Flygtningenævnets baggrundsmateriale

Bilagsnr.:	**452**
Land:	Afghanistan
Kilde:	CPAU.
Titel:	Conflict analysis - Jaghori and Malistan districts, Ghazni province
Udgivet:	1. april 2009
Optaget på baggrundsmaterialet:	4. oktober 2012

Conflict analysis: Jaghori and Malistan districts, Ghazni province

Gina Bergh with Christian Dennys and Idrees Zaman

CPAU April 2009

Cooperation for Peace and Unity

Acknowledgment

This conflict analysis is one of 5 provincial studies focusing on Badakhshan, Kunduz, Kabul, Wardak and Ghazni conducted by CPAU with the financial support of Trocaire. The views expressed in the papers are the sole responsibility of CPAU and the authors and are not necessarily held by Trocaire.

The principal author is grateful to CPAU colleagues in London and Afghanistan for their support and information-sharing throughout the research process. Thanks also to Brendan Whitty and James Williams for guidance on aspects of the research and data analysis.

Copies of this paper can be downloaded from www.cpau.org.af

For further information or to contact CPAU please email:

Idrees Zaman idrees.zaman@cpau.org.af

Christian Dennys christian.dennys@cpau.org.af

Table of Contents

Table of Figures

Glossary

AGE	Anti Government Element
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANBP	Afghanistan new Beginnings Programme
ANP	Afghan National Police
AREU	Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CCR	Crude Conflict Rate
CDC	Community Development Council
CPAU	Cooperation for Peace and Unity
CSO	Central Statistics Office
DDR	Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration
DfID	Department for International Development
DIAG	Disbandment of Illegally Armed Groups
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICG	International Crisis Group
IMF	International Military Forces
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
IWPR	Institute for War and Peace Reporting
MRRD	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development

NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPS	Naval Postgraduate School
NSP	National Solidarity Programme
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
PTS	Programme Tahkeem-i Solh
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
US	United States
USAID	US
WB	World Bank

Dari and Pashto terms

Haram	Literally forbidden, used to describe actions which are forbidden for religious reasons in Islam
Hizb	Party
Mahalla	Village enclaves
Mujahideen	Literally those who strive, used to refer to participants in the resistance against the Soviet backed Communist government
Shabnamah	Night letters
Shia	Adherents of Shia Islam
Sunni	Adherents of Sunni Islam
Shura	Council
Toyana	Bride price
Wolesi Jirga	Lower House of Parliament

List of Parties

Harakat-i Islami Afghanistan

Hizb-i Islami (Hekmetyar - HiG)

Hizb-i Islami (Khalis – HiK)

Hizb-i Wahdat-i Islami (Khalili)

Hizb-i Wahdat-i Islami Mardom-i Afghanistan (Mohaqeq)

Hizbullah

Ittihad-i Islami (Sayyaf)

Jabhe Muttahed-e Inqelab-e Islami Afghanistan

Mahaz-i Melli-i Islami (Pir Sayed Ahmed Gailani)

Nahzat-i Islami Afghanistan (Eftekhari) Note: Not to be confused with Nahzat-i Islami Afghanistan which is run by a brother of Ahmed Shah Massoud, see http://nahzatislami.com/index.php?lang=DA&page_id=32

Pasdaran-e Jihad-e Islami

Sazman-e Nasr-e Afghanistan

Sepah-i Pasdaran (Mohammad Akbari)

1. Introduction

Conflict resolution and peacebuilding are complex processes which are impacted by a myriad of local and national realities. This report presents the ways in which local conflict in two districts in Ghazni, Jaghori and Malistan, are affected by factors and dynamics at district, provincial and national-level. The findings indicate that there are links between trends evident at each of these levels, which can be evaluated comparatively to determine the nature and extent of the impact these factors have on one another.

Increases in province-level insurgency-related conflict were found to affect the rate of district-level conflict, which increased in line with provincial conflict trends. Conflict at all levels reflected seasonal trends, with significant increases in the spring. Anti Government Elements (AGE) attacks on the Kabul-Kandahar road traversing Ghazni have severely and adversely affected aid and development in Jaghori and Malistan districts, despite the dire need for such assistance, particularly following recent years of drought. This is likely to have played a role in exacerbating local conflicts in Jaghori and Malistan. Fragile agriculture and livestock husbandry livelihoods in these districts are linked in several ways to conflict, as scarce resources and a lack of sufficient humanitarian assistance leave rural families barely able to sustain themselves, resulting in a chronic situation of crisis. This fuels a variety of district-level conflicts including land and water-related, interpersonal and debt-related conflicts.

Tenuous or absent government control in the districts has resulted in the negation of government systems originally intended to address local conflict. This is linked with the level of insurgency across Ghazni which has targeted government infrastructure and officials, making it impossible to rectify the situation by strengthening the links between provincial and district governance. The lack of government presence, particularly in Jaghori and Malistan districts, is a significant contributing cause of abuse and land occupation by factional leaders who are also associated with those government officials who are in place. This situation is reflected in district-level land-related conflict rates, and has caused the internal displacement of people in recent years.



Figure 1 Ghazni province, Afghanistan (Baumgartner 2006)

2. Definitions and Methodology

Definitions

The definitions applied in this project reflect the perception of conflict as defined by the Peace Councils. This has been adopted in place of an externally applied definition so as to reflect an Afghan interpretation of their experiences of conflict. This led to several categorical and definitional challenges and therefore coding of conflicts, who was involved and what was the cause of the conflict have been driven by what the councils reported rather than a pre-defined list set by CPAU. This step is crucial to the process of understanding what conflict is in Afghanistan.

Conflict

'Conflict' in the context of this study is an incident that has been brought to a Peace Council run by CPAU in the districts under investigation. The range of conflicts is diverse, including everything from fights over parking; access to pasture land; control of water resources; domestic violence; kidnapping; murder; debt amongst others. Further conflicts are not recorded in terms of the number of times they are brought to a council for resolution, nor the length of the conflict (though some records note that conflicts have been present for a number of years). In addition the councils do not record whether this is a conflict that had been addressed by another body, or been considered dormant by the parties.

These limitations mean that we cannot make any judgements on how many times the Peace Council must meet to address a conflict, how long conflicts last or what is the rate at which they are dormant but then re-emerge at a later date. These are issues that could be looked at in future studies but are beyond the ability of the current data-set.

Parties

'Parties' to the conflict recorded are individuals or groups that are directly engaged in the conflict. The councils recorded not only the individuals involved but also their affiliation and relation to other parties in the conflicts, including both individual and communal groups. The team created a separation between conflicts within families (intra-family), between 2 families (inter-family), between families in the same community (intra-community) and finally between different communities (inter-community).

Cause

Conflict is often caused by more than one factor, and conflicts can continue over many episodes (see definition above). When the data was collected the councils were asked to identify the *primary* reason or cause for the conflict that they recorded. The team then formed categories based on the themes that emerged from the data. They include conflicts caused by water, land, weddings/marriages, debt/financial, murder/blood feud and domestic violence. These 6 categories captured 82% of the conflicts recorded. Another category of 28 'other' conflicts was created as well as one for the 18 'interpersonal' conflicts (11% and 7% respectively of the total included in the data set). The 'interpersonal' conflicts were all recorded in one district and 'other/interpersonal' is considered one category in the analysis – though the reason why one district would have a large number of different interpersonal conflicts should be investigated further.

Conflict rate

The 'conflict rate' that is applied in some of the quantitative data analysis and graphs is based on the calculation of crude mortality rates used in humanitarian situations such as refugee camps to identify the severity of the health issues facing a community. The rationale behind the use of the 'crude conflict rate' is to address some of the perennial data issues in Afghanistan. Firstly, there is an extreme variation in population sizes between districts – within this sample alone the range is from 15,000 – 249,000. Secondly, simple counting of conflicts provides no indication about how severe a situation could be. As an example we could imagine the report 'a car accident on a road killed 3 people and injured 7'. The accident itself doesn't tell us

anything about how dangerous the area where the accident happened actually is. Is it a one off accident, or the latest in a series of accidents?

Similarly, in an example using conflict, if there are 15 cases of conflict in a district with 250,000 people how do we know whether or not this is as severe as 15 conflict cases in a district with 15,000 people? This indicates how simple reporting of conflicts tells us very little which is why, for the purposes of the project, we devised a Crude Conflict Rate to provide some empirical basis for qualitative and quantitative data.

The crude conflict rate indicates severity allowing greater comparability between districts with differing populations. By indicating severity over time we can also identify which conflicts are affected by other conflict drivers. Replacing deaths with 'conflicts' results in the following calculation;

$$Crude\ Conflict\ Rate\ (CCR) = \frac{Crude\ Conflict\ Rate\ x\ Population\ of\ District}{100{,}000}$$

The 'crude' in the title is important – this is a crude indicator, and conflict is not as finite as mortality, so caution should be exercised in taking the analysis too far. This is particularly important because the CCR does not differentiate the seriousness between the different causes or parties – a murder is given the same importance as a debt related conflict. What it can help with is analysing which districts are affected by a very high rate of conflict – from which, using other data and analysis, strategies can then be developed to mitigate, address and reduce conflict.

Primary sources

CPAU monitoring

The key primary resource is a data-set of the monitoring carried out by CPAU Peace Councils in 6 of the 8 target districts. Once the data was cleaned and re-coded the data for 5 districts was significant and include 256 unique conflict incidents in 5 of 8 districts. One district, Chak, had only 8 incidents so was dropped from the quantitative analysis. However it was retained in the analysis as a null category, along with Sayedabad and Jaghori which had no monitoring data collected, to identify whether the CPAU monitoring made a significant difference to our understanding of conflict in the district.

The remaining districts provide information over the period 2005-2008 (first half). Not all districts had data for all years – and Baharak had a gap in reporting for one year between August 2006 – June 2007, though this did not affect the trends noted in the analysis. The analysis of Chak, Sayedabad and Jaghori districts continued without the quantitative data, in effect creating a null category where a conflict analysis is done with qualitative data only. This is important in demonstrating the value added by using quantitative data in support of qualitative analysis.

This report presents Jaghori and Malistan together, though the primary data only comes from Malistan. From CPAU's field experience and a number of additional sources it was believed that Malistan and Jaghori are close enough in make-up and dynamics to make comparisons despite the lack of quantitative data from Jaghori. The Malistan data includes 94 conflicts recorded by Peace Councils between February 2005 and March 2008. All 2008 figures are weighted to provide an annual figure.

The data is a comprehensive set of what the Peace Councils experienced but from interviews with Peace Council members and reviewing the data it is clear that a) the councils are not reporting all of the incidents they deal with b) they are not reporting many incidents they fail to 'resolve'. These issues are discussed in greater depth in Implications for Peace Building Programming later in this synthesis paper.

Questionnaires

A questionnaire was sent to CPAU staff to assist with political, social and economic understanding of each district under investigation. The questionnaire covered a number of areas including the political affiliations of

key individuals in the district and province; movements of nomadic groups; presence of armed groups and functioning of state institutions. The questionnaires were also designed to fill gaps in knowledge about the relationships between district level conflicts and provincial level conflicts and / or dynamics. For some districts where information was difficult to verify additional organisations and individuals were contacted to provide further analysis.

Secondary sources

Each of the researchers reviewed literature specific to their region, province and district to investigate the historical conflict trends in that area. This included a range of academic and policy related information and was summarised in a background paper for each district (Provinces where two districts were under investigation were combined into 1 paper). Further the team was able to access a media database covering 2002-2008 for all of the target districts. This allowed the staff to corroborate academic material, the security databases and the CPAU monitoring against reporting from that area.

Security databases

The team has access to 2 security datasets which are not public. They cover 2002-5 for all provinces/districts and 2007-8 for some of the districts. The two datasets are not comparable.

They provide a benchmark to investigate the statistical linkages between local conflicts (as reported by the CPAU Peace Councils) and higher order conflicts – though simple inferences should not be made and causality can only be made from further qualitative data.

Analytical frameworks

In order to assist in the ordering, prioritisation and critique of the large amount of data generated by the project various frameworks were developed in the process of the project. Of these two were selected to help provide an appreciation of the dynamics of conflict and another for the dimensions of conflict.

The framework for dimensions of conflict was developed to represent the international/regional, national, provincial and local factors in conflicts that had emerged out of the various data sources. The types of conflicts, such as land or water, were inserted into the matrix and the team was asked to identify the links that the major conflicts in their areas had with other actors.

The dynamics of conflict framework is adapted from the Department for International Development's (DfID) Conflict assessment tool developed by the Conflict Security and Development Group (Goodhand 2001). The dynamics framework uses the same list of major conflicts that were in the dimensions framework and asks questions about the relation of the conflict to economic, social, political, and security elements. It has been modified in this project to include space for discussing the policy implications of each section where relations are identified and is presented only in the synthesis paper.

3. Conflict history in Ghazni

Ghazni province is home to approximately 4.7% of Afghanistan's population, making it the 6th most populous province in the country. It has been known throughout Afghanistan's history as a significant political, cultural and religious centre particularly since the Ghaznavid period (10th -12th Century AD), and Ghazni city has been referred to as the 'city of shrines' due to the numerous historic sites and monuments it contains (AISA 2006).

Ghazni's landscape comprises arid and flat land towards the south-east and wetter mountainous terrain in the north-west. Livelihoods in the province centre on agriculture and animal husbandry, and much of the population (89%) inhabits rural areas. The population of Ghazni is culturally diverse, with the largest population being Pashtuns (49%) followed closely by Hazara (46%), and smaller groups of Tajiks (5%), Hindu/Sikhs (less than 1%) and other minorities. Kuchi nomads also inhabit Ghazni, and their presence in the province varies throughout the year. In winter their population is relatively small at around 31,000 but in summer the number of Kuchi in Ghazni increases to approximately 121,000. Most Kuchi arriving during the summer migrate from Kandahar, Nangarhar, Zabul, Uruzgan, Helmand and Khost (MRRD 2007).

A prominent feature of the province today is the important Kabul to Kandahar highway that traverses it, making Ghazni a key trade and transport route. However, trade and development in Ghazni have been seriously hampered by the increased and pervasive insecurity in the province. Once-thriving agriculture and livestock-related production was also affected by the migration of just under a third of the population, primarily to Iran and Pakistan, during decades of conflict (MRRD 2007). Drought since 1998 and high levels of insecurity have largely prevented the rejuvenation of agriculture and livestock-related productive activities to pre-1998 levels (Fitzherbert 2006; AISA 2006).

About half of the population in Ghazni are land-owners and most of the remaining people work and live on farmland as labourers and tenants, with a minority earning income through non-farming related activities. Various sharecropping systems exist in Ghazni, whereby tenants labour on land and receive percentages of a farm's produce, though these systems are in decline (Fitzherbert 2006). In the Hazara-dominated districts of Ghazni – primarily Jaghori and Malistan, handicrafts and wool production have historically been important, and though these activities have declined they remain significant. The Hazara also tend to be more reliant on livestock-related livelihoods than other groups.

Pre-1978

The history of Jaghori and Malistan districts in Ghazni is bound more closely with that of the Hazara people than that of the rest of the province which is primarily Pashtun.[1] Central government control only extended to Ghazni in the 1830's after Dost Muhammed Khan was able to install his brother in 1837 (Noelle 1997, 22).[2] Before Afghanistan's administrative boundaries were re-formed, Malistan and Jaghori operated as part of the Hazarajat, a region which functioned largely autonomously during much of this period with minimal allegiance to central powers in Kabul.

Land conflicts in Ghazni are complex and changes in land ownership enforced by central government have been driven largely by attempts to extend their authority, by confiscating land from one population and handing it over to another for strategic reasons. Hazara lands were given to Pashtuns and vice versa; an illustrative case of this practice was when Amir Abdur Rahman Khan punished supporters of Mullah Mushk Alam (Pashtun) by giving lands to Hazara communities in Andar, as well as when Kuchi (Pashtun) grazing rights were extended within the Hazarajat (Mousavi 1998, 133).

[1] The districts were not historically resistant of foreign forces until the Soviets in 1978. Other parts of Ghazni, especially Andar which was the home of the spiritual leader of the resistance against the British in 1879, Mullah Mushk-i 'Alam Akhunzada has been historically linked to resisting against foreign forces in Afghanistan (Kakar 2006, 34).

[2] The province included 4 districts; Nani, Oba, Qarabagh and Muqor, of which only the latter two are in existence. It is not exactly clear where the boundaries of the other districts lay, but it is known that Muhammed Khwaja Hazaras did live in the province (Noelle 1997, 37).

Table 1 General information - Ghazni[3]

	Population[4]	Area (km²)[5]	Major ethnicities and tribal groups[6]	Major political parties[7]	Major agricultural products[8]
Ghazni	1,080,843	21783	Ethnicities: Pashtun 48.9%; Hazara 45.9%; Tajik 4.7%; Hindu/Sikh 0.4% Tribal Groups: Ghilzai; Kuchi; Andar; Tajik; Suleman Khail; Taraki; Kharoti; Niazi; Sulemanzi; Alikhail; Hazara; Daptani; Durrani; Miya Khail; Bayat; Jalalzai; Khogiani; Musa Khail; Hotak; Wardak	Hizb-i Islami / Gulbuddin (HiG); Hizb-i Islami / Khalis (HiK); Harakat-i Inqilabi Islami; Harakat-i Islami; Ittihad-i Islami / Sayyaf; Hizb-i Wahdat / Mohaqeq; Hizb-i Wahdat (Khalili); Pir Ishaq Gailani / Mahaz-i Melli	Wheat; barley; maize; alfalfa; melons; almonds; grapes; apricots, apples; plums; walnuts; onions; potatoes; leeks; tomatoes
Jaghori	152,162	1792	Ethnicities: Hazara; Pashtun minority in south-eastern areas Tribal Groups: Hoqe; Moska; Dehrada; Khodeedad; Meerdad; Ezdaree	Hizb-i Wahdat/ Khalili / Nasr faction; Hizb-i Wahdat Islami; Hizb-i Wahdat / Akbari; Sepah-i Pasdaran (Mohammad Akbari); Harakat-i Islami; Hizb-i Islami;	Rice; corn; peas; vetch; beans; maize; wheat; almonds; walnuts; mulberries; grapes; tobacco; sesame; cotton; sugar extract; oranges; pomegranates; potatoes; onions; herbs
Malistan	71,784	1279	Ethnicities: Hazara Tribal Groups: Unknown	Hizb-i Wahdat/ Khalili / Nasr faction; Hizb-i Wahdat / Akbari; Harakat-i Islami	Wheat; corn; maize; peas; grapes; almonds; potatoes; onions; herbs

[3] Information in the table is compiled from MRRD 2007, UNAMA 2008, NPS 2008
[4] CSO and UNFPA 2003
[5] Taken from the 398 district model for Afghanistan held by author.
[6] MRRD 2007 and NPS 2008
[7] Various sources
[8] CSO and UNFPA 2003; MRRD 2007

1979-2001

Following the communist coup in 1978 the Hazaras in theory stood to gain from the government's support for land reform. However resistance to the government increased in 1979 and by the following spring it had lost control of the Hazarajat.[9] Without government support most Pashtuns including Kuchi nomads were forced to leave the Hazarajat, and during the Soviet resistance and civil war the grazing pastures of the Hazarajat were no longer accessible to the Kuchi (De Weijer 2002, 35).

Though Ghazni is administratively outside the Hazarajat, several districts including Jaghori and Malistan are ethnically considered within the Hazarajat because of their large Hazara populations. Hazara and Shia based resistance parties were active in both districts throughout the resistance. This included Maoist groups, particularly in Jaghori, including the Mahmudi brothers, though after several members were hanged in 1980 in Kabul the group later moved out to Quetta (Dorronsoro 2005, 221). The Hazarajat itself did not become an idyll of no government, but descended in to a number of civil wars as groups fought to establish a government (Ibrahimi 2009). As Ibrahimi (2009) has noted, "*Nasr, Nahzat*[10]*, Pasdaran* and *Jabhe Muttahed* were helping each other in the fight against *Shura, Harakat* and later *Hizb-e Islami*. Following the defeat of *Harakat* in Qarabagh of Ghazni (1985) at the hand of *Nasr*, the Khomeinist organisations united to contest *Hizb-e Islami*'s supremacy in the districts of Jaghori and Malistan." The infighting and collusion continued through much of the 1980's with conflict continuing between Nasr, Nahzat and Hizb-i Islami in to the late 1980's. The infighting and little strategic interest in Jaghori and Malistan for the central government meant that there were only sporadic clashes between resistance parties and Soviet or Afghan government forces in Jaghori (Ibrahimi 2009)

More broadly in Ghazni there were widespread revolts and a range of Islamicist and traditional resistance parties operated in the province. The initial organisation of resistance in non-Hazara areas of Ghazni tended to be motivated through the religious networks associated with the Khodam ul-Forqan network linked to the Mujaddedi family (Dorronsoro 2005).[11]

With the mujahideen defeat of the Soviet-backed Najibullah regime in 1992, civil war ensued between various factional powers. The fragmentation of the resistance led, in Ghazni, to the emergence of Qari Baba under whom most of the Pashtun groups agreed to work (Marsden 2002, 40). There was however not a simple dichotomy between the Shia and Sunni groups. Whilst they are generally assumed to have been antagonistic, and there are accounts of aggression on both sides (pertinently here in Hazara attacks in Jaghori against Pashtuns in an apparent attempt to take back land lost to Abdur Rahman Khan) there was also a level of cooperation between groups, i.e. Qari Baba is credited with working and fighting alongside Shah Jan of Harakat-i Islami (Dorronsoro 2005, 222). However, Qari Baba was not entirely unchallenged by other members of the ruling Ulema Shura which included forces loyal to Hizb-i Islami Hekmetyar (Dorronsoro 2005, 126).[12]

The Taliban moved from Zabul in late 1994 to take control of Ghazni in January 1995, defeating Hizb-i Islami (HiG) forces and disarming those of Inqelab which had allied itself with Rabbani's government in resisting the Taliban (Nojumi 2002, 136). Inqelab then essentially became part of the Taliban (Dorronsoro 2005, 250). In 1997 the Taliban blockade of the southern, western and eastern approaches into the Hazarajat, coupled with the inability of relief supplies to be transported from the northern approaches led to a significant food crisis in the late 1990's – leaving up to 1 million Hazara's on the brink of starvation, including in Hazara dominated areas of Ghazni and Wardak (Rashid 2001, 67). Relations between the predominantly Pashtun Taliban and the

[9] The Hazaras more generally seem to be overrepresented in the numbers of those killed and imprisoned in the first year of the PDPA. A list published by President Amin shows that 7,000 Hazaras we shot at Pul-i Charkhi in a few months out of a total of 12,000 (Dorronsoro 2005, 104).
[10] See Glossary for clarification regarding Nahzat-i Islami.
[11] It is interesting to note that President Taraki was born in Moqur district, Ghazni in 1917 (Dorronsoro 2005, 86)
[12] Qari Baba may have switched allegiances at some point during the resistance. In the 1980's his is alleged to have been with Harakat-i Inqelab (Dorronsoro 2005, 222), but by the 1990's is believed to have been operating under Rabbani (Nojumi 2002, 136).

Hazara continued to deteriorate with a number of alleged killings and reprisal attacks by both groups in the Hazarajat and northern Afghanistan (HRW 1998 and 2001).

However it is too simplistic to say that the relationship between the Taliban and Hazara communities was always conflictual. Experiences in Jaghori point to an accommodation reached between Hazara communities and the political and military leaders of the Taliban – at least locally (Suleman and Williams 2003).

2001 to Present

The 2001 attack on the World Trade Centre in New York, believed to have been orchestrated by al-Qaeda groups based in Afghanistan, led to the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) through which international military forces supported the Northern Alliance factions in removing the Taliban from power by December of the same year. Initially only OEF was present in Ghazni, with ISAF taking over control of military operations in the province in October 2006. Despite some level of stability for a period following the fall of the Taliban, including in the troubled south-east region, the Taliban-led insurgency, along with activities of other 'anti-government-elements' (AGEs) has increasingly destabilised the south-eastern provinces and since 2006 security has dramatically deteriorated. In 2008 the situation in Ghazni remained wholly insecure. In much of the south-east allegiances are mixed and the constant battle between insurgents, International Military forces (IMF) and government forces for military control and 'hearts and minds' continued.

A range of sources for the period from 2003 – 08 indicated that there was a significant increase in security related incidents across the province. Overall security incidents shave increased by at least three or four times in the period between 2003-8 (Security Database 1; Campbell and Shapiro 2008; B. Rubin 2008).

This marked security deterioration in Ghazni is closely connected to both military strategy and governance deficiencies, i.e. by 2008 46% of people in Ghazni stated that they had never seen the Afghan National Police (ANP) (NPS 2008). This is demonstrative of the low government security presence in the province, which has in part allowed for insurgent groups to carry out activities and extend their influence amongst the population. Another element, and possibly the most significant one, contributing to the spread of the insurgency is public perception. With the Taliban and AGE's relying heavily on local support to exist and operate, public disillusionment with both the government and foreign forces comes to play a key role in the progression of the conflict and on which side comes to prevail.

A major factor for increased public support of the Taliban, particularly in provinces in the south and south-east like Ghazni, seems to be the government and foreign forces' inability to maintain security. This is exacerbated by rural people feeling ignored and left behind by the government, as it does not offer them protection from armed groups, insurgents or other forms of conflict, leading to the assumption that under the Taliban there would be more stability and security in the rural areas, as they maintain a more active presence there than the government has been able to. Ghazni's police are outnumbered by the Taliban forces and desertion rates in the province are high. By way of example, in March 2006 an entire unit of 40 highway police in Ghazni province resigned (A. Giustozzi 2007, 179).

Despite clear problems in maintaining security in Ghazni, in 2008 100 to 150 US troops withdrew from rural Nawa district following sustained Taliban attacks. This district is strategically important to the Taliban and the withdrawal of foreign troops signalled to people in Ghazni that the Afghan government is not in control of rural areas (BBC 2008). This and similar events seem at worst to have led locals to turn their support to the Taliban as the primary power holders and a source of security in the absence of an alternative, or at best diminished local will and capacity to resist Taliban presence and the establishment of associated shadow government structures.

The Taliban have focused efforts on extending their influence in Ghazni because they view it as a strategic province with proximity and road access to Kabul via the Kabul-Kandahar road. Towards this aim of using

Ghazni as a platform from which to extend their activities further north, they have spread propaganda prolifically in villages across the province, primarily through the distribution of night letters (or *shabnamah*). Propaganda focuses on the government's shortcomings, and promotes joining their movement as the only potential solution to villagers' difficulties. Also indicative of the consolidation of their influence in Ghazni in the Pashtun-populated districts is the establishment of shadow government structures across much of the province. The Taliban have shadow District Commissioners in many Pashtun-dominated districts of Ghazni, including Andar, Dih Yak, Zana Khan, Gelan and Waghaz. Shadow chief of police are also present in insecure districts. The Taliban's parallel administration in Ghazni is run by the Quetta Shura (UNAMA 2008).

Table 2 Summary of key Government and Taliban actors in Ghazni

	Name	Known current affiliation	Known previous affiliation
Governor	Dr Osman Osmani	-	From Kandahar Province, Arghandab district
Police Chief	Khan Mohammad Mujahid	-	From Kabul Province, Deh-Sabze district
Taliban Governor	Mullah Naser (aka Mulla Rahmatullah)	Taliban	Native of Nawa district; past affiliation to Harakat-i Islami
Andar district Taliban District Commissioner	Mullah Ismael	Taliban	Native of Andar district
Dih Yak district Taliban District Commissioner	Qari Andullah	Taliban	From Andar district
Zana Khan district Taliban District Commissioner	Qari Andullah	Taliban	From Andar district
Gelan district Taliban District Commissioner	Mullah Mohammad Rahim Faroqi	Taliban	Native of Gelan district
Waghaz district Taliban District Commissioner	Mullah Ismail	-	-

Political parties and actors

Jaghori and Malistan have played host to a number of political parties. Some, including of a Moaist ideology, no longer exist, but the role of political parties has been important, for example leaders of Nahzat-i Islami who had both military and political roles also ran a number of madrasas. There were conflicts between Khomeinist and Kho'i supporting Shiite Hazara factions more broadly in the Hazarajat and specifically involving Jabhe Muttahed-e Inqelab-e Islami Afghanistan (formed 1981), Hizbullah (formed 1981 in Iran), Harakat-i Islami (formed 1979 in Iran led by Mohsini), Sazman-e Nasr-e Afghanistan (formed 1979 in Iran) and Pasdaran-e Jihad-e Islami Afghanistan (formed 1983 in Iran) (Ibrahimi, 2009).

The Shia parties during the resistance were highly fragmented, despite their early success in removing the government from the Hazarajat. Hizb-i Wahdat was originally formed in 1989 as an umbrella party for the Shia parties but it remained divided into several factions during the civil war (1992 onwards), primarily between the Akbari (also called Sepah-i Pasdaran) faction and the Khalili faction, led by Karim Khalili who is affiliated with the Nasr group which continues to hold significant power in Jaghori and Malistan (A. Giustozzi 2008). The Akbari faction sided with the Taliban during the time that they ruled Afghanistan until 2001, and the Khalili faction fought against the Taliban with the Northern Alliance (A. Giustozzi 2008). Today these factions have varying and competitive levels of control in districts of Ghazni, Bamyan and Uruzgan provinces, the Khalili

faction enjoying more power and support from the government in Kabul. The entity that was Wahdat has largely ceased to function.

Ghazni has had an exceptionally frequent turnover of governors in the past two years which is both a cause and symptom of extent to which officials in Ghazni have been targeted by the Taliban and AGE's. Dr Osman Osmani is the third Governor appointed to Ghazni province in 2008, preceded by Governor Shir Khosti who occupied the position from March until June. Prior to that Faizanullah Faizan held the post (NPS 2008). Because of the direct targeting of officials from 2005 onwards, most officials have been forced to avoid leaving the main district centres and roads. The sustained attempt to assassinate government officials in Ghazni has included attempts on the governor, deputy governor (Haidar 2008a) and successful attempts against the police chiefs of Qarabagh and Andar. In addition several districts, including Arjistan and Nawa have been lost by the government at various times, though they have been re-taken (Haidar 2008b)

People in Ghazni have suffered to varying extents, depending on their village's location, at the hands of local commanders and factions. Reported abuses against villagers by armed groups in Ghazni include extortion of money or food, as well as land occupation. It has not been possible to ascertain the extent to which this is the case today, but in 2003 UNHCR reported that armed groups in Ghazni were committing abuses against people in the Pashayi area, where Nasr faction had dispossessed villagers by land occupation. In this area returnees were targeted for having terminated their past involvement or allegiance with this faction, or for being allied with other groups including Harakat-i Islami, Hizb-i-Wahdat / Akbari and the Taliban (UNHCR 2003b). Abuses by factional armed groups reported to have occurred in areas of Jaghori and Malistan districts will be discussed below in the context of these districts.

4. Jaghori District

Jaghori and Malistan are the only districts in Ghazni almost entirely populated by the Hazara, and will be the focus of this study in comparing district-level conflict dynamics against provincial and national-level trends. These two districts form the south-eastern reaches of the Hazara-inhabited highland region, the Hazarajat, which covers much of central Afghanistan. The Hazara are a culturally distinct group that speaks the Hazaragi dialect of Dari and most follow the Shia branch of Islam. Towards the outskirts of Jaghori are other communities including Pashtuns who occupy enclaves of villages called *mahalla* (suburbs or areas of a village occupied by a distinct ethnic group) (Fitzherbert 2006, 9-10).

Compared with other districts of Ghazni, Jaghori has high levels of productivity, and is responsible for a proportionately high output of goods and farm produce including handicrafts, industrial crops, herbal products and fruits. It also yields a high proportion of Ghazni's subsistence crops, vegetables, and animal products. In addition animal husbandry plays an important role in livelihoods in the district. Jaghori is also a seat of Islamic cultural and religious practice, and is home to the second highest number of mosques in Ghazni (the provincial centre of Ghazni district containing the highest number) (CSO and UNFPA 2003, 44). In addition Jaghori has a proportionally high number of schools.

Figure 2 Map of Ghazni

There are reports and indications that political parties in Ghazni, including in Jaghori and Malistan districts, no longer have the strength they enjoyed in the past primarily due to the fact that many of them played significant roles in the civil war and thus lost public credibility. Possibly due to this partial loss of parties' political power, relations among the parties tend not to lead directly to conflict, despite significant differences among and between parties in their aims and interests (UNAMA 2008).

A number of parties remain active in Jaghori but overall the Nasr faction of the former Hizb-i Wahdat (Khalili), is most influential (UNHCR 2002; A. Giustozzi 2008). In 2002 Commander Mohammed Ali Ahmadi was acting Head of District for Jaghori representing the Khalili faction, and Security Commander Mohammed Hanif Hussaini was his aide during the post-Taliban period. Despite the dominant control by the Khalili faction in Jaghori and Malistan, Hizb-i Wahdat (Akbari), Hizb-i Islami and Harakat-i Islami also have military presence in these districts (A. Giustozzi 2008).

There have also been reports of Hizb-i Wahdat (Khalili) members raiding Pashtun villages towards the outskirts of the Hazarajat, namely in Qarabagh district which neighbours Jaghori to the east, where the population includes both Hazaras and Pashtuns. The Taliban is also infiltrating the outskirts of this region, including in the border areas of Jaghori district where villages are home to both Hazara and Pashtun communities (A. Giustozzi 2008). They have also established their presence in the ethnically mixed district of Qarabagh, neighbouring Jaghori.[13]

UNHCR reports from 2003 indicate that factional military groups holding power in Jaghori and Malistan subjected the populations in parts of these districts to various abuses, including extortion, see below (UNHCR 2003b). Linked with this concerning situation is the extremely low government presence in Jaghori. A 2008 survey found that on average 46% of people in Ghazni had never seen the Afghan National Police, and this was highest in Jaghori district at 90%. Similarly, 51% of people in Ghazni reported having never seen the Afghan National Army, which again was highest in Jaghori at 90% (NPS 2008). The same survey notes that villagers of Jaghori district fear the Taliban most out of all districts in Ghazni, an indication both of the concern that the return of the Taliban might put them at risk, but also that the Pashtun dominated Taliban are currently seen as a threat. Any shift in the balance of military power from Hizb-i Wahdat to the Taliban in Jaghori or across other parts of the Hazarajat could lead to a re-emergence of past conflicts which included atrocities and mass killings along ethnic lines.

Attempts by the Taliban to recruit Hazara and other ethnic groups have for all these reasons been met with limited success. Reports indicate that due to this difficulty the Taliban have had in penetrating Hazara areas they are to some extent actively fuelling tensions between Hazara and Pashtun communities in Ghazni in an attempt to further their control by making inter-community relations volatile and fragile (UNAMA 2008). This tactic of dividing communities in regions they seek to control is one employed successfully by the Taliban as they extended their reach across the country in the 1990's (Suleman and Williams 2003, 14).

Despite the risk of future ethnic conflict between the Taliban and Hazara, the risk of this is likely to be lower in Jaghori than elsewhere in the Hazarajat. This is because in the past the people and elders of this district demonstrated unique negotiation and proactive peacebuilding strategies towards the Taliban in the 1990's. CPAU research carried out in Jaghori in 2002/3 showed how the people of Jaghori pre-empted Taliban encroachment or attack on their district in 1997, convened a shura and sent delegates to negotiate with key Taliban leaders in Kandahar, Kabul and Ghazni to discuss and agree the terms of a peaceful surrender to the Taliban (Suleman and Williams 2003, 8).

[13] Whose district governor, Habibullah, is also a member of Hizb-i Wahdat.

Table 3 Significant actors in Jaghori

	Name	Known current affiliation	Known previous affiliation	Any known relations between officials
District Governor	Khudadad Irfani	Hizb-i Wahdat	Native of Jaghori	No known link to criminal groups
Police Chief	Isehaq Ali	Hizb-i Wahdat	Native of Kabul Province, Dashtee Barchi district	No known link to criminal groups
Taliban officials	None present	-	-	

5. Malistan District

Malistan is located at the north-western border of Jaghori, and was originally part of Jaghori until it was separated from it in 1949. It also neighbours Arjistan and Nawur districts in Ghazni province, as well as Zabul and Uruzgan provinces to the south and west respectively. Malistan is somewhat less densely populated than most districts in Ghazni, with an average number of people per household of eight, compared with a provincial average of ten (CSO and UNFPA 2003, 36). The population of Malistan is almost 100% Hazara and, unlike Jaghori, Malistan is not home to Pashtun communities at the outskirts of the district because it is located further into the Hazarajat than Jaghori.

Malistan produces various handicraft products in quantities second only to Jaghori in Ghazni, for example carpets, wool, pottery and rugs, as well as other animal products and crops (CSO and UNFPA 2003, 36). Farmers in Malistan produce significant amounts of wheat, corn, maize, peas, grapes, almonds, potatoes, onions and herbs. Like in Jaghori, agriculture and animal husbandry are the most important livelihoods to the people of Malistan. This in turn means that access to land and water for grazing and farming plays a key role in subsistence as well as income-generating activities.

Malistan district has been under the control of the Hizb-i-Wahdat (Khalili), Nasr faction since 2001 (A. Giustozzi 2008; UNHCR 2003a). This faction has been known to resist attempts to bring the district under the control of the rule of law or government administrators - central or provincial. Commander Ustaz Irfani of Jaghori district, despite being located in Jaghori, has also exerted some control over Malistan since 2001. In 2003 UNHCR reported that attempts to appoint formal District Administrators by the central government had failed due to Nasr faction members threatening to violently repress public support for the appointees (UNHCR 2003a). It is not clear to what extent this manner of control is exerted by Nasr faction in Malistan today, but these practices may persist.

Self-appointed military leaders and militants from Nasr faction were also reported to violently mistreat, extort money from, detain and harass the people of Malistan. Particularly, returnees to Malistan were reported to have been targeted by members of Nasr. Former members of Nasr who had left the movement were also targeted, including people associated with Harakat, Hizb-i Wahdat / Akbari, the Taliban or other parties (UNHCR 2003b). In some cases villagers who were unable to pay amounts up to 3 million Afghanis were detained by armed groups. Abusive practices by militants were mainly reported from the villages of Balakh San, Kushanak, Maknak and Pashayi (UNHCR 2003b). Villagers from Nawur district, neighbouring Malistan to the north-east, also reported extortion by armed members of Hizb-i Wahdat. The level of violent abuse by armed groups in both Malistan and Jaghori and led to some internal displacement, mainly to other parts of Ghazni province (UNHCR 2003b).

Taliban presence in Ghazni has become a factor for serious consideration. The group has effectively consolidated its control of all Pashtun-dominated areas. Jaghori and Malistan districts both remain out of the reach of Taliban control due to the military and political power of Hizb-i Wahdat Khalili / Nasr which seems to be robust across the Hazarajat. Despite their proximity, there are as yet no reported clashes between the

Taliban and Hizb-i Wahdat Khalili / Nasr, as the Taliban has not yet taken steps to challenge groups in control of the Hazarajat region.

Table 4 Significant actors in Malistan

	Name	Known current affiliation	Known previous affiliation	Any known relations between officials
District Governor	Zafar Sharif	-	-	No known links to criminal groups
Police Chief	Aqhyee Abassi	Nahzat-i Islami[14]	-	No known links to criminal groups
Taliban officials	None present	-	-	

6. Conflict Dynamics

Local level conflict resolution[15]

District-level data on conflict in Malistan is based on conflicts recorded by the CPAU Peace Councils in the district. There are as yet no records from neighbouring Jaghori district, so analysis of local level conflict will be based solely on data from Malistan. However, due to these districts' proximity and numerous other social, political, geographic and economic similarities, it can be extrapolated that trends would likely follow similar patterns in these districts. The total population of Malistan has been estimated at 71,784, with an average rate of 8 people per household (CSO and UNFPA 2003, 36). In Malistan the data under analysis was provided by 7 councils, which reported 94 conflicts that were brought to their offices in the period from January 2005 to March 2008. The Peace Councils have between 20-30 members and are made up of a diverse board of councillors, for example, one council in Malistan comprises 10 teachers, 10 students, 4 elders, 5 traders and 1 farmer. Based on the records of the Peace Councils in Malistan, as well as extensive open-source research and interviews, conflict trends and links between district, province and national-level conflicts will be examined.



Figure 3 Causes of conflict in Malistan - CPAU Monitoring

[14] See clarification about Nahzat-i Islami in the Glossary.
[15] Please see the methodology section for explanations of how terms such as 'conflict', 'party', 'cause' and 'conflict rate' are used.

Figure 3 reflects that proportionately high rates of conflict in Malistan district are related to land and water disputes. These rise sharply in 2006, which marked almost a decade of severe drought in Malistan and across Afghanistan. The drought contributed to a situation of acute humanitarian crisis and by 2006, due to drought, poverty and internal migration, nine million people in Afghanistan were in need of urgent financial assistance to prevent starvation (The Kabul Times 2006). The lack of food in Arjistan, neighbouring Malistan, was so acute that it led some groups to eat grass to avoid starvation by the end of the 2008 winter (IRIN 2008a). This situation has continued into 2008 with the UN calling for additional funds to support 5 million Afghans unable to meet their food requirements (IRIN 2008b).

During the severe and sustained drought in Malistan cultivation of crops became vulnerable and at times impossible, many of which are essential for people's survival, as well as to feed livestock which are in turn a source of people's subsistence or income (Fitzherbert 2006). Over time remittances from family abroad have become a crucial source of income for survival, and economic migration from Malistan district, primarily to Iran, is pervasive (UNHCR 2003a).

Livestock generates income for households that can afford to keep enough animals to produce related products for sale in addition to what is needed for household consumption, but with the lack of water during years of drought livestock herds shrank rapidly: according to an elderly farmer from Jaghori district, his village went from having 102 cows before the drought to just 2 in 2007 (Fitzherbert 2006, 51). It is factors such as these that demonstrate the pressure of drought on households in Malistan that are likely to be connected with high rates of land and water-related conflict in the district.

Another factor that may have contributed significantly to the 2006 spike in land and water disputes is the flood that hit Jaghori district that year, which is likely to have also had an impact on Malistan district. This was caused by unseasonal rainfall in July-August 2006, leaving 15 people dead and destroying 1600 homes across Ghazni, making this flood one of significant proportions, particularly to communities with limited resources to cope with and rebuild in the face if unforeseen crisis (Dartmouth 2006; Associated Press 2006).

Factors like flooding and drought can contribute to other conflict dynamics such as debt. Fieldwork indicates that the vast majority of households are involved in some form of informal credit, either as borrowers or lenders (Klijn and Pain, 2007: 19; Fitzherbert 2006; UNHCR 2002; UNHCR 2003a). Extended periods of crisis as well as unexpected crises like flooding affect informal credit systems in a way that is likely to contribute to conflict, as pressure for debt repayment increases sharply. The informal credit system operates on a necessarily flexible basis, in terms of the time period over which debt can acceptably be repaid within, as well as the nature of repayment. Debts may need to be repaid as cash, but are often also paid in grain or labour due to low income levels which make financial payment often impossible (Klijn and Pain 2007, 9).

As agriculture and animal husbandry are important livelihoods for the people of Malistan, access to land and water, as well as sufficient animal feed, are key aspects of maintaining livelihoods in this district. The years of drought affected Malistan seriously in that they forced almost all households into a resource-scarce situation of crisis, where survival was no longer guaranteed by the balance of modest resources and informal credit practices among households, which would normally act as a buffer in times of shortage. Instead, with lending households being under strain, repayment pressures sharply increased, and additionally lending became less frequent, as households that would normally lend food or cash conserved resources for their own survival.

The result is that poorer rural households are hit hardest by being unable to obtain loans from wealthier ones, on which they would normally depend. Furthermore, with unexpected and immediate demands for debt repayment, which would usually be repaid in a flexible manner and on a long-term basis, there is scope for increased conflict (Klijn and Pain 2007, 35-6). The 2007 peak in economic (debt/financial) and interpersonal disputes is also likely reflective of fragile livelihoods continuing to be impacted by the effects of drought and

resource scarcity, and are likely to relate to some extent to the breakdown of informal credit systems outlined above.

The rise in conflicts in all categories except 'Murder/Blood feud' in 2006 and in three of five categories into 2007 is indicative of the overall increase in conflict in the south-east which occurred parallel to increasing insurgent activity. The classification of these districts in terms of security and freedom of movement for international actors has deteriorated since 2005 to a point where even passing through this region is advised against. It is worth noting that the districts themselves are in some cases considered safer for movement than the rest of Ghazni, but getting to the districts is often impossible (ICG 2006; Meo 2007). This situation of pervasive insurgency and associated insecurity across Ghazni contributed to a lack of the rule of law and government control, particularly in rural districts like Malistan. Though insurgents were not present in or targeting Malistan at this time, the insecurity and insurgency at a provincial level has had an impact on the security of all districts. For example, the military campaigns of AGE's including the Taliban severely hampered development and humanitarian efforts, due to the specific targeting of development workers or anyone associated with the government. Since the 2006 intensification of the insurgent campaign almost all NGOs once active in Jaghori and Malistan, as well as other districts of Ghazni and even Ghazni city, have been forced to scale back or close down operations to avoid being targeted.



Figure 4 Parties involved in conflicts in Malistan - CPAU monitoring

Figure 4 shows that there is a parallel between the high incidence of 'Inter-family' disputes and the similarly high 'Land and Water' trends reflected in Figure 3, both increasing rapidly into 2006. Inter Family conflicts accounted for 73% of all land and water conflicts addressed by Peace Councils in the district. This could suggest that many disputes over resources in Malistan occur within an otherwise culturally cohesive community, the population being almost entirely Hazara, following Shia Islam. Again this indicates the extent of resource scarcity and the fragility of livelihoods in Malistan, which are sustained by remittances from abroad, subsistence farming, animal husbandry, and limited production of industrial crops.

Kuchi nomads travel across Ghazni in the spring and autumn each year en-route to or from winter camps in southern and south-eastern Afghanistan and pastures in the central highlands of the Hindu Kush (Fitzherbert 2006, 9). Though there is often an interdependent relationship between the Kuchi and settled communities,

this has been and remains fraught with conflict as it is characterised by competition for land and resources. The Kuchi need land for their livestock to graze, but this damages and depletes farmlands cultivated by settled people. The question of ownership rights is frequently disputed, and in many cases groups refer to different versions of legislature and agreements as a basis for their land rights claims (Fitzherbert 2006, 59-60). Inter-community disputes over who owns land in an area are not easily resolved. The government tends to be considered a threat by villagers as opposed to a source of support or resolution, because the government department that addresses land tenure rights does not share a common interpretation and perception of the legal aspects of land tenure to that of villagers in rural areas (McEwen and Whitty 2006).

However, evidence indicates that in the past two years conflict between the Kuchi and settled Hazara has resumed. Reports indicate that armed conflict broke out between the Kuchi and Hazara in 2007 and 2008, in the Hazara-inhabited districts of Behsud in Wardak province and Jaghori in Ghazni. In June 2007 Kuchi staged two well-prepared armed attacks on Behsud, which resulted in clashes and damage to 11 villages as well as displacement of an estimated 500 families, and a number of fatalities (Daily Afghanistan 2007). Jaghori district was affected by similar acts at this time, of an unknown but presumably lower intensity. In June 2008 dozens of people in Behsud district were killed and thousands displaced due to another armed Kuchi attack on the district (Pajhwok 2008). Hazara communities cited the disarmament of local people in the DDR programme as a problem in that it allowed for the Kuchi to invade knowing they would be militarily superior, whereas before the DDR programme villagers would have been in a position to protect themselves (Daily Afghanistan 2007).[16]

Connected with the risk of increasing conflict with the Kuchi in central and northern regions of Afghanistan is the risk of the insurgents using this nomadic group to further its influence in these areas of government control, by assisting them to destabilise areas along their migration route. This would constitute a repeat of a tactic the Taliban used during the period from 1998 when they mobilised the Kuchi to conquer the Hazarajat, using them as a supplementary and strategic force (A. Giustozzi 2008). According to reports from the region, the insurgents have recently increased their influence in the Kuchi minority again, and aim to use their followers within this community migrating to Hazara areas to extend their control into Hazara areas. If the clashes between Kuchi and Hazara occur again and the situation escalates, it is likely that the relations between Hazara and settled Pashtun communities will also be affected and may escalate from a relatively peaceful co-existence to a dynamic of conflict (UNAMA 2008).

A factor contributing to the spike in 'Inter-community' disputes in 2007 (see Figure 4) may be the trend of increased insurgency and decreased central government control across Ghazni at this time, which would likely result from the overall decrease in security in the districts, including Malistan. This dynamic also applies to the 2007 increase in 'Inter family' disputes. The lack of central government presence or control, particularly in rural districts, is indicated, for example, by reports that there are at time of writing there were no cases in the Ghazni provincial court - demonstrating the extent to which the Taliban have set up a shadow administration including their own justice systems based on Sharia and the separation of the district from provincial authorities (A. Giustozzi 2008).

Cynicism towards the post-2001 Karzai government has grown rapidly since 2005, and villagers report that they suffer at the hands of corrupt officials who exploit their positions of power. In Jaghori, for example, an interviewee cited problems in the district administration, with the courts and with the government-appointed judge, as the main causes of conflict in the district. This was reportedly due to corruption and because these government actors and systems 'waste the people['s] rights' (CPAU field data 2008). This adds to evidence that in Malistan central government control is too weak to prevent extortion and abuse by officials of the ruling faction. This trend is likely to contribute to land-related conflicts in Malistan, indicated in Figure 3. The public are reluctant to report problems of land occupation by the ruling faction to the appointed authorities for resolution because of the likelihood of extortion from one or both parties in the dispute (UNHCR 2003a).

[16] Afghan source, interviewed 12 September 2008.

Seasonality

Figure 5 reflects seasonal trends in the breakdown of conflict types by month from May 2005 - March 2008 in Malistan district. All conflict types reflect the seasonal increase in the spring-summer months. This increase is reflected clearly in the total which shows that March and May are the most conflict-active months of the year. Conflict related to land and water is highest in the spring (March-June) and again in August. This graph makes clear that conflict trends in Malistan are highly seasonal, and are closely associated with the harvest, seasonal movement of peoples, fluctuations in resource requirements like water for irrigation, as well as seasonal socio-cultural activities - most importantly marriage.



Figure 5 Causes of conflict by month - CPAU monitoring

In 2008 UNAMA reported that 35% of Afghanistan's population could not meet the minimum daily food requirements, and the majority of households were spending 85% of their income on food, which is a 20% increase from 2005 (IRIN 2008b). The World Food Programme has responded to this situation by aiming to deliver food aid to the parts of Afghanistan that are most in need, including Ghazni, but Taliban and AGE attacks on their vehicles and seizure of goods persisted, severely hampering food aid programmes in the province and elsewhere in the country (IRIN 2008b). The result is that aid was not effectively delivered to address food shortages. It is in this context that pressure on households for survival is a significant contributing factor to various seasonal conflicts particularly conflict over land and water as well as economic related conflict.

The group of marriage-divorce-domestic violence related conflicts spike twice, in March and in June. The June spike coincides with the most common month for weddings. It is not clear why there is also a spike in March. Of the marriage-divorce conflicts a large proportion are specifically related to the bride price (Toyana). Large debts are taken to cover the traditionally high cost of Toyana, and often families' mortgage properties and future produce to put forward the money for the bridal price. This and the wedding costs are often well above families' means (Toyana may cost up to 150,000 Afs = US$3,000) (Klijn and Pain 2007, 27-8).

Importantly for rural livelihoods marriages create an informal credit system between two families as a source of security for the future. It places the households in a connected and mutually supportive situation,

expanding social and financial support options as well as credit sources (Klijn and Pain 2007, 27-8). However, in situations of extreme resource scarcity or crisis, as caused by the drought, inter-family systems of credit management may disintegrate, severely affecting inter-family relations and becoming a potential catalyst of conflict. Incidents recorded in the CPAU dataset for Malistan often cited the 'traditional' high prices associated with marriage as the cause of conflicts.



Figure 6 Parties to conflict by month - CPAU monitoring

The monthly breakdown of conflicts from 2005-8 by parties to conflict in Figure 6 is consistent with Figure 5 in reflecting the spring spike in all conflict rates in March, continuing into summer. This trend is especially high in the 'Inter family' category, which demonstrates significantly higher rates of conflict than other categories for much of the year. The timing and rate of inter family conflict is similar to patterns of rates in the 'Access to land/water' category in Figure 7, which displays high peaks in March, May and August as discussed above.

In addition to the drought that exacerbated pressure on livelihoods, another contributing factor to seasonal increases in conflict is the lack of aid and development assistance delivered to rural areas, mainly due to insurgents' attacks on NGOs and humanitarian agencies creating a climate of insecurity that prevents international actors from conducting projects in these areas. The lack of security and government presence to ensure stable land tenure may also be connected to the high levels of inter family disputes, and corruption of local officials likely contributes as families avoid taking disputes to authorities for resolution for fear of extortion.[17]

Figure 7 represents the number of conflicts by parties from 2005-8. Inter-family conflicts are most prevalent in Malistan. This supports the argument that there is a specific nature to conflict resolution in Malistan which seems to have limited communal conflict.

[17] CPAU research, August 2008



Figure 7 Parties to conflict in Malistan – CPAU Monitoring

Other actors and conflict

Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Disbandment of Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG)

The DDR programme was officially completed countrywide in June 2006, including in Ghazni. DDR reportedly did have an impact on the security structures in the province. The DIAG programme does not seem to have had a significant impact in Ghazni. In early 2005, based on initial mapping of illegally armed groups a UN map indicated that there were between 22 – 46 IAGs in Ghazni, with the highest concentration in Jaghori (11-20 groups) with Malistan having between 2-5 groups.[18] The DIAG programme is widely accepted to have failed in Ghazni.

More generally armed groups in the south and south-east have refused to disarm arguing that they cannot do so in the face of the worsening security situation and insurgency (ICG 2008). According to an *Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme* report in 2006, the south-east accounted for only 5% of the total number of weapons handed over to the DIAG programme since October 2006 (ANBP 2006b). Much of this may have been from one disarmament initiative where four commanders in Ghazni handed over 600 light and heavy weapons (ANBP 2006a).

Aid and development

Despite widespread attempts to deliver aid and development by national programmes, UN agencies and NGOs, insecurity in Ghazni has hampered these activities. Aid and development seem to have been impacted by conflict, rather than causing further conflict.

According to official NSP reports, by March 2008 a total of 18 districts in Ghazni had been covered by NSP, 799 CDCs had been elected and 1,086 projects financed, with 786 subprojects completed. The NSP facilitating

[18] The mapping exercise conducted for IAGs was known to have included around 1800 IAGs which ranged in size from groups with a handful of men and small numbers of arms, to those with hundreds of personnel. Interestingly no groups in Ghazni were considered of significant threat generally, or to counter narcotics efforts or governance specifically. One group in Jaghori was considered a threat to the elections. Source: UN maps held by author.

partner NGO in Jaghori and Malistan districts is CARE. Community Development Committees (CDCs) in the province act to plan development projects targeted to address needs specific to communities at village-level. In Jaghori district 60 CDCs were reportedly active in 2007, and in Malistan 182 were reportedly active in 2007 (MRRD 2007).

Due to the severe lack of security and increased insurgent violence in Ghazni, NSP efforts in the province have been adversely affected. MRRD staff attempting to implement NSP have been targeted and killed, and others were threatened and warned by the Taliban and AGE groups to cease activities. Facilitating partners have been forced to temporarily stop working in dangerous areas including Ghazni (ICG 2007b). However, a number of NSP projects have been successfully carried out in the province, primarily prior to the 2006 deterioration of security.

Various other initiatives towards development reportedly continue to operate in Ghazni. District Development Assemblies (DDAs) are operating in 18 of Ghazni's districts with about 500 members of staff. These DDAs carry out development projects identified in District Development Plans (MRRD 2007).

Returning refugees

Returning refugees and migration in general have generally been as a result of conflict, though the return of refugees since 2001 has led to some conflicts. The high proportion of displaced peoples in Jaghori and Malistan districts can be attributed primarily to the civil war, abuses committed against the Hazara during the Taliban regime, and long running drought. In these districts it has also been necessary for households to send men away to earn a living in Afghan cities or abroad, primarily to Iran and to a lesser extent Pakistan, in search of employment. Large proportions of young men continue to migrate to Iran, particularly from Malistan (UNHCR 2003a). Between 2003 and 2008 the UNHCR assisted 12,348 refugees to return to Jaghori and 3,801 to Malistan which is equivalent to nearly 8% of all returnees to Ghazni (UNHCR 2008).[19] This represents approximately 10% of the population in Jaghori and 5% of the population of Malistan, both lower than the average percentage return across Ghazni of 13% (CSO 2008).

Table 5 Assisted returns of Ghazni city and Province (% of annual returns) (UNHCR 2008)

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Total
Jaghori	1,812 (7.3%)	873 (3.1%)	2,001 (4.2%)	1,058 (2.5%)	1,581 (22%)	561 (4.2%)	181 (21.9%)	12,348 (7.5%)
Malistan	1,370 (5.3%)	915 (3.2%)	618 (1.3%)	313 (0.7%)	491 (3.5%)	59 (0.4%)	35 (4.2%)	3,801 (2.3%)
Ghazni Province	25,741	28,250	47,374	42,052	7,140	13,411	828	164,796

Since April 2007 the Iranian government began forced deportations of Afghan refugees back across the border. The implementation of this policy of mass deportation will have an impact on Jaghori and Malistan as Iran is the primary migrant destination. In the rest of Ghazni, due to Pashtun tribal and religious links, migration to and back from Pakistan is more frequent.

In Malistan the abuses, including harassment, detention and extortion, committed by the ruling Nasr faction of Hizb-i Wahdat against the population have caused mass displacement, as discussed above (UNHCR 2003a). In 2002, 51 families from Malistan fled to Ghazni city in spring and summer when conflict is seasonally high, due to violence against them by Nasr faction which reportedly targeted anyone perceived to be opposed to the faction (UNHCR 2003a). There are indications that abuse by the ruling faction remains problematic and is likely to be a factor fuelling conflict in Malistan (CPAU field data 2008; A. Giustozzi, 2008).

[19] This covers assisted returnees from Pakistan between 3rd March 2002 to- 31st October 2008 and from Iran between 9th April 2002 – 31st October 2008. Note this does not include those resident in Pakistan for migrant labour who may have returned or those who did not accept UNHRC support.

Links between local conflict and higher level conflict

Conflict rates in Figure 8 are based on Security Database 1 data which reflect the high and rapidly increasing levels of resistance to government in Ghazni province since 2004, with a sharp increase in insurgency-related conflicts in 2005. This follows presidential elections in 2004 and provincial elections in 2005. These elections passed without major conflict breaking out, but not without incident. There was increased insurgent activity surrounding the elections which included attacks on polling stations, intimidation and murder of electoral workers and candidates, attacks on clerics who promoted the election process and intimidation of voters. Increased insurgent and Taliban activity during the elections was particularly noted across the south and south-eastern regions, including in Ghazni province. Intimidation of those involved in the electoral process was mainly by military commanders against political rivals, which was coupled with violent acts of AGEs opposed to the democratic process. It is also important to note that female candidates in Ghazni were intimidated by local commanders and armed group representatives, extending to threats and acts of violence against them (HRW 2005).



Figure 8 Causes of conflict Security Database 1 (Ghazni)

The rate of 'resistance to government' activities is high relative to other conflict types, comprising close to the total of conflict incidents, and is likely to reflect the growing anti-government sentiment in the predominantly Pashtun communities of the province since 2004. Although Taliban and AGE activities often involve intimidation of the population, their growth also relies on a significant degree of community support or at least cooperation, which suggests that their activities accelerated since 2004 along with increasing local facilitation. Though not all insurgent activities are linked to the Taliban, this group is unmistakably at the forefront of insurgency in Ghazni, in cooperation with Hizb-i Islami (HiG) and other groups.

Around the end of 2005 there was a marked shift in the nature, frequency and scope of violent attacks in Ghazni and other south-eastern provinces. This included a major increase in the number of suicide attacks, remote controlled car bombs and attacks on soft targets. The use of these and other techniques has been widely attributed to the Taliban and AGEs learning from networks active in Iraq (ICG 2006; A. Giustozzi 2008). Mohammed Daud and Hamza Sangari are Taliban commanders who trained in Iraq and became active in

Ghazni using the skills and techniques employed in Iraq against US forces (Robichaud 2005). Taliban statements have corroborated this, even indicating that mujahideen fighters from Iraq split their time between their activities in Iraq and Afghanistan depending on requirements in each country at the time, taking into account the need for more fighters, for example, during Afghanistan's spring offensives (Ariana TV 2007).

These influences contributed to a sharp increase in insurgent activity in south and south-eastern provinces including Ghazni, by large numbers of well-equipped fighters coming from the borderlands between Afghanistan and Pakistan. These regions of Pakistan serve as training grounds and havens for the Taliban, and it is from here that the Taliban recuperate and coordinate attacks over the border in Afghanistan (A. Giustozzi 2007, 21; Walsh 2006). The Taliban and associated groups employ a range of tactics such as intimidating night letters or *shabnamah*, preaching, death threats, beatings and executions to gain control of areas, all of which have been used in Ghazni since 2004.

Taliban tactics have reportedly extended to the seizure of aid money distributed by Coalition Forces or government in attempts to fund reconstruction projects or win favour among people in particular villages. Yet teachings of local *Ulema* and the Taliban insist accepting money from outsiders is '*haram'* (legally forbidden by Islamic law), and will be punished. It is unclear whether external donations are channelled to the Taliban willingly or due to intimidation, but it has been reported that in some cases such funds are then used to strengthen the Taliban's military power by funding equipment and weaponry (IWPR 2006b).

By exploiting local grievances against the government and local authorities the Taliban successfully mobilised much of the population in the south and south eastern provinces against government and foreign presence. This resulted in the collapse of government structures, in some cases across entire provinces including in Ghazni (A. Giustozzi 2007). Despite the collapse in government control of Ghazni, at the district level in Jaghori and Malistan the Taliban do not hold influence, and overall security has been somewhat better.

The Taliban tactic of intimidation and murder of those who oppose them or support the government has been effective in forcing villagers, and indeed entire villages across Ghazni to support them. In resistant areas this has also involved the assassination of elders and 'collaborationists' – anyone who supports or works for the government. Instances of these practices began to occur widely across areas of Ghazni in 2006. (A. Giustozzi 2007, 51; 102) In Andar district, which was the centre of Taliban encroachment in Ghazni, 28 officials were killed in 9 months from 2005-6 (A. Giustozzi 2007, 51; 102).

Developments in Taliban tactics over the past two years include an increased reliance on suicide and roadside attacks, and the exploitation of existing ethnic and cultural tensions to divide communities in regions, thus facilitating Taliban infiltration and control by weakening established social and leadership structures. This approach is exemplified by reported attacks on parts of Jaghori which have included killing key community figures' family members, kidnappings, and killing Hazara labourers from Jaghori working in nearby Pashtun areas. These activities have also affected Malistan, as the Taliban target commuters travelling between Jaghori and Malistan districts (Daily Afghanistan 2007).

Another aspect of shifting Taliban tactics has been the increased focus on soft targets, particularly education. From January to July 2006, 202 attacks on schools in 27 provinces were reported by the Ministry of Education. In Ghazni and 5 other south-eastern provinces 208 schools were closed between April and July 2006 for security reasons and due to threats (HRW 2006; ICG 2006). Girls' schools and schools built by foreign NGOs or with foreign funding were specifically targeted (A. Giustozzi 2008). By June 2008 the threat of the Taliban had successfully prevented school attendance to the extent that even girls' schools in Ghazni city were forced to close down. There have been reports that the Taliban have also been active in Jaghori and neighbouring Qarabagh districts distributing threats and warnings that communities must close down particular schools (Walsh 2006). Attacks typically coincide with the distribution of such threatening documents. Numerous reports indicate that threats and attacks against education in Ghazni gained momentum in 2006, resulting in

some 50,000 pupils in Ghazni being deprived of education that year (PAN 2007). Problems with security affecting school attendance and education are worst in rural districts of Ghazni. The increase in school attacks in 2006 runs parallel to the increase in overall province-level insurgency, and in 2008 the impact on education by insurgents continued across the majority of Ghazni.

Another factor is that Ghazni contains a key stretch of the Kabul-Kandahar road which is the only practical route to Kabul from the south and is seriously affected by insecurity. This stretch of road has been the target of numerous attacks by Taliban, including hijackings and ambushes, carried out almost always from motorcycles and often targeting government forces or police attempting to patrol or traverse the area (Younus 2006). International actors including the UN entirely avoid this stretch of the Kabul-Kandahar road. Despite growing Taliban influence they do not control the trafficking of drugs through it, which takes place in heavily armoured vehicle convoys controlled by non-Taliban groups. One of the secondary highways that joins Jaghori and Qarabagh in Ghazni is even more dangerous than the Kabul-Kandahar road, and reports indicate that this road is frequently targeted by Taliban patrols and attacks (Pajhwok 2006).

Despite pervasive Taliban influence in Ghazni Taliban remain at the outskirts of Jaghori and Malistan districts. Towards the end of 2006 there were efforts being made to gain the support of Hazara communities, by the Taliban proposing that if they gained their support they would share power and resources with Hazara leaders, but this campaign was not highly successful (A. Giustozzi 2007, 119).

7. Dimensions of conflict

Through this study it is clear that there are numerous interlinking factors that lead to and impact on conflict trends in Jaghori and Malistan. Local or district-level conflicts that have been discussed on the basis of CPAU Peace Council data can be understood as linked to causes at provincial, national, and even regional levels. Effectively pursuing an agenda of local-level conflict resolution thus requires an examination and understanding of the often complex higher level conflicts and factors of influence. The table below aims to consolidate and present some of the numerous possible causal links between local conflict and contributing higher level factors, which are outlined as they apply to the categories of 'Regional', 'National' and 'Provincial'.

Table 6 Dimensions of conflict - Malistan and Jaghori[20]

Local Conflict	Regional	National	Provincial
1.Land and water conflicts – Type 1 - localised livelihoods	N/A	Corruption makes government systems predatory for most Afghans; the government is not seen as a source of protection by citizens	Drought significantly reduces the ability of the local population to provide their basic needs and increases pressure on scarce resources Provincial administration disconnected from rural concerns which leads to poor administration of land tenure in rural areas
2. Land conflict – Type 2 – Land acquisition	N/A	Lack of national government control of regional factions	Low ANA and ANP presence in Ghazni, particularly in rural areas at risk of factional abuse
3. Land conflict –	N/A	Absence of government action to ensure that Kuchi	The consolidation of Taliban influence across Ghazni in 2006-8

[20] The design of this table was inspired by (Autesserre 2006) who argued that in addressing conflicts in Eastern Congo the national and regional conflicts, and their linkages to and expression in local conflict, must be understood. The table here adds another dimension, the Province, which is critical to the state apparatus in Afghanistan.

Type 3 – migration of nomadic groups		nomads have alternative land tenure to prevent attacks on Hazara in the Hazarajat;	relates to the resumption of Kuchi attacks: Provincial shift of power in favour of the Taliban; Possibility of Taliban in Ghazni using ethnic and historic links with Kuchi to mobilize the group and penetrate Hazara areas
4. Activity of government opposition groups	International elements and linkages of resistance groups contribute to the insurgency; Pakistan is a haven for Taliban to resource and plan attacks; IMF use of air strikes, and support the ANP which reduces public support	Inability of the government to maintain sufficient presence in rural areas because they are targeted by AGEs; high defection rates of police and military personnel; salaries not as high as Taliban salaries; security not maintained on transport routes throughout Afghanistan	Increases in province-level insecurity due to campaign by insurgents to target government officials and reduce government capabilities in Ghazni; Taliban influence extends beyond areas they control due to province-wide insecurity; little policing of the Jaghori-Qarabagh road; targeting of aid convoys and international staff leading to withdrawal of aid and agencies.
5. Inter-party or factional conflicts	N/A	Tensions between different factions of Hizb-i Wahdat	Tensions between different factions of Hizb-i Wahdat
6. Criminal activities	N/A	N/A	N/A
7. Debt and financial conflicts	N/A	Microfinance options to act as a buffer during resource crisis are not available	N/A
8. Marriage and domestic violence	N/A	Tradition of high Toyana (bridal price) upheld	Tradition of high Toyana (bridal price) upheld

The table above shows that though no single factor can be interpreted as the cause of a local-level conflict - the combination of related factors undoubtedly plays a role in local conflicts as addressed by the CPAU Peace Councils data. The primary themes that can be deduced from this table are that regional factors of most influence relate to the international nature of the resistance movement in Afghanistan, which sustains the insurgency in provinces including Ghazni, with knock-on effects for security in rural districts including Jaghori and Malistan. Without the substantial international support provided to the Taliban and AGEs, particularly during seasonal offensives or for specific campaigns, there would be a stronger possibility that international forces could curb or contain the spread of insurgency. This would in turn increase security in rural districts and potentially decrease local conflict as the rule of law and government control stabilised. Linked with this is the role of Pakistan, which is used as a base for the Taliban to coordinate and recuperate within, and due to the inability of the Pakistani government to secure the border areas of North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, international forces have had to face Taliban fighters that are significantly better-supplied and trained than they would be without these havens within Pakistan. Another significant international factor is international military strategy. Aerial bombing which has at times caused civilian casualties has provided the Taliban with ample material to use in propaganda against international presence and Karzai's government, allowing them to more easily and swiftly garner local support for their movement and spread with greater ease through villages.

At a national level the most pertinent aspects of governance that lead directly or indirectly to local conflict relate to the maintenance or provision of security in rural areas. Shortfalls in security and governance of rural areas lead to situations including the inability to control regional factions that abuse villagers and catalyse land-related conflict through occupation; a lack of rural governance in the resolution of local disputes through legitimate legal structures (allowing for a re-emergence of seasonal inter-community conflict between nomadic Kuchi and settled Hazara); loss of morale in government employees including the police and military, resulting in high defection rates and in turn further decreased security. Underlying these trends is prolific corruption, which has been reported widely in literature and the media. The consequences of corruption are far-reaching, and include the negation of government systems and an overall public mistrust of government officials that is conducive to the Taliban and AGEs furthering their public support base.

Provincial factors relate closely to national factors. Tenuous government control of Ghazni at the level of provincial administration is an overarching factor of the increased insurgency that filters down to affect the situation in districts substantially. This is connected with the targeting of government officials by the Taliban and AGEs, as well as lack of sufficient funding being provided to government officials to establish stronger links with key community leaders. Weak provincial governance and presence has led directly to an insecure situation across Ghazni and allowed for the targeting of transit routes, most significantly the Kabul-Kandahar highway and the Jaghori-Qarabagh road. This has repercussions for economic activity and trade, and also prevents or hinders transit across the province, by locals or staff from international agencies. The impact of this situation is a lack of aid and development reaching areas of Ghazni in need which exacerbates conflicts related to resource-shortages by preventing relief from reaching villages.

Another provincial factor of concern is a shift in power in favour of the Taliban in Ghazni, which has led in part to the re-emergence of conflict between Hazara and migrating Kuchi groups. Seasonal conflict between Hazara and Kuchi requires close monitoring and intervention to contain or reduce it, as it could escalate to severe levels causing mass displacement.

8. Conclusion

Through the analysis it is possible to draw a number of conclusions about the interconnected nature of province and district level conflicts in Jaghori and Malistan. A key finding is that increases in province-level insurgency and associated insecurity seem to affect the rate of district-level conflict, which mirrors the timing of these provincial increases. Province and district-level conflicts also tend to be highly seasonal, with particularly high rates reflected in provincial and district data in the spring.

Despite the fact that Jaghori and Malistan are not under Taliban control the Taliban do seem to have some influence. Attacks on education throughout Ghazni have affected these Hazara districts. The attacks by the Taliban and AGEs on the Kabul-Kandahar highway passing through Ghazni have severely hampered or altogether prevented aid and development projects from reaching Jaghori and Malistan, which have been severed from Ghazni city and Kabul and isolated due to the insurgency. As a result of little food aid and development reaching people in these districts, particularly following the drought, pressure to maintain livelihoods and survive has become acute reaching a crisis situation. This in turn fuels a myriad of district-level conflict dynamics from land and water to interpersonal and debt-related conflict.

Lack of government control in rural areas allows corruption to make government systems intended to address local issues, including land disputes, defunct. As a result people avoid government systems for fear of extortion and abuse, and this contributes to conflict as legal or other forms of government recourse do not serve to protect citizens. This lack of control has led to unclear administration of land tenure in rural areas which has combined with misunderstandings between the public and relevant government institutions' understanding of land tenure law exacerbating land-related conflict in the districts. This is made more complicated by the abuse

and land occupation by Hizb-i Wahdat Nasr leaders which has led to further land-related conflict and internal displacement of people in Malistan

Though a lack of security at national, provincial and district levels may appear in this analysis to be the primary factor underpinning conflict, the social, economic and governance challenges that seem to be exacerbated by this lack of security can at the same time be understood as the root causes of the security situation. Thus any effort towards stabilisation or peacebuilding in Afghanistan must take into account and transform the complex array of factors underlying insecurity, as outlined in this analysis, if the right to stability is to be realised in Jaghori and Malistan.

Bibliography

AISA. *Provincial Profile for Ghazni, Regional Rural Economic Regeneration Strategies (RRERS)* . Kabul: AISA, 2006.

Amin, T. "Afghan Resistance: Past, Present and Future." *Asian Survey*, 1984: 24(4), 373-399.

ANBP. *ANBP Newsletter October 2006.* Newsletter, Kabul: Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme, 2006b.

ANBP. *FOUR COMMANDERS VOLUNTARILY SURRENDER WEAPONS IN GHAZNI, 5th March 2006.* Press Release, Kabul: Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme, 2006a.

Ariana TV. "'Taleban commander interviewed on spring offensive plans' ." Kabul: Ariana TV / BBC Monitor, 6 3 2007.

Associated Press. "'Afghan parliament OKs Karzai's cabinet'." 7 8 2006.

Autesserre, S. "Local Violence, National Peace? Postwar "Settlement" in the Eastern D.R. Congo (2003–2006) ." *African Studies Review*, 2006: Volume 49, Number 3, pp. 1–29.

Baumgartner. "Map of Ghazni." *Wikimedia Commons.* 2006. http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/9e/Afghanistan_Ghazni_Province_location.PNG/120px-Afghanistan_Ghazni_Province_location.PNG (accessed 12 12, 2008).

BBC. "'Concern over Afghan "withdrawal"'." *BBC News,.* 15 8 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7562905.stm (accessed 8 28, 2008).

Bergen, Peter. "'America's juggling act' ." *San Jose Mercury News.* 16 9 2006. http://www.afghanistanwatch.org/2006/09/peter_bergen_wh.html.

Burke, Jason. "Taliban win over locals at the gates of Kabul." *The Observer.* 24 8 2008. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/24/afghanistan (accessed 12 11, 2008).

Campbell, Jason H., and Jeremy Shapiro. *Afghanistan Index Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan .* Brookings, 2008.

CPAU field data. "Thematic Questionnaire." 12 Jul 2008.

CSO. "Afghanistan Estimated Population & Assisted Return Estimated Population (Afghanistan Central Statistic Office) 2008-2009'." *UNHCR.* 2008. http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl=SUBSITES&id=491865612 (accessed 12 12, 2008).

CSO and UNFPA. *Ghazni: A Socio-economic and Demographic Profile, Household Listing.* Kabul: Central Statistics Office, 2003.

Daily Afghanistan. *'The series of national discord is taking shape', 13 June 2007.* Kabul: Daily Afghanistan, 2007.

Dartmouth. "Global Register of Major Flood Events." *Dartmouth.* 2006. http://www.dartmouth.edu/~floods/Archives/2006sum.htm (accessed 9 3, 2008).

De Weijer, F. *Pastoralist Vulnerability Study.* Kabul: World Food Programme/ Vulnerability Assessment Mapping Unit, 2002.

Dorronsoro, Gilles. *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present.* The CERI Series in Comparative Politics & International Studies, 2005.

Fitzherbert, A. *'Water Management, Livestock And The Opium Economy: Livestock Husbandry'.* AREU Case Study Series, Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), 2006.

Giustozzi, A. *Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop, The neo Talban insurgency in Afghanistan.* London: Hurst & Company, 2007.

Giustozzi, Antonio. (19 8 2008).

Goodhand, Jonathan. *Conflict assessments A synthesis report: Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Nepal and Sri Lanka .* London: Conflict Security and Development Group, 2001.

Haidar, S. A. "Governor survives Taliban attack." *Pajhwok Afghan News (PAN).* 12 8 2008a. http://www.pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=60258 (accessed 12 11, 2008).

—. "Taliban capture district in Ghazni." *Pajhwok Afghan News (PAN).* 15 8 2008b. http://www.pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=60433 (accessed 12 11, 2008).

HRW. "Backgrounder on Afghanistan: History of the War." *Human Rights Watch.* 2001. http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/afghan-bck1023.htm (accessed 8 15, 2008).

—. "Blood-Stained Hands: Past Atrocities in Kabul and Afghanistan's Legacy of Impunity." *Human Rights Watch.* 2005a. http://hrw.org/reports/2005/afghanistan0605/ (accessed Jun 25, 2008).

—. "Campaigning against Fear: Women's Participation in Afghanistan's 2005 Elections." *Human Rights Watch.* 2005. http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/wrd/afghanistan0805/index.htm (accessed 8 21, 2008).

—. "Killing You is a Very Easy Thing For Us: Human Rights Abuses in Southeast Afghanistan." *Human Rights Watch.* 2003. http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2003/07/28/killing-you-very-easy-thing-us-0 (accessed Jun 25, 2008).

—. "Lessons in Terror: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan." *Human Rights Watch.* 2006. http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/afghanistan0706/ (accessed Jun 27, 2008).

—. "The Massacre In Mazar-I Sharif ." *Human Rights Watch.* 1998. http://www.hrw.org/reports98/afghan/index.htm#TopOfPage (accessed Aug 15, 2008).

Ibrahimi, N. "At the source of factionalism and civil war in the Hazarajat." *Crisis States Research Centre.* Jan 2009. http://www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/wpSeries2/WP41.2.pdf (accessed Jan 20, 2009).

ICG. *'Afghanistan's Endangered Compact' 29 January 2007.* Asia Policy Briefing No. 59, Brussels and Kabul: International Crisis Group (ICG) , 2007b.

ICG. *Afghanistan: The need for international resolve.* ICG Report No. 145, Brussels and Kabul: International Crisis Group (ICG), 2008.

ICG. *Countering Afghanistan's Insurgency: No Quick Fixes, 2 November 2006.* Asia Report N°123, , Brussels and Kabul: International Crisis Group (ICG), 2006.

IRIN. "'AFGHANISTAN: UN renews call for food aid funding'." *IRIN.* 24 11 2008b. http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=79881 (accessed 8 19, 2008).

—. "AFGHANISTAN: Food shortages cause grass eating, displacement." *IRIN.* 2008a. http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=77195 (accessed 12 11, 2008).

IWPR. “US hearts and minds cash goes to Taleban.” *Institute for War and Peace Reporting.* 28 November 2006b. http://www.iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=325721&apc_state=heniarr2006 (accessed Jul 14, 2008).

Kakar, M. Hassan. *A Political and Diplomatic History of Afghanistan 1863 - 1901.* Leiden: Brill, 2006.

Klijn, F., and A. Pain. *Finding The Money: Informal Credit Practices In Rural Afghanistan.* AREU Case Study Series, Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), 2007.

Marsden, Peter. *The Taliban: War and Religion in Afghanistan.* London: Zed Books, 2002.

McEwen, A., and B. Whitty. *‘Water Management, Livestock And The Opium Economy: Land Tenure.* Case Study Series, Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), 2006.

McGowan. “A Deal With the Devil.” *The New York Times.* 2 4 2007. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/02/opinion/02mcgowan.html (accessed 12 9, 2008).

Meo, N. “Leaked aid map of Afghanistan reveals expansion of no-go zones.” *The Times.* 2007. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article3000067.ece (accessed 12 11, 2008).

Mousavi, S. *The Hazaras of Afghanistan: An Historical, Cultural, Economic and Political Study.* Surrey: Curzon , 1998.

MRRD. *‘Provincial Development Plan: Ghazni Provincial Profile’, National Area Base Development Programme.* Kabul: Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, 2007.

Noelle, Christine. *State and Tribe in Nineteenth-Century Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir Dost Muhammed Khan (1826 - 1863).* Richmond: Curzon, 1997.

Nojumi, Neamatollah. *The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass mobilisation, civil war, and the future of the region.* New York: Palgrave, 2002.

NPS . “Program for Culture and Conflict Studies Ghazni Profile.” *NPS .* 2008. http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/Ghazni.html (accessed 7 11, 2008).

Pajhwok. *ANMP Condoles Mohaqiq for Death of Innocent People, 16 July 2008.* Kabul: Pajhwok, 2008.

—. “Bodies of kidnapped Afghan soldier, ex-NGO employee, discovered .” *Pajhwok News Agency.* 30 Aug 2006.

PAN. “Threatened and snubbed: 50,000 students banned from school in Ghazni.” *Pajhwok Afghan News.* 2 Jan 2007. http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2007/01/02/threatened-and-snubbed-50-000-students-banned-from-school-in-ghazni.html (accessed Aug 21, 2008).

Panjara . “‘Afghan weekly warns of stronger unity among opposition’.” *Panjara.* Kabul, 9 10 2003.

Rashid, Ahmed. *Taliban: The story of the Afghan Warlords.* London: Pan MacMillian, 2001.

Robichaud, C. *‘Iraq to Afghanistan’ 13 November 2005 .* Afghanistan Watch, 2005.

Rubin, B., and J Sherman. *Counter-narcotics to stabilize Afganistan: The false promise of crop eradication.* New York: CIC, 2008.

Rubin, Barnett. *Rubin: Afghanistan Insurgent Attacks up in 2008.* 2008. http://icga.blogspot.com/2008/04/rubin-afghanistan-insurgent-attacks-up.html (accessed 12 12, 2008).

—. *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan.* Yale University Press, 2002.

Suleman, Mohammad, and Sue Williams. *Strategies and structures in preventing conflict and resisting pressure: A study of Jaghori District, Ghazni, Afghanistan, under Taliban control* . CPAU, 2003.

The Kabul Times. "Nine million people in Afghanistan need food aid." Kabul: Kabul Times, 9 8 2006.

Trives, S. "Afghanistan : réduire l'insurrection / le cas du Sud-Est." *Politique étrangère*, 2006: 1, pp. 105-118.

UNAMA. Email correspondence, September 2008.

UNHCR. " Sub-office Central Region (2002) District Profile, Jaghori." *UNHCR.* 30 7 2002. http://www.aims.org.af/afg/dist_profiles/unhcr_district_profiles/centra/ghazni/jaghori.pdf (accessed 7 10, 2008).

UNHCR . "UNHCR Returnee Monitoring Report, Afghanistan Repatriation, January 2002 - March 2003." *UNHCR.* 2003b. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f1bbde74.html (accessed 8 13, 2008).

UNHCR. "Assisted Voluntary Repatriation to Afghanistan Returns by District of Destination." *UNHCR.* 2008. http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl=SUBSITES&id=491862832 (accessed 12 12, 2008).

UNHCR. *Assisted Voluntary Repatriation to Afghanistan Returns by District of Destination.* Kabul, 2008.

—. "UNCHR, Sub-office Central Region (2003) District Profile, Malistan." *UNHCR.* 3 2 2003a. http://www.aims.org.af/afg/dist_profiles/unhcr_district_profiles/centra/ghazni/malistan.pdf (accessed 7 10, 2008).

Walsh, Declan. "Better paid, better armed, better connected - Taliban rise again." *The Guardian,.* 16 9 2006. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/sep/16/afghanistan.declanwalsh (accessed 12 15, 2008).

Younus, B. "Taleban call the shots in Ghazni." *Institute for War and Peace Reporting.* 25 Apr 2006. http://www.iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=261314&apc_state=henh (accessed Aug 21, 2008).