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IRAN CRISIS UPDATE, SEPTEMBER 28

Sep 28, 2022 - [Press ISW](#)



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Nicholas Carl, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Zachary Coles, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 28, 5:00 pm ET

The Iran Crisis Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).

Circumstantial evidence suggests that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is at least temporarily unable to perform his normal duties. Khamenei has been unusually absent in recent days amidst countrywide, anti-regime protests, which began on September 16. Rumors have circulated that Khamenei's health has deteriorated significantly since early September.[1] CTP cannot verify these rumors about Khamenei's health, and such reports should be treated with skepticism. There are indications that Khamenei is ill or incapacitated, however. Regime power centers are behaving as if succession is either imminent or underway. President Ebrahim Raisi—a prominent frontrunner to succeed Khamenei—is positioning himself to become the next supreme leader with support from senior officers from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).

The ongoing Mahsa Amini protests are straining the regime's capability and willingness to crack down but are not yet existential to the regime. Protests began on September 16 in response to the regime's brutal killing of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini.[2] Protests have concentrated primarily in ethnically Kurdish regions of Iran, where Amini lived, and Tehran but spread rapidly to other locations and demographics.[3] State security services have launched a bloody crackdown against the ongoing protests but have struggled with bandwidth constraints and exhaustion according to some Iranian media outlets.[4] Tehran security officials reported that 185 Basij members were injured in the protests with five in critical condition.[5] The Basij is a paramilitary branch of the IRGC responsible for civil defense and social control. These protests do not appear close to collapsing the regime at this time, however.

The IRGC may assess that anti-regime Kurdish militants operating around the Iran-Iraq-Turkey border are arming and stoking the protests. The IRGC has conducted five consecutive days of attacks involving artillery, drones, and missiles into Iraqi Kurdistan.[6] Iranian state media have claimed that anti-regime Kurdish groups are fomenting instability against the regime.[7] CTP cannot verify these allegations. The most recent round of IRGC attacks on September 28 killed an American citizen, Omar Mahmoudzadeh, in Iraqi Kurdistan.[8]

The regime's brutal crackdown and continuing IRGC attacks are stoking unrest in Kurdish communities throughout the region. Demonstrations expressing solidarity with the Iranian protesters occurred in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah in Iraqi Kurdistan and Qamishli in northern Syria on September 28.[9]

Key Takeaways

- Circumstantial evidence suggests that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is at least temporarily unable to perform his normal duties.
- Regime power centers are behaving as if succession is either imminent or underway.
- The ongoing Mahsa Amini protests may be challenging the regime's capability and willingness to crack down but do not appear close to collapsing the regime.
- The IRGC may assess that anti-regime Kurdish militants operating around the Iran-Iraq-Turkey border are arming and stoking the protests.
- The IRGC conducted a large-scale attack into Iraqi Kurdistan on September 28, killing one American.

Supreme Leader Succession

Circumstantial evidence suggests that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is at least temporarily unable to perform his normal duties. Khamenei canceled his planned attendance at the annual meeting of the Assembly of Experts—the regime body constitutionally responsible for selecting the supreme leader—on September 7.[10] Khamenei has historically given speeches at these meetings. The *New York Times* and *Wall Street Journal* both reported that Khamenei's health has declined

CTP cannot verify these rumors about Khamenei's health, but circumstantial evidence indicates that Khamenei may indeed be ill or incapacitated. He has been abnormally silent about the ongoing countrywide, anti-regime protests, which began on September 16. Khamenei gave speeches on September 17 and 21 but did not address the protests.[12] Khamenei has never failed to address a major protest wave and responded previously to such protest waves within days of their initiations. He commented five days after countrywide protests erupted in December 2017 and two days after countrywide protests erupted in November 2019.[13] It is unclear why he did not comment on September 17 or 21, but his continued absence as the protests have expanded and become more dangerous strongly suggests that he is at least temporarily unable to address them publicly.

Twenty-four current and former IRGC leaders signed an open letter publicly praising Raisi for his speech to the UN General Assembly on September 21.[15] The letter signatories include Iran's most high-ranking and influential officers who control most of the Iranian armed forces, such as Armed Forces General Staff Major General Mohammad Bagheri, Khatam ol Ambia Central Headquarters Commander Major General Gholam Ali Rashid, IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami, and IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani. Many of these officers are part of a human network of IRGC leaders who have maintained close ties with one another for decades and periodically intervene in domestic politics to promote their headline agenda.[16] This IRGC network publishes such letters extremely rarely and uses them to signal its political position on critical issues to the rest of the regime. The timing of this letter indicates that the IRGC network likely seeks to signify its endorsement of Raisi as supreme leader, particularly since there was nothing particularly remarkable about Raisi's UN speech to have called forth such an unusual and rare response. The participation of Ali Shamkhani and Yahya Rahim Safavi in this letter was especially significant as they are both in Khamenei's inner circle. Shamkhani is the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, which advises the supreme leader on defense and foreign policies. Safavi is Khamenei's senior military adviser.

Anti-Regime Protests

September 2022: Anti-Regime Protests Sweep Iran



As of September 25, 2022 2:00 PM ET
Map: AEI's Critical Threats Project • Source: Author's Research • Created with Datawrapper

The regime has violently suppressed protests and sustained casualties among its security forces in recent days. State broadcaster IRIB reported that 41 people including security personnel have died in the ongoing protests as of September 25.[20] Recent estimates place protest-related deaths at 76.[21] A Tehran Province Basij official today announced that 185 Basij members have been wounded—five of whom are in critical condition—in violent clashes with protestors. The official claimed that some protestors were armed.[22] Iranian state-affiliated media and officials have similarly confirmed the deaths of several security officials throughout the country.[23]

Iranian reporting and statements from senior judiciary and security officials suggest that the regime fears losing its capability to crack down on ongoing unrest. This is a low-confidence assessment. Social media users circulated purportedly leaked footage of Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei discussing protest suppression efforts, stating that Iranian security personnel suffered from low morale and had not slept in several days.[24] IRGC-affiliated media similarly circulated footage of Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Commander Hossein Ashtari encouraging police officers to continue quashing unrest, likely corroborating Ejei's comments about low morale among security personnel.[25] Reformist Ham Mihan Newspaper reported that Ashtari discussed security force bandwidth constraints and exhaustion with IRGC Commander Hossein Salami and Intelligence and Security Minister Esmail Khatib.[26] Ham Mihan removed this report shortly after its publication.

Some hardline officials have sympathized with Mahsa Amini's death—and subsequent demonstrations—and called on the regime to heed their demands. Iranian media and officials have largely framed ongoing protests as riots organized by foreign actors and vowed to suppress further unrest.[27] Other officials, however, notably a hardline Shia cleric, have intimated that the protestors have legitimate grievances. Grand Ayatollah Hossein Nouri Hamedani released a statement urging Iranian authorities to address protestors' concerns on September 25.[28]

Amini's death has ignited unrest among historically marginalized ethnic groups within and outside of Iran's borders. Amini was an Iranian Kurd who lived in Kurdistan Province. Amini's death likely ignited preexisting anti-regime sentiment among Iranian Kurds and possibly other minorities, such as Iranian Baloch in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[29] Footage circulating on social media suggests that most protests were initially concentrated among Kurdish communities in northwestern Iran.[30]

Protests have spread to Kurdish communities throughout the region. Demonstrations against the Iranian regime began on September 24 in Erbil City, Erbil Province, and on September 28 in Sulaymaniyah City, Sulaymaniyah Province.[31] Videos of the protests circulated on Twitter suggest several hundred Iraqi Kurds attended the demonstrations. Hundreds of Syrian Kurds staged similarly large protests in Qamishli, Hasakah Province on September 28.[32]

Axis of Resistance and Regional Developments

The IRGC has conducted large-scale artillery, drone, and missile attacks against anti-regime Kurdish militias in Iraqi Kurdistan since September 24. The IRGC Ground Forces targeted Kurdish groups such as Komala, the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran, the Free Life Party of Kurdistan, and Kurdistan Freedom Party positions.[33] The most recent IRGC attack on September 28 included 73 rockets and ballistic missiles as well as kamikaze drones, killing at least nine and injuring 32 civilians.[34] The IRGC killed an American citizen, Omar Mahmoudzadeh, in the attack.[35]

The Iranian regime and its proxies are framing these attacks as retaliation for anti-regime Kurdish militants stoking tensions in Iran. Iranian state media have claimed that these Kurdish groups are arming and supporting protesters.[36] Iran-backed proxy Telegram channels parroted this narrative and described the Kurdish militias as international terrorist organizations.[37] The IRGC may have sought to degrade Kurdish militias' capability to logistically and materially support protesters.

US forces downed an Iranian Mohajer-6 drone that the US assessed posed a threat to US personnel.[38] It is unclear whether the IRGC meant to target US positions with the drone or whether it was part of the attack on anti-regime Kurdish targets.

[1] <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/16/world/middleeast/irans-supreme-leader...>
<https://www.wsj.com/articles/amid-iran-protests-a-powerful-leader-emerge...>

[2] <https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/22/middleeast/iran-protests-mahsa-amini-fath...>

[3] <https://twitter.com/criticalthreats/status/1574146703657078784>

[4] <http://www.iranglobal dot info/node/183769>; <https://twitter.com/BeniSabti/status/1575071504425164801>

[5] <https://www.tasnimnews dot com /fa/news/1401/07/06/2780838/%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%86-%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87-185-%D8%A8%D8%B3%DB%8C-%D8%AC%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AD-%D8%B4%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%AF>

[6] <https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/07/06/2781091>

[7] <https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/07/06/2780803/>

[8] <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/no-us-officials-injured-iranians...>

- [9] <https://twitter.com/IraqiQahwa/status/1573641436377014273?s=20&t=7KIONf...>; <https://twitter.com/Lawwwen/status/1573598116372168705?s=20&t=7KIONfWxt...>; <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/kurdish-protesters-rally-erbil...>; <https://twitter.com/Javanmardi75/status/1575226031710928896>
- [10] <https://www.radiofarda.com/a/32028485.html>
- [11] <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/16/world/middleeast/irans-supreme-leader...>
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- [14] <http://www.president dot ir/fa/139919/>
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- [23] <https://president dot ir/fa/139869>; <https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/06/31/2777807>
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- [26] <http://www.iranglobal dot info/node/183769>; <https://twitter.com/BeniSabti/status/1575071504425164801>
- [27] <https://president dot ir/fa/139869>; <https://www.instagram.com/p/Ci9cTKoqpiC/?igshid=NmNmNiAwNzg%3D>
- [28] <https://www.eghtesadnews dot com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-57/523799-%D9%88%D8%A7%DA%A9%D9%86%D8%B4-%D8%A2%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D9%86%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D9%87%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%AE%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A6%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%85-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%85-%DA%AF%D9%88%D8%B4-%D8%AF%D9%87%D9%86%D8%AF>
- [29] <https://twitter.com/BeniSabti/status/1574812802316918786>; <https://twitter.com/Natsecieff/status/1574800487735492610>
- [30] <https://twitter.com/criticalthreats/status/1572674287051460609>
- [31] <https://twitter.com/SAMRIReports/status/1573609247832686593>; <https://twitter.com/Javanmardi75/status/1575226031710928896>; <https://twitt>
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- [34] <https://twitter.com/mhmiranusa/status/1575130372643364864?s=20&t=mc70Fhd...>; <https://www dot kurdistan24 dot net/ckb/story/225801-%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%BE%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%BE%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%87%DB%95%DA%95%DB%95%D8%B4%DB%95%DB%8C-%D8%A8%DB%95%D8%B1%D8%AF%DB%95%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D9%87%DB%8E%D8%B1%D8%B4%DB%95%DA%A9%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%DB%95%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%AA>; <https://www dot rudaw dot net/english/middleeast/iran/280920221>
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[36] [https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/07/06/2780803/](https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1401/07/06/2780803/)

[37] <https://t.me/sabreenS1/59975>

[38] <https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/STATEMENTS/Statements-View/Article/3173389...>


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2022-09-25 Anti Regime Protests Map.png



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Iran Crisis Update, September 29

Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Nicholas Carl, Zachary Coles, and Frederick W. Kagan
September 29, 3:00 pm ET

The Iran Crisis Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).

The Iranian regime’s extensive internet and telecommunications censorship is severely limiting the open-source information available on ongoing anti-regime protests in Iran. Iranian state media and officials have confirmed that they are blocking domestic access to Western social media applications such as WhatsApp and Instagram to impede protester coordination and organization and limit the free flow of information September 22.¹ Iranian internet users reported restricted access to foreign domains—including Google—and difficulties accessing Google Play and Apple’s App store, preventing users’ efforts to download VPNs.² CTP cannot verify most protest footage circulating on social media. Iranian authorities previously blocked internet access in 2019 gasoline protests.³

Uncorroborated social media reports suggest that Iran loosened internet restrictions around Tehran on September 29 but may continue blocking some social media platforms such as Instagram.⁴ Some Iranian officials have called on the regime to permanently block Instagram in recent days.⁵ Iranian newspapers have similarly reported that Instagram could be permanently blocked even after protests subside.⁶

Iran will likely continue improving its censorship infrastructure—possibly with support from China—to suppress future protests more effectively. Iranian authorities have praised the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) control of its domestic information space and signed agreements on cyber and law enforcement cooperation with China⁷. Some Iranian internet experts have compared Iranian internet disruptions prior to the ongoing protests to the CCP’s internet filtering system.⁸ The regime may increasingly mirror the Chinese model of internet sovereignty as it seeks to preempt and quell unrest.

Key Takeaways

- Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei remains absent and did not make a public appearance or statement on September 29.
- Anti-regime protests likely occurred in at least six Iranian cities on September 29, but demonstrations appear to have subsided overall for now.
- Anti-regime protests may increase inside and outside of Iran on October 1.
- The IRGC conducted an artillery attack into Iraqi Kurdistan on September 29, marking the sixth consecutive day of such attacks.

Supreme Leader Succession


Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei remains absent and did not make a public appearance or statement on September 29. Unverifiable social media rumors continue to circulate online that suggest that Khamenei's health is worsening.⁹ CTP will continue to monitor the situation.

Anti-Regime Protests

Anti-regime protests occurred in at least six Iranian cities on September 29, although demonstrations appear to have subsided as a whole for now. This is a moderate-to-high confidence assessment. Social media users documented protests in Gilan, Qom, Esfahan, Kurdistan, Khorasan Razavi, and Kermanshah Provinces and have reported unrest in Khuzestan, Mazandaran, Hormozgan Provinces that CTP is unable to verify.¹⁰ Iranian officials have reported diminished protest activity in Tehran Province, where protests first erupted following Mahsa Amini's death on September 16. Tehran Provincial Governor Mohsen Mansouri announced that protests had subsided in Tehran on September 29, and social media users have circulated less footage of unrest in Tehran and other cities.¹¹ Social media users may be circulating less information due to internet restrictions.

Social media reports suggests that anti-regime demonstrations may resume within and outside of Iran's borders on Saturday, October 1. Iranian students announced plans to resume demonstrations in front of several universities in Tehran on October 1.¹² Organized student protests would coincide with international demonstrations scheduled in several US, Australian, Canadian, and European cities on the same date.¹³ Iranian authorities reportedly plan to prevent spectators from attending Iranian soccer matches from October 9-10 in seven cities, possibly suggesting that the regime anticipates and is attempting to preempt further unrest.¹⁴

Axis of Resistance and Regional Developments



The IRGC conducted an artillery strike in Iraqi Kurdistan on September 29, marking the sixth consecutive day of such attacks. Iraqi media reported that the IRGC struck two locations in Erbil Province.¹⁵ The IRGC has conducted artillery, drone, and missile attacks on anti-regime Kurdish positions in Iraqi Kurdistan since September 24. IRGC Operations Deputy Brigadier General Abbas Nilforoushan accused these Kurdish groups in Iraqi Kurdistan of stoking the ongoing, anti-regime protests.¹⁶ The IRGC Ground Forces published a statement on September 29, vowing to continue such attacks until it destroys the groups.¹⁷

¹ <https://t.me/farsna/263268>

² <https://twitter.com/filterbaan/status/1574061779881164801>; <https://twitter.com/xhdix/status/1572938218668195841>

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⁹ <https://twitter.com/SaeedAganji/status/1575552279201153032>

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¹² <https://www.iranintl.com/202209296135>

¹³ <https://twitter.com/esmaeilion/status/1574923992250449921>

¹⁴ <https://iranwire.com/en/sports/108082-irans-premier-league-to-host-football-matches-without-spectators/>

¹⁵ <https://www.shafaq.com/en/Kurdistan/Iranian-artillery-renews-bombing-regions-in-Iraqi-Kurdistan-2>

¹⁶ <https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1401/07/05/2779695>

¹⁷ www.defapress.ir/fa/news/548082



Iran Crisis Update, September 30

**Nicholas Carl, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Zachary Coles, and Frederick W. Kagan
September 30, 5:00 pm ET**

The Iran Crisis Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).

Anti-regime protests are continuing in at least 10 major cities in eight provinces and escalated violently in southeastern Sistan and Baluchistan Province on September 30. Protesters clashed with security forces in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, attacking local police stations and killing the provincial head of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) intelligence.¹ Social media users suggested that state security services deployed helicopters to abet their crackdown.² These clashes are among the most violent in the ongoing protest wave thus far.

The security situation around Zahedan could worsen in the coming days and weeks, straining state security services more than they already are. Anti-regime militancy is common around Zahedan, where Salafi-jihadi groups such as Jaish al Adl operate. An Iranian Baluch militant group, Anonymous Tigers of Baluchistan, reportedly released a video on September 30 threatening to escalate further against the regime in response to the clashes on September 30.³ State security services have struggled with bandwidth constraints and exhaustion throughout Iran during the ongoing, countrywide protests, and escalations around Zahedan will impose additional pressure.

A senior Iranian military official, Major General Mohammad Bagheri, threatened to attack US forces in Iraq in retaliation for the US shootdown of an Iranian drone illegally operating in Iraqi airspace near an American military base.⁴ Bagheri also suggested that Iran would attack US bases in Iraq for supporting anti-regime Kurdish groups. The IRGC has conducted six consecutive days of attacks on anti-regime Kurdish militants in Iraqi Kurdistan.⁵ Bagheri accused the US of using its Harir airbase in Erbil Province to coordinate with and support these groups in September 2021.⁶ Iranian proxies in Iraq accused Omar Mahmoudzadeh, the American whom the IRGC killed in Iraqi Kurdistan on September 28, of training anti-regime Kurdish militants.⁷

Key Takeaways

- **Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei remains absent and did not make a public appearance on September 30.**

- The ongoing, anti-regime protests occurred in at least 10 cities in eight provinces and were especially violent in southeastern Sistan and Baluchistan Province on September 30.
- Iran's most senior military official threatened to attack US bases in Iraq.

Supreme Leader Succession

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei remains absent and did not make a public appearance on September 30. Iranian state media reported that Khamenei issued a statement expressing condolences over the death of senior cleric Mohsen Labbani.⁸ Unverifiable social media rumors circulated on September 29 claiming that Khamenei's health is worsening.⁹


President Ebrahim Raisi gave a speech in Tehran to commemorate the National Firefighting Day.¹⁰ Raisi made no noteworthy remarks on supreme leader succession or the ongoing anti-regime protests.

Anti-Regime Protests

The ongoing, anti-regime protests occurred in at least 10 Iranian cities in eight provinces and were especially violent in southeastern Sistan and Baluchistan Province on September 30. This is a moderate-to-high-confidence assessment. Iranian social media users documented unrest in:

- Karaj, Alborz Province
- Ardabil City, Ardabil Province
- Kerman City, Kerman Province
- Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province
- Dezful, Khuzestan Province
- Abadan, Khuzestan Province
- Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province
- Saghez, Kurdistan Province
- Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province
- Tehran, Tehran Province

Protest Activity in Iran September 30



Violent clashes between protestors and Iranian security personnel erupted in Zahedan City, killing a senior provincial IRGC intelligence official.¹¹ Social media users circulated footage purportedly of Iranian security forces firing live ammunition at protestors and flying helicopters around Zahedan.¹² CTP cannot verify the authenticity of this footage or the social media claims that the helicopters included Cobra attack aircraft. A provincial official and Iranian media outlets later corroborated reports of unrest and claimed that unidentified assailants damaged local security infrastructure and killed at least 19 Zahedan residents, one of whom was a senior provincial IRGC intelligence official.¹³ An independent cybersecurity watchdog organization announced severe internet disruptions in the vicinity of Zahedan as the regime likely seeks to impede further regional protest coordination and organization.¹⁴

The regime reports that it has arrested over a thousand Iranian civilians since protests began on September 16. Iranian state-affiliated media outlets and officials have reported the arrest of over a thousand Iranians throughout the country in recent days, although the total number of arrests is likely significantly higher.¹⁵ Social media users have circulated reports of increased arrests in recent days as well, although these numbers are difficult to corroborate amidst ongoing internet restrictions.¹⁶ Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security publicized the arrest of nine European nationals and dozens

of purported opposition group members for their role in stoking nation-wide protests as the regime seeks to blame foreign actors for internal dissent.¹⁷

Iranian truckers have gone on strike, and their strikes could expand in the coming days. Iranian truckers have begun strikes to protest the regime crackdown.¹⁸ Iranian trucker strikes have occurred in previous protests, notably 2018, and often spread rapidly. They pose a more serious threat to the regime than other labor-related movements because of their general economic effect and their widespread nature.¹⁹ Iranian oil industry workers warned on September 26 that they will strike if the regime does not stop the crackdown.²⁰ Iranian rideshare drivers have stated that they will begin strikes on October 1.²¹

Unverified reports of dissent within the regime are circulating online.

- Persian-language media outlet Zeitoon published a statement allegedly from students and teachers at the Tehran, Mashhad, and Qom seminaries on September 30, condemning Khamenei and the regime crackdown on the ongoing, anti-regime protests.²² CTP cannot verify the authenticity of this report.
- A statement appeared on the IRGC-affiliated Fars News Agency website allegedly from its employees on September 30, expressing support for the protests and condemning the regime.²³ The statement claimed that the regime has arrested 23,000 people and that 423 people have died in the protests. The statement also called on the Artesh—Iran's conventional military—to support the protests. Fars News Agency removed the statement from its website shortly after its publication. It is unclear whether the statement came from its employees or hackers, although Fars News did not claim that its site had been hacked.
- Anti-regime outlet IranWire reported that members of the Basij Organization are refusing to attend meetings and are leaving their morality patrols, citing an unidentified former Iranian security official.²⁴ The Basij Organization is a paramilitary body under the IRGC responsible for civil defense and social control. The source told IranWire that Iranian authorities are concerned about defections and dissent in the state security services. CTP cannot confirm this report.

Axis of Resistance and Regional Developments

Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri, the most senior military official in Iran, threatened to attack the US on September 30.²⁵ Bagheri threatened to retaliate for the US downing of an Iranian Mohajer-6 drone on September 28 and stated that Iran will attack any US bases in Iraq that threaten the regime. Bagheri claimed that the US downing of the Iranian drone was evidence that the US cooperates with anti-regime Kurdish groups in Iraqi Kurdistan. Bagheri in September 2021 accused the US of using its Harir airbase in Erbil Province to coordinate with and support anti-regime militants against Iran.²⁶ The Armed Forces General Staff, which Bagheri heads, is Iran's highest military body and responsible for military policy and strategic guidance. Bagheri is an IRGC general and a member of the network of senior IRGC officials that has been largely controlling the Guards for decades.

Iran's Iraqi proxies are amplifying Tehran's narrative blaming anti-regime Kurdish militias for the protests, but Iraqi political unrest may undermine the proxies' messaging. Media channels closely tied to Iranian proxy militias Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) and Kataib Hezbollah (KH) emphasized anti-regime Kurdish militias' alleged role in the Iranian protests in Telegram posts on September 29.²⁷ AAH and KH also downplayed the deaths of Kurdish civilians and US citizen Omar Mahmoudzadeh, further alleging that Mahmoudzadeh was affiliated with the US military and was training Kurdish militants.²⁸

Iran's Iraqi proxies are simultaneously conducting a media campaign against Iraqi nationalist Shia cleric Moqtada al Sadr's Iraqi nationalist movement. The proxies aim to politically isolate Sadr's followers, known as Sadrists, and blame them for Iraq's political gridlock and the armed clashes in Baghdad on September 28.²⁹ The proxies may prioritize the anti-Sadrist media campaign and dilute their messaging that blames the US and anti-regime Kurdish militias for the protests.

Solidarity protests against the Iranian regime occurred in Afghanistan, Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan, and Turkey on September 29-30.³⁰ Afghan women protested in front of the Iranian embassy in Kabul on September 29.³¹ Taliban security forces fired live ammunition into the air to disperse the crowd. Demonstrators in Sulaymaniyah, Iraqi Kurdistan, held anti-regime solidarity protests and denounced the continued IRGC military operation in Iraqi Kurdistan.³² Turkish demonstrators protested near the Iranian consulate in Istanbul on September 29.³³

Upcoming Sadrist and anti-corruption demonstrations may converge with solidarity protests against the Iranian regime. Iraqi demonstrators also held solidarity protests against the Iranian regime and set fire to Iranian flags on September 29 in Najaf, home to the most important Shia shrine.³⁴ The Sadrists seek to improve their bargaining position in Iraq's ongoing government formation processes, and they may attempt to spread and tie anti-Iranian-regime sentiments to Iran's Iraqi proxies. Anti-regime protests also may converge with upcoming demonstrations on the anniversary of Iraq's October 2019 anti-corruption Tishreen movement. The movement coincided with similar anti-Iranian regime protests in Lebanon in October 2019 and in Iran in November 2019.

¹ <https://www.irna dot ir/news/84900671/>; www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/07/08/2781751 حمله-تروریستی-در-زاهدان

² https://twitter.com/ir_humanrights/status/1575853699200856065

³ <https://twitter.com/SAMRIReports/status/1575905188422246400>

⁴ <https://www.irna dot ir/news/84900566>

⁵ <https://shafaq dot com/en/Kurdistan/Iranian-artillery-renews-bombing-on-Sidekan-8>

⁶ www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1400/06/30/2576194

⁷ <https://t.me/Tura313/33156>; <https://t.me/sabreenS1/60292>

⁸ www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/07/08/2781578/

⁹ <https://twitter.com/SaeedAganji/status/1575552279201153032>

¹⁰ www.president dot ir/fa/139925

¹¹ tn dot ai/2781751

¹² https://twitter.com/no_itsmyturn/status/1575824485701279744?s=20&t=YAQMMGCUQkbnJtMJ1Wz9IA,
https://twitter.com/Sima_Sabet/status/1575826470731411458?s=20&t=TrHV-4rxB9qlHdY5Y_mj-g,
https://twitter.com/ir_humanrights/status/1575853699200856065

¹³ <https://www.irna dot ir/news/84900671/>; <https://aftabnews dot ir/fa/news/797657/%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1->

[%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D8%A8%D9%84%D9%88%DA%86%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%DB%B1%DB%B9-%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%AB%D9%87-%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%B4%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%AF](#)

¹⁴ <https://twitter.com/netblocks/status/1575873319781380097>

¹⁵ https://tn_dot_ai/2779555; https://www.irna_dot_ir/news/84897327/; https://www.borna_dot_news/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%DA%AF%DB%8C%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86-88/1380640-%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%DA%AF%DB%8C%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B4%DA%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%AB-%D8%A7%D8%AE%DB%8C%D8%B1-%DA%AF%DB%8C%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86

¹⁶ <https://twitter.com/manimostofi/status/1575607508290478096?s=20&t=0-WjIQmpwPREUynTpuDlnQ>

¹⁷ https://www.tasnimnews_dot_com/fa/news/1401/07/08/2781738/%D8%A8%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%87-%D9%85%D9%87%D9%85-%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%81%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88-%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%DA%AF%DB%8C%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%AE%DB%8C%D8%B1

¹⁸ <https://twitter.com/ManotoNews/status/1575821518990643203>

¹⁹ <https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/More-Protests-No-Progress.pdf?x91208>

²⁰ <https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-oil-workers-threaten-strike-crackdown-amini/32054705.html>

²¹ <https://twitter.com/ManotoNews/status/1575821518990643203>

²² www.zeitoons_dot_com/105642

²³ https://t_dot_co/psMci5Njas

²⁴ <https://iranwire.com/en/politics/108086-exclusive-irans-security-and-intelligence-officials-fear-mutiny-in-the-ranks/>

²⁵ https://www.irna_dot_ir/news/84900566

²⁶ www.tasnimnews_dot_com/fa/news/1400/06/30/2576194

²⁷ <https://t.me/Tura313/33156>; <https://t.me/sabreenS1/60292>

²⁸ <https://t.me/sabreenS1/60276>; <https://t.me/sabreenS1/60342>; <https://t.me/Tura313/33125>

²⁹ <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/09/clashes-rock-baghdads-green-zone-iraqi-parliament-re-elects-speaker>; https://twitter.com/ali_almikdam/status/1575912885230112769?s=20&t=TcESNh5PKBW2SC250Y6pYA;

³⁰ https://www.arabnews_dot_com/node/2172341/middle-east; https://twitter.com/Murad_Official/status/1575847328698728448; <https://twitter.com/PeregrafNews/status/1575872189043462144>; https://anfenglishmobile_dot_com/women/women-pr-otest-for-mahsa-amini-in-front-of-the-iranian-consulate-in-istanbul-62775; <https://twitter.com/HurakhshNargiss/status/1575475280533135361>

³¹ <https://www.voanews.com/a/taliban-disrupt-afghan-women-s-rally-supporting-iran-protests-/6768633.html>

³² https://twitter.com/Murad_Official/status/1575181236385230850?s=20&t=tk43D_cUdhcAvO6RxhKdIQ

³³ <https://twitter.com/HurakhshNargiss/status/1575475280533135361?s=20&t=Ahzwal0s2lc7L9msMdfN0g>; <https://twitter.com/senkayadilara/status/1575557014901886976?s=20&t=TXD213fq087a4hmeXwIqPQ>

³⁴ https://twitter.com/HoWaziri/status/1575876328355614720?s=20&t=5nXILSsAhWRRo3X6d3_yLQ;

IRAN CRISIS UPDATE, OCTOBER 1

Oct 1, 2022 - [Press ISW](#)



Nicholas Carl, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Zachary Coles, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 1, 2:30 pm ET

The Iran Crisis Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).

Iranian protesters successfully planned anti-regime demonstrations in at least 21 Iranian cities in 17 provinces on October 1 despite regime censorship. Protestors had announced plans over the past few days for protests on October 1 as CTP has previously reported.^[i] The successful coordination of these demonstrations despite internet restrictions suggests that protesters—specifically university students—have found ways to organize.

These protests pose a serious and increasing threat to the regime as their grievances resonate across a growing range of Iranians. These protests now include many marginalized minorities, merchants, students, and the urban elite.

Protesters have found secular martyrs around whom to rally. Mahsa Amini is the most prominent symbol of this movement, especially among social media users.^[ii] Protesters have chanted slogans from a viral Iranian protest song titled “Baraaye,” which lists popular grievances against the regime.^[iii] State security services arrested the author of this song, Shervin Hajipour, on September 29.^[iv] These individuals provide resonant symbols for the protesters similar to how protesters rallied against the regime killing of Neda Agha Soltan during the 2009 Green Movement when Iranians took to the streets to protest the fraud-plagued reelection of then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.^[v]

Key Takeaways

- **Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei remains absent and did not make a public appearance or statement.**
- **Ongoing, anti-regime protests expanded to involve at least 20 Iranian cities in 17 provinces.**
- **Demonstrations in Iraq planned for other purposes adopted an anti-Iran tone and expressed solidarity with Iranian protests.**
- **Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah criticized Iraqi protesters for chanting against the Iranian regime but did not make the anti-Iran protests a focal point of his address.**

Supreme Leader Succession

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei remains absent and did not make a public appearance or statement on October 1. A Persian-language social media account tweeted on October 1 that Khamenei will visit Law Enforcement Command (LEC) facilities in the coming days.^[vi] The LEC is Iran’s premier internal security service and police force. The regime has used the LEC extensively throughout Iran to crack down on the ongoing, anti-regime protests.

Anti-Regime Protests

Anti-regime protests significantly increased in number and scale on October 1. CTP can assess with moderate-to-high confidence that preorganized, anti-regime protests occurred in at least 21 Iranian cities in 17 different provinces. Iranian social media users documented unrest in the following locations:

- Karaj, Alborz Province

- Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province
- Bushehr City, Bushehr Province
- Esfahan City, Esfahan Province (large protest, violence reported)
- Shiraz, Fars Province
- Rasht, Gilan Province
- Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province
- Kerman City, Kerman Province
- Kermanshah, Kermanshah Province
- Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province (large protest)
- Yasouj, Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad Province
- Dehgolan, Kurdistan Province
- Marivan, Kurdistan Province (violence reported)
- Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province
- Babol, Mazandaran Province
- Birjand, South Khorasan Province
- Tehran City, Tehran Province (large protest, violence reported)
- Qods City, Tehran Province
- Yazd City, Yazd Province
- Zanjan City, Zanjan Province



CTP can assess with moderate confidence that merchants participated in strikes supporting anti-regime protests in at least 11 Iranian towns and cities, particularly throughout northwestern Iranian provinces:

- Ilam City, Ilam Province
- Javanroud, Kermanshah Province
- Ravansar, Kermanshah Province
- Baneh, Kurdistan Province
- Divandarreh, Kurdistan Province
- Marivan, Kurdistan Province
- Saghez, Kurdistan Province
- Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province
- Tehran City, Tehran Province
- Boukan, West Azerbaijan Province
- Oshnavieh, West Azerbaijan Province

Uncorroborated social media reports suggest that university students—specifically in Tehran, Esfahan, and Mashhad cities—mostly organized and attended protests on October 1.^[vii] IRGC-affiliated Javan News reported that 93 percent of individuals participating in ongoing unrest are younger than 25.^[viii] Footage circulating on social media shows protestors chanting a slogan unique to the Mahsa Amini movement: “Woman, Life, Freedom,” which appears to originate from a viral song detailing popular grievances against the regime.^[ix] Iranians have reportedly played this song as a sign of dissent in recent days, underscoring the role of social media in mobilizing ongoing unrest.^[x] Iranian authorities reportedly arrested the songwriter on September 29.^[xi]

One of the 2009 Green Movement leaders, Mir Hossein Mousavi, released a statement calling for the Iranian armed forces to end their crackdown and support the protesters.^[xii] The regime has kept Mousavi under house arrest since 2009.^[xiii] The Kalemeh TV Telegram channel published Mousavi’s statement.

Axis of Resistance and Regional Developments

Planned demonstrations in Iraq adopted an anti-Iran tone and expressed solidarity with Iranian protests on October 1.[xiv] Iraqi demonstrators gathered in Baghdad to commemorate the third anniversary of the October 2019 protests, which protested against government corruption and inefficiency as well as against Iranian influence in Iraq. Social media accounts reported that comparable demonstrations occurred in Basra and Nasiriyah, although CTP cannot verify these claims.[xv] Supporters of prominent Shia cleric Moqtada al Sadr participated in the Baghdad demonstrations. They voiced anti-Iran sentiment. Sadr has competed with Iranian-backed political parties for influence throughout the Iraqi government formation process, which has been in political deadlock since October 2021.

Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah criticized Iraqi protesters for chanting against the Iranian regime on October 1.[xvi] Nasrallah stated that Iran is the center of the so-called “Axis of Resistance” and accused the West of stoking protests in Iran. Nasrallah made these remarks in a speech that primarily focused on domestic Lebanese issues. Nasrallah likely seeks to prevent anti-Iran protests from spreading further throughout Iraq and to Lebanon. Similar protests against the Iranian regime spread from Iraq to Lebanon and Iran in October and November 2019, respectively.

The IRGC conducted attacks on anti-regime Kurdish militants in Iraqi Kurdistan for the seventh consecutive day. The IRGC conducted an artillery attack on Samilan in Choman District, Erbil Province.[xvii]

[i] <https://www.iranintl.com/202209296135>

[ii] <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/30/opinion/tech-companies-iran.html>

[iii] <https://twitter.com/MaryamNamazie/status/1575246090621911041>

[iv] <https://www.rferl.org/a/32059684.html>

[v] <https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/23/world/middleeast/23neda.html>

[vi] <https://twitter.com/tiak77475122/status/1575879850774052864>

[vii] <https://twitter.com/KianSharifi/status/1576136409450106881>; <https://twitter.com/ranarahimpour/status/1576182580101128192?s=20&t=-ZAD...>; <https://twitter.com/ICHRI/status/1576267013953052673?s=20&t=-ZADHSYvY7s2...>

[viii] <https://www.javanonline.ir/fa/news/1106918/%D8%AF%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%84-%DA%A9%D9%86%D8%B4%DA%AF%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%AA%DB%8C%E2%80%8C%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%B6%D8%B9%D9%81-%D9%85%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%B7-%D8%A2%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA>

[ix] <https://twitter.com/ICHRI/status/1576204899981094913>; <https://twitter.com/KhosroKalbasi/status/1576175547935526912>; https://twitter.com/Sima_Sabet/status/1575582781652234240

[x] https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1576071437038899200; <https://twitter.com/khoshnevisnaser/status/1576220831889625094>

[xi] <https://www.rferl.org/a/32059684.html>

[xii] <https://www.radiofarda.com/a/32060735.html>

[xiii] <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde13/3694/2021/en/>

[xiv] https://twitter.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/1576200445034262528

[xv] <https://twitter.com/SajadJiyad/status/1576244114487934976>

[xvi] https://t.me/Eng_ahed/38967; <https://english.almanar.com.lb/1702560>

[xvii] <http://www.shafaq.com/en/Kurdistan/Iranian-artillery-renews-bombing-regions-in-Iraqi-Kurdistan-7>

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IRAN CRISIS UPDATE, OCTOBER 2

Oct 2, 2022 - [Press ISW](#)



Nicholas Carl, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Zachary Coles, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 2, 5:00 pm ET

The Iran Crisis Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).

The continued public absence of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei may be hindering regime officials' efforts to develop a coherent response to the ongoing, anti-regime protests. Khamenei has not addressed the protests nor made a public appearance since September 21, possibly due to his reportedly worsening health.[1] An unidentified Iranian official told *Reuters* that intra-regime disagreements over supreme leader succession and protest management are dividing the regime elite.[2] This division suggests that Khamenei is not playing his usual role of cohering the regime during a crisis.

Khamenei's silence may have opened a leadership vacuum that other regime authorities are having to fill. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) leaders struck a more conciliatory tone on October 2 as university students have adopted an increasingly prominent role in the protest movement. IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami said, "we consider [the protesting youth] our friends, and we will not allow the enemy to attack you." [3] Salami was referring to his allegation that Iran's international adversaries are coopting and stoking the protests to destabilize the regime. Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri met with students and celebrated their role in advancing the regime and revolution.[4] Khamenei would ordinarily play a prominent role in such messaging during a crisis, and his silence is abnormal.

President Ebrahim Raisi has played a minor role thus far in communicating to the protesters or the Iranian population. His low profile is remarkable given his legal responsibilities for maintaining public order in Iran. He may seek to avoid becoming the face of the crackdown to preserve his chances to be accepted as the next supreme leader, but it is hard to see his relative silence as anything other than weakness.

Anti-regime outlet IranWire has published reports claiming that security leaders have disagreed over how to respond to the protests, further indicating that they may lack guidance from the supreme leader. IranWire reported on September 24 that IRGC leaders accused other security bodies suppressing protests of negligence, citing an unidentified former Iranian official. [5] IranWire also reported on September 29 that senior IRGC officers have disagreed with the brutal treatment of protesters and instead advocated for fighting anti-regime Kurdish groups in northwestern Iran.[6] CTP cannot verify these reports.

Khamenei's absence may be emboldening segments of the clerical establishment, especially in Qom, to criticize and pressure the regime more openly. Two senior clerics—Ayatollah Mustafa Mohaghegh Damad and Ayatollah Asadollah Bayat Zanjani—issued statements on September 17, criticizing state security services for the death of Mahsa Amini.[7] Ayatollah Hossein Nouri Hamedani called on the regime to listen to the people's grievances on September 25.[8] Persian-language media outlet *Zeitoun* published a statement allegedly from students and teachers at the Tehran, Mashhad, and Qom seminaries on September 30, condemning Khamenei and the regime crackdown on the protests.[9]

Key Takeaways

- Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei remains absent and did not make a public appearance or statement.
- Anti-regime protests decreased in number across Iran but were significantly more violent in Tehran.
- Social media rumors claimed that state security services are facing significant bandwidth constraints in West Azerbaijan and Kurdistan provinces.

- Iran's Iraqi proxies are attempting to decouple anti-corruption Tishreen movement protests from Iraqi nationalists' anti-Iran sentiments.
- Solidarity protests against the Iranian regime spread to Lebanon.
- The IRGC attacked anti-regime Kurdish militia positions in Iraqi Kurdistan for the seventh consecutive day.

Supreme Leader Succession

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei remains absent and did not make a public appearance or statement on October 2. Persian-language social media account tweeted on October 1 that Khamenei will visit Law Enforcement (LEC) facilities in the coming days. The LEC is Iran's premier internal security service and police force. The regime has used the LEC extensively throughout Iran to crack down on the ongoing, anti-regime protests.

Anti-Regime Protests

Anti-regime protests decreased in number across Iran but were significantly more violent—specifically in Tehran—on October 2. CTP assesses with moderate-to-high confidence that demonstrations occurred in at least 13 Iranian cities in 10 different provinces. Iranian social media users documented unrest in the following locations, the majority of which occurred on or in the vicinity of university campuses.

- Esfahan City, Esfahan Province
- Najaf Abad, Esfahan Province
- Kashan, Esfahan Province
- Shahr-e Kord, Esfahan Province
- Shiraz, Fars Province
- Kerman City, Kerman Province
- Kermanshah City, Kermanshah Province
- Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province
- Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province
- Tehran City, Tehran Province (violence reported)
- Yazd, Yazd Province
- Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province
- Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province (violence reported)



Regime security forces brutally suppressed anti-regime protests at the Sharif University of Technology in Tehran on October 2. Sharif University students reported that security personnel barricaded, shot, and arrested student protestors.[10] Some social media users reported that Basij members seized students' cellphones and checked for footage or photographs of protests. Basijis allegedly beat students who possessed documentation of protests on their personal devices. [11] Students were still able to circulate footage of protests—and ensuing violence—to Twitter accounts reporting on ongoing demonstrations.[12] Some Sharif University students called on other local Iranian youth to visit Sharif's campus in solidarity.[13] Sharif University's student newspaper was similarly able to report on the regime's violent protest crackdown on its official Twitter account. [14] Science, Research, and Technology Minister Mohammad Ali Zolfi Gol allegedly visited the Sharif University campus to defuse tensions, likely signaling the gravity of clashes between protestors and security forces.[15] Student protestors reportedly remain unable to leave the university campus at the time of this publication.[16]

Sharif University protests may particularly concern the regime given the importance of the university to the military establishment. Sharif University of Technology has ties to the Iranian armed forces and supports the regime's ballistic missile development. Sharif University has previously supported the Iranian nuclear program and has close ties to the Guards.[17] The US Treasury Department sanctioned Sharif University President Rasoul Jalili in 2012 for his role in supporting human rights abuses, censorship, and terrorism perpetrated by the Iranian government.[18].

Social media rumors claimed that state security services are facing significant bandwidth constraints in West Azerbaijan and Kurdistan provinces. A Persian-language social media account

tweeted that the IRGC Ground Forces Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Headquarters has called on local Kurdish militias to secure Baneh, Kurdistan Province and Mahabad, West Azerbaijan Province.[19] The Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Headquarters oversees IRGC activities and security in West Azerbaijan and Kurdistan provinces.[20] The account claimed that the regime's elite security forces, such as the LEC Special Units, have been deployed to the major cities in West Azerbaijan and Kurdistan provinces, suggesting that these security forces do not have the bandwidth to cover Baneh and Mahabad.

The regime could escalate significantly against the protesters in Najaf Abad if they expand further. The IRGC Ground Forces 8th Najaf-e Ashraf Armored Division is headquartered around the town's periphery.[21] The IRGC is likely sensitive to instability particularly in Najaf Abad given the location of this armored division's headquarters. Najaf Abad is a relatively small town with a population of around 300,000 according to 2016 estimates.[22].



Axis of Resistance and Regional Developments

Iran's Iraqi proxies are attempting to decouple anti-corruption Tishreen movement protests from Iraqi nationalists' anti-Iran sentiments. Media channels affiliated with Iranian proxy militias Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) and Kataib Hezbollah (KH) thanked peaceful Tishreen protesters, distinguishing them from the violence perpetrated by Iraqi nationalist Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's followers during the October 1 protests in Baghdad.[23] AAH and KH media channels also claimed that cleavages had emerged between Tishreen protesters and the Sadrist.[24]

AAH, KH, and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) media channels echoed Iranian regime talking points that downplayed the severity of the protests and blamed Iran's adversaries. AAH and KH media channels claimed that the US, United Kingdom, and Saudi Arabia instigated and encouraged unfavorable reporting of the protests.[25] Proxy media channels also stressed the protests' shrinking scale and warned that outside actors seek to divide the Iranian people.[26] LH media outlets repeatedly promoted IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami's September 2 speech that warned the US, United Kingdom, and Saudi Arabia are attempting to deceive Iran's youth.[27]

Solidarity protests against the Iranian regime spread to Lebanon on October 2.[28] Several dozen women staged a solidarity protest in Beirut and chanted the Arabic translation of the popular Iranian "women, life, freedom" protest slogan.[29]

The IRGC attacked anti-regime Kurdish militia positions in Iraqi Kurdistan for the seventh consecutive day. The IRGC conducted an artillery attack on Sidekan in Soran District, Erbil Province.[30] The IRGC has concentrated attacks on militia positions in Choman District and Soran District since September 26.[31]

[1] <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/16/world/middleeast/irans-supreme-leader...>

[2] <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-leaders-disarray-struggle...>

[3] <http://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/07/10/2782488>

[4] <http://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/07/10/2782439>

[5] <https://iranwire.com/en/iran/107848-iranwire-exclusive-khamenei-may-orde...>

[6] <https://iranwire.com/en/politics/108086-exclusive-irans-security-and-int...>

[7] <https://www.radiofarda.com/a/32037877.html>

[8] <https://www.radiofarda.com/a/nouri-hamedani-urge-government-listen-peopl...>

[9] www.zeitoons dot com/105642

- [10] https://twitter.com/Sharif__Daily/status/1576590810594041861
- [11] <https://twitter.com/hediekimiaee/status/157663338797826050>
- [12] <https://twitter.com/homelandir/status/1576621528669913089>,
<https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1576596305152864256>
- [13] <https://twitter.com/Hassanesmaeil8/status/1576580822207180800>
- [14] https://twitter.com/Sharif__Daily/status/1576590810594041861
- [15] <https://twitter.com/borzou/status/1576642345663336449>
- [16] <https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1576660628315336706>
- [17] <https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/sharif-university-technology>
- [18] <https://www.state.gov/report-to-congress-list-of-persons-who-are-respons...>
- [19] <https://twitter.com/goliammar/status/1576517596782157824>
- [20] <https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Irans-Reserve-of-Last-Res...>
- [21] <https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Irans-Reserve-of-Last-Res...>
- [22] <http://najafabadnews dot ir/%d8%aa%d9%88%d8%b2%db%8c%d8%b9%d8%aa%d9%88%d8%b2%d9%8a%d8%b9-%d8%ac%d9%85%d8%b9%d9%8a%d8%aa-%d8%b4%d9%87%d8%b1%d8%b3%d8%aa%d8%a7%d9%86/>
- [23] <https://t.me/Tura313/33354>
- [24] <https://t.me/sabreenS1/60711>; <https://t.me/sabreenS1/60746>;
- [25] <https://www.alahednews dot com dot lb/article.php?id=46379&cid=116>
- [26] <https://t.me/maymun5/9890>; <https://t.me/maymun5/9867>; <https://t.me/maymun5/9862>
- [27] <https://www.alahednews dot com dot lb/article.php?id=46379&cid=116>
- [28] <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/10/whole-generation-revol...>
<https://twitter.com/nafisekhBBC/status/1576651428461887488?s=20&t=ZXywi...>
- [29] <https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1313370/women-in-beirut-demonstr...>
- [30] <https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D9%80%D9%80%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%84-%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%84>
- [31] <https://www.thenationalnews dot com/mena/iraq/2022/09/26/iran-renews-attacks-on-kurdish-groups-in-iraq-as-protests-continue/>

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[IranProtestMap_02OCT .png](#)



[IRGC Base in Najaf Abad.png](#)

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Iran Crisis Update, October 3

Nicholas Carl, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Zachary Coles, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 3, 3:00 pm ET

The Iran Crisis Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei made his first public appearance since September 21. [1] He spoke to a military officer graduation ceremony alongside the regime's most senior military leaders. Khamenei appeared in stable condition during his speech.

Khamenei condemned the ongoing, anti-regime protests during his speech—his first public acknowledgment of the protests. Khamenei accused the US and Israel of stoking the protests and said that the greatest victims were the state security services “and the Iranian nation.” Khamenei honored the security personnel killed in the protests.

Khamenei may have decided to meet the military leadership for his first address on the protests to signal his support for the security establishment and for a hard line on the demonstrations. Khamenei has not typically made public spectacles of meetings with senior military officers in previous major protest waves, although he has held such meetings during non-crisis periods. The following individuals joined Khamenei:

- Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri
- IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami
- Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi
- LEC Commander Brigadier General Hossein Ashtari
- Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Gharaei Ashtiani
- Interior Minister Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi

Khamenei stated that some of the regime's strongest female supporters do not wear the full hijab in public, indicating that the regime may relax its hijab enforcement to placate protesters. Khamenei's remark does not likely signify a reversal of the mandatory hijab law but rather a message to the security establishment to enforce it less aggressively. Khamenei also expressed regret over the death of Mahsa Amini.

Key Takeaways

- **Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei made his first public appearance since September 21 to condemn the ongoing, anti-regime protests.**
- **Protests increased in number to at least 18 Iranian cities in 16 provinces.**
- **University students and faculty staged widespread protests in response to the regime's brutal crackdown on Sharif University students.**
- **Iranian proxies pivoted their media messaging to match Khamenei's speech.**

Supreme Leader Succession

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei made his first public appearance since September 21. [2] Khamenei spoke to a military officer graduation ceremony alongside senior military and security forces leaders. Khamenei appeared to be in no worse health than on his last such public engagement, suggesting that he may have recovered if Western reporting that his health had deteriorated was accurate.


Anti-Regime Protests

Anti-regime protests increased in number on October 3. CTP assesses with moderate-to-high confidence that demonstrations occurred in at least 18 Iranian cities in 16 different provinces. Iranian social media users documented unrest in the following locations, all of which occurred on or in the vicinity of university campuses:

- Karaj, Alborz Province
- Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province (violence reported)
- Esfahan City, Esfahan Province
- Jahrom, Fars Province
- Shiraz, Fars Province
- Gorgan, Golestan Province


- Kerman City, Kerman Province
- Kermanshah City, Kermanshah
- Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province
- Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province
- Khorramabad, Lorestan Province
- Damghan, Semnan Province
- Semnan City, Semnan Province
- Birjand, South Khorasan Province
- Shahriar, Tehran Province
- Tehran City, Tehran Province (violence reported)
- Urmia, West Azerbaijan Province
- Zanjan City, Zanjan Province

Protest Activity in Iran October 3



Iranian university students and faculty staged widespread demonstrations following the regime's brutal crackdown on Sharif University protestors on October 2. Science, Research, and Technology Minister Mohammad Ali Zolfi Gol met with Sharif University President Rasoul Jalili the following day.^[3] Sharif University's Students Basij Organization—which is an extension of the Iranian security services—released a statement condemning the regime's response to October 2 protests, signaling the gravity of clashes between protestors and security forces.^[4] Sharif University announced that its classes will be held virtually until further notice.^[5] The Iranian Teacher's Trade Association released a statement urging all teachers and students to boycott classes and join nationwide strikes and protests on October 3.^[6] Footage circulating on social media suggests that university students are continuing to organize and attend protests, despite reports of heavy security presence in major Iranian university campuses.^[7] Protests were documented in several universities in Tehran including Shahid Beheshti University, which the EU sanctioned in 2011 for its ties to the Iranian nuclear program.^[8] Anti-regime demonstrations at Sharif and Shahid Beheshti Universities may particularly concern the regime given the importance of these institutions to Iranian nuclear proliferation and military efforts.

University Protests in Tehran, Iran October 3



Iranian high school girls are increasingly participating in protests throughout Iran. Social media users circulated footage of Iranian highschoolers purportedly chanting anti-regime slogans and destroying pictures of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.^[9] The regime will likely face difficult decisions if young people continue to demonstrate in this fashion.

Axis of Resistance and Regional Developments

Iranian proxies pivoted to match messaging from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's October 3 speech. IRGC media channels amplified Khamenei's accusation that US and Israeli agents orchestrated riots in Iran.^[10] Iraqi proxy media channels and Lebanese Hezbollah's Al Ahed news website highlighted the same narrative.^[11] Proxy media channels had not emphasized Israel in their October 2 claims of foreign interference. Their pivot to emphasize accusations of Israeli agitators in reaction to Khamenei's speech suggests that Khamenei is redirecting Axis of Resistance messaging in a more anti-Israel direction.

The IRGC likely attacked anti-regime Kurdish militia positions in Iraqi Kurdistan for the eighth consecutive day. An Iraqi media source stated that the IRGC attacked positions in Sidekan, Soran District, Erbil Province.^[12] The source said the attack did not cause casualties or damage any property. CTP cannot independently validate this report.

[1] www.leader dot ir/fa/content/26050

[2] www.leader dot ir/fa/content/26050

[3] <http://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/07/10/2782769>

[4] <http://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/07/11/2783007>

[5] <http://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/07/11/2782826>

[6] https://twitter.com/IranIntl_En/status/1576848496359006209

[7] <https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1576890241490636800>

[8] <https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/shahid-beheshti-university>

[9] <https://twitter.com/Javanmardi75/status/1576947825274810368>, <https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1576843289285693441>, <https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1576939593923907585>

[10] <https://t.me/SEPAHCYBERY/53385>

[11] <https://alahednews dot com dot lb/article dot php?id=46402&cid=116>; <https://t.me/maymun5/9955>; <https://t.me/sabreenS1/60863>; <https://t.me/Tura313/33420>;

[12] <https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D9%80%D9%80%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D9%84%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%AF%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%84>



Iran Crisis Update, October 4

Nicholas Carl, Zachary Coles, and Frederick W. Kagan
October 4, 3:00 pm ET

The Iran Crisis Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).

University and high school students have begun largely leading the ongoing protest movement in Iran—at least for the moment. Anti-regime protests occurred in at least 17 cities in 14 provinces on October 4, primarily around universities and high schools. Students expressed frustration with the regime and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

The student protesters are a generation younger than the youth who played a prominent role in the Green Movement in 2009, during which Iranians took to the streets to protest the fraud-plagued reelection of then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. These protests will likely influence this younger generation's formative years in a fashion similar to the way the Green Movement affected the Iranian youth at the time. It will be interesting to observe how the experiences in those earlier demonstrations of the parents of young people protesting today shape both generations.

It is unclear how long the university and high school students will sustain their protests. The regime may not use the same brutality and force that it has previously used throughout the crackdown against young people. The continuation of the student demonstrations could afford the other segments of the protest movement time to rest before returning to the streets, however.

Key Takeaways

- **Anti-regime protests occurred in at least 17 cities in 14 provinces.**
- **Senior Iranian political and security officials overwhelmingly echoed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's hard line on the protests.**

- The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) continued attacking anti-regime Kurdish militant positions in Iraqi Kurdistan for the ninth consecutive day.
- Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) promoted a conspiracy theory alleging Mahsa Amini committed suicide to trigger civil unrest in Iran.

Supreme Leader Succession

There was nothing significant to report today.

Anti-Regime Protests

Anti-regime protests occurred in at least 17 cities in 14 provinces on October

4. CTP assesses with moderate-to-high confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

- Karaj, Alborz Province
- Bushehr City, Bushehr Province
- Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province
- Esfahan City, Esfahan Province
- Shiraz, Fars Province
- Rasht, Gilan Province
- Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province
- Marivan, Kurdistan Province
- Saghez, Kurdistan Province
- Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province
- Babol, Mazandaran Province
- Tehran City, Tehran Province
- Urmia, West Azerbaijan Province
- Yazd City, Yazd Province
- Zanzan City, Zanzan Province

CTP assesses with low confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

- Najafabad, Esfahan Province
- Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province



Senior Iranian political and security officials overwhelmingly echoed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's talking points on the protests. These individuals include President Ebrahim Raisi, Parliament Speaker Brigadier General Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei, Interior Minister Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi, Expediency Discernment Council Chairman Sadegh Amoli Larijani, Guardian Council Secretary Ahmad Jannati, and Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri.¹

These individuals all accused the US and Israel of coopting and stoking the protests against the regime—in line with Khamenei's remarks from October 3. They framed the protesters as rioters and seditionists. Bagheri, Vahidi, and Amoli Larijani praised the state security services and framed them as heroes and victims of the protests. All these officials expressed little to no sympathy for the protesters and their grievances—a departure from the somewhat more conciliatory tone that Bagheri and IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami have been using.

Anti-regime militant group Jaish al Adl vowed to retaliate against the regime for killing protesters in Sistan and Baluchistan Province. The group stated on October 1 that it will “enter the field with all its power to hold the regime accountable.” The group also denied its involvement in the deadly clashes between protests and regime security forces in Zahedan on September 30. Jaish al Adl operates around the Iran-Pakistan border region and regularly conducts attacks against regime security forces.

The IRGC Intelligence Organization released a statement on October 2 vowing to avenge the security forces personnel who died in the deadly clashes in Zahedan.² The IRGC Intelligence Organization condemned “separatist groups” in the statement, alluding to Jaish al Adl. Intelligence and Security Minister Esmail Khatib threatened on October 2 to retaliate against the “terrorists” responsible for the clashes as well.³

President Joe Biden issued a statement condemning the regime crackdown and expressing support for the protesters.⁴ Biden stated that the US is “making it easier for Iranians to access the Internet, including through facilitating greater access to secure, outside platforms and services.” Biden also stated that the US will impose “further costs.”

Axis of Resistance and Regional Developments

The IRGC continued attacking anti-regime Kurdish militant positions in Iraqi Kurdistan for the ninth consecutive day. The IRGC attacked a village near Sidekan, Soran District, Erbil Province.⁵ The IRGC attacked the village with a Mohajer-6 drone, which is capable of carrying glide bombs and anti-armor guided munitions.⁶ IRGC attacks targeting Sidekan have not included drones since September 26.

Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) promoted a conspiracy theory alleging Mahsa Amini committed suicide to trigger civil unrest in Iran. LH-affiliated Al Manar aired a segment that discussed and elaborated on Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s October 3 statement that Mahsa Amini died under “mysterious circumstances.” Al Manar pundit Abdo Laqis reiterated Khamenei’s claim that Iranian security forces did not harm Amini and claimed that Amini plotted with Israeli agents to commit suicide while in Iranian Law Enforcement Command custody.⁷

¹ <http://www.president.ir/fa/139993>; <http://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1401/07/12/2783717>; <http://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1401/07/12/2783546>; <http://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1401/07/12/2783700>; <https://www.irna.ir/news/84904318>; <http://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1401/07/12/2783563>; <http://www.nournews.ir/fa/news/110636/>

² <http://www.defapress.ir/fa/news/548488/>

³ <http://www.defapress.ir/fa/news/548411>

⁴ <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/10/03/statement-by-president-biden-on-the-violent-crackdown-in-iran/>

⁵ <https://shafaqdot.com/ar/%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D9%80%D9%80%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D9%84%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8011-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%84>

⁶ [http://www dot nournews dot ir/fa/news/110655;](http://www.dotnournews.ir/fa/news/110655)
[https://twitter.com/IranIntlbrk/status/1577292126378987521?s=20&t=KJHZy0KT02qckFpO_FJrtg;](https://twitter.com/IranIntlbrk/status/1577292126378987521?s=20&t=KJHZy0KT02qckFpO_FJrtg)
<https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/irans-drone-inventory-and-potential-sales-to-russia>
⁷ [http://program dot almanar dot com dot lb/episode/240979/2;](http://program.dotalmanar.com.lb/episode/240979/2)
<https://twitter.com/alaa86ala/status/1577164032250769408>



Iran Crisis Update, October 5

Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Nicholas Carl, Zachary Coles, and Frederick W. Kagan
October 5, 3:00 PM

The Iran Crisis Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).

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Anti-regime protests seemingly subsided in extent and size on October 5. October 5 marks the death of a prominent Shia Imam and is a national holiday in Iran, possibly explaining the decrease in protest activity in Iranian high schools. The regime's ongoing internet and telecommunication restrictions are likely limiting the open-source information available on anti-regime demonstrations.

Key Takeaways

- **Anti-regime protests may have occurred in at least four cities in four provinces—a significant decrease from the previous day's protest activity.**
- **Anti-regime outlet Iran International reported that Iran is using orbit jamming to block the network's satellite signal into Iran.**
- **The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) conducted an artillery strike on Sidekan in Iraqi Kurdistan for the tenth consecutive day.**

Supreme Leader Succession


There was nothing significant to report today.

Anti-Regime Protests

Anti-regime protests may have occurred in four cities in four provinces on October 5. The regime's ongoing internet and telecommunications censorship has severely limited the open-source information available on protest activity. CTP assesses with low to moderate confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

- Khorasgan, Esfahan Province
- Alborz, Karaj Province
- Qom City, Qom Province
- Tehran City, Tehran Province

Protest Activity in Iran October 5



Former Foreign Affairs Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif stated on October 4 that the regime cannot ignore its people, referring to the protests.¹ Zarif's more-sympathetic rhetoric diverges from the hard line that other senior political and security officials have taken on the protests. Zarif served under former moderate President Hassan Rouhani.

Anti-regime outlet Iran International reported on October 4 that the regime has started using orbit jamming to block the network's satellite signal into Iran in recent days.² Iran International accused Iran of violating international law and said that it would legally pursue the issue.

Axis of Resistance and Regional Developments

The IRGC attacked anti-regime Kurdish militant positions in Iraqi Kurdistan for the tenth consecutive day.³ The IRGC shelled positions near Sidekan, Soran District, Erbil Province. The IRGC has concentrated its attacks into Iraqi Kurdistan exclusively around Sidekan since October 1.

¹ <http://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/697475>

² https://twitter.com/IranIntl_En/status/1577388204872896523

³ <https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/story/29645-Iranian-artillery-shelling-of-Kurdistan-Region-continues-for-12-consecutive-days>



Iran Crisis Update, October 6

Nicholas Carl, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Zachary Coles, and Frederick W. Kagan
October 6, 5:00 pm ET

The Iran Crisis Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).

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Iran may attack the US, Israeli, and/or Saudi targets in retaliation for the role Iranian officials claim those countries have played in stoking the ongoing, anti-regime protests. This assessment is based on rhetoric from Iranian military leaders on October 6. Senior Iranian military officers released a statement accusing the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia of coopting and stoking the protests and vowed to retaliate.¹ The content and nature of the statement suggests that the heads of each major military and security body approved its release. The statement did not list the names of these officers but noted that they are from the following military bodies:

- The Armed Forces General Staff;
- The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters (the body that commands and coordinates all Iranian operational military activity);
- The Artesh (Iran's conventional military);
- The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC); and
- The Law Enforcement Command.

The regime could use its proxy and partner militias in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Yemen to attack US forces and US regional partners. Yemen's civil war truce expired on October 2, allowing the regime to resume using the Houthis to attack the Gulf states.

The security forces' statement suggested that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei likely was indeed seriously ill in recent weeks but has recovered. The officers reaffirmed the armed forces' allegiance to Khamenei and wished him good health and a long life. Western reporting indicates that Khamenei's health declined significantly in early September.² Khamenei spoke to a military officer graduation ceremony on October 3, appearing no more unhealthy than he has seemed in recent months.³

1 Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War 2022.

The military officers reiterated their uncompromising stance toward the protests in the statement. They labeled protesters “secessionists” and vowed to defeat them. These remarks match the aggressive rhetoric that Khamenei and other senior political and security officials have used in recent days. The regime labeled the protesters in the 2009 Green Movement and other major protest waves “secessionists.”

Some university faculty called for further protests on October 8.⁴ University students have previously shown that they can coordinate widespread demonstrations in this protest wave, and the university faculty may be similarly capable of doing so.

This protest movement is unlike previous protest waves in Iran, and its trajectory is therefore difficult to forecast. Protester grievances are primarily political but resonate across many different communities and socio-economic classes in Iran. The last major political (as opposed to economic) protest movement in Iran was the Green Movement, which lasted throughout 2009. It is thus unclear whether this protest movement will last for weeks or months.

Key Takeaways

- **Iran’s senior military leadership accused the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia of stoking the ongoing, anti-regime protests and vowed to retaliate.**
- **Anti-regime protests occurred in at least eight cities in five provinces.**
- **Protests could increase in extent and size on October 8.**
- **The IRGC conducted an artillery strike on Sidekan in Iraqi Kurdistan for the eleventh consecutive day.**


Supreme Leader Succession

There was nothing significant to report today.

Anti-Regime Protests

Anti-regime protests occurred in at least nine cities in five provinces on October 6. Highschool and university students reportedly led smaller-scale demonstrations throughout the country. The regime’s ongoing internet and telecommunication restrictions are likely limiting the open-source information available on anti-regime demonstrations. CTP assesses with moderate-to-high confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

- Esfahan, Esfahan Province (Economically-driven protests)
- Rasht, Gilan Province
- Marivan, Kurdistan Province
- Arak, Markazi Province
- Eslam Shahr, Tehran Province
- Parand, Tehran Province
- Tehran City, Tehran Province
- Qods, Tehran Province
- Boukan, West Azerbaijan Province



Note: CTP will begin publishing updates to our maps each morning to reflect the previous day's protests that occurred late in the evening. We will begin publishing these updated maps tomorrow, October 7.

IranWire corroborated social media reports of a brutal crackdown on Tabriz University student protestors on October 2, citing an eyewitness account.⁵ IranWire's source stated that the Iranian Law Enforcement Command's anti-riot unit used batons and shotguns to injure protestors and arrested roughly 300 students.⁶ The source added that students were unable to access the internet on campus as of October 5.⁷

Prominent Iranian Sunni cleric Molavi Abdolhamid refuted the regime's claims that Salafi Jihadi militants killed dozens of Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan residents and security personnel on September 30.⁸ Abdolhamid insinuated that Iranian authorities were responsible for violent clashes between security forces and anti-regime protestors, which resulted in the deaths of senior provincial IRGC officials.⁹ Many social media users have referred to the regime's violent crackdown on Zahedan protestors as "bloody Friday."¹⁰ Amnesty International reported that Iranian security forces have killed at least 82 protestors and bystanders—some of whom were children—since nation-wide protests began on September 16.¹¹

Anti-regime protests may increase in size and scale in the coming days, particularly on October 8.¹² A Tehran University faculty member announced that Sharif University faculty members will commemorate violent anti-regime protests that occurred on the university's campus on October 2.¹³ Some student groups are also calling on university faculty to condemn the regime's brutal crackdown on student protestors.¹⁴ Iranian social media users are increasingly commemorating teenagers Sarina Esmail Zadeh and Nika Shakarami, both of whom were brutally killed by security forces after participating in anti-regime protests.¹⁵ These individuals

serve as secular martyrs around whom protestors can rally and may reinvigorate demonstrations in the coming days.

Axis of Resistance and Regional Developments

The IRGC attacked anti-regime Kurdish militant positions in Iraqi Kurdistan for the eleventh consecutive day. The IRGC shelled positions near Sidekan, Soran District, Erbil Province.¹⁶ Sidekan mayor Ihsan Chalabi said that attacks by Iranian and Turkish forces since September 24 have forced civilians to abandon six villages and close two schools.¹⁷ An anonymous senior Iraqi Kurdish official claimed that the IRGC is reinforcing positions along the border. The official said the IRGC warned the Kurdistan Regional Government that it may conduct ground operations in eastern Iraqi Kurdistan if anti-regime Kurdish militants do not vacate the area.¹⁸ More than 100 Iraqi MPs signed a Kurdistan Democratic Party-led request to hold an emergency parliamentary session about Iran's repeated attacks into Iraqi Kurdistan.¹⁹ Iraqi Speaker of Parliament Mohamed al-Halbousi agreed to discuss the issue during the upcoming October 8 parliament session.²⁰

Solidarity protests against the Iranian regime occurred in Israel on October 6. Several dozen women staged demonstrations in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv to support protests against the Iranian regime.²¹ The Tel Aviv city hall displayed a translation of the popular "women, life, freedom" protest slogan.²²

¹ <https://akharinkhabar dot ir/politics/9305719>

² <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/16/world/middleeast/irans-supreme-leader-ayatollah-ali-khamenei-ill.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare:%20https://www.wsj.com/articles/amid-iran-protests-a-powerful-leader-emerges-from-the-shadows-11664105423>

³ www.leader dot ir/fa/content/26050

⁴ <https://twitter.com/IranIntlbrk/status/1578013814292942848>

⁵ <https://twitter.com/YasharH3/status/1577058918773448705>, <https://iranwire.com/en/politics/108311-day-18-child-victims-hundreds-arrested-and-international-support/>

⁶ <https://iranwire.com/en/politics/108311-day-18-child-victims-hundreds-arrested-and-international-support/>

⁷ <https://iranwire.com/en/politics/108311-day-18-child-victims-hundreds-arrested-and-international-support/>

⁸ <https://www.irna dot ir/news/84900671/> ; www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/07/08/2781751; <https://t.me/molanaabdolhamid/5168>

⁹ <https://t.me/molanaabdolhamid/5168>

¹⁰ <https://twitter.com/Sonofthebeach98/status/1575876251235258368>

¹¹ <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/10/iran-at-least-82-baluchi-protesters-and-bystanders-killed-in-bloody-crackdown/>

¹² <https://twitter.com/IranIntlbrk/status/1578013814292942848>

¹³ <https://twitter.com/IranIntlbrk/status/1578013814292942848>

¹⁴ <https://twitter.com/IranIntlbrk/status/1577971061160828928>

¹⁵ <https://twitter.com/SamRasoulpour/status/1578091019312168960>;

https://twitter.com/alikarimi_ak8/status/1577942493173268480;

<https://twitter.com/Vahid/status/1577874939188854784>;

https://twitter.com/reza_shkv/status/1577862530143248384?s=20&t=PZpvYAS4dGhyinA0BsJKeA;

<https://twitter.com/MrMamoli/status/1577225790496059392?s=20&t=PZpvYAS4dGhyinA0BsJKeA>

¹⁶ <https://shafaq dot>

[com/ar/%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D9%80%D9%80%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7](https://ar/%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D9%80%D9%80%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7)

%D8%AA/%D9%84%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-13-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7-
%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AA-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A

¹⁷ <https://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/051020221>

¹⁸ <https://www.voanews.com/a/iran-increases-troops-near-kurdistan-region-threatening-ground-operation-/6776421.html>

¹⁹ <https://almadapaper.net/view.php?cat=274701>

²⁰ <https://iq.parliament.iq/blog/2022/10/06/%d8%ac%d8%af%d9%88%d9%84-%d8%a7%d8%b9%d9%85%d8%a7%d9%84-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ac%d9%84%d8%b3%d8%a9-%d8%b1%d9%82%d9%85-3-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b3%d8%a8%d8%aa-8-%d8%aa%d8%b4%d8%b1%d9%8a%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a7/>

²¹ https://twitter.com/AmySpiro/status/1578034782122151937?s=20&t=KQS1nFZQFqQj7imiFHkq_A

²² https://twitter.com/MayorOfTelAviv/status/1578080422000562176?s=20&t=W_UR47YySzw5lmOnc-hCRA



Iran Crisis Update, October 7
Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Nicholas Carl, Zachary Coles, Brian Carter, and
Frederick W. Kagan
October 7, 5:00 pm ET

The Iran Crisis Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).

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Regime disinformation about protester deaths may further stoke anti-regime sentiment and even revitalize anti-regime demonstrations. The regime released a report on October 8 alleging that Mahsa Amini died from an underlying illness, refuting evidence that she died from police brutality.¹ Iranian authorities are trying to deflect blame for Amini's death. Regime-affiliated media outlets and officials similarly claimed that Sarina Esmail Zadeh and Nika Shakarami—two teenage protestors brutally killed by security forces--committed suicide.² Iranian social media users are increasingly commemorating Esmail Zadeh and Shakarami, who are serving as secular martyrs around whom protesters can rally.³

This blatant disinformation could increase turnout for planned university protests on October 8. Iranian students and some faculty members planned demonstrations on university campuses throughout Iran.⁴ Social media users circulated calls for unrest on October 8, and protests could easily expand to include other disaffected citizens.⁵

Supreme Leader Succession

There was nothing significant to report today.

Anti-Regime Protests

Anti-regime protests occurred in at least two cities in two provinces on October 7. The regime's ongoing internet and telecommunication restrictions are severely limiting the open-source information available on anti-regime demonstrations. CTP assesses that protests occurred in the following locations:

1 Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War 2022.

- Esfahan City, Esfahan Province
- Tehran City, Tehran Province



Law Enforcement Commander Brigadier General Hossein Ashtari met with senior Iranian cleric Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi in Qom to discuss the protests.⁶ Shirazi largely condemned the protests but noted that some demonstrators have legitimate economic grievances. Shirazi is a prominent religious leader among the Iranian clerical establishment.

Ashtari may have met with Shirazi as part of a regime effort to garner support among the clerical establishment. An unidentified source told *Iran International* that Ashtari conveyed plans to Shirazi to restart morality patrols around the middle of the Persian calendar month *Aban* (October 23-November 21, 2022).⁷ The regime may seek to cultivate support among the clerical establishment as it suppresses protests and restarts morality patrols. CTP previously reported that some senior clerics have criticized the regime more openly in recent weeks, and there are rumors of dissent among the students and teachers at major seminaries.⁸

President Ebrahim Raisi ordered Interior Minister IRGC Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi to investigate the deadly clashes between protesters and security forces in Zahedan on September 30.⁹ Vahidi will prepare a report on the clashes. Raisi entrusting Vahidi with this task highlights the extent to which IRGC officers

will continue controlling regime narratives on the protests. Vahidi was the first commander of the IRGC Quds Force, serving from 1988 to 1998.

The US sanctioned seven Iranian political and security officials responsible for the regime crackdown and internet censorship on October 6.¹⁰ The US targeted:

- Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi;
- Information and Communications Technology Minister Isah Zareh Pour;
- IRGC Political Affairs Deputy Yadollah Javani;
- IRGC Sarallah Operational Headquarters Deputy Commander Hossein Nejat;
- LEC Deputy Commander Hossein Sajedi Nia;
- LEC Cyber Police Chief Vahid Mohammad Naser Majid; and
- LEC Tehran Provincial Police Chief Hossein Rahimi.

Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland announced that plan to expand sanctions against the IRGC.¹¹ They also stated that they would ban top IRGC leaders from Canada. Freeland described the IRGC as a “terrorist organization.”

Axis of Resistance and Regional Developments

Iranian proxies echoed Iranian regime narratives that denied Mahsa Amini died from injuries inflicted by security forces. IRGC, Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) and Iraqi proxy Asaib Ahl al-Haq media channels repeated the Iranian regime’s claim that Mahsa Amini died due to complications from a prior illness.¹² LH media channels also emphasized Iranian regime allegations that the US and other Western countries intend to incite riots with false narratives about Amini’s death and additional sanctions against Iranian officials.¹³

The IRGC attacked anti-regime Kurdish militant positions in Iraqi Kurdistan for the twelfth consecutive day. The IRGC shelled positions near Mount Sakran, Choman District, Erbil Province.¹⁴ IRGC Telegram channels also claimed the IRGC targeted anti-regime Kurdish militants with rockets in “the border areas” of West Azerbaijan Province.¹⁵ Iranian state media did not corroborate the claim.

Several dozen Iraqi protesters gathered in front of the Iranian embassy in Baghdad to protest Iranian attacks into Iraqi Kurdistan.¹⁶ The demonstration precedes the Iraqi parliament’s October 8 session to discuss the issue.

Iran may co-opt Houthi grievances to encourage the Houthis to attack Saudi Arabia from Yemen in retaliation for the role Iranian officials claim Saudi

Arabia has played in stoking protests.¹⁷ The civil war truce in Yemen lapsed on October 2, though the UN is still attempting to extend the truce and the Houthis have not yet resumed drone and missile attacks into Saudi Arabia.¹⁸ The Houthis have threatened to attack Saudi and Emirati oil facilities in recent days if Saudi Arabia and the UAE fail to meet the Houthis' demands to extend the truce.¹⁹ Iran has previously encouraged Houthi attacks against Gulf states in response to regional dynamics, such as cooperation with Israel.²⁰

¹ <https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/07/15/2784677/%D9%BE%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87-%D9%85%D9%87%D8%B3%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%BE%D8%B2%D8%B4%DA%A9%DB%8C-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D9%82%DB%8C%D9%82-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%B1%D8%B3%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%AD-%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%88%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%87%D8%B3%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B2%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%AA%D8%B1>

² <https://www.mehrnews dot com/amp/5603744/>; [https://www.mehrnews dot com/amp/5603744/](https://www.hamshahrionline dot ir/news/710534/%D8%AF%D9%88-%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%B6%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%88%D8%AA-%D9%86%DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%A7-%D8%B4%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B1%D9%85%DB%8C-%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA-%DB%8C%DA%A9%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86); <https://www.hamshahrionline dot ir/news/710534/%D8%AF%D9%88-%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%B6%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%88%D8%AA-%D9%86%DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%A7-%D8%B4%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B1%D9%85%DB%8C-%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA-%DB%8C%DA%A9%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86>

³ <https://twitter.com/SamRasoulpour/status/1578091019312168960>;
https://twitter.com/alikarimi_ak8/status/1577942493173268480;
<https://twitter.com/Vahid/status/1577874939188854784>;
https://twitter.com/reza_shkv/status/1577862530143248384?s=20&t=PZpvYAS4dGhyinA0BsjKeA;
<https://twitter.com/MrMamoli/status/1577225790496059392?s=20&t=PZpvYAS4dGhyinA0BsjKeA>

⁴ <https://twitter.com/IranIntlbrk/status/1578013814292942848>;
<https://twitter.com/IranIntlbrk/status/1577971061160828928>

⁵ <https://twitter.com/DTehran/status/1578372816860512257>;
<https://twitter.com/IranNW/status/1578365912037498880>

⁶ <http://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/07/15/2784475>

⁷ <https://twitter.com/IranIntlbrk/status/1578351080236150787>

⁸ <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-october-2>

⁹ <http://www.president dot ir/fa/140009>

¹⁰ <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0994>

¹¹ <https://www.reuters.com/world/canada-ban-irans-irgc-leaders-entry-expand-sanctions-2022-10-07/>

¹² <https://www dot alahednews dot com dot lb/article.php?id=46549&cid=116>; <https://www dot almanar dot com dot lb/10012950>; <https://t.me/maymun5/10392>; <https://t.me/SEPAHCYBERY/53587>

¹³ <https://www dot alahednews dot com dot lb/article.php?id=46524&cid=116>;

¹⁴ <https://twitter.com/K24English/status/1578367431143088129?s=20&t=IYP7Z2kt8z07yWvs2OytMw>

¹⁵ <https://t.me/SEPAHCYBERY/53582>; https://t.me/Sepah_Ir/70435

¹⁶ <https://shafaq dot com/en/Iraq-News/Dozens-protest-in-front-of-Iranian-Embassy-in-Baghdad>

¹⁷ <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-october-6>

¹⁸ <https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/3910831/un-chief-urges-yemen-rivals-no-new-violence-and-renew-truce> and <https://osesgy.unmissions.org/statement-un-special-envoy-negotiations-extend-and-expand-nationwide-truce-yemen>

¹⁹ https://marebpress.net/news_details.php?lang=arabic&sid=187684 and <https://www.alalam.ir/news/6385308> and

<https://twitter.com/army21ye/status/1576620949561954304?s=20&t=Qlry9diYvDU8P7GVBd-Xiw> and <https://twitter.com/army21ye/status/1576623634726400001?s=20&t=Qlry9diYvDU8P7GVBd-Xiw>

²⁰ <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/january-2022-map-update-al-houthi-attacks-on-saudi-arabia-and-the-uae>



Iran Crisis Update, October 8

Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Zachary Coles, Dana Alexander Gray, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 8, 6:30 PM ET

The Iran Crisis Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).

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The Iranian regime’s rhetorical responses to ongoing anti-regime protests may suggest that senior regime officials are posing for the benefit of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei or other key power centers rather than trying to reach their restive populace. Regime disinformation about brutality against demonstrators is increasingly disconnected from reality and more likely to stoke protestor anger than to assuage it. President Ebrahim Raisi spoke at a women’s university in Tehran to illustrate that he retains support from young Iranian women in the face of mass protests by young women against the regime.¹ IRGC-affiliated media outlets are similarly propagating disinformation about protestor deaths, claiming that several protestors died from an underlying illness, suicide, and other causes unrelated to police brutality.² Uncorroborated reports suggest that the regime edited the Telegram account of Sarina Esmail Zadeh—whom Iranian security forces brutally killed during an anti-regime protest—to support to the regime’s narrative that she committed suicide.³

These kinds of regime messages are unusually disconnected from reality and alienating to protestors and those who sympathize with them. These narratives may be directed instead at an internal audience. Khamenei appeared in stable condition during an appearance on October 3 and has seemingly recovered from reports of deteriorating health.⁴ Recent regime messaging nevertheless suggests that discussions surrounding supreme leader succession are ongoing. The regime’s tone-deaf messaging could be intended to shape the perceptions of leaders, like Khamenei, who receive information about ongoing protests indirectly and possibly via television, about how well regime officials and possible successors are doing rather than those, like the protestors and the outside world, who can see the situation for themselves more directly.

The growing gap between the fictional world described by regime messaging and the reality on the ground will likely inflame demonstrations, in any event.

Key Takeaways

- **Regime messaging suggests that key regime officials could be posing to gain or retain favor as part of efforts to shape the succession to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rather than focusing on responding to protestor grievances.**
- **Anti-regime protests occurred in at least 29 Iranian cities in 20 provinces.**
- **Iranian security forces are using increasingly violent and lethal means to suppress protests.**
- **Protestors have demonstrated the capacity to coordinate demonstrations despite extensive internet and telecommunication restrictions.**
- **Protest rhetoric has evolved to include revolutionary calls to topple the regime.**
- **Oil industry workers and bazaar merchants participated in strikes on October 8.**
- **The IRGC did not attack anti-regime Kurdish militia positions for the first time since September 26, likely in part because the Iraqi parliament met to discuss the attacks.**

Supreme Leader Succession

There was nothing significant to report today.

Anti-Regime Protests

Anti-regime protests significantly increased in number and scale on October 8. CTP assesses that preorganized anti-regime protests occurred in at least 29 Iranian cities in 20 different provinces. October 8 saw some of the most significant protest activity since demonstrations began on September 16. October 8 protests featured participation from a broad swath of the Iranian population including marginalized minorities, merchants, students, and the urban elite. Iranian social media users documented unrest in the following locations:

- Fardis, Alborz Province
- Karaj, Alborz Province
- Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province
- Esfahan City, Esfahan Province (violence reported)
- Kashan, Esfahan Province
- Shahinshahr, Esfahan Province

- Shiraz, Fars Province (violence reported)
- Rasht, Gilan Province
- Gorgan, Golestan Province
- Hamedan City, Hamadan Province
- Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province (violence reported)
- Kerman City, Kerman Province
- Javanroud, Kermanshah Province (violence reported)
- Naysar, Khuzestan Province
- Shadegan, Khuzestan Province
- Saghez, Kurdistan Province (violence reported)
- Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province (violence reported)
- Doroud, Lorestan Province
- Arak, Markazi Province
- Babol, Mazandaran Province (violence reported)
- Sari, Mazandaran Province
- Qazvin City, Qazvin Province
- Tehran City, Tehran Province (violence reported)
- Qods, Tehran Province
- Boukan, West Azerbaijan Province
- Mahabad, West Azerbaijan Province
- Piranshahr, West Azerbaijan Province
- Yazd City, Yazd Province
- Zanzan City, Zanzan Province

Protest Activity in Iran as of October 8, 2022, 6:30 PM ET



Footage shared on social media suggests that security personnel fired live ammunition at protestors and bystanders in several cities on October 8, possibly marking an escalation in the regime's protest suppression response. Security personnel have largely arrested or fired rubber bullets and paintballs against anti-regime protestors in major Iranian cities in prior weeks, with the noteworthy exceptions of lethal force used in Kurdish cities and in Zahedan on several occasions.⁵ Security forces reportedly fired live ammunition at three protestors—one of whom was a bystander not involved in the protests—in videos that are being widely circulated and condemned by social media users.⁶ Iranian social media users compared the violent clashes between security forces and protestors on October 8 to war zones.⁷

The regime may increasingly use lethal force as it struggles to contain protests in some Iranian cities. A provincial law enforcement official vowed decisive action against protestors on October 8.⁸ Tehran Governor Mohsen Mansouri also acknowledged flaws within the city's local law enforcement command's ability to respond to protests and noted that Tehran security personnel had not slept in several days because of their involvement in suppressing the demonstrations.⁹ Some Iranian social media users

reported that protestors successfully repelled security forces in areas throughout Tehran and Sanandaj cities.¹⁰ Other reports suggest that a judiciary official in Saghez sustained injuries in clashes with protestors on October 8.¹¹

The increased use of lethal force by regime security services is not surprising given the guidance Khamenei gave in his speech advocating for harsher crackdowns on October 3, as CTP has previously reported. Regime security force leaders have been echoing Khamenei's commitment to crush the protests since that speech, including in a joint letter released on October 6.¹² The regime will likely continue to use greater violence and more lethal force until and unless Khamenei directs it to take a softer approach, which is unlikely.

Iranian protestors are seemingly able to coordinate despite extensive internet and telecommunication restrictions. Protestors successfully organized anti-regime protests on October 8, although it is unclear how they were able to do so.¹³ Protestors have additionally demonstrated the ability to anticipate and blunt some of the regime's demonstration suppression tactics. Footage circulating on social media shows protestors barricading streets to obstruct Iranian security forces' movements in Tehran and other major cities, a tactic that regime officials have tried— and failed—to preempt.¹⁴

Iranian protestors are increasingly referring to anti-regime demonstrations as a revolutionary movement aimed at overthrowing the Islamic Republic. Recent protest slogans have evolved from grievances about Khamenei and Iranian regional objectives to explicit calls to topple the regime. Protestors were documented chanting slogans such as “stop saying protest, this is a revolution,” and “this is the year of blood, Khamenei will be overthrown” in recent days.¹⁵ CTP cannot independently verify this footage.

Protests are incorporating a broad segment of Iranian society. Oil industry workers went on strike at the Abadan refinery in Khuzestan Province.¹⁶ Bazaar merchants reportedly closed businesses in Tehran.¹⁷ Merchants also reportedly closed businesses in Karaj, Alborz Province.¹⁸

Axis of Resistance and Regional Developments

The IRGC did not attack anti-regime Kurdish militant positions in Iraqi Kurdistan for the first time since September 26. The IRGC conducted daily attacks against anti-regime Kurdish militants in Choman and Soran Districts, Erbil Province, from September 26 to October 7.¹⁹ IRGC media channels stated that the IRGC paused operations because it had successfully destroyed its list of predetermined targets.²⁰ IRGC media channels warned that the IRGC may resume attacks, including ground operations, if the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) failed to curtail anti-regime Kurdish militia activity in Iraqi Kurdistan.²¹

The IRGC paused attacks into Iraqi Kurdistan likely in part to avoid undermining Iran-aligned Iraqi political factions' efforts to form a government. Several Iran-aligned Shia Coordination Framework (SCF) officials were sworn in as MPs during the October 8 parliamentary session.²² The new MPs filled the remaining vacant seats left open by the June 12 resignations of members belonging to Iraqi nationalist Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's political faction. The SCF is pursuing ongoing government formation negotiations with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Sunni-dominated Sovereignty Alliance, which withdrew from their political alliance with the Sadrists on September 25.²³ An agreement between the SCF and the KDP and Sovereignty Alliance would likely bring together enough parliamentary seats form a government.²⁴ The IRGC likely intends to avoid jeopardizing the SCF's negotiations with the KDP with more attacks in Iraqi Kurdistan.

The IRGC also likely intends to avoid stoking Iraqi nationalist sentiments that Sadrists may leverage to further obstruct government formation efforts. Sadrist supporters have repeatedly occupied Parliament to prevent government formation efforts since June 12.²⁵ The October 8 parliamentary session is only the second session since Sadrist Saraya al-Salam militants clashed with Iran's Iraqi proxy militants in Baghdad to obstruct government formation efforts on August 29.²⁶ The IRGC is likely attempting to avoid any actions that would incite renewed violence or galvanize anti-Iran sentiment in Iraq.

The Iraqi parliament initiated an investigation to address prior Iranian attacks in Iraqi Kurdistan. Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohamed al-Halbousi accepted a Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)-led October 6 petition to hold an emergency parliamentary session to discuss the IRGC's recent attacks throughout Iraqi Kurdistan.²⁷ Halbousi directed the Security, Defense, and Foreign Relations Committee to prepare a report on Turkish and Iranian attacks in Iraqi Kurdistan during the October 8 parliamentary session.²⁸ Halbousi and Iraqi Deputy Speaker of Parliament Shakhwan Abdullah told press that Iraq will submit the report and associated emergency petitions to the United Nations Security Council and the Inter-Parliamentary Union.²⁹

¹ <https://president dot ir/fa/140029>

² <https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/07/15/2784677/%D9%BE%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87-%D9%85%D9%87%D8%B3%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%BE%D8%B2%D8%B4%DA%A9%DB%8C-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D9%82%DB%8C%D9%82-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%B1%D8%B3%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%AD-%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%88%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%87%D8%B3%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B2%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%AA%D8%B1>; <https://www dot mehrnews dot com/amp/5603744/>; <https://www dot hamshahrionline dot ir/news/710534/%D8%AF%D9%88-%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%B6%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%88%D8%AA-%D9%86%DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%A7-%D8%B4%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B1%D9%85%DB%8C-%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B2->

²⁶ <https://english-dot-alarabiya-dot-net/News/middle-east/2022/09/26/Iraq-MPs-to-meet-for-first-time-since-inter-Shia-bloodshed-;https://www-dot-aljazeera-dot-com/news/liveblog/2022/8/29/iraq-unrest-live-blog-sadr-announces-hunger-strike>

²⁷ <https://iq-dot-parliament-dot-iq/blog/2022/10/06/%d8%ac%d8%af%d9%88%d9%84-%d8%a7%d8%b9%d9%85%d8%a7%d9%84-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ac%d9%84%d8%b3%d8%a9-%d8%b1%d9%82%d9%85-3-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b3%d8%a8%d8%aa-8-%d8%aa%d8%b4%d8%b1%d9%8a%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a7/>

²⁸ <https://shafaq-dot-com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%82-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B6%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9>

²⁹ <https://shafaq-dot-com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%AD%D9%81%D8%B8-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%AA%D9%87-%D9%88%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B4-%D9%88%D9%86%D9%87>



Iran Crisis Update, October 9
Nicholas Carl, Zachary Coles, and Frederick W. Kagan
October 9, 6:00 pm ET

The Iran Crisis Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).

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Iran may be preparing to escalate militarily against its foreign adversaries, including the US, in response to the ongoing, anti-regime protests. Likely Iranian-backed militants conducted a rocket attack against a US military base in northeastern Syria on October 8. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other senior political and security officials have accused the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia of coopting and stoking the protests in recent days.¹ Senior Iranian military officers released a statement vowing to retaliate on October 6.² Iranian forces or proxies may conduct additional attacks against US positions in the Middle East, especially in Iraq and Syria, in response to what they claim is Washington's role in the protests.

Iranian proxies may also escalate against Turkey to redirect Iraqi resentment over Iranian attacks into Iraqi Kurdistan toward Ankara rather than Tehran. Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militants conducted a rocket attack on a Turkish military base in Mosul Province on October 8.³ Liwa Ahrar al Iraq—a front group that Iranian-backed Iraqi militants use to claim attacks against Turkish forces —claimed responsibility. Iranian-backed Iraqi militants frequently used Liwa Ahrar al Iraq to claim attacks against Turkish positions during a period of escalatory attacks in June and July 2022.⁴ The Iraqi public and political establishment rallied against Turkey and its attacks into Iraqi Kurdistan during this period. Liwa Ahrar al Iraq resurfacing to claim attacks on Turkish forces may indicate that Iran and its proxies are preparing to escalate against Turkish forces and seek to again divert Iraqi citizens' and officials' anger toward Ankara rather than Tehran.

Iran may be preparing to conduct a ground incursion into Iraqi Kurdistan to attack anti-regime Kurdish militant groups operating there. The IRGC Ground Forces conducted daily artillery, drone, and missile attacks against Kurdish militants in Iraqi Kurdistan from September 26 to October 7.⁵ An IRGC-affiliated social media account tweeted on October 8 threatening that IRGC armored and special forces units would intervene against these militant groups if Iraqi Kurdish political authorities do not remove these groups from the border region.⁶ IRGC-affiliated *Tasnim News Agency* echoed this threat on October 9.⁷ Social media rumors on October 9 alleged that the IRGC has begun concentrating forces in Baneh, Kurdistan Province near the Iran-Iraq border.⁸ CTP is unable to corroborate those rumors at this time.

Key Takeaways

- **Anti-regime protests occurred in at least 18 cities in 15 provinces.**
- **Anti-regime group The Neighborhood Youth of Tehran announced their expansion to other unnamed cities in Iran.**
- **Some low-level military and security personnel may have defected.**
- **Iranian leadership may have ordered the IRGC Ground Forces to participate directly in the protest crackdown.**

Supreme Leader Succession

There was nothing significant to report today.

Anti-Regime Protests

Anti-regime protests occurred in at least 18 cities in 15 different provinces on October 9. Protest activity on October 9 declined somewhat from its October 8 peak. Protesters nevertheless sustained large-scale demonstrations without evident advanced planning—unlike the preplanned October 8 protests—and despite the regime’s increasingly violent suppression tactics. The October 9 protests continued to feature a broad swath of the Iranian population, including marginalized ethnic groups, urban elite, students, and Iran’s merchant class.

CTP assesses with high and medium confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

- Karak, Alborz Province
- Najafabad, Esfahan Province
- Gorgan, Golestan Province
- Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province (violence reported)
- Kermanshah, Kermanshah Province
- Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province
- Saghez, Kurdistan Province (violence reported)
- Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province (violence reported)
- Arak, Markazi Province
- Qazvin, Qazvin Province
- Tehran, Tehran Province
- Mahabad, West Azerbaijan Province
- Zanzan, Zanzan Province

CTP assesses with low confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

- Rasht, Gilan Province
- Yasuj, Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad Province
- Babol, Mazandaran Province (violence reported)
- Bukan, West Azerbaijan Province
- Piranshahr, West Azerbaijan Province

Protest Activity in Iran as of October 9, 2022, 3:30 PM ET



Anti-regime group The Neighborhood Youth of Tehran announced its expansion to other unnamed cities in Iran.⁹ The group has participated in organizing protests in recent weeks.

Some low-level Iranian military and security personnel may have defected to the protesters. A Persian-language social media account tweeted on October 8 that the regime has arrested some officers from the Artesh Ground Forces 21st Hamzeh Infantry Division, which is headquartered near Tabriz.¹⁰ Videos on social media depict LEC officers marching with protesters around Tehran on October 9.¹¹ CTP cannot verify the authenticity of these videos nor whether the officers were joining the protests or simply escorting them. Parliamentarian and former IRGC officer Brigadier General Mohammad Esmail Kowsari stated that the regime should hold accountable security personnel who do not fulfill their duties, suggesting that there are such personnel.¹²

Iranian leadership may have ordered the IRGC Ground Forces to support the protest crackdown directly. Protesters killed a member of the IRGC Ground Forces 22nd Beyt ol Moghaddas Operational Division in Sanandaj on October 8.¹³ Iranian state media reported that the guardsman was killed while trying to disperse protesters and protect property. Another guardsman was injured. An unverified social media account tweeted that the IRGC Ground Forces deployed the 27th Mohammad Rasoul Ollah Operational Division and 10th Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Division in Tehran.¹⁴

The deployment of the IRGC Ground Forces would indicate that the regime considers the protests an extremely serious threat. The IRGC Ground Forces is the regime's last line of defense against internal unrest and the most prominent internal security service after the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) and Basij Organization.¹⁵

The IRGC Ground Forces would likely use extreme force to suppress protests. IRGC Ground Forces units are equipped with armored and mechanized vehicles and the full panoply of equipment suitable for insurgency, counterinsurgency, and mechanized war. The regime used the IRGC Ground Forces briefly during the countrywide gasoline protests in November 2019. These forces deployed to Mahshahr, Khuzestan Province, where they killed around 148 protesters.¹⁶ The deployment of elements of multiple IRGC Ground Forces divisions, if confirmed, would indicate that the regime has grown very alarmed about its ability to control the ongoing demonstrations and may suggest that it is preparing to use greater levels of brutality to suppress them.

Radio Farda reported that forces from the LEC Special Units transferred from Zahedan to Kerman.¹⁷ The LEC Special Units is a highly trained, anti-riot force that deploys when regular police cannot contain protests.¹⁸ This LEC branch is known as one of the most ideologically fervent in the Iranian armed forces. A regime decision to deploy the LEC Special Units away from Zahedan would be surprising given the recent deadly unrest there and explicit threats from anti-regime militant groups to escalate further. The IRGC Ground Forces could deploy its 110th Salman Farsi Independent Special Forces Brigade, which is headquartered in Zahedan, to suppress protests in place of the LEC Special Units if it felt the situation merited such force.¹⁹

A popular English-language social media account tweeted that the Office of the Supreme Leader dismissed some of its security personnel and replaced them with a new cadre of officials.²⁰ CTP cannot verify this rumor.

Axis of Resistance and Regional Developments

There was nothing significant to report today.

¹ <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-october-6>

² <https://akharinkhabar dot ir/politics/9305719>

³ <https://english dot alaraby dot co dot uk/news/turkish-base-northern-iraq-targeted-rocket-attack>

⁴ <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-liwa-ahrar-al-iraq>

⁵ <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-october-8>

⁶ https://twitter.com/Sepah_Com/status/1578651936311500800

⁷ <http://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/07/17/2785594>

⁸ <https://twitter.com/IranIntlbrk/status/1579191406694141953>

⁹ https://mobile.twitter.com/javanane_t/status/1579017697312268289

¹⁰ https://twitter.com/saeedaganji/status/1578741192413806592?s=46&t=Gr01pWJ4f_Pjj-VUGHWx0w

¹¹ <https://twitter.com/GEsfandiari/status/1579014741606813696>; and

<https://twitter.com/ManotoNews/status/1578996345461182464>

¹² <https://www.radiofarda.com/a/32072010.html>

¹³ www.kayhan dot ir/fa/news/250930

¹⁴ <https://twitter.com/RezaVaisi/status/1578790187995627521>

¹⁵ <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/whatever-it-takes-to-end-it-irans-shift-toward-more-oppressive-governance>

¹⁶ <https://ir.usembassy.gov/commemoration-of-the-massacre-of-mahshahr-and-designation-of-iranian-officials-due-to-involvement-in-gross-violations-of-human-rights/>

¹⁷ https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1579080581463560192

¹⁸ <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/whatever-it-takes-to-end-it-irans-shift-toward-more-oppressive-governance>

¹⁹ <https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Irans-Reserve-of-Last-Resort.pdf>

²⁰ https://twitter.com/no_itsmyturn/status/1578844037208895488



Iran Crisis Update, October 10

Nicholas Carl, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Dana Alexander Gray and Frederick W. Kagan

October 10, 5:00 PM ET

The Iran Crisis Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).

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The ongoing, anti-regime protests could interact with and feed off of preexisting insurgencies in Iran. There are at least three active but low-level insurgencies in Iran's northwestern, southwestern, and southeastern border regions. Iranian Arab, Baloch, and Kurdish militant groups have leveraged economic and political frustrations among marginalized minorities in Iran to fuel these groups' anti-regime agendas for decades. These groups, which include the Kurdistan Free Life Party and Jaish al Adl, have historically conducted attacks into Iran and clashed with state security services regularly.

The greatest violence in the current protest movement has been in northwestern Kurdistan Province and southeastern Sistan and Baluchistan Province partly because insurgent groups operate in these areas.¹ These groups are likely trying to coopt and stoke the unrest to fight the regime. State security services are using greater force in these areas as well.

Demonstrations in the Iranian heartland may already be approaching the threshold identified in US military doctrine for a "latent and incipient" insurgency. CTP has not yet observed clear indicators that the protest movement has crossed the threshold and is not prepared to forecast that it will. American counter-insurgency doctrine, using a modified version of the Maoist insurgency framework, defines the lowest level of insurgency as follows:

*"The first phase is latent and incipient. During this phase, activities include the emergence of insurgent leadership, creation of initial organizational infrastructure, training, acquisition of resources, and political actions, such as organizing protests. A group that eventually becomes members of an insurgency may simply be a legitimate political group at this stage. Governmental actions and changes in society can transform political groups into insurgencies."*²

Protestor organizations are understandably cautious about leaving observable traces in the open source, making it impossible to gauge their extent, capabilities, or intentions at this time. But the appearance of nascent protestor organizations like the Neighborhood Youth of Tehran suggesting that they can do more than simply generate protests—specifically preventing regime security forces from entering certain areas of Tehran and other cities—could indicate an inflection in their capabilities or intentions.³ The slogans and chants calling for the overthrow of the regime, particularly those saying that this is not a protest but a revolution, are another possible indicator.⁴

Evaluating the movement of a protest movement along insurgency phases derived from Maoist theory is problematic, to be sure. Maoist theory and US counter-insurgency doctrine assumes the existence of a group intending to overthrow a government before large demonstrations begin and may not adequately cover the case of a protest movement that transforms over time into an insurgency.

The Syrian civil war, however, followed a similar path to the one Iranian protest may be on—peaceful protests were met by violent oppression that fractured the security forces. Security force defectors joining the protests helped organize them and prepare them to defend themselves against increasing regime violence. Limited indications of Iranian security force defections are emerging, although some Iranian security forces have joined protestors in previous protest waves without turning them into organized insurgencies. The risk to the Iranian regime is there, however, if the current protest wave interacts with Iran’s long-standing insurgencies and the regime’s brutal response in ways that propel it along the insurgency spectrum.

Key Takeaways

- **Ongoing, anti-regime protests could interact with and feed off of preexisting insurgencies in Iran in ways that could prolong, reinvigorate, and exacerbate the unrest.**
- **Iranian security forces have launched a brutal crackdown on protestors in Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province.**
- **Thousands of oil workers reportedly participated in strikes and anti-regime protests on October 10, which could pose a significant threat to the regime’s oil production if prolonged.**
- **Protest activity will likely increase in size and scale on October 12.**
- **Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei adopted a conciliatory tone toward protestors on October 10, breaking with the pattern of regime senior leader statements since Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s speech on October 3.**

Supreme Leader Succession

There was nothing significant to report today.

Anti-Regime Protests


Anti-regime protests occurred in at least 16 cities in 11 different provinces on October 10. Iranian security forces are using increasingly violent and lethal means to suppress protests, particularly in Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province. CTP assesses with high and medium confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

- Asalouyeh, Bushehr Province
- Esfahan City, Esfahan Province
- Karzin, Fars Province
- Marvdast, Fars Province
- Shiraz, Fars Province
- Kermanshah City, Kermanshah Province
- Abadan, Khuzestan Province
- Dehgolan, Kurdistan Province
- Saghghez, Kurdistan Province
- *Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province (significant violence reported)*
- Arak, Markazi Province
- Qazvin City, Qazvin Province

- Tehran City, Tehran Province
- Mahabad, West Azerbaijan Province

CTP assesses with low confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

- Baneh, Kurdistan Province
- Ramsar, Mazandaran Province



Iranian security forces violently and significantly escalated against anti-regime protesters in Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province. Iranian security personnel fired live ammunition and teargas indiscriminately at protesters and into people's homes on October 9 and 10.⁵ A Kurdish human rights outlet reported that Basij members surrounded and enclosed residents in several local neighborhoods, preventing them from leaving, and fired teargas at residents chanting anti-regime slogans from their homes on October 10.⁶ Other human rights organizations reported that security forces have killed multiple several Sanandaj residents, including a seven-year-old child.⁷ Some social media users are comparing the regime's brutal protest crackdown in Sanandaj to a war zone.⁸

A Kurdish human rights organization based in Europe reported that some Kermanshah Provincial Law Enforcement Command members assigned to suppress unrest in Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province are refusing to participate in the ongoing crackdown.⁹ CTP cannot verify these claims.

Oil workers participated in strikes and anti-regime protests in Bushehr and Khuzestan Provinces on October 10, threatening the regime's oil production. Over 1,000 petrochemical workers in Asalouyeh, Bushehr Province participated in anti-regime solidarity strikes and protests.¹⁰ Asalouyeh workers reportedly blocked highways, set fire to some facilities at the petrochemical plant, and chanted revolutionary slogans, including "this is the year of blood, Khamenei will be

overthrown.”¹¹ Oil Refinery workers in Abadan, Khuzestan Province similarly participated in strikes and anti-regime protests.¹² The Council of Oil Contract Workers alleged that 4,000 oil workers participated in strikes on October 10, including several other oil refineries along the Persian Gulf.¹³ The council called for further protests and strikes throughout Iran, urging protesters to “prepare for nationwide and back-breaking strikes.”¹⁴

Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei adopted a conciliatory tone toward protesters on October 10. Ejei called for engaging protesters in dialogue and discussing reform, diverging from other senior political and security officials who have struck a harder line toward protesters in recent days.¹⁵ It is unclear whether Ejei’s comments signify a shift in regime messaging in response to the growing oil worker strikes or whether Ejei is diverging from the regime talking points. President Ebrahim Raisi briefly articulated a similar position on September 28 but has adopted a more aggressive stance since then.¹⁶ CTP continues to monitor the situation and will develop this assessment in the coming days.

Demonstrations will likely increase in scale and size on October 12. Anti-regime group The Neighborhood Youth of Tehran published a statement calling for protests on this date and provided protestors with guidance on how deter and blunt Iranian security forces.¹⁷

Axis of Resistance and Regional Developments

There was nothing significant to report today.

¹ https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-october-8#_ednf7b70e1ec197916a0d7a7ec6a45bfbfe15

² https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/fm3_24.pdf

³ https://twitter.com/javanane_t/status/1579466569016410120

⁴ <https://twitter.com/begoonah1/status/1578437042396020737>;
<https://twitter.com/pooyanmokari/status/1578746500930187265>;

<https://twitter.com/AlirezaNader/status/1576313764344832000>

⁵ <https://twitter.com/AmnestyIran/status/1579546065933840385>

⁶ <https://twitter.com/KurdistanHRN/status/1579538480006574081>

⁷ <https://twitter.com/HengawO/status/1579540801583222786>; <https://twitter.com/HengawO/status/1579551368909819904>

⁸ https://twitter.com/bai_mina/status/1579525545897136129, <https://twitter.com/HengawO/status/1579559921267642369>,
<https://twitter.com/AnonymousIran/status/1579533489309118464>; <https://iranwire.com/en/politics/108472-iran-protests-oil-workers-strike-and-say-khamenei-is-done/>

⁹ https://twitter.com/Hengaw_English/status/1579471482853687299

¹⁰ https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-protests-oil-workers-unrest/32073170.html#0_8_10089_9356_3158_243917036

¹¹ <https://twitter.com/KhosroKalbasi/status/1579458021646045184>; https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-protests-oil-workers-unrest/32073170.html#0_8_10089_9356_3158_243917036

¹² <https://twitter.com/pouriazeraati/status/1579424209285312514>

¹³ <https://iranwire.com/en/politics/108472-iran-protests-oil-workers-strike-and-say-khamenei-is-done/>

¹⁴ <https://twitter.com/IranIntlbrk/status/1579433845278920704>

¹⁵ <https://www.hamshahrionline.ir/news/711242/>

¹⁶ <http://www.president.ir/fa/139919/>

¹⁷ https://twitter.com/javanane_t/status/1579466569016410120



Iran Crisis Update, October 11

**Nicholas Carl, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Zachary Coles, and Frederick W. Kagan
October 11, 6:00 PM ET**

The Iran Crisis Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Crisis Updates via email, please subscribe [here](#).

Unconfirmed reports suggest that the Iranian regime is amassing military and security forces in Kurdistan Province to violently suppress protests and possibly also to conduct a ground operation into Iraqi Kurdistan.¹ Social media rumors reported on October 10 that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Law Enforcement Command (LEC) have transferred forces from Hamedan, Yazd, and elsewhere to Sanandaj, where the regime is conducting a brutal crackdown.² Anti-regime outlet IranWire and a UK-based Sky News journalist reported that the regime is concentrating forces in Kurdistan Province.³

CTP cannot verify these reports and advises caution when evaluating these reports in light of the many, often-conflicting, information operations being conducted by the regime and its opponents.

Violent clashes between protesters and state security services in Kurdistan Province occurred on October 10 and 11.⁴ Social media observers described Sanandaj as a “war zone,” a description that coheres with available pictures and videos of the clashes.⁵

The regime may use forces concentrated in the border region to conduct a ground incursion into Iraqi Kurdistan against anti-regime Kurdish militant groups. Iranian political and security officials have repeatedly accused these groups of coopting and stoking the protests against the regime. Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi reiterated this accusation on October 11.⁶ The IRGC conducted daily artillery, drone, and missile attacks against anti-regime Kurdish militant positions in Iraqi Kurdistan from September 26 to October 7.⁷ A Telegram channel run by Iranian proxies in Iraq posted on October 11 that the IRGC is conducting a ground incursion but quickly deleted the post.⁸

The reports that the regime may conduct a ground incursion into Iraqi Kurdistan may be an Iranian information operation. An unidentified source told anti-regime outlet *Iran International* that the IRGC is conducting such an information operation aimed at anti-regime Kurdish militants in Iraqi Kurdistan possibly to scare them away from the border and disrupt their operations.

The concentration of security forces in Kurdistan Province could exacerbate Iranian security forces' bandwidth issues—a key vulnerability in the regime's internal security apparatus. The regime relies on a small number select, highly ideological units from the IRGC, Basij, and LEC to crack down on unrest and thus does not have enough manpower to cover the entire country.⁹ The regime shuffles its forces to where they are needed most—typically the restive border regions—when protests erupt.¹⁰

Simultaneous protests in the border areas and major cities strain these forces—a vulnerability that protesters and other anti-regime groups may seek to exploit. Anti-regime, Persian-language social media accounts have called for protester solidarity with the demonstrators in Sanandaj and Zahedan.¹¹ Deadly clashes erupted between protesters and security forces in Zahedan on September 30.¹²

Unobserved indications that the security forces are experiencing bandwidth issues include:

- Reports of security forces transferring away from cities where there are ongoing protests
- Reports of the regime using the Artesh—its conventional military—and foreign proxies on a large-scale for protest suppression.

Anti-regime protests continued in at least 16 cities in 11 provinces on October 11 and could expand in the days ahead. English- and Persian-language social media accounts have called for protests across Iran on October 12 and 13.¹³ Protesters have already demonstrated that they can coordinate large-scale demonstrations and may again succeed in doing so in the coming days.

Key Takeaways

Supreme Leader Succession

There was nothing significant to report today.

Anti-Regime Protests

Anti-regime protests occurred in at least 16 cities in 11 different provinces on October 11. Iranian security forces are continuing to use violent and lethal means to suppress protests, particularly in Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province. Anti-regime groups have called for demonstrations on October 12 and protest activity will likely increase in size and scale on this date. CTP assesses that protests occurred in the following locations on October 11:

- Borazjan, Bushehr Province
- Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province
- Esfahan City, Esfahan Province
- Najafabad, Esfahan Province (violence reported)
- Rasht, Gilan Province
- Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province
- Kermanshah, Kermanshah Province

- Abadan, Khuzestan Province
- Baneh, Kurdistan Province (violence reported)
- Divandarreh, Kurdistan Province
- Saghez, Kurdistan Province
- Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province (violence reported)
- Qom City, Qom Province
- Marlik, Tehran Province
- Tehran City, Tehran Province
- Mahabad, West Azerbaijan Province



Iranian intelligence and security officers have been entering hospitals and surveilling pharmacies to identify and arrest injured protestors. CBS News reported that Iranian protestors injured in anti-regime demonstrations are avoiding seeking treatment at medical facilities for fear of being arrested by Iranian authorities, preferring home treatment to hospitalization¹⁴ Security personnel have reportedly begun to station themselves in front of pharmacies in Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province to identify injured protestors avoiding visiting medical facilities.¹⁵ Some social media users reported that pharmacies have limited medical supplies needed by injured protestors, including medical gauze, antibiotic serum, and lidocaine.¹⁶ Iranian medical officials have issued several statements strongly condemning Iranian authorities' hospital probes.¹⁷

Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi met with senior provincial officials in Kurdistan Province as the regime struggles to contain unrest in Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province.¹⁸ Iranian security forces' use of lethal force against protestors in Sanandaj has failed to curtail further

demonstrations.¹⁹ Footage circulating on social media allegedly captured security forces running away from protestors on October 11.²⁰ CTP cannot verify this footage. Vahidi warned Iranian youth against overthrowing the Islamic Republic—reflecting that the regime recognizes the revolutionary nature of these protests and the threat it may pose.²¹

President Ebrahim Raisi held a phone call with the family of a Basij member killed in protests in Tehran.²² Raisi praised the Basij members' sacrifice and service in the call. This phone call is especially tone deaf given that Raisi has expressed little to no sympathy for the protestors. Raisi is likely messaging internal regime audiences rather than the protestors. He likely seeks to reaffirm his commitment to the security establishment and its leaders, who will play a critical role in choosing the next supreme leader. He also likely sought to signal support for the low-level security personnel who are reportedly experiencing exhaustion and low morale.²³

Axis of Resistance and Regional Developments

The Iraqi parliament plans to select a president during its upcoming October 13 session, and Iraqi nationalist and anti-corruption protesters may hold renewed anti-Iran demonstrations in response. Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohamed al Halbousi announced during an October 11 parliamentary session that parliamentarians will reconvene for a session on October 13 to vote on a new Iraqi president.²⁴ Iraqi anti-corruption Tishreen movement protesters and supporters of Iraqi nationalist Shia cleric Moqtada al Sadr may play up anti-Iran sentiments—intensified by IRGC attacks into Iraqi Kurdistan and the Iranian regime's extreme mishandling of the protests—to prevent progress on government formation.

¹ https://twitter.com/IranIntl_En/status/1579929763447459840; <https://twitter.com/HengawO/status/1579571797468778496>; <https://twitter.com/HengawO/status/1579561797937664000>

² <https://twitter.com/HengawO/status/1579561797937664000>

³ <https://iranwire.com/en/politics/108498-revolutionary-guards-deploy-forces-to-iranian-kurdistan-as-crackdown-intensifies>; <https://twitter.com/DominicWaghorn/status/1579852130487521281>

⁴ <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-october-10>

⁵ https://twitter.com/bai_mina/status/1579525545897136129, <https://twitter.com/HengawO/status/1579559921267642369>, <https://twitter.com/AnonymousIran/status/1579533489309118464>; <https://iranwire.com/en/politics/108472-iran-protests-oil-workers-strike-and-say-khamenei-is-done/>

⁶ <http://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/07/19/2786502>

⁷ <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-october-8>

⁸ Data can be provided upon request.

⁹ <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/whatever-it-takes-to-end-it-irans-shift-toward-more-oppressive-governance>

¹⁰ <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/whatever-it-takes-to-end-it-irans-shift-toward-more-oppressive-governance>

¹¹ https://twitter.com/javanane_t/status/1579769324952522752, https://twitter.com/javanane_t/status/1579828785683521542

¹² <https://www.irna dot ir/news/84900671/> حلی مترو بیتی در زاهدان; www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/07/08/2781751

¹³ <https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1579871367423725572>; https://twitter.com/javanane_t/status/1579828785683521542; https://twitter.com/javanane_t/status/1579769324952522752

¹⁴ <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-news-protests-deaths-people-shot-afraid-hospital-arrest-us-doctors-help/>

¹⁵ <https://twitter.com/IranIntlbrk/status/1579398272174604288>

¹⁶ <https://twitter.com/SasanAmjadi/status/1579376369804644352>

¹⁷ <https://twitter.com/ManotoNews/status/1579391125986869249>

¹⁸ <http://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/07/19/2786502>

¹⁹ <https://twitter.com/HengawO/status/1579883663919316992>

²⁰ <https://twitter.com/SamRasoulpour/status/1579773924195577857>

²¹ <https://www.jahannews dot com/news/815131/%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B2%DB%8C-%D8%AD%DA%A9%D9%88%D9%85%D8%AA-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D9%81%DA%A9%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%84%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA>

²² <http://www.president dot ir/fa/140076>

²³ <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-september-28>

²⁴ <https://iq dot parliament dot iq/blog/2022/10/11/%d9%85%d8%ac%d9%84%d8%b3-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%86%d9%88%d8%a7%d8%a8-%d9%8a%d8%ad%d8%af%d8%af-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ae%d9%85%d9%8a%d8%b3-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d9%82%d8%a8%d9%84-%d9%85%d9%88%d8%b9%d8%af%d8%a7-%d9%84/>



Iran Crisis Update, October 12
Nicholas Carl, Zachary Coles, and Frederick W. Kagan
October 12, 5:00 PM ET

The Iran Crisis Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Crisis Updates via email, please subscribe [here](#).

Iranian leadership is still largely speaking to itself rather than to the Iranian people. Iranian officials continue to ignore protester grievances and are instead emphasizing their readiness to brutally crack down. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei addressed the protests publicly for the second time on October 12, reiterating his accusation that foreign enemies are responsible for the unrest.¹ He dismissed the protests as minor events. Khamenei did not mention Mahsa Amini or the citizens killed in the protests. Khamenei likely sought to reaffirm to the political and security establishment his approval of the brutal crackdown while portraying strength.

Other Iranian officials are following Khamenei's lead, ignoring protester grievances and boasting of their tools of repression. President Ebrahim Raisi met with the Supreme Cyberspace Council on October 11 to discuss efforts to develop the national intranet. The regime uses this intranet to substitute for foreign internet services, asserting greater control over the Iranian information space.² A senior Law Enforcement Command (LEC) official, Brigadier General Hassan Karami, boasted that the LEC Special Units use miniature drones to track protesters who flee into alleyways.³ Karami commands the Special Units, which is the LEC's highly trained, anti-riot force. These units are heavily involved in the ongoing crackdown.

This messaging suggests that the regime will not make concessions to the protesters. This rhetoric will not assuage protester frustrations either. Regime officials may hope that the protests will lose momentum with time and brutality and slowly dissipate, but their actions and failures even to speak to their people directly are more likely to fuel continued unrest.

Key Takeaways

- **Iranian leadership is still largely speaking to itself rather than to the Iranian people.**
- **Anti-regime protests occurred in at least 29 cities in 18 provinces.**

- Protesters continue to demonstrate their capability to coordinate large-scale demonstrations despite expanding regime censorship and increasingly violent suppression.
- Commercial and industrial groups are increasingly attempting to coordinate protests and strikes between cities.
- Iranian proxy media channels in Iraq and Lebanon emphasized anti-West messaging from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's October 12 speech.

Supreme Leader Succession

There was nothing significant to report today. CTP will include this section in the future only when reportable events occur.

Anti-Regime Protests

Anti-regime protests occurred in at least 29 cities in 18 provinces on October 12. Commercial and industrial strikes continued in nine cities and spread to Baneh, Kurdistan Province, and Sarpol-e Zahab, Kermanshah Province. Iranian security forces responded most violently to protests in ethnically Kurdish areas of Iran, which have had some of the country's most frequent protests.

CTP assesses with moderate or high confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

- Fardis, Alborz Province
- Karaj, Alborz Province (violence reported)
- Ardabil, Ardabil Province
- Asalouyeh, Bushehr Province
- Bushehr, Bushehr Province
- Baharestan, Esfahan Province
- Esfahan, Esfahan Province
- Shahinshahr, Esfahan Province
- Shiraz, Fars Province
- Rasht, Gilan Province
- Gorgan, Golestan Province
- Kermanshah, Kermanshah Province
- Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province
- Abadan, Khuzestan Province
- Baneh, Kurdistan Province
- Marivan, Kurdistan Province (violence reported)
- Saghez, Kurdistan Province
- Arak, Markazi Province
- Sari, Mazandaran Province
- Tehran, Tehran Province
- Bukan, West Azerbaijan Province

- Mahabad, West Azerbaijan Province

CTP assesses with low confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

- Najafabad, Esfahan Province
- Abadeh, Fars Province
- Ilam, Ilam Province
- Kerman, Kerman Province
- Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province (violence reported)
- Babol, Mazandaran Province
- Qom, Qom Province



Protesters continue to demonstrate their capability to coordinate large-scale demonstrations despite expanding regime censorship and increasingly violent suppression. Protests grew significantly on October 12 after CTP reported protests in at least 16 cities in 11 provinces on October 11. Protesters started calling for protests on October 12 as early as October 10.

The Iranian regime activated internet and telecommunication restrictions earlier than usual on October 12. The regime restricted internet access at approximately 0600 local time on October 12.⁴ Anti-regime outlet *Iran International* claimed that Iranian mobile devices could connect to the country's national intranet but not to the global internet.⁵ The regime has typically delayed restricting access until the late morning or early afternoon during the current protest wave. The regime decided to impose internet and telecommunications restrictions earlier likely in anticipation of the

October 12 surge in preplanned protest activity. The earlier shutoff nevertheless failed to prevent protests from occurring or to stop Iranians from getting reports and footage of protests to the outside world.

Commercial and industrial groups are increasingly attempting to coordinate protests and strikes between cities. The Free Union of Iranian Workers published an October 12 statement urging Iranian workers to expand labor strikes to their cities and industries.⁶

Education Minister Yousef Nouri stated on October 11 that the regime has sent arrested high school students to “psychological centers” to educate and reform them.⁷ Nouri neglected to say how many students the regime sent to these centers when a journalist asked him, stating that “there are not many.”

Axis of Resistance and Regional Developments

The Iraqi parliament ostensibly still plans to select a new president on October 13. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) withdrew its nominee for Iraqi president on October 12 and proposed a compromise candidate to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The KDP nominated PUK-affiliated former Iraqi Water Minister Latif Rasheed as its compromise candidate.⁸ The PUK has yet to accept the KDP’s compromise candidate.⁹ A continued KDP-PUK deadlock on the presidential nomination may prevent Parliament from voting on a president on October 13. No political group has yet petitioned to delay the October 13 session. Supporters of Iraqi nationalist Shia cleric Moqtada al Sadr and the anti-corruption Tishreen movement will likely protest if parliament meets whether or not it selects a new president. If parliament meets without choosing a new president its failure could provide additional momentum to protests aimed at further delegitimizing the Iran-backed Shia Coordination Framework’s efforts to form a government.

Iranian proxy media channels in Iraq and Lebanon emphasized anti-West messaging from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s October 12 speech. Lebanese Hezbollah media channels published components of Khamenei’s speech that characterized the ongoing protests as a West-led plot to undermine Iran’s Islamic system.¹⁰ An Iran-backed Asaib Ahl al Haq Telegram channel posted an excerpt from Khamenei’s speech that emphasized the same narrative.¹¹

¹ [www.leader dot ir/fa/content/26068](http://www.leader.ir/fa/content/26068)

² [www.president dot ir/fa/140098](http://www.president.ir/fa/140098)

³ [www.mashreghnews dot ir/news/1425551](http://www.mashreghnews.ir/news/1425551)

⁴ [Ahttps://twitter.com/netblocks/status/1580114341709643777?s=20&t=PAT1WmAqIt1xQjNMImUa7g](https://twitter.com/netblocks/status/1580114341709643777?s=20&t=PAT1WmAqIt1xQjNMImUa7g)

⁵ <https://www.iranintl.com/202210124655>

⁶ <https://twitter.com/ManotoNews/status/1580108695043645440?s=20&t=-R-PXngovq6Ypm9zXEyW3Q>

⁷ [https://www.sharghdaily dot com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-6/858207-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B4-%D8%A2%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D9%86%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%85-](https://www.sharghdaily.com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-6/858207-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B4-%D8%A2%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D9%86%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%85-)

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%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%AF%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B4-
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%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B3-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%85%DB%8C-%DA%AF%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%AF

⁸ [https://www dot shafaq dot com/en/Iraq-News/State-of-law-commends-KDP-recent-initiative](https://www.dotshafaq.com/en/Iraq-News/State-of-law-commends-KDP-recent-initiative)

⁹ [https://www dot shafaq dot com/en/Iraq-News/State-of-law-commends-KDP-recent-initiative](https://www.dotshafaq.com/en/Iraq-News/State-of-law-commends-KDP-recent-initiative)

¹⁰ [https://www dot alahednews dot com dot lb/article dot php?id=46668&cid=116](https://www.alahednews.com.lb/article.php?id=46668&cid=116)

¹¹ <https://t.me/maymun5/10974>

Iran Crisis Update, October 13

Nicholas Carl, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 13, 5:30 PM ET

The Iran Crisis Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Crisis Updates via email, please subscribe [here](#).

Expanding protests could strain Iranian state security services beyond their capabilities to respond in the coming days. Anti-regime protest organizations and social media accounts have called for protests in Khuzestan Province on October 14 and throughout the country on October 15. A group called the Youth of the Whole Country, which began tweeting on October 11, has repeated these calls and stated that it seeks to overthrow the regime.^[1] The group added that it has coordinated with local protest leaders throughout Iran. Numerous other Persian-language social media accounts with similar naming conventions are circulating on Twitter, claiming to represent Iranian protesters in cities across the country.^[2] The Youth of Tehran Neighborhoods tweeted that the October 15 demonstrations will be “the beginning of the end [for the regime].”^[3]

CTP cannot verify that the authenticity of these groups or their claims to be leading protests in Iran. The Youth of the Whole Country notably states that its members are inside and outside Iran.^[4] These calls for protests on October 14 and 15 will likely bring more Iranians onto the streets in any event.

Such a scenario would strain the regime’s capability to suppress protests in major cities and border regions at the same time. The regime relies on relatively small numbers highly ideologically committed and well-trained security units for protest crackdowns, which introduces a vulnerability in the security apparatus: Iranian leaders do not have enough of these forces to cover all of Iran.^[5] The regime has historically shuffled these elite security forces around the country to where they are needed most—typically the restive border regions. The regime has conducted brutal crackdowns on demonstrators in northwestern Kurdistan Province and southeastern Sistan and Baluchistan Province in recent weeks and is likely focused on preventing any insurgent groups from gaining traction in these regions. The regime may face the added pressure of trying to control protests in Khuzestan Province, where anti-regime violence is common, on October 14 and in major cities across Iran on October 15.

Simultaneous protests across Iran—in major cities and the border regions—could overwhelm security forces and prevent them from being able to control demonstrations in some locations. Such a scenario will not likely collapse the regime in itself, but it would certainly pressure it significantly.

Key Takeaways

- **Expanding protests could strain Iranian state security services beyond their capabilities to respond in the coming days**
- **Anti-regime protests occurred in at least 17 cities in 12 provinces.**
- **The Iraqi parliament elected Kurdish compromise candidate Abdul Latif Rashid as president.**

Anti-Regime Protests


Anti-regime protests occurred in at least 17 cities in 12 provinces on October 13. Social media reports suggest that commercial and industrial strikes continued in cities throughout Bushehr, Hormozgan, Kerman, Khuzestan, Kurdistan and Tehran Provinces,^[6] marking four days since oil and petrochemical workers in Bushehr and Khuzestan joined strikes and anti-regime protests.^[7] CTP assesses with moderate or high confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

- Karaj, Alborz Province
- Najafabad, Esfahan Province
- Ilam City, Ilam Province
- Kermanshah City, Kermanshah Province
- Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province
- Baneh, Kurdistan Province
- Marivan, Kurdistan Province
- Saghez, Kurdistan Province
- Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province (violence reported)
- Arak, Markazi Province
- Mirjaveh, Sistan and Baluchistan Province
- Tehran City, Tehran Province
- Boukan, West Azerbaijan Province
- Mahabad, West Azerbaijan
- Abhar, Zanjan Province
- Zanjan City, Zanjan Province

CTP assesses with low confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

- Dehgolan, Kurdistan Province

Protest Activity in Iran as of October 13, 5:30 PM



The Iranian regime continues to violently suppress and arrest protestors, specifically in Kurdistan Province, as anti-regime demonstrations approach their twenty-first consecutive day. Social media users continue to report lethal violence used against protestors, and Amnesty International claimed that Iranian security personnel have killed at least 23 children since protests began on September 16.^[8]

A Kurdish human rights group reported that Iranian authorities have arrested more than 2,180 people in Kurdistan Province since September 16.^[9] Security and intelligence officials have additionally arrested over 30 oil and petrochemical workers participating in strikes and anti-regime demonstrations since strikes began on October 10.^[10] Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei pardoned and or commuted 1,862 prisoners' sentences, including 218 prisoners with "security-related" charges on October 13.^[11] His website framed the pardons as a commemoration of the Prophet Mohammad birthday and Imam Jafar Sadegh.^[12] Such pardons as part of commemorations are normal.

Senior Iranian officials rhetorically escalated against the US and its allies on October 13, echoing Khamenei's comments blaming Iran's enemies for ongoing protests on October 12.^[13] IRGC Commander Hossein Salami and IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh framed ongoing protests as an ideological war driven by the US, the UK, Israel, and Saudi Arabia in meetings with university professors on October 13.^[14] Hajizadeh added that Iran was monitoring its enemies' military and defense capabilities.^[15] President Ebrahim Raisi similarly accused the US of pursuing policies aimed at destabilizing the regime at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia member-state summit in Astana, Kazakhstan.^[16] An IRGC-affiliated newspaper accused British diplomat Simon Shercliff of aiming to incite further unrest in Iran on October 13.^[17] *Politico* similarly reported that multiple Iranian officials had privately warned the EU against imposing protest-related sanctions on Iran, stating that the ramifications would be "grave and that bilateral relations may not survive it."^[18]

Axis of Resistance and Regional Developments

The Iraqi parliament elected Kurdish compromise candidate Abdul Latif Rashid as president on October 13.^[19] An Iranian proxy-affiliated Telegram channel celebrated Rashid's election.^[20] Rashid selected Mohammad Shia al Sudani, who is Iran-aligned, as the prime minister-designate. The Shia Coordination Framework—the umbrella coalition for Iranian-backed parties in Iraq—previously identified Sudani as their nominee. Sudani is responsible for submitting a cabinet proposal to Parliament in 30 days. Iran will likely try to exploit Sudani's potential premiership to expand its political reach into Iraq after former Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi sought to curtail Iranian influence.

The Syrian Foreign Affairs Ministry released a statement supporting the Iranian regime's brutal crackdown on ongoing protests on October 13.^[21] The statement expressed support for Khamenei's leadership and the regime's ability to overcome demonstrations. Syria additionally warned against foreign interference and demanded that Western countries drop sanctions on Iran.^[22]

^[1] https://twitter.com/iran_javanan/status/1580523031805714433;
https://twitter.com/iran_javanan/status/1580576767848636417.

^[2] https://twitter.com/javanane_A/status/1580525135164866560

^[3] https://twitter.com/javanane_t/status/1580595477132607488

^[4] https://twitter.com/iran_javanan

^[5] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/whatever-it-takes-to-end-it-irans-shift-toward-more-oppressive-governance>

^[6] <https://twitter.com/IranIntl/status/1580520286658494464>; <https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1580542674028806144>; <https://twitter.com/IranNewsUpdate1/status/1580570032668434432>; <https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1580589305923506176>; <https://twitter.com/IranNewsUpdate1/status/1580602571143536640>;
<https://www.iranintl.com/en/202210131401>; <https://twitter.com/bbcpersian/status/1580615368787169280>

^[7] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-october-10>

[8] <https://t.co/61eyYuyWOB>; <https://twitter.com/AmnestyIran/status/1580633290385797121?s=20&t=NbUvcZaobZi8hjqlW8DvQ>

[9] https://twitter.com/KurdistanHRN_En/status/1580523119101771776

[10] <https://iranwire.com/fa/news-1/108561-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%B4%D8%AF%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%87-%D8%AE%D9%88%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%87-%DB%B9%DB%B6-%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%AF/>

[11] https://twitter.com/IranIntl_En/status/1580579919590961152

[12] <https://farsi.khamenei.ir/message-content?id=51135>

[13] www.leader.ir/fa/content/26068

[14] [https://www.isna.ir/news/1401072111035/%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%AD%D8%AC%D9%85-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B9%DB%8C-%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D8%B4%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B7%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%B4-%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA](https://www.isna.ir/news/1401072111035/%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%AD%D8%AC%D9%85-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B9%DB%8C-%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D8%B4%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B7%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%B4-%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA;); <https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1401/07/21/2787628/%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AC%DB%8C-%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%AF%D8%B1%DA%AF%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%AC%D9%86%DA%AF-%D8%AA%D8%B1%DA%A9%DB%8C%D8%A8%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C-%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D9%87%D8%B3%D8%AA%DB%8C%D9%85>

[15] <https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1401/07/21/2787628/%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AC%DB%8C-%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%AF%D8%B1%DA%AF%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%AC%D9%86%DA%AF-%D8%AA%D8%B1%DA%A9%DB%8C%D8%A8%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C-%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D9%87%D8%B3%D8%AA%DB%8C%D9%85>

[16] <https://www.president.ir/fa/140128>

[17] <https://www.barrons.com/articles/britain-denies-official-s-tehran-visit-linked-to-protests-01665672907>

[18] <https://www.politico.eu/article/iran-menace-eu-sanction-protest-mahsa-amini-jcpoa/>

[19] <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/rockets-hit-baghdads-green-zone-sources-2022-10-13/>



Iran Crisis Update, October 14

Nicholas Carl, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Zachary Coles, and Frederick W. Kagan
October 14, 5:00 pm ET

The Iran Crisis Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Crisis Updates via email, please subscribe [here](#).

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) may be mobilizing retired servicemembers and other affiliated officers to suppress protests in Tehran on October 15. *Iran International* reported that the IRGC has called on its retirees and other affiliates to report to the Mohammad Rasoul Ollah Corps headquarters—the IRGC unit responsible for security in Tehran Province.¹ The regime is likely preparing for the planned countrywide protests on October 15. Trying to mobilize retirees and other affiliates would indicate that Iranian leaders are increasingly concerned by the mounting unrest.

CTP cannot verify this reporting. *Iran International* is UK-based and has an explicit anti-regime agenda. Individuals tied to the Saudi royal family reportedly fund it.² The report that the IRGC is trying to mobilize retirees and others is consistent with CTP's previous assessments that Iranian security forces are struggling with bandwidth constraints, exhaustion and low morale.³

Demonstrators have killed more Iranian security personnel in the current protest wave than in any previous wave in the regime's history according to regime statistics. Iranian state media reported that 26 security personnel have died.⁴ One IRGC major and one Basij Organization member were killed in Beyram, Fars Province on October 14.⁵ Beyram is a small town in a rural area. The killing of security officers there reflects the expansion of anti-regime violence to small towns deep in Iran in addition to major cities and border regions. The second most deadly wave for regime personnel according to regime statistics was the 2009 Green Movement, during which 23 security officers died.⁶

Key Takeaways

- **The IRGC may be mobilizing retired servicemembers and other affiliated officers to suppress protests in Tehran on October 15.**
- **Protesters have killed more Iranian security personnel in the current protest wave than in any previous wave in the regime's history according to regime statistics.**


1 Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War 2022.

- Anti-regime protests occurred in at least 11 cities in seven provinces.
- Social media accounts that are representing themselves as youth groups organizing and coordinating protests called for countrywide unrest on October 15.

Anti-Regime Protests

Anti-regime protests occurred in at least 11 cities in seven different provinces on October 14. Anti-regime groups have called for widespread demonstrations on October 15, and protest activity will likely increase in size and scale on this date. CTP assesses that protests occurred in the following locations on October 14:

- Arak, Markazi Province
- Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province
- Dezful, Khuzestan Province
- Lali, Khuzestan Province
- Marivan, Kurdistan Province
- Saghez, Kurdistan Province
- Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province (violence reported)
- Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province
- Tehran City, Tehran Province
- Boukan, West Azerbaijan Province (violence reported)
- Yazd City, Yazd Province



Security forces reportedly lethally injured and arrested dozens of Shahed High School students who had chanted anti-regime slogans in Ardabil several days earlier, marking a serious escalation in Iran’s protest response. Iranian security personnel allegedly arrested at least seven students and beat several others, 10 of whom were hospitalized and one of whom succumbed to her injuries on October 14.⁷ Iranian provincial security provincials have denied these reports.⁸

Social media accounts that are representing themselves as youth groups organizing and coordinating protests called for countrywide unrest on October 15. Dozens of social media accounts are presenting themselves as provincial components of a broader youth movement aimed at overthrowing the regime.⁹ The movement does not appear to have a central headquarters or hierarchy—at least on social media—and some of these groups’ rhetoric is notably disjointed from the others. These accounts claim to have a presence in multiple Iranian cities, including Tehran, Karaj, Neyshabour, Hamedan, Shiraz, and Ahvaz.¹⁰ Some of these accounts called for protests in Khuzestan on October 14, which did materialize in three different cities across the province on that date.¹¹ Another account claimed that it had activated “sabotage groups” to destabilize the regime on October 14.¹² The Tehran Neighborhood Youth group currently has the most followers and has posted for the longest period of time, possibly suggesting that it inspired copycat accounts based in other cities.¹³

Some of these groups are presenting themselves as having moved from protest organization to coordinating phase one insurgency attacks (see CTP’s update of Oct 10 for the definition a phase one insurgency).¹⁴ The Karaj group tweeted instructions to protesters on how to ambush security forces.¹⁵ CTP has no means of evaluating the veracity of these groups’ claims, their leadership, or their membership at this time.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei praised the regime’s strength in an annual Islamic Unity Council Conference in Tehran, marking his second appearance in three days.¹⁶ Khamenei and President Ebrahim Raisi blamed ongoing protests on foreign actors, and Khamenei warned Iran’s adversaries against overthrowing the regime.¹⁷ IRGC-affiliated news outlets highlighted Raisi’s attendance on their social media platforms.¹⁸ Two prominent Sunni clerics from Sistan and Baluchistan reportedly did not attend the conference following the regime’s violent crackdown in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province on September 30, when security forces reportedly killed 96 protestors.¹⁹

The regime staged and publicized a pro-regime rally commemorating the Prophet Mohammad’s birthday in Vali-Asr Square, Tehran City.²⁰ State-affiliated media outlets unveiled a new poster in Vali-Asr Square on October 14.²¹ The regime had previously installed a poster tying prominent Iranian women to the regime on October 13, but quickly removed it after some of these women publicly complained about being included and criticized the regime.²² The regime reportedly launched another campaign centering on women’s role within the Islamic Republic, although this campaign mistakenly used the Hungarian and not the Iranian flag.²³

Axis of Resistance and Regional Developments

Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) media channels amplified Khamenei's accusation that Western media is overstating the magnitude of protests to incite a revolution. LH-owned Al Ahed News highlighted talking points from Khamenei's October 14 speech that framed the protest movement as "scattered riots."²⁴ LH-affiliated media personality Hossein Mortada further disputed reports of large protests in Tehran on Twitter and claimed that the media is uninformed about who controls the streets in Tehran.²⁵ Al Ahed also claimed that a DC-based "operations room" has instructed Western media to encourage a revolution against the regime by overplaying the size and scope of ongoing protests.²⁶

An IRGC-affiliated Telegram channel claimed that the Artesh Air Force flew several combat aircraft around the Iran-Azerbaijan border on October 14 to warn the Azerbaijani government against pursuing policies hostile to Iran.²⁷ The regime may suspect that Azerbaijan has a role in stoking the protests among ethnically Azeri communities. Iranian state media has accused Azerbaijan of hosting Israeli intelligence agents as well.²⁸ Tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan have flared in recent months. Iran has opposed Azerbaijani efforts to expand its transportation infrastructure into Armenia, arguing that it would block Iranian economic access to European and Russian markets.²⁹

¹ https://twitter.com/IranIntl_En/status/1580857849810661379?s=20&t=JZT7-BP5q2vtOhqQHFnJaw

² <https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-sought-vices-help-to-build-a-media-empire-11549621800>

³ <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-october-13>; <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-september-28>

⁴ <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iranian-police-deploy-unrest-continues-four-weeks-after-mahsa-amini-death-2022-10-14/>

⁵ www.farsnews dot ir/fa/news/14010722000142

⁶ <https://www.javanonline dot ir/fa/news/503849>

⁷ <https://twitter.com/ManotoNews/status/1581002798954872832>

⁸ <https://twitter.com/HosseinDalirian/status/1581018059082383361>

⁹ https://twitter.com/javanane_t; <https://twitter.com/javananAhvaz>; https://twitter.com/javanane_n; https://twitter.com/javanane_hmd; https://twitter.com/javanane_tabriz; https://twitter.com/javananeh_Sh; https://twitter.com/javanane_urmia; <https://twitter.com/JavananeRasht>; https://twitter.com/Javanan_mashhad; https://twitter.com/javanan_khansar/status/1580685768938631170; https://twitter.com/javanane_KI; https://twitter.com/iran_javanan.

¹⁰ https://twitter.com/javanane_t; <https://twitter.com/javananAhvaz>; https://twitter.com/javanane_n; https://twitter.com/javanane_hmd; https://twitter.com/javanane_tabriz; https://twitter.com/javananeh_Sh; https://twitter.com/javanane_urmia; <https://twitter.com/JavananeRasht>; https://twitter.com/Javanan_mashhad; https://twitter.com/javanan_khansar/status/1580685768938631170; https://twitter.com/javanane_KI; https://twitter.com/iran_javanan.

¹¹ https://twitter.com/iran_javanan/status/1580523031805714433; <https://twitter.com/javananAhvaz/status/1580893351041110017>; <https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1581020077620482048?s=20&t=BVf-qsRMpSgEocvgtE3p6A>; <https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1581009033091162112>; <https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1581013803361525760?s=20&t=BVf-qsRMpSgEocvgtE3p6A>

¹² https://twitter.com/iran_javanan/status/1580906176459730944?s=20&t=rINHtHXetiMtv_KCZ4IQ7g

¹³ https://twitter.com/javanane_t/status/1576988668836818944

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- ¹⁴ <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-october-10>
- ¹⁵ https://twitter.com/javanane_k/status/1580928320941985792?s=20&t=4aiW4oLWtEMIVwn96DEMWg
- ¹⁶ <https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/26079/%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%B9%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%8C-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A6%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%88-%D9%85%D9%87%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86-%DA%A9%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B3-%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-october-12>
- ¹⁷ <https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/26079/%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%B9%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%8C-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A6%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%88-%D9%85%D9%87%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86-%DA%A9%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B3-%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C; https://www dot farsnews dot ir/news/14010722000071/%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%B4%DB%8C%D8%B9%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%86%DA%AF%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%B3%DB%8C-%D9%88-%D8%B3%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A2%D9%85%D8%B1%DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%88>
- ¹⁸ https://twitter.com/Tasnimnews_Fa/status/1580880532207898625?s=20&t=VfRrxjDc5QaM7O-bGykGRQ
- ¹⁹ <https://twitter.com/IranIntl/status/1580879153749889024; https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/14/world/middleeast/iran-zahedan-crackdown.html>
- ²⁰ https://twitter.com/IRNA_1313/status/1580925671563370496?s=20&t=vdaIWdwyCKTAXe5auN4Yow
- ²¹ https://twitter.com/IRNA_1313/status/1580456598270464001; https://www.rferl.org/a/32083379.html
- ²² https://twitter.com/IRNA_1313/status/1580456598270464001; https://www.rferl.org/a/32083379.html
- ²³ <https://twitter.com/ManotoNews/status/1580892435278102528>
- ²⁴ <https://www dot alahednews dot com dot lb/article dot php?id=46680&cid=116>
- ²⁵ <https://twitter.com/HoseinMortada/status/1580598514782212097?s=20&t=8-pmardldKP0wLGKrix6VA>
- ²⁶ <https://www dot alahednews dot com dot lb/article dot php?id=46706&cid=121>
- ²⁷ https://t.me/sepah_pasdaran/114457
- ²⁸ <https://www.mashreghnews dot ir/news/1376411>
- ²⁹ www.imna dot ir/news/525950