 2019, told Radio Dabanga:

‘Twelve hours we spent incommunicado in the detention centre in Abu Jinzir Square [in central Khartoum] and in the cells of the Northern Section [in Khartoum Bahri]. In Abu Jinzir I saw the worst that the human soul can have of hatred, evil and the pleasure of torturing, insulting and abusing people. They make no difference between young and old.’²⁴²

In February 2019 BBC News released “Dramatic footage filmed by protesters in Sudan shows masked security agents chasing down protesters, beating them and dragging them away to secret detention centres” and “analysed dozens of dramatic videos filmed during the recent uprising, and spoken with witnesses who have survived torture. Some of these protesters tell us about a secret and widely feared holding facility – The Fridge – [in Khartoum] where the cold is used as an instrument of torture”.²⁴³

In April 2019 Radio Dabanga reported that in a statement issued by the Darfur Bar Association (DBA) “lawyers pointed to the fate of Mohamed Zakariya, who was detained at the Rasarees mine in El Tartar in El Tadamon in southern Sudan in December 2018, says he was exposed to torture in the

²³⁷ U.S. Department of State, [2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan](#), 13 March 2019, section 1.c., *Prison and Detention Center Conditions*

²³⁸ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan security releases ‘activists against voluntary return’ arrested in Chad](#), 17 January 2019

²³⁹ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan security releases ‘activists against voluntary return’ arrested in Chad](#), 17 January 2019

²⁴⁰ Radio Dabanga, [Journalists beaten, detained for covering Sudan uprising](#), 15 January 2019

²⁴¹ Radio Dabanga, [Journalists beaten, detained for covering Sudan uprising](#), 15 January 2019

²⁴² Radio Dabanga, [Sudan journalists recount detention ordeal](#), 20 January 2019

²⁴³ BBC News, [What happens inside Sudan’s secret detention centres?](#), 13 February 2019

cells of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) in [...] the large NISS facility in Khartoum North ‘near the Shendi bus station’”.²⁴⁴

An African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies report covering the events of 13 December 2018 to 11 April 2019 summarised that:

A large number of peaceful protesters of all ages were subjected to arbitrary detention and ill-treatment by the NISS and the Police Force. This included children, the elderly, human rights activists, doctors, lawyers and politicians who were held in incommunicado detention. Detainees were locked up in the detention centers of the NISS located at its political section in Khartoum North as the main detention center as well as all detention centers affiliated to the NISS in the provinces of Sudan. In particular these detention centers included the NISS wing in Kober prison in Khartoum North [...] Dabak prison in Khartoum North [...] Detainees were locked up in extreme detention circumstances involving low temperatures and poor health care until they were released on April 12, 2019. [...].²⁴⁵

Omdurman – general detention conditions

An African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies report covering the events of 13 December 2018 to 11 April 2019 summarised that:

A large number of peaceful protesters of all ages were subjected to arbitrary detention and ill-treatment by the NISS and the Police Force. This included children, the elderly, human rights activists, doctors, lawyers and politicians who were held in incommunicado detention. Detainees were locked up in the detention centers of the NISS located at its political section in Khartoum North as the main detention center as well as all detention centers affiliated to the NISS in the provinces of Sudan. In particular these detention centers included [...] the women’s prison in Omdurman [...] and Al Huda prison in the north of Omdurman. Detainees were locked up in extreme detention circumstances involving low temperatures and poor health care until they were released on April 12, 2019. [...].²⁴⁶

In October 2019 Radio Dabanga reported that “Five Sudanese detectives have been charged with murder after a man was allegedly tortured to death in police custody [...] It is alleged that 40-year-old Mohamed Siddig was tortured to death at the Doha Police station in Omdurman on 11 October [2019]. He was arrested two days earlier with another six suspects in connection with the theft of jewellery and hard currency”.²⁴⁷

Unspecified location – general detention conditions

In January 2019 Radio Dabanga reported that “Opposition sources say that the number of civilians killed by government action to suppress the wave of public mass protests that have swept Sudan for more than two weeks, has risen to 45. More than 1,000 people have been injured and another 2,000 people have reportedly been detained and allegedly tortured. In a statement [...] the National

²⁴⁴ Radio Dabanga, [Darfur Bar Assoc: NISS tortured miners to death for 'cooperating with Radio Dabanga'](#), 17 April 2019

²⁴⁵ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: Extrajudicial killing and incommunicado detention: A Report covering the events of December 13, 2018 to April 11, 2019](#), 10 January 2020, Executive Summary p.1, 1. Extrajudicial Killing p.11, and 5. Arbitrary and Incommunicado Detention, p.20

²⁴⁶ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: Extrajudicial killing and incommunicado detention: A Report covering the events of December 13, 2018 to April 11, 2019](#), 10 January 2020, Executive Summary p.1, 1. Extrajudicial Killing p.11, and 5. Arbitrary and Incommunicado Detention, p.20

²⁴⁷ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan detectives charged after suspect's 'death by torture' in police custody](#), 22 October 2019

Umma Party (NUP) confirmed that at least 45 people have died, and that ‘the number of detainees during these peaceful demonstrations exceeded 2,000 detainees in the whole of Sudan, most of whom were tortured’²⁴⁸.

An April 2019 African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies publication on torture in Sudan noted with regards to the profiles of persons affected in Sudan in general:

The prevalence of torture in Sudan is a longstanding concern. Human rights defenders, women, political activists, lawyers, journalists, trade unionists, students and other groups have been systematically targeted.

The NISS and Sudanese Military Intelligence are the primary institutions responsible for torture and ill-treatment cases in detention. Security agents have been vested with wide-ranging immunities, and have carried out a range of human rights violations with impunity. Sudan’s National Security Act 2010 provides a legal foundation giving the NISS extensive powers to arrest, arbitrarily detain, and interrogates perceived political opponents and those with perceived links to rebel groups, in order to silence opposition. Torture is commonly practised by police and prison staff to extract confessions or to extort money. Police in particular are implicated in the enforcement of public order laws, and numerous reports of ill-treatment, torture and sexual violence of female prisoners in police stations exist.²⁴⁹

A December 2019 report from REDRESS and African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies on ‘Anti-torture reforms in Sudan in the post-Bashir era’ asserted that:

Over the last three decades, security forces, militias and police, the agents of the ruling National Congress Party (formerly the National Islamic Front), practised the most brutal and diverse forms of torture, including routine beating of detainees, electric shocks, rape and threats of rape, sleep deprivations and refusal of food and medical assistance. The list of victims of torture in Sudan is extensive and includes students, human rights defenders and political activists, trade unionists, professionals, journalists, minority ethnic groups and women. The system of immunities has ensured that anyone who committed torture remains above the law, and victims have no recourse to pursue justice and obtain reparations for their violations.²⁵⁰

The same source made a series of recommendations to bring Sudan in line with its international obligations, including:

Sudan must sign on and ratify international and regional instruments that regulate the prohibition of torture. The domestic law should be amended to ensure that the definition of torture is in compliance with Article 1 of the International Convention Against Torture and Cruel and Inhuman, Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Currently the punishment for torture is minimal or non-existent. The law should ensure that offences of torture are punishable by appropriate penalties which reflect the grave nature of the crime. To avoid any future instances of torture, the law must provide for basic due process rights of detained individuals. These include access to legal representation from the time of the arrest, ensure that a detained person can contact his or her family or employer without requiring prior authorizations as well requiring a medical examination within 24 hours of detention to avoid instances of torture. Justice cannot be achieved if the immunity laws that have prevented families and victims of torture from seeking justice remain in place.

²⁴⁸ Radio Dabanga, [‘Opposition: ‘45 civilians dead, 1k+ injured, 2k+ detained in Sudan mass protests’](#), 2 January 2019

²⁴⁹ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [‘Torture in Sudan: Justice and Prevention, Priorities for change following the end of al-Bashir regime’](#), 25 April 2019

²⁵⁰ REDRESS and African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [‘A Way Forward? Anti-torture reforms in Sudan in the post-Bashir era’](#), 19 December 2019

Finally, any reforms must include effective institutional reforms. The judiciary and entities tasked with monitoring and investigation of human rights violations must be independent from the executive and victims must be able to seek reparations.²⁵¹

Looking back at 2019, Human Rights Watch reported that “In response to the protests starting in December, National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) officials arrested and rounded up protesters, opposition members, and activists. Security agents subjected detainees to abuses while in detention including beatings, inhumane conditions in a facility known as “the refrigerator,” and insults and beatings during interrogations. Many detainees were not allowed family visitation or access to lawyers. Women released from detention told Human Rights Watch they were beaten and sexually harassed and threatened with rape”.²⁵²

1.3.1. Darfuri

Khartoum / Khartoum North

A human rights defender [HRD] working for the Sudan Social Development Organisation (SUDO) told a UK Home Office fact finding mission in August 2018 after being asked whether Darfuris are treated differently by the state than other tribes that “perhaps more beaten, when arrested, if a Darfuri but the level of ill-treatment would depend on which organisation arrested and detained you. NISS [National Intelligence and Security Service] personnel are generally from the Nile State and Khartoum, and do not treat Darfuris well. NISS are taught that all Darfuris are rebels, hence the poor treatment. If a person is arrested by the police, made up of all tribes, they would treat all people the same, regardless of tribe”.²⁵³

Salih Mahmoud M Osman (SO), Deputy Chair of the Darfur Bar Association (DBA), also interviewed by the UK Home Office Fact-Finding Mission in August 2018, reported that “The last time he was detained was for 2 months and 10 days from February to April 2018 in Kober prison [Khartoum North] following the January 2018 demonstrations against the rise in prices. He was accused of agitating the people and acting against the government. Asked how he was treated, SO said it was bad. While there was no physical torture he was forced to witness the beatings of other young detainees, which was very difficult for him as a human rights defender. NISS beat demonstrators from all backgrounds”.²⁵⁴

A civil society activist interviewed by the same fact finding mission stated that “Having interviewed former detainees, the organisation said they were racially abused by the police and faced physical mistreatment in detention. If a person is arrested by NISS they are ‘likely to be beaten’, regardless of ethnicity. But if you are young and Darfuri, the risks of being beaten are higher”.²⁵⁵

²⁵¹ REDRESS and African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [A Way Forward? Anti-torture reforms in Sudan in the post-Bashir era](#), 19 December 2019

²⁵² Human Rights Watch, [World Report 2020: Sudan, Events of 2019](#), 13 January 2020, *Arbitrary Detentions, Torture*

²⁵³ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, *Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, A human rights defender*, p. 162/163

²⁵⁴ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, *Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, Salih Mahmoud M Osman, Darfur Bar Association*, p. 121

²⁵⁵ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, *Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, A civil society activist*, p. 150

Maddy Crowther, Co-Executive Director of Waging Peace, published a report in January 2019 on 'Risk on return for Darfuris in Sudan' and consulted a range of organisations and individuals for it.²⁵⁶ The report highlighted:

v) Treatment in detention

In addition to determining that Darfuris were more likely to be subject to discrimination and persecution, several respondents were keen to highlight the likelihood of worse treatment for Darfuris once arrested and detained. Olivia Bueno from IRRI said "it appears that Darfuris are subjected to harsher treatment than other activists when they are arrested and detained." Concerningly, NGO B said this extended beyond generally worse cell conditions or treatment to specific targeting for abuses: "Women human rights defenders rank their likelihood of being raped or sexually assaulted whilst in detention as dependent on the colour of their skin or ethnicity, with Darfuris ranking as most likely. This view has been echoed by testimonies in which individuals at protests – whether as leaders, participants or simple bystanders – are more likely to face inhumane treatment (beatings, torture, use or threat of sexual violence) if they are Darfuri."²⁵⁷

For specific information on the treatment of women in detention see [1.3.7 Women](#).

Omdurman

In May 2019 Radio Dabanga reported that "At least 235 prisoners of the Sudan Liberation Movement under the leadership of Minni Minawi (SLM-MM) and the SLM-Transitional Council headed by Nimir Abdelrahman are still being detained in El Huda prison in Omdurman", following their "capture in Darfur in May 2017". According to the same source, the Darfur Bar Association highlighted in its statement that "Of the 245 rebel fighters who were detained, six of them died at El Hoda Prison and the Karari Military Prison in Omdurman. Four minors were released. The remaining 235 prisoners were subjected to cruel treatment in Darfur and Kordofan, and then transferred to Karari Military Prison to undergo the same cruel treatment and torture. During the six-month prison period they were denied visits and were only given a piece of bread twice a day as meal".²⁵⁸ Early July 2019 235 of these combatants were released and "Former SLM-TC head Nimir Abdelrahman, who was released as well, said that the prisoners were tortured at Karari Prison. Ten of them died due to lack of medical care and a shortage of medicines at El Huda prison, he claimed".²⁵⁹

Unspecified location

In April 2019 the head of the Darfur Bar Association, Mohamed Abdallah El Doma, was quoted as stating that:

between 400 and 800 Darfuri activists and rebel fighters captured during battles are still in prisons. A number of them have died in detention because of torture. Some prisoners were also subjected to amputations.

²⁵⁶ See Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019

²⁵⁷ Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019, 6. *Viability of internal relocation to Khartoum, c. Surveillance*, p. 30-31 [Note that on p. 6 of her report she clarifies that "It should be noted that references to Khartoum refer to 'Greater Khartoum' throughout', also encompassing the cities of Omdurman and Khartoum North".]

²⁵⁸ Radio Dabanga, [Darfur lawyers: TMC holding rebel fighters in jail is 'continuation of policies of former regime'](#), 30 May 2019

²⁵⁹ Radio Dabanga, [235 SLM prisoners of war released, claim that they were tortured](#), 5 July 2019

El Doma confirmed at a press conference in Khartoum on Wednesday that the detainees are those sentenced in political cases and prisoners of war. He stressed that no one was allowed to visit them since they were captured; not their parents, lawyers, or local organisations.

He said that the prisoners are living in very difficult health and humanitarian conditions. They are hungry and diseases are spreading among them. El Doma expressed surprise that the prisoners of Darfur have not been released after the revolution and the overthrow of the regime, despite the fact that these prisoners came out and fought to uproot and overthrow the regime, which was the target for the rebels.²⁶⁰

1.3.2. Nuba

For non-profile specific, general information on treatment in detention including ill-treatment and torture, see the sources included at the beginning of section [1.3. Prison conditions](#).

Khartoum

In January 2019 the Belgian COI Unit, CEDOCA, published a report which addressed the situation for people from the Two Areas in Khartoum.²⁶¹ It cited a linguist, anthropologist and Sudan researcher as stating:

Yes, I know of a great many examples of Nuba people experiencing discrimination by these authorities. This ranges from anything to difficulty obtaining documents to be harassed, or imprisoned, or softer violence such as being told they are 'slaves', that they are inferior, uneducated, uncivilized, dirty, or, for women, that they are prostitutes. I know of women who've been raped while being called 'Nigger' or 'slave' by policemen. I know of situations where Nuba were forced to change their names to Arab names by authorities, or being physically attacked or violated because they were visibly different from so-called 'Arabs', with darker skin, and 'African' dress.²⁶²

Omdurman

No COI published between 10 July 2018 and 10 December 2019 on the detention conditions of Nuba in Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

1.3.3. Other ethnic and/or religious minorities

For non-profile specific, general information on treatment in detention including ill-treatment and torture, see the sources included at the beginning of section [1.3. Prison conditions](#).

Khartoum

No COI published between 10 July 2018 and 10 December 2019 on the detention conditions of other ethnic and/or religious minorities in Khartoum was found amongst the sources consulted.

²⁶⁰ Radio Dabanga, [Lawyers: 'Up to 800 Darfur activists, rebel fighters still detained'](#), 18 April 2019

²⁶¹ CEDOCA, [COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas](#), 22 January 2019

²⁶² CEDOCA, [COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas](#), 22 January 2019, 2.2.1. Discriminatie en geweld: economische, etnische, politieke factoren p.41

Omdurman

The U.S. Department of State's 2018 Report on International Religious Freedom noted that "Some prisons, such as the Women's Prison in Omdurman, had dedicated areas for Christian observance. Christian clergy held services in prisons, but access was irregular".²⁶³ In its annual human rights report the same source similarly stated "In Omdurman Women's Prison, church services were held six times a week".²⁶⁴

Unspecified location

The US Commission on International Religious Freedom's (USCIRF) report covering 2018 noted that "Minority Muslims also reported being dismissed from their jobs or facing other ill treatment by society and officials. Some shared with USCIRF how their members have been beaten and allegedly tortured over their religious beliefs".²⁶⁵

The U.S. Department of State's 2018 report on International Religious Freedom noted that "Prisons provided prayer spaces for Muslims, but sources stated that authorities did not allow Shia prayers. Shia prisoners were permitted to join prayer services led by Sunni imams. Some prisons, such as the Women's Prison in Omdurman, had dedicated areas for Christian observance. Christian clergy held services in prisons, but access was irregular".²⁶⁶

The U.S. Department of State's annual Country Report on Human Rights Practices described that "Christian clergy held services in prisons. Access varied across prisons. In Omdurman Women's Prison, church services were held six times a week, but regularity of services in other prisons was not verified. Sunni imams were granted access to facilitate Friday prayers. Shia imams were not allowed to enter prisons to conduct prayers. Detained Shia Muslims were permitted to join prayers led by Sunni imams".²⁶⁷

1.3.4. Students, political activists, human rights activists and journalists who are not originally from these cities or who support persons not originally from there

For non-profile specific, general information on treatment in detention including ill-treatment and torture, see the sources included at the beginning of section [1.3. Prison conditions](#).

Khartoum – (Darfuri) students

Reporting in October 2018 Radio Dabanga highlighted the plight of Darfuri student, Asim Omar, who required an operation on his ear following being beaten in Kober Prison in Khartoum North.²⁶⁸ The same source further reported that "Omar, a member of the Independent Student Congress Party

²⁶³ US Department of State, [2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: Sudan](#), 21 June 2019

²⁶⁴ US Department of State, [Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2018 – Sudan](#), 13 March 2019, Section 1.c Prison and Detention Center Conditions

²⁶⁵ US Commission on International Religious Freedom, [2019 Annual Report; Country Reports: Tier 1 Countries \(Recommended for CPC Designation\): Sudan](#), April 2019,

²⁶⁶ US Department of State, [2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: Sudan](#), 21 June 2019

²⁶⁷ US Department of State, [Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2018 – Sudan](#), 13 March 2019, Section 1.c Prison and Detention Center Conditions

²⁶⁸ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan: Medical operation for tortured student](#), 28 October 2018

(affiliated to the opposition Sudanese Congress Party, (SCP), has allegedly been tortured in prison several times since he was detained in early May 2016".²⁶⁹

An African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies report covering the events of 13 December 2018 to 11 April 2019 summarised that:

Four (4) student residential units, in which university students ethnically descending from Darfur region resided, were targeted. These units were in each of Kosti, Sennar State, Ad-Durushab neighborhood in Khartoum North, Jabal Awliya in Khartoum and Al-„Abassiyya in Omdurman. The number of students arrested at these units was (54) university students. The detainees were subjected to physical and psychological torture comprising beating with water hoses, wooden sticks and batons during the process of arresting, transporting and interrogating them. They were forced to stand up for long hours, deprived of sleep and medication, exposed to excessive cold, electrified and raped. The psychological torture of detainees typically involved threat with rape, harassment by Police and Security officers, verbal and racial abuse through death and rape threats, ill-treatment comprising forcing women to clean cells and wash dishes at Omdurman Prison, transporting detainees with their hands cuffed and preventing them from using toilets. This involved prisoners transported from the rural areas to Khartoum like transporting detainees from Port Sudan on the Red Sea, Kasala, El-Gedaref and Nyala to Khartoum and the detainees at El-Obeid in Northern Kordofan to Port Sudan on the Red Sea. These abuses involved violation of privacy, harassment, men inspecting and frisking women, confiscating mobile telephones, touching sensitive female body parts during inspection, forcing detainees to change clothes in front of Security Service men, as well confiscating valuables like mobile telephones in return for release.²⁷⁰

The same report observed with regards to ‘torture on the basis of colour’ that:

On December 23, 2018 a force belonging to the NISS cracked down on a house in Sennar city, Sennar State and arrested 30 students most of them descending from Darfur region in western Sudan. They were later transferred to Khartoum where they were kept in solitary confinement. On December 25, 2018 two incidents occurred in Ad-Drushab neighborhood in Khartoum North. More than 15 students also descending from Darfur region were arrested. Later on January 1 2019, other students descending from Darfur region were also detained in Jabal Awliya suburb in Southern Khartoum. [...] During the crackdown on the students in Ad-Drushab suburb, Salih Yagoub Omar, a student studying Political Science in Alzaiem Alazhari University was shot by the NISS. His body disappeared from the scene of the accident and was later identified in the morgue of Omdurman Hospital on January 10, 2019. On December 28, 2018, the NISS held a press conference in which its officials announced that the detained Darfurian students were members of a Darfurian armed movement, which they named as Sudan Liberation Movement/ Abdel Wahid Mohamed al-Nur. The announcement said they were trained by the Israeli Mossad in order to carry sabotage operations during the protests. Later on December 28, 2018 a live television broadcast showed some Darfurian detainees making confessions of intended sabotage. However, according to the African Center’s monitoring team, the looks of the detainees showed obvious fatigue as they confessed to inciting people to demonstrate. Later in the period February 20-27, all the detainees were released without being accused of criminal charges. On November 26, 2019 Suliman Abakar Suliman, one of the students arrested on December 28, 2018, died at the Accidents Department in Omdurman Hospital of the torture he was subjected to during the period of his detention.²⁷¹

²⁶⁹ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan: Medical operation for tortured student](#), 28 October 2018

²⁷⁰ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: Extrajudicial killing and incommunicado detention: A Report covering the events of December 13, 2018 to April 11, 2019](#), 10 January 2020, Executive Summary, p.2

²⁷¹ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: Extrajudicial killing and incommunicado detention: A Report covering the events of December 13, 2018 to April 11, 2019](#), 10 January 2020, 7. Torture on the Basis of Color, p.23

Darfur lawyer, Salah Adam, who was arrested in February 2019 in Darfur and moved to the “infamous NISS premises ‘near the Shendi bus station’ in Khartoum North” stated reportedly in a Radio Dabanga article that “he was jailed with the Darfuri students who had been detained from El Doroshab area on January 4 [2019], and taken to ‘Shendi bus station’, known as the “the refrigerators detention centre’. He pointed out that the eight students were chained and subjected to all kinds of torture and abuse to the extent they were scared of him even though introduced himself and assured them that he was from Darfur”.²⁷²

Omdurman – (Darfuri) students

An African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies report covering the events of 13 December 2018 to 11 April 2019 summarised that:

Four (4) student residential units, in which university students ethnically descending from Darfur region resided, were targeted. These units were in each of Kosti, Sennar State, Ad-Durushab neighborhood in Khartoum North, Jabal Awliya in Khartoum and Al-Abassiyya in Omdurman. The number of students arrested at these units was (54) university students. The detainees were subjected to physical and psychological torture comprising beating with water hoses, wooden sticks and batons during the process of arresting, transporting and interrogating them. They were forced to stand up for long hours, deprived of sleep and medication, exposed to excessive cold, electrified and raped. The psychological torture of detainees typically involved threat with rape, harassment by Police and Security officers, verbal and racial abuse through death and rape threats, ill-treatment comprising forcing women to clean cells and wash dishes at Omdurman Prison, transporting detainees with their hands cuffed and preventing them from using toilets. This involved prisoners transported from the rural areas to Khartoum like transporting detainees from Port Sudan on the Red Sea, Kasala, El-Gedaref and Nyala to Khartoum and the detainees at El-Obeid in Northern Kordofan to Port Sudan on the Red Sea. These abuses involved violation of privacy, harassment, men inspecting and frisking women, confiscating mobile telephones, touching sensitive female body parts during inspection, forcing detainees to change clothes in front of Security Service men, as well confiscating valuables like mobile telephones in return for release.²⁷³

The same report observed with regards to ‘torture on the basis of colour’ that “on February 26 [2019], other students were arrested. These students descended from Shiqaq Caro in Darfur and were residing in the neighborhood of Al-'Abbasiyya in Omdurman”.²⁷⁴

Unspecified location – Darfuri students

The Sudan Democracy First Group (SDFG) interviewed 15 students from “the University of Khartoum, Nileen University, Omdurman Islamic University, Sharq Elnil University, Holy Quran University, and Algazeera University” for its October 2018 report on the treatment faced by Darfuri students in Sudanese Universities.²⁷⁵ One of the Darfuri student interviewed, “who is also a member of a

²⁷² Radio Dabanga, [Released Darfur lawyer tells of NISS torture](#), 19 April 2019

²⁷³ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: Extrajudicial killing and incommunicado detention: A Report covering the events of December 13, 2018 to April 11, 2019](#), 10 January 2020, Executive Summary, p.2

²⁷⁴ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: Extrajudicial killing and incommunicado detention: A Report covering the events of December 13, 2018 to April 11, 2019](#), 10 January 2020, 7. Torture on the Basis of Color, p.23

²⁷⁵ See Sudan Democracy First Group, [Tales of the Tombstones, The Discrimination Against Sudanese Students from Darfur in Sudanese Universities, Denial of the Right to Education, Denial of the Right to Life](#), 1 October 2018, Standards and sources of information, p. 7

national political party”, told SDFG about his experience in detention “that occurred in the last five years”:

when we were detained after a peaceful protest inside the campus, I was the only one of the student detainees from Darfur and my fellow detainees were from northern and central Sudan. I was separated from my colleagues and taken to another place by myself. Security officers beat me severely and hit my body till it was bleeding from everywhere. They kept saying to me: “You are a slave. We are your masters. You are a son of a slave. Your father is a slave and you want to disobey? We allowed you to study in the university. You should keep silent and even if we order you to sleep in the garbage dump, you should do it and thank us.” They released us after seven days. I was so tired that I could not stand on my feet. I was surprised when I found my colleagues were not subjected to severe torture like me. They were very touched when I told them what happened to me and stood with me. They took me to a doctor they know to be treated.²⁷⁶

The same SDFG report noted with regards to the nature of sentences being handed down to Darfuri students that:

The judicial authorities have issued various sentences against Darfur’s students such as corporal punishments including flogging, fines and imprisonment and even death sentences. Darfuri students are arrested by the security services and police from inside university campuses, from the streets or from student houses. They are left for long periods in detention centers where the security apparatus subjects them to severe physical and psychological torture, in addition to contempt and racial abuse by officers and soldiers of the security apparatus.²⁷⁷

Omdurman – Political opponents

Radio Dabanga reported in August 2018 that “Prisoner of War Abdelsalam Mohamed Siddig has died at El Huda prison in Omdurman after suffering a fracture in both legs due to torture and deprivation of treatment that caused him internal bleeding, according to a joint statement issued by the Sudan Liberation Movement led by Minni Minawi (SLM-MM) and the Transitional Council”.²⁷⁸ The source did not specify the place of origin of Abdelsalam Mohamed Siddig.

In August 2019 Radio Dabanga reported on the hunger strike of 10 members of Sudan’s Revolutionary Awakening Council (RAC) detained since November 2017 wanting to highlight their plight: “they have spent two years in a military prison in Omdurman ‘during which they have been subjected to systematic ill-treatment by the prison authorities and deprived of their most basic rights such as medical treatment and to meet their relatives through visits’”.²⁷⁹ Again the source did not specify the place of origin of the 10 members of the RAC.

Unspecified location – range of political profiles

An October 2018 joint report by the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) and the

²⁷⁶ Sudan Democracy First Group, [*Tales of the Tombstones, The Discrimination Against Sudanese Students from Darfur in Sudanese Universities, Denial of the Right to Education, Denial of the Right to Life*](#), 1 October 2018, *The Crimes of the Ruling Regime Against the Student Movement*, p. 17

²⁷⁷ Sudan Democracy First Group, [*Tales of the Tombstones, The Discrimination Against Sudanese Students from Darfur in Sudanese Universities, Denial of the Right to Education, Denial of the Right to Life*](#), 1 October 2018, *The nature of sentences*, p. 35

²⁷⁸ Radio Dabanga, [*SLM-MM: ‘PoW dead after torture in Sudan prison’*](#), 15 August 2018

²⁷⁹ Radio Dabanga, [*Sudan: Revolutionary Awakening Council detainees on hunger strike*](#), 29 August 2019

Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders on the repression of human rights lawyers in Sudan described that “In most cases, the arrest is carried out directly by the NISS, without any arrest warrant. Subsequently, human rights lawyers are kept in detention for periods ranging from one day to several months, often without being informed of the charges against them, without being able to see a lawyer and without seeing a judge”.²⁸⁰ The same report further noted:

General poor detention conditions in Sudan are reflected in the situation of human rights lawyers, who often suffer from cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment during their arbitrary detention. Most of the lawyers mentioned in this report were detained in cold and overcrowded cells, with poor sanitary conditions which can amount to ill-treatment under international law. They had limited access to food and drinkable water.

In several cases, they were detained in solitary confinement and denied contacts with other detainees. [...] Another common practice used by the NISS to intimidate and control human rights lawyers is to torture the detainees to force them to disclose their emails and social media accounts passwords. [...]

Further, several lawyers were held in prolonged incommunicado and secret detention, which can be considered as a form of torture and ill-treatment itself.²⁸¹

A January 2019 African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies report noted that it “has received information that the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) and police have since December 19 2018, carried out a mass campaign of arrests targeting activist including, doctors, human rights defenders, journalists, professors and political party leaders with arbitrary arrest and prolonged detention, in some cases incommunicado, for their participation or suspected participation in the protests that occurred across Sudan. Some of the detainees were subsequently released while others remain in NISS and police custody without charge or access to lawyers or family visits. Female detainees have been subjected to a thorough search while in detention centers and many have been asked about their tribes or where they come from”.²⁸²

Reporting on the situation for protestors which began in December 2018 African Arguments noted in a February 2019 article that “The Sudanese regime has resorted to its customary crackdown. Reports of excessive force, killings of protesters by snipers reportedly trained by Russian security personnel, arbitrary arrests, detention and torture abound”.²⁸³

An African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies report covering the events of 13 December 2018 to 11 April 2019 summarised that:

Detainees were subjected to different forms of physical and psychological torture. These included the following:-

- Being beaten with water hoses and wooden batons during arresting, transporting and interrogating detainees,
- electric shocks,
- exposure to low degrees of temperature(coldness)
- Detainees were made to stand for long hours,
- depriving detainees of medication, and
- Rape, threats with rape and sexual harassment by security and Police officers.

²⁸⁰ African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies et al, [Sudan: Target one to silence a hundred: The repression of human rights lawyers in Sudan](#), October 2018, 4.1 Criminalisation and arbitrary detention, p.10

²⁸¹ African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies et al, [Sudan: Target one to silence a hundred: The repression of human rights lawyers in Sudan](#), October 2018, 4.2 Torture, ill-treatment and incommunicado detention, p.13

²⁸² African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies, [Sudan: Activists targeted with arbitrary arrest and incommunicado detention whilst the media remains restricted amidst crackdown on December 2018 peaceful protests](#), 17 January 2019

²⁸³ African Arguments, [Sudan: A genuine, peaceful people's revolution in the making](#), 12 February 2019

Torture also included threats with death, ill-treatment by forcing detainees to clean cells and women to clean utensils in the women's prison in Omdurman, transporting detainees with their hands cuffed behind their backs in addition to forbidding detainees to go to toilets. All these forms of physical and psychological torture were practiced by the Police and NISS forces and the National Congress militias. [...] Torture, in a nutshell, included all forms of ill-treatment including such as violence, men frisking women and touching their sensitive body parts and robbing the belongings of peaceful protestors in return for releasing them. Several detainees spoke to the African Center for Justice and Peace Studies saying that they were beaten up, insulted and forced to surrender their money and mobile telephones and then they were released after signing undertakings not to participate in demonstrations.²⁸⁴

An April 2019 African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies publication on torture in Sudan noted with regards to the profiles of persons affected in Sudan in general:

The prevalence of torture in Sudan is a longstanding concern. Human rights defenders, women, political activists, lawyers, journalists, trade unionists, students and other groups have been systematically targeted.

The NISS and Sudanese Military Intelligence are the primary institutions responsible for torture and ill-treatment cases in detention. Security agents have been vested with wide-ranging immunities, and have carried out a range of human rights violations with impunity. Sudan's National Security Act 2010 provides a legal foundation giving the NISS extensive powers to arrest, arbitrarily detain, and interrogates perceived political opponents and those with perceived links to rebel groups, in order to silence opposition. Torture is commonly practised by police and prison staff to extract confessions or to extort money. Police in particular are implicated in the enforcement of public order laws, and numerous reports of ill-treatment, torture and sexual violence of female prisoners in police stations exist.²⁸⁵

1.3.5. IDPs

No COI published between 10 July 2018 and 10 December 2019 on the detention conditions of IDPs in Khartoum or Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

For non-profile specific, general information on treatment in detention including ill-treatment and torture see the sources included at the beginning of section [1.3. Prison conditions](#).

1.3.6. Returnees

No COI published between 10 July 2018 and 10 December 2019 on the detention conditions of returnees in Khartoum or Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

For non-profile specific, general information on treatment in detention including ill-treatment and torture see the sources included at the beginning of section [1.3. Prison conditions](#).

²⁸⁴ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: Extrajudicial killing and incommunicado detention: A Report covering the events of December 13, 2018 to April 11, 2019](#), 10 January 2020, 9. Torture, p.28

²⁸⁵ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Torture in Sudan: Justice and Prevention, Priorities for change following the end of al-Bashir regime](#), 25 April 2019

1.3.7. Women

For non-profile specific, general information on treatment in detention including ill-treatment and torture see the sources included at the beginning of section [1.3. Prison conditions](#).

Khartoum

Human Rights Watch reported in November 2019 that “Women released from detention in Khartoum in March [2019], following arrests at protests] told Human Rights Watch they had been beaten, groped, and threatened with rape by NISS officers”²⁸⁶.

Omdurman

An October 2018 joint report by the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) and the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders on the repression of human rights lawyers in Sudan described that:

Women human rights lawyers are often victim of specific forms of harassment and abuses. In these cases, discrimination factors that affect women in general represent an additional challenge within the framework of their human rights work, which can make them more vulnerable to gender-based violence by the security forces, sexual harassment and other forms of intimidation.

In several situations, women human rights lawyers are subjected to verbal abuses and insults, threats, stigmatisation and sexual harassment. One situation in which they are particularly vulnerable to sexual abuses is during searches and interrogations. [...] In a recent report, ACJPS has documented a number of abuses during intimate searches for women human rights defenders at NISS detention centres, in which they were subjected to direct contact with the private parts of their bodies accompanied by verbal abuse, threats of rape, and stigmatisation. Women human rights defenders were also denied sanitary towels.²⁸⁷

Reporting on the situation for detained women protestors in Omdurman, the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies reported in February 2019 that:

The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) and FIDH are deeply concerned about the safety of 30 women detained without access to lawyers or family members by the Sudanese National Security Intelligence Services (NISS) in Omdurman women’s prison. The detainees were targeted for their participation or suspected involvement in the ongoing protests calling for the resignation of president Omar al-Bashir. ACJPS and FIDH have gathered disturbing information about the detention conditions of these women, all of whom have been subjected to invasive strip searches, amounting to acts of sexual violence.

The detainees include members of opposition political parties, human rights defenders, journalists, teachers and doctors. Of the 30 women currently held at Omdurman, 18 were arrested during protests held between December 20, 2018 and February 2, 2019. They were forced to climb into NISS pickup trucks and to face downward so that they could not recognize where they were being taken. The other detainees were arrested over the same time period during NISS raids of their private residences and political party offices. The oldest detainee is in her late 70’s whilst the youngest is 24 years old. At least one is suffering from asthma. [...]

²⁸⁶ Human Rights Watch, [“They Were Shouting ‘Kill Them’”, Sudan’s Violent Crackdown on Protesters in Khartoum](#), 17 November 2019, *Background, Protests Since December*

²⁸⁷ African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies et al, [Sudan: Target one to silence a hundred: The repression of human rights lawyers in Sudan](#), October 2018, 5. *Harassment against women human rights lawyers*, p.16

ACJPS and FIDH have received reliable information indicating that the 30 women were made to sit for hours while facing the wall as they waited for admission into the prison. After having their phones confiscated and inspected, all of the women were subjected to body searches by NISS agents including in their private parts, amounting to acts of sexual violence. While in detention, they have not had access to sanitary towels, thus exposing them to risks of infection. Many have been subjected to verbal abuse including calling them prostitutes. At least eight women are obliged to share a single cell measuring approximately 5x5 meters.²⁸⁸

In February 2019 the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) issued a statement raising their 'deep concern' about the "safety of 30 women detained without access to lawyers or family members by the Sudanese National Security Intelligence Services (NISS) in Omdurman women's prison. The detainees were targeted for their participation or suspected involvement in the ongoing protests calling for the resignation of president Omar al-Bashir. ACJPS [African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies] and FIDH have gathered disturbing information about the detention conditions of these women, all of whom have been subjected to invasive strip searches, amounting to acts of sexual violence".²⁸⁹ With regards to the profiles of those detained, the source further reported that "The detainees include members of opposition political parties, human rights defenders, journalists, teachers and doctors. Of the 30 women currently held at Omdurman, 18 were arrested during protests held between December 20, 2018 and February 2, 2019. They were forced to climb into NISS pickup trucks and to face downward so that they could not recognize where they were being taken. The other detainees were arrested over the same time period during NISS raids of their private residences and political party offices. The oldest detainee is in her late 70's whilst the youngest is 24 years old. At least one is suffering from asthma".²⁹⁰

Further details were included in the statement in relation to the prison conditions and treatment in detention as follows:

ACJPS and FIDH have received reliable information indicating that the 30 women were made to sit for hours while facing the wall as they waited for admission into the prison. After having their phones confiscated and inspected, all of the women were subjected to body searches by NISS agents including in their private parts, amounting to acts of sexual violence. While in detention, they have not had access to sanitary towels, thus exposing them to risks of infection. Many have been subjected to verbal abuse including calling them prostitutes. At least eight women are obliged to share a single cell measuring approximately 5x5 meters.

NISS authorities have used detainees' family members to pressure them to reveal information. The husband of at least one detainee was brought to the prison by NISS agents to force her reveal the identity of members of the Sudanese Professionals Association. Before the arrest of another detainee, her nephew was arrested by NISS to force her to report to their offices. Her nephew was eventually released.²⁹¹

The September 2019 report by the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA) focusing on the 'Human Rights Conditions of Female Detainees and Prisoners in Sudan' noted that:

Several human rights groups have highlighted their concerns of ill treatment, torture and incommunicado detention in Sudan. Detainees and prisoners are at high-risk of torture and ill

²⁸⁸ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: 30 women detained in inhumane conditions following involvement in protests](#), 20 February 2019

²⁸⁹ International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), [Sudan: 30 women detained in inhumane conditions following involvement in protests](#), 21 February 2019

²⁹⁰ International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), [Sudan: 30 women detained in inhumane conditions following involvement in protests](#), 21 February 2019

²⁹¹ International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), [Sudan: 30 women detained in inhumane conditions following involvement in protests](#), 21 February 2019

treatment by authorities [sic], prison guards, police and military. Although the human rights of detainees of both genders are being violated, this brief is specifically aimed at raising awareness around the dire situation of women detainees and prisoners in Sudan [...]

An investigation carried out by SIHA Network, in Omdurman Prison-Dar Al-Teibat, documented the severe conditions women detainees and prisoners are subjected to. The main findings are outlined below:

- Biased enforcement: Women, particularly those from poor and marginalized communities, are disproportionately targeted for arrest under the Public Order Regime (POR) and Sudan Criminal Act.
- Rampant sexual violence: In detention centers and even in prison, sexual violence perpetrated by police, soldiers, and others in authority is rampant and is met with impunity.
- Differential treatment: Human rights violations are normalized within detention centers and prisons in Khartoum and severity of abuse appears to be rooted in racial, social, and economic status.
- Targeting invisible labor: Women who work in the informal sector tend to be targeted for arrest under the POR.
- Economic exploitation and corruption: Fines and bribes levied by POR police and judges constitute a significant source of income and enable the POR to control and oppress poor people.²⁹²

With special reference to the Omdurman Prison, the same report noted that “Omdurman Prison is a Federal Prison where women from all over Sudan are transferred. Within greater Khartoum, around 15 detention facilities further exist, for detainees accused under the POL [Public Order Law]. After being detained, most of the women are transferred to Omdurman Prison or other prisons within Sudan, while awaiting charges [...] The capacity of Omdurman Prison is designed for 500 women. However, reports indicate since 2011, the number of inmates almost doubles the originally intended capacity”.²⁹³

As to the demographics/backgrounds of the female inmates, the report reported:

The biography of Dr. Amal Gabaralla, previous detainee in Omdurman prison for women in 1992, mentioned that most of the women prisoners were from Darfur, Nuba Mountains, and South Sudan, and that their main crimes were making and selling alcohol, sex work, attempt of sex work, and adultery. By 2015, 23 years later, no remarkable change occurred in the prisoners’ demographic; only the fact that women from South Sudan became foreigners. News reports indicate that alcohol selling and making is the main charge of the majority of women in prison; 427 out of 965 prisoners were alcohol dealers, representing about 45% of the total number of prisoners. Moreover, between 1992 and 2015, women from South Sudan represented the majority of prisoners according to the testimony of the manager of Omdurman Prison, stating clear bias in regard to ethnicity, and citizenship.²⁹⁴

The report further highlighted that “Additional layers of discrimination and vulnerability presented when looking at tribal affiliation, social and economic status, and type of crime the detainees are charged for or inherit. Ethnic and racial factor, largely contribute to vulnerability, with POR [Public Order Regime], specifically targeting those hailing from Nuba Mountains, Darfur or South Sudan or those who are internally displaced. Ethnicity again, plays an important role in physical and sexual patterns of abuse [...]”.²⁹⁵

²⁹² Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA), [Human Rights Conditions of Female Detainees and Prisoners in Sudan](#), September 2019, p. 1

²⁹³ Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA), [Human Rights Conditions of Female Detainees and Prisoners in Sudan](#), September 2019, p. 2

²⁹⁴ Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA), [Human Rights Conditions of Female Detainees and Prisoners in Sudan](#), September 2019, p. 3

²⁹⁵ Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA), [Human Rights Conditions of Female Detainees and Prisoners in Sudan](#), September 2019, p. 3

Unspecified location

A January 2019 African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies report noted that “The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies has received information that the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) and police have since December 19 2018, carried out a mass campaign of arrests targeting activist including, doctors, human rights defenders, journalists, professors and political party leaders with arbitrary arrest and prolonged detention, in some cases incommunicado, for their participation or suspected participation in the protests that occurred across Sudan. Some of the detainees were subsequently released while others remain in NISS and police custody without charge or access to lawyers or family visits. Female detainees have been subjected to a thorough search while in detention centers and many have been asked about their tribes or where they come from”.²⁹⁶

An April 2019 African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies publication on torture in Sudan noted with regards to the profiles of persons affected in Sudan in general:

The prevalence of torture in Sudan is a longstanding concern. Human rights defenders, women, political activists, lawyers, journalists, trade unionists, students and other groups have been systematically targeted.

The NISS and Sudanese Military Intelligence are the primary institutions responsible for torture and ill-treatment cases in detention. Security agents have been vested with wide-ranging immunities, and have carried out a range of human rights violations with impunity. Sudan’s National Security Act 2010 provides a legal foundation giving the NISS extensive powers to arrest, arbitrarily detain, and interrogates perceived political opponents and those with perceived links to rebel groups, in order to silence opposition. Torture is commonly practised by police and prison staff to extract confessions or to extort money. Police in particular are implicated in the enforcement of public order laws, and numerous reports of ill-treatment, torture and sexual violence of female prisoners in police stations exist.²⁹⁷

An African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies report covering the events of 13 December 2018 to 11 April 2019 summarised that:

Sexual violations during the period covered by the report comprise several forms such as touching sensitive parts of female bodies, insulting females by reference to the cultural implications of age and threats with rape. [...]

Sexual violations included frisking women by security and Police personnel during the process of arresting and taking them to different detention centers. Touching female body parts was a practice whose scope widened in the protests during the process of frisking women by the NISS men. This amounted to threats of rape addressed at female detainees. Some NISS officers addressed verbal insults at girls telling them that respectful girls and women do not participate in protests. Slapping was also a form of violation which targeted girls.²⁹⁸

A May 2019 African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies report on the Sudanese Public Order law described that “Upon studying the application of the public order laws, it revealed that there is a

²⁹⁶ African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies, [Sudan: Activists targeted with arbitrary arrest and incommunicado detention whilst the media remains restricted amidst crackdown on December 2018 peaceful protests](#), 17 January 2019

²⁹⁷ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Torture in Sudan: Justice and Prevention, Priorities for change following the end of al-Bashir regime](#), 25 April 2019

²⁹⁸ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: Extrajudicial killing and incommunicado detention: A Report covering the events of December 13, 2018 to April 11, 2019](#), 10 January 2020, 8. Sexual Violations, p.27

systematic targeting of women in the public space, through the trappings which is encouraged by the legal provisions".²⁹⁹ The same source further described that:

Torture has been widely practiced by the Public Order Police. According to credible reports, the search and break-in continues to be carried out on daily basis in violation of the law. The detainees are subjected to physical and psychological torture, which is characterized by verbal abuses that vary according to the reason arrested.

Those accused of alcohol-related offenses are subjected to verbal abuse by calling them (Alcohol addict- Sakara), those arrested on sexual related acts, or attending or participating in mixed dances are verbally abused as (lewd), "prostitutes" or homosexuals. In the Islamic law, homosexuality is a sin. The word "prostitute" is also used in the case of those subjected to the examination of virginity. Sometimes, the detainees are forced by the police to perform dances while police take their video and publishes it on the social media.

Torture is usually by beating using water hoses, hands slaps, kick by guns, forced dancing in the presence of police officers who turn around in mockery, forced standing for long hours, and policemen questioning about the dress worn by a detainee in the case of arrest for perceived scandalous dressing, forced haircut by the police and hanging by the ceiling or the fan called ('Tayara Gamat' plane take off).

Torture continued to enjoy a further immunity from investigation. Where detainees requested to visit the doctor for medical examination, they are again subjected to torture to withdraw the request or are threatened with facing fabricated evidences and threats of telling off, particularly in the case of women's sexual relations, to use the social stigma around the sexual relations which made most of the arrested prefer the swift penalty.³⁰⁰

Looking back at 2019, Human Rights Watch reported that "Women released from detention told Human Rights Watch they were beaten and sexually harassed and threatened with rape".³⁰¹

1.3.8. Children

For non-profile specific, general information on treatment in detention including ill-treatment and torture see the sources included at the beginning of section [1.3. Prison conditions](#).

Khartoum

The U.S. Department of State's annual 'Country Report on Human Rights Practices' described that "In Khartoum juveniles were not held in adult prisons or jails, but they were reportedly held with adults elsewhere. During the year there was an unconfirmed report of a child dying in detention".³⁰²

Omdurman

No COI published between 10 July 2018 – 10 December 2019 on prison conditions for children in Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

²⁹⁹ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudanese Public Order: A law designed to control people, not protect morality](#), 9 May 2019, *Abstract*, p.2

³⁰⁰ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudanese Public Order: A law designed to control people, not protect morality](#), 9 May 2019, *Torture*, p.14

³⁰¹ Human Rights Watch, [World Report 2020: Sudan, Events of 2019](#), 13 January 2020, *Arbitrary Detentions, Torture*

³⁰² US Department of State, [Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2018 – Sudan](#), 13 March 2019, *Section 1.c Prison and Detention Center Conditions*

Unspecified location

The U.S. Department of State's annual 'Country Report on Human Rights Practices' described that "Police typically sent homeless children who had committed crimes to government camps for indefinite periods. Health care, schooling, and living conditions were generally very basic. All children in the camps, including non-Muslims, had to study the Quran".³⁰³

1.3.9. Individuals of diverse sexual orientation or gender identity

No COI published between 10 July 2018 – 10 December 2019 on prison conditions for individuals of diverse sexual orientation or gender identity in Khartoum or Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

For non-profile specific, general information on treatment in detention including ill-treatment and torture see the sources included at the beginning of section [1.3. Prison conditions](#).

1.4. Violence and discrimination against family members of (perceived) political opponents

Khartoum

No COI published between 10 July 2018 – 10 December 2019 on the violence and discrimination faced by family members of (perceived) political opponents in Khartoum was found amongst the sources consulted.

Omdurman

An African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies report covering the events of 13 December 2018 to 11 April 2019 reported with regards to the treatment of family members that:

Detaining family members as hostages came to the forefront as one of the events of a widening domain. Round five o'clock in the evening of December 13, 2018 a group of the NISS forces cracked down on the house of political activist Abdal Fatah Al Rufai in Omdurman who happened to be out of town. His daughter Batool was arrested and taken to a detention center. She was shortly released later on after being interrogated about her political activities and she was forced to sign an undertaking to stop practicing any activity or participating in protests. Following her release, her sister Sarah was also interrogated about her political activities and forced to sign an undertaking not to participate in any protest. Sarah was arrested shortly after signing this undertaking after the Security agents were assured that her father was out of town to offer his condolences on a deceased relative.³⁰⁴

³⁰³ US Department of State, [Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2018 – Sudan](#), 13 March 2019, Section 6, Children

³⁰⁴ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: Extrajudicial killing and incommunicado detention: A Report covering the events of December 13, 2018 to April 11, 2019](#), 10 January 2020, 5. Detaining Family Members as Hostages p.17

Unspecified location

Siddig Yousef [SY], member of the central committee of the Communist Party and head of the Sudanese Solidarity Committee was interviewed by a UK Home Office fact finding mission in August 2018.³⁰⁵ The report noted him as stating that “Sometimes if the authorities are interested in an individual but cannot find them they will arrest a family member”.³⁰⁶

The same report cited a human rights defender (HRD) as stating that “In general, families of people who are wanted by NISS would not be at risk unless there are personal issues between NISS [National Intelligence and Security Service] and the family concerned. It is very rare that families would be targeted – HRD said this wasn’t the way things worked in Sudan. This applies to all ethnic groups”.³⁰⁷ A further activist stated that “Asked whether someone who was active in Europe would be monitored by NISS and then detained on return, the source thought this would be dangerous. Knew of women activists in the UK, with family in Sudan, have to be careful and try not to be visible, but added that NISS would not arrest family members. Families of wanted persons might be harassed or have their phones bugged, to try and identify persons whereabouts, but families normally would not face arrest”.³⁰⁸

Reporting generally on the situation in Sudan, a February 2019 African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies noted that “Since 13 December 2018, tens of thousands of people have participated in protests against the government throughout Sudan. The authorities have responded by indiscriminately firing live ammunition and tear gas into crowds of peaceful protesters killing more than 50 civilians and wounding hundreds. There have documented attacks by security forces on 6 hospitals and medical staff. The government has acknowledged that at least 2530 have been arrested, including those participating in, or supporting the protests, and their family members, members of the political opposition, prominent lawyers, doctors, intellectuals, and human rights defenders. At least have three died in custody as a result of torture”.³⁰⁹

The East African reported that in March 2019 “Mariam al-Mahdi -- daughter of opposition Umma Party chief and ex-prime minister Sadiq al-Mahdi - was sentenced to a week in prison by an emergency court” following her and her sister’s arrest earlier that week during protests.³¹⁰

³⁰⁵ See UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, Siddig Yousef

³⁰⁶ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, Siddig Yousef, p. 160

³⁰⁷ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, Human rights defender, p. 163

³⁰⁸ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, An activist, p. 175

³⁰⁹ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Urgent appeal to the African Commission on human and people’s rights to dispatch an independent fact-finding mission](#), 25 February 2019

³¹⁰ The East African, [Sudan opposition leader sentenced to jail for protest](#), 10 March 2019

2. Forced recruitment in Omdurman and Khartoum by the Sudanese government

2.1. Overview of Military service (legal framework, unlawful or disproportionate punishment for refusal to serve, Desertion)

According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook, the military service age and obligation in Sudan is “18-33 years of age for male and female compulsory or voluntary military service; 1-2 year service obligation (2013)”.³¹¹

The undated website of GlobalSecurity.org details that:

The law governing military service is the National Service Act 1992. The Act was introduced in an attempt to meet the increasing personnel needs of the armed forces. National service does not always entail military service as there are alternatives to military service but those called up have no choice as to what kind of national service they do. Persons called for national service must serve in the Sudanese army, the police force, the Public Order Police, in one of the other security forces, in government departments and public projects for social and economic development. People drafted into national service are paid for their services by the Government. Men who have completed their military service receive a certificate stating their national service has been completed. The requirement that completion of national service was mandatory before entering public or private sector employment has been cancelled.³¹²

Regarding punishment for refusing or evading military service, The National Service Act 1992 states that:

28.1 Whoever contradicts this Act shall be punished by imprisonment [for a] period not exceeding three years, or shall be fined, or with both penalties. [...]

28.3 Any person subject to do the service shall be punished with imprisonment for a period of not less than two years and not exceeding three years who does not present himself for recruitment, or tries to avoid service through deceit, or by inflicting any harm to himself.³¹³

Salih Mahmoud M Osman of the Darfur Bar Association interviewed by a UK Home Office fact finding mission in August 2018 explained that “All Sudanese graduates do National Service (NS), there is no exemption for any group. You have to have a National ID number to do NS and you have to be a graduate. In the past, the government used to capture non-graduates from the streets for the army and paramilitary forces like the Popular Defence Forces. Now the government uses mercenaries from Chad, Niger and Mali, so don’t do this anymore. People from Chad, Mali, etc are mainly in the RSF. It is a policy to recruit graduates into government jobs. NS takes place in government departments (ministries)”.³¹⁴

Dr Ahmed Eltoum Salim, European & African Centre observed when interviewed by the same mission that “Although compulsory, it is possible to pay a bribe to avoid national service (NS) and to obtain a card that states you have undertaken national service. You can keep paying over the years in case you want to travel for a good reason such as getting a work contract abroad, so never have to

³¹¹ CIA, [World Factbook: Sudan](#), last updated 10 January 2020

³¹² Global Security.org, [Sudan - Military Personnel](#), undated [accessed 22 January 2020]

³¹³ Cited in Danish Immigration Service, [Report on Fact-finding Mission to Cairo, Khartoum and Nairobi: Human Rights Situation, Military Service, and Entry and Embarkation Procedures in Sudan. 8 to 19 August and 20 to 23 November 2001](#), 1 December 2001, Annex 4: The National Service Act for 1992 p.67

³¹⁴ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, Salih Mahmoud M Osman, Darfur Bar Association p. 120

do it. The terms of service are one year for a graduate; two years for non-graduate. There are classes A- B - C for people not physically able to complete a lengthy term. Military training is for 45 days, it is for people over 18 yrs. There is an upper age limit. If you get work abroad, you can be exempted from national service – or get it delayed. It is not obstacle to leaving the country. NS can be delayed”.³¹⁵

The King of Berti mentioned when asked if the Berti must do national service (NS), that “it was the same rules for everyone. 1 year for graduates, 2 years for non-graduates. In general, NS done before university, but if accepted at university persons may be able to postpone. If a person did not do NS, then not able to go to university, won’t get (formal) employment and technically not allowed to travel although there are exceptions to this which cost money”.³¹⁶

Siddig Yousef, member of the central committee of the Communist Party and head of the Sudanese Solidarity Committee considered that “Everyone has to do national service (NS) for 2 years, military service is for 6 months. Military service continues [despite the end of conflict] however because the government hasn’t got the facilities to accommodate all the NS conscripts, it concentrates on students. The punishment for not doing NS is that students do not get a degree and therefore not a (good) job, but they are not sent to prison”.³¹⁷ A human rights defender added that:

National service is compulsory for all Sudanese men and women, under a certain age, who have completed schooling/university, but generally, not served in the military.

The military do not get people; they go into government institutions. People are supposed to do it, but some do not. Some Nomads, farmers and uneducated men may avoid undertaking national service. Penalties include not being able to obtain a passport or leave the country (by legal channels) without proving you’ve completed national service or have got an exemption.³¹⁸

An activist interviewed by the same fact-finding mission (FFM) further explained that:

Darfuris have to do national service (NS) – there are no exceptions. They have military training, sent to a camp (but this is not for firearms training). After this, they are attached to a government ministry to complete NS. NS is one year for a graduate, 2 years for non-graduates. Most students go after they have completed university.

Asked if government round-ups people for NS, the source thought that this used to be the case in the past but this has stopped in the last 5 years. The FFM team had heard it suggested that it might be possible to pay money to avoid NS, the source had heard about this but did not have evidence of it occurring. The source noted that once NS is completed a person was given a certificate / letter. They then got a card showing they had done NS, which had to be renewed every 2 to 3 years to maintain proof of having completed NS, which costs around 200 Sudanese Pounds each time.

Asked about the penalty for not doing NS, the source said that it would prevent a future career and gave the example of a lawyer, they would not be able to enrol at the bar. Nor would a graduate be able to apply for a masters degree without showing the NS card. When asked if there are other

³¹⁵ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, Dr Ahmed Eltoum Salim, European & African Centre (EAC) p. 133

³¹⁶ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, The King of Berti, p. 170

³¹⁷ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, Siddig Yousef, p. 159

³¹⁸ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, Human rights defender, p. 162

penalties – for example prison or fine – the response was no. NS is for both men and women, but the government does not ‘insist’ that women undertake NS.³¹⁹

Khartoum

An official of Western Embassy A interviewed by a UK Home Office fact finding mission in August 2018 observed that “Regarding national service (NS), the official had heard of one incident of army personnel in vehicles stopping young men and asking them if they had completed their NS in Khartoum. The official observed that it was explained to them that this was unlikely to happen outside of Khartoum. This practice may vary depending on the security situation of the country at the time”.³²⁰

In an April 2019 report on attacks on peaceful protestors, Physicians for Human Rights described that “Physicians have also experienced threats, intimidation, and other extreme pressures in their work places. One witness noted that in Khartoum and many other cities, doctors are striking from working in government-run outpatient clinics. However, they still have strong obligations to their communities, so they are seeing their patients in private clinics, hospital wards, offices, and emergency rooms. In response, the government is threatening them with arrest, canceling their opportunity to use their medical work as their military service (Sudan has compulsory military service), and not paying them wages or denying them access to training and education. One witness stated that ‘a lot of doctors have stopped getting paid’”.³²¹

2.2. Darfuri

Khartoum

No COI published between 10 July 2018 – 10 December 2019 on the forced recruitment of Darfuris in Khartoum was found amongst the sources consulted.

Omdurman

No COI published between 10 July 2018 – 10 December 2019 on the forced recruitment of Darfuris in Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

Unspecified location

In January 2019 the Belgian COI Unit, CEDOCA, cited a founder of a press organisation in the Nuba mountains as stating “Since the war has started the people from Nuba, Blue Nile and Darfur have been targeted and arrested without charge and some have been tortured. Many of them have also

³¹⁹ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, An activist, p.173

³²⁰ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, An official of Western Embassy B p. 154

³²¹ Physicians for Human Rights, [Intimidation and Persecution, Sudan’s Attacks on Peaceful Protesters and Physicians](#), April 2019, Workplace Intimidation p.14

been physically picked up off the streets, against their will, by militias and the Sudan military to fight against their own people in the areas of conflict and Yemen”.³²²

However, according to a university professor interviewed by a UK Home Office fact finding mission in August 2018 with regards to military service for Darfuris in general in Sudan:

All Sudanese do National Service (NS). Most Darfuris do NS, like all Sudanese. People who have connections can get better placements. But it is more difficult for Darfuris, who are not likely to obtain such good placements as non-Darfuris unless they have a ‘good connection’ who can secure them a better placement. Darfuris are more likely to be sent to the military, in the past this would have meant being sent to the ‘frontline’, i.e. one of the conflict areas. If a person doesn’t do NS they will be denied their university certificate; they will not be able to get a good job and they will not be able to travel”.³²³ Similarly Lieutenant-General Awad Dahiya, Head of Passports and Civil Registration Corporation, Ministry of Interior, explained that “Exit visas are also required and can be applied for at passport offices all over Sudan – there are 5 main offices in Khartoum. The applicant must provide their valid passport, evidence they have completed national service, and their reason for travel.”³²⁴

An official of Western Embassy B stated that “Darfuris are still required to do national service but they would find it difficult to get ‘sensitive’ jobs. But this is the same for all ‘African’ groups. Darfuris would find it difficult to get into government, i.e. government jobs”.³²⁵ The same source further noted that “Everyone has to do NS, which is supposed to be compulsory and, depending on the person’s level of education, is for 1 to 3 years. Some tribes, rich families pay to get a medical certificate to exempt them from NS. Not sure of the penalties for not doing NS. Anecdotally, NAD [Non-Arab Darfuri] generally tend to end up in lower ranks and are sometimes not allowed to go to ‘sensitive’ places”.

For information on the forced recruitment of Darfuris and Darfuri children in Darfur, see:

- ❖ Asylum Research Centre, [Sudan: Country Report; Updated Country Report on Darfur](#), January 2020, 4. *Forced recruitment and conscription*, p.88

2.3. Nuba

Khartoum

No COI published between 10 July 2018 – 10 December 2019 on the forced recruitment of Nuba in Khartoum was found amongst the sources consulted.

³²² CEDOCA, [COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas](#), 22 January 2019, 2.2.1. *Discriminatie en geweld: economische, etnische, politieke factoren*, p.42

³²³ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: *Notes of meetings with sources*, A university professor p. 115

³²⁴ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: *Notes of meetings with sources*, Lieutenant-General Awad Dahiya p. 167

³²⁵ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: *Notes of meetings with sources*, A university professor p. 115

Omdurman

No COI published between 10 July 2018 – 10 December 2019 on the forced recruitment of Nuba in Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

Unspecified location

In January 2019 the Belgian COI Unit, CEDOCA, cited a founder of a press organisation in the Nuba mountains as stating “Since the war has started the people from Nuba, Blue Nile and Darfur have been targeted and arrested without charge and some have been tortured. Many of them have also been physically picked up off the streets, against their will, by militias and the Sudan military to fight against their own people in the areas of conflict and Yemen”.³²⁶

A May 2019 Radio Dabanga article reported that “The majority of the RSF [Rapid Support Forces] troops consist of Darfuri Arab gunmen and militiamen, recruited by Hemeti since 2013. Ethnic Nuba have also reportedly been enlisted into the RSF”.³²⁷

2.4. Other ethnic and/or religious minorities

No COI published between 10 July 2018 -10 December 2019 on forced recruitment of ethnic/religious minorities in Khartoum or Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

2.5. Students, political activists, human rights activists and journalists who are not originally from these cities or who support persons not originally from there

No COI published between 10 July 2018 -10 December 2019 on the forced recruitment of students, political activists, human rights activists and journalists in Khartoum or Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

2.6. IDPs

No COI published between 10 July 2018 -10 December 2019 on the forced recruitment of IDPs in Khartoum or Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

2.7. Returnees

No COI published between 10 July 2018 -10 December 2019 on the forced recruitment of returnees in Khartoum or Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

³²⁶ CEDOCA, [*COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas*](#), 22 January 2019, 2.2.1. *Discriminatie en geweld: economische, etnische, politieke factoren*, p.42

³²⁷ Radio Dabanga, [*Sudan militia commander: ‘Killers of protesters at Khartoum sit-in arrested’*](#), 20 May 2019

2.8. Women

No COI published between 10 July 2018 -10 December 2019 on the forced recruitment of women in Khartoum or Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

However, note that the sources cited above in section 2.1 present different views as to whether national service is mandatory for women.

2.9. Children

Khartoum / Omdurman

No COI published between 10 July 2018 -10 December 2019 on the forced recruitment of children in Khartoum or Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

Unspecified location

In its annual report on trafficking covering the period April 2018 to March 2019 the U.S. Department of State noted that:

During the reporting year, the NCCW [National Council for Child Welfare] and the Ministry for Social Welfare continued efforts to prevent the use of child soldiers within the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and its auxiliaries through the implementation of the National Action Plan to Prevent the Recruitment and Use of Children in Armed Conflict. Unlike previous years, the government did not report identifying or reintegrating any child soldiers in 2018. Officials coordinated with the UN to conduct monitoring and verification visits, although observers reported security officials intermittently denied access to conflict areas in Darfur. In 2018, an international organization reported at least one case of child soldier recruitment and use by security forces in 2018. Media outlets reported government officials recruited children—particularly from Darfur—into combat roles in Yemen. In 2017, the government coordinated with international organizations to conduct monitoring and verification visits in eight conflict states, and officials from the NCCW facilitated the release of 21 child soldiers from non-governmental armed forces in the Darfur region. [...]

Sudanese law prohibits the recruitment of children as combatants and provides criminal penalties for perpetrators; however, an international organization reported SAF elements forcibly abducted a minor for the purpose of recruitment in 2018. Media reported complicit officials associated with Sudan's Rapid Support Force recruited children and provided forged documents for minors to serve as combatants in Yemen. Sudanese military forces denied observers' access to conflict areas in Darfur making verification of child soldier recruitment more challenging.³²⁸

Reporting generally on the situation in Sudan following the December 2018 protests, UNICEF stated in June 2019 that "We have received information that children are being detained, recruited to join the fighting and sexually abused. [...] Many parents are too scared to let their children leave the house, fearful of violence, harassment and lawlessness".³²⁹ According to the Assessment Capacities Project "In times of increased intercommunal fighting and an increase of armed group activity youth, especially males in rural areas, are at higher risk of recruitment".³³⁰

³²⁸ U.S. Department of State, [US Department of State: 2019 Trafficking in Persons Report: Sudan](#), 20 June 2019

³²⁹ UNICEF, [Children killed, injured, detained and abused amid escalating violence and unrest in Sudan](#), 11 June 2019

³³⁰ Assessment Capacities Project, [SUDAN Escalation of violence](#), 17 June 2019

UNICEF's humanitarian situation report covering the third quarter of 2019 noted that:

There has been significant social media attention on the recruitment of children by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) for deployment both in Sudan and Yemen. UNICEF alongside the Resident Coordinator Office and UNAMID designed a workshop in July 2019 to identify and visit all the RSF barracks and training centres to conduct a comprehensive age verification exercise and awareness raising and training for troops to prevent underage recruitment. Troop reviews, interviews and documentation of suspected cases are used to identify and monitor individuals suspected to be underage, while transitional care, family tracing and reunification for children associated with armed forces and armed groups who are identified is used to support those confirmed. UNICEF and partners also conducted a workshop for the Government of Sudan Technical Committee members on the age verification process.

Based on the results of these two workshops a comprehensive 4 day verification visit was conducted to the RSF sector of Naila, South Darfur state. More than 600 RSF new recruits were interviewed and 40 RSF commanders were trained on protection of children from grave violations and the relevant legal frameworks including Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and RSF laws.

Furthermore, 36 senior legal SAF officers also received seven days of TOT [Training of Trainers] training on International Humanitarian Law, protection of children during armed conflict and national and international obligations such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Sudan Child Act 2010.

The engagement with RSF revealed that there are multiple factors at the community level which encourage families and parents to accept their children's involvement with the RSF. UNICEF in collaboration with the NCCW has developed community awareness materials which will be used in the next verification process seven other states (Khartoum, North Darfur, East Darfur, Central Darfur, West Darfur, Blue Nile and West Kordofan).³³¹

A December 2019 International Federation for Human Rights and African Center for Justice and Peace Studies report stated with regards to recruitment into the Rapid Support Forces:

It is alleged that these troops include child soldiers, aged between 14 and 17 years, some of whom have been deployed to Yemen to fight alongside the Saudi-led coalition. Since March 2015, Sudan has been playing a significant role in the conflict in Yemen, mainly by sending as many as 14,000 combatants to the battlefield. Most of these combatants have the same profile: boys – aged between 14 and 17 – originating from poor Darfuri families, in search of economic opportunities. A significant number of them are thought to have grown up in Darfur IDPs camps and have been eager to integrate RSF troops to earn money and get their families out of the camps.³³²

A May 2019 African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies report on the Sudanese Public Order law argued that the particular groups subjected to disproportionate enforcement of the law are: workers in the informal economic sector, 'beggars', the general public and women.³³³ With regards to 'beggars' the report noted that:

They are requested by the Public Order Law to obtain Identity Cards, issued upon payment of fee. This measure aims to control their movements and keep them away from the public street. They also subject to intimidation by the security forces which, recruit them to serve as sources of information. The security forces order them to track people and monitor the movement of political activists, the demonstrations, besides being subject to various forms of exploitations. Some are recruited to work

³³¹ UNICEF, [Sudan Humanitarian Situation Report Third Quarter 2019](#), 5 November 2019

³³² International Federation for Human Rights, African Center for Justice and Peace Studies, Sudan Human Rights Monitor, [Will There Be Justice for Darfur? Persisting impunity in the face of political change; Fact-finding mission report](#), December 2019, *The Rapid Support Forces (RSF)*, p. 26

³³³ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudanese Public Order: A law designed to control people, not protect morality](#), 9 May 2019, *Public oppression of those who work in the public street* p.9

in military, especially children and boys above 18 who are classified as homeless, some of them are subject to sexual abuse in places where they are forced to sleep at night in the markets areas.³³⁴

UNOCHA reported in its January 2020 Humanitarian Needs Overview “Forced recruitment of children continues”.³³⁵ Furthermore, “Boys and girls recruited by armed groups are subject to detention and separation from their families, and experience acute psychosocial distress. They also face challenges with reintegration into their communities, and barriers in access to education and other services”.³³⁶

For information on the forced recruitment of Darfuri children in Darfur, see:

- ❖ Asylum Research Centre, [Sudan: Country Report; Updated Country Report on Darfur](#), January 2020, 4. *Forced recruitment and conscription*, p.88

2.10. Individuals of diverse sexual orientation or gender identity

No COI published between 10 July 2018 – 10 December 2019 on the forced recruitment of individuals of diverse sexual orientation or gender identity in Khartoum or Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

3. Access to justice, including follow-up by State law enforcement agencies in cases of violence and other abuses against members of specific groups

Protests in Sudan: Emergency Courts

Human Rights Watch reported that “President al-Bashir declared a state of emergency on February 22 [2019], banning protests and authorizing ‘emergency courts’ to try violators in speedy trials. Many protesters were detained, tried summarily, and imprisoned or fined, without due process protections”.³³⁷ Associate Director of the Africa Division within Human Rights Watch, Jehanne Henry, assessed: “Now al-Bashir’s emergency courts are another tool for repression. Hastily-formed courts set up by chief justice Abdelmajid Idris on February 25 [2019] have convicted hundreds of people in summary trials – for crimes such as protesting and disseminating anti-government information – without due process or access to lawyers in many cases, witnesses told us. Sentences range between fines up to seven years in prison”.³³⁸

Less than a month after being set up “Sudanese authorities have transferred 870 people to Emergency Courts in Khartoum, Omdurman, and Khartoum North, on charges of participating in demonstrations” the Democratic Lawyers Alliance reported.³³⁹ According to the same news article “Dozens of lawyers volunteered to defend scores of protesters. The Emergency Courts in Khartoum

³³⁴ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudanese Public Order: A law designed to control people, not protect morality](#), 9 May 2019, *Public oppression of those who work in the public street* p.8

³³⁵ UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Needs Overview](#), January 2020, 1.4 *Humanitarian Consequences, Risk to children and adolescents* p.20

³³⁶ UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Needs Overview](#), January 2020, 3.6 *Protection, Child protection* p.50

³³⁷ Human Rights Watch, [World Report 2020: Sudan, Events of 2019](#), 13 January 2020, *Crackdowns on Protesters*

³³⁸ Jehanne Henry (Human Rights Watch), [Emergency Decrees Bring More Repression in Sudan](#), 5 March 2019

³³⁹ Radio Dabanga, [Lawyers: 870 cases referred to Sudan’s new Emergency Courts](#), 3 March 2019

issued sentences to write-off a large number of complaints, convicted dozens, and imposed financial penalties against them with an alternative prison sentence in case of non-payment of the fines. The courts handed-down sentences of between one and two weeks' imprisonment against a number of people".³⁴⁰

In March 2019 Radio Dabanga reported that "Emergency Courts in Sudan have issued a number of verdicts in trials against protesters. Several demonstrators have been convicted to imprisonment, paying fines, or both, while others have been acquitted owing to the absence of complainants".³⁴¹ Muez Hadra, defence lawyer for protesters, told Radio Dabanga that "the Emergency Courts in Sudan, they have issued 'various and varied sentences against many of the demonstrators [...] Even though the act for which the sentences are issued is one act of demonstration. Which indicates that these courts do not have a single doctrine, with the knowledge that the demonstration is guaranteed by the Constitution. Hadra pointed out that the Emergency Courts have violated the constitutional rights of those who have appeared before them. There has been no integrity of procedures, right of defence, and availability of the intention of justice for these people, the lawyer said".³⁴²

Access to justice – General situation in Sudan, particularly post-protests

Reporting generally on the situation in Sudan, the U.S. Department of State's annual report for 2018 noted that "Impunity remained a serious problem throughout the security forces, although crimes involving child victims were prosecuted more regularly. Aside from the inconsistent use of NISS' [National Intelligence and Security Service] special courts [...] the government rarely lifted police immunity or pressed charges against SAF [Sudanese Armed Forces] officers. The government also generally failed to investigate violations committed by any branch of the security forces".³⁴³

Furthermore, "Persons seeking damages for human rights violations had access to domestic and international courts. The domestic judiciary, however, was not independent. There were problems enforcing domestic and international court orders. According to the law, individuals and organizations may appeal adverse domestic decisions to regional human rights bodies. Some individuals, however, reported they feared reprisal".³⁴⁴ Moreover, "The government was uncooperative with, and unresponsive to, domestic human rights groups. It restricted and harassed workers of both domestic and international human rights organizations".³⁴⁵

In October 2018 the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) and the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders published a joint report and described that:

Under the new NSA [National Security Act] 2010 [...] NISS personnel benefit from immunity for all acts committed "in good intention while or by reason of performing his/her functions or any duty assigned

³⁴⁰ Radio Dabanga, [Lawyers: 870 cases referred to Sudan's new Emergency Courts](#), 3 March 2019

³⁴¹ Radio Dabanga, [Emergency trials against Sudan protesters: punishment or acquittal](#), 5 March 2019

³⁴² Radio Dabanga, [Emergency trials against Sudan protesters: punishment or acquittal](#), 5 March 2019

³⁴³ US Department of State, [2018 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Sudan](#), 13 March 2019, *Section 7, d. Discrimination with Respect to Employment and Occupation*

³⁴⁴ US Department of State, [2018 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Sudan](#), 13 March 2019, *Section 1.e Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies*

³⁴⁵ US Department of State, [2018 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Sudan](#), 13 March 2019, *Section 5. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights*

thereto or any act he/she did as part of any power bestowed on him/her pursuant to this Act” (Art. 52(1)).

Moreover, Art. 52(3) states that “no civil or criminal procedures may be brought against a member or associate unless upon the approval of the Director”. Such power is not subjected to judicial scrutiny and, in practice, this immunity is rarely lifted. For this reason, the vast majority of cases of human rights violations committed remain unpunished. [...]

Mechanisms of protection available in case of human rights violations in Sudan are widely insufficient and contribute to fuel a climate of impunity.³⁴⁶

An April 2019 African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies publication on torture in Sudan noted with regards to accountability for violations in Sudan in general:

There has been almost complete impunity for torture, including acts of rape and sexual violence, in Sudan. A series of interrelated factors contribute to this impunity: lack of a criminal offence of torture that is in line with international standards; immunities for officials; brief statutes of limitations; lack of victim and witness protection; and the absence of a system aimed at holding officials accountable for wrongdoing, i.e. by means of prompt, impartial and effective investigations and prosecutions. The granting of immunity has been the most visible means of shielding alleged perpetrators from accountability. It reflects a system dominated by the executive at the expense of effective oversight, be it judicial or otherwise.³⁴⁷

The same source reported with regards to remedies and reparation for victims of torture in Sudan in general:

Following the removal of al-Bashir as President there is likely to be a large number of victims of torture seeking reparation for their treatment. To date, there is an almost complete absence of cases that have resulted in compensation or other forms of reparation being awarded to victims of torture. The law does not provide for an explicit right to reparation for torture. Immunities, short statutes of limitation and lack of adequate protection for victims and witnesses, in combination with systemic shortcomings that undermine effective access to justice, render existing remedies ineffective, a fact recognised by the African Commission in its jurisprudence. There are no effective national human rights institutions or administrative mechanisms providing at least some form of reparation for torture survivors.³⁴⁸

An International Federation for Human Rights and African Center for Justice and Peace Studies report considered that “The 3 June [2019] massacre committed in the streets of Khartoum is an extension of the serious crimes committed by the RSF in the Darfur region since 2003. This massacre reminds us once again that deeply entrenched impunity in Sudan, in particular in respect of the crimes committed in Darfur, has constituted fertile ground for the continued perpetration of serious human rights violations”.³⁴⁹ In June 2019 Radio Dabanga cited Sudan’s Transitional Military Council’s (TMC) spokesman and chairman of the Political Committee, Lt Gen Shamseldin Kabbashi, as

³⁴⁶ African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies et al, [Sudan: Target one to silence a hundred: The repression of human rights lawyers in Sudan](#), October 2018, 6.1 NISS unlimited powers and total immunity, p.17, 6.2 Lack of remedies for human rights violations, p.18, and 6.3 Absence of judicial scrutiny and legal safeguards, p.18

³⁴⁷ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Torture in Sudan: Justice and Prevention, Priorities for change following the end of al-Bashir regime](#), 25 April 2019

³⁴⁸ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Torture in Sudan: Justice and Prevention, Priorities for change following the end of al-Bashir regime](#), 25 April 2019

³⁴⁹ International Federation for Human Rights, African Center for Justice and Peace Studies, Sudan Human Rights Monitor, [Will There Be Justice for Darfur? Persisting impunity in the face of political change; Fact-finding mission report](#), December 2019, *Impunity for the crimes in Darfur continues to threaten nation-wide stability* p.14

declaring that “the TMC would not accept an international commission of inquiry because Sudan is a sovereign state”.³⁵⁰

Following the swearing in of the new Sudanese leaders on 21 August 2019 Human Rights Watch reported:

The constitutional charter, signed August 4 [2019], among other things, calls for a raft of major institutional and legal reforms. They are designed to end repression and gender discrimination; secure accountability for crimes since 1989 under al-Bashir’s rule; and establish an investigation into the attacks on protesters on June 3 [2019], which killed over 100 people according to independent doctors’ groups.

But the charter does not contain benchmarks or consequences for failure to make any specific reforms or to ensure justice and accountability, Human Rights Watch said. It does not provide that the investigation into attacks on June 3 should be capable of leading to criminal prosecutions of those most responsible. It provides immunity for sovereign council members, including Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, or “Hemeti,” who is the head of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Burhan’s deputy. By all accounts heard by Human Rights Watch researchers, the RSF has led most of the attacks on protesters since April [2019], including on June 3.

In July [2019], the attorney general announced findings of an investigation into the June 3 attack, claiming that 87 people had died, and finding that “rogue” RSF soldiers were responsible. Burhan denied ordering the crackdown, while Hemeti announced arrests of some suspects. However, Sudanese activists and protesters rejected the findings and have continued to call for accountability for the killings.³⁵¹

Human Rights Watch further called upon the new transitional government to:

Incoming leaders should ensure that the new investigation committee has the authority to thoroughly investigate the crimes, with the capacity to preserve evidence, and that it is mandated to produce a public report that identifies those most responsible for the crimes and recommends ways to hold them accountable. They should request external involvement from all appropriate international bodies, including the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and Human Rights Council.

Leaders should also prioritize Sudan’s compliance with international human rights law, including ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and the Convention against Torture.³⁵²

In September 2019 Radio Dabanga reported that:

demonstrators submitted a memorandum to the Minister of Justice Nasreldin Abdelbari demanding the appointment of Abdelgadir Mohamed Ahmed as Chief Justice and Mohamed El Hafiz as Attorney General. They also demanded the formation of a commission of inquiry into the massacre at the break-up of the sit-in in front of the army command on June 3 [2019]. The moment that this commission should be formed, as agreed upon in the Constitutional Document, is coming near, the memorandum says [...] The demonstrators demanded that members of the former regime involved in the coup, war crimes and genocide will be put on trial or extradited to the International Criminal Court. They also demand that legal steps will be taken to recover looted funds. The memorandum expressed deep concern that impunity and a lack of accountability continue under the civilian government.³⁵³

³⁵⁰ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan junta rejects international inquiry into Khartoum massacre](#), 16 June 2019

³⁵¹ Human Rights Watch, [Sudan: Prioritize Justice, Accountability](#), 23 August 2019

³⁵² Human Rights Watch, [Sudan: Prioritize Justice, Accountability](#), 23 August 2019

³⁵³ Radio Dabanga, [Tens of thousands demonstrate in Sudan for justice](#), 20 September 2019

By October 2019 an ‘Independent Committee of Inquiry’ had been set up, “headed by prominent human rights lawyer Nabil Adib. Senior advisor Osman Mohamed has been appointed as rapporteur, prosecutor Soheib Abdellatif as deputy rapporteur, and Ismat Taha and Ahmed El Tahir as members. Its task is to investigate the June 3 [2019] massacre and other human rights violations. The Committee has the authority to investigate and identify the persons responsible for the break-up of the Khartoum sit-in on June 3 and those who were involved in it. It can summon anybody, including government officials and members of the regular forces, to give testimony”.³⁵⁴ However, “Human rights activist and chair of the ‘No to Oppression against Women Initiative’, doctor Ihsan Fagiri, denounced the lack of any representation of women in the independent Committee of Inquiry”.³⁵⁵

In an December 2019 article, Human Rights Watch noted with regards to the 3 June 2019 incident that “As one of his first acts as prime minister, Abdalla Hamdok met with families of the protesters who were killed. A month later, he established an investigation committee into the violence on June 3 [2019], which the power-sharing agreement mandated. He has since named the members, and in October the new attorney general said the committee would have prosecutorial powers”.³⁵⁶ The same source further noted that:

the families of victims and rights groups have rightly raised concerns about the long delays in setting up the committee, its limited mandate, its independence and the members’ lack of expertise, especially regarding sexual violence cases. It remains to be seen whether this committee will get the expertise, legal powers and independence it needs to function in line with basic international standards. [...]

Yet, almost five months on, the transitional government has made little concrete progress and the international community — especially donor governments — has gone quiet. They should urgently throw support behind justice and accountability, the cornerstone for the envisioned transition. To this end, they should adopt human rights benchmarks in their dealings with Sudan’s new rulers and find every opportunity to remind the government, especially its military component, of what is at stake.³⁵⁷

Also in December 2019, Amnesty International similarly noted that “One year after protests broke out in Sudan leading to the ouster of President Omar al Bashir on 11 April 2019, the new transitional authorities must live up to the hopes and expectations of the Sudanese people”.³⁵⁸ The source added:

“The transitional authorities must honour the commitments they made to restore the rule of law and protect human rights. The Sudanese people deserve nothing less.”

The Sudanese people’s hopes now lie squarely with the transitional authorities headed by Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdok, and backed by the Transitional Constitutional Charter, which enshrines the country’s most comprehensive Bill of Rights yet. [...]

“The responsibility on Prime Minister Hamdok’s shoulders is as large as the aspirations of the Sudanese people who suffered decades of serious human rights violations, and crimes under international law including genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The victims have the right to truth, justice and reparations under international law,” said Seif Magango [Amnesty International’s Deputy Director for East Africa, the Horn and the Great Lakes].

³⁵⁴ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan activist: ‘Committee of Inquiry should include women’](#), 23 October 2019

³⁵⁵ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan activist: ‘Committee of Inquiry should include women’](#), 23 October 2019

³⁵⁶ Human Rights Watch ([The Washington Post](#)), [Sudan is still waiting for justice. The world can’t look away](#), 2 December 2019

³⁵⁷ Human Rights Watch ([The Washington Post](#)), [Sudan is still waiting for justice. The world can’t look away](#), 2 December 2019

³⁵⁸ Amnesty International, [Sudan: One year after protests began, time to deliver on human rights](#), 19 December 2019

The government must proactively address accountability for these crimes by among other things, rebuilding the credibility and capacity of the justice system to thoroughly and effectively investigate and prosecute the crimes. [...]

While the recent appointment of a new Attorney General and Chief Justice offers hope that accountability will be a priority for the transitional authorities, successful prosecution of those found responsible for grave human rights violations would greatly bolster confidence in the national judicial system.³⁵⁹

Looking back at 2019 Human Rights Watch stated that “The [new] government has yet to cooperate with the International Criminal Court (ICC) in respect of cases against al-Bashir and four other men on charges of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Darfur”.³⁶⁰ The same source further noted that “Sudan has failed to investigate other allegations of torture by national security officials and has yet to ratify the Convention Against Torture, which it signed in 1986. In violation of international human rights law, it retains the death penalty and corporal punishment for numerous crimes, including consensual same-sex conduct”.³⁶¹

In December 2019 it was reported that the Sudanese Attorney General, Tajelsir El Hibir, “confirmed that he has ordered all the prosecutors to continue the investigation procedure regarding the massacre of June 3 [2019], and all crimes committed since 18 December 2018 [...] The attorney general explained that all prosecutions have been asked to keep the statements and testimonies of witnesses highly confidential, to ensure that solid witness protection is in place”.³⁶²

In January 2020 Elin Skaar, Senior Researcher at the Chr. Michelsen Institute explained to Radio Dabanga that “‘No victorious army has ever been prosecuted, and this is true. Also, there is no country has actually tried to prosecute its military at the time of transition. This is almost a universal rule.’ She also, clarified that it is unlikely to build a democratic judiciary that is capable of upholding the rule of law in a very short time period. It can take years to establish strong legal system that is competent to rule on grave human rights violations”.³⁶³

A further January 2020 Radio Dabanga article reported that “Sudan has formed a committee to investigate grave human rights violations with specific material and temporal jurisdictions. The committee has announced the time and places where individuals can file complaints. [...] The temporal jurisdiction of the Committee starts from June 30, 1989 up to April 11, 2019. The material jurisdiction of the committee includes torture, rape, and unlawful detention as well as systematic violence against students. The committee identified offices where complaints can be filed in Khartoum, Omdurman, and in Khartoum North, and at Public Prosecution offices in the other states”.³⁶⁴

³⁵⁹ Amnesty International, [Sudan: One year after protests began, time to deliver on human rights](#), 19 December 2019

³⁶⁰ Human Rights Watch, [World Report 2020: Sudan, Events of 2019](#), 13 January 2020

³⁶¹ Human Rights Watch, [World Report 2020: Sudan, Events of 2019](#), 13 January 2020, *Arbitrary Detentions, Torture*

³⁶² Radio Dabanga, [Sudan A-G: ‘June 3 massacre investigation needs competent witness protection’](#), 1 December 2019

³⁶³ Radio Dabanga, [Interview – Elin Skaar on Sudan transitional justice: ‘No victorious army has ever been prosecuted’](#), 19 January 2020

³⁶⁴ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan: Victims of human rights abuse can file complaints now](#), 14 January 2020

3.1. Darfuri

Additional non-profile specific information on the ‘Emergency Courts’ set up in February 2019 in the wake of the protests that started in December 2018, as well as general information on ‘Access to justice’ can be found in sections [Protests in Sudan: Emergency Courts](#) and [Access to justice– General situation in Sudan, particularly post-protests](#).

Khartoum

The August 2018 UK Home Office fact finding mission interviewed Salih Mahmoud M Osman of the Darfur Bar Association who stated “Based on tradition and customs, there are Tribal Associations - ‘Councils of Elders’ for all Arabs and NADs [Non-Arab Darfuris] representing each tribe (shura councils). All NAD groups have shura councils, including Darfuris in Khartoum. People feel more protected by the shura councils than by the government security services. There are tribal associations for northern tribes, eastern tribes, the Nuba, Fur, Massalit and the Zaghawa. The associations protect the interests of the tribes and serve a role in social life. They may be involved in personal conflict management – for example, even a killing may be resolved without the need to refer the issue to a Court”.³⁶⁵

With reference to the trial of Musa Hilal, Janjaweed leader, in Khartoum, Radio Dabanga reported in September 2019 that “The military court [...] prevented four lawyers assigned by Hilal’s family to defend him, from attending the session held at the general army command in Khartoum”.³⁶⁶

Omdurman

No COI published between 10 July 2018 – 10 December 2019 on access to justice for Darfuris in Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

Unspecified location

Reporting with regards to justice and accountability for Darfuris more generally, the January 2020 final report of the UN Panel of Experts noted that:

Transitional justice measures, which are essential to ensuring accountability, are not in place, and there are no guarantees of non-recurrence, reconciliation and reparations. Demands for justice and accountability are growing, yet Darfurians fear that those who bear the greatest responsibility for violations, including security forces, are unlikely to be held accountable. At the core of any transitional justice initiative is the need for engagement with the affected populations to better identify their needs for more viable and lasting solutions.

Many sources, in particular internally displaced persons and the Fur community, have also expressed serious concerns at the appointment of both General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and General Hemetti, given their alleged involvement in past human rights violations in the Darfur conflict.³⁶⁷

³⁶⁵ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, Salih Mahmoud M Osman, Darfur Bar Association p.119

³⁶⁶ Radio Dabanga, [Khartoum: Hilal Court Martial denies defence lawyers entry](#), 17 September 2019

³⁶⁷ UN Security Council, [Letter dated 10 January 2019 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council \[S/2020/36\]](#), 14 January 2020, paras 138 and 139

A January 2020 African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies report covering the events of 13 December 2018 to 11 April 2019 summarised that:

The peaceful protests that broke out in December 2018 were responded to by excessive use of force employing live ammunition, rubber bullets, tear gas, plastic and wooden batons and sniping from the roofs of high buildings. Shooting protesters from high buildings resulted in direct shots on the heads and upper body parts of civilians including special needs children. All these repressive measures were used in a large scale as of December 29, 2018 until April 12, 2019. Protesters were killed by direct gunshots during the protests, or crackdowns and arbitrary detention at dwellings. As a result, hundreds of men and women incurred different injuries and wounds that necessitated undergoing operations leading to the amputation of limbs in some cases.

Perhaps it is worth mentioning here that until now no criminal proceeding has started against those responsible for the bloody events except for one case- the criminal proceeding against suspects of torturing Ahmed Al Khair who is one of the victims of killing in the detention center in the town of Khashm el-Girba in Kasala State in Eastern Sudan.³⁶⁸

3.2. Nuba

Additional non-profile specific information on the 'Emergency Courts' set up in February 2019 in the wake of the protests that started in December 2018, as well as general information on 'Access to justice' can be found in sections [Protests in Sudan: Emergency Courts](#) and [Access to justice– General situation in Sudan, particularly post-protests](#).

Khartoum

The August 2018 UK Home Office fact finding mission interviewed Salih Mahmoud M Osman of the Darfur Bar Association who stated "Based on tradition and customs, there are Tribal Associations - 'Councils of Elders' for all Arabs and NADs [Non-Arab Darfuris] representing each tribe (shura councils). All NAD groups have shura councils, including Darfuris in Khartoum. People feel more protected by the shura councils than by the government security services. There are tribal associations for northern tribes, eastern tribes, the Nuba, Fur, Massalit and the Zaghawa. The associations protect the interests of the tribes and serve a role in social life. They may be involved in personal conflict management – for example, even a killing may be resolved without the need to refer the issue to a Court".³⁶⁹

In January 2019 the Belgian COI Unit, CEDOCA, published a report which addressed the situation for people from the Two Areas in Khartoum.³⁷⁰ It cited anthropologist and independent researcher at the Law Organization Science and Technology, Enrico Ille, as stating:

Coming from a long-term war-affected and economically marginalized region such as the Two Areas gives people a very weak basis to start on a life in Khartoum, and puts a huge part of them under

³⁶⁸ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: Extrajudicial killing and incommunicado detention: A Report covering the events of December 13, 2018 to April 11, 2019](#), 10 January 2020, 1. Extrajudicial Killing p.11

³⁶⁹ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, Salih Mahmoud M Osman, Darfur Bar Association p.119

³⁷⁰ CEDOCA, [COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas](#), 22 January 2019

circumstances that ensure a vicious circle. The political implications of the wars as well as its entanglement with religious categories of 'righteous believers' and ideological claims ('foreign agendas', e.g. vis-à-vis Christian organizations) aggravate this situation. If then an individual is targeted by state authorities or forms of discrimination, there is little protection (and often little attention).³⁷¹

Omdurman

No COI published between 10 July 2018 – 10 December 2019 on access to justice for Nuba in Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

3.3. Other ethnic and/or religious minorities

Additional non-profile specific information on the 'Emergency Courts' set up in February 2019 in the wake of the protests that started in December 2018, as well as general information on 'Access to justice' can be found in sections [Protests in Sudan: Emergency Courts](#) and [Access to justice– General situation in Sudan, particularly post-protests](#).

Khartoum

In January 2019 the Belgian COI Unit, CEDOCA, published a report which addressed the situation for people from the Two Areas in Khartoum.³⁷² The report cited anthropologist and independent researcher at the Law Organization Science and Technology, Enrico Ille, as stating:

An even more complicated issue is Christianity, especially since not all Nuba are Christians (actually only a small minority) and not all Christians are Nuba. [...] there are clear patterns of discrimination against Christians that have been highlighted in several reports and journal articles. Some of this discrimination is systemic - such as the removal of allowing Sunday to be made a holiday in Christian-majority schools, some is situational - such as the targeting or even destruction of churches in specific neighborhoods, some is a combination - such as the observation of some Christian institution by security forces (in my own neighborhood in Omdurman, for instance, in front of a Catholic clinic), or the judiciary's and police's weak support or even open rejection of protests against the expropriation of church land property for the sake of private investors.³⁷³

According to the U.S. Department of State's 2018 Report on International Religious Freedom, "In February authorities demolished a church belonging to the SCOC [Sudan Church of Christ] in the Haj Youssef neighborhood of Khartoum North and confiscated the property of the church, including Bibles and pews. As of year's end, the government had not provided compensation for the damage nor provided an alternative space for worshipping, according to church leaders".³⁷⁴ Furthermore, "During the year, 22 churches filed complaints with the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC)

³⁷¹ CEDOCA, [COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas](#), 22 January 2019, 2.2.1. Discriminatie en geweld: economische, etnische, politieke factoren p.39

³⁷² CEDOCA, [COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas](#), 22 January 2019

³⁷³ CEDOCA, [COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas](#), 22 January 2019, 2.4. Christenen p.50

³⁷⁴ U.S. Department of State, [2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: Sudan](#), 21 June 2019, Executive Summary

following an outreach campaign to Christian religious communities in the Khartoum area by the NHRC. Most of the complaints related to land and administrative issues. At year's end, the commission was following up with the complaints and established a working group to investigate systematic issues related to the registration of and land permits for Christian places of worship".³⁷⁵

Omdurman

In January 2019 the Belgian COI Unit, CEDOCA, published a report which addressed the situation for people from the Two Areas in Khartoum.³⁷⁶ The report cited anthropologist and independent researcher at the Law Organization Science and Technology, Enrico Ille, as stating:

Some of this discrimination is systemic - such as the removal of allowing Sunday to be made a holiday in Christian-majority schools, some is situational - such as the targeting or even destruction of churches in specific neighborhoods, some is a combination - such as the observation of some Christian institution by security forces (in my own neighborhood in Omdurman, for instance, in front of a Catholic clinic), or the judiciary's and police's weak support or even open rejection of protests against the expropriation of church land property for the sake of private investors.³⁷⁷

Unspecified location

According to the U.S. Department of State's annual report for 2018, "Migrant workers and some ethnic minorities were unaware of their legal rights, suffered from discrimination, and lacked ready access to judicial remedies".³⁷⁸ The same source further noted that "The government attempted to respond to some interethnic fighting and, in a few instances, was effective in mediating peaceful solutions. The government had a poor record, however, in preventing societal violence".³⁷⁹

3.4. Students, political activists, human rights activists and journalists who are not originally from these cities or who support persons not originally from there

Additional non-profile specific information on the 'Emergency Courts' set up in February 2019 in the wake of the protests that started in December 2018, as well as general information on 'Access to justice' can be found in sections [Protests in Sudan: Emergency Courts](#) and [Access to justice– General situation in Sudan, particularly post-protests](#).

Khartoum – Activist

Radio Dabanga reported in July 2018 that "authorities in Khartoum charged journalist and human rights activist Nawal Omer with violating public morals and prostitution last week. The charges may

³⁷⁵ U.S. Department of State, [2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: Sudan](#), 21 June 2019, *Government Practices*

³⁷⁶ CEDOCA, [COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas](#), 22 January 2019

³⁷⁷ CEDOCA, [COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas](#), 22 January 2019, 2.4. Christenen p.50

³⁷⁸ US Department of State, [2018 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Sudan](#), 13 March 2019, Section 7., d. Discrimination with Respect to Employment and Occupation

³⁷⁹ US Department of State, [2018 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Sudan](#), 13 March 2019, Section 1.c Role of the Police and Security Apparatus

also include “crimes against the state,” which can carry the death penalty”.³⁸⁰ The same source provided the following background information to the case:

Nawal Omer, better known as Wini Omer, has long been a vocal opponent of Sudan’s morality laws that criminalise “indecent dress” and other private choices, making her a frequent target for prosecution by authorities [...]

Omer was held at a bus stop in Khartoum in December [2017] [...] for wearing “inappropriate clothes”. Authorities opened charges of “indecent dress,” but the judge dropped the charge after three court hearings, concluding her long skirt, blouse, and scarf were not indecent. In February [2018], policemen in plain clothes raided an apartment where Omer was meeting with three friends. They confiscated their laptops and mobile phones, and detained them. After five days, the group was released. As they were accused of prostitution, they were not allowed to leave the country.

On Tuesday [July 2018], Omer had to appear before a Public Order court, facing charges of prostitution and violating public morals. At the hearing, she was told that she could also face further charges of spying against the government and crimes against the state [...].³⁸¹

Omdurman

No COI published between 10 July 2018 – 10 December 2019 on access to justice in Omdurman for students, political activist, human rights activist and journalists who are not originally from these cities or who support persons not originally from there was found amongst the sources consulted.

Unspecified location – Darfuri students

The October 2018 Sudan Democracy First Group report on the treatment faced by Darfuri students in Sudanese Universities highlighted the “imposition of arbitrary punishments against students by security” as the “security apparatus intervenes in administrative decisions against Darfuri students in universities, dictating these decisions to the administrations. Many times, these are dismissal decisions”.³⁸² Moreover, the report further documented that:

The NCP government regularly subjects students to unfair trials before judges who do not abide by the law but rather follow the directions of the regime’s security apparatus, violating the most basic due process rights and representing a serious and dangerous violation of the law, the constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This calls into question the independence and impartiality of the judiciary under this regime. Sending students to trial for demanding their rights as students or expressing their political positions without violating the law is in itself a violation of the right to freedom of expression and opinion guaranteed by the constitution and international law. The involvement of university administrations in bringing malicious cases fabricated by the security services is an abdication of their responsibility to protect students, especially within the campus. Darfuri students are the student group most exposed to unfair trials and criminalised by the police and security apparatus. In most cases, Darfuri students are detained in security cells and subjected to speedy trials. In many cases, they are not allowed to receive legal aid, but sentenced quickly to sentences such as flogging, fines and imprisonment [...]

³⁸⁰ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan charges woman activist with ‘crimes against the state’](#), 29 July 2018

³⁸¹ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan charges woman activist with ‘crimes against the state’](#), 29 July 2018

³⁸² Sudan Democracy First Group, [Tales of the Tombstones, The Discrimination Against Sudanese Students from Darfur in Sudanese Universities, Denial of the Right to Education, Denial of the Right to Life](#), 1 October 2018, *Imposition of arbitrary punishments against students by security*, p, 32

The targeting of ethnically Darfuri students is more evident when you recognize that the issues that they were arrested protesting are common to all Sudanese students e.g.; student union elections or student peaceful sit-ins demanding improvements in the university environment.³⁸³

A December 2019 International Federation for Human Rights and African Center for Justice and Peace Studies report explained:

In Khartoum and other towns in Central Sudan, Darfurian University students were amongst those primarily targeted by NISS when the first protests broke out. Several of them were arrested and detained, including incommunicado in unknown locations. All of them were allegedly released following Al-Bashir's overthrow.³⁸⁴

Unspecified location – Range of political profiles

In October 2018 the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) and the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders published a joint report on the repression of human rights lawyers in Sudan and described that "human rights defenders and lawyers' vulnerability is further increased by the lack of adequate safeguards against arbitrary detention and violations of the right to a fair trial".³⁸⁵

3.5. IDPs

No COI published between 10 July 2018 – 10 December 2019 on access to justice for IDPs residing in Khartoum or Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

Additional non-profile specific information on the 'Emergency Courts' set up in February 2019 in the wake of the protests that started in December 2018, as well as general information on 'Access to justice' can be found in sections [Protests in Sudan: Emergency Courts](#) and [Access to justice– General situation in Sudan, particularly post-protests](#).

3.6. Returnees

No COI published between 10 July 2018 – 10 December 2019 on access to justice for returnees to Khartoum or Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

Additional non-profile specific information on the 'Emergency Courts' set up in February 2019 in the wake of the protests that started in December 2018, as well as general information on 'Access to justice' can be found in sections [Protests in Sudan: Emergency Courts](#) and [Access to justice– General situation in Sudan, particularly post-protests](#).

³⁸³ Sudan Democracy First Group, [Tales of the Tombstones, The Discrimination Against Sudanese Students from Darfur in Sudanese Universities, Denial of the Right to Education, Denial of the Right to Life](#), 1 October 2018, *Unfair trials*, p. 34/35

³⁸⁴ International Federation for Human Rights, African Center for Justice and Peace Studies, Sudan Human Rights Monitor, [Will There Be Justice for Darfur? Persisting impunity in the face of political change; Fact-finding mission report](#), December 2019, 3. *Politically instigated violence remains pervasive* p.31

³⁸⁵ African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies et al, [Sudan: Target one to silence a hundred: The repression of human rights lawyers in Sudan](#), October 2018, 6.3 *Absence of judicial scrutiny and legal safeguards*, p.18

3.7. Women

Additional non-profile specific information on the 'Emergency Courts' set up in February 2019 in the wake of the protests that started in December 2018, as well as general information on 'Access to justice' can be found in sections [Protests in Sudan: Emergency Courts](#) and [Access to justice– General situation in Sudan, particularly post-protests](#).

Khartoum

In October 2019 "Human rights activist and chair of the 'No to Oppression against Women Initiative', doctor Ihsan Fagiri, denounced the lack of any representation of women in the independent Committee of Inquiry that will investigate the Khartoum massacre on June 3 [2019], and other violent incidents against protestors throughout Sudan" particularly as "women and girls paid a high price during the break-up of the Khartoum sit-in on June 3. They were killed and raped, and had their bodies thrown into the Nile. She also confirmed the suicide of three rape victims".³⁸⁶

Omdurman

The September 2019 report by the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA) focusing on the 'Human Rights Conditions of Female Detainees and Prisoners in Sudan' noted with special reference to the Omdurman Prison, the same report noted that "According to Mr. Subair, a human rights lawyer: "Most women in Omdurman prison do not have lawyers representing them, stating various reasons among financial barriers and lack of awareness regarding trial standards".³⁸⁷

Unspecified location

UNICEF noted in an April 2019 report with regards to protection needs in Sudan in general that:

While GBV [Gender Based Violence] vastly impacts women, men, boys and girls, the lack of quality response services, especially health and social services for child and adolescent survivors of sexual violence can exacerbate short and long-term harm [...] While the economic crisis impacts women, boys and girls in different ways, a lack of access to a variety of assets, including but not limited to financial services, legal status, and social safety nets, places women and children in unfavourable and insecure environments that expose them to violence and exploitation. Rape, physical violence, female genital mutilation (FGM), early/forced marriages, denial of economic opportunities, and verbal abuse are some of the common violations against women and girls reported. Gaps in personal hygiene kits (PHKs) further exacerbate risks for women and girls of reproductive health age. Survivors of GBV have inadequate access to services and reporting mechanisms. Specialized lifesaving GBV services, such as the clinical management of rape (CMR), including tailored services for child and adolescent survivors, psychosocial support (PSS) and quality case management services, are unavailable in over 80 per cent of affected localities and where available, quality and access needs to be strengthened.³⁸⁸

A May 2019 African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies report on the Sudanese Public Order law argued that the one of the groups subjected to disproportionate enforcement of the law is

³⁸⁶ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan activist: 'Committee of Inquiry should include women'](#), 23 October 2019

³⁸⁷ Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA), [Human Rights Conditions of Female Detainees and Prisoners in Sudan](#), September 2019, p. 2

³⁸⁸ UNICEF, [2019 Humanitarian Response Plan January -December 2019](#), April 2019

women.³⁸⁹ The same source further noted that “Torture continued to enjoy a further immunity from investigation. Where detainees requested to visit the doctor for medical examination, they are again subjected to torture to withdraw the request or are threatened with facing fabricated evidences and threats of telling off, particularly in the case of women’s sexual relations, to use the social stigma around the sexual relations which made most of the arrested prefer the swift penalty”.³⁹⁰

Hala Al-Karib, regional Director of the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA), noted in her opinion piece published by Al Jazeera that “The reliance of the state on the militarisation of civilians in the form of militias has legitimised loosely organised armed groups to exert their power through violence with the aim of consolidating the power of the state. This has largely undermined the rule of law in the country, enabled dangerous state-supported militia to control land and resources, and normalised sexual violence, enslavement, rape, and the terrorisation of populations within Sudan, particularly in Darfur, South Kordofan and the Blue Nile as an extension of state power”.³⁹¹ She further highlighted:

These militias operate inside and outside of the boundaries of the state, thus, they manage to claim state authority without the limitations and expectations of conduct that state-led forces may be held to account for. Their human rights violations, and especially acts of sexual violence against women and girls, are being concealed by the state and ignored by international and regional actors.

Like elsewhere in the world, in Sudan the international community appears to be taking the lead in the fight against sexual violence, with agencies and NGOs with action plans drafted miles away from Sudan setting direction and pace. These actors maintain a stagnant approach and narrative that is loaded with victimhood, labelling the Sudanese society as being culturally and ideologically crippled, and thereby compromising the capacities of national actors, civil societies, and activists to stand against sexual violence.

Moreover, the international community contributes directly to the exacerbation of sexual violence by ignoring the basic facts of social transformation and, most importantly, turning a blind eye to the contextually-specific root causes of sexual violence, which are the political dynamics that capitalise on violations against civilians as an instrumental means to sustain power.³⁹²

Reporting generally on sexual violence being perpetrated against women protestors, a September 2019 CHR. Michelsen Institute article noted that:

Being raped by the military forces will destroy not only for the woman herself, but also her family. It is about breaking down dignity and honor. The Rapid Support Forces and Islamist security forces have repeatedly told female protesters that they will “destroy their reputation”. [...]

Sexual violence has long been a taboo topic and a source of shame for survivors who are likely to be regarded as broken, unhonourable, and unfit for marriage. Survivors seldom report such incidents to the police. Partly because the lack of legal protection within the law, but also because of the social stigma. Blame is often put on the women, even by police and judges in court, because she walked alone during the night or wore indecent clothing or somehow tempted her rapist to rape her. There is a very real risk that the survivor of rape will be prosecuted for gross indecency or fornication/adultery, rather than the perpetrator being sent away to jail.

Now survivors of sexual violence during the Ramadan massacre are met with social support and demands for justice. This is nothing less than the start of a social revolution.³⁹³

³⁸⁹ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudanese Public Order: A law designed to control people, not protect morality](#), 9 May 2019, *Public oppression of those who work in the public street* p.9

³⁹⁰ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudanese Public Order: A law designed to control people, not protect morality](#), 9 May 2019, *Torture* p.14

³⁹¹ Hala Al-Karib (Al Jazeera), [Sudan's youth showed us how to counter sexual violence](#), 5 September 2019

³⁹² Hala Al-Karib (Al Jazeera), [Sudan's youth showed us how to counter sexual violence](#), 5 September 2019

³⁹³ CHR. Michelsen Institute, [Sexual violence does not stop Sudan's women from speaking up](#), 4 September 2019

The September 2019 report by the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA) focusing on the ‘Human Rights Conditions of Female Detainees and Prisoners in Sudan’ noted that:

According to the 1991 Criminal Act of Sudan, any accused person can be detained for a maximum of 24 hours in jail, after which either the detention duration is renewed up to 72 hours, or the accused person gets transferred to to [sic] prison while awaiting trial. The reality is however far different, as in many instances detainees stay for as long as several months in jail. Trial standards present flaws, as most of the time, the accused is charged at the first session without presentation of lawyers, and the witnesses presented are the police that had previously captured the accused. This presents a clear bias in favour of the state. Although the Sudanese Criminal Code Law (3) declares that the court must recruit a lawyer for the accused in cases where the punishment may reach 10 years, life imprisonment, or stoning, etc, this does not always happen, opposing international standards and the right to fair trial.³⁹⁴

UNOCHA reported in its January 2020 Humanitarian Needs Overview:

access to justice for GBV survivors is very low due to lack of community awareness on legal and justice issues related to GBV; lack of legal aid; shortages of female police officers; community distrust of formal legal mechanisms; centralized handling of cases at state capitals which disadvantage survivors from poor backgrounds due to transport costs and legal fees; and weak referral mechanisms. The fear of sexual violence also impacts opportunities for women and girls, as they will cautiously or at times not engage in some livelihood activities.

Lack of GBV awareness among communities makes it challenging to ensure prevention, mitigation and access of survivors to the relevant multi-sectoral services where available. SGBV risk among refugees is aggravated by inadequate lighting in camps and settlements, and access to energy and water supply gaps that require women and girls to travel long distances to collect water and firewood, exposing them to harassment and violence.

Early marriage and FGM are contributing factors to high cases of fistula. Partners working on GBV response are hesitant to collect data on GBV cases, and assessments have not been possible for several years. Sexual violence continues to be chronically underreported due to a culture of denial, social stigma, fear of harassment, physical and psychological trauma, the lack of protection afforded to victims and witnesses, and the perceived inaction of law enforcement and justice institutions. The lack of succinct information and data affects programming as well as advocacy. Gaps highlighted in other sectors involved in the provision of multi-sectoral services, especially health and livelihoods, poses a challenge to GBV response.³⁹⁵

3.8. Children

Additional non-profile specific information on the ‘Emergency Courts’ set up in February 2019 in the wake of the protests that started in December 2018, as well as general information on ‘Access to justice’ can be found in sections [Protests in Sudan: Emergency Courts](#) and [Access to justice– General situation in Sudan, particularly post-protests](#).

³⁹⁴ Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA), [Human Rights Conditions of Female Detainees and Prisoners in Sudan](#), September 2019, p. 2

³⁹⁵ UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Needs Overview](#), January 2020, 1.4 Humanitarian Consequences, Sexual and Gender Based-Violence (SGBV), p.20, and 3.6 Protection, Gender Based Violence, p.52

Khartoum

No COI published between 10 July 2018 – 10 December 2019 on access to justice for children in Khartoum was found amongst the sources consulted.

Omdurman

No COI published between 10 July 2018 – 10 December 2019 on access to justice for children in Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

Unspecified location

According to the U.S. Department of State's annual report for 2018, "Impunity remained a serious problem throughout the security forces, although crimes involving child victims were prosecuted more regularly".³⁹⁶

UNOCHA noted in its January 2020 Humanitarian Needs Overview with regards to child protection:

Pre-existing systemic weaknesses in delivering quality protection services such as psycho social support, legal assistance and health assistance have been exacerbated by high staff turnover among social workers; ailing case management systems; poorly maintained social service facilities; and lack of capacity of key child protection workers.

This has further increased the number of children in need of care and support services. According to safety audits conducted among children in 103 villages in 57 localities, an average of 74 per cent of children (40 per cent female) reported having challenges in accessing quality child protection response services, including but not limited to clinical care, psychosocial support, social workers, legal services, community based child protection structures, and referral systems. Multiple other factors also contribute child protection risks, including limited availability of data to inform analysis and planning across all sectors to monitor and mitigate child protection risks; limited funding; restrictions on the scope of humanitarian programs and access which hampers the ability of child protection actors to assess and support children and caregivers. Poor quality of services is, within itself, a protection risk to children as they may cause further harm.³⁹⁷

3.9. Individuals of diverse sexual orientation or gender identity

Additional non-profile specific information on the 'Emergency Courts' set up in February 2019 in the wake of the protests that started in December 2018, as well as general information on 'Access to justice' can be found in sections [Protests in Sudan: Emergency Courts](#) and [Access to justice– General situation in Sudan, particularly post-protests](#).

No COI published between 10 July 2018 – 10 December 2019 on access to justice for individuals of diverse sexual orientation or gender identity in Khartoum or Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

³⁹⁶ US Department of State, [2018 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Sudan](#), 13 March 2019, Section 7., d. Discrimination with Respect to Employment and Occupation

³⁹⁷ UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Needs Overview](#), January 2020, 3.6 Protection, Child Protection, p.52

Unspecified location

A Sudanese blogger of LGBTIQ sexual orientation gave information in May 2019 around the official discrimination and lack of access to justice of LGBTIQ people in Sudan:

The LGBTIQ+ community has never been recognized in Sudan and is still to a great extent denied any form of rights to freedom, peace and justice.³⁹⁸

The US Department of State reported in their annual human rights report covering events in 2018 that:

Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) persons are not considered a protected class under antidiscrimination laws.

[...] There were no reports of official action to investigate or punish those complicit in LGBTI-related discrimination or abuses.³⁹⁹

4. Freedom of movement

Khartoum – Non profile specific

A human rights defender (HRD) working for the Sudan Social Development Organisation (SUDO) told the UK Home Office fact finding mission in August 2018 that “There are no restrictions for travelling around Khartoum. There may be checkpoints in the city late at night (after midnight) in certain locations, which affect all people. These may be a deterrent against crime and coups, for example”.⁴⁰⁰

Without specifying the profile of persons affected, the UNOCHA reported in its January 2020 Humanitarian Needs Overview on the impact of the economic crisis on movement restrictions:

Between January and June 2019, about 84 per cent of the requests made to travel from Khartoum to non-conflict states were delayed. This represented an increase compared with the second half of 2018, when only 53 per cent of requests were delayed. The civil unrest and political uncertainty during the first half of the year contributed to these delays as there was limited capacity to process these requests.

Entry visas also faced several delays, with 73 per cent delayed beyond the directives’ timeframe of seven days – taking on average over 24 days to clear (between June and September).

However, as of August 2019, travel permits are no longer required for conflict-affected states, and the process for travel notifications has been simplified and shortened. This no longer requires separate approval at federal and state level, or separate stamps from security agencies in addition to the Humanitarian Aid Commission. In December, the HAC [Humanitarian Aid Commission] announced that travel notifications for staff to a given location will be valid for a period of six months, reducing the need for multiple requests. Since these announcements, humanitarian partners have reported a reduction in the processing time for travel notifications by the HAC.⁴⁰¹

³⁹⁸ Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), [Blog from Sudan: The Sudanese revolution: A fight for LGBTIQ + rights?](#), 8 May 2019

³⁹⁹ US Department of State, [2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan](#), 13 March 2019, Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons

⁴⁰⁰ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, A human rights defender, p. 164

⁴⁰¹ UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Needs Overview](#), January 2020, 1.2 Impact of the Crisis p.13

As part of the protests that engulfed Khartoum since December 2018, barricades were set-up on a number of roads and bridges within the city, as documented by the following sources [non-exhaustive list]:

- 1 January 2019: "Journalists said, the authorities tried to close the bridges to prevent people from reaching Khartoum from Omdurman and Khartoum North. All shops in El Soug El Arabi and around El Ganduol roundabout were closed"⁴⁰²;
- 30 January 2019: "The demonstrators closed the roads with large rocks and logs. Witnesses said security forces fired tear gas, batons and plastic bars to disperse the demonstrations"⁴⁰³;
- 9 February 2019: "The protesters closed a number of main roads in Khartoum, including Juba Street"⁴⁰⁴;
- 20 February 2019: "Demonstrators closed the main roads at [...] El Sahafa East in Khartoum by setting fire to barricades of tyres"⁴⁰⁵;
- 8 April 2019: "Large numbers of commuters from Omdurman and Khartoum North were unable to reach central Khartoum because security forces closed the main bridges linking the three cities"⁴⁰⁶;
- 15 May 2019: "The junta says it will only continue its dialogue with the opposition after the barricades from the main roads in Khartoum have been removed"⁴⁰⁷;
- 10 June 2019: "Paramilitary Rapid Support Forces were deployed in the streets of Khartoum. The army and police were not seen. Barricades on major roads and subways of Khartoum state obstruct the public transport"⁴⁰⁸;
- 11 June 2019: "Lt Gen Jamaledine Omar, from the ruling transitional military council, said [...] that by closing roads and setting up barricades [in Khartoum], the protesters had committed a crime. 'The technique of closing the roads and building barricades ... is a fully-fledged crime as it deprives people from being able to go about their normal life,' he said"⁴⁰⁹;
- 15 July 2019: "in Khartoum, paramilitaries of the RSF closed three bridges to prevent demonstrators from Omdurman and Khartoum North from entering Khartoum"⁴¹⁰;
- 29 July 2019: "In response to the report by the investigation committee street protests erupted in Khartoum in the late afternoon of Saturday and continued into Sunday. Security forces used tear gas to disperse protesters who barricaded streets and major roads"⁴¹¹;
- 31 July 2019: "In Khartoum, demonstrators closed a number of main roads using barricades and burning tires of vehicles"⁴¹²;
- 29 August 2019: "Protestors blocked the Burri El Lamab road in eastern Khartoum on Wednesday to protest against power and water outages in the neighbourhood [...] They blocked the main road with barricades and stones and set fire to tyres"⁴¹³.

Omdurman – Non profile specific

As part of the protests that also reached Omdurman since December 2018, barricades were set-up on a number of roads as documented by the following sources [non-exhaustive list]:

⁴⁰² Radio Dabanga, [Sudan forces suppress new Khartoum march with live fire](#), 1 January 2019

⁴⁰³ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan uprising: Mass action across capital and states](#), 30 January 2019

⁴⁰⁴ Radio Dabanga, [Thousands of Sudanese march for justice and women](#), 8 March 2019

⁴⁰⁵ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan uprising: 'Night of Marches'](#), 20 February 2019

⁴⁰⁶ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan uprising: Mass action following 100 days of demonstrations](#), 8 April 2019

⁴⁰⁷ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan uprising: Timeline of tumultuous change](#), 12 August 2019

⁴⁰⁸ Radio Dabanga, [Four people killed on first day of civil disobedience in Sudan](#), 10 June 2019

⁴⁰⁹ Radio Dabanga, [Sudanese doctors say dozens raped during sit-in attack](#), 11 June 2019

⁴¹⁰ Radio Dabanga, [Demonstrations commemorate dismantling of Khartoum sit-in](#), 15 July 2019

⁴¹¹ Radio Dabanga, [Five school children dead, 40-50 wounded, as militiamen open fire in North Kordofan capital](#), 29 July 2019

⁴¹² Radio Dabanga, [Mass rallies across Sudan condemn El Obeid massacre](#), 31 July 2019

⁴¹³ Radio Dabanga, [Power, water cuts prompt protest in Sudan capital](#), 29 August 2019

- 10 January 2019: “The demonstrations continued until late on Wednesday in the districts of Wad Nubawi, Banat, Beit El Mal, Abbasiya and Morada as the demonstrators placed barricades on main roads to prevent vehicles of the security forces from reaching the demonstrators”⁴¹⁴;
- 20 February 2019: “Demonstrators closed the main roads at El Hatana district in Omdurman [...] by setting fire to barricades of tyres”⁴¹⁵;
- 24 February 2019: “Hundreds of demonstrators went out at El Jemayer, El Ferdous, El Iskan, El Lamab Nasir, El Kalakla, Khartoum 3, El Haj Yousef, and Soba El Hilla and closed a number of main roads”⁴¹⁶.

4.1. Darfuri

No specific COI published between 10 July 2018 and 10 December 2019 on restrictions imposed specifically against Darfuris limiting their freedom of movement in Khartoum or Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted. However, information was located on the surveillance of Darfuris across Sudan and with special reference to Khartoum, which may impact on the free movement experienced by Darfuris.

Surveillance of Darfuris across Sudan

Maddy Crowther, Co-Executive Director of Waging Peace, published a report in January 2019 on ‘Risk on return for Darfuris in Sudan’ and consulted a range of organisations and individuals for it, amongst others Margie Buchanan-Smith and Susanne Jaspars, both experts on Sudan:

Margie Buchanan-Smith and Susanne Jaspars were forthright in their assessment that surveillance, and resulting restrictions on freedom of movement for Darfuris, was a primary driver of migration. They wrote, “They [Darfuri groups] may come under surveillance, especially if they live in IDP camps in Darfur, are university students and/ or political activists. If and when they come under surveillance, their movements are likely to be restricted by the security services. Some are ordered to report regularly to security. Teenage boys may be asked, and put under pressure to spy on their relatives and community. Many young Darfuri men interviewed for the research inside Sudan cited arrest, surveillance, harassment and intimidation as the primary reason for wanting to leave Sudan. Those who had already left, interviewed in Europe, similarly cited those factors as their primary reason for leaving.”⁴¹⁷

Khartoum: Surveillance of Darfuris

A joint study by the Humanitarian Policy Group (ODI) and Research & Evidence Facility, who carried out field work at the end of 2017 and published its findings in August 2018, found that “Contrary to the narrative that the Darfur conflict is over and that stability is being restored, this study provides evidence of persistent and pervasive harassment (including attack, arrest and detention),

⁴¹⁴ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan uprising: ‘Unprecedented’ march in Omdurman despite live bullets and tear gas](#), 10 January 2019

⁴¹⁵ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan uprising: ‘Night of Marches’](#), 20 February 2019

⁴¹⁶ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan uprising: Anti Al Bashir demos after Friday prayers met with violence](#), 24 February 2019

⁴¹⁷ Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019, 6. *Viability of internal relocation to Khartoum, c. Surveillance*, p. 22 [Note that on p. 6 of her report she clarifies that “It should be noted that references to Khartoum refer to ‘Greater Khartoum’ throughout’, also encompassing the cities of Omdurman and Khartoum North”].]

surveillance and discrimination against Darfuris of particular ethnic groups, within Darfur and in Khartoum”.⁴¹⁸

NGO C interviewed for by Maddy Crowther for her January 2019 report stated:

in Khartoum the Sudanese government will always make surveillance. // Khartoum is Sudan. However, the open violence against civilians will be carried in a different manner. There may not be military raids against Darfurians in Khartoum. Burning of houses and lootings are not reported from Khartoum. But, Darfurians live in Khartoum in hide. Khartoum itself is not safe. The NISS has strong networks in the capital and make a follow up on all Darfurians who live in Khartoum. Those who managed to cover their identity and hide can relatively escape the NISS torturous treatments. Otherwise, Khartoum cannot be declared a place to relocate for their safety. The NISS operate both in Darfur and Khartoum similarly. The difference is the Janjaweed’s sporadic and indiscriminate attacks.⁴¹⁹

Pieter Smit, a Netherlands-based Sudan expert who also contributed to the report provided the following case studies of surveillance of Darfuris in Khartoum:

Two persons that I interviewed separately both hail from Darfuri parents and lived (almost) their whole live in Khartoum area, speaking Arabic without Darfuri accent. They claimed (in my professional opinion believe-worthy) to be interrogated and severely abused for many weeks by security agents (NISS). Their statements matched each other, and (in my non-professional opinion) by many scars on their bodies. They apparently were treated in this way for organizing or being present in a non-political charity meeting, to decide on requests for very small grants or loans from destitute family members in or coming from Darfur. Their cases show that 1: The security organizations are well informed even about meetings with Darfuri family members only, 2: Any consideration given to requests for humanitarian assistance from destitute family members in Darfur, is sufficient reason to arrest and severely abuse persons for many weeks. The purpose may be to install fear and hence stop any money flows from Khartoum-region to Darfur.

All three [another Nuba individual was mentioned] men had in common that they had never been in the 'native area' where their parents came from (Darfur, Nuba Mountains) and that they did not identify with, let alone were active with opposition groups. They were (allegedly) arrested and tortured, for organizing tiny amounts of humanitarian assistance, or for what their business might do in the future for opposition groups they were seen as ethnically related to.

“Apparently, the Sudanese security apparatus aims to preclude and repress any connection (real, imagined and even potential) between Sudanese in Khartoum area, and their kin in Darfur or Nuba Mountains. Likely, the same counts for people in Khartoum, related to families in other conflict areas. The same will like count for relocatees from Darfur into Khartoum-region: They might be seen as having even stronger links with people inside the conflict [sic] zones.”⁴²⁰

⁴¹⁸ Humanitarian Policy Group (ODI)/Research & Evidence Facility (REF), [Darfuri migration from Sudan to Europe, From displacement to despair \(Summary\)](#), August 2018, Summary, Causes of migration, p. 2

⁴¹⁹ Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019, 6. *Viability of internal relocation to Khartoum, c. Surveillance*, p. 22 [Note that on p. 6 of her report she clarifies that “It should be noted that references to Khartoum refer to ‘Greater Khartoum’ throughout’, also encompassing the cities of Omdurman and Khartoum North”].]

⁴²⁰ Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019, 6. *Viability of internal relocation to Khartoum, c. Surveillance*, p. 23 [Note that on p. 6 of her report she clarifies that “It should be noted that references to Khartoum refer to ‘Greater Khartoum’ throughout’, also encompassing the cities of Omdurman and Khartoum North”].]

4.2. Nuba

No specific COI published between 10 July 2018 and 10 December 2019 on the freedom of movement of Nuba in Khartoum or Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

4.3. Other ethnic and/or religious minorities

No specific COI published between 10 July 2018 and 10 December 2019 on the freedom of movement of Nuba in Khartoum or Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

4.4. Students, political activists, human rights activists and journalists who are not originally from these cities or who support persons not originally from there

No COI published between 10 July 2018 and 10 December 2019 on freedom of movement for these profiles in Khartoum or Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

4.5. IDPs

No COI published between 10 July 2018 and 10 December 2019 on freedom of movement for IDPs in Khartoum or Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

4.6. Returnees

No COI published between 10 July 2018 and 10 December 2019 on freedom of movement for returnees in Khartoum or Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

4.7. Women

No COI published between 10 July 2018 and 10 December 2019 on freedom of movement for women in Khartoum or Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

Unspecified location

Freedom House, reporting on the situation in 2018, stated “Women are not allowed to travel or obtain state identification without the permission of a male guardian”.⁴²¹

⁴²¹ Freedom House, [Freedom in the World 2019: Sudan](#), 4 February 2019, G. *Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights: 1 / 16*

4.8. Children

No specific COI published between 10 July 2018 and 10 December 2019 on the freedom of movement for children in Khartoum or Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

4.9. Individuals of diverse sexual orientation or gender identity

No COI published between 10 July 2018 – 10 December 2019 on freedom of movement for individuals of diverse sexual orientation or gender identity in Khartoum or Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

5. Living conditions, including: housing; access to basic services (e.g. water and sanitation); education; healthcare; and employment

Sources have been included to provide some background to the general living conditions, access to healthcare, and food security in Sudan as limited profile-specific information was found.

General information on living conditions in urban areas

In August 2018 “Residents of several Sudanese states have complained about the lack and high prices of lifesaving medicines to treat chronic conditions such as blood pressure and diabetes, as well as medicines related to epilepsy and other neurological and psychological conditions. A number of patients, doctors and pharmacists told Radio Dabanga that the costs of treatment in the states are very high, and poverty and collapse of the currency put it out of financial reach of many in Sudan”.⁴²² According to the same article “A number of pharmaceutical companies in Sudan have confirmed the scarcity of several medicinal products in the country”.⁴²³

Radio Dabanga reported how in October 2018 “Listeners from various Sudanese states have renewed their complaints about the rise in the prices of food and consumer goods across the country, driven sky-high by a combination of the ongoing fuel crisis and a shortage of cash”.⁴²⁴

In December 2018 the World Food Programme (WFP) provided the following summary with regards to what prompted the start of the demonstrations that month:

Since 20 December [2018], popular demonstrations have taken place in 29 localities across Sudan, including greater Khartoum. The protests were prompted by economic distress that has sharply increased the cost of living in the country. Sudan is currently experiencing shortages of bread, fuel, essential medicines and cash, affecting basic livelihoods and food security.⁴²⁵

International Crisis Group provided the following analysis of the economic situation in 2018 affecting Sudan:

⁴²² Radio Dabanga, [Chronic, essential medicines unaffordable for many Sudanese](#), 2 August 2018

⁴²³ Radio Dabanga, [Chronic, essential medicines unaffordable for many Sudanese](#), 2 August 2018

⁴²⁴ Radio Dabanga, [Meat, veg, fruit scarce or unaffordable in Sudan](#), 18 October 2018

⁴²⁵ World Food Programme (WFP), [WFP Sudan, Country Brief](#), December 2018, *Operational Updates*, p. 1

President Bashir's government [...] has faced a severe economic crisis since the start of 2018, consistently refused to cut exorbitant state spending in the security sector and lost potential investment due to sanctions, international isolation and a failure to develop an attractive environment for investors. The country's already-high levels of debt mean that it will be difficult to borrow funds to finance its deficits, and its chief financial backers in the Gulf are less generous than in the past.

Sudan's economic crisis originates in part from South Sudan's secession in 2011, which led to the loss of nearly three quarters of Sudan's oil reserves [...]

While the economic shock of South Sudan's secession was inevitable, Khartoum also failed to prepare for it. Long-term economic mismanagement, pervasive graft and high military expenditure have contributed to unaffordable levels of spending. International isolation caused by U.S. sanctions, introduced in the late 1990s, inhibited attempts to diversify the economy through foreign investment, leaving Sudan with a crippling lack of foreign-exchange reserves, which has resulted in shortages, particularly of fuel [...]

The government's limited attempts at belt tightening have both failed to address the economic crisis and fuelled discontent. In January 2018, its annual budget included a cut to wheat subsidies. The World Bank and IMF had encouraged such measures, seeing subsidies as a costly and ineffective method to help the poor, but recommended Khartoum offset these cuts by increasing spending on social protection, such as making cash transfers to needy families. The government did not do so. Moreover, because its efforts to reduce spending focused on eliminating subsidies rather than downsizing the military budget or recovering revenues lost to corruption, they hit the poor hardest. In response to the wheat subsidy cut, bread prices doubled and the cost of other staples, particularly sorghum and millet, increased as the market reacted to extra demand [...].⁴²⁶

The International Peace Institute (IPI) reported in its April 2019 report that "Sudan's fragmented, underfunded healthcare system, combined with the effects of decades of armed conflict and economic crisis, result in inadequate access to healthcare across the country. About 36 percent of primary healthcare facilities are not fully functional, while only 24 percent of functional facilities provide the minimum basic healthcare package. Only a third of Sudanese have access to adequate reproductive healthcare [...] There is a stark urban-rural divide in access to healthcare across the country".⁴²⁷

The New Humanitarian summarised the situation at the end of July 2019 as follows:

Eight months after the protests began, a power-sharing deal is being negotiated between the ruling transitional military council that replaced al-Bashir and the civilian protestors whose persistence led to his ouster.

But what is proving harder to resolve, and dimming hopes for real change, is the impact of poverty and rising prices on a large and growing percentage of the population.

One indicator of the broader crisis is the crash of the Sudanese pound. It has lost almost half its value since December – dropping from 47 to the US dollar to 70 today. Fuel prices are rising, and the impact of the political strikes and stay-aways has added to wider inflation [...]

Mohamed Yusif, a prominent member of the Sudan Professionals Association, a civil society group that has led the pro-democracy opposition, worries that the depth of the economic crisis may sap the ability of activists to stay on the streets and keep up the pressure for change.

"The ordinary citizen and his family rely on his daily income," Yusif said. "If he is protesting and calling for civilian rule and never reporting to work, his family might well be affected."⁴²⁸

The same report also highlighted:

⁴²⁶ International Crisis Group, [Improving Prospects for a Peaceful Transition in Sudan](#), 14 January 2019, III. *Economic Grievances at a Tipping Point*

⁴²⁷ International Peace Institute (IPI), [Stuck in Crisis: The Humanitarian Response to Sudan's Health Emergency](#), April 2019, p. 7

⁴²⁸ The New Humanitarian, [Sudanese pay a price for revolution as cost of living soars](#), 25 July 2019

Fixing Sudan's economy won't happen overnight. It shrank by 2.3 percent in 2018 and has only worsened since then.

Al-Bashir's regime was notoriously corrupt, embezzling oil and gold revenues, selling public assets cheaply to supporters and Gulf businessmen, and generally preferring loyalty over ability, said economist Siddiq Kabbalo.

Corruption watchdog Transparency International ranks Sudan as one of the most graft-ridden countries globally.⁴²⁹

In October 2019 Sudan's Minister of Labour and Social Development, Lina El Sheikh, has reportedly "described the feasibility of direct financial support to poor and vulnerable people in the country during the transitional period as 'inadequate'" according to Radio Dabanga.⁴³⁰ The same source further reported that the Minister also "pointed out the absence of real statistics that reflect the country's poverty rate", but "acknowledged that reports by international organisations confirm a rise in poverty".⁴³¹

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) described Sudan's health care system in larger towns in December 2019 as follows:

Years of war and economic turmoil have corroded Sudan's health care system. In [...] larger towns, hospitals and clinics often do not have enough drugs and the ones that are available are too expensive for many Sudanese to purchase. Doctors are chronically underpaid and opt to leave Sudan to work abroad, draining the country of its health care workforce.⁴³²

The UNOCHA reported in its January 2020 Humanitarian Needs Overview with regards to health:

Imports of medicines and medical supplies dropped by about 35 per cent compared to the same period in 2018, which contributed to cost increases of 50-100 per cent, reducing the overall availability of essential medicines in the public sector from 60 per cent in 2018 to 43 per cent in 2019, and restricting access to essential life-saving health care services. As a result, medicine availability was only 43 per cent in the national medical supply fund, 49 per cent in the national health insurance fund, and 59 per cent in the private sector [...].⁴³³

In January 2020 Radio Dabanga reported that:

The Dollar exchange rate witnessed an unprecedented rise against the Sudanese Pound on Friday. Forex dealers reported on Friday that the Dollar rate reached SDG 95, while the Euro traded for SDG 104.34, and the Saudi Riyal for SDG 25.6. Traders attributed the increases to a rise in the demand, and continuing shortages of supply.

People in Khartoum and El Fasher, capital of North Darfur, told Radio Dabanga that the prices of basic consumer goods are soaring again.

In Khartoum, the price of a 50-kg sack of sugar kilo jumped from SDG 2,100 to SDG 2,250 (\$50*). A jerrycan with 36 *ratul* (18 litres) of cooking oil is now sold for SDG 1,900 (\$42). People living in El Fasher reported that they are now paying SDG 2,500 for 50 kg of sugar, and SDG 2,600 for 18 litres of cooking oil. A piece of the cheapest soap costs SDG 25 (\$ 0.56).

The sources also reported renewed shortages of bread and fuel in Khartoum and a number of towns in the states.⁴³⁴

⁴²⁹ The New Humanitarian, [Sudanese pay a price for revolution as cost of living soars](#), 25 July 2019

⁴³⁰ Radio Dabanga, [Minister: 'Financial support inadequate for Sudan's poor'](#), 20 October 2019

⁴³¹ Radio Dabanga, [Minister: 'Financial support inadequate for Sudan's poor'](#), 20 October 2019

⁴³² International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), [I am no different than anyone else](#), 3 December 2019

⁴³³ UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Needs Overview](#), January 2020, 3.4 Health p. 45

⁴³⁴ Radio Dabanga, [Sudanese Pound continues to fall, food prices rising again](#), 18 January 2020

Khartoum - Access to healthcare

In August 2018 Radio Dabanga reported:

A number of patients in Khartoum have complained about the lack of intensive care rooms in public and private hospitals, as well as the lack of access to blood and blood products, prompting people to call on social media to reach out to donors to save their relatives.

A number of residents have also complained of the lack and scarcity of psychiatric and neurological medicines in the pharmacies, including those of the National Fund for Medical Supplies.⁴³⁵

In November 2018 “Pharmacies in the Sudanese capital Khartoum as well as the other states are witnessing lack of many types of medicines amid rising prices”.⁴³⁶

With regards to access to mental health services, the International Peace Institute (IPI) reported in its April 2019 report that “Facilities providing mental healthcare are centralized in Khartoum, and most Sudanese face cultural, financial, and geographic barriers to accessing these services”.⁴³⁷

In November 2019 Dr Naeema Al Gasseer, WHO Representative in Sudan stated that “More than eight million people live in Khartoum State, where the public health system is impacted by the economic crisis, recent flooding, and ongoing outbreaks of infectious diseases”.⁴³⁸

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) described Khartoum’s health care system in December 2019 as follows:

Years of war and economic turmoil have corroded Sudan's health care system. In Khartoum and larger towns, hospitals and clinics often do not have enough drugs and the ones that are available are too expensive for many Sudanese to purchase. Doctors are chronically underpaid and opt to leave Sudan to work abroad, draining the country of its health care workforce.⁴³⁹

Khartoum State – Food security

The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification reported in January 2019 that “The highest prevalence of population in IPC [Integrated Phase Classification]⁴⁴⁰ Phase 3 (Crisis) and IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) are in the states of Khartoum and South Darfur”.⁴⁴¹

Khartoum – Access to water and power

In May 2019 Radio Dabanga reported that:

Khartoum [...] have been witnessing power and water outages since the beginning of the fasting month of Ramadan on May 6 [2019] [...]

⁴³⁵ Radio Dabanga, [Diarrhoea, healthcare shortages in Kordofan, Khartoum](#), 27 August 2018

⁴³⁶ Radio Dabanga, [Essential meds in short supply at Sudan pharmacies](#), 8 November 2018

⁴³⁷ International Peace Institute (IPI), [Stuck in Crisis: The Humanitarian Response to Sudan’s Health Emergency](#), April 2019, p. 7

⁴³⁸ World Health organization (WHO), [WHO scales up cholera vigilance in Khartoum, Sudan](#), 5 November 2019

⁴³⁹ International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), [I am no different than anyone else](#), 3 December 2019

⁴⁴⁰ More information on the Integrated Phase Classification can be found [here](#).

⁴⁴¹ Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, [Sudan, IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis, October 2018 – March 2019](#), 15 January 2019, p. 1

Various districts in Khartoum [...] and Khartoum North have suffered from water cuts since last month [April 2019]. [...]

On social media, people suggest that the authorities are doing this on purpose “to break the intifada”.⁴⁴²

Omdurman – Access to water and power – non profile specific

In May 2019 Radio Dabanga reported that:

Omdurman [...] have been witnessing power and water outages since the beginning of the fasting month of Ramadan on May 6 [2019] [...]

Various districts in [...] Omdurman [...] have suffered from water cuts since last month [April 2019]. [...]

On social media, people suggest that the authorities are doing this on purpose “to break the intifada”.⁴⁴³

5.1. Darfuri

For non-profile specific, general information on living conditions in Khartoum and Omdurman, as well as other urban areas across Sudan, consult sources included at the beginning of section [5. Living conditions](#).

Khartoum

Amjed Farif El Tayeb, researcher, political activist and spokesperson of the Sudan Change Now movement was recorded by the UK Home Office Fact-Finding Mission in August 2018 as stating that

Access to employment is difficult for young Darfuris, especially government jobs. Security checks are made by the government for some jobs, e.g. in oil or telecoms, and Darfuris don't pass these checks, neither do political activists. Healthcare is expensive (private) and above the means of many. Non-Darfuri groups may have family support that may help them sometimes in paying for healthcare. There are free health clinics in Khartoum University but these are poorly resourced and equipped. If a student cannot pay their tuition fees, they will not receive a student ID card, which is required to access the university clinic. There is a large displaced Darfuri community in Khartoum, which lives in the outskirts of the city. There are some wealthy Darfuris but few are in this bracket. They used to trade in a market – Libya market. Libya market was built on importing goods from Libya, which now decreasing. However, there is a notion of ethnic class migration. Many rich Darfuris tend to claim an Arab identity and cut their ties with Darfuri community.⁴⁴⁴

A Sudanese political scientist, governance advisor for the British Council in Sudan, was recorded by the UK Home Office Fact-Finding Mission in August 2018 as stating that “Asked if Darfuris face discrimination on a daily basis, the PS [political scientist] said yes, definitively for government jobs. The private sector, second only to the public sector is not a big employer”.⁴⁴⁵

⁴⁴² Radio Dabanga, [Power, water outages in Sudan's capitals since start of Ramadan](#), 12 May 2019

⁴⁴³ Radio Dabanga, [Power, water outages in Sudan's capitals since start of Ramadan](#), 12 May 2019

⁴⁴⁴ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, Amjed Farid El Tayeb, p. 104

⁴⁴⁵ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, A Sudanese political scientist, p. 109

A university professor from Darfur was recorded by the UK Home Office Fact-Finding Mission in August 2018 as stating with regards to the socio-economic situation for Darfuris in Khartoum “There is no official discrimination by the state, but the degree of access to certain services depends how those in charge, who sometimes practise favouritism or nepotism towards their own people, but there are also issues of limited resources and bad governance. People in charge give more access to some ‘favoured’ people – those without relatives who hold some influence are denied. A Darfuri who is in a position of some authority, or knows someone who is, can access services. It is not that Darfuris are categorically denied access”.⁴⁴⁶ The same interlocutor further stated, “For an ordinary Darfuri, there could be latent discrimination, which the government tries to conceal. Many Darfuris complain, for example, that a Darfuri may not be promoted. It is a ‘feeling’ that they are discriminated. For example, a Darfuri who was best in their class, best in the department, will not be given the promotion they deserve - that would go to a less qualified and less able non-Darfuri. Discrimination existed before the conflict, but after ‘Inghaz’ [Arabic for ‘salvation’, the term used to describe the take-over of the government by the, then, National Islamic Front (now NCP) in 1989] it became ideological”.⁴⁴⁷

Salih Mahmoud M Osman, Deputy Chair of the Darfur Bar Association (DBA), also interviewed by the UK Home Office Fact-Finding Mission in August 2018, reported that “Darfuris do not enjoy socio-economic rights - most are not registered, i.e. do not have National ID numbers. So, they cannot take up employment; they cannot participate in elections, they do not get recognition. However, some Darfuris who are affiliated to the ruling party have better opportunities than those who are considered enemies of the state. The Darfuris are known as moderate Muslims not as religious fanatics, or zealous for the ruling party; Darfuris are considered as not co-operative with the government”.⁴⁴⁸

A Sudanese practising lawyer and activist was interviewed by the same UK Home Office fact finding mission in August 2018:

On Darfuris socio-economic situation in Khartoum, the source noted that Darfuris have access to healthcare, treated the same as other tribes. Enrolment in the military and police forces may be a problem, unless the individual supports the (ruling) National Congress Party (NCP). In the army and police, there are many Darfuris, including officers in lower ranks. In terms of education, following the Doha Peace Agreement, Darfuris are entitled to free university education. But the source thought that once the funds ran out of the process, the government declined to give money to students to cover student fees. For jobs, many prefer to go abroad like every other young person. For work, Sudan is a kind of hell for everyone. There is no clear plan of enrolment for graduates. Thousands are applying for 10-15 positions. When asked if Darfuris faced discrimination in getting jobs, the source considered it was more about political affiliation, whether a member of the NCP or not. Maybe someone (fellow tribe members) inside an organisation could help a person get a job. Some people of one tribe employ people others of same tribe in an organisation, e.g. in the oil industry, where most employees are of the same tribe of the Minister for oil.⁴⁴⁹

⁴⁴⁶ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, A Sudanese political scientist, p. 112

⁴⁴⁷ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, A Sudanese political scientist, p. 112

⁴⁴⁸ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, Salih Mahmoud M Osman, Darfur Bar Association, p. 119

⁴⁴⁹ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, An activist, p. 172

In contrast, Dr Ahmed Eltoum Salim, who started the European & African Centre (EAC) in Sudan, denied that Darfuris have problems from the government and stated that he “had not witnessed any discrimination in Khartoum due to a person’s ethnicity. There are human rights abuses, but Darfuris are not targeted”.⁴⁵⁰ Similarly, the Second Secretary Political [PS] from the British Embassy stated that he “does not consider there is marginalisation of Darfuris within Khartoum [...] There is no overriding racism or discrimination against Darfuris”.⁴⁵¹ Similarly, Siddig Yousef [SY], member of the central committee of the Communist Party and head of the Sudanese Solidarity Committee, told the UK Home Office fact finding mission in August 2018 that “Asked about day-to-day life for Darfuris in Khartoum and how they are treated by other Sudanese, SY thought they were treated like everyone else, no special treatment, day to day life goes on. Asked how they were treated by the government, SY considered that if there was no link with rebel groups then there would be no problem. However, the government accuses / suspects Darfuris are linked with rebels, so discriminates against Darfuris in accessing jobs, e.g. if in competition with a different tribe”.⁴⁵²

Maddy Crowther, Co-Executive Director of Waging Peace, published a report in January 2019 on ‘Risk on return for Darfuris in Sudan’ and consulted a range of organisations and individuals for it.⁴⁵³ The report highlighted:

vi) Economic and social discrimination

Many gave an all-round assessment of the economic and social discrimination suffered by Darfuris, notably in terms of access to various services required to build a sustainable life in Khartoum. Sudan expert A concluded, “Darfuris are discriminated in Khartoum in particular for access to housing, employment and education.”

PAX agreed, adding, “In terms of accessing healthcare, housing, employment and other welfare provisions, Darfuris suffer discrimination and in some cases outright exclusion.”

In addition, Mosaab Baba from the Ayin Network, in discussing individuals relocating internally to Khartoum, said they “will be confined to the outskirts of Khartoum that lack basic services, and they will face police repression”, adding that “Even those who are in Darfur and relocate to Khartoum, will live in areas where housing, education, and religious freedom are severely deteriorated.”

Some respondents tied this directly to the inability of Darfuris to access identity cards, often as a result of deliberate Government obstruction.

For instance, the Darfur Bar Association’s Salih Mohammed Osman: “The mentioned groups are denied from all basic Rights in Khartoum IDPs are not recognized since the government prohibited the establishment of any IDPs camps in Khartoum for the Darfuris after the eruption of this human suffering in 2003 They are not registered they don’t have national documents therefore a Large number of them and their children don’t enjoy health care or education rights”.

In addition, others who responded expanded the notion of social discrimination to include societal attitudes and behaviors.

Huqooq’s Nagla Ahmed said, “Darfuris in Khartoum are facing discrimination and prosecution from both the government and some people, for example there are well-documented cases where people reported to the security on Darfuris living in the neighborhood as they are rebels, or set fire in the resident houses because they don’t want them to live in the area, or kicked out of rented houses”.

By far the biggest area of comment among respondents with respect to economic discrimination, however, was the overwhelming presence of Darfuris in the informal economy.

Nagla Ahmed linked this specifically to a crisis among university graduates, saying, “according to one graduated student he said there are around 25,000 graduates from Darfur five states are unemployed.” The reasons for their unemployment are undoubtedly to do with a generally poor

⁴⁵⁰ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, Dr Ahmed Eltoum Salim, p. 133

⁴⁵¹ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, Second Secretary Political, p. 136 and 137

⁴⁵² UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, Siddig Yousef, p. 159

⁴⁵³ See Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019

economy with high general unemployment, but some respondents went further, alleging discrimination in employment practices.

NGO B said, "Several Darfuris who have spoken to this author have expressed issues with employment, which they believe is a result of discrimination. Though it must be stated that due to the economic situation in Darfur following the secession of South Sudan, employment opportunities of most Sudanese have decreased with more turning to the informal sector."

Similarly, Margie Buchanan-Smith and Susanne Jaspars argued, "Our research findings show that Darfuris of certain ethnic groups (particularly those associated with the rebellion) are subject to discrimination in finding work, especially government and civil service jobs, but also when setting up and running businesses and working as traders. This was an issue for Darfuris of particular ethnic groups, both within Darfur and in Khartoum." They said both this, "plus imposed restrictions on movement, especially for young displaced men, severely limit their livelihood opportunities. Discrimination also extends to the provision of basic services. For example, areas in and around Khartoum that have mainly been settled by Darfuris are particularly poorly served."

Furthermore, some argued that in a sense this meant that the impact of any economic shock was more acutely felt by Darfuris.

Huqooq's Nagla Ahmed said "the impact of the recent economic crisis in Sudan continue to take its toll on the population in Darfur states, and affecting the most vulnerable communities."

A further issue being that those in the informal sector are also more vulnerable to targeting by security actors.

NGO B said, "should an individual not be able to find employment then they may be forced to work in the informal sector, which is dominated by persons from the peripheries including Darfur. Individuals within the informal sector (tea ladies, traders, water vendors etc) are more likely to be targeted by the Government and their security services."

Hala Al-Karib said, "Dauriaes [*sic*] who are poor, students or holding entry level work or casual laborers work, living in the peripheries of the capital are vulnerable and often subjected to the National security hostility and profiled and accused of affiliation to Darfuri rebel groups [...]"

Some respondents suggested that operating in the informal sector may make individuals more vulnerable to corrupt practices.

Mohammed El-Ansari, head of the National Umma Party UK and Ireland chapter, said, "Darfur [*sic*] allowed to work in margin job like car wash, selling teas and coffee and government taken more 50% of their very low income."

Hala Al-Karib further said that the poor residents of Khartoum are associated with opposition activity: "The only aspect of discrimination I could confirm is, The ethnic profiling leading to the political profiling of Darfuris by the National security organs who tend to victimize poor Darfuris claiming that they are affiliated to rebels and accusing them of being behind the indictment of the Sudanese president." [...].⁴⁵⁴

In November 2019 Radio Dabanga reported:

The sit-in of Darfuri students from Northern state's Dongola University in front of the Ministry of Higher Education in Khartoum against "racist practices" by the university administration entered its fourth day yesterday.

The students who are protesting "racist treatment" of Darfuri students by the university's administration, refuse to return to Dongola and demand transferral to universities in the Sudanese capital.

More than a week ago, the university administration demanded that the students form a student committee to negotiate with the university administration about their complaints concerning the shortage of lecturers and badly equipped training units.

When the students did so, the administration accused four Darfuri members of the committee of "inciting" the other students to complain.

⁴⁵⁴ Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019, 6. *Viability of internal relocation to Khartoum, c. Surveillance*, p. 30-33 [Note that on p. 6 of her report she clarifies that "It should be noted that references to Khartoum refer to 'Greater Khartoum' throughout', also encompassing the cities of Omdurman and Khartoum North".]

In response, more than 200 students from the Faculty of Computer Science at Dongola University resigned.

A student at the sit-in complained to Radio Dabanga they have been obstructed to use the bathrooms of the ministry and that the source they used to charge their mobile phones has been cut-off.⁴⁵⁵

Omdurman

No COI published between 10 July 2018 and 10 December 2019 on the living conditions for Darfuris in Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

Unspecified location

A civil society activist interviewed by the UK Home Office fact finding mission in August 2018 stated:

Darfuris do better than the Nuba in terms of socio economics. Darfuris and people from the Zaghawa tribe often work together (particularly students at university to fund their studies). One of the main features of the Zaghawa is their aptitude for trade and they help each other in business. But since the conflict, Zaghawans have also been targeted by the government with huge tax bills. Everything in Sudan is money; but it is not a free market: 40-60% of the country is run by (government-backed) companies and individuals, although some Zaghawans are still in business. In general Darfuris are better off than the Nuba people. Nuba IDP families rely on income generated by their children collecting re-cyclable items to sell from rubbish dumps. The Fur, who used to be farmers, make-up the majority of the people in IDP camps. They are not able to look after their children so well. A person needs insurance to access healthcare. Even so, a contribution of 25% is needed towards the cost of medicines. The insurance used to cost around 500-800 Sudanese Pounds (SDG) per annum, before the economic problems – unaffordable for most Sudanese. Surgery may cost 4000 SDG and could be reduced to 2000 SDG, but still not within the reach of most Sudanese. There are some clinics, health centres in the shanty areas where the marginalised groups live, but they provide a very basic service. For example, you could attend if you had a cough or malaria (and have the test) – but you wouldn't be able to pay for the treatment. In any case, the most common medicines have not been available in Sudan since the economic crisis, apart from a few supplies in expensive 'chemists' which are not affordable. Some people who have the means order medication from outside Sudan, for example from Egypt.⁴⁵⁶

5.2. Nuba

For non-profile specific, general information on living conditions in Khartoum and Omdurman, as well as other urban areas across Sudan, consult sources included at the beginning of section [5. Living conditions](#).

⁴⁵⁵ Radio Dabanga, [Darfuri students continue sit-in in Khartoum](#), 29 November 2019

⁴⁵⁶ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, A civil society activist, p. 149

Khartoum

An August 2018 UK Home Office fact finding mission interviewed a Sudanese political scientist (PS) and noted that

Asked if these are informal settlements, the PS said it was complicated. According to official zoning, some areas that are shanty towns are recorded as 'normal' areas even though they are a slum. Locals view these areas as IDP areas. There are social problems, poor access to services. There is no formal IDP classification in Khartoum as the government does not recognise them as IDPs or fully recognize them as residents of the area. This is a source of misery as they are not recognized as residents, nor given support. Darfuris share the area with the Nuba, but the majority are Darfuri. The government sees these areas as a security threat and treats the people as suspects. The government media and security agencies (NISS) describe these areas as sleeping cells for rebels. There is an increased security presence, large NISS presence in these areas. The PS and others have found it difficult to collect information about these communities as they are followed or don't get permits".⁴⁵⁷

The same mission interviewed a political secretary (PS) who was reported as stating "You see Darfuris in government, business, medicine, law – for example there is a Darfuri Bar Association – no such equivalent for the Nuba, for example. [...] There has been no recent census but some reports put Khartoum's population at 10 million, up from around 5 million only 10-15 years ago. This can be seen in the growth of the shanty towns. In these you see 2 groups who are the poorest: South Sudanese and people from the Nuba mountains. Don't see many Darfuri ghettos as they are more integrated. PS has been to the shanty towns where people from the Nuba mountains live".⁴⁵⁸

The same source further noted that "Arabs do look down upon other groups such as the Nuba and people from South Sudan. Nuba and South Sudanese face problems. [...] On discrimination in accessing socio-economic rights (housing, education, etc), PS thought there might be but did not know for sure. He noted that there is a Darfur Bar Association, so there are enough Darfuri lawyers to have their own group but this is not the case for the Nuba. PS had met only one Nuba lawyer".⁴⁵⁹

The mission also interviewed a civil society activist who works for a civil and human rights organisation; they were reported as noting that "In general Darfuris are better off than the Nuba people. Nuba IDP families rely on income generated by their children collecting re-cyclable items to sell from rubbish dumps".⁴⁶⁰

Siddig Yousef (SY), member of the central committee of the Communist Party and head of the Sudanese Solidarity Committee, considered that "Asked about the treatment of Darfuris by society generally, SY noted that the Nuba are treated badly, but face less societal discrimination than the Darfuris. But society generally does not treat the Darfuris and people from South Kordofan differently from other groups".⁴⁶¹

⁴⁵⁷ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, A Sudanese political scientists, p. 109

⁴⁵⁸ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, Second Secretary Political, British Embassy p.136

⁴⁵⁹ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, Second Secretary Political, British Embassy p.136

⁴⁶⁰ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, A civil society activist, p.149

⁴⁶¹ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, Siddig Yousef, p. 159

The mission also interviewed Salih Mahmoud M Osman (SO) of the Darfur Bar Association (DBA) who stated “There are Darfuri IDP camps around El Fasher and the main cities in Darfur, but Darfuris who have migrated to Khartoum tend to find remote areas on the perimeter of the city and set up home there (‘shanty towns’ – illegal settlements). People who are living in these places are all Darfuris and Nuba. They are often forcibly evicted. The DBA has challenged some evictions and, in some cases, has won. Asked if the courts discriminate, SO thought it not hopeless but difficult”.⁴⁶²

In January 2019 the Belgian COI Unit, CEDOCA, published a report which addressed the situation for people from the Two Areas in Khartoum.⁴⁶³ Whilst predominantly written in Dutch, some interlocutors provided written contributions in English: Geir Skogseth, Sudan Analyst from the Norwegian Landinfo was cited as stating:

There are no reliable available official statistics on the population of greater Khartoum, seeing that it would not include the population living in non-registered areas. Also, official demographic data would not present the ethnic distribution or regional origin of the residents in a given area.

Still, migrants with origins in the Nuba mountains clearly constitute a significant segment of the population in greater Khartoum. In an IDP household survey conducted by IOM in North Sudan in 2006, 33,8 % of the households originated in South Kordofan and 29,6 % identified as Nuba, but it’s difficult to say if this estimate is representative (though the definition of IDP used includes persons migrating for reasons other than security from violence). A field study from the al-Baraka shantytown in Khartoum also identifies Nuba as an important community in that particular area.

[...]. In conclusion, available research indicates that the Nuba are an important community in greater Khartoum, but we do not have access to accurate figures – neither on the accumulated Nuba population, or on their settlement patterns, socio-economic situation, etc.

On the other hand, there is little doubt that the Nuba population in greater Khartoum remains predominantly poor, as it mostly comes from rural areas of South Kordofan, and moving to the capital has not significantly improved its access to education or better paid work. [...]

Since South Sudan seceded in 2011, Sudanese sources have called Nubans and non-Arab groups from Blue Nile ‘the new South Sudanese’, i.e. the ones filling the position of ‘anti-pole’ to the ‘Arab ideal’.

[...] There is no institutional, explicit discrimination based on ethnicity regarding access to state services and the like. On the other hand, the regime does very little to level out the deep-rooted social and economic differences in Sudanese society, whether these differences follow ethnic (or regional, or religious) divides or not. Therefore, access to public services and resources is generally easier for the urban middle class, which is dominated by Nile River Arabs, than for other segments – especially those with origins in the periphery.⁴⁶⁴

The same report cited a human rights organisation based in Khartoum as reporting:

The majority of people from South Kordofan and some from Blue Nile most likely to live in the slums of the capital Khartoum with no water of electricity and no health services or education, the majority of the poor slums of Khartoum occupies by either Darfuri or Nuba, neighbourhood such like Ummabada in Omdurman occupied by over million people from South Kordofan, most of them work in very low income jobs, as there are certain jobs for certain ethnic groups they cannot access them.⁴⁶⁵

⁴⁶² UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, Salih Mahmoud M Osman, Darfur Bar Association p.119

⁴⁶³ CEDOCA, [COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas](#), 22 January 2019

⁴⁶⁴ CEDOCA, [COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas](#), 22 January 2019, 2.1.1. Aantal en herkomst p.32 and 2.2.1. Discriminatie en geweld: economische, etnische, politieke factoren p.39

⁴⁶⁵ CEDOCA, [COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas](#), 22 January 2019, 2.1.1. Aantal en herkomst p.32

According to Mukhtar Albaqir, director of KACE (Al-Khatim Adlan Center for Enlightenment), cited in the same report, “Women and men from Nuba Mountains Blue Nile, Darfur is often accused of being affiliated to rebel groups, they are also subjected to racial discrimination blackmailed and verbal abuse. [...] More likely indigenous No Arabized Sudanese in addition to their poverty which typically increases their vulnerability are subjected to racial discrimination”.⁴⁶⁶ Moreover, a Sudanese human rights defender stated with regards to the situation for non-Arab Sudanese:

Yes, they are likely to encounter problems. [...] Indeed Sudan currently is an apartheid system; and one's profile determines his or her treatment. The government projects Sudan as Arab/Islamist state and it sides with the Arabs and Islamists contingency and targets non-Arabs, non-Islamists. [...] if you are from these areas which are considered rebel cradle, you are likely to face problems or difficulties, delays, etc with all the state institutions. And if your bad luck make you cross roads with law enforcement agencies, such as the police, security etc, you are likely to be badly illtreated. There is institutional racism in Sudan.⁴⁶⁷

According to Tajeldin Adam, a Sudanese journalist and safety analyst living in Belgium, “Folks from South Kordofan, Blue Nile and other similar areas are subjected to a systematic and state-sponsored type of discrimination regarding access to job opportunities and basic services. These groups are among the most disprivileged in the country. In the capital Khartoum, they predominately live in improvised housing settlements in the peripheries in areas such as Haj Yusif, Dar al-Salaam, Mayo and others. The vast majority of them were originally displaced from war zones in home towns”.⁴⁶⁸

Furthermore, a linguist, anthropologist and Sudan researcher was cited as stating “Yes, a person identifying as ‘Nuba’ (with some exceptions because certain Arabs come from South Kordofan) means he is claiming not to be Arab. [...] But generally yes, ordinary Nuba people do face greater discrimination than lower-income people that identify as Sudanese Muslims and Arabs”.⁴⁶⁹

Moreover, the founder of a press organisation in the Nuba mountains stated “People coming from Nuba are not given the same opportunities as other groups of people in Sudan. No matter their political affiliation they are considered ‘rebels.’ It is very common in Sudan for Arab people to use the word ‘slave’ to describe Nuba and Blue Nile people. [...] There is a great economic divide for the black African tribes in Nuba vs. the Arab tribes. Then when you add religion in to this division it becomes more dangerous for the Christians but Muslim Nuba and Blue Nile people are also persecuted”.⁴⁷⁰

An August 2019 Open Democracy article cited Maddy Crowther, co-Director of Waging Peace, as stating that “The violence recently seen in Khartoum's streets has long been meted out to those in

⁴⁶⁶ CEDOCA, [*COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas*](#), 22 January 2019, 2.2.1. Discriminatie en geweld: economische, etnische, politieke factoren p.36

⁴⁶⁷ CEDOCA, [*COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas*](#), 22 January 2019, 2.2.1. Discriminatie en geweld: economische, etnische, politieke factoren p.36

⁴⁶⁸ CEDOCA, [*COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas*](#), 22 January 2019, 2.2.1. Discriminatie en geweld: economische, etnische, politieke factoren p.42

⁴⁶⁹ CEDOCA, [*COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas*](#), 22 January 2019, 2.2.1. Discriminatie en geweld: economische, etnische, politieke factoren p.41

⁴⁷⁰ CEDOCA, [*COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas*](#), 22 January 2019, 2.4. Christenen p.50

Darfur, Blue Nile and South Kordofan, accompanied by a racist ideology that treats these individuals as second-class citizens. Although the agreement between the civilian and military delegations is welcome, there is a danger it just becomes power-sharing between Nile elites".⁴⁷¹

In December 2019 Radio Dabanga reported that "Thousands of displaced people who fled armed conflict in Sudan's peripheries, are attempting to survive in the open in the capital Khartoum".⁴⁷² It cited Khalafallah Ismail, Executive Director of Sabah Organisation for Childhood Care and Development as stating during a workshop in Khartoum that "They are living in dire conditions and are in urgent need of food, clothing, and shelter".⁴⁷³ The same article further noted that "The homeless, of whom 95 per cent fled attacks and hunger in Darfur, the Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan, and Blue Nile state, are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance, Ismail stated. Both the government and the society should intervene and help them out. [...] The NGO director said the government does not support them. Any help offered comes from Sudanese civil society organisations".⁴⁷⁴

Omdurman

The January 2019 CEDOCA report cited Geir Skogseth, Sudan Analyst from the Norwegian Landinfo as stating:

The majority of people from South Kordofan and some from Blue Nile most likely to live in the slums of the capital Khartoum with no water of electricity and no health services or education, the majority of the poor slums of Khartoum occupies by either Darfuri or Nuba, neighbourhood such like Ummbada in Omdurman occupied by over million people from South Kordofan, most of them work in very low income jobs, as there are certain jobs for certain ethnic groups they cannot access them.⁴⁷⁵

Unspecified location

The August 2018 UK Home Office fact finding mission interviewed Salih Mahmoud M Osman (SO) of the Darfur Bar Association (DBA) who stated "The government makes it impossible to get a National ID number as verification from a male relative is required (and in many cases women do not have a surviving male relative). Other people, for example from the East, Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountains, are also discriminated against on these grounds (particularly in the respect of women that are not able to obtain verification as they do not have male relatives)".⁴⁷⁶

A March 2019 Radio Dabanga article described that "Sudan faces a high youth unemployment rate. A quarter of the unemployed youths are university graduates, Sudanese economists reported, stressing that their dissatisfaction might pose a security threat to the country. Economists revealed the prevalence of a high unemployment rate among youths in the country. Speaking to Sudanese media, several economists said that the rate amounts to two million unemployed people, 25 per cent of whom are university graduates. [...] Also high numbers of young, studying or graduated

⁴⁷¹ Open Democracy, [In this new Sudan, will the elite protesters stand up for suffering Darfur?](#) 15 August 2019

⁴⁷² Radio Dabanga, [Thousands of homeless people try to survive in Sudanese capital](#), 21 December 2019

⁴⁷³ Radio Dabanga, [Thousands of homeless people try to survive in Sudanese capital](#), 21 December 2019

⁴⁷⁴ Radio Dabanga, [Thousands of homeless people try to survive in Sudanese capital](#), 21 December 2019

⁴⁷⁵ CEDOCA, [COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas](#), 22 January 2019, 2.1.1. Aantal en herkomst p.32

⁴⁷⁶ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, Salih Mahmoud M Osman, Darfur Bar Association p.119

people who originally come from Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, and eastern Sudan face a high youth unemployment rate”.⁴⁷⁷

5.3. Other ethnic and/or religious minorities

For non-profile specific, general information on living conditions in Khartoum and Omdurman, as well as other urban areas across Sudan, consult sources included at the beginning of section [5. Living conditions](#).

Khartoum

In January 2019 the Belgian COI Unit, CEDOCA, published a report which addressed the situation for people from the Two Areas in Khartoum.⁴⁷⁸ It cited a linguist, anthropologist and Sudan researcher as stating “generally yes, ordinary Nuba people do face greater discrimination than lower-income people that identify as Sudanese Muslims and Arabs. Of course, this is also complex, as certain Darfur groups, and other so-called Arab groups (e.g. Rashaida), or Shi'a Muslims, and so on and so forth, also experience discrimination”.⁴⁷⁹ According to a Sudanese academic specialised in ethnic identity, land rights and conflict analysis:

Yes, people of African origins from Darfur, Blue Nile and Nuba Mountains face more discrimination based on their ethnic affiliations and or religious background namely Christians and non-Muslims. Lacking financial resources and unemployment is a result and manifestation of the discriminatory treatment despite the fact that the Constitution provides equal treatment for all citizens.⁴⁸⁰

Moreover, a Sudanese human rights defender stated with regards to the situation for non-Arab Sudanese:

Yes, they are likely to encounter problems. [...] Indeed Sudan currently is an apartheid system; and one's profile determines his or her treatment. The government projects Sudan as Arab/Islamist state and it sides with the Arabs and Islamists contingency and targets non-Arabs, non-Islamists. [...] if you are from these areas which are considered rebel cradle, you are likely to face problems or difficulties, delays, etc with all the state institutions. And if your bad luck make you cross roads with law enforcement agencies, such as the police, security etc, you are likely to be badly illtreated. There is institutional racism in Sudan.⁴⁸¹

Geir Skogseth, Sudan Analyst from the Norwegian Landinfo was cited as stating:

⁴⁷⁷ Radio Dabanga, [Economists: 'Unemployment of Sudan's graduates disgruntles youth'](#), 29 March 2019

⁴⁷⁸ CEDOCA, [COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas](#), 22 January 2019

⁴⁷⁹ CEDOCA, [COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas](#), 22 January 2019, 2.2.1. Discriminatie en geweld: economische, etnische, politieke factoren p.41

⁴⁸⁰ CEDOCA, [COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas](#), 22 January 2019, 2.2.1. Discriminatie en geweld: economische, etnische, politieke factoren p.42 and 2.2.2. Risico bij terugkeer p.45

⁴⁸¹ CEDOCA, [COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas](#), 22 January 2019, 2.2.1. Discriminatie en geweld: economische, etnische, politieke factoren p.36

More specifically, there is an 'ethnic hierarchy' in Sudanese society, which is far from binary Arab/non-Arab. A better way to picture it, in my opinion, is to see it as a sliding scale between two poles:

One pole is represented by the powerful families and clans in the Nile River Valley, who have monopolised much of political power in Sudan for centuries. They can be seen as a sort of 'ideal Arabs' against which other Sudanese are measured – and often measure themselves. The opposite pole to this 'ideal' is constituted by members of social groups categorised as African – especially Nilotic groups like Dinka, Nuer, etc., but also other ethnicities that don't use a variety of Arabic as their main language, or who don't identify themselves (or are identified by others) as Arab.

A number of factors influence where on this scale people place themselves and others:

- Looks
 - o Skin colour, facial features, styling of hair/beard, body shape, dress
- Language
 - o Arabic dialect(s) or other languages as first language; knowledge of formal Arabic
- Religious affiliation
 - o Muslim
 - From established Muslim communities where 'everyone' has been Muslim for many generations to converts and more recently Islamised communities
 - o Christian
 - o African religions
 - Regional origin
 - Clan
 - Ethnicity
 - Professional background
 - Urban/rural
- o Sedentary/nomad
 - Modern/traditional
 - Level of education
 - Social class
 - Civilised/uncivilised
 - Gender.

[...] There is no institutional, explicit discrimination based on ethnicity regarding access to state services and the like. On the other hand, the regime does very little to level out the deep-rooted social and economic differences in Sudanese society, whether these differences follow ethnic (or regional, or religious) divides or not. Therefore, access to public services and resources is generally easier for the urban middle class, which is dominated by Nile River Arabs, than for other segments – especially those with origins in the periphery.”⁴⁸²

An August 2019 Open Democracy article cited Maddy Crowther, co-Director of Waging Peace, as stating that “The violence recently seen in Khartoum's streets has long been meted out to those in Darfur, Blue Nile and South Kordofan, accompanied by a racist ideology that treats these individuals as second-class citizens. Although the agreement between the civilian and military delegations is welcome, there is a danger it just becomes power-sharing between Nile elites”.⁴⁸³

Omdurman

No COI published between 10 July 2018 and December 2019 on the living conditions for other ethnic/religious minorities in Khartoum or Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

⁴⁸² CEDOCA, [COI Focus: Soedan Veiligheidssituatie in de Two Areas / Situatie in Khartoem van personen afkomstig uit de Two Areas](#), 22 January 2019, 2.2.1. Discriminatie en geweld: economische, etnische, politieke factoren p.37

⁴⁸³ Open Democracy, [In this new Sudan, will the elite protesters stand up for suffering Darfur?](#) 15 August 2019

Unspecified location

In its annual report covering 2018 Freedom House reported that “Sudan’s political system heavily favors the ethnic groups, predominantly Arab and Muslim, with populations concentrated around Khartoum. Peripheral regions—notably Darfur, the Two Areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile, and eastern Sudan—are marginalized. [...] Sudan’s many ethnic, regional, and religious groups face political, social, and economic marginalization”.⁴⁸⁴

The US Department of State reported in its annual human rights report covering events in 2018 that “Discrimination occurred in employment and occupation based on gender, religion, and ethnic, tribal, or party affiliation. Ethnic minorities often complained that government hiring practices discriminated against them in favor of ‘riverine’ Arabs from northern Sudan”.⁴⁸⁵

In an October 2019 report, International Crisis Group noted that:

Abdelaziz al-Hilu, who [...] leads the largest faction of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army-North, characterised the rebels’ core grievances to Crisis Group as structural. Al-Hilu said Arabic-speaking elites in Khartoum have long tried to impose a “false Arab identity” on a culturally diverse country. This attitude, he said, impelled minorities to take up arms to protect their position in society. He added that successive regimes have worsened centre-periphery relations with the logic of political Islam, which casts non-Muslims as second-class citizens. Al-Hilu concluded by saying: “The other in Sudan is always oppressed, marginalised and excluded when it comes to access to power and wealth. The other in Sudan is left with only two options, either to accept inferiority status or be exterminated”.⁴⁸⁶

5.4. Students, political activists, human rights activists and journalists who are not originally from these cities or who support persons not originally from there

No COI published between 10 July 2018 and December 2019 on the living conditions for this particular profile in Khartoum or Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted, with the exception of the following source:

Unspecified location

A March 2019 Radio Dabanga article described that “Sudan faces a high youth unemployment rate. A quarter of the unemployed youths are university graduates, Sudanese economists reported, stressing that their dissatisfaction might pose a security threat to the country. Economists revealed the prevalence of a high unemployment rate among youths in the country. Speaking to Sudanese media, several economists said that the rate amounts to two million unemployed people, 25 per cent of whom are university graduates. [...] Also high numbers of young, studying or graduated people who originally come from Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, and eastern Sudan face a high youth unemployment rate”.⁴⁸⁷

⁴⁸⁴ Freedom House, [Freedom in the World 2019 – Sudan](#), 4 February 2019

⁴⁸⁵ US Department of State, [2018 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Sudan](#), 13 March 2019, Section 7., d. *Discrimination with Respect to Employment and Occupation*

⁴⁸⁶ International Crisis Group, [Safeguarding Sudan’s Revolution](#), 21 October 2019, IV. *The Opposition*, B. *Splintered Rebels*, p. 22

⁴⁸⁷ Radio Dabanga, [Economists: ‘Unemployment of Sudan’s graduates disgruntles youth’](#), 29 March 2019

For non-profile specific, general information on living conditions in Khartoum and Omdurman, as well as other urban areas across Sudan, consult sources included at the beginning of section [5. Living conditions](#).

5.5. IDPs

For non-profile specific, general information on living conditions in Khartoum and Omdurman, as well as other urban areas across Sudan, consult sources included at the beginning of section [5. Living conditions](#).

Khartoum

The U.S. Department of State's annual human rights report covering 2018 noted, "As in previous years, the government did not establish formal IDP or refugee camps in Khartoum".⁴⁸⁸

A Sudanese political scientist, governance advisor for the British Council in Sudan, was recorded by the UK Home Office Fact-Finding Mission in August 2018 as stating that:

Darfuris go to west Omdurman (Fatah, Dar es Salaam neighbourhoods) and south Khartoum. Asked if these are informal settlements, the PS [Political scientist] said it was complicated. According to official zoning, some areas that are shanty towns are recorded as 'normal' areas even though they are a slum. Locals view these areas as IDP areas. There are social problems, poor access to services. There is no formal IDP classification in Khartoum as the government does not recognise them as IDPs or fully recognise them as residents of the area. This is a source of misery as they are not recognised as residents, nor given support. Darfuris share the area with the Nuba, but the majority are Darfuri. The government sees these areas as a security threat and treats the people as suspects. The government media and security agencies (NISS) describe these areas as sleeping cells for rebels. There is an increased security presence, large NISS presence in these areas. The PS and others have found it difficult to collect information about these communities as they are followed or don't get permits. Some sections of the areas referred to above in Khartoum are formally zoned, land sold by the government. Find slum areas between recognised areas and hear about tensions between these communities (the formal and informal). The recognised communities want to expand; it is a daily phenomenon that informal communities are bull-dozed by the police.⁴⁸⁹

UNOCHA reported in its 2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview, published in mid-March 2019, that:

An additional driver of increased needs and food insecurity is the economic situation Sudan faced in 2018. Against a backdrop of foreign exchange shortage, currency depreciation, and limited access to international markets and finance, the cost of living has increased since January 2018, with the inflation reaching nearly 70 per cent by November. and 73 per cent in December. In rural areas it was 74 per cent in November 2018, while inflation in urban areas stood at 63 per cent. At the state level, Red Sea recorded the highest inflation among all states at 98 per cent, followed by Northern and Al Gezira at 94 and 87 per cent respectively, while the rate of inflation in Khartoum stood at 60 per cent. The higher cost of living has left many families, especially those most vulnerable, struggling to meet

⁴⁸⁸ U.S. Department of State, [2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan](#), 13 March 2019, section 2.d. Freedom of Movement

⁴⁸⁹ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, A Sudanese political scientist, p. 108/109

their basic needs. It is estimated that more than 58 per cent of the resident population and more than 90 per cent of the refugee and IDP population cannot afford to buy a local food basket per day.⁴⁹⁰

At the end of December 2019 Radio Dabanga reported that “Thousands of displaced people [...] are attempting to survive in the open in the capital Khartoum” where “They are living in dire conditions and are in urgent need of food, clothing, and shelter, Khalafallah Ismail, Executive Director of Sabah Organisation for Childhood Care and Development”.⁴⁹¹ The same article further noted that “The homeless, of whom 95 per cent fled attacks and hunger in Darfur, the Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan, and Blue Nile state, are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance, Ismail stated. Both the government and the society should intervene and help them out. [...] The NGO director said the government does not support them. Any help offered comes from Sudanese civil society organisations”.⁴⁹²

Omdurman

A Sudanese political scientist, governance advisor for the British Council in Sudan, was recorded by the UK Home Office Fact-Finding Mission in August 2018 as stating that:

Darfuris go to west Omdurman (Fatah, Dar es Salaam neighbourhoods) and south Khartoum. Asked if these are informal settlements, the PS [Political scientist] said it was complicated. According to official zoning, some areas that are shanty towns are recorded as ‘normal’ areas even though they are a slum. Locals view these areas as IDP areas. There are social problems, poor access to services. There is no formal IDP classification in Khartoum as the government does not recognise them as IDPs or fully recognise them as residents of the area. This is a source of misery as they are not recognised as residents, nor given support. Darfuris share the area with the Nuba, but the majority are Darfuri. The government sees these areas as a security threat and treats the people as suspects. The government media and security agencies (NISS) describe these areas as sleeping cells for rebels. There is an increased security presence, large NISS presence in these areas. The PS and others have found it difficult to collect information about these communities as they are followed or don’t get permits. Some sections of the areas referred to above in Khartoum are formally zoned, land sold by the government. Find slum areas between recognised areas and hear about tensions between these communities (the formal and informal). The recognised communities want to expand; it is a daily phenomenon that informal communities are bull-dozed by the police.⁴⁹³

Unspecified location

UNOCHA reported in its 2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview, published in mid-March 2019, that “The impact of shortage and increase in the cost of health care and basic medications is particularly acute for poor and vulnerable groups, including many IDPs and refugees, as they often lack health insurance coverage”.⁴⁹⁴

UNOCHA reported in its January 2020 Humanitarian Needs Overview “Overall, an estimated 1.2 million people are in need of life-saving emergency shelter and household items (ES/NFIs). This includes those affected by conflict, floods or other hazards; those using negative coping mechanisms; and people in need of shelter and NFIs to ensure their minimum living standards,

⁴⁹⁰ UNOCHA, [2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Sudan](#), As of 13 March 2019, *Food insecurity* p. 9

⁴⁹¹ Radio Dabanga, [Thousands of homeless people try to survive in Sudanese capital](#), 21 December 2019

⁴⁹² Radio Dabanga, [Thousands of homeless people try to survive in Sudanese capital](#), 21 December 2019

⁴⁹³ UK Home Office, [Report of a fact finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018, Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources, A Sudanese political scientist, p. 108/109

⁴⁹⁴ UNOCHA, [2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Sudan](#), As of 13 March 2019, *Malnutrition, Disease* p. 10

dignity, and to contribute to their physical and mental wellbeing. [...] IDPs and returnees are highly vulnerable without shelter to protect them from the elements and from further exposure to health and protection risks. Shelter and NFIs are also required for IDPs integrating into communities, and to support the host population. Pregnant and lactating women, chronically ill people, elderly people, unaccompanied minors, and physically disabled persons are particularly vulnerable amongst both IDPs and returnees”.⁴⁹⁵

Furthermore, “Based on several recent food security assessments, the main needs of the most vulnerable communities - including IDPs, returnees, refugees and host communities - include physical and financial access to adequate and sufficient nutritious foods through markets or their own food production; and the ability to produce sufficient good-quality agricultural products while ensuring their availability and affordability on the market”.⁴⁹⁶

Moreover, “The people in greatest need of protection support are IDPs, persons with disabilities, survivors of SGBV, women, children, people with serious medical conditions, the elderly and minority groups. These groups have a limited ability to adapt to and mitigate new risks or hazards, and they often face additional barriers when attempting to access services. As the protection environment is weak, and further weakened in situations of conflict and protracted displacement, all vulnerable groups require protection and assistance to enable them to avoid undue physical and mental harm, fully participate in society, and access basic social services”.⁴⁹⁷ In addition “1.7 million IDPs and 291,000 returnees are in dire need of WASH support – 26 per cent of the total people in need”.⁴⁹⁸

5.6. Returnees

No COI published between 10 July 2018 and 10 December 2019 on living conditions of returnees in Khartoum or Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

For non-profile specific, general information on living conditions in Khartoum and Omdurman, as well as other urban areas across Sudan, consult sources included at the beginning of section [5. Living conditions](#).

5.7. Women

For non-profile specific, general information on living conditions in Khartoum and Omdurman, as well as other urban areas across Sudan, consult sources included at the beginning of section [5. Living conditions](#).

Khartoum

According to a paper by Liv Tønnessen from the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) published in the summer of 2019:

⁴⁹⁵ UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Needs Overview](#), January 2020, 3.2 ES/NFIs p.39

⁴⁹⁶ UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Needs Overview](#), January 2020, 3.3 FSL p.41

⁴⁹⁷ UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Needs Overview](#), January 2020, 3.6 Protection, General protection p.50

⁴⁹⁸ UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Needs Overview](#), January 2020, 3.7 WASH, Affected population p.54

It seems that the Sudanese legal framework is contradictory in granting women the equal right to work in the Constitution, yet also granting husbands with the authority to veto their opportunity to work in the Muslim Family Law of 1991.

The general literature, as well as my interviewees, have identified women's agency in family law as an important barrier to women's wage employment [...]

Only 28 percent of Sudanese women have entered the formal labor force, and only a minority is from a privileged class position where there is economic room for women to spend their income in ways other than boosting the household economy.

Even a restrictive legal framework can enable working women in Sudan to make independent economic choices and thereby give them capacity for strategic forms of agency in their own lives. Women living in contexts that many would call restrictive or oppressive see advantages of the status quo.

However, my findings suggest that the economic resources gained through wage work have had limited transformative potential in relation to the larger structures constraining various aspects of women's lives. Women representing a range of political and ideological outlooks report that generating an income has not resulted in higher bargaining power in the household, nor has it led to husbands' partaking in unpaid care work. However, it has created some economic independence from the husbands and has created a sense of accomplishment and self-realization among women in certain demographic groups. Ironically, by giving elite women some limited freedoms, the Islamist government may have helped dilute their opposition and bought some time for the stability of the regime.⁴⁹⁹

The UNOCHA reported in its January 2020 Humanitarian Needs Overview with regards to health:

While the deteriorating health situation in Sudan has impacted the whole population, specific groups of people are affected disproportionately due to their differences in vulnerability. [...]

A 2017 survey showed that only 32 per cent of the emergency obstetric and neonatal care (EmONC) facilities are fully functioning. A number of States had severe gaps in EmONC availability. East Darfur, Gedaref, Kassala, North Kordofan, Blue Nile, Red Sea, South Kordofan, North Darfur, Khartoum, Sinnar and Gazira all had less than 37 per cent of the recommended number of EmONC facilities.⁵⁰⁰

Omdurman

UNICEF noted in its mid-year report for 2019 that "Following requests by the Ministry of Health, UNICEF delivered vital health supplies to augment hospital capacity in Khartoum and Omdurman following the 3 June [2019] tragedy. Supplies targeted maternal and child health, including low osmolarity oral rehydration solution (ORS), surgical kits, resuscitators, midwifery and obstetric kits to address immediate needs".⁵⁰¹

Unspecified location

Freedom House, reporting on the situation in 2018, stated "Women are not allowed to travel or obtain state identification without the permission of a male guardian".⁵⁰² The same report continued

⁴⁹⁹ Liv Tønnessen (Social Politics), [Women at Work in Sudan: Marital Privilege or Constitutional Right?](#), Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society, vol. 26, no. 2, Summer 2019, p. 239/240

⁵⁰⁰ UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Needs Overview](#), January 2020, 3.4 Health p. 45

⁵⁰¹ UNICEF, [Sudan Humanitarian Situation Report Mid-Year 2019](#), August 2019

⁵⁰² Freedom House, [Freedom in the World 2019: Sudan](#), 4 February 2019, G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights: 1 / 16

to note that “Women face extensive discrimination [...] Traditional and religious law restricts the property rights of women”.⁵⁰³

5.8. Children

For non-profile specific, general information on living conditions in Khartoum and Omdurman, as well as other urban areas across Sudan, consult sources included at the beginning of section [5. Living conditions](#).

Khartoum

The UNOCHA reported in its January 2020 Humanitarian Needs Overview with regards to child protection:

The people in greatest need of protection support are IDPs, persons with disabilities, survivors of SGBV, women, children, people with serious medical conditions, the elderly and minority groups.

These groups have a limited ability to adapt to and mitigate new risks or hazards, and they often face additional barriers when attempting to access services. As the protection environment is weak, and further weakened in situations of conflict and protracted displacement, all vulnerable groups require protection and assistance to enable them to avoid undue physical and mental harm, fully participate in society, and access basic social services. [...]

About half the people in need of protection support are children. This includes 585,000 refugees, IDPs, 75,937 returnees, and 1 million other vulnerable residents. Children with catastrophic severity of needs (severity level 5), including refugees, live in 111 localities across East Darfur, Central Darfur, North Darfur, Blue Nile, South Darfur, Khartoum, South Kordofan, Sennar, Gederef, Red sea, West Darfur, West Kordofan and White Nile states.⁵⁰⁴

Khartoum – Food and basic services

In July 2018 Radio Dabanga reported that “Thousands of pupils and students in Sudan currently do not enjoy breakfast as their parents can no longer afford the costs. Parents, teachers, and janitors told Radio Dabanga that the majority of the children remain hungry throughout the school day because of their families’ inability to provide them with a decent meal in the morning. [...] A number of mothers in the poor districts around Khartoum as well complain about having to send their children to school without a proper meal because of poverty.’ More than 70 per cent of the schoolchildren in the area do not buy breakfast at school,’ one of them explained. ‘My children now share one sandwich after the price of three loaves reached five Pounds’”.⁵⁰⁵

UNOCHA reported in its January 2020 Humanitarian Needs Overview on the impact of the economic crisis in Khartoum:

As the economic crisis continues, people in urban areas, including Khartoum, are increasingly struggling to cope. In December 2018, the previous government implemented several policy changes – particularly the removal of subsidies - which had a deleterious effect on the urban poor. The extreme rise in the price of wheat and other staples impacted urban families the most, as prices

⁵⁰³ Freedom House, [Freedom in the World 2019: Sudan](#), 4 February 2019, G. *Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights*: 1 / 16

⁵⁰⁴ UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Needs Overview](#), January 2020, 3.6 *Protection* p. 50

⁵⁰⁵ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan crisis: Thousands of school children go without breakfast](#), 29 July 2018

increased four times from October 2017 levels. Poor people in urban areas usually have more cash assets, which they are unable to protect from the effects of inflation, and thus have felt the effects of the high inflation and overall economic crisis particularly strongly.

Within Khartoum state, 75 per cent of households surveyed in a rapid assessment of the impact of the economic situation (October 2018) were unable to satisfy their basic needs without selling assets, borrowing money, or reducing their spending on health and food. In the same assessment, 27 per cent of respondents indicated they had been forced to reduce education expenses by transferring their children to a lower quality school or withdrawing them from school entirely. 24 per cent of respondents said they could not afford health services. Asked to rate their living conditions after January 2018 compared to before January 2018, 82 per cent of those surveyed said living standards were “much worse” or “worse”. In Mayo, a periphery of Khartoum, a “special market [to sell] left over food” has risen up, where people sell food collected from weddings or restaurants, some of it spoiled, at a discount. As the economic crises persists, these dynamics are likely to continue.

In the longer term, the conflict in Darfur and in the Two Areas, as well as the lack of education and work opportunities in rural areas, have continued to drive urbanization and migration into Khartoum and its peripheries. This continuous urbanization, combined with the negative effects of the economic crisis, stress already stretched or non-existent services. The availability and quality of education, health, and WASH services varies widely across Khartoum’s different neighbourhoods. Improved basic services, as well as an enhanced social safety net, are needed to address existing needs and to ensure more people do not fall into humanitarian need.⁵⁰⁶

Khartoum – Health

In July 2019 Radio Dabanga reported that “The Ministry of Health of Khartoum state reports that 142 children have suffered from measles in the state. The announcement of cases of measles in the capital coincides with the start of the campaign to escalate the eradication of measles, polio, and vitamin A deficiency in Khartoum state from July 22-31 [2019]. The ministry has acknowledged the existence of significant challenges which delayed the campaign for four months, including political events in the country, as well as difficult access to children from the age of three years in the home”.⁵⁰⁷

The UNOCHA reported in its January 2020 Humanitarian Needs Overview with regards to health:

During 2019, episodes of violence and armed conflict continued to occur across Sudan resulting in more than 500 fatalities, mainly in Khartoum, Red Sea, Darfur, and South, West and North Kordofan states. Imports of medicines and medical supplies dropped by about 35 per cent compared to the same period in 2018, which contributed to cost increases of 50-100 per cent, reducing the overall availability of essential medicines in the public sector from 60 per cent in 2018 to 43 per cent in 2019, and restricting access to essential life-saving health care services. As a result, medicine availability was only 43 per cent in the national medical supply fund, 49 per cent in the national health insurance fund, and 59 per cent in the private sector. The lowest availability of medicines was in Red Sea (10 per cent), followed by West Darfur (12 per cent), Northern (30 per cent), and South Kordofan (31 per cent). [...]

While the deteriorating health situation in Sudan has impacted the whole population, specific groups of people are affected disproportionately due to their differences in vulnerability. Children under 5 years of age are particularly exposed to vaccine preventable and infectious diseases compounded by poor nutritional status. Malnutrition is the leading cause of deaths of children under five in hospitals, contributing to 17 per cent of such deaths. Septicemia (11 per cent), malaria (9 per cent), and diarrheal diseases (5 per cent) are also significant causes.⁵⁰⁸

⁵⁰⁶ UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Needs Overview](#), January 2020, 1.2 *Impact of the Crisis* p.13

⁵⁰⁷ Radio Dabanga, [Vaccination campaign to eradicate measles in Khartoum state](#), 23 July 2019

⁵⁰⁸ UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Needs Overview](#), January 2020, 3.6 *Protection* p. 50

Omdurman – Health

Radio Dabanga reported in September 2019 that “Reports are reaching Radio Dabanga from various parts of Sudan of a rise in water- and mosquito-borne diseases. [...] northern districts of Omdurman, especially in El Iskan and other peripheral areas, witnessed cases of diarrhoea, fevers, and nausea among children”.⁵⁰⁹

Khartoum – Access to education

UNICEF’s humanitarian situation report covering the third quarter of 2019 noted that:

The heavy rain and flooding affected nutrition services such as in South Khartoum where closures left women and children without access to nutrition support. The nutrition sector participated in an interagency rapid assessment in South Khartoum and mobilized partners to respond. Partners were assisted with their applications for SHF emergency funding (case for funding) to enact contingency plans. Pre-positioned nutrition supplies were distributed in all States with support from UNICEF and WFP. Mass screening (MUAC screening) was conducted and mobile OTPs were operationalised especially in hard to reach areas. Health and nutrition volunteers received training and mothers and children received key messages through home visits. Mothers also received infant and young child (IYCF) support through existing mother to mother support groups. [...]

Flooding and heavy rain in August resulted in extensive damage to education facilities in Central Darfur, Gedarif, Kassala, Khartoum, North Kordofan, White Nile and West Darfur with 297 basic schools, 293 kindergartens and 269 secondary schools being affected with White Nile and Khartoum states suffering heaviest affects.⁵¹⁰

UNOCHA reported in its January 2020 Humanitarian Needs Overview on the impact of the economic crisis in Khartoum “Within Khartoum state, 75 per cent of households surveyed in a rapid assessment of the impact of the economic situation (October 2018) were unable to satisfy their basic needs without selling assets, borrowing money, or reducing their spending on health and food. In the same assessment, 27 per cent of respondents indicated they had been forced to reduce education expenses by transferring their children to a lower quality school or withdrawing them from school entirely”.⁵¹¹

5.9. Individuals of diverse sexual orientation or gender identity

No COI published between 10 July 2018 and 10 December 2019 on living conditions for individuals of diverse sexual orientation or gender identity in Khartoum or Omdurman was found amongst the sources consulted.

For non-profile specific, general information on living conditions in Khartoum and Omdurman, as well as other urban areas across Sudan, consult sources included at the beginning of section [5. Living conditions](#).

⁵⁰⁹ Radio Dabanga, [Disease, malaria rife in Sudan amid medicine, healthcare shortages](#), 3 September 2019

⁵¹⁰ UNICEF, [Sudan Humanitarian Situation Report Third Quarter 2019](#), 5 November 2019

⁵¹¹ UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Needs Overview](#), January 2020, 1.2 Impact of the Crisis p.13

Unspecified location

A Sudanese blogger of LGBTIQ sexual orientation noted in May 2019 that:

The LGBTQI+ community has never been recognized in Sudan and is still to a great extent denied any form of rights to freedom, peace and justice. Because of your sexual orientation or gender identity, you risk being denied access to health services and education, to lose your job and being subject to hate crimes.⁵¹²

⁵¹² Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), [Blog from Sudan: The Sudanese revolution: A fight for LGBTQI + rights?](#), 8 May 2019