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Peoples under
Threat 2014:
hate crimes and
mass killing

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A crime against humanity is defined in the statute of the International Criminal Court as a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population ‘in furtherance of a state or organizational policy’. Similarly, the analysis framework used by the UN Special Adviser on the prevention of genocide to determine whether there may be a risk of genocide in a given situation includes consideration of the ‘motivation of leading actors in the state’, as well as factors such as discriminatory legislation, systematic exclusion of groups from employment in state institutions, imposition of emergency laws, and other manifestations of state power. While a number of other factors are also considered, the focus here on state behaviour is both logical and essential given the central role of the state in coordinating and legitimating mass atrocities in recent history, including the Nazi Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide.

However, state officials may not be the only actors involved in the commission of atrocities, or in the racist or sectarian violence that frequently precedes atrocities. A range of private or non-state actors, from racist individuals and criminal gangs to extremist associations, political parties or armed opposition groups, may be responsible for attacks on minorities and other vulnerable communities. Much of this activity could, or should, be treated as hate crime under national criminal law. States are obliged to prevent and punish such hate crimes. The failure to do so effectively is an important factor in creating an environment where atrocities are more likely to occur.

The 2014 release of the *Peoples under Threat* index demonstrates the complexity of the relationship between the role of the state and the role of private actors in the commission of widespread hate crimes and, in the extreme case, mass atrocities. States may lack the capacity to respond to rising hate crimes in society or may be otherwise unable or unwilling to recognize and prosecute hate crimes. The impunity thus created may be strengthened by elements of the state sharing the prejudices or bias motivation of the perpetrators. In some cases the persecution can be led by state officials or politicians, including through public statements. (The office of the UN Special Adviser on the prevention of genocide

includes in its monitoring a ‘sudden increase in inflammatory rhetoric or hate propaganda, especially by leaders, even if it does not amount to incitement to genocidal violence in itself.’) The prevalence of hate crimes in society may thus demonstrate collusion or even coordination by parts of the state.

At the same time, the persecuted group or groups may also be targeted by official measures, whether symbolic (such as the removal of protection for minority languages) or repressive (for example, exclusion from public positions, compulsory registration or identification) - measures which may themselves invite further persecution. In the most deadly circumstances, the state itself becomes a mechanism for mass killing, including through its own security forces or other agents. In such cases the state may also co-opt or constrain private actors to take part, or may even coordinate death squads or armed militias to perpetrate killing clandestinely or at one remove from the state.

The *Peoples under Threat* index identifies those countries around the world where communities face the greatest risk of genocide, mass killing or systematic violent repression. Based on current indicators from authoritative sources (see box below), *Peoples under Threat* has been compiled every year since 2005 to provide early warning of potential future mass atrocities. A number of states that rose prominently in the index over the last two years – including South Sudan, the Central African Republic, Pakistan and Syria – subsequently faced episodes of extreme ethnic or sectarian violence.

The 2014 release of *Peoples under Threat* shows that the risk in those states remains critical – but also that threat levels have risen in other states. In many cases, the threat comes not just from governmental forces, or even armed opposition groups seeking to form a new government, but also from private or non-state actors whose relationship with formal authorities may be opaque or controversial. In some cases, the involvement of non-state actors may even be a deliberate ruse to avoid accountability mechanisms.

Rising threats in 2014

The Middle East and Africa dominate the list of major risers in the index this year.

In January 2014 the Office of the UN High

Commissioner on Human Rights announced that the difficulty of verifying information had led it to abandon updating death tolls for the conflict in Syria, last estimated at over 100,000. The fragmentation of the war, in terms of both the proliferation of armed groups and the complex pattern of shifting control on the ground, creates further problems for determining accountability. It also accompanies a growing sectarianization of the conflict. The government of President Bashar al-Assad retains principal culpability for the slaughter, including through indiscriminate bombardment of civilian areas and the deployment of the Shabiha militia. But the Free Syrian Army (FSA), the military wing of the national coalition opposed to the Assad government, steadily lost ground during the year to a number of Islamist militias with a sectarian agenda, including Jabhat Al-Nusra, the Islamic Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), all responsible for gross human rights abuses. Kurds in the north, long persecuted under Assad, faced repeated attacks in the second half of the year by Islamist groups as well as the FSA, pushing some 50,000 refugees to flee to Iraqi Kurdistan.

Yemen has steadily risen in *Peoples under Threat* over eight years and now finds itself in the top ten states in the index. A national dialogue conference concluded in January 2014, with delegates agreeing to extend the term of President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi by one year to oversee the drafting of a new Constitution before general elections and moves towards a more federal system of government. But the dialogue process was marked by entrenched disagreements, mirroring conflict on the ground on a number of separate fronts, including between al-Houthi (Shi'a) rebels in the north and Sunni tribes, as well as between the authorities and Southern secessionists. Large-scale attacks and assassinations by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and other Islamist groups continued, as did US drone strikes against them.

Egypt has risen a striking 33 places in the index this year, although it remains outside the critical upper reaches of the table. Following the removal of President Mohamed Morsi by the military in July, clashes between Muslim Brotherhood protesters and security forces escalated in August. Over 1,000 people were

killed in an army crackdown on protest camps in the Nahda and Rabaa al-Adawiya squares in Cairo and subsequent clashes across the country, although exact figures remain heavily disputed. Attacks on Coptic Christians and on Coptic churches were blamed on Muslim extremists, but human rights activists also criticized an inadequate response from Egyptian authorities, including in Minya governorate. A new Constitution, approved by referendum in January 2014, improved protections for minorities but also entrenched the power of the military. After Morsi's removal, a major military operation was launched against Islamist militants in North Sinai. Sinai Bedouin, long marginalized by Egyptian authorities, fear their communities will suffer most in the escalation of the conflict.

It continues to host the largest UN peace-keeping mission in the world, but the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) rose again in the *Peoples under Threat* index in 2014. Katangan separatism, at the centre of the first Congo crisis in the 1960s, led to resurgent violence and the displacement of up to 200,000 people in the province of Katanga last year. In a rare success for government forces, the M23 rebellion in the east was suppressed with the support of UN peace-keepers, but the threat levels in the DRC remain high for at least three related reasons: the proliferation of different armed groups, leading to dozens of separate conflicts, particularly in the east, over ethnicity and natural resources; the track record of neighbouring states in consistently supporting such armed groups; and the repeated practice of integrating former rebels into the Congolese armed forces, who are now often as feared by local communities as the militias from which they came.

When the newly independent state of South Sudan sprang straight near the top of the index two years ago, it seemed that pessimism had prevailed over hope. But the events of recent months have sadly proved the prescience of *Peoples under Threat*. A dispute between President Salva Kiir Mayardit and his deputy, Riek Machar, quickly degenerated into open ethnic conflict in December, pitting Dinka forces controlled by the government against ethnic Nuer. The NGO International Crisis Group estimated that up to 10,000 people had been

Major Risers since 2013

Rank	Rise in rank since 2013	Country	Group	Total
3	3	Syria	Political targets, Shi'a/Alawites, Christians, Kurds, Palestinians	21.61
4	4	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	Hema and Lendu, Hutu, Luba, Lunda, Tutsi/Banyamulenge, Batwa/Bambutu, other groups	20.98
10	1	Yemen	Zaydi Shi'a, 'Akhdam', Southerners	18.58
12	2	South Sudan	Murle, Nuer, Dinka, Anuak, Jie, Kachipo	17.71
14	3	Central African Republic	Muslims, Christians; Kaba (Sara), Mboum, Mbororo, Gula, Aka	15.88
17	8	Mali	Tuaregs, Arabs, Maure and others in the north	15.47
23	33	Egypt	Copts, Shi'a, Bahá'ís; Nubians, Bedouin	14.12
30	6	Turkey	Kurds, Alevis, Roma, Armenians and other Christians	12.86
40	18	Guinea-Bissau	Balanta, Fula (Fulani), Manjaco, Mandinga, Papel, Ejamat (Felupe), Jola (Diola), Susu, Cape Verdeans	12.10
60	New entry	Ukraine	Tatars, Krymchak and Karaites in Crimea; Russians, Hungarians, Moldovans and other national minorities	10.91

killed by January 2014, and the UN estimated in March that over one million had been displaced. Further massacres targeted by ethnicity took place in Bentiu and in Bor in April, even as peace negotiations continued in neighbouring Ethiopia. Adama Dieng, the Special Adviser on the prevention of genocide, reported to the UN Security Council that in Bentiu more than 200 Dinka civilians were killed and 'fighters allied to Dr Riek Machar incited the civilian population to attack the Dinka', while in Bor more than 50 mostly Nuer civilians were killed when a UN camp was attacked by an organized group including 'individuals in the uniforms of the army of South Sudan'. The Special Adviser noted that reports of 'homogenization of security forces by both camps are worrying'. The mobilization of the current or former armed forces of the state to carry out ethnic killing elevates the situation in South Sudan to a level of critical danger.

Recent events in South Sudan have detracted attention from increased violence in the Republic of Sudan, particularly in Darfur. Clashes between Sudanese armed forces and rebels in North Darfur, as well as tribal clashes in the centre and south of the region, have led to renewed population displacement and accusations that

the authorities are denying humanitarian access to the affected areas. Last year the joint African Union (AU)–UN mission in Darfur was targeted in a string of armed assaults, resulting in the death of 16 peace-keepers. AU-mediated talks continue between the government and rebels in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, but the government's expressed intention to bring all rebellions in the country to an end by the summer has led to fears of renewed attacks on civilian populations in all three areas.

In the Central African Republic, both UN and French officials warned in November of the risk of genocide. The predominantly Muslim Séléka rebel coalition which took power in March 2013 had fallen apart by September, but fighters were responsible for widespread looting and a series of abuses against civilians, leading to the creation of Christian self-defence militias, known as anti-balaka, which include supporters of former President Bozizé. Abuses by anti-balaka have now left the minority Muslim communities, often accused of supporting Séléka, at the greatest risk of mass killings. The UN Special Adviser described such abuses as crimes against humanity when he addressed the Security Council in March, reporting that 'Muslims are now being

deliberately and systematically targeted by the anti-balaka and by mobs of civilians in Bangui and in the countryside'. Muslims have fled the capital Bangui and only some 20 per cent of the total Muslim population is left in the country. The interim president Catherine Samba-Panza has the task of re-establishing the government's authority and halting abuses by its troops, to be aided by a UN peace-keeping force of 12,000 agreed by the Security Council in April.

Despite the successful holding of presidential elections last year and the return to constitutional government, Mali continues to face instability from both Islamist rebels and the Tuareg fighters of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). In recent months some 200,000 people have returned to Northern Mali after the end of conflict, but the MNLA withdrew from a ceasefire agreed in June and clashes with Islamist fighters continue.

After five coups in the last three decades, hopes that elections in Guinea-Bissau this year will bring stability have to be tempered with caution. The country's rise in the index is partly due to declines in governance, as corruption and drug-trafficking have become further entrenched. But politics in Guinea-Bissau is also characterized by strong ethnic allegiances, and memories of a bitter civil war in the 1990s are still fresh.

The new entry of Ukraine into the *Peoples under Threat* table is perhaps unsurprising given recent events. Russia's annexation of Crimea has prompted particular concern for the Crimean Tatars, an indigenous population of some 300,000 who suffered forced displacement under the Soviet regime. In an atmosphere of intimidation, many Tatars did not vote in the March 2014 referendum on joining with Russia organized by the Crimean authorities. The concerns are not limited to Crimea, however. The presence of ethnic nationalists among the protesters who brought down President Viktor Yanukovich and the immediate repeal of minority language legislation after his fall were worrying signals for many of Ukraine's minorities, including ethnic Russians as well as Hungarians and Romanians. Violent protests by pro-Russian protesters in Eastern Ukraine escalated tensions further in April.

A number of parallels exist between the

situation in Ukraine and that in Moldova, which also entered the *Peoples under Threat* table this year. Ethnic Russian protesters in Moldova's breakaway region of Trans-Dniester have called for annexation by Russia, which has troops stationed there. The Russian authorities are acutely concerned that Moldova will sign an association agreement with the EU in 2014 – the same process that sparked the Ukraine crisis.

Peoples at greatest risk

Of the countries covered above, Syria, Sudan, the DRC and Yemen are all placed in the top ten of the *Peoples under Threat* index. For nearly all the countries at this critical level of the index, mass killing is not just a pressing threat: it is already a reality.

Somalia grimly held on to its place at the head of the *Peoples under Threat* index again this year. The Federal Government of Somalia and the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) successfully pushed al-Shabaab rebels out of many towns and cities, but the group continues to control large rural areas – imposing a fundamentalist version of *Sharia* – and repeatedly demonstrated its ability to carry out suicide bombings and other high profile attacks in the capital Mogadishu. Minorities, including the Bantu, remain highly vulnerable, although with control over different parts of south-central Somalia shifting between a range of religious and/or clan-based militias, sometimes allied with Ethiopian or Kenyan troops, almost all Somalis remain at risk of violence.

In Afghanistan, overall civilian casualties rose by 14 per cent in 2013, according to the UN assistance mission. Of 2,959 civilian deaths, most were due to indiscriminate bombings and other attacks by the Taliban and anti-government elements, although there was also an increase in the number of civilians killed in the course of operations by pro-government forces. The start of the presidential election campaign in 2014 was marked by a rise in attacks by the Taliban, who have vowed to recapture more of the country after the scheduled departure of international troops by the end of the year. Meanwhile the National Front, a new alliance of Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara leaders, has announced its opposition to accommodation with the Pashtun-dominated Taliban.

Peoples most under threat – highest rated countries 2014

Rank	Country	Group	Total
1	Somalia	Minorities incl. Bantu, Benadiri and 'caste' groups (Gabooye etc.); clan members at risk in fighting incl. Hawiye, Darod, etc.	23.34
2	Sudan	Fur, Zaghawa, Massalit and others in Darfur; Ngok Dinka, Nuba, Beja	21.63
3	Syria	Political targets, Shi'a/Alawites, Christians, Kurds, Palestinians	21.61
4	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	Hema and Lendu, Hutu, Luba, Lunda, Tutsi/Banyamulenge, Batwa/Bambutu, other groups	20.98
5	Afghanistan	Hazara, Pashtun, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Baluchis	20.96
6	Iraq	Shi'a, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkmen, Christians, Mandaeans, Yezidis, Shabak, Faili Kurds, Bahá'ís, Palestinians	20.67
7	Pakistan	Shi'a (incl. Hazara), Ahmadiyya, Hindus and other religious minorities; Baluchis, Mohhajirs, Pashtun, Sindhis	20.49
8	Burma/Myanmar	Kachin, Karenni, Karen, Mons, Rakhine, Rohingyas, Shan, Chin (Zomis), Wa	19.69
9	Ethiopia	Anuak, Afars, Oromo, Somalis, smaller minorities	19.18
10	Yemen	Zaydi Shi'a, 'Akhdam', Southerners	18.58

With some 8,000 civilians killed, 2013 was the bloodiest year in Iraq since 2007. Operations by the rebel group ISIS increased in intensity, particularly in Anbar, and car bombings ran at the rate of two a day for much of the year. Both the activities of armed groups and the tense political situation led to a dangerous new rise in Sunni–Shi'a sectarian killing. At the same time, the situation remains precarious for many of Iraq's smaller communities, including Chaldo-Assyrians, Yezidis and Turkmen, particularly in Ninewa, Kirkuk and other disputed areas of northern Iraq.

While the deadly conflict in Pakistan with Islamist armed groups in the north-west draws most international media attention, the threat of ethnic or sectarian killing reaches across the country. This includes risks from inter-ethnic political violence in Sindh, sectarian clashes between Deobandi and Barelvi militant groups, violent repression of Baluchi activists in Baluchistan, continued persecution of Christians and Ahmadiyya, and an exterminatory campaign against Hazara and other Shi'a across the country waged by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sipah-e-Sahaba and the Pakistani Taliban, which claimed the lives of hundreds of victims last year.

The gradual thawing of Myanmar's system of authoritarian government continues, but the country remains stubbornly in the upper reaches of the *Peoples under Threat* index. One reason for this is the growing hostility against minority Muslims. The most serious abuses have occurred against Muslim Rohingya in Rakhine state, but violence has also spread to other parts of the country, stoked by Buddhist extremist rhetoric. Most killings of Muslims have been carried out by local mobs or Buddhist gangs, but the government has also effectively cut off humanitarian aid to the 100,000 displaced Rohingya living in camps. At the same time, ceasefire talks continue between the government and a negotiating coalition of 16 ethnic armed groups. It is too early to predict the outcome of the process, but the last year was marked by continued armed clashes, particularly in Kachin state, leading to mass displacement of local communities.

In Pakistan and Myanmar, hate crimes against a particular religious minority have already reached the scale of mass atrocities. The situation in each of those countries is very different, yet both are characterized by a

pervasive impunity that leaves perpetrators free to kill repeatedly, encouraged and justified by hate speech circulating unchecked. Individual criminal responsibility should adhere to the principal authors of such crimes, be they members of armed groups, community leaders or fundamentalist clerics. But at the very least the state should also be held accountable for a catastrophic failure to protect the human rights of its peoples. ■

How is *Peoples under Threat* calculated?

Since the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, our ability to identify those situations most likely to lead to genocide or mass killing has improved. A number of comparative studies of the factors preceding historic episodes of political mass killing had been undertaken since the 1970s, including by Helen Fein and Ted Robert Gurr, but it was not until the 1990s that researchers such as Rudolf Rummel and Matthew Krain pioneered quantitative longitudinal analysis of a wide range of such factors, enabling the testing of different causal hypotheses. Rummel, for example, showed the very strong relationship between concentration of government power and state mass murder; Krain demonstrated the correlation between existing armed conflict or political instability and the onset and severity of mass killing.

Following the early work of the Clinton administration's policy initiative on genocide early warning and prevention, Professor Barbara Harff, a senior consultant with the US State Failure Task Force, constructed and tested models of the antecedents of genocide and political mass murder and her results were published in 2003 ('Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955', *American Political Science Review* 97, February 2003). Her optimal model identifies six preconditions that make it possible to distinguish, with 74 per cent accuracy, between internal wars and regime collapses in the period 1955–1997 that did, and those that did not, lead to genocide and political mass murder (politicide). The six preconditions are: political upheaval; previous genocides or politicides; exclusionary ideology of the ruling elite; autocratic nature of the regime; minority character of the ruling elite; and low trade openness.

Minority Rights Group International (MRG) has drawn on these research findings to construct the *Peoples under Threat* table, although responsibility for the final table is exclusively our own. *Peoples under Threat*

is specifically designed to identify the risk of genocide, mass killing or other systematic violent repression, unlike most other early warning tools, which focus on violent conflict as such. Its primary application is civilian protection.

Indicators of conflict are included in the table's construction, however, as most, although not all, episodes of mass ethnic or religious killing occur during armed conflicts. War provides the state of emergency, domestic mobilization and justification, international cover, and in some cases the military and logistic capacity, that enable massacres to be carried out. Some massacres, however, occur in peacetime, or may accompany armed conflict from its inception, presenting a problem to risk models that focus exclusively on current conflicts. In addition, severe and even violent repression of minorities may occur for years before the onset of armed conflict provides the catalyst for larger scale killing.

The statistical indicators used all relate to the state. The state is the basic unit of enquiry, rather than particular ethnic or religious groups at risk, as governments or militias connected to the government are responsible for most cases of genocidal violence. Formally, the state will reserve to itself the monopoly over the means of violence, so that where non-state actors are responsible for widespread or continued killing, it usually occurs with either the complicity of the state or in a 'failed state' situation where the rule of law has disintegrated. Certain characteristics at the level of the state will greatly increase the likelihood of atrocity, including habituation to illegal violence among the armed forces or police, prevailing impunity for human rights violations, official tolerance or encouragement of hate speech against particular groups, and in extreme cases, prior experience of mass killing. Egregious episodes of mass killing targeted principally at one group have also seen other groups deliberately decimated or destroyed.

However, some groups may experience higher levels of discrimination and be at greater risk than others in any given state. MRG has identified those groups in each state which we

believe to be under most threat. (This does not mean that other groups or indeed the general population may not also be at some risk.) It should be noted that although these groups are most often minorities, in some cases ethnic or religious majorities will also be at risk and in relevant cases are therefore also listed in the table. In some cases, all the groups in the country are at risk of ethnic or sectarian killing.

One indicator that has been tested and discarded by a number of studies is the general level of ethnic or cultural diversity in a society. Krain did not find any correlation between 'ethnic fractionalization' and the onset of genocide or political mass killing. Similarly, neither of the patterns of ethnic diversity tested by Harff had any effect on the likelihood of mass killing (although she did find the minority character of the ruling elite to be significant). These findings are supported by research on the relationship between diversity and conflict.

The overall measure is based on a basket of ten indicators. These include indicators of democracy or good governance from the World Bank, conflict data from the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research and the Center for Systemic Peace, indicators of group division or elite factionalization from the Fund for Peace and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the State Failure Task Force data on prior genocides and politicides, and the country credit risk classification published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (as a proxy for trade openness). For citations and further information, see the notes to the table. For a fuller discussion of the methodology, see *State of the World's Minorities 2006*.

Based on current indicators from authoritative sources, *Peoples under Threat* seeks to identify those groups or peoples most under threat in 2014. ■

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Country	Group	Conflict indicators		
		A. Self-determination conflicts	B. Major armed conflict	C. Prior genocide/politicide
Somalia	Minorities incl. Bantu, Benadiri and 'caste' groups (Gabooye etc.); clan members at risk in fighting incl. Hawiye, Darod, etc.	4	2	1
Sudan	Fur, Zaghawa, Massalit and others in Darfur; Ngok Dinka, Nuba, Beja	5	2	1
Syria	Political targets, Shi'a/Alawites, Christians, Kurds, Palestinians	5	2	1
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	Hema and Lendu, Hutu, Luba, Lunda, Tutsi/Banyamulenge, Batwa/Bambutu, other groups	4	2	1
Afghanistan	Hazara, Pashtun, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Baluchis	4	2	1
Iraq	Shi'a, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkmen, Christians, Mandaans, Yezidis, Shabak, Faili Kurds, Bahá'í, Palestinians	5	2	1
Pakistan	Shi'a (incl. Hazara), Ahmadiyya, Hindus and other religious minorities: Baluchis, Mohhajirs, Pashtun, Sindhis	5	2	1
Burma/Myanmar	Kachin, Karenni, Karen, Mons, Rakhine, Rohingyas, Shan, Chin (Zomis), Wa	5	2	1
Ethiopia	Anuak, Afars, Oromo, Somalis, smaller minorities	5	2	1
Yemen	Zaydi Shi'a, 'Akhdam', Southerners	4	2	0
Nigeria	Ibo, Ijaw, Ogoni, Yoruba, Hausa (Muslims) and Christians in the North	5	2	1
South Sudan	Murle, Nuer, Dinka, Anuak, Jie, Kachipo	0	2	1
Iran	Arabs, Azeris, Bahá'í, Baluchis, Kurds, Turkmen	4	0	1
Central African Republic	Muslims, Christians; Kaba (Sara), Mboum, Mbororo, Gula, Aka	0	2	0
Israel/OPT	Palestinians in Gaza/West Bank, Israeli Palestinians, Bedouin	5	1	0
Zimbabwe	Ndebele, white Zimbabweans, political/social targets	2	0	1
Mali	Tuaregs, Arabs, Maure, and others in the north	4	2	0
Chad	'Black African' groups, Arabs, Southerners	2	1	0
Russian Federation	Chechens, Ingush and others in North Caucasus; indigenous northern peoples, Roma, Jews	5	2	1
Cote d'Ivoire	Northern Mande (Dioula), Senoufo, Bete, newly-settled groups	3	1	0
Philippines	Indigenous peoples, Moros (Muslims), Chinese	5	2	1
Burundi	Hutu, Tutsi, Batwa	0	0	1

Indicators of group division			Democracy/governance indicators				Total
D. Massive movement – refugees and IDPs	E. Legacy of vengeance – group grievance	F. Rise of factionalized elites	G. Voice and accountability	H. Political stability	I. Rule of law	J. OECD country risk classification	
10.0	9.3	10.0	-2.233	-2.894	-2.450	7	23.34
10.0	10.0	10.0	-1.784	-2.267	-1.208	7	21.63
9.5	9.3	9.2	-1.789	-2.688	-1.101	7	21.61
10.0	9.4	9.5	-1.516	-2.118	-1.653	7	20.98
9.2	9.2	9.4	-1.317	-2.420	-1.723	7	20.96
8.8	10.0	9.6	-1.134	-1.932	-1.497	7	20.67
9.1	9.7	9.2	-0.868	-2.682	-0.910	7	20.49
8.5	9.0	8.6	-1.647	-0.962	-1.354	7	19.69
8.7	8.6	8.7	-1.277	-1.535	-0.656	7	19.18
9.2	9.0	9.5	-1.394	-2.431	-1.265	7	18.58
6.6	9.8	9.4	-0.727	-2.053	-1.181	5	18.39
10.0	10.0	9.8	-1.264	-1.217	-1.387	7	17.71
7.3	8.8	9.4	-1.574	-1.321	-0.901	7	16.42
9.8	8.5	9.1	-1.261	-1.869	-1.446	7	16.02
7.4	9.8	8.1	-1.021	-1.936	-0.456	7	15.74
8.7	8.4	9.7	-1.445	-0.785	-1.618	7	15.69
7.6	7.6	5.0	-0.547	-1.977	-0.693	7	15.47
9.7	8.8	9.5	-1.328	-1.065	-1.454	7	15.13
5.3	8.2	8.0	-0.965	-0.822	-0.821	3	15.07
9.3	9.0	9.4	-0.793	-1.261	-1.109	7	14.90
6.5	7.9	8.0	-0.042	-1.160	-0.546	3	14.36
8.8	8.1	7.9	-0.933	-1.683	-1.089	7	14.21

Country	Group	Conflict indicators		
		A. Self-determination conflicts	B. Major armed conflict	C. Prior genocide/politicide
Egypt	Copts, Shi'a, Bahá'í; Nubians, Bedouin	5	1	0
Lebanon	Druze, Maronite Christians, Palestinians, Shi'a, Sunnis	2	1	0
Libya	Black Libyans, Sub-Saharan migrants, Tebu, Berbers	2	1	0
Sri Lanka	Tamils, Muslims	4	0	1
Kyrgyzstan	Uzbeks, Russians	2	1	0
Kenya	Borana, Kalenjin, Kikuyu, Luhya, Luo, Muslims, Turkana, Endorois, Maasai, Ogiek, other indigenous groups	2	1	0
Algeria	Berbers, Saharawi	2	1	1
Turkey	Kurds, Alevs, Roma, Armenians and other Christians	5	2	0
Equatorial Guinea	Bubi, Annobon Islanders	1	0	1
Thailand	Chinese, Malay-Muslims, Northern hill tribes	5	2	0
Angola	Bakongo, Cabindans, Ovimbundu, Pastoralists, San and Kwisi	2	0	1
Nepal	Madheshis (Terai), Dalits, <i>Janajati</i> , linguistic minorities	2	0	0
Guinea	Fulani (Peul), Malinke	0	0	0
Eritrea	Afars, Saho, Tigre, religious minorities	0	0	0
Uganda	Acholi, Karamojong, Basongora, Batwa	1	0	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Croats, Bosniac Muslims, Serbs, Roma	2	0	1
Rwanda	Hutu, Tutsi, Batwa	0	0	1
Guinea-Bissau	Balanta, Fula (Fulani), Manjaco, Mandinga, Papel, Ejamat (Felupe), Jola (Diola), Susu, Cape Verdeans	0	0	0
Kosovo	Serbs, Roma/Ashkali/Egyptians, Bosniaks, Turks, Gorani	4	0	0
Bangladesh	Ahmadiyya, Hindus, other religious minorities; Chittagong hill tribes	3	0	0
Tajikistan	Uzbeks, Pamiris, Russians	1	0	0
China	Tibetans, Uyghurs, Mongols, Hui, religious minorities	5	0	1
Colombia	Political/social targets, Afro-descendants, indigenous peoples	2	2	0
Niger	Djerema-songhai, Hausa, Tuaregs	2	0	0
Uzbekistan	Tajiks, Islamic political groups, religious minorities, Karakalpaks, Russians	1	0	0
Azerbaijan	Armenians	4	0	0
Cameroon	'Westerners', Southerners	2	0	0
Haiti	Political/social targets	0	0	0

Indicators of group division			Democracy/governance indicators				Total
D. Massive movement – refugees and IDPs	E. Legacy of vengeance – group grievance	F. Rise of factionalized elites	G. Voice and accountability	H. Political stability	I. Rule of law	J. OECD country risk classification	
6.5	8.5	8.7	-0.738	-1.481	-0.452	6	14.12
8.5	8.5	9.2	-0.415	-1.648	-0.752	7	13.81
5.4	7.4	8.0	-0.937	-1.561	-1.148	7	13.74
8.4	9.5	9.3	-0.598	-0.706	-0.108	6	13.69
5.6	8.4	8.0	-0.639	-0.889	-1.151	7	12.96
8.7	9.0	9.0	-0.299	-1.293	-0.865	6	12.91
7.0	7.8	7.3	-0.914	-1.341	-0.795	3	12.86
7.4	9.0	7.3	-0.241	-1.192	0.035	4	12.86
3.3	6.6	8.2	-1.874	0.207	-1.263	7	12.82
6.4	8.1	8.8	-0.342	-1.205	-0.172	3	12.48
7.2	6.8	7.3	-1.083	-0.378	-1.276	5	12.41
7.7	9.0	8.2	-0.697	-1.384	-0.790	7	12.39
8.2	7.6	8.9	-1.083	-1.281	-1.437	7	12.29
7.4	6.1	8.1	-2.153	-0.691	-1.364	7	12.19
8.4	8.0	8.6	-0.494	-0.890	-0.358	6	12.15
6.8	7.7	8.7	-0.140	-0.536	-0.230	7	12.15
7.9	8.2	8.2	-1.238	-0.212	-0.263	7	12.14
7.8	5.7	9.7	-1.408	-0.926	-1.520	7	12.10
6.6	8.0	8.0	-0.220	-1.146	-0.563	7	12.07
7.3	8.6	8.9	-0.416	-1.351	-0.908	6	12.05
5.3	6.7	8.3	-1.373	-1.162	-1.176	7	11.97
6.1	8.3	7.2	-1.578	-0.544	-0.489	2	11.96
8.3	7.5	7.7	-0.111	-1.403	-0.392	4	11.83
7.9	7.8	8.9	-0.395	-1.173	-0.738	7	11.78
6.0	7.5	8.7	-1.984	-0.522	-1.267	6	11.73
7.9	6.9	7.8	-1.261	-0.687	-0.805	5	11.65
7.3	7.8	9.2	-1.029	-0.575	-1.021	6	11.42
8.6	7.0	9.0	-0.797	-0.791	-1.344	7	11.41

Country	Group	Conflict indicators		
		A. Self-determination conflicts	B. Major armed conflict	C. Prior genocide/politicide
Djibouti	Afars	3	0	0
Cambodia	Cham, Vietnamese, indigenous hill tribes (Khmer Leou)	0	0	1
Mauritania	Haratins ('Black Moors'), Kewri	0	0	0
India	Assamese, Bodos, Nagas, Tripuras, other <i>Adivasis</i> ; Kashmiris, Sikhs, Muslims, Dalits	5	2	0
North Korea	Political/social targets, religious minorities	0	0	0
Laos	Hmong, other highland peoples	2	0	0
Venezuela	Indigenous peoples, Afro-descendants	0	0	0
Ecuador	Afro-descendants, indigenous peoples	2	0	0
Serbia	Bosniaks, Ethnic Albanians, Croats, Roma	2	0	1
Ukraine	Tatars, Krymchak and Karaites in Crimea; Russians, Hungarians, Moldovans and other national minorities	5	0	0
Vietnam	Montagnards (Degar), other highland peoples, religious minorities	2	0	1
Georgia	Adzhars, Abkhazians, South Ossetians	4	0	0
Guatemala	Indigenous peoples, Garifuna	0	0	1
Congo (Rep.)	Lari, M'Boshi, Aka	1	0	0
Indonesia	Achinese, Chinese, Dayaks, Madurese, Papuans, religious minorities	4	0	1
Liberia	Dan, Krahn, Ma, other groups	0	0	0
Turkmenistan	Uzbeks, Russians, Kazakhs, religious minorities	0	0	0
Togo	Ewe, Kabre	0	0	0
Belarus	Poles	0	0	0
Moldova	Trans-Dniester Slavs	4	0	0

Notes to Table

Sources of the indicators are as follows:

- Conflict indicators:** The base data used was Monty G Marshall, 'Major Episodes of Political Violence 1946–2013' (Center for Systemic Peace, 2014) and, for self-determination conflicts, Monty G Marshall and Ted R Gurr, 'Peace and Conflict 2005' (CIDCM, University of Maryland, 2005) updated for 2013–4 using figures from Center for Systemic Peace, MRG and the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (Conflict Barometer 2013, Heidelberg, HIIK, 2014). Self-determination/autonomy conflicts in 2014 were ranked on a scale of 0–5 as follows: 5=ongoing armed conflict; 4=contained armed conflict; 3=settled armed conflict; 2=militant politics; 1=conventional politics. Major armed conflicts were classified as 2=ongoing in late 2013; 1=emerging from conflict since 2009 or ongoing conflict with deaths under 1,000.
- Prior genocide or politicide:** Harff, US Political Instability Task Force (formerly State Failure Task Force). 1=one or more episodes since 1945, updated using MRG data.

Indicators of group division			Democracy/governance indicators				Total
D. Massive movement – refugees and IDPs	E. Legacy of vengeance – group grievance	F. Rise of factionalized elites	G. Voice and accountability	H. Political stability	I. Rule of law	J. OECD country risk classification	
7.2	6.2	7.5	-1.417	0.167	-0.777	7	11.38
6.2	7.0	8.0	-0.975	-0.136	-0.965	6	11.36
8.3	7.2	8.2	-0.942	-1.127	-0.872	7	11.27
5.2	8.2	6.8	0.353	-1.246	-0.105	3	11.24
5.0	6.6	7.7	-2.175	-0.099	-1.253	7	11.12
5.8	6.1	8.3	-1.576	0.035	-0.828	7	11.10
4.8	6.4	7.3	-0.925	-0.991	-1.686	7	11.07
5.7	7.2	8.2	-0.332	-0.602	-1.160	7	10.98
6.6	8.0	8.0	0.167	-0.225	-0.386	6	10.96
3.2	5.9	8.0	-0.288	-0.099	-0.795	7	10.91
4.7	5.7	6.9	-1.379	0.251	-0.504	5	10.65
7.5	8.0	9.4	-0.017	-0.672	-0.029	6	10.61
6.0	7.3	6.0	-0.391	-0.652	-1.097	5	10.48
8.0	6.0	6.7	-1.156	-0.478	-1.117	6	10.45
6.0	7.3	7.0	0.028	-0.573	-0.597	3	10.40
9.2	6.5	8.3	-0.360	-0.475	-0.920	7	10.13
3.9	6.7	7.7	-2.210	0.351	-1.375	6	10.03
7.1	4.8	7.5	-1.019	-0.419	-0.918	7	9.96
3.6	6.8	8.3	-1.540	0.024	-0.921	7	9.94
5.0	6.0	7.7	-0.087	0.024	-0.359	7	9.91

- *Indicators of Group Division*: Failed States Index, Fund for Peace and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013.
- *Democracy/Governance Indicators*: Annual Governance Indicators, World Bank, 2013.
- *OECD country risk classification*: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 'Country Risk Classifications of the Participants to the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits', January 2014.

Data for Kosovo includes some indicators relating to Serbia. Where separate indicators are available for

Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the latter have been used.

Indicators were rebased as necessary to give an equal weighting to the five categories above, with the exception of the prior geno-/politicide indicator. As a dichotomous variable this received a lesser weighting to avoid too great a distortion to the final ranking. Resulting values were then summed.

The full formula is:

$$(A/2) + (Bx1.25) + (Cx2) + (D+E+F)/6 + (G+H+I)/-1 + (Jx0.625)$$

Minority Rights Group International

Minority Rights Group International (MRG) is a non-governmental organization (NGO) working to secure the rights of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities and indigenous peoples worldwide, and to promote cooperation and understanding between communities.

Our activities are focused on international advocacy, training, publishing and outreach. We are guided by the needs expressed by our worldwide partner network of organizations which represent minority and indigenous peoples.

MRG works with over 150 organizations in nearly 50 countries. Our governing Council, which meets twice a year, has members from nine different countries. MRG has consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), observer status with the African Commission on Human and People's Rights, and is registered with the Organization of American States.

MRG is registered as a charity and a company limited by guarantee under English law. Registered charity no. 282305, limited company no. 1544957.

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Peoples under Threat

MRG's annual ranking showing countries most at risk of mass killing is now available as an online map:
www.peoplesunderthreat.org

World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples

The internet's leading information resource on minorities around the globe:
www.minorityrights.org/Directory

State of the World's Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2014

Events of 2013

Across the world, minorities and indigenous peoples are disproportionately exposed to hatred. From intimidation and verbal abuse to targeted violence and mass killing, this hatred often reflects and reinforces existing patterns of exclusion. The impacts also extend beyond the immediate effects on individual victims to affect entire communities – in the process further marginalizing them from basic services, participation and other rights. This year's edition of *State of the World's Minorities and Indigenous Peoples* highlights how hate speech and hate crime, though frequently unreported or unacknowledged, continue to impact on every aspect of their lives. The volume also documents many of the initiatives being taken to promote positive change and the different ways that governments, civil society and communities can strengthen protections for minorities and indigenous peoples.

