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18 September 2025

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Ethiopia: Treatment of members of opposition parties, particularly those of the Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (ECSJ, Ezema) party, the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the National Movement of Amhara (NaMA), and the Balderas for True Democracy (Balderas Party); documents issued to members of the

Balderas Party; the flag and logo of the Balderas Party (2023–September 2025)

Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

1. Overview

According to sources, political parties in Ethiopia are mainly based on ethnic identity (Freedom House 2025-02-26, Sec. B4; Sweden 2024-12-18, 7; US 2024-04-22, 52). Sources note that Ethiopia has seen a rise in political "polarisation" (ISS 2024-07-22; Sweden 2024-12-18, 7), which is contributing to armed conflict in the regions of Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray (Sweden 2024-12-18, 7). The Institute for Security Studies (ISS), an African non-profit organization that provides analyses, training and assistance to governments and civil society (ISS n.d.), reports that "[f]actionalism and infighting" have been key features of political movements in Ethiopia, both "before and since 2018" (2024-07-22). However, the Swedish Migration Agency's country of origin information unit, Lifos, indicates that "around" 2020, the government's treatment of political opposition and anti-government critics has "hardened," and has increased in the use of "[r]epressive measures that have stifled political pluralism," such as limits placed on the freedom of expression and peaceful assembly (Sweden 2024-12-18, 7). Citing confidential sources interviewed in September 2023, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands notes that "most" political parties in Ethiopia have been "neutralised by co-optation and infiltration" by the ruling Prosperity Party, and that political leaders considered "more radical" have "regularly" faced arrest (Netherlands 2024-01-31, para. 3.2.2.4).

Sources report that major opposition parties "boycotted" the 2021 elections due to "electoral mismanagement and harassment by the ruling party" (Freedom House 2025-02-26, Sec. B2) or "government intimidation" (Reuters 2021-06-22). Freedom House's annual report covering 2024 adds that the 2021 elections were marked by a "climate of

insecurity" and of increasing "repression of some opposition groups," keeping "[m]any Ethiopians" from participating in the political process (2025-02-26, Sec. C1).

According to Amnesty International, since Ethiopia declared a state of emergency in August 2023 [1], authorities have used it to justify the quelling of "peaceful dissent," including through the arbitrary detention of "prominent politicians critical of the government" (2024-02-19). In annual reports covering 2024, Amnesty International and Human Right Watch both indicate that the state of emergency was renewed for 4 months in February 2024, to expire in June of the same year (Amnesty International 2025-04-24, 166; Human Rights Watch 2025-01-16). Human Rights Watch adds that "mass arrests persisted" following the state of emergency's expiration (2025-01-16).

The Ethiopian daily newspaper *Addis Standard* indicates that by May 2024, a national political dialogue process was underway (2024-05-23). The newspaper also reports, however, on a statement from the Caucus of Opposition Parties (CoP), "an umbrella of eleven opposition groups in Ethiopia," expressing "concern" about the National Dialogue Commission and its consultation process (*Addis Standard* 2024-05-23). The statement indicated that although the Commission was created to foster "'justice, national unity, understanding, and reconciliation among the people of Ethiopia'," and to achieve lasting peace among armed actors engaged in internal conflicts, it was instead politicized by the ruling party and lacked "inclusivity and transparency" (*Addis Standard* 2024-05-23). According to the Ethiopian non-profit organization Center for the Advancement of Rights and Democracy (CARD), the CoP boycotted the national dialogue process for its "failure to adhere to its stated principles" (CARD 2024-10-31, i, 28). ISS summarizes it as follows: "While the [national dialogue] commission and government see a stable post-dialogue Ethiopia, the

opposition warns that the process will impose outcomes predetermined by government and lead to another cycle of violence" (2024-07-11).

2. Treatment of Members of Opposition Parties

The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicates that being critical of the government as well as a member or supporter of a political opposition party introduces a "risk of negative attention" from federal authorities, "especially when combined" (Netherlands 2024-01-31, para. 3.2.2.1).

According to sources, in 2024, members of opposition parties faced restrictions on their freedom of assembly, at times being arrested (Freedom House 2025-02-26, Sec. B1; UN 2024-06, para. 26) or harassed (Freedom House 2025-02-26, Sec. B1). Sources note that such violations against political opponents occurred beyond the period of the state of emergency (Sweden 2024-12-18, 8; UN 2024-06, para. 26). For instance, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC), Ethiopia's "independent federal state body accountable to parliament and responsible for investigating and reporting on the country's human rights" situation, including observing elections (US 2024-04-22, 44), writes in its report on the human rights situation under the 2023-2024 state of emergency that

[p]olitical parties whose members were arrested after the State of Emergency was declared include the Amhara National Movement (NAMA), Balderas for Real Democracy (Balderas), All Ethiopia Unity Organization (AEUP), Wolaita National Movement (WNM), Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (EZEMA), Gogot for Gurage Unity and Justice (GOGOT), Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP), Sidama Federalist Party (SFP) and Enat Party. (EHRC 2024-11-19, 41)

The US Department of State's *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2023* indicates that the state of emergency saw "thousands of individuals arbitrarily detained," and "many" purportedly because they belonged to the Amhara ethnic group (US 2024-04-22, 53). Human Rights Watch reports that under the state of emergency, federal authorities conducted "mass arrests without a warrant" and imposed "numerous restrictions on people's movement and communication," targeting politicians and journalists "critical" of the government response to the conflict in Amhara (2025-01-16). Freedom House reports that in February 2024, "at least five prominent political figures" were arrested, then "den[ied] ... due process" under provisions of the state of emergency (2025-02-26, Sec. B1).

For instance, Amnesty International reports that 2 members of Parliament [of the NaMA opposition party], Christian Tadele and Desalegn Chane, both known to criticize the Abiy administration, were arrested by authorities, with one arrest occurring in August 2023 and the other in early 2024 (2024-02-19). EHRC notes that Ethiopia's Parliament voted to "stri[p] the [arrested] MPs of their immunity" (2024-11-19, 41). According to the same source, 2 members of Addis Ababa City Council and 4 members of regional councils (Amhara, Oromia (Chefe), Central Ethiopia, and Southern Ethiopia Regional Councils) were also "arrested on orders allegedly issued by the Command Post [2] following the declaration of a State of Emergency" (EHRC 2024-11-19, 41). The source adds that "some" of them were liberated "[a]fter months" (EHRC 2024-11-19, 41).

Freedom House reports that the ruling Prosperity Party accuses members of opposition parties and government critics of having ties to "rebel groups or state enemies" to restrict their political participation (2025-02-26, Sec. B2). The source adds that the ruling party also uses corruption claims against public servants or opposition politicians "to punish dissent" (Freedom House 2025-02-26, Sec. C2). Lifos similarly

reports that cases of arrest and detention of politicians and "others suspected of links to or support for armed opposition," appear to be government interventions, used to control the narratives coming out of conflict zones (Sweden 2024-12-18, 7).

EHRC reports that, in Oromia region in particular, "a pattern of mass arrests, restrictions on movement, detentions including of political party members," were justified by authorities either as a response to the security situation or due to "suspicion of 'providing support to/aiding armed groups operating in the region'" (2024-11-19, 45). In its country report on Ethiopia, the Danish Immigration Service (DIS) interviewed 3 researchers, a research institute, as well as EHRC, who stated that it is "difficult for both state and non-state actors to distinguish between friend and foe" in the ongoing conflict in Oromia [3] (Denmark 2024-10, 45).

For instance, sources report that Taye Dendea, Ethiopia's former Minister of Peace who criticized his own ruling party's response to internal conflict, was arrested in 2023 (Amnesty International 2024-02-19; Freedom House 2024-02-29, Sec. D4), accused of having ties to the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) [4] (Freedom House 2024-02-29, Sec. D4). According to an article by *Addis Standard*, Dendea was released on bail in December 2024 and rearrested in June 2025 as the court revived charges previously dismissed against him (2025-06-02). The UN Office for the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) indicates in its report on the human rights situation in Ethiopia that police arrested 4 members of opposition parties in December 2023, 3 days before a planned public demonstration against "ongoing conflicts in the parts of the country" (UN 2024-06, para. 26). Information indicating whether the individuals were released or prosecuted could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

Lifos reports that, much like the increased targeting of Tigrayans and Tigrayan armed groups by the federal government during the war in Tigray [5], in the context of the armed conflict in Amhara region, the government is taking "repressive actions" against both Amhara armed groups like Fano, and Amhara political opponents and critics (Sweden 2024-12-18, 8). DIS interviewed a part-time professor at the School of Transnational Governance and Migration Policy Centre of the European Union Institute (EUI n.d.), who indicated that state authorities "indiscriminate[ly]" view "all Amhara people" as part of Fano, and "considers anyone who opposes them a Fano representative," resulting in "widespread targeting and persecution" (Denmark 2024-10, 49). The DIS also published notes from their May 2024 interview with the civil society organization Ethiopian Human Rights Defenders Center (EHRDC), in which EHRDC stated that, as with a tactic deployed in the war in Tigray, authorities now check individuals with an Amharic name against a list that includes the "names of journalist, activists and human rights defenders who are vocal and advocating for the Amharan cause" (Denmark 2024-10, 87). The police and security forces conduct

random searches in Addis Ababa, and they check telephones and social media accounts during searches. If the authorities detect any videos or posts related to Fano or OLF, family members will be interrogate[d] and subjected to a background check as well. If there is any indication that a person is involved with or support any opposition movement, authorities will interrogate the person. The checks and searches are conducted randomly almost every evening in Addis Ababa. (Denmark 2024-10, 87)

Based on information from interviews with confidential sources conducted in November 2023, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs writes that authorities were "particularly looking for individuals who were mobilising financial or logistical support for the armed groups or who were gathering information for them," which could in some instances

include "members of political parties, as well as businesspeople or other groups"; a confidential source, moreover, stated that mass arrests were used to find such targets (Netherlands 2024-01-31, para. 3.2.2.3).

According to Freedom House, Ethiopia's judiciary faces political interference by the government (2025-02-26, Sec. F1). The same source adds that judges are subjected to dismissal or arrest if they try to act independently, while security forces enjoy "impunity," particularly in cases involving the treatment of political prisoners (Freedom House 2025-02-26, Sec. F1). Lifos indicates that state authorities are reportedly involved in kidnapping journalists, activists, and other critics of the state's security response and humanitarian conditions in conflict zones (Sweden 2024-12-18, 7). Similarly, *US Country Reports 2023* notes that local media have reported an "increase in enforced disappearances of prominent figures critical of the government," among them "political commentators, former military officers, investigative journalists, and social media activists" (US 2024-04-22, 5). EHRC documents a case of one of its staff members who was "beaten by people identified as government security forces" in Bahir Dar, Amhara region (2024-11-19, 43). Reporters Without Borders (Reporters sans frontières, RSF) states that "[n]umerous" reporters who were not "aligned with the government" in their coverage of the Tigray and Amhara conflicts have been detained "on serious charges," further noting that "sometimes" journalists were held for "months in military camps in the heart of the desert" and that "multiple" journalists remain in prison (RSF [2025]).

2.1 Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (ECSJ, Ezema) Party

According to Lifos, since its founding in 2019, Ezema was seen to "have largely supported the federal government," with a shared view of "national unity" and an ideological position against "ethnically based politics" (Sweden 2024-12-18, 9). However, the same source notes that according to "international and Ethiopian reporting," Ezema has also

experienced tensions with the federal government, including arrests reported in Addis Ababa under the 2023 state of emergency, and additional arrests and "violent treatment" in Southern Ethiopia in October 2024, for which Lifos says that little detail was provided (Sweden 2024-12-18, 9). EHRC reports that "about" 90 leaders and members of Ezema active in Arbaminch Zuriya district, in the Gamo zone of Southern Ethiopia, were arrested by government authorities in November 2023, "on grounds of 'destabilizing the area and causing harm to human life and injury'" (2024-11-19, 46).

In its interview with the DIS, EHRDC stated that an informal political group founded by "former members of the opposition party, Ezema," were demonstrating and calling for an end to the conflict, when authorities responded as follows:

Five of the members were detained. One person managed to escape to Nairobi, and five police officers surrounded his house, while he was in Nairobi, interrogated his wife and children and asked about his whereabouts, after which they destroyed everything inside the house. (Denmark 2024-10, 87)

Sources report that in October 2023, Ezema's leader, Chanie Kebede, was arrested by authorities under the provisions of the state of emergency, an incident which the party called "unrelated" to his leadership responsibilities in the party (*Addis Standard* 2023-10-02; Borkena 2023-10-03). According to Borkena, a Toronto-based online platform focused on Ethiopian news [6] (Borkena 2024-11-17), Kebede was in prison as of September 2025 (Borkena 2025-09-11). Sources additionally report that on 31 May 2024, Yeshiwas Assefa, the former leader of Ezema, was arrested for purportedly "'inciting violence'" (*Addis Standard* 2024-06-05; Borkena 2024-06-08), in connection with his social media posts (Borkena 2024-06-08). Information indicating whether Assefa was released or prosecuted could not be found among the

sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

2.2 Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC)

Information on the treatment of members and leaders of the OFC by the authorities was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

According to Freedom House, OFC took part in the 2021 elections boycott (2025-02-26, Sec. B2).

Addis Standard reports that in August 2023, Bekele Gerba resigned as first deputy of the OFC, due to—according to his remarks to the BBC in an Amharic-language article—the "serious political situation in Ethiopia," which he felt restricted "peaceful struggle and personal freedom" (2023-08-28). The newspaper adds that Gerba was incarcerated in the wake of the violence that occurred in response to the assassination of Oromo artist Hachalu Hundessa in June 2020; he was released after 18 months in jail and subsequently fled to the US (*Addis Standard* 2023-08-28).

In April 2024, the spouse of a central committee member of the OFC reported to *Addis Standard* that her husband had been in police custody for more than a week and had yet to be brought before a court (2024-04-26). An OFC spokesperson also noted the committee member's detention to the newspaper and further reported that at least 7 other party members had been in detention across the Oromia region "for a considerable duration," and that the whereabouts of some were unknown (*Addis Standard* 2024-04-26).

2.3 Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)

According to Freedom House, OLF took part in the 2021 elections boycott (2025-02-26, Sec. B2).

According to interviews the DIS conducted with several interlocutors, including researchers and organizations, despite the OLF's designation as a "legal opposition party," its members and supporters face "a risk" of being targeted by state authorities (Denmark 2024-10, 44). An international researcher interviewed by the same source explains that the federal government has "*de facto* 'decapitated' OLF, who cannot in reality function as an actual opposition party," pointing to the assassination of a "prominent OLF member" in April 2024 as an example (Denmark 2024-10, 97). Sources report that in April 2024, a senior OLF member and "outspoken critic" of the federal government, Bate Urgessa, was murdered in the Oromia region; his family accuses government security forces of the killing, a claim which regional authorities deny (BBC 2024-04-10; Freedom House 2025-02-26, Sec. B1).

DIS interviewed 2 researchers in Addis Ababa who agreed that "low-ranking members of the OLF are more likely to be victims of assassinations and kidnapping compared to high-ranking members," due to the "higher risk for the perpetrator" in targeting a public-facing, high-ranking officer who has better protection than their lower ranking counterparts (Denmark 2024-10, 45). The DIS report includes this additional context on the OLF and its base of support:

A research institution interviewed for this report highlighted that for many ethnic Oromos, the OLF has remained a symbol of resistance, but the OLF does not constitute a cohesive unit. To a greater extent, it is a "societal form of resistance," so it is difficult to demarcate its members from members of the community. (Denmark 2024-10, 45)

Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

According to Freedom House's 2023 annual report, "[s]everal" OLF leaders were detained since 2020 despite court rulings demanding their release (2024-02-29, Sec. B1). Sources indicate that in September 2024, the 7 OLF leaders were released after 4 years of detention without charge (*Addis Standard* 2024-09-05; Human Rights Watch 2024-09-09).

2.4 National Movement of Amhara (NaMA)

Citing a May 2020 Lifos report published in Swedish, the DIS's March 2021 report on Ethiopia's opposition parties describes the NaMA as "an ethno-nationalist party" formed in June 2018 (Denmark 2021-03, 14). Lifos describes the relationship between state authorities and the NaMA party in its 2024 report as one of "a history of government intervention" (Sweden 2024-12-18, 9). The source further states that as state security operations in Amhara started in the first half of 2022, "the government increasingly began to target Amhara nationalist forces," including "NaMA-linked persons" who were said to be among the "politicians arrested alongside the Amhara armed opposition"; as the conflict intensified and the state of emergency was declared in August 2023, additional arrests followed (Sweden 2024-12-18, 10).

According to sources, in August 2023, authorities arrested Christian Tadele, a [NaMA (US 2024-04-22, 15)] member of Parliament known to criticize the government (Amnesty International 2024-02-19; US 2024-04-22, 15) and its handling of the armed conflict in Amhara (US 2024-04-22, 15). Sources state that Tadele was "beat[en]" by police (Borkena 2023-08-04; *Addis Insight* 2023-08-05). Human Rights Watch indicates that Tadele remained in detention throughout 2024 (Human Rights Watch 2025-01-16). Sources indicate that another member of Parliament from the NaMA opposition party, Desalegn Chane, [known for criticizing the prime minister (Amnesty International 2024-02-19)], was detained by

authorities in early 2024 (Amnesty International 2024-02-19; Human Rights Watch 2025-01-16). Human Rights Watch indicates that he was freed on 14 March of the same year (2025-01-16).

Borkena reports that in April 2025, Belete Molla, Abiy's Minister of Innovation and Technology since 2021, was elected chairman of NaMA during the party's third general meeting (2025-04-07). The meeting was held in Addis Ababa, rather than its usual location, Bahir Dar, in Amhara region (Borkena 2025-04-07). Borkena notes that NaMA was once "a popular" political opposition party, despite its recent formation, but that it has since ceded "a significant portion of its support base in the Amhara region of Ethiopia," for purportedly going "from opposition to an ally and supporter of Prime Minister Abiy's ruling Prosperity Party" (2025-04-07).

Similarly, a letter signed by 35 international Amhara organizations [7] and posted in May 2025 on the website of the Amhara Association of America (AAA), a US-based organization that advocates for the political and humanitarian interests of the Ethiopia's Amhara people (AAA n.d.), denounces the NaMA's "handful" of leaders who joined Abiy's cabinet in addition to Molla, such as "current office holders Gashaw Mersha and Yesuf Ibrahim" (AAA 2025-05-27).

2.5 Balderas Party

According to Lifos, federal authorities' treatment of political opposition parties, like Balderas and other Amhara-based parties, is influenced by the armed conflict in Amhara region:

The focus of the authorities' repressive response against opposition figures has varied, at least in part, according to the political dynamics and security situation in the country. With the heightened tensions in Amhara in 2022 and the escalation in 2023, Amharas and Amhara nationalists have been more widely affected. In this context, the NaMA and Balderas parties figure with their connection to the Amhara community. (Sweden 2024-12-18, 9)

Lifos further writes that the Balderas Party has faced "repression" at the hands of federal authorities since before the conflict in Amhara, as an "Amhara-dominated" party seen to be "close to Amhara nationalists and in favour of the Fano," due to the party's founder and former leader (resigned in August 2022), Eskinder Nega (Sweden 2024-12-18, 10). Nega is known to have "taken command of an Amhara-based militia" in May 2023, a group which appears to have subsequently joined the Fano militias; the source notes, however, that what remains unknown is the Balderas Party's position on its former leader's post-resignation activities (Sweden 2024-12-18, 10).

Sources report that Nega was arrested in 2020 in the midst of the government "crack[down]" that followed the assassination of Oromo singer Hachalu Hundessa (Amnesty International 2020-07-18; Borkena 2022-08-11) due to an alleged "'attempt to incite violence and threaten the constitutional order'" (Borkena 2022-08-11). Borkena reports that he has been released, and that in August 2022, Nega resigned the leadership of Balderas Party, saying he could not carry out the duties of the role "due to outright repression and dictatorship of the government" (Borkena 2022-08-11). Borkena adds that as of August 2022, the Balderas Party does not have national status as a political party, and its membership "mostly" comes from residents of Addis Ababa (2022-08-11).

Freedom House indicates that in March 2023, the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) and the EHRC voiced concerns over restrictions placed by authorities on several opposition parties' activities, including those of the Balderas Party, with the EHRC pointing to "police

officers' disruptions" of their assemblies (2024-02-29, Sec. B1). For instance, media sources report that Balderas Party Deputy President, Amaha Dagneu, was arrested and detained on 11 March 2023 (Addis Insight 2023-04-03; Borkena 2023-03-13). Borkena adds that he was released by authorities on the same day, only 2 days before a planned general assembly for the party, which was blocked by regional authorities (2023-03-13). Ethiopian digital news platform Addis Insight reports that on 1 April 2023, Dagneu was "abducted once again without explanation" from his residence, similarly to what other Balderas Party leaders, followers, and supporters had, "for the past few days," "repeatedly" faced at the hands of the government, in an attempt to block the party from holding a compulsory general meeting required to "finalize its national status" (2023-04-03).

3. Additional Information on Balderas Party

3.1 Documents Issued to Members

Information on the documents issued to members of the Balderas Party could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

3.2 Flag and Logo of Balderas Party

A logo is available on the Amharic-language website of the Balderas Party, with the following features, as observed by the Research Directorate:

- Medallion-shaped with a yellow-beige coloured backdrop and a red, yellow and green border
- Green-coloured ribbon of text in Amharic circling the top and bottom of the medallion
- In the centre of the medallion, a red outline of a fist, thrust upward (Balderas for True Democracy n.d.).

Information on the flag of the Balderas Party could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

Notes

[1] Ethiopia's House of People's Representatives approved the declaration of a nationwide state of emergency effective in August 2023 in response to rising violence in the Amhara region between government forces and Fano militia (Amnesty International 2024-02-19). The state of emergency conferred "sweeping powers" onto state authorities, including the ability to "arrest suspects without a court warrant, impose curfews, restrict the right to freedom of movement, and ban public assemblies or associations" (Amnesty International 2024-02-19). [\[back\]](#)

[2] Under the extension order for the state of emergency issued on 2 February 2024, the Amhara region came under the control of a "command post led by the head of the National Intelligence and Security Service reporting directly to the prime minister" (Amnesty International 2024-02-19). [\[back\]](#)

[3] Armed conflicts in Ethiopia's Amhara and Oromia regions were said to have "worsened" in 2024, and an "ongoing government campaign to suppress armed opposition groups" has resulted in repeated violent clashes (Freedom House 2025-02-26, Sec. F3). Cases of "large-scale, ethnically motivated killings have occurred in Oromia, perpetrated by Amhara militias, the [Oromo Liberation Army (OLA)], Oromia regional forces, and federal forces" (Freedom House 2024-02-29, Sec. F3). In an interview with the DIS, EHRC elaborated that Oromia has seen "widespread levels of crimes and attacks against civilians" by both state and non-state forces, and that "revenge and retaliations attacks" also take place (Denmark 2024-10, 45-46). [\[back\]](#)

[4] "Tension" between the OLF and Ethiopia's federal government resulted in the rise of the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) wing, "which has opted for armed resistance" against state authorities, and has led to Oromia region becoming "one of the most affected conflict zones in the country"(ISS 2024-07-22). [\[back\]](#)

[5] A war between the Tigrayan forces and the federal government of Ethiopia occurred between 2020 and 2022 (ISS 2024-07-22). [\[back\]](#)

[6] Borkena is an "independent platform" managed by one individual aiming to provide "news content and a platform for thought leaders," as well as to promote small businesses in the Ethiopian community (Borkena 2024-11-17). BBC Monitoring describes Borkena as a "pro-opposition site" (BBC 2025-06-06). [\[back\]](#)

[7] The list of signatories are as follows: International Amhara Movement (IAM); Federation of Amharas in North America (FANA); Canadian Amhara Societies Alliance (CASA); Federation of Amhara Associations in New Zealand (FAANZ); Amhara Association of America (AAA); Amhara Association of Calgary; Amhara Community in Toronto; Amhara Society Social Forum; Dejen for Amhara Survival; The Federation of Amhara Associations in Australia; Amhara Association in New South Wales; Amhara Association in Western Australia; Amhara Association in

Queensland (AAQ); Amhara Families Society of Wellington in New Zealand; Amhara Support, Relief, and Rehabilitation Association (ASRRA) - Christchurch, New Zealand; Amhara Families Ethiopian Association in Auckland; Amhara Professionals Union (APU); Amhara Association of Nevada; Amhara Association Arizona; Amhara Association of Chicago – Illinois; Amhara Association of Los Angeles – California; Amhara Association of Michigan; Amhara Association in Dallas – Texas; Amhara Association in Georgia; Amhara Association in South Carolina; Black Lion Amhara Movement; Amhara Community in Sioux Falls, South Dakota; Amhara Association of Colorado; Association Amhara Éthiopienne en France; Amhara Association in Sweden; Amhara Association in Switzerland; Fidel Amhara Community Organization; Gonder Province Welkait Tsegede-Telemet Amhara Identity Civic Association in North America; Washington Area Amhara Association (WAAA); Amhara Association of Oregon (AAA 2025-05-27). [\[back\]](#)

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