

**SUBMISSION FOR THE UNITED NATIONS
UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW (UPR) OF
KYRGYZSTAN: KEY ISSUES REGARDING CIVIC
SPACE AND THE PROTECTION OF
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS**

**For the 49th session session of the UPR Working Group
in April-May 2025**

October 2024

International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) is an independent, non-governmental organisation founded in 2008. Based in Brussels, IPHR works closely together with civil society groups from different countries to raise human rights concerns at the international level and promote respect for the rights of vulnerable communities in repressive environments.

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1. Introduction

1.1. This submission covers key issues regarding civic space and the freedoms of expression, association and assembly in Kyrgyzstan. It is based on ongoing cooperation by International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) and its local partners on documenting developments in Kyrgyzstan for the CIVICUS Monitor, an initiative that tracks civic space worldwide.¹

1.2. During the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) in January 2020, Kyrgyzstan received important recommendations on protecting civil society, fostering an environment conducive to media and free speech, ensuring that activists, journalists, and human rights defenders can work without intimidation, and safeguarding fundamental freedoms.

1.3. However, four years later, the situation has not improved – in fact, it has worsened. After President Sadyr Japarov came to power in autumn 2020², a controversial new constitution was adopted, which significantly broadened the president's powers without establishing effective checks and balances.³ Although Japarov pledged that Kyrgyzstan would remain democratic and free from political persecution,⁴ his time in office has seen new efforts to restrict civil society, increased pressure on independent media, and a widening campaign against government critics. This has led to a significant decline in civic freedoms, reflected in Kyrgyzstan's downgrade on the CIVICUS Monitor in December 2023: its civic space is now assessed as 'repressed' – the second worst rating.⁵

1.4. The following sections provide more details on these trends, along with recommendations to the Kyrgyzstani authorities.

1.5. We welcome the attention of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to the issues covered in this submission and urge UN member state delegations to prioritise them during the upcoming UPR.

2. Restrictive legislation affecting non-governmental organisations (NGOs)

2.1. In spring 2024, Kyrgyzstan's Parliament passed a controversial foreign agent-style NGO law, which President Japarov swiftly signed, despite widespread criticism from civil society, international human rights bodies, and representatives of the international community. The so-called law on 'foreign representatives' provides for a stigmatising registration regime for NGOs that receive foreign funding and are engaged in 'political' activities – a term that is broadly defined as influencing decision-making, policies or public opinion and effectively can be interpreted to encompass core NGO activities. It also provides for excessive and intrusive state control of NGO activities. NGOs accused of non-compliance may face suspension and eventual liquidation.

2.2. As stressed by IPHR and partners⁶, although the law on ‘foreign representatives’ is purportedly aimed at ensuring transparency and accountability of foreign-funded groups, its true intent appears to be stifling scrutiny, discussion, and criticism of those in power.

2.3. Under a government decree, NGOs are required to register under the new law by 9 November 2024.⁷ Thus, groups that receive foreign funding and conduct activities which can potentially be interpreted as ‘political’ now face the difficult decision of whether to register as ‘foreign representatives’ and submit to stigmatising and excessive state control, refuse to do so and risk harsh sanctions, or pre-emptively close down their operations.

2.4. As of early October 2024, only three organisations had voluntarily registered as ‘foreign representatives’ and been included in the public register created for this purpose.⁸ Other NGOs had initiated self-liquidation procedures or limited their activities to avoid the potential implications of the law. NGO representatives have also taken legal action to challenge the law and its implementing regulations,⁹ but without success to date.

2.5 Another draft NGO law, first initiated in autumn 2022¹⁰, remains under review by a government-led working group, with an extended deadline of 1 November 2024. Civil society members of the working group have previously raised concerns that their recommendations have not been adequately taken into account in the review process and it is feared that the draft law may be re-introduced still featuring highly restrictive provisions governing the registration, operations, and oversight of NGOs.

2.6. Recommendations to the Kyrgyzstani authorities:

- Repeal the law on ‘foreign representatives’ due to its stigmatising, discriminatory and excessively restrictive nature.
- Ensure that any legislative initiatives affecting NGOs fully correspond to international standards and are elaborated in close consultation with civil society representatives and international experts.
- Allow NGOs to operate without undue interference and harassment.

3. Pressure on independent media

3.1. Independent media has been subjected to increasing pressure.

3.2. In an alarming development, law enforcement authorities raided the offices of the 24.kg news agency and the Temirov Live investigative group in January 2024 and detained journalists.¹¹ The 24.kg journalists were released after questioning, but the agency's office remained sealed for two months due to allegations of ‘war propaganda’ related to its coverage of Russia's war against Ukraine. Later these charges were dropped.¹² Temirov Live journalists were charged and convicted in relation to the group's reporting on corruption (see more in next chapter).

3.3. The authorities have also sought the closure of independent news sites. In February 2024, a local court ordered the liquidation of the organisation behind the Kloop news portal in clear retaliation for the portal's investigative and independent reporting. The arguments used to justify the decision focused on the purported harmful impact of Kloop's 'negative' coverage of current affairs and its 'sharp criticism' of the government, and court-commissioned experts even accused it of contributing to mental illness, sexual depravity, and drug addiction among the public.¹³ The Supreme Court upheld Kloop's liquidation in July 2024, whereby it gained legal force. This was a serious blow to Kloop, but it intends to continue its work through other platforms.¹⁴ While President Japarov claimed that the ruling against Kloop 'will not affect' freedom of expression in Kyrgyzstan¹⁵, IPHR and its partners criticised it as an unacceptable attack on independent reporting and called for its retraction.¹⁶

3.4. Previously, in April 2023, a local court ruled in favour of a government petition to terminate the activities of Radio Azattyk, the local service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). The reason was a video report about hostilities at Kyrgyzstan's border with Tajikistan, which authorities claimed contained 'war propaganda', although it merely reported the official positions of both countries. Radio Azattyk subsequently reached an agreement with the government, resulting in the reversal of the court decision. However, the service remains under government scrutiny. In September 2024, President Japarov's press secretary publicly questioned the need for its work, accusing it of pursuing editorial policies 'aimed at deliberately discrediting' the country's leaders.¹⁷

3.5. The government has repeatedly used a controversial 2021 law to block access to independent news sites because of publications allegedly containing 'false' information. This law allows for suspending access to websites for up to two months without court approval.¹⁸ Those targeted include Kloop, Radio Azattyk, 24.kg and others.¹⁹ Recently, in September 2024, the government threatened to block the *Novye Litsa* site unless it promptly removed an article about alleged Russian involvement in President Japarov's 2021 election campaign.²⁰ The ministry also warned Radio Azattyk because of a related report.²¹ Media and human rights groups have repeatedly called for repealing the 2021 law. Concerns about its misuse were reinforced by the recent creation of a government body tasked with systematically monitoring the internet for 'provocative' or 'incorrect' information and initiating blocking or other measures in response.²²

3.6. Draft legislation submitted to Parliament in August 2024²³ would re-introduce criminal liability for defamation and grant the government broad powers to issue fines for spreading insulting, slanderous and 'false' content in media or online. Fines could amount to approx. 1000 EUR for individuals and 2000 EUR for legal entities. Civil society representatives have raised concerns about the lack of impartiality in the proposed arrangement²⁴, and the Venice Commission warned the amendments could lead to self-censorship and undermine public debate unless revised.²⁵ The Ombudsperson also called for a revision of the proposed provisions.²⁶ In early October 2024, the draft law remained under consideration in Parliament.

3.7. A so-called law on protecting children from harmful information from 2023 bans spreading content that contradicts 'family values' and promotes 'non-traditional sexual relations'. This could result in violations of freedom of expression and access to information on sexual orientation and gender identity.²⁷ Additionally, draft legislation proposing harsher penalties for possessing and sharing 'extremist' material²⁸ has sparked free speech concerns given the lack of a clear definition of 'extremism'.

3.8. Further, a draft media law submitted to Parliament in December 2023 was criticised by human rights groups, the media community, and international experts for granting the authorities excessive powers to regulate the media and online space. In response to the criticism, President Japarov ordered a further revision of the draft law by a working group including media representatives.²⁹ A new version presented in June 2024 featured important improvements, despite some remaining concerns.³⁰ At the time of writing, the revised draft law had yet to be submitted to Parliament for consideration.

3.9. Recommendations to the Kyrgyzstani authorities:

- Stop pressuring independent media by pursuing criminal cases, forcing closures, blocking sites, or otherwise obstructing their work.
- Do not use concerns about disinformation, so-called traditional values, or extremism to suppress public debate or information exchange.
- Repeal the law on protection against ‘false’ information and ensure it is not used to block online resources for criticism of the government.
- Ensure all cases involving claims of ‘false’ or ‘defamatory’ information are considered by court in full accordance with fair trial standards.
- Ensure the new media law fully aligns with international standards prior to its adoption and that its implementation does not violate media freedoms.

4. Violations of the right to peaceful protest

4.1. While peaceful protests often are held without interference, there are also threats to the freedom of peaceful assembly.

4.2. Most worryingly, authorities have imposed extended blanket bans on peaceful protests in violation of international standards.³¹ The longest ban to date was first issued by a local court in the capital, Bishkek, in spring 2022 following a request from the Russian embassy to end protests held outside its premises after the launch of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine. Thus, the court banned peaceful protests outside the Russian embassy, near the presidential and parliament building, on Ala-Too Square and in other central areas of the capital, instructing protesters to instead gather in a specifically designated park. Official events were exempted from the ban, illustrating its discriminatory nature.³² Police used the ban to prevent planned protests³³ and to justify detentions of peaceful protesters on several occasions.³⁴ The ban was repeatedly prolonged, most recently through September 2024³⁵, resulting in it being in force for over two years. As of early October 2024, it had not been further extended.

4.3. Blanket bans have also been imposed in central areas in other cities. For example, peaceful protests were outside the mayor’s office and at the central square in Osh from late July through December 2024.³⁶

4.4. Both human rights defenders and international experts have criticised the use of blanket bans. When reviewing Kyrgyzstan’s compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in

2022, the Human Rights Committee called on the authorities to avoid imposing blanket restrictions on peaceful assemblies and to refrain from selectively and discriminatorily dispersing protests.³⁷

4.5. In another worrying development, activists have been prosecuted when seeking to peacefully protest. For example, Aftandil Jorobekov and Olzhobay Shakir both faced criminal charges after announcing plans to protest against controversial government initiatives (see more below).

4.6. Recommendations to the Kyrgyzstani authorities:

- Uphold the right to peaceful assembly in line with international standards, and ensure citizens are not detained or penalised for peacefully exercising this right.
- Avoid imposing blanket restrictions on assemblies, as called for by the Human Rights Committee.

5. Persecution of activists, journalists and bloggers

5.1. Civil society activists, journalists, bloggers, and others who criticise the authorities face increasing intimidation and harassment, ranging from online threats to arrests and criminal prosecution.

5.2. Eleven current and former **Temirov Live** journalists were arrested during January 2022 raids (see “pressure on media”) and charged with calling for riots because of video reports published by the group, known for its corruption investigations.³⁸ Although six journalists were later moved to house arrest and one released with travel restrictions, four remained in detention when the trial entered its final stage in late September 2024. Prosecutors requested six-year prison sentences for all defendants.³⁹ Together with international partner NGOs, IPHR called for the dismissal of the charges, calling them retaliation for the journalists’ activities. The NGOs stressed that the prosecution had failed to present any credible evidence of unlawful actions, instead arguing that the journalists’ reporting on corruption discredited the authorities, which could potentially lead to riots and unrest.⁴⁰

5.3. On 10 October 2024, the verdict was announced: **Makhabat Tazhikbek Kyzy**, Temirov Live’s director, and **Azamat Ishenbekov** were sentenced to six and five years in prison, respectively. Two others, **Aktilek Kaparov** and **Aike Beishekeyeva** were given three years’ probation. The remaining seven were acquitted.⁴¹ While it is a relief that some of the journalists were acquitted, the convictions are a great disappointment because of the retaliatory nature of the charges. The lawyers of Makhabat Tazhikbek Kyzy and Azamat Ishenbekov said they would appeal.⁴²

5.4. Earlier, in April 2024, Makhabat Tajibek kyzy reported being beaten by a detention officer. However, prosecutors accused her of fabricating the injuries and dismissed her claims.⁴³

5.5. Temirov Live’s chief editor, **Bolot Temirov** – who is also the husband of Makhabat Tajibek kyzy - has reported facing similar charges as his colleagues in absentia.⁴⁴ He was previously deported from Kyrgyzstan in 2022 after being prosecuted on other charges clearly initiated in retaliation for his work.⁴⁵

5.6. Over two dozen civil society and political activists were arrested in October 2022 and charged with preparing riots and attempting to seize power after peacefully opposing a border deal with Uzbekistan over the Kempir-Abad reservoir.⁴⁶ Their pre-trial detention was repeatedly extended, forcing them to spend up to 19 months in unsanitary conditions with limited medical care and family visits. After a closed-door trial marred by due process violations, prosecutors sought 20-year sentences for 22 defendants in June 2024, despite a lack of credible evidence.⁴⁷ In a positive development, all were acquitted, including prominent activists **Klara Sooronkulova** and **Rita Karasartova**. However, prosecutors appealed after President Japarov publicly stated he ‘would have imposed some kind of punishment’ if he were the judge.⁴⁸ At the time of writing, the appeal is pending. In addition, the cases of four defendants are being heard separately.

5.7. An increasing number of activists, bloggers, and journalists have been charged over social media posts critical of those in power. These charges often rely on vaguely worded Criminal Code provisions on calling for ‘disobedience’ to authorities or riots (article 278, part 3), or ‘inciting’ ethnic, national or other hatred (article 330).⁴⁹

5.8. The Temirov Live journalists were charged under article 278, part 3. Others prosecuted under this provision include writer **Olzhobay Shakir** and blogger **Zarina Torokulova**, each of whom received five-year prison sentences in spring 2024 because of allegedly provocative posts. Shakir was arrested after announcing plans to peacefully rally against a government initiative to transfer Soviet-era property to Uzbekistan – a post Torokulova shared.⁵⁰ In October 2024, Shakir’s sentence was replaced with three years’ parole-like probation.⁵¹

5.9. Musician-poet **Askat Zhetigen** faced charges of ‘disobedience’ and calling for the seizure of power after harshly criticising President Japarov in a Facebook post.⁵² In July 2024, he was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment.

5.10. Human rights activist **Ondurush Toktonasyrov**, who has been vocal about government persecution and Russia’s war against Ukraine, was fined approx. 1000 EUR in June 2024 for posts deemed as inciting hatred.⁵³ Retired journalist and former RFE/RL correspondent **Bayan Jumagulova**, who has actively commented on current developments on social media, went on trial on similar charges in September 2024.⁵⁴ After being extradited from Russia in February 2024, activist-blogger **Kanykei Aranova** received a three-year sentence on charges of inciting hatred and calling for the seizure of power through government-critical posts, believed to be from a fake account created in her name. These posts criticised the president and advocated for a change of power.⁵⁵

5.11. Other cases are ongoing, including those against blogger-activist **Aftandil Jorobekov** – who opposed a controversial government initiative to change the country’s flag⁵⁶ – and whistleblower **Zhoomart Karabaev** – who exposed the National Academy of Sciences’ alleged practice of preparing expert reviews dictated by security services in cases against government critics⁵⁷. Both face charges of calling for ‘disobedience’ to authorities.

5.12. Some prosecuted activists-bloggers, such as Askat Zhetigen and Zhoomart Karabaev have alleged ill-treatment in detention.⁵⁸

5.13. Recommendations to the Kyrgyzstani authorities:

- End intimidation and harassment of activists, journalists, and others exercising their freedom of expression and other fundamental rights. Drop charges and release anyone prosecuted on these grounds, and investigate allegations of ill-treatment.
- Revise Criminal Code articles 278, part 3 and 330 to prevent their misuse in restricting free expression in violation of international standards.

¹ See <https://monitor.civicus.org/country/kyrgyzstan/>.

² For more information, see our special update on the October 2020 political crisis that preceded Japarov's rise to power: <https://monitor.civicus.org/updates/2020/10/21/post-election-protests-plunge-kyrgyzstan-crisis/>

³ See joint opinion by the Venice Commission and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights: [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD\(2021\)007-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2021)007-e)

⁴ See interview given by Japarov to Radio Azattyk on 15 March 2021: https://rus.azattyk.org/a/sadyr-zhapparov-goneny-na-politikov-i-zhurnalystov-otnyne-ne-budet/31152016.html?fbclid=IwAR0RYDBhwin4ozvYVz_TrF8edB3kbuBhju5fE0fwYYy3wXhz1bfFbuwUyWU

⁵ https://monitor.civicus.org/globalfindings_2023/

⁶ See the following joint appeals by IPHR and partners: <https://iphronline.org/articles/ngo-appeal-to-the-eu-defend-civil-society-in-kyrgyzstan-against-repressive-draft-law/>; <https://iphronline.org/articles/kyrgyzstan-civil-society-organisations-call-on-president-to-veto-law-on-foreign-representatives/>

⁷ Government decree 518 of 27 August 2024: <https://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/7-31405/edition/15185/ru>

⁸ The registry is available at: <https://nko.minjust.gov.kg/ru>

⁹ See, for example, press release issued by Bir Duino Human Rights Movement about its legal actions to challenge the law and its implementing regulations: <https://birduino.kg/pressaru/sudebnyie-razbiratelstva-v-zashhitu-konstitucionnogo-prava-na-svobodu-obedinenij-i-realizacziyu-grazhdanami-prava-uchastvovat-v-upravlenii-delami-obshchestva-i-gosudarstva>

¹⁰ See appeal by IPHR and CIVICUS for more information on this draft law: <https://iphronline.org/articles/kyrgyzstan-withdraw-draft-law-threatening-ngos/>

¹¹ See more in joint statement issued by IPHR and partners on 16 January 2024: <https://iphronline.org/articles/kyrgyzstan-charges-raids-against-independent-media/>

¹² For more information, see IPHR update prepared for the CIVICUS Monitor in April 2024: <https://iphronline.org/articles/kyrgyzstan-civic-space-deteriorates-further-as-foreign-agent-style-ngo-law-is-adopted-and-media-crackdown-widens/>

¹³ For more information, see IPHR update prepared for the CIVICUS Monitor in April 2024: <https://iphronline.org/articles/kyrgyzstan-civic-space-deteriorates-further-as-foreign-agent-style-ngo-law-is-adopted-and-media-crackdown-widens/>, and joint statement issued by IPHR and partners on 4 September 2023: <https://iphronline.org/articles/kyrgyzstan-stop-pressuring-leading-independent-news-portal-withdraw-lawsuit-to-shut-it-down/>

¹⁴ See Kloop statement from 29 August 2024: <https://kloop.kg/blog/2024/08/29/kloop-media-uzhe-tochno-likvidiruyut-verhovnyj-sud-molchal-ob-etom-bolshe-mesyatsa-no-my-prodolzhaem-rabotat/>

¹⁵ See Kloop article from 3 September 2024 about comments made by Japarov in interview with state information agency Kabar: <https://kloop.kg/blog/2024/09/03/sadyr-zhapparov-likvidatsiya-kloop-media-nikak-ne-povliyaet-na-svobodu-slova-v-kyrgyzstane/>

¹⁶ See joint statement issued by IPHR and partners on 6 September 2024: <https://iphronline.org/articles/kyrgyzstan-overturn-decision-to-liquidate-kloop-media/>

¹⁷ See statement posted by the president's press secretary on Facebook on 4 September 2024: <https://www.facebook.com/askat.alagozov/posts/8099897236745113>

¹⁸ For more information on this law, see joint submission by IPHR and partners to UN Human Rights Committee from September 2022: <https://www.iphronline.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/IPHR-LPF-CIVICUS-submission-on-Kyrgyzstan-September-2022.pdf>

¹⁹ For examples, see update prepared for the CIVICUS Monitor in November 2022: <https://www.iphronline.org/kyrgyzstan-widening-campaign-against-false-information.html>

²⁰ See statement posted by the chief editor of Novie Litsya on Facebook on 4 September 2024: <https://www.facebook.com/leila.saralaeva/posts/pfbid02XoSacr4BsamrZmhaCbLHpnD8zbnQZkKEuQnjxhyXKToJDLcVo8GjAwDxbVtePKl>

²¹ See statement posted by the president's press secretary on Facebook on 4 September 2024: <https://www.facebook.com/askat.alagozov/posts/8099897236745113>

²² For more information, see the following RFE/RL article from 19 August 2024: <https://rus.azattyk.org/a/33084286.html>

²³ The proposed amendments to the Code of Offenses are available: <http://koomtalkuu.gov.kg/ru/view-npa/3637>

²⁴ For more information, see update IPHR update for the CIVICUS Monitor from April 2024:

<https://iphronline.org/articles/kyrgyzstan-civic-space-deteriorates-further-as-foreign-agent-style-ngo-law-is-adopted-and-media-crackdown-widens/>

²⁵ Venice Commission opinion issued in June 2024: [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD\(2024\)025-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2024)025-e)

²⁶ See statement issued by the Ombudsperson on 27 September 2024: <https://ombudsman.kg/ru/publications/akyykatchy-prizvala-otozvat-popravki-o-shtrafnyh-sankciyah-za-klevetu-i-oskorblenie>

²⁷ See more in our briefing paper from November 2023: <https://www.iphronline.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/IPHR-LPF-briefing-paper-for-EU-Kyrgyzstan-HR-Dialogue-2023.pdf>

²⁸ Proposed amendments to article 332 of the Criminal Code, published for public consultation until 2 October 2024, at <http://koomtalkuu.gov.kg/ru/view-npa/4159>

²⁹ See more in the following update from April 2024: <https://iphronline.org/articles/kyrgyzstan-civic-space-deteriorates-further-as-foreign-agent-style-ngo-law-is-adopted-and-media-crackdown-widens/>

³⁰ The revised draft text, presented in June 2024 is available at: <https://knews.kg/2024/06/28/minkultury-kyrgyzstana-vyneslo-na-obsuzhdenie-novuyu-versiyu-zakonoproekta-o-smi-tekst/>

³¹ For more information on this practice and how it violates international standards, see our submission to the UN Human Rights Committee from September 2022: <https://www.iphronline.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/IPHR-LPF-CIVICUS-submission-on-Kyrgyzstan-September-2022.pdf>

³² See more in our briefing paper from November 2023: <https://www.iphronline.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/IPHR-LPF-briefing-paper-for-EU-Kyrgyzstan-HR-Dialogue-2023.pdf>

³³ For a recent example, see Kloop post from 2 July 2024: <https://x.com/kloopnews/status/1808118052770152469>

³⁴ For examples, see our briefing paper from November 2023: <https://www.iphronline.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/IPHR-LPF-briefing-paper-for-EU-Kyrgyzstan-HR-Dialogue-2023.pdf>

³⁵ See report by the local RFE/RL service from 4 July 2024: <https://rus.azattyk.org/a/33018581.html>

³⁶ See Kaktus article from 23 July 2024:

https://kaktus.media/doc/505652_v_centre_osh_a_do_konca_goda_zapretili_provodit_mitingi.html

³⁷ See concluding observations issued by the Human Rights Committee:

https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fKGZ%2fCO%2f3&Lang=en

³⁸ See more in IPHR update prepared for the CIVICUS Monitor in April 2024: <https://iphronline.org/articles/kyrgyzstan-civic-space-deteriorates-further-as-foreign-agent-style-ngo-law-is-adopted-and-media-crackdown-widens/>

³⁹ See Kloop article from 26 September 2024: <https://kloop.kg/blog/2024/09/26/gosobvinenie-zaprosilo-dlya-kazhdogo-figuranta-dela-temirov-live-po-6-let-kolonii/>

⁴⁰ Joint statement issued on 9 October 2024: <https://iphronline.org/articles/kyrgyzstan-drop-charges-against-11-journalists-and-human-rights-defenders/>

⁴¹ See Kloop news update at: <https://x.com/kloopnews/status/1844260715911090521>

⁴² See RFE/RL report: <https://rus.azattyk.org/a/33153373.html>

⁴³ See Kaktus article from 18 June 2024:

https://kaktus.media/doc/503512_specprokyratyra_otkazalas_vozbyjdat_delo_po_izbieniu_mahabat_tajibek_kyzy.html

⁴⁴ See message posted by Bolot Temirov on Telegram on 13 September 2024: <https://t.me/bolottemirov/2478>

⁴⁵ See IPHR statement from 23 November 2022: <https://iphronline.org/articles/kyrgyzstan-corruption-busting-journalist-deported-to-russia/>

⁴⁶ See joint statement issued by IPHR and partners on 28 October 2024: <https://iphronline.org/articles/kyrgyzstan-mass-arrests-of-government-critics/>

⁴⁷ For more information, see joint statement issued by IPHR and partners in June 2024: <https://iphronline.org/articles/kyrgyzstan-prosecutors-seek-20-years-for-peaceful-critics/>

⁴⁸ See Kloop article from 12 July 2024: <https://kloop.kg/blog/2024/07/12/prokurory-podali-novuyu-apellyatsiyu-po-kempir-abadskomu-delu-i-prosyat-osudit-obvinyaemyh/>

⁴⁹ See more in IPHR update for the CIVICUS Monitor from April 2024: <https://iphronline.org/articles/kyrgyzstan-civic-space-deteriorates-further-as-foreign-agent-style-ngo-law-is-adopted-and-media-crackdown-widens/>

⁵⁰ For more information on their cases, see our updates prepared for the CIVICUS Monitor: <https://iphronline.org/articles/kyrgyzstan-foreign-agent-style-law-advances-pressure-on-media-and-criminal-proceedings-against-government-critics-continue/>; <https://iphronline.org/articles/kyrgyzstan-civic-space-deteriorates-further-as-foreign-agent-style-ngo-law-is-adopted-and-media-crackdown-widens/>

⁵¹ <https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyzstan-shakir-release-probation/33151194.html>

⁵² See more on his case in our update from April 2024: <https://iphronline.org/articles/kyrgyzstan-civic-space-deteriorates-further-as-foreign-agent-style-ngo-law-is-adopted-and-media-crackdown-widens/>

⁵³ See more on her case in our update from April 2024: <https://iphronline.org/articles/kyrgyzstan-civic-space-deteriorates-further-as-foreign-agent-style-ngo-law-is-adopted-and-media-crackdown-widens/>

⁵⁴ See more on her case in the following RFE/RL articles: <https://rus.azattyk.org/a/33000610.html>;

<https://rus.azattyk.org/a/33115964.html>, as well as the following statement by Women in Journalism:

<https://www.womeninjournalism.org/threats-all/kyrgyzstan-criminal-investigation-launched-against-bayan-jumagulova-over-facebook-post>

⁵⁵ See OCCRP statement from 16 July 2024: <https://www.occrp.org/en/scoop/kyrgyz-activist-jailed-for-facebook-posts-says-she-was-framed>

⁵⁶ See more on his case in update from April 2024: <https://iphronline.org/articles/kyrgyzstan-civic-space-deteriorates-further-as-foreign-agent-style-ngo-law-is-adopted-and-media-crackdown-widens/>

⁵⁷ For more information on his case, see

[https://kaktus.media/doc/505062_mejdynarodnaia_pravozashitnaia_organizaciia_prokommentirovala_delo_joomarta_karabaeva.h](https://kaktus.media/doc/505062_mejdynarodnaia_pravozashitnaia_organizaciia_prokommentirovala_delo_joomarta_karabaeva.html)

[tml](https://rus.azattyk.org/a/33084232.html); <https://rus.azattyk.org/a/33084232.html>; <https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/profile/zhoomart-karabaev>

⁵⁸ See more in the following media articles: <https://kloop.kg/blog/2024/05/23/akyn-askat-zhetigen-pozhalovalsya-na-pytki-so-storony-silovikov/>; <https://kloop.kg/blog/2024/09/20/akyjkatchy-prizvala-genprokuraturu-provesti-proverku-po-zhalobam-eks-sotrudnika-nan-karabaeva/>