

Global IDP
DATABASE

**PROFILE OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT :
RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

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PROFILE SUMMARY

IDPs in northern Caucasus endure violence and destitution

Attempts by the Russian federal authorities to stabilise the military, political and socio-economic situation in Chechnya during 2003 have so far failed to reduce levels of violence in the province to allow for the safe return of the more than 200,000 people who remain internally displaced. The holding in 2003 of a constitutional referendum and presidential elections in Chechnya, which the federal authorities claimed were free and fair but which human rights groups dismissed as a farce, have done little to raise hopes that the situation will improve. Unemployment in Chechnya is as high as 85 percent, and almost the entire population lives below the poverty line. Meanwhile, displaced Chechens have been under continuous pressure from the authorities to go back to the war-torn republic. This is despite a commitment to the principle of voluntary return made by the federal authorities during the visit of the UN Representative on IDPs to the northern Caucasus in September 2003. Many camps have been closed, aid withdrawn, and since April 2001, the authorities have ceased to register newly arriving IDPs. Furthermore, only 20 percent of the estimated 330,000 people displaced in the Russian Federation as a result of conflict have been granted "forced migrant" status, which provides protection to victims of forced displacement under federal law. And despite the vulnerability and dependence of IDPs in this region, humanitarian organisations continue to be obstructed by the federal authorities in doing their work. Although there are continuing reports of human rights violations committed by both sides, international criticism of the role of the federal security forces in this conflict has largely abated since Russia voiced its support for the international "war on terrorism".

A decade of conflict in the northern Caucasus

The first armed conflict between federal forces and secessionist armed groups in Chechnya (1994-1996) took the lives of 30,000 civilians and displaced as many as 600,000 people. The resumption of armed hostilities between federal military forces and Chechen separatists in 1999 plunged the northern Caucasus into a new humanitarian disaster and a large-scale displacement crisis. Both sides have conducted armed operations in disregard of humanitarian principles, including disproportionate use of force, indiscriminate attacks, arbitrary arrest, and torture and inhumane treatment. This catalogue of human rights abuses, which human rights organisations mainly attribute to the federal forces, had compelled up to 600,000 people to leave their homes by the end of 1999. The majority of those internally displaced remained within Chechnya but a significant number of them (up to 200,000 persons) fled to the neighbouring republic of Ingushetia during the winter of 1999-2000, the only escape route left open by the federal authorities (USCR 2001).

Most ethnic Russians and other non-ethnic Chechen groups left Chechnya and other north Caucasian republics during the first conflict and resettled elsewhere in the Russian Federation (UNHCR, February 2003).

A smaller conflict in North Ossetia, another north Caucasian republic within the Russian Federation, displaced several thousand people in 1992. Tensions between the Ingush and Ossetian communities in the Prigorodny district of North Ossetia triggered the displacement of the ethnic Ingush population to neighbouring Ingushetia. An agreement of cooperation signed in 1992 between North Ossetia and Ingushetia provided for the repatriation of the displaced ethnic Ingushetians. However, about 14,000 people originating from North Ossetia are still waiting for return in Ingushetia.

Key figures

- Total IDP population (estimate): 330,000
- Population of the Russian Federation: 148,000,000

Second Chechnya conflict (from 1999):

- IDPs in Ingushetia (UNHCR/Danish Refugee Council): 71,500 (October 2003)
- Total population in Ingushetia: 350,000
- IDPs in Chechnya (UN estimate): 140,000 (October 2003)
- Total population in Chechnya (official 2002 census): 1,000,000
- IDPs elsewhere in the Russian Federation (UN estimate): 48,000 (October 2003)

Conflict in the Prigorodny district (North Ossetia) (1992) and first Chechen conflict (1994-1996):

- IDPs with "forced migrant" status: 74,000 (June 2003)

Acute insecurity in Chechnya

Four years after the resumption of armed hostilities in Chechnya, internally displaced people in the northern Caucasus continue to live in hostile conditions. Since the withdrawal of the Chechen rebels from the lowlands to the mountains in 2000, low-intensity warfare has prevailed in Chechnya, with continuous reports of indiscriminate attacks and violence from both the rebel groups and the federal security forces. While the number of "sweep operations" seemed to have diminished in 2002, more targeted raids against individuals and homes have increased. Civilians in Chechnya are still victims of killings, arbitrary arrest and torture (HRW, January 2003; IHF, September 2003). It is only since 2002 that the return movements from Ingushetia to Chechnya have outnumbered departures from Chechnya, which have nonetheless continued at a lower pace (UN OCHA, November 2003).

Recent measures adopted by the federal authorities to stabilise the situation have had little effect on the overall security in Chechnya. The amnesty bill encouraging the surrender of rebel fighters took effect on 7 June 2003 but was expected to have little impact (HRW, September 2003). On 23 April 2003, the Commander and Military Prosecutor released the Order No. 98/110, which explicitly acknowledged that existing orders and instructions providing for human rights safeguards during the conduct of special operations and targeted activities were not respected (CPT, 10 July 2003). But despite this admission, members of federal security forces continue to enjoy impunity, as suggested by the UN Human Rights Committee in November 2003 (UN CHR, 6 November 2003). Federal authorities initiated a political normalisation process with a constitutional referendum in March 2003 and the holding of presidential elections for Chechnya in October 2003, which human rights organisations dismissed as a farce (BBC, 11 October 2003). However, insecurity continues to prevail in Chechnya, and armed violence and terrorist activities have been spreading to other northern Caucasian republics as well as the capital, Moscow (IHF September 2003).

Insecurity and inadequate living conditions

IDPs from Chechnya who initially found a safe haven in neighbouring Ingushetia, have been living under increasing threats to their physical safety. Since 2002, federal and Ingush authorities have exerted strong pressure on the IDPs living in tent camps to leave. Mop-up operations have been conducted in several camps during 2003, leading to arbitrary arrests, disappearances, ill-treatment, and the looting of property belonging to IDPs. The human rights organisation Memorial reported that in Ingushetia 20 IDPs were snatched in June and July 2003, and that most of them were still missing (IWPR, 31 July 2003).

IDPs in Ingushetia remain dependent on the assistance and the protection provided by the international community for their basic needs. The vast majority of IDPs are unemployed, while half of the displaced families rely on the pension of one of their family members (UN, November 2003). IDPs who are not

registered by the local authorities do not receive federal assistance and rely on aid from international agencies. Non-registered IDPs living in temporary settlements or hosted by the local population have been increasingly vulnerable to evictions as authorities have stopped reimbursing owners of settlement premises for the accommodation and utilities provided (UN OCHA, 31 March 2003). Tent camps were upgraded in 2002 while rehabilitated rooms and box tents were provided to IDPs in 2003 (UN OCHA, 25 July, 21 October 2003).

In Chechnya, IDPs and the civilian population in general continue to be exposed to violence perpetrated by both parties in the conflict. Human rights organisations reported that civilians were still victims of killings, forced disappearances, and torture. The risk of disappearances following detention at checkpoints and during nightly raids remained considerable throughout 2003. In addition, there has been a series of bomb attacks, including suicide bombings, by Chechen extremists (IHF, September 2003). This general level of violence has led to a chronic sense of insecurity among the Chechen population (AI, 31 May 2003).

Humanitarian needs of IDPs in Chechnya remain considerable. Unemployment is as high as 85 percent, while almost the entire population lives below the poverty line (UN November 2003). Conditions in collective "temporary accommodation centres" (or TACs) have improved in 2003 as a result of rehabilitation work implemented by the authorities (UNHCR 5 December 2003). However, international observers continued to report a lack of housing capacity for IDPs returning from Ingushetia (COE, 17 September 2003; UNICEF, 2 May 2003).

Poor living conditions in Ingushetia and Chechnya have exposed IDPs and local residents to increased risks of communicable diseases. An outbreak of measles in both republics in 2003 particularly hit the displaced in tent camps and TACs. UNICEF reported extremely low vaccination coverage among displaced children in camps and temporary settlements in Ingushetia (UNICEF, 16 August 2003). The dilapidated health structures in Chechnya and the fragile health system in Ingushetia remain unable to cope with high rates of tuberculosis, hepatitis A and sexually transmitted diseases among the population and IDPs without international assistance (UN, November 2003).

Chechen IDPs elsewhere in the Russian Federation are denied any legal status, depriving them of access to essential services and rights. One main problem for these IDPs is the inability to register their residence or temporary sojourn. Despite the abolition of the system of residence permits inherited from the Soviet period (the so called *propiska* system), de facto limitations to a free choice of residence remain in place in numerous regions, including major urban centres, such as Moscow or St. Petersburg. Furthermore, Chechens displaced by the current conflict have not been able to gain the "forced migrant" status, granted in federal law to victims of forced displacement but denied by the authorities to persons exposed to war and violence committed by federal forces. Deprived of any legal status, most displaced Chechens in urban centres have been unable to access essential services and social benefits and have been exposed to harassment from police forces and local authorities (UNHCR, February 2003).

Risks of forced return

The Russian and Ingush authorities have put continuous pressure on displaced Chechens to go back to their war-torn republic. This has included the disruption of federal aid in camps, forced closure in camps, security operations in IDP settlements, and military forces being stationed around IDP camps. In addition, migration services have ceased to register newly arrived Chechen IDPs in April 2001 and have arbitrarily removed people from state distribution lists, thus further increasing pressure on IDPs to leave (UNHCR, February 2003). As a result, the number of IDPs in Ingushetia decreased from 240,000 in January 2000 to 70,000 in November 2003, according to figures compiled by the Danish Refugee Council. Efforts by UNHCR to promote the re-registration of IDPs have had limited impact (UNHCR, 30 September 2003; OCHA, 17 September 2003).

Federal authorities have adopted several measures aimed at improving conditions in return areas in Chechnya, but IDPs in Ingushetia have remained reluctant to return. On 4 July 2003, the federal

government adopted a decree providing for the payment of compensation for property lost or damaged during the conflict, to be implemented before the end of 2003 (UN OCHA, 7 October 2003). A programme of reconstruction has also been implemented in 2002 and 2003 in Chechnya, but its impact on the ground has been hampered by corruption and mismanagement, as reported by the Russian Audit Chamber (RFE/RL, 30 April 2003). A survey conducted by MSF in IDP tent camps in Ingushetia in February 2003 showed that 98 percent of the interviewed IDPs did not want to go back to Chechnya in the near future, mainly because of concerns for their security (MSF, April 2003). During his visit to Ingushetia and Chechnya in September 2003, the Representative of the UN Secretary General on IDPs, Dr. Francis Deng, noted significant discrepancies between the official policy statements in favour of voluntary return in safety and dignity, and the experiences of IDPs (UN, 15 September 2003).

Authorities in Ingushetia have given green light to the resettlement of a group of 30,000 people displaced from Chechnya, mostly of Ingush ethnicity. In 2003, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation provided support to the Ingush authorities for resettling these IDPs, through the construction of houses on land plots allocated by the authorities. UNHCR helped strengthen the self-reliance capacity of these families through the creation of a carpentry workshop (UN OCHA, 31 March 2003, 6 August 2003).

Obstruction to humanitarian assistance

The Russian authorities have often cited insecurity as an obstacle to safe access to the northern Caucasus for humanitarian and human rights organisations. Violence and fighting in Chechnya has in fact been a major obstacle to the delivery of assistance and protection by international agencies (UN, November 2003). International humanitarian workers have been exposed to major threats, as a result of armed violence and abduction, as illustrated by the unsolved case of the MSF head of mission in Dagestan, who has been missing since August 2002 (MSF, 5 November 2003).

Insecurity, however, only partially explains the persisting reluctance of authorities to grant unimpeded access to Chechnya. In contradiction to their pledges to restore conditions for early return, the authorities have consistently obstructed the work of international NGOs through numerous bureaucratic obstacles (UN, November 2003). The OSCE mission in Chechnya was forced to close down in December 2002 after the Russian authorities refused to extend its human rights mandate. A more positive signal with regard to access was sent in September 2003, as the UN Representative on IDPs was officially invited to visit the Russian Federation and was able to travel to Ingushetia and Chechnya (UN, 15 September 2003). However, access to IDP camps for international aid agencies continued to be restricted, and several NGOs saw their computers confiscated by the local authorities in October 2003 (UN OCHA, 21 October 2003).

Indispensable international aid

Despite access difficulties, assistance provided by the international community has proved essential in meeting the basic needs of displaced people in the north Caucasus. UN agencies have progressively provided more assistance to the civilian population within Chechnya itself based on vulnerability criteria. Under the leadership of UNHCR, humanitarian agencies continue to monitor the situation of IDPs in Ingushetia in order to ensure that any returns to Chechnya are voluntary and that IDPs continue to benefit from a safe haven in Ingushetia or elsewhere in the Russian Federation until they are willing to return (UN November 2003). Protection is also an area where several organisations, such as UNHCR and the Council of Europe, have been actively involved, through the support given to governmental and non-governmental human rights institutions. But as a result of Russia's support to the international alliance against terrorism in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks, public criticism from western states has largely abated. This is illustrated by the failure of the UN Human Rights Commission to adopt any resolution against human rights abuses in Chechnya since 2001 (HRW, 25 April 2003).

CAUSES AND BACKGROUND OF DISPLACEMENT

The conflicts in Chechnya

Background to the conflict: Chechnya recent history (1922-1998)

- Russian expansion in the Caucasus meets fierce Chechen resistance throughout the nineteenth century
- Forced collectivization and attempts at "Russification" by the Bolsheviks led to renewed unrest and rebellion in Chechnya, culminating with brutal repression during the Stalinist 1930s
- Chechens and Ingush deported en masse to Soviet Central Asia and other far reaches between 1944-1957
- In 1957, Khrushchev decreed their return
- With Ingushetia opting to remain within Russia, Chechen leader Djohar Dudayev, a former Soviet Air Force General, proclaimed Chechen sovereignty on November 2, 1991
- As a result of the declaration of independence, some 100,000 Russians left Chechnya
- December 1994-August 1996: Russian troops undertake a military intervention in the republic; up to 400,000 people flee to other areas of Chechnya and the Russian Federation
- 1997-1999: Chechnya remains unstable; insecurity and hostage-taking oblige to a reduction of international humanitarian aid; Sharia law introduced by the President of the Chechen republic

"Chechnya experienced 21 months of warfare between December 1994, when some 40,000 Russian troops entered the rebellious republic, and August 1996 when a cease-fire took hold. An estimated 50,000 people, mostly civilians, were killed. Indiscriminate bombing and artillery attacks destroyed large areas of the Chechen capital Grozny in the first two months of the war, forcing up to 400,000 people to flee to other areas of Chechnya and to the frontier regions of Ingushetia, Daghestan, North Ossetia, and southern Russia. As the war continued into the surrounding countryside and southern mountain areas, entire villages were destroyed, resulting in further displacement.

The war was the most recent manifestation of the historical inability of Chechnya and Russia to find a workable *modus vivendi*. Chechnya's history over the past 200 years has been defined largely by Russian and Soviet attempts to subdue the Caucasus. In Czarist times, an uncontrolled northern Caucasus was considered to be Russia's Achilles' heel against incursions from the Persian and Ottoman Empires. From the second decade of the nineteenth century, Russian armies began their push into the mountains meeting fierce, well-organized, and Islamicized Chechen resistance. During a 25-year campaign of resistance led by the Imam Shamil between 1834-1859, Russian forces opted for a scorched earth strategy, destroying the lands and villages that gave the Chechen fighters sustenance and forcing the population to flee to the relative safety of the mountains. Russian armies won a titular military victory in 1859 with Shamil's capture, but resistance continued for the remainder of the century and well into the next. In modern times Shamil, who was an ethnic Avar from Daghestan, remains a venerated folk hero in both Chechnya and Daghestan.

Upon the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917, Bolsheviks promised independence, cultural autonomy, and religious freedom to Chechens and others in the northern Caucasus. However, the Soviet Red Army consolidated its power in the Caucasus soon afterward. Forced collectivization and attempts at Russification led to renewed unrest and rebellion in Chechnya, culminating during the Stalinist 1930s with

brutal repression, forced famine, mass arrests, exiles, and killings. Chechnya was united with Ingushetia as an ASSR in 1934. The Ingush and Chechens, who together comprise the Vainakh people, are ethnically related, speak a similar language, and often share kinship ties.

With the advent of World War II, as German forces advanced into the Caucasus, small numbers of anti-Soviet guerrillas mounted attacks against Soviet forces. This provided Stalin with a pretext to punish the 'unreliable' ethnic groups of the northern Caucasus. With great loss of life, Chechens and Ingush were deported en masse to Soviet Central Asia and other far reaches, and their lands were divided up among Russians, the Laks of Daghestan, and North Ossetians. The Chechens and Ingush remained in exile until 1957, when it was decreed by Khrushchev that they could return to their homes. The return was badly managed, however, and recurring clashes between the returnees and settlers continued for many years.

Perestroika in the late 1980s allowed for the resurgence and open expression of national identities in the Caucasus, leading in Chechnya as elsewhere to a declaration of independence from Russia. With Ingushetia opting to remain within Russia, Chechen leader Djohar Dudayev, a former Soviet Air Force General, proclaimed Chechen sovereignty on November 2, 1991, shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Relations between the struggling democracy in Moscow and the Chechen capital Grozny were difficult from the outset. Moscow refused to recognize Chechnya's secessionist aspirations and mounted both covert and overt operations to weaken Dudayev's position and replace him with a more tractable regime.

In Chechnya, the pervasive socioeconomic ills brought about by the collapse of the Soviet system and Dudayev's own increasingly autocratic style of leadership sent the territory into a spiral of fragmentation and instability. These conditions were exacerbated by the emptying of jails, the proliferation of small arms, and burgeoning criminal activity. Like his successor Aslan Maskhadov, Dudayev's challenge was to impose a hierarchical state system atop a society more closely organized along lateral, clan-based relations. Amid a worsening breakdown of law and order, some 100,000 Russians, many of them holding highly skilled, essential jobs in Chechnya's infrastructure and industry, departed for more hospitable surroundings. Russian military leaders promised Yeltsin that Chechnya could be quickly subdued. Amid protests from Ingushetia and liberal circles in Moscow, a Russian invasion force was mustered in the northern Caucasus and entered Chechnya on December 11, 1994.

[...]

Although an OSCE mission with fewer than 10 diplomats and military observers was dispatched to Grozny in June of 1996, the mission's political marginalization by OSCE member states and its size meant that it could achieve little tangible result over the course of the war. Russia was given largely free reign by the international community in its prosecution of the war, in deference to Russian sovereignty and its key roles in other pressing international foreign policy issues. Fighting eventually ended in August 1996, following an all-out attack in Grozny on Russian forces, who were forced out in a humiliating defeat by a much smaller separatist force. Russian President Yeltsin's national security advisor at the time, former Soviet general Alexander Lebed, concluded a cease-fire agreement with the separatist leadership. The terms of the cease-fire stipulated the withdrawal of Russian forces and a five-year hiatus for discussions on Chechnya's future political relationship with Russia.

From the cease-fire to [June 1998], Chechnya has remained unstable. Despite presidential and parliamentary elections and repeated accommodations of radicals and militants by the elected leadership, the warlords and factions rather than politicians have continued to control events. Criminality has deepened in Chechnya following the cease-fire, partly a consequence of large numbers of unemployed former fighters and the destroyed economy. Specifically, humanitarian actors have been increasingly targeted for attack, the most tragic instance of which was the assassination, with possible political motives, of six expatriate ICRC employees and the serious wounding of a seventh in an ICRC hospital compound south of Grozny on December 17, 1996, just prior to elections. Although the aid community drastically scaled back its presence in response, a rash of hostage takings targeting expatriate aid agency staff continued in and around Chechnya to February 1998, when the kidnapping of the UNHCR head of office in Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia, led to a further reduction of humanitarian action in the northern Caucasus. Since the scaling down of international aid operations, the Russian Federation has responded with emergency assistance to

several ecological disasters in Chechnya. Insecurity has precluded any comprehensive assessment of post-war need." (Hansen 1998, pp. 20-22)

"In February 1999 [January 1997 elected President] Maskhadov introduced Islamic law into the republic by presidential decree. He also stripped the parliament of its legislative powers and abolished the post of vice-president. Maskhadov ordered the drafting of a new constitution based on the Koran and created a *Shura* (State Council), as an advisory body which the opposition was invited to join. The opposition was created an alternative *Majlis Shura* (Supreme State Council), to which they elected themselves and in which they allocated a seat to Maskhadov, but on condition that he resigned as president, claiming that presidency is incompatible with *Sharia* law. The parliament, once the base of support for Maskhadov, refused to recognize the presidential initiatives as legitimate and continued to function as before. This created a triarchy, although no one possesses ultimate political authority over the entire republic." (Matveeva 1999, pp. 94-95)

The military operations in Dagestan and Chechnya (September 1999 - March 2000)

- Russian military intervention in Chechnya follows bomb explosions in Moscow attributed to Chechen terrorists and a Chechen incursion into the neighbouring republic of Dagestan (August-September 1999)
- After advancing quickly through northern Chechnya, Russian forces encountered fierce resistance as they approached the Chechen capital Grozny (November-December 1999)
- Chechen rebel forces abandon Grozny; military operations continue in Southern Chechnya; Chechen leader calls for a guerrilla war against the Russian forces (February-March 2000)

"On September 5 [1999], Russian military forces began a month-long air assault on Russia's self-ruled, separatist republic of Chechnya, displacing more than 80,000 civilians by month's end. What began as a campaign to defeat Chechen-based armed Islamic 'Wahhabi' guerrillas who seized several villages in Chechnya's neighboring republic, Dagestan, in August and early September, quickly turned into an offensive resembling the 1994-1996 Russian-Chechen war [...].

Throughout September, Russian forces widened the bombing campaign from sites along Chechnya's eastern border with Dagestan to targets throughout the republic. They reportedly targeted the Wahhabi guerrillas, who they claimed bombed several apartment buildings in Moscow, Dagestan, and other areas of the Russian Federation. On September 28, after several failed attempts to engage Russia and stop the escalating war, President Maskhadov condemned 'the Russian aggression' and enlisted Shamil Basayev—former Chechen commander and leader of the Wahhabi guerrillas—to lead Chechnya's new war against the Russian Federation. (Unlike the 1994-1996 war in which many ethnic Chechens fought for independence, most Chechens reportedly oppose the fundamentalist ideology of the Wahhabi guerrillas and their attempts to infiltrate Dagestan.)

By the end of September, villages surrounding Chechnya's capital, Grozny, lay in ruins, hundreds of civilians had been killed by wayward bombs, and more than 80,000 displaced Chechens sought shelter in neighboring Ingushetia, Dagestan, and North Ossetia." (USCR October 1999)

"After advancing quickly through northern Chechnya, taking several towns without a fight, including Chechnya's second largest city of Gudermes, Russian forces encountered fierce resistance as they approached the Chechen capital Grozny. In November, Russian troops fought hard to encircle the city and cut off supply lines from the south, with towns and villages to the south of Grozny the scene of very heavy fighting. By early December, Russian forces had more or less encircled Grozny.

Russian commanders initially ruled out a ground offensive into Grozny, in an apparent attempt to avoid repeating the mistakes of December 1994 and January 1995, when hundreds of Russian soldiers entering

the city in columns of tanks proved to be easy targets for the Chechen rebels. Russian forces began a relentless bombing and shelling campaign on the city in late November 1999. On December 6, the Russian military announced an ultimatum to all civilians in Grozny to leave the city by December 11 or face 'elimination.' Leaflets dropped from Russian planes instructed civilians: 'Those who remain will be viewed as terrorists and bandits and will be destroyed.... Everyone who does not leave the city will be destroyed.' The ultimatum was eventually retracted, apparently under pressure from the international community.

Countless civilians fell victim to the continuing bombing and shelling campaign. On various occasions the Russian government and military announced safe exit routes for civilians wishing to flee from the city but continued to target those very routes. An estimated ten to fifty thousand civilians, often the elderly, poor, and infirm, remained trapped in Grozny's basements.

In mid-December, Russian forces started the ground offensive on Grozny. In Grozny, Russian soldiers met fierce resistance from Chechen rebel fighters intimately familiar with the city. During the offensive, the number of casualties among Russian soldiers rose very quickly. In one episode reminiscent of the 1994-1995 offensive on Grozny, Associated Press and Reuters correspondents reported that, on December 16, a column of tanks trying to enter the center of the city was surprised, and Russian troops were slaughtered by Chechen fighters. Maria Eismont of Reuters and Ruslan Musayev of the Associated Press said they had counted the bodies of more than one hundred Russian soldiers. The report was vehemently denied by the Russian government. In interviews with foreign and Russian journalists, however, numerous Russian soldiers who had fought in Grozny admitted that many soldiers from their units had died. Several soldiers described how each step on the streets of Grozny posed a threat as Chechen snipers were hiding all over the city and claimed the lives of many Russian soldiers. In mid-January, Chechen snipers killed General Malofeyev, one of the commanders of the invasion of Grozny, in a major setback for the Russian army. Russian troops were unable to recover his body until five days later.

The Russian government initially denied reports in the Russian and international media that claimed that the casualty rate among soldiers had soared. In mid-January, officials reported that 700 soldiers had died since the beginning of the fighting in Dagestan in August. On January 25, the Russian government said that in fact 1,173 soldiers had died. Many independent observers, however, believe even these numbers severely understate the real casualty figures, and some have estimated that as many as 3,000 Russian soldiers may have died in the Chechnya campaign so far.

In early February, Chechen rebel forces abandoned Grozny. One group apparently tried to bribe Russian officers for a safe passage but walked into a mine field which left many rebels dead and many more wounded. On February 7, Russian Acting President Vladimir Putin claimed that his troops had taken control of all of Grozny. In an interview with a Spanish daily, Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov said that 'for the time being we have given up [Grozny].'" (HRW February 2000)

"Civilians continue to flee villages in southern Chechnya amid reports of widespread destruction of property and a continuing military push by Russian troops. Newcomers report that virtually all homes in the Komsomolskoe village in Southern Chechnya have been destroyed. The number of people fleeing Chechnya has remained steady at about 1,000 people a week." (UNHCR 28 March 2000)

"The Russian authorities at present claim to have control over the vast majority of the territory of Chechnya; however, military operations continue in the mountains in the south of the Republic. The media have put the number of Chechen combatants at approximately 3 000. The Russian forces have captured a leader of the Chechen fighters, Mr S. Raduyev, who has been taken to Moscow for trial.

This fighting still causes significant loss of life among civilians and military personnel alike. There is no evidence that the belligerents have changed their way of conducting the military operations. Mr Maskhadov has called for a guerrilla war against the Russian forces, and attacks on Russian military targets are increasing in the territories formally controlled by the Russians." (COE Parliamentary Assembly 4 April 2000, paras. 20-21)

For a detailed chronology of events in Chechnya from August 1999 to January 2000, see Annex IV of the report on the conflict in Chechnya presented to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (25 January 2000) [Internet]

Violations of humanitarian law by the Federal Forces has led directly to the displacement of the civilian population (1999-2000)

- The indiscriminate use of force (air power and artillery) by the federal forces resulted in the displacement of up to 200,000 persons and widespread civilian casualties
- Reports of summary executions, arbitrary detention, torture and rape by the federal forces
- Early December 1999, ultimatum by the Federal forces requests civilian population to leave Grozny despite absence of safe corridors

"The indiscriminate use of force by government forces in the conflict with separatist elements in Chechnya resulted in widespread civilian casualties and the displacement of up to 200,000 persons, the vast majority of whom sought refuge in Ingushetiya.

Estimates vary of the total number of civilian casualties caused by bombs and artillery used by government forces. The number of civilian casualties cannot be verified, and figures vary widely from several hundred to several thousand. Government officials argue that they are employing 'high precision' tactics against separatist and terrorist targets in Chechnya. However, a wide range of reporting indicates that government forces are relying mainly on unguided rockets and other low precision weapons.

In September and early October, government forces launched air and artillery attacks against numerous Chechen villages along the republic's eastern border with Dagestan-in the territory controlled by Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev. Basayev led attacks in Dagestan in July and August and was believed to have retreated to this region in Chechnya. Villagers living in the region under attack claimed that they were not supporters of Basayev.

Attempts by government forces to gain control over Chechnya's capital, Grozny, were characterized by indiscriminate use of air power and artillery, which destroyed numerous residential and civilian buildings. Up to 140,000 Russian military and security personnel in the Northern Caucasus region were involved in the current conflict in Chechnya, far more than during the 1994-96 conflict in Chechnya. On September 24, government aircraft reportedly bombed a bus with refugees near Samashki, resulting in the deaths of eight persons. Human Rights Watch confirmed that on September 27, Russian aircraft allegedly bombed a school and residential areas in Staraya Sunzha, a suburb of Grozny, killing 7 civilians and wounding another 20, including schoolchildren. Human Rights Watch confirmed an attack by Russian airplanes on Urus-Martan, 15 miles south of Grozny, on October 3, which resulted in the deaths of 27 civilians. On October 5, a government tank fired on a bus near Chervlyonnaya, reportedly killing some 28 civilians. According to NGO reports, on October 7, government troops attacked the village of Elistanzhi, killing some 48 civilians. On October 21, explosions killed scores of civilians in Grozny's downtown market and a local hospital. Western press organizations reported at least 60 civilian deaths and 200 persons injured, although Chechen government officials claimed that at least 118 persons died and more than 400 were injured. Russian officials offered contradictory explanations for the explosions; some denied any government complicity and blamed Chechen separatists. However, Ministry of Defense officials claimed on October 22 that special forces units had attacked a weapons market, but without using artillery or air power. The ICRC reported that two-thirds of Grozny's 150,000 residents fled the city as a result of the military campaign. On October 27, government forces subjected Grozny to the heaviest attacks up to that point as government aircraft bombed the city and killed dozens of Chechens. Chechen defense officials claimed that 116 persons were killed in the attacks that day. Also on October 27, government forces shelled the village of Samashki,

killing at least 5 persons and injuring dozens. On November 1, government troops that had taken positions in a psychiatric hospital near Samashki overnight opened fire on the doctors and other medical staff who reported to work that morning, resulting in injuries to three staff members. Troops prevented hospital staff from returning to care for their patients for several days, and the condition of the hospital's patients remains unknown. On November 16, government troops surrounded and shelled two large towns near Grozny, Achkhoy-Martan, and Argun. The attacks prompted criticism from international human rights organizations for indiscriminate attacks against civilian settlements.

According to human rights NGO's, government troops raped civilian women in Chechnya in December in the village of Alkhan-Yurt and in other villages.

Early in December, government forces airdropped a series of leaflets over Grozny that warned civilian residents and rebel fighters to leave the city. In one leaflet directed at Chechen fighters, the command of the Combined Group of Federal Forces in the Northern Caucasus warned that any persons remaining in Grozny after December 12 would be destroyed by air and artillery strikes. Amid international criticism of the leaflets, government officials later qualified the leaflets' language and denied that they had imposed an ultimatum on the city's inhabitants." (U.S. DOS 25 February 2000, sec. 1g)

Insecurity and violence hamper government's plans of normalization in Chechnya (2000-2002)

- Russian troops regain nominal control over most of Chechnya by the spring of 2000, allowing the cessation of large-scale hostilities
- Security operations against the Chechen guerilla continued however to target civilians and hamper any large-scale return of the displaced in 2000 and 2001
- In 2002, casualties among the federal troops has reverted to the levels known at the early stage of the conflict
- A political resolution to the conflict is unlikely to take place in the near future
- The adoption of a new constitution and presidential elections in Chechnya in 2003 could exacerbate the situation
- Two terrorist attacks perpetrated by Chechen rebels in Moscow and Grozny (October-December 2002) demonstrate that the conflict has not ended

Overview

"By the spring of 2000, Russian troops had established nominal control over most of Chechnya and large-scale hostilities ceased. As Russian troops moved further into Chechen territory, they conducted numerous so-called sweep operations to seek out rebel fighters and ammunition depots in villages and towns, often arbitrarily detaining large numbers of Chechen civilians along with captured fighters, and beating and torturing them in detention. Subsequent months marked the gradual transition from a conventional military operation into a classical 'dirty war,' where the targeting of civilians and not the taking or defense of territory are the hallmarks.

As Russian troops pursued their 'dirty war' in Chechnya, Nikolai Koshman, a deputy prime minister of the Russian Federation and the temporary civilian leader of Chechnya, started setting up new administrative and law enforcement structures, and tried to revamp the defunct educational system. The Russian government appointed loyal Chechens to head local administrations and, in June 2000, appointed Akhmad Kadyrov, a Chechen religious leader, as the head of the administration for all of Chechnya. In January 2001, Kadyrov appointed a former head of the Stavropol region in southern Russia, Stanislav Iliasov, as prime minister of Chechnya and asked him to form a new Chechen government.

Eager to convince an increasingly skeptical domestic public and a critical international community that the war was over, Russian government agencies sought to implement measures traditionally associated with the end of armed conflict in the first half of 2001. They announced a new military strategy that involved small-scale operations against specific rebel leaders, a significant cutback in troops, and the return of the Chechen government to Chechnya's capital, Grozny. They also actively sought the return of internally displaced persons from neighboring Ingushetia to Chechnya. However, the republic's harsh realities—with a continuing 'dirty war' against civilians by Russian troops, increasingly bold and abusive rebel tactics, and a complete lack of trust in Russian government agencies among civilians—quickly proved these measures premature.

In January 2001, President Vladimir Putin told his government in a televised meeting that the armed forces had 'completed their main tasks' in Chechnya. Announcing the partial withdrawal of troops, he handed control in Chechnya to the Federal Security Service (FSB), which has to continue the operation 'with the use of different means and forces and with a different emphasis.' A spokesman clarified that the FSB had been tasked to conduct 'special operations to search for and neutralize the ringleaders of the bandit formations and their adherents.'

In February, Russian and Chechen government officials announced that they sought the return of all internally displaced persons (IDPs) to Chechnya before the end of the year. They said conditions were being created for Chechens to return, including temporary settlements for the displaced in various towns and villages in Chechnya. A few months later, in April 2001, the pro-Russian government of Chechnya announced that it would move its seat from Chechnya's second city Gudermes back to the capital Grozny, calling this a 'symbolic event' that was to promote 'stabilization.'

Most of the announced changes, however, appeared to be dictated by the need for a new public relations offensive and took little account of Chechen realities. As Chechen rebel attacks on Russian positions and assassinations of Chechen administrators continued unabated, the scheduled withdrawal of Russian troops ceased before it truly started. Federal forces, meanwhile, continued to conduct large-scale sweep operations that were no less abusive than those in earlier months. In such circumstances, most internally displaced persons—aware of the continuing abuses and guerrilla warfare—decided to await an improved security situation before returning home. Daily security incidents in Grozny forced the Chechen government to move its seat back to Gudermes after only two weeks in the capital." (HRW February 2002, pp. 4-5)

"In 2001, abuses by Russian forces continued to be an integral part of the daily life of civilians in Chechnya. In villages and towns throughout Chechnya federal forces conducted dozens of sweep operations. Ostensibly designed to seek out rebel fighters and their supporters and ammunition depots, sweeps are usually reactive, following Chechen military actions such as ambushes on Russian military columns or attacks on Russian checkpoints. They are routinely the occasion for abuse, particularly arbitrary detention and subsequent torture, ill-treatment, and 'disappearances'. Soldiers also killed numerous civilians, both during and beyond the context of sweep operations, in indiscriminate shootings. Masked soldiers conducted numerous nightly raids, detaining men who subsequently 'disappeared'." (HRW 18 March 2002, p. 3)

For more details on security operations conducted by the Russian forces and security threats for the civilian population, see "Civilian population in Chechnya continuously exposed to major threats to their physical and personal security (2001-2002)" [Internal link]

See also FEWER, "Policy Brief: Chechnya - Low Intensity Conflict persists", 20 December 2001 [Internet]

Developments in 2002

"Hostilities in Chechnya have intensified considerably over the past two months, particularly in the mountainous southern areas close to the border with Georgia. Casualties, especially amongst the Russian

federal troops, have reverted to the levels seen in Spring 2000. Hit-and-run acts of violence, most likely perpetrated by militants, continue unabated throughout the republic. There are very few signs that a political resolution or accommodation is likely in the next 12-18 months. Nevertheless, Moscow and the Chechen administration have proceeded to draft a new constitution (on which a referendum is to be held in October), while presidential elections are planned for 'some time next year'. These two measures, if implemented before a political accommodation has been reached, could well exacerbate the already critical situation in Chechnya. Crime - often associated with the kidnapping of officials or with groups enriching themselves illegally by taking advantage of the republic's oil reserves - is rife." (IASC-WG 10 September 2002)

"Two incidents in late 2002 that caused enormous loss of civilian life demonstrate vividly that the armed conflict in Chechnya has not ended. On October 23, about fifty Chechens took hundreds of civilians hostage in a Moscow theatre, an act that, as already noted, resulted in the deaths of 129, mostly due to the effects of a debilitating gas that Russian special forces used in their rescue operation. On December 27, Chechen forces blew up the main government building in Grozny, killing at least seventy-two civilians and wounding 210. Chechen forces also are believed to be responsible for continuing pattern of assassinations of village administrators and other civil servants working for the pro-Moscow government in Chechnya. At the same time, abuses of Russian forces in Chechnya - forced disappearances, extrajudicial executions, looting, and arbitrary detention - have continued unabated." (HRW January 2003, p. 2)

"Russian officials have set 23 March as the date for the breakaway republic of Chechnya to vote in a referendum on a constitution that strengthens ties with Moscow. The vote is a forerunner to eventual elections of a Chechen president and parliament. The Kremlin announced that presidential elections are likely to be held in Chechnya in November or December [2003]." (RFE/RL 15 January 2003)

For more information on the prospects for peace, see:

"A useful war", by Pavel Baev, in Russia and Eurasia Review, Volume 1, Issue 14, 17 December 2002, Jamestown Foundation [Internet]
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, "Is Russia hell-bent on war 'to the last Chechen'?", 29 September 2002 [Internet]

See also: Government of the Russian Federation, "There are no plans to reinforce the military in Chechnya in response to the worsening situation in the North Caucasus", 3 October 2002 [Internet]

Civilian population in Chechnya also exposed to violence from the Chechen rebel groups (2000-2002)

- Rebel armed groups fail to differentiate between civilians and combatants
- Chechen guerilla target Chechens who cooperate with the Russian government
- According to unconfirmed reports, rebels killed civilians who would not assist them, used civilians as human shields, and prevented displaced from fleeing Chechnya

"After their withdrawal from Chechnya's lowlands into the mountains, Chechen rebel fighters reverted to guerilla warfare tactics, failing to differentiate between civilians and combatants. As a result, civilians have died or sustained injuries." (HRW 22 January 2001)

"Throughout 2001, Chechen fighters and their sympathizers assassinated, attacked, or threatened Chechen civil servants, seeking to intimidate Chechens who might cooperate with the Russian government. From September 2000 to September 2001, there were at least forty-one apparent assassinations, including eleven village mayors, four deputy village mayors, four deputy district chiefs, three religious officials (and two of their relatives), eight policemen, and two educators. There were also at least thirteen attempted

assassinations including of four village mayors, three district chiefs, three deputy district chiefs, one judge, and the head of the Chechen administration, Akhmad Kadyrov.

[...]

In a letter to Human Rights Watch, Aslan Mackhadov, the leader of the Chechen rebels and president of the self-proclaimed Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, denied claims that his forces had issued an order to assassinate Chechens who voluntarily cooperate with the Russian government.

He stated, however, that he considered such Chechens to be guilty of treason and did not rule out that some of his fighters may have committed some 'isolated abuses against them, 'perhaps in the heat of the battle or from the desire to seek vengeance that stems from rage and loss'. Despite these denials of involvement in the killings of civilian administrators, it is widely believed that rebel forces have been behind many of the killings." (HRW 18 March 2002, pp. 9-11)

"Chechen fighters also committed abuses; however, as with the many reported violations by federal troops--there were difficulties in verifying or investigating them. According to unconfirmed reports, rebels killed civilians who would not assist them, used civilians as human shields, forced civilians to build fortifications, and prevented refugees from fleeing Chechnya. In several cases, elderly Russian civilians were killed for no apparent reason other than their ethnicity.

On September 3, a bomb exploded in the main Russian administration building in Grozny, killing one woman. Mufti Akhmad Kadyrov, the pro-Moscow head of the Chechen Administration, had been conducting a meeting on the third floor when the bomb was detonated.

According to Chechen sources, rebel factions also used violence to eliminate their economic rivals in illegal activities or settle personal accounts. Many Chechens believed that Arbi Barayev (killed at the end of May), Shamil Basayev, and their groups in particular used such violence.

Chechen fighters planted landmines that killed or injured federal forces and often provoked federal counterattacks on civilian areas. In other incidents, the rebels took up positions in populated areas and fired on federal forces, thereby exposing the civilians to federal counterattacks. When villagers protested, they sometimes were beaten or fired upon by the rebels.

Chechen fighters also reportedly abused, tortured, and killed captured soldiers from federal forces. In the summer, rebels began a concerted campaign to kill civilian officials of the government-supported Chechen administration.

Individual rebel field commanders reportedly were responsible for funding their units, and some allegedly resorted to drug smuggling and kidnaping to raise funds. As a result, it often was difficult, if not impossible, to make a distinction between rebel units and criminal gangs." (U.S. DOS 4 March 2002, sect. 1g)

Review of population movements between Chechnya and Ingushetia (September 1999-December 2000)

- Most of the displaced arrived in Ingushetia in September 1999, mainly from Grozny and other major cities affected by the conflict
- Significant return movements were reported following the fall of Grozny in February 2000
- The intensification of military operations from July 2000 triggered new flows of displaced into Ingushetia

"At the start of the last quarter of 1999, about 100,000 refugees were registered in Ingushetia. In two months that population almost doubled to reach 186,000 in December 1999, according to the HCR. That result, far below the level put forth by the Ingushetian migrations department, which put out a figure of 275,000 refugees, is probably closer to reality in view of the host country's desire to obtain an additional volume of aid. However, until February 2000 the fighting intensified constantly, and on that date it was estimated that almost 260,000 Chechens were refugees in Ingushetia.

During this period, the majority of the refugees came from Grozny and its surroundings, but also from a few other large cities (Ourous-Martan) which were still the only ones affected by war.

Generally speaking all of these refugees, exhausted, waited for hours at the border stations. On several occasions, the border was closed for several days. Even evacuation of the injured was then impossible, and the refugees remained in the rain and the mud, sleeping in trenches, without food.

- The return of the refugees to Chechnya following the fall of Grozny in February 2000

It was not until after the fall of Grozny (between 31 January 1999 and 2 February 2000) that the refugees began to return to Chechnya, leaving their precarious camps or housing, short of money for the tenants, in the hope of a normalisation of the situation.

That return movement was not on a large scale, little by little the number of refugees in Ingushetia declining to reach a population of less than 200,000 in May 2000 (175,000 according to the authorities).

Numerous refugees are multiplying their reconnaissance trips, and there are many of them (particularly the Grozny inhabitants) who found that they had no home left to which to return.

Others make business trips (mainly women coming to get supplies at the market in Nazran, the capital of Ingushetia, to resell them on a retail basis in the stalls in Chechnya), and the majority travel because the families have become separated and it is first of all necessary to try to reconstruct.

- New flow of refugees into Ingushetia in June / July 2000

Since the beginning of July, the intensification of military operations, repression and Russian exactions related to the multiplication of military actions carried out by the Chechen fighters on their territory have brought a population shift back toward Ingushetia. Thus on 13 July 2000, the HCR recorded the passage of 400 families at the Kavkaz border station, as against fewer than 50 in the other direction. The next day the queue of refugees stretched out for more than two kilometres.

The majority of the new arrivals are still registered with the Ingushetian authorities, who have since received an order not to register anybody else.

Mid-July: according the manager of the Migrations department, 152,000 persons are officially registered compared with 210,000 in January. 35,000 of them are not Chechens (the majority being Ingushetians), and, benefiting from specific aid, they will not return to Chechnya. 67,000 Chechens are said to have left, by way of personal networks, for the other regions in the Russian Federation, and 100,000 others are "parked" in two provisional housing centres.

- A delicate situation since the summer of 2000

At present, the population movements seem to be stabilising, since about 150,000 officially registered persons are refugees in Ingushetia. 2,000 of them make very frequent round trips between Ingushetia and Chechnya to check on the possibility of re-settlement or to care for old people who are unable to travel. On the other hand, few definitive departures are registered. That is because of the present refusal on the part of the Migrations department to register the new arrivals or to re-register persons who have left Ingushetia a

first time. The refugees' reluctance to leave that host republic is also explained by their fear of losing their place in a tent or in a carriage, this applying both to the official camps and to the informal ones.

To the 150,000 persons officially registered by the HCR, one should add an indefinite number of "clandestines". The fact is that the last few months the Russian military has laid siege to the mountains and to new villages, a fact that risks giving rise to a new flow of Chechens toward Ingushetia. The arrival of winter will probably increase the number of refugees.

A reign of terror is largely maintained by the Russian military which since summer has been multiplying bombardments of forests and fields, but also of homes using heavy artillery, exactions, sacks and installation of anti-personnel mines. In addition, a very large number of young men considered potential fighters have been arrested in the last few months. Last summer, some 'cleansing' operations also took place in the Ingushetian camps: Russian soldiers, supported by the Ingushetian militia, surrounded several camps and arrested all young men, particularly the ones who had spoken in the filtration camps.

The multiplication of such acts and their widespread distribution among the population of the camps maintain this climate of terror for the purpose of dissuading the Chechens from returning to their country. In addition there is the deterioration of the situation between the Chechens and the Ingushetians, the latter finding it ever more difficult to tolerate the presence of the refugees on their territory." (MDM December 2000)

Violence and insecurity continue to trigger displacement in Chechnya and Ingushetia (2001-2002)

- Sweep operations conducted by the federal forces push terrorized civilians to flee temporarily to neighbouring Ingushetia
- Civilians in rural areas move to the capital Gorzny in search of physical and material safety during the winter 2001-2002

Displacement from the Urus-Martan district (August 2002)

"A large number of Chechen refugees arrived today in Ingushetia. Almost all of them live in villages in the Urus-Martan district where Chechen fighters came this morning. Commanders of the Chechen armed groups told the civilians that in line with their order they have to stay in the villages for three days.

In order to avoid civilian casualties, Chechen fighters asked the villagers to leave their homes. In the early morning, resident of Martan-chu, Roshni-chu, Gekhi-chu and Shalazhi started hastily leaving their villages. Witnesses said that the refugees were carrying everything they could to save it from fighting." (Prague Watchdog 16 August 2002)

"The situation in the Urus-Martan district remains unstable. Since September 1 the Komsomolskoye village has been surrounded by Russian servicemen and armoured vehicles. The goal and the reasons for the unexpected concentration of military resources near the village are not clear. The local administration head has not been informed as well.

The inhabitants of Komsomolskoye, who have the experience of March 2000 when fierce fighting between the Russian military and Chechen fighters led by field commander Ruslan Gelayev completely destroyed the village and caused death to civilians, are silently leaving Chechnya. Several families, especially males and young people, have arrived in Ingushetia already." (Prague Watchdog 4 September 2002)

Displacement in Ingushetia (September 2002)

"On 26 September military operations began in the Galashki village of Ingushetia, bordering with Chechnya and Georgia (about 30 km distance). One military helicopter was shot down and casualties

among the soldiers were reported. Most of the village's 6,000 inhabitants fled to other areas of Ingushetia. The IDP camps in Sleptoskaya and UN offices in Nazran are about 20km away from the Galashki village. This is the first time in three years that such fighting erupted in the Republic of Ingushetia." (WFP 27 September 2002)

See also Radio Free Europe: "Chechnya: Armed foray in Ingushetia adds fuel to Russian-Georgian dispute", 27 September 2002 [Internet]

Displacement following sweep operations: the example of Sernovodsk and Assinovskaya (July 2001)

"In July [2001] following an explosion that killed five federal soldiers riding in a jeep, a particularly severe cleansing action took place in the villages of Sernovodsk and Assinovskaya. Males between 14 and 60 were lined up in the courtyards of houses in which they had been found. Some were able to buy their way out by paying an immediate levy, depending on the validity of their identification documents; cleansings also are a means for military and police personnel operating in Chechnya to supplement their incomes. Federal forces interrogated several hundred others who were unwilling or unable to pay the levies. During these interrogations federal forces beat and tortured the detainees by administering electric shocks. Private and public buildings were looted and destroyed. Federal forces took approximately 100 persons to filtration camps, but eventually released them with the exception of 4 or 5 persons who disappeared. The cleansing caused a temporary outflow of several thousand persons from the villages to refugee camps in neighboring Ingushetiya." (U.S. DOS 4 March 2002, sect. 1 g)

Rural-urban movements in Chechnya (winter 2001-2002)

"DRC reported that many people have left rural areas to go to Grozny before the upcoming winter. The Chechen Administration confirmed that the population of Grozny has increased by several thousands and expects numbers to continue to increase." (WFP 16 November 2001)

"In Chechnya, DRC reported that a large number of people have moved from rural areas to Grozny city due to security problems and looking for a better living condition. As a result, the number of WFP beneficiaries, has increased from 44,000 to 55 in Grozny alone." (WFP 22 February 2002)

"The situation in the region has not changed significantly. Occasional attacks by the Chechen armed formations are usually followed by the so-called mopping-up operations conducted by the Russian army. These operations are however officially referred to as 'sting operations' or 'addressed operations'. Nevertheless, no major changes in the attitude of the Russian soldiers to civilians during these operations was noted, whatever their name.

With warmer days in February and March more people appeared in the streets of Grozny although no outflow of IDPs from Ingushetia was reported. According to unofficial data from the Committee for Forced Migrants (with the Government of the Chechen Republic), which so far could not be verified, IDPs have actually returned mainly from two camps (Yuzhny and Severny) near Znamenskoye because the government had prepared temporary accommodation for them in Staropromyslovski district of Grozny.

Appearance of more Grozny dwellers is reflected in the DRC registration database which has been "swelling" every month with new beneficiaries. The growing number is most likely due to the fact that the internal IDPs in Chechnya are trying to resettle to and register in Grozny because of easier access to humanitarian aid there." (PNIF 10 April 2002)

Federal authorities fail to stabilize the situation in Chechnya (2003)

- The situation in Chechnya has shown no signs of stabilization, despite authorities' claims
- Measures adopted in 2003 (amnesty law, property compensation, constitutional referendum and elections) have not changed the dynamics of the conflict

- Human rights observers express serious doubts about fairness of constitutional referendum and presidential elections
- Instead of advancing stability, the announcement of presidential elections seem to have incited a new escalation of violence
- IDPs continue to move to Chechnya at least temporarily, because of insecurity
- Violence has spread outside Chechnya to neighbouring republics and Moscow

"For more than a year, Russian authorities have been claiming that the situation in Chechnya has normalized and that the people displaced by the conflict can safely return home. In reality, the situation in Chechnya has shown no signs of stabilization—the republic remains an active conflict zone, with both sides responsible for serious human rights and humanitarian law violations.

In 2003, Russian authorities took several steps that were supposed to advance the stabilization process. They adopted an amnesty law encouraging the surrender of rebel forces, [34] and promised to pay compensation for houses and property destroyed during the war. [35] The constitutional referendum held in March 2003 and presidential elections scheduled to take place on October 5, 2003 have been hailed by the government as the major landmarks on the way to a political solution of the Chechnya problem.

None of these steps has visibly changed the dynamics of the conflict, however.

The amnesty did not prompt a large-scale surrender of rebel forces—according to the Chechen procuracy, only 126 former fighters were amnestied as of August 18, 2003. [36]

The number is insignificant, considering that several thousand rebel fighters are currently operating in Chechnya. [37] Instead of welcoming the gesture, Chechen forces marked the announcement of the amnesty with the largest open attack on federal troops since the beginning of this year, storming the town of Argun. [38] At the same time, by extending the amnesty to federal servicemen, the Russian government has created yet another tool for shielding its troops from accountability for crimes committed in Chechnya. [39]

As mentioned above, the promises to pay compensation appear to have been designed as an effective measure for pressuring internally displaced persons to return to Chechnya, rather than as a remedy for past abuse or a step toward normalization.

As for political stabilization, many independent observers, including leading Russian human rights defender Liudmila Alekseeva, believed that the March referendum was flawed and expressed serious doubts that the October elections could be fair and democratic. [40] Moreover, although the number of abuses, especially forced disappearances, had decreased slightly during several weeks before and after the referendum, it then skyrocketed again. The Chechen minister of internal affairs admitted that in the month following the referendum nearly fifty people disappeared in Chechnya. [41] In mid-August he released new figures, saying that nearly 400 people disappeared in Chechnya since the beginning of the year. [42] During its missions to the region, Human Rights Watch as well as other human rights organizations, continued to document cases of summary executions, torture, arbitrary detention, and looting in Chechnya. [43]

Instead of advancing stability, the announcement of presidential elections seemed to have incited a new escalation of violence in Chechnya. In the summer of 2003, reports of armed clashes involving large groups of rebels and leading to numerous deaths on both sides appeared virtually every day. Official field reports confirmed that the situation was far from stable. For example, in a weekly report on August 11, 2003, representatives of the United Federal Group of Forces reported that federal positions came under fire on twenty-one occasions, nine armed clashes took place, and about 140 explosive devices were disarmed. Federal forces, for their part, reportedly killed thirty-six rebel fighters and arrested fifty others. SU-24

fighter-bombers and SU-25 ground attack aircraft completed thirty-four missions, and helicopters completed about 500. [44]

Recent developments in Chechnya clearly demonstrate that Russian authorities cannot guarantee the security of returnees, and by compelling internally displaced to leave Ingushetia, the authorities deliberately put their lives and safety at risk."

[Footnote 34: Decree "On the announcement of amnesty in connection with the adoption of the Constitution of Chechen Republic," adopted by Russian State Duma on June 6, 2003, *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, June 7, 2003. The amnesty granted immunity from prosecution to Chechen rebels who surrendered before September 1, 2003, as well as to federal servicemen. It did not apply to those accused of "grave offenses," such as premeditated murder, rape, or hostage-taking.

Footnote 35: Government of the Russian Federation, Decree 404 "On the procedure of paying lost housing and property compensation to permanent residents of the Chechen Republic who suffered during the settlement of the crisis in its territory," July 4, 2003.

Footnote 36: Statement by Chechen prosecutor Vladimir Kravchenko, cited by ITAR-TASS World Service, August 18, 2003. Unwillingness of Chechen forces to surrender may be attributed both to the limited character of the amnesty and to the controversial results of the previous Chechnya amnesty adopted in 1999. The Moscow Helsinki Group has alleged that out of 500 who turned in their weapons under the law, most have since been killed or disappeared. See Matt Bivens, "War Amnesty Is Well Wide of the Mark," *The Moscow Times*, June 2, 2003.

Footnote 37: According to Chechen Prime Minister Anatoly Popov, there are currently 2,000-3,000 rebels operating in Chechnya. See, "2,000-3,000 Rebels operating in Chechnya - PM," Interfax, August 26, 2003.

Footnote 38: Alexander Raskin, "Argun breakthrough," *Izvestia*, June 9, 2003.

Footnote 39: One of the cases documented by Human Rights Watch proves this allegation. See below, case of Imran Guliev.

Footnote 40: See for example, Ivan Sukhov, "Intriguing Arithmetic," *Vremia Novostei*, August 13, 2003. The officially reported turnout during the March constitutional referendum was 85 percent, out of which 95.97 percent approved the new Constitution, consolidating Chechnya's status as part of Russian Federation. The figures sharply contrasted the eyewitness accounts of deserted polling stations and cast doubts on the fairness of the electoral process. Lord Judd, the Council of Europe's rapporteur on Chechnya, resigned in protest at the conditions in which the referendum took place. See also Natalie Nougayrède, "La Russie organise un simulacre de référendum en Tchétchénie," *Le Monde*, March 25, 2003; "The vote of the dead souls—Chechnya's flawed referendum on a new constitution," *The Economist*, March 29, 2003.

Footnote 41: The figure was released by Alu Alkhanov, Chechen interior minister. See "Chechen kidnappings continuing despite referendum: officials," Agence France Press, April 24, 2003.

Footnote 42: "Nearly 400 people disappear in Chechnya this year," ITAR-TASS, August 17, 2003.

Footnote 43: For details, see Human Rights Watch, "Into Harm's Way," Human Rights Watch, "On the Human Rights Situation in Chechnya." See also regularly updated chronicle of the events in Chechnya and Ingushetia published by the Memorial Human Rights Center, available at: <http://www.memo.ru/hr/hotpoints/caucas1/index.htm> (retrieved August 24, 2003).

Footnote 44: Cited in: Viktor Paukov, "When guns go off, the police are silent," *Vremia Novostei*, August 12, 2003.] (HRW September 2003, pp. 8-9)

The situation of IDPs inside Chechnya remains precarious. There is a small but regular flow of people continuing to flee Chechnya to Ingushetia, citing especially a lack of security and basic living conditions. Many of the IDPs say they are fleeing fighting in their place of origin and are intent on remaining in Ingushetia only temporarily. (UN 24 June 2003, p. 5)

Violence spreading outside Chechnya

[T]he war is spreading across the borders of Chechnya and into the neighboring republics and even to Moscow, which has become the site of terrorist attacks emanating from Chechnya. Ingushetia, long exempted from military clashes and attacks, have become the site of several clashes between federal forces and Chechen fighters. In September 2002 there was an incursion into Ingushetia by a group of Chechen fighters led by the commander Ruslan Gelayev who clashed with federal troops near the village of Galashki. The incursion seemed an isolated incident, but in the summer of 2003 there have been new attacks against federal targets in the vicinity of Galashki, a village in the south of Ingushetia, following sweep operations by the federal forces in the area (for instance in the village Arshty on 6 and 7 June). At the same time, federal forces, sometimes in conjunction with representatives of Ingush and Chechen law enforcement structures, have carried out a number of operations in IDP settlements, sometimes resulting in disappearances and deaths. (IHF September 2003, p. 19)

The Presidential elections in Chechnya

The Chechen Electoral Commission announced the victory of Akhmat Kadyrov in the presidential elections in the Chechen Republic of 5 October. According to the commission, the turn out was 87,7 % and Kadyrov won 80.8% of votes. The Electoral Commission Chairman, Abdul-Kerim Arsakhanov, said that there had been no complaints from observers, which could influence the ballot outcome. However, human rights groups reported instances of ballot stuffing, voting by unregistered voters, and pressure from local authorities. Commenting on the elections outcome, the European Union Presidency expressed the hope that the political settlement process in Chechnya continues, while noting 'negative development as the lack of real pluralism of candidatures to the presidency and the absence of independent media'. (UN OCHA 21 October 2003).

Amnesty law

"According to the latest figures of the Chechen Prosecutor's office, 204 people, including former rebels and Russian military and law-enforcement officers have been amnestied in Chechnya. Official Russian sources estimate the number of active rebels in Chechnya at around 2,000 and 3,000." (COE 20 October 2003, para. 51)

See also:

Guerilla fighting continues in Chechen mountains, Prague Watchdog, 2 November 2003 [Internet]

"More Russian military personnel than Chechen militants benefit from the amnesty", Radio Free Europe, 19 September 2003 [Internet]

After the Chechen Referendum: What next?, Radio Free Europe, 31 March 2003 [Internet]

Other causes of displacement

Ethnic Russian population leave North Caucasian republics in a context of ethnic antagonisms

"Immigration into the North Caucasus grew from 1989 (when there was anti Caucasian violence in Central Asia) and reached its peak in 1995 when a massive displacement occurred within the region as a result of

fighting in Chechnya. From 1996 emigration overtook immigration and at present the migration balance is negative. Those who are leaving are the local intelligentsia and Russians, a rapidly shrinking minority.

In the nationalist conflicts among the indigenous groups, concessions to accommodate new demands were made at the expense of the local Russians. There is no official pressure on Russians to leave; in fact, measures are taken to encourage them to stay. In reality, however, all the important economic and socially prestigious positions, as well as viable political appointments, are being monopolized by indigenous groups. Only token Russians remain in formal positions, while the real power lies firmly with representatives of the titular groups. Moreover, many Russians used to work in the numerous defence enterprises in the region. They were left unemployed in changing economic circumstances when heavy industries collapsed and economic activities started to concentrate mainly around the trade and service sectors. Their ability to adapt to the new situation has also been hampered by the absence of extended family networks and lack of free capital. Moreover, Russians more readily consider emigration as few have roots in the North Caucasian republics and some have places to go back in the rest of Russia.

The Russian community in Chechnya is a special case. According to various estimates, between 30,000 to 50,000 still [June 1999] live in the republic, mostly in Naruski and Shelkovskii raions. They are subject to widespread abuse, pressure to give up their houses, robbery and murder, while the Chechen law enforcement structures are unable to offer effective protection. The Russian community has petitioned the federal authorities to organize an urgent evacuation of Chechnya for resettlement assistance, but their appeals have fallen on deaf ears. It is hypocritically assumed that Chechnya is a part of the Russian Federation and therefore Russians cannot face any specific problems." (Matveeva 1999, p. 58)

See also movements of Ethnic Russians leaving Chechnya prior to the first conflict in Chechnya in "Background to the conflict: Chechnya recent history (1922-1998)" [Internal link]

Displacement resulting from the inter-communal conflict in the Prigorodny district (1992-1998)

- Administrative and practical obstacles prevented the return of deported Ingush to the Prigorodny district in North-Ossetia after 1956
- Between 30,000 and 60,000 Ingush and 9,000 Ossetians forced to leave the Prigorodny district as a result of violent conflict in 1992
- Only the Ossetians have been able to return since

"The conflict area of Prigorodnyi Raion extends from the suburbs of Vladikavkaz in North Ossetia east to the present Ingush border, less than 20 minutes from Chechnya. Like the Chechens, the Ingush were forcibly deported under Stalin in 1944. When Khrushchev signed a decree rehabilitating the deported peoples in 1956, the lands presently comprising Prigorodnyi Raion, which had been ceded to North Ossetia, were not returned to the newly reconstituted Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) despite their 90 percent Ingush makeup prior to the deportations. Administrative and practical obstacles, many of them engineered by Ossetian authorities, prevented many Ingush from again taking up residence on their former lands.

Tensions between the Ingush and Ossetians rose and fell through the 1970s and 1980s but exploded into the open with perestroika. Mass demonstrations and growing unrest led the Ossetian authorities to declare a state of emergency in Prigorodnyi in April 1991. Intercommunal violence rose steadily in the area of Prigorodnyi east of the Terek river, despite the introduction of 1,500 Soviet interior troops to the area. On April 26, 1991, in the last months of the Soviet Union, the Russian Supreme Soviet passed the Law on the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples that pledged a return to predeportation boundaries. Fearful of losing Moscow's support for a return of Prigorodnyi, Ingushetia opted to remain in Russia when Chechnya

claimed independence. By this time, some 16,000 refugees from the conflict in South Ossetia, but who had primarily lived in other parts of Georgia, had fled north and took shelter in Prigorodnyi, significantly adding to the prevailing tensions. Ingush-Ossetian violence worsened and both sides began arming in earnest. According to human rights investigators, many of the worst incidents of intimidation and forced eviction of Ingush occurred at the hands of South Ossetian refugees. In some cases, North Ossetian locals protected Ingush from those refugees.

Open warfare broke out in October 1992. Approximately 500 people died in a week of concentrated violence during which many homes, primarily belonging to ethnic Ingush, were destroyed or taken over. Russian interior forces actively participated in the fighting and sometimes led Ossetian fighters into battle. Estimates of displacement from Prigorodnyi vary widely, but between 34,500-64,000 Ingush were forced to flee to Ingushetia and 9,000 Ossetians to North Ossetia. Most Ossetians had returned as of 1998, but only a handful of Ingush had done so. IDPs from Prigorodnyi who found refuge in Ingushetia would later compete for space and aid with massive influxes of Chechen IDPs.

The conflict in Prigorodnyi Raion remains frozen amid low-level, back-and-forth violence against police officers and civilians, widespread hostage taking, and deepening animosities. New hope for peace and resettlement was kindled in 1997 with Russian-brokered agreements that set out plans for return and resettlement. However, at the time of this writing, IDP returns have been stalled by continued violence and have been further undermined by the curtailment of UNHCR's presence due to untenable security conditions." (Hansen 1998, pp. 19-20)

For more details on the conflict, see also Human Rights Watch/Helsinki Report "The Ingush-Ossetian Conflict in the Prigorodnyi Region" (May 1996) [Internet]

Meskhethian Turks under pressure to leave their settlements in Krasnodar (2001-2003)

- Meskhethian Turks, expelled from Uzbekistan in 1989-1990, settled in Krasnodar Kray and the Kabardino-Balkariya Republic.
- They continue to be denied citizenship and are subject to pressure to leave
- Cossak paramilitary units victimized Krasnodar Meskhethian Turks through public harassment, robbery, and vandalism

"According to the Moscow Helsinki Group's 2001 human rights report, during 1989-90, approximately 90,000 Meskhethian Turks, an ethnic group many of whose members had been deported from the Soviet Republic of Georgia during World War II, were forced by ethnic conflicts to leave the Soviet Republic of Uzbekistan where they had settled. At the end of the year, an estimated 60,000 Meskhethian Turks remained in the Russian Federation. Of these, more than 13,000 had settled in Krasnodar Kray, and approximately 700 had settled in the Kabardino-Balkariya Republic. Authorities in Krasnodar Kray and the Kabardino-Balkariya Republic continued to deny the Meskhethian Turks the right to register, which deprived them of all rights of citizenship, despite provisions of the Constitution that entitled them to citizenship. Meskhethian Turks living in Krasnodar, like other ethnic minorities, were subject to special registration restrictions; for example, they were required to register as 'guests' every 45 days. The administration of Krasnodar Governor Tkachev appeared to be attempting to use economic measures to force the Meskhethians to leave the territory. According to Memorial, in the winter of 2001-02 the authorities prohibited them from leasing land and cancelled existing leases for the 2002 crop season. Other measures imposed on them included a prohibition on employment or commercial activity in local markets." (U.S. DOS 31 March 2003, sect. 2d)

"Human rights observers reported that the authorities have been particularly hostile toward certain minority groups in the Province of Krasnodar Kray. The Kray has been home to large numbers of ethnic minorities for decades but has experienced considerable immigration and domestic migration in recent years [...].

According to Memorial, Krasnodar Governor Aleksandr Tkachev in a March speech promised a group of regional and municipal officials that he would create 'unbearable conditions' for 'illegal migrants' [...], and there were unconfirmed reports that the Krasnodar government provided funding to paramilitary Cossack groups, some of which were said to be brutally repressive toward such groups." (U.S. DOS 31 March 2003, sect. 5)

"[C]hauvinistic local authorities have not intervened to prevent local Cossack paramilitary units from repeatedly victimizing Krasnodar Meskhetian Turks through public harassment, robbery, and vandalism. In late May [2003], a mob of around 50 people attacked Meskhetian Turks and other non-Russian-looking individuals in two villages, injuring 30 people and hospitalizing six." (Smith 25 July 2003)

"In October [2001] according the Glasnost northern Caucasus publication, authorities forcibly expelled more than 100 Roma from the Krasnodar region to Voronezh, their officially registered place of residence. Authorities claimed that the Roma were involved in drug trafficking, although the police brought no formal charges against them." (U.S. DOS 4 March 2002, sect. 1f)

See also *"Ethnic minorities could face deportation from Russia under new decree", UNHCR, 5 April 2002 [Internet]*

Definitions

Internal displacement in the CIS region: A wide range of categories

- Internally displaced persons have been officially recognised by governments of the CIS and international agencies as part of the scope of the June 1996 CIS Conference
- The Russian Federation does not collect statistics based on the IDP definition but the category of "forced migrant", a status created to provide protection to ethnic Russians and others, coming from former Soviet republics (or "involuntary relocated persons", according to the terminology adopted by the CIS Conference), and internally displaced persons
- It is possible to distinguish IDPs in statistics for forced migrants on the basis of the place of origin
- Other categories defined in the context of the CIS Conference may also encompass internally displaced persons, such as the "formerly deported persons" or "ecological migrants"; those categories are not documented in this profile

Categories of population movements identified by the CIS Conference which can include internal displacement (CIS Conference 11 June 1996)

"Internally displaced persons (4) are persons or groups of persons who have been forced to flee their homes or places of habitual residence suddenly or unexpectedly as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violations of human rights or natural or man-made disasters and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.

Note (4) Working definition used by the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons (Document No. E/CN.4/1995/50 of 2 February 1995.)"

"Involuntarily relocating persons (7) are persons who are forced to relocate to the country of their citizenship as a result of circumstances endangering their lives, such as armed conflict, internal disorder, inter-ethnic conflict or systematic violations of human rights and who are in need of assistance to resettle in their countries of citizenship.

Note (7) In the Russian Federation, such persons are included in the category "forced migrants", which may also include 'internally displaced persons'."

[Ed. Note: UNHCR continues to refer to IRPs in its programme documents for the Russian Federation. UNHCR planning figures for 2000 includes a total of 965,000 IRPs, which include some 170,000 persons who left Chechnya during the 1994-1996 conflict. The figure of 965,000 corresponds to the caseload of forced migrants, as defined in the Russian law (see below). (UNHCR December 1999, p. 193)]

"Formerly deported peoples are peoples who were deported from their historic homeland during the Soviet period. Some of the persons belonging to this category may be stateless."

[Ed. Note: The current country profile covers only internal displacement within the Russian Federation. Displacement from former Soviet Republics whose independence has been internationally recognized since then is not covered in the profile. This is the case of the Crimeans Tatars and the Meskhetians]

"Ecological migrants are persons who are obliged to leave their place of permanent residence and who move within their country, or across its borders, due to severe environmental degradation or ecological disasters."

[Ed. Note: Internal displacement as a result of human-made or natural disasters is not documented in this profile.]

Definition of a forced migrant, Law 20 December 1995 On The Introduction Of Amendments And Additions To The Law Of The Russian Federation "on Forced Migrants"

"A forced migrant shall be a citizen of the Russian Federation who was forced to leave his/her place of permanent residence due to violence committed against him/her or members of his/her family or persecution in other forms, or due to a real danger of being subjected to persecution for reasons of race, nationality, religion, language or membership of some particular social group or political opinion following hostile campaigns with regard to individual persons or groups of persons, mass violations of public order."

[Ed. Note: This category has been applied by the authorities of the Russian Federation to provide protection to ethnic Russians, Tatars, and others, coming from former Soviet republics, and persons displaced within the Russian Federation, mainly as a result of the Osset-Ingush and the Chechen conflicts. Official statistics for forced migrants indicate the place of origin of the displaced, which makes possible to distinguish IDPs. (IOM 1998, pp.10-14)]

For more information on the CIS Conference, see "The CIS Conference: A regional process to address the problems of displacement (May 1996)" [Internal link]

POPULATION PROFILE AND FIGURES

Population figures: displacement as a result of the second conflict in Chechnya (since August 1999)

Displaced persons in Ingushetia: 70,000 persons according to the Danish Refugee Council/UNHCR (as of November 2003)

- Number of IDPs in Ingushetia has decreased by 30 percent during 2003
- 54 percent of the IDPs live in private accommodation
- The share of IDPs living in camps has decreased from 18 percent of the IDP population in January 2003 to 11 percent in November 2003
- Federal authorities reported a total of 62,700 IDPs in July 2003, while up to 80,000 IDPs were registered by the Danish Refugee Council on that date

IDPs from Chechnya registered to receive assistance in the Republic of Chechnya (as of 20 August 2003)

	Change since 1 Jan	20 August 2003	31 July 2003	30 June 2003	31 May 2003	30 April 2003	31 March 2003	28 Feb 2003	31 Jan 2003	1 Jan 2003
A Camp	-1,514	2,430	2,621	2,811	2,848	2,901	2,910	2,907	2,967	3,944
B Camp	-1,963	1,236	1,405	1,891	1,911	2,006	2,181	2,191	2,287	3,199
C Camp	-1,194	2,718	2,921	2,937	2,953	3,087	3,095	3,157	3,554	3,912
Sputnik Camp	-1,609	3,526	3,605	3,617	3,601	3,752	3,797	3,881	4,770	5,135
Bart Camp	-978	2,206	2,269	2,492	2,494	2,606	2,611	2,673	2,679	3,184
Total Camps:	-7,258	12,116	12,821	13,748	13,807	14,352	14,594	14,809	16,257	19,374
Temp. Settlements	-3,872	24,017	24,150	25,068	26,784	27,152	27,381	27,082	26,606	27,889
Private Accommodation	-12,304	43,266	43,310	45,255	46,655	48,725	49,868	51,546	52,098	55,570
Total:	-23,434	79,399	80,281	84,071	87,246	90,229	91,843	93,437	94,961	102,833

Information provided by the Danish Refugee Council (funded by UNHCR and ECHO)
(DRC 29 August 2003)

"As of 30 November 2003, a total of 69,900 internally displaced persons from Chechnya were registered for assistance in Ingushetia in the database of the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), an implementing partner of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Of this total, over 8,300 were registered in four tent camps, more than 23,400 persons in temporary settlements, and some 38,100 persons in private accommodation." (UN OCHA 5 December 2003)

"As of 15 October [2003], a total of 74,294 internally displaced persons from Chechnya were registered for assistance in Ingushetia in the database operated by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), a UNHCR implementing partner. This number included over 10,000 persons registered in tent camps, more than 23,000 persons in temporary settlements, and about 41,000 persons in private accommodation." (OCHA 21 October 2003)

In September [2003], 1,990 persons returned to Chechnya from Ingushetia; 217 persons arrived to Ingushetia from Chechnya. As of 30 September, the number of registered IDPs in Ingushetia stands at 75,710 compared to 78,913 in early September. (WFP 3 October 2003)

77,000 IDPs in Ingushetia as of 30 September, according to UNHCR

The relocation of Bella camp (or B camp) residents to Satsita camp in August and September 2003 "has boosted Satsita camp's population to more than 3,500, making it the largest of the four remaining camps in Ingushetia. In all, there are some 11,000 displaced Chechens in Satsita, Bart, Sputnik and Alina camps, while another 66,000 live in temporary settlements or private accommodation in Ingushetia." (UNHCR 30 September 2003)

Figures from the federal authorities

"According to Russia's federal migration service, Ingushetia is home to 62,700 internally displaced from Chechnya. Thirteen and a half thousand of them live in camps while 22,700 reside in special housing called 'compact accommodation points', with 25,700 in private homes." (IWPR 31 July 2003)


UN working figures (for programme planning in 2004)

Residents in Ingushetia: 350,000

IDPs in Ingushetia: 70,000

(UNOCHA November 2003, p. 11)


Ingushetia: IDP population by gender and age




(UNOCHA November 2003, p. 13)

Movements between Chechnya and Ingushetia: a monthly average of 1,000 persons return to Chechnya (2003)

- IDPs arriving from Chechnya have outnumbered IDPs returning to Chechnya since mid-2002
- During the first 9 months of 2003, an estimated 12,600 IDPs return to Chechnya from Ingushetia, including 6,500 that returned to their homes in Chechnya
- According to the Ingush authorities, more than 10,000 Chechen refugees in Ingushetia have filed applications to return home (November 2003)
- Most IDPs are returning to secure a place in newly opened Temporary Accommodation Centres or hope to benefit from the new plan to compensate for lost property



(UN 24 June 2003, p. 4)



"In Ingushetia, the number of IDPs from Chechnya has steadily decreased over the last three years from a high of 240,000 in January 2000, to the UN estimate of 75,651 as of 29 September. The UN estimates that during the first 9 months of 2003 12,600 IDPs chose to leave Ingushetia and return to Chechnya, including 6,500 that returned to their homes in the Chechen Republic." (UN November 2003, pp. 5-6)

"According to the President of Ingushetia, Murat Zyatikov, more than 10,000 Chechen refugees currently in Ingushetia have filed applications to return home. On 19 October [2003], the Russian Ministry for Emergency Situations stated that about 25,000 IDPs have returned to the Chechen Republic so far this year.

The gradual return of IDPs from Ingushetia to Chechnya has continued, reaching in October the highest ever monthly number of 2,985 registered returns. From 1-14 November, 1,614 IDPs returned home and no new arrivals from Chechnya to Ingushetia were reported." (COE 28 November 2003, paras. 49-50)

According to the Chechen Forced Migrant Committee, over 1,200 IDPs returned to Chechnya in an organized manner. Of this number, 661 persons de-registered in Ingushetia and registered for assistance in Chechnya. In addition, Vesta, another UNHCR implementing partner, reported the individual return of 130 persons from Ingushetia to Chechnya and the arrival of 67 persons from Chechnya to Ingushetia. (UN OCHA 21 October 2003)

From 13-30 September, the Chechen Forced Migrant Committee reported the organized return of 1,078 persons. Of this number, 513 persons de-registered in Ingushetia and registered for assistance in Chechnya. In addition, Vesta, another UNHCR implementing partner, reported the individual return of 121 persons from Ingushetia to Chechnya and the arrival of 110 persons from Chechnya to Ingushetia. (UN OCHA 7 October 2003)

From 1-12 September [2003], the Chechen Forced Migrant Committee reported the organized return to Chechnya of 703 persons. Of this number, 383 persons de-registered in Ingushetia and registered for assistance in Chechnya. In addition, Vesta, another UNHCR partner, reported individual returns of 103 persons from Ingushetia to Chechnya and the arrival of 197 persons from Chechnya to Ingushetia through the Adler and Spartak checkpoints on the administrative border. (UNOCHA 22 September 2003)

"From 16-31 August, the Chechen Forced Migrant Committee reported the organized return to Chechnya of 503 persons. Of them, 261 persons de-registered in Ingushetia and registered for assistance in Chechnya. Vesta NGO, a UNHCR implementing partner that monitors population movement at two checkpoints on the administrative border between Chechnya and Ingushetia, reported individual returns of 49 persons from Ingushetia to Chechnya and the arrival of 137 persons from Chechnya to Ingushetia." (UN OCHA 4 September 2003)

"From 1-15 August, 1,123 IDPs returned to Chechnya from Ingushetia. Of this total 930 returned with the assistance of the Chechen Forced Migrant Committee. Vesta, a UNHCR NGO partner, reported 125 arrivals in Ingushetia from Chechnya over the same period." (UN OCHA 20 August 2003)

"From 1-29 July [2003], 2,201 IDPs returned to Chechnya from Ingushetia. Out of this number 1,851 IDPs returned with the assistance of the Chechen Forced Migrant Committee. During the same period, Vesta, a UNHCR NGO partner, reported 228 arrivals in Ingushetia from Chechnya." (UN OCHA 6 August 2003)

"Despite the well-known tenuous security situation in Chechnya, an average of 1,200 IDPs have returned from Ingushetia to Chechnya from the tented camps, temporary settlements, and private accommodation. UNHCR systematically interviews the returnees, and while there is evident pressure resulting from rumours of camp closure and in some instances de-registration, there has been no evidence of forced returns in recent months. Most IDPs are returning to secure a place in a newly opened Temporary Accommodation Centres (TAC) or hope to benefit from the recently announced plan to compensate for lost property." (UN OCHA 24 June 2003, p. 5)

"Over 28,000 IDPs have left Ingushetia since the beginning of [2003]." (WFP 24 October 2003)

140,000 persons are displaced in Chechnya, the UN estimate (November 2003)

- IDPs in Chechnya have not been registered by the Danish Refugee Council since January 2003
- According to the official census, the population of Chechnya is more than one million persons, but NGOs argue that this figure is inflated
- The increase of the IDP population in 2002 is mainly due to return movements from Ingushetia

The UN Consolidated Appeal for 2004 reports a total of 140,000 persons displaced within Chechnya (UN November 2003, p. 26). From January 2003, the Danish Refugee Council no longer collects data regarding internally displaced persons in Chechnya, but focuses on vulnerable groups. However, the Danish Refugee Council estimated that there were between 80,000 and 100,000 IDPs within Chechnya, as of August 2003 (DRC 29 August 2003). In January 2003, the NGO gave the number of 143,000 displaced persons in Chechnya.

UN working figures (for programme planning)

Residents in Chechnya: 650,000 persons

IDPs in Chechnya: 150,000 persons

(UN May 2003, p. 2)

Disaggregated figures (November 2002).

Age Group	Female		Male		Total	
	Numbers	%	Numbers	%	Numbers	%
0-4	5517	50,4%	5423	49,6%	10940	7,7%
5-17	20757	49,0%	21626	51,0%	42383	29,9%
18-59	42090	54,8%	34752	45,2%	76842	54,2%
60 and >	6990	60,1%	4645	39,9%	11635	8,2%
Total	75354		66446		141800	

(DRC 2 November 2002)

According to the Danish Refugee Council, the total population in Chechnya as of 1 January 2003 reaches 674,798 persons (DRC 31 January 2003).

As of August 2002, up to 182,000 persons displaced within Chechnya have obtained the Form No. 7, the registration document issued by the Federal Migration Service (FMS) to register IDPs in the North Caucasus (UN November 2002, p. 98).

For detailed data for the geographical distribution of IDPs in Chechnya, see DRC statistical table [Internal link]

UN working figures for 2003

	Number
Residents in Chechnya	660,000
IDPs in Chechnya	140,000

(UN November 2002, p. 6)

Debate around estimated total population in Chechnya:

"Experts query accuracy of census results for Chechnya. The census conducted in Chechnya on 12-13 October has established that the republic's present population is 1,088,816, Chechen Premier Stanislav Ilyasov announced in Grozny on 14 October. Ilyasov acknowledged that that figure is higher than anticipated, and not much lower than the population of the then Checheno-Ingush ASSR at the time of the last Soviet census in 1989, which was 1,277,000. The permanent population of the Republic of Ingushetia as of 1 January 2001, not counting displaced persons from Chechnya, was 460,100, according to ingushetia.ru. Preliminary census data for Ingushetia are not yet available.

Russian and Chechen human rights activists have, however, expressed doubts over the accuracy and reliability of the figures that Ilyasov cited, according to chechenpress.com on 17 October. Memorial's Aleksandr Cherkasov estimated on 16 October that Chechnya's present population is no higher than 700,000. He listed three possible explanations for that discrepancy. First, he suggested that some residents of Chechnya might have moved from one village to another to avoid reprisals by Russian troops and have been counted twice. But, Cherkasov added, that alone could not account for the fact that the census data exceed his estimates by between 40,000 and 500,000 people.

More likely, Cherkasov said, are deliberate falsifications on the part of either local or Russian government officials. Both would stand to benefit from overstating the actual population figures: The local authorities could then ask for more funds from Moscow, while the central government could adduce the figure of over 1 million residents as proof that the situation in Chechnya is 'stabilizing.'

Between the Soviet censuses of 1979 and 1989, the Checheno-Ingush ASR experienced 11 percent population growth. If that rate of increase had been maintained, one could anticipate that the combined population of the two separate republics would now be in the region of 1.42 million. Subtract the current Ingush population and the figure is less than 1 million. But that end figure does not take into account either the casualty figures for the 1994-96 war (estimated at between 80,000 and 100,000) and the current war (estimated at 20,000-40,000), or the fact that most of Chechnya's Russian community has already fled to other regions of Russia.

Ilyasov told Interfax on 22 October, however: first, that Western estimates of war dead are far too high, and that no more than 10,000 people have died; and second, that one cannot estimate Chechnya's current population on the basis of the 1989 census results, as many people have left the republic, while others have come there. (Liz Fuller)." (RFE/RL 24 October 2002)

Evolution in 2001-2002

Danish Refugee Council

31 December 2001	134,4540	DRC 31 December 2001
30 June 2002	139,920	DRC 30 June 2002
14 August 2002	140,150	WFP 16 August 2002
12 October 2002	141,583	DRC 12 October 2002

UN working figures for 2002

Residents in Ingushetia	440,000
IDPs in Ingushetia	160,000

(UN November 2001, p. 8)

According to the Danish Refugee Council, the increase in the IDP population in 2002 is mainly due to the return of 5,000 IDPs from Ingushetia. These IDPs have lost their homes in Chechnya and were obliged to remain internally displaced in Chechnya upon their return from Ingushetia. (DRC 21 October 2002)

Displaced persons in Ingushetia: 94,000 persons according to the Danish Refugee Council (as of January 2003)

- About 54 percent of the IDPs have found shelter with host families, while the rest live in camps or spontaneous settlements
- There is a female predominance for the age group of 17 to 60 as males do not live with their families, or for security reasons do not wish to be registered
- According to Ingush authorities, there are only 65,000 IDPs as of January 2003
- The continued decrease of the IDP population since 2001 is due to the constant verification of registered IDPs and the removal of double registrations
- Statistics are also difficult to establish because of constant population movements between Chechnya and Ingushetia

Situation as of January 2003

Data compiled by the Danish Refugee Council (end of January 2003):
Chechen IDPs in Ingushetia breakdown by gender and age

Sex	>1998	<=1998 - >1986	<=1986 - >1943	<=1943	Total	%
Female	3,002	15,561	28,943	4,054	51,560	54.3%
Male	3,036	15,266	22,681	2,418	43,401	45.7%
Total	6,038	30,827	51,624	6,472	94,961	100.0%
%	6.4%	32.5%	54.4%	6.8%	100.0%	

(DRC 30 January 2003)

16,257 persons in camps (17 %)
 26,606 persons in spontaneous settlements (28 %)
 52,098 persons in host families (54 %)
 Total: 94,961 persons
 (DRC 30 January 2003)

"Over 75 percent of the IDP population is of urban origin, mostly from Grozny City. The gender composition is 55 percent female and 45 percent male. There is a substantial gender gap for the age group of 17 to 60 (59 percent female vs. 41 percent male). Males in this age group do not live with their families, or for security reasons do not wish to be registered." (WFP 2002, para. 18)

Figures from Ingush Authorities:

"According to the official data released by the Ingush President's Administration on 19 January, there are 64,295 internally displaced persons living in Ingushetia. Out of that, 26,045 people reside with host families, 21,179 people find refuge in the spontaneous settlements, and 17,071 people are accommodated in the tented camps. It is an evident discrepancy from the Danish Refugee Council's December figures used by the UN and very close to the ICRC's ones (host families: 55,570; spontaneous settlements: 27,889; camps: 19,374)" (UNICEF 26 January 2003)

See also "Ingush Migration authorities artificially reduce number of Chechen refugees in Ingushetia", Prague Watchdog, 4 February 2003 [Internet]

UN working figures for 2003

Residents in Ingushetia	350,000
IDPs in Ingushetia	110,000

(UN November 2002, p. 6)

Evolution in 2001-2002

Danish Refugee Council

31 December 2001	139,670	DRC 31 December 2001
30 June 2002	116,578	DRC 30 June 2002
14 August 2002	114,500	WFP 16 August 2002
12 October 2002	110,728	DRC 12 October 2002

UN working figures for 2002

Residents in Ingushetia	350,000
IDPs in Ingushetia	150,000

(UN November 2002)

Reasons for the decreasing figures

"The IDP population in Ingushetia has reduced over the last month for about 8,000 persons, as a result of de-registration of those, who were either double-registered in both Chechnya and Ingushetia or do not reside in Ingushetia. The decrease of the beneficiaries concerned mainly the IDPs living in the tent camps (over 3,000 persons) and with the host families (about 3,500)." (WFP 31 January 2002)

"The number of registered IDPs in Ingushetia decreased from 153,000 in January 2001 to 116,000 in August 2002. This was mainly due to continued verification of registered IDPs and the linking of the two distribution databases of Ingushetia and Chechnya to reduce cases of double registration." (WFP 2002, para. 19)

The decrease in the IDP figure in the course of 2002 is mainly a result of the removal from DRC's distribution list of the people commuting from Chechnya for food assistance in Ingushetia. According to DRC; these people were mainly originating from districts in Chechnya neighbouring with Ingushetia (Aschkoy-Martan, Urux Martan, Groznensky district and also Grozny city). (DRC 21 October 2002)

Ethnic background

IDPs from Chechnya, total (1999-2000)	153,000 (UNHCR/DRC registration)
Ethnicity - ethnic Chechens	92 %
- ethnic Ingush	7,1 %

(UNHCR 1 March 2001)

Registration problems

"UNHCR monitors reported that during the second half of May, the number of IDPs crossing the Chechen-Ingush border increased to up to 1,000 people travelling in each direction daily." (WFP 7 June 2002)

"Ingushetia has the largest concentration of IDPs, estimated between 140,000-160,000. Roughly 25% have at least one family member commuting regularly into Chechnya. This is one of the facts making it difficult to assess the needs and numbers of IDPs with precisions." (ICRC 14 December 2001)

"Registrations have been officially suspended since February-March 2001. New arrivals are therefore 'invisible', since they do not appear on the lists. Women at MSF's clinics speak of authorities refusing to register children born on Ingush territory.

The absence of official registration of displaced persons obviously makes the number of daily arrivals difficult to assess the seriously handicaps any humanitarian assistance program. Indeed, without a complete census of this population, the existence of some 20,000 to 50,000 people is being ignored. Official registrations counted 150,000 displaced persons, while the passport and propiska services counted 170,000 and the Ingush authorities estimate they have 200,000 IDPs." (MSF January 2002, p. 10)

See also "Chechnya: Kremlin admits deficiencies in its migration policy in Ingushetia- Human rights defender", Prague Watchdog, 11 February 2003 [Internet]

No precise figure for the displaced who left Chechnya and Ingushetia to other parts of Russia (2001-2002)

- According to 2003 estimates, about 48,000 persons left Chechnya and Ingushetia and moved to other regions in the Russian Federation

- ICRC estimate that there remains about 6,000 Chechen IDPs in Dagestan, as most Dagestani IDPs have been able to return home (June 2002)
- About 69,000 displaced in Ingushetia left to other parts of the Russian Federation, according to Federal authorities (November 2000)

The UN estimates that 8,000 IDPs from Chechnya still reside in Dagestan, and 40,000 in other regions of the Russian Federation. (UNOCHA November 2003, p 5)

"According to the Ministry on the Affairs of Federation, National and Migration Policy (Ministry of Federation) about 45,000 people fled to other regions of the Russian Federation, including 7,000 to Stavropol, 4,500 to Dagestan, and 2,500 to North Ossetia – Alania." (UN November 2001, p. 8)

"According to the Ingush Territorial Representative Office of the RF Ministry for Federal Affairs, Migration and National Policy (former Migration Service for Ingushetia), since the beginning of the military conflict in Chechnya in 1999, a total of 302,390 IDPs from Chechnya came to Ingushetia. Out of them, 68, 792 persons left for other parts of Russia, and 91,181 - returned to Chechnya." (DRC 10 November 2000)

40,000 estimated IDPs from the current Chechnya conflict are located in other parts of the Russian Federation (than Ingushetia), mainly in the North-Caucasian republics and Moscow (10,000) (UNHCR 6 March 2001).

IDPs in Dagestan:

"In 1994 to '96 Chechnya underwent a period of hostilities, with Dagestan receiving a massive influx of Chechen IDPs fleeing the violence in Chechnya. In August 1999, a second cycle of violence erupted in the region with a military operation in Dagestan and a series of bombing attempts in Moscow and Southern Russia followed by heavy fighting in Chechnya. September 1999 marked the first intrusion of Chechen combatants into Dagestan, followed shortly thereafter, by a second wave and counter offensive in Chechnya led by Russian troops.

The humanitarian consequences of these hostilities for the civilian population were severe, with the destruction of villages bordering Chechnya and displacement of thousands of Chechen IDPs into Dagestan and more than 40,000 Dagestani IDPs within Dagestan. As a result of this period of hostilities, relations between Dagestan and Chechnya remain strained. Today, much of the infrastructural damage has been repaired, the Dagestani IDPs have returned to their places of origin, although about 6,000 Chechen IDPs remain in Dagestan." (ICRC July 2002, Dagestan, p. 8)

"More than half of the IDPs (57%) are located in the urban area of Khasavhyurt with the remainder living in the northern districts of Dagestan [Locations: Khasavhyurt (57%), Kyyzlar /11%), Turamov (20%) and Nogai (12 %) Districts]. [...] About 30 % of IDPs live in Collective Centres, while the remainder live in private live in private housing either with a host (13%) or independently (57%).

[...]

Of the IDPs hhs surveyed, 20% report arriving at their present location between 1994-98, 50% arrived in 1999 and 30% have arrived since then. Over three quarters of those living in the northern area arrived in 1999, while about half of the IDPs in Khasavhyurt arrived during the same time. Over 60% of IDPs report having relocated at least once since arriving in Dagestan. The extent of the unstable living circumstances of the IDPs is evident, particularly in contrast to those of the [Residents affected by the hostilities], and there are few indications that these IDPs will be able to return to their places of origin in Chechnya any time soon due to the on going crisis there." (ICRC July 2002, Dagestan, p. 11)

The Danish Refugee Council estimates that the total number of IDPs in the whole of Dagestan reaches 10,000 IDPs (DRC 31 January 2003). Only 3,748 IDPs have been granted the so-called Form No. 7, the registration document issued by the territorial branches of the Ministry of the Interior's Federal

Migration Service (FMS) in Dagestan (August 2002). UN estimates give 8,000 IDPs in Dagestan (UNHCR 13 February 2002)

Ingushetia hosts between 120,000 and 170,000 displaced persons from Chechnya (November 2000-March 2001)

- Estimates by local authorities give at least 170,000 internally displaced in Ingushetia but only about 150,000 displaced have been registered for humanitarian assistance
- These figures may be inflated as a result of movements of displaced in Chechnya who travel to Ingushetia to collect food
- 55% of the displaced are women and 45% are under 18
- About 70 % of the displaced are living with host families

Population figures used by UN Agencies in 1999-2001:

Population	Nov 1999	Mar 2000	July 2000	Nov 2000	May 2001	Oct 2001
Residents in Ingushetia	N/A	N/A	320,000	320,000	320,000	350,000
IDPs in Ingushetia	198,000	185,000	200,000	160,000	160,000	150,000

(UN November 2001, p. 9)

UN planning figures for 2001

The UN has considered various sources of information on population figures for the republics of Chechnya and Ingushetia. These include government figures from EMERCOM and the Ministry of Federation; Danish Refugee Council registrations; and discussion with major humanitarian organisations such as the ICRC. While there is fairly widespread agreement that there are a total of 300-350,000 IDPs living in Chechnya and Ingushetia, the views differ on the proportion of IDPs in each of the two republics. The UN has compared the various sources with data from the last official census taken in 1989, and considered the number of people who have reportedly emigrated from the region, as well as known casualties, and morbidity and birth rates since 1989. As a consequence of this exercise the UN used the following figures as indicative for planning purposes.

Population	Number
Residents in Ingushetia	320,000
IDPs in Ingushetia	160,000

(UN November 2000, p. 8)

Field figures

"According to the Ingush Branch of the Ministry for Federal Affairs, Migration and Ethnic Policies, presently there are 179,701 IDPs from Chechnya living in Ingushetia. Out of them, as many as 147,198 persons are officially registered by the local authorities and considered to be entitled to receive humanitarian assistance coming through EMERCOM and other state sources.

[...]

As of 19/02/2001, the total number of the displaced registered with DRC/ASF in Ingushetia constituted 153,683 persons." (DRC 26 February 2001)

UNHCR field figures as of 18 February 2001

122,500 IDPs in Ingushetia (of which 29,000 in camps) (IASC 28 February 2001)

Problems of registration

According to an UNHCR/DRC update, 178 000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from Chechnya are still staying in the neighbouring republic of Ingushetia [2]. Of this figure, 152 000 fled the recent conflict, the remainder has been displaced since the previous war. Minors make up 45% of this figure. According to the Ministry of Emergencies (EMERCOM) the IDPs in Ingushetia amount to 142 149. The discrepancy between the two figures is most likely due to the fact that UNHCR/DRC might have registered some IDPs residing on the Chechen side of the border and travelling to Ingushetia to collect food. However, to any of these figures one should add an additional few thousand IDPs who are not registered. It should be noted that the population of Ingushetia amounts to 300 000 people. (COE 23 January 2001, para. 4)

According to the Ingush authorities, currently there are 176,000 IDPs living in Ingushetia. 144,375 persons of them are officially registered. The official data also indicates that the highest number of IDPs are registered in Sunzha district. The number of displaced persons registered with DRC is 151,417. As indicated by the UNHCR monitors, the number of new arrivals from Chechnya is increasing, and during the reporting period as many as 1,700 persons arrived in Ingushetia while only 100 people left for Chechnya over the same period. The majority of new arrivals were from Argun, Grozny, and Achkhoy-Martan. The IDPs indicate the security situation and lack of inadequate living conditions as the main reasons for remaining in Ingushetia. (UN OCHA 15 February 2001)

IDPs from Chechnya, total (1999-2000)	153 000 (UNHCR/DRC registration)
Ethnicity: - ethnic Chechen	92 %
- ethnic Ingush	7,1%
Female/Male	55 % / 45%
Children (under 18)	45 %
Shelter: - in tent camps	10 %
- in train wagons	2 %
- in spontaneous settlements	18 %
- with host families	70 %
New arrivals of IDPs in Ing. 1-31 Feb.	2500 (UNHCR estimate)
Return movement to Che. 1-31 Feb.	200 (UNHCR estimate)

(UNHCR 1 March 2001)

For more detailed statistics on the geographical distribution of the internally displaced population in Ingushetia and for breakdown figures by age group and genders, see also annex 1 to the report of the Danish Refugee Council No. 34, 26 February 2001 (pdf format) [Internet]

See also "Movements of displaced persons between Ingushetia and Chechnya remain without effect on the total IDP caseload (2000)" [Internal link]

Estimates for the internally displaced population in Chechnya range from 138,000 to 235,000 persons (February 2001)

- At least 70 % of the internally displaced population registered by the Danish Refugee Council are women and children
- Central districts in Chechnya hosts about 50% of the displaced population

Population figures used by UN Agencies in 1999-2001:

Population	Nov 1999	Mar 2000	July 2000	Nov 2000	May 2001	Oct 2001
Residents in Chechnya	N/A	100,000	350,000	370,000	400,000	440,000
IDPs in Chechnya	N/A	100,000	150,000	170,000	160,000	160,000

(UN November 2001, p. 9)

UN planning figures for 2001

"The UN has considered various sources of information on population figures for the republics of Chechnya and Ingushetia. These include government figures from EMERCOM and the Ministry of Federation; Danish Refugee Council registrations; and discussion with major humanitarian organisations such as the ICRC. While there is fairly widespread agreement that there are a total of 300-350,000 IDPs living in Chechnya and Ingushetia, the views differ on the proportion of IDPs in each of the two republics. The UN has compared the various sources with data from the last official census taken in 1989, and considered the number of people who have reportedly emigrated from the region, as well as known casualties, and morbidity and birth rates since 1989. As a consequence of this exercise the UN used the following figures as indicative for planning purposes."

Population	Number
Residents in Chechnya	370,000
IDPs in Chechnya	170,000

(UN November 2000, p. 8)

Field figures

Danish Refugee Council/ASF registration of Chechnya IDPs in Ingushetia (as of 19 February 2001)
(Breakdown by location)

District	Total	IDP
Achkhoy-Martanovskiy	75 131	17 474
Vedenskiy	21 257	1 827
Groznyanskiy	86 174	13 361
Gudermesskiy	92 384	12 419
Zavodskoy	16 723	4 748
Itum-Kalinskiy	3 020	219
Kurchalovskiy	62 646	4 656
Leninskiy	26 135	9 396
Nadterechny	45 033	7 992
Naurskiy	36 685	6 423
Nozhay-Yurtovskiy	33 785	4 092
Oktyabr'skiy	22 643	7 594
Staropromyslovskiy	27 092	6 554
Urus-Martanovskiy	91 114	14 083
Shalinskiy	108 581	23 835
Sharoyevskiy	1 352	4
Shatoyevskiy	8 732	1 137
Shelkovskoy	34 950	3 126
Total	793 437	138 940

DRC/ASF registration of inner IDPs in Chechnya (as of 19 February 2001) (breakdown by age & sex)

Sex / Age	0-4	5-17	18-59	60+	Grand Total
W	5 444	21 934	39 736	6 784	73 898
M	5 571	22 634	32 401	4 436	65 042
Total	11 015	44 568	72 137	11 220	138 940

(DRC 26 February 2001)

See also survey conducted by the Danish Refugee Council about the population in Chechnya from March to July 2000 [Internet]

UNHCR reports 234,000 internally displaced persons in Chechnya (of which 12,000 in camps) as of 18 February 2001 (IASC 28 February 2001)

Population figures: other situations of displacement

60,000 persons displaced from Chechnya are granted the status of forced migrant (June 2003)

- The vast majority of the forced migrants from Chechnya were displaced during the first Chechen conflict (1994-1996)
- Very few of the persons displaced since 1999 have been granted the status
- Up to 450,000 persons have fled as a result of the 1994-1996 conflict in Chechnya, according to governmental estimates

Total of forced migrants originating from Chechnya 23,086 cases (ie 60,284 persons) (as of 30 June 2003) (UNHCR 21 August 2003)

"As a result of the 1994-96 conflict in Chechnya, some 162,000 IDPs, mostly of Russian ethnicity, were granted the status of forced migrant in the 79 administrative divisions of the Russian Federation. The status of forced migrant is primarily meant to facilitate the integration of displaced persons in their new place of residence, through the allocation of special allowances, assistance with housing, job placement, loans, and related support.

At the beginning of the 2000 some 240,000 person had been displaced from Chechnya. Very few of those displaced as a result of the current conflict have been granted forced migrant status. Although precise information is not available, government statistics indicate that between 30 September 1999 and 31 December 2002 some 13,232 persons were granted forced migrant status. Because of protracted procedures, this number also includes IDPs from the 1994-96 conflict granted forced migrants status in the past few years." (UNHCR February 2003, paras. 10-11).

Total number of forced migrants originating from Chechnya: 67,000 persons (as of October 2002)
Total number of persons originating from Chechnya who were given the "forced migrant" between January-October 2002: 768 persons
(UNHCR 3 March 2003)

"The former Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation assessed that some 450,000 persons had fled the 1994-96 conflict in Chechnya. It is further estimated that most non-Chechen IDPs did not return to Chechnya after that conflict." (UNHCR January 2002, para. 60)

"There are no separate statistics for IDPs from the first 1994-96 conflict and IDPs from the current conflict. The total number of IDPs from Chechnya officially registered as forced migrants was 87,258 as at 31 December 2001. The only way to figure-out how many of those are IDPs from the 1994-96 conflict is to deduct from this figure the number of IDPs from Chechnya who were granted the 'forced migrant' status since the beginning of the second conflict, assuming that all those who obtained FM since September 1999 are new IDPs, which is not automatically the case. Statistics from 1998 and first half of 1999 indicate that persons were still being granted the 'forced migrant' status, presumably from the previous conflict, as a result of protracted status determination procedures). So, if we deduct 12,000 IDPs who got the 'forced migrant' status from September 1999 until December 2001, to the total number of 87,258 forced migrants from Chechnya, we get approximately 75,000 IDPs from the first conflict still registered as 'forced migrants'." (UNHCR 1 April 2002)

For more information on the "forced migrant" status, see "An official category for IDPs and involuntary migrants from the former Soviet Union: the status of 'forced migrant'" [Internal link]

Ingushetia hosts at least 12,000 displaced from the Prigorodny district (North Ossetia) (June 2002)

- Half of them are likely to resettle permanently in Ingushetia according to UNHCR
- Another 13,000 to 14,000 ethnic Ingush have resettled durably in Ingushetia

There were 12,400 ethnic Ingush displaced from the Prigorodny district as of June 2002. All of them were holders of the forced migrant status. Another 8,700 forced migrants originating from North Ossetia are also registered in North Ossetia. (UNHCR 18 October 2002)

"Almost the entire ethnic Ingush population (34,000 to 64,000 people) in Prigorodnyi and about 9,000 ethnic Ossetians fled as a result of the war. Although most Ossetians returned home, about 15,000 ethnic Ingush who expressed their intention to return to the Prigorodnyi Region remained displaced in Ingushetia at year's end. Another 13,000 to 14,000 ethnic Ingush have integrated into Ingushetia, and 'are likely to settle permanently in Ingushetia,' according to UNHCR." (USCR 2001, p. 253)

According to the Federal Ministry on Federal Affairs, Nationalities and Migration Policy, 14,650 internally displaced from the Prigorodny district (North Ossetia) in Ingushetia are holders of the forced migrant status as of January 2001. (Ministry of Federal Affairs, Nationalities and Migration Policy, January 2001)

"Another 35,000 ethnic Ingush from North Ossetia remained internally displaced in Ingushetia." (USCR 2000, p. 270)

"A total of 23,009 IDPs from the Prigorodny District (North Ossetia-Alania) and 5 IDPs from Dagestan were registered in Ingushetia during the process [of registration undertaken by the Danish Refugee Council in Ingushetia in February-March 2000]." (DRC 21 March 2000)

Caseload from the first conflict in Chechnya (as of 2000 and 2001)

- 169,000 displaced from Chechnya were officially registered as forced migrants between 1992 and 1999; about 114,000 of them remain registered as of June 2000
- Up to 300,000 ethnic Russians may have fled Chechnya during that period since not all of them were registered at their new place of residence, according to the government
- The Chechen diaspora throughout Russia may reach 500,000 persons, the government estimates

"Before October 1991 (the actual date of D. Dudaev's rise to power) Chechnya's population was over 1 million persons including 744,500 Chechens (57.8%); 229,500 Russians (23.1%); 21,000 Ukrainians; 15,000 Armenians; 10,000 Nogayans; 6,000 Tartars and other nationalities.

In 1992-1994, as a result of a determined policy of forcing out the representatives of the non-title nation and the flight of the Chechen intellectuals to other entities of the Russian Federation about 250,000 persons left Chechnya. Out of this number 83,400 inhabitants (in 1992 - 21,588; 1993 - 39,823; 1994 - 22,008) were officially registered as internally displaced persons.

In 1995-1996, 53,700 more persons were registered as internally displaced (in 1995 - 33,769; 1996 - 19,922). In the consecutive years the outflow from Chechnya continued. 32,849 inhabitants were registered as internally displaced persons (in 1997 - 15,160; 1998 - 13,007; in the first half of 1999 - 4,682). The actual number of those who have fled Chechnya was much higher since not all of them were registered at their new place of residence.

The Chechen population of Chechnya as of September 1999 was about 650,000 persons but for social, economic and other reasons about 50% of the Chechen inhabitants were practically permanently residing beyond the Republic's territory i.e. under 350,000 Chechens were actually living in the Chechen Republic.

The Chechen 'diaspora' in other regions of Russia reaches today 500,000 persons, including up to 250,000 in Moscow.

According to some estimates, the Russian population in Chechnya accounts now for no more than 20,000 persons i.e. has reduced 10 times as compared to 1991. (Government of the Russian Federation 17 January 2000)

Other neighbouring regions, namely the Republic of North Ossetia-Alanya, the Republic of Dagestan and the Stavropol region accommodate in total approximately 10 000 people displaced after the recent conflict. However, certain areas have been accommodating large numbers of Chechen IDPs since 1992. According to the Russian official figures, as many as 300 000 ethnic Russians have left the Chechen Republic since 1992. For example, in the Stavropol region alone, the number amounts to 76 000 people. The delegation visited some settlements of Russian IDPs from Chechnya in the area of Budennovsk constructed with the assistance of local communities. The Orthodox Church has largely contributed to this integration. Undoubtedly, living conditions in these settlements are much better than those in IDP camps and the majority of IDPs have been successfully integrated into the local communities. Many of them have found employment. (COE 23 January 2001, para. 5)

Internally displaced persons registered as "forced migrants":

131,340 IDPs currently hold the forced migrant status, as of June 2001. 810 percent of them have been displaced from Chechnya, mostly as a result of the first 1994-96 Chechnya. Other have been displaced from other republics in northern Caucasus, mainly Ingushetia and North Ossetia. The IDPs ex-Chechnya are spread all over the Russian Federation, but most have settled in the North-Caucasus District; IDPs with forced migrant status from Prigorodny district of North-Ossetia are mainly in Ingushetia (14,158 persons as of June 2001). (Federal Ministry on Federal Affairs, Nationalities and Migration Policy, June 2001)

Statistical sources

IDP registration in Ingushetia: restrictive practices by local authorities (November 2003)

- Since April 2001, the Ingush migration service has suspended IDPs newly arrived from Chechnya
- UNHCR estimates that up to 13,000 IDPs in Ingushetia are not registered by the authorities
- An increasing number of IDPs in Ingushetia have also been deregistered by local courts ruled in their favour
- IDPs in Ingushetia are also registered by the Danish Refugee Council and the ICRC

"Governmental and international aid agencies register internally displaced persons (IDPs) for three main reasons: i) legal status, ii) statistical purposes, and iii) access to humanitarian assistance. This note highlights three ways in which displaced persons are registered.

Registration by the migration services: The territorial branches of the Ministry of the Interior's Federal Migration Service (FMS) register IDPs for statistical purposes as well as to manage the distribution of government humanitarian assistance. IDP heads of families fill a form (so-called Form No.7), which information is then entered into a database by the various migration services. Since April 2001, the Ingush migration service has suspended routine registration (under Form No. 7) of all new IDP arrivals. Without such registration, the IDPs concerned do not have access to governmental assistance, including accommodation in government-managed camps and settlements and food distributions. Furthermore, throughout 2003, an increasing number of IDPs in Ingushetia, previously registered under Form No.7, were deregistered from the FMS database. UNHCR estimates that some 13,000 IDPs in Ingushetia are not registered in the FMS database. When such deregistration was considered unjustified, UNHCR requested the migration authorities to re-register the IDPs. Where no agreement could be reached, UNHCR's local NGO partners forwarded selected cases to local courts. All cases (as of September 2003) were positively decided by the local courts.

[...]

Registration by international organisations: To assess the vulnerabilities of the civilian population, as well as to manage the distribution of humanitarian assistance, the ICRC and DRC do also register IDPs in the North Caucasus. Upon request, both databases on social and economic vulnerabilities can be consulted by other aid agencies. In Ingushetia the ICRC is using social criteria in the registration of IDPs. As far as the registration of beneficiaries in Chechnya is concerned, both agencies have adopted economic criteria to determine the most needy amongst the Chechen population." (UN OCHA November 2003, p. 151)

UNHCR support to deregistered IDPs in Ingushetia

"In Ingushetia, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) continued assisting IDPs from Chechnya with their registration status. The authorities stopped registering newly arrived IDPs in April 2001. Recently, the Ingush authorities de-registered several hundreds IDPs, primarily in temporary settlements. The reasons for the de-registration were not always clear, and UNHCR protection staff and its implementing partners, Vesta and Memorial NGOs, helped individuals appeal against it. In addition, UNHCR discussed these cases directly with the Ingush migration authorities, and 14 out of the first 22 cases presented by UNHCR were already re-registered. UNHCR submitted information on another 30 cases to the authorities at the end of May. Vesta and Memorial submitted 30 de-registration cases to the migration authorities and 3 cases to courts. The refusal to register new arrivals and de-registration of IDPs already in Ingushetia increase the vulnerability of IDPs and the pressure on them to return home." (UN OCHA 31 May 2003)

"UNHCR remains concerned about the de-registration by the migration authorities of IDPs in Ingushetia, in particular those residing in temporary settlements. For instance, the local migration service de-registered 108 persons (21 families) out of the 176 residing in Vainakh settlement, Malgobek raion. UNHCR interviewed the de-registered IDPs and informed the Ingush migration service of the results. In June, 59 person of 108 were already re-registered, while other cases are under consideration by the authorities." (UN OCHA 23 June 2003)

"Ruslan Isayev, North Caucasus – New inspections have been underway in Chechen refugee camps in Ingushetia. This time the Moscow-backed Chechen government's commission for forcibly displaced people has been checking the refugees according to the lists.

Members of the commission walk tent by tent and put down the surname of every person whom they find there. Those who are not present are removed from the list thus losing their right to humanitarian aid.

The members of the commission claim these measures are taken in order to identify those who have been receiving humanitarian aid both in Chechnya and Ingushetia, and to find the so-called 'dead souls'.

However, these efforts have had a totally opposite effect. A number of refugees have been removed from the list at the time when they were gone from the camp to work or run an errand. No one had notified them about the inspections.

Many refugees literally flocked Chechnya to get their documents after having found about the possibility to get compensated for their lost homes. And they were mostly these people who have been removed from the lists.

During one day only, some five hundred people were taken off the list in the Sputnik refugee camp in the Ordzhonikidzevskaya village. In all the camps in Ingushetia this measure affects a few thousand refugees." (Prague Watchdog 17 July 2003)

"A local Ingush court ruled in favour of 18 IDPs that had appealed a previous decision taken by the IMS to deregister them from its database. As a result, the IMS will need to reregister the IDPs again. The average time of an appeal has been brought back from two months to two weeks." (UN OCHA 19 September 2003)

PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT

General

Relocation of IDPs outside Chechnya and Ingushetia remains limited (2003)

- The Federal Migration Service made some attempts to relocate IDPs to other regions of the Federation
- At the end of November, some 570 persons were still being accommodated in collective centres in Tambov, Saratov and Moscow regions
- IDPs are reluctant to travel beyond Ingushetia to areas where they are not welcome

"In view of the overcrowded situation in Ingushetia, the Federal Migration Services (FMS) made some attempts, in 1999 and 2000, to relocate some IDPs to other regions of the Federation. Several hundred families thus voluntarily relocated to existing temporary accommodation centres in Tambov and Saratov regions, with the FMS covering transport costs (vouchers with train tickets were provided by the FMS). At the end of November 2002, some 573 persons were still being accommodated in various [Temporary Accommodation Centres (TACs)] run by the Federal Migration Service (mainly in Tambov, Saratov and Moscow region). While originally the FMS intended to relocate more IDPs to other regions in central Russia, this project has not been as successful as the federal authorities expected. Firstly, most of the concerned regions do not have any sizeable Chechen community and were not enthusiastic with the prospect of having to provide accommodation to Chechen IDPs. Secondly, the Chechen IDPs themselves wish to remain close to their homes in Chechnya and are reluctant to travel beyond Ingushetia to regions where they are not welcome." (UNHCR February 2003, para. 29)

PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

Physical safety and personal liberty

Civilians exposed to mines and unexploded ordnance in Chechnya (2003)

- Despite lack of reliable data, extent of mines and UXO contamination in Chechnya is considered very high
- IDPs and returnees are exposed to particular risks upon their return or resettlement
- The Chechen Ministry of Agriculture estimates that some 30% of all agricultural land in the republic is contaminated by mines/UXO

"Landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) continue to have a dramatic impact on the daily life of civilians in Chechnya. No reliable estimate of the number of mines present in the republic is available, but, according to various sources, they have been widely used during the hostilities. The degree of UXO contamination is also considered to be high. According to IMSMA [Information Management System for Mine Action] database, managed by UNICEF and its partner 'Voice of the Mountains', as of October 2003, 474 people had been killed by mines and UXO and 2,072 injured. Due to various factors, including limited access to Chechnya, collecting data remains difficult. Therefore the IMSMA figures are likely to represent only a part of the total.

The mine/UXO threat aggravates the social and economic vulnerability of the population. Mines have been used around checkpoints, temporary positions and military bases, and when laid for these purposes, combatants rarely remove them. Thus, people live in fear and children cannot play freely wherever they want. IDPs and returnees are exposed to particular risks, as they move through or resettle in areas that might be mine/UXO-affected.

The Chechen Ministry of Agriculture estimates that some 30% of all agricultural land in the republic is contaminated by mines/UXO, and livestock has been severely stricken. Economic necessity leads people to adopt unsafe behaviour. For example, UXO is collected and dismantled for selling purposes, while people collect wood or pick up fruit in mined areas. Travel between villages is restricted because of mined routes. This limits access to markets and hinders economic activities and traditional social contacts. In addition to this, caring for the injured is a considerable economic burden." (UN OCHA November 2003, p. 58)

"As of 30 September [2003], the VoM [Voice of the Mountains]-run IMSMA database has reached the figure of 2,500 casualty entries. According to the casualty forms submitted by one NGO, 34 persons have been injured or killed by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) since 24 August. Males aged from 25-50 currently account for some 60% of all entries in the database. Data gathered in Nadterechny district of Chechnya revealed that many children reported to have seen and even played with various UXO and bullets." (UNICEF 15 October 2003)

"According to the International Campaign to ban Landmines, Chechnya has more landmine casualties than any other place in the world. In its last report, the group said that 5,695 people (among them 938 were children) were killed or injured by landmines in the republic in 2002, more than twice the figures of 2001. This, in a region whose population is less than one million. Half a million landmines had been planted in Chechnya – making it 'one of the most landmine polluted zones in the world, very much up there with Afghanistan, Angola, and Sri Lanka'." (COE 20 October 2003, para. 13)

"In November 2001 and June 2002 UNICEF and its partner Voice of the Mountains (VoM) carried out two surveys in Ingushetia and in Chechnya to gauge the level of mine awareness and assess needs for survivor assistance, focusing on children. The survey showed that the mine risk reduction and mine awareness campaign and the victim assistance programme needed to be fine tuned. In the absence of mine-clearance and functioning infrastructure for victim assistance in Chechnya, UNICEF continues to search for solutions to the problem." (UNOCHA November 2002, p. 57)

For more details about landmines, consult the Landmine Monitor Report 2003: Toward a Mine-Free World, Russian Federation [Internet]

See also, "Chechen partisans continue laying mines and explosives", Prague Watchdog, 18 April 2003 [Internet]

Violence in IDP settlements in Ingushetia (2003)

- Human rights organizations report growing number of mop-up operation in IDP communities in Ingushetia
- Abuses committed during these raids include arbitrary detention, ill-treatment, and looting
- This violence puts pressure on IDPs to return to Chechnya prematurely
- UNHCR monitors the detention of IDPs with authorities

"Since 3 June, the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF) has learned of multiple serious human rights violations during so-called 'mop-up' operations in Ingushetia. These Ingushetia-based mop-up operations, carried out by masked Russian forces, have targeted internally displaced persons (IDPs) living in camps and private residences in an alarming escalation of state-sponsored abuses. According to information gathered by the Russian human rights group Memorial during these raids, Russian forces have subjected Chechen IDPs to forced disappearance, torture and ill-treatment and have looted their property.

According to reports, these raids are being carried out by Russian forces and pro-Moscow Chechen police under the control of Chechnya administrator, Akhmad Kadyrov. The raids in Ingushetia demonstrate a widening of the near four-year-long Chechnya conflict, and violate international protection standards for IDPs. These standards include the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, which state that 'national authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons within their jurisdiction' (Principle 3). Moreover, the Principles specifically require that IDPs 'be protected in particular against . . . enforced disappearances, including abduction or unacknowledged detention, threatening or resulting in death' (Principle 10 (d))." (IHF 18 June 2003)

"Russia's abusive military operations are spreading from Chechnya to the neighbouring province of Ingushetia. Human Rights Watch said today [16 July 2003].

Human Rights Watch researchers in Ingushetia have documented numerous cases of arbitrary detention, ill-treatment, and looting during recent 'sweep' operations conducted in Ingush villages and settlements of displaced Chechens. In one incident, Russian forces appeared to be responsible for killing one person and wounding another. In a separate incident, a Russian soldier shot and wounded a sixteen-year-old boy in the leg.

[...]

In June 2003, Russian forces based in Chechnya and the forces of the pro-Moscow Chechen administration conducted a series of sweep operations in Ingush villages and in 'spontaneous settlements' – abandoned factories or collective farms where displaced Chechens reside. These operations repeated the same patterns of abuse committed during sweeps in Chechnya.

[...]

Until recently, Ingushetia remained a relatively safe and peaceful area, hosting thousands of IDPs who had fled Chechnya after the outbreak of the second conflict in 1999. The situation changed in 2002 when federal migration authorities started pressuring internally displaced persons living in Ingushetia to return to Chechnya, claiming the situation there had 'normalized'.

This campaign intensified in December 2002, when the authorities attempted to close tent camps and to force their dwellers back, threatening them with arrests on false charges and impending sweep operations in Ingushetia. An international diplomatic and media outcry, coupled with logistical difficulties, ultimately saved the camps from closure, yet the authorities did not abandon the plan and now appear to have again intensified pressure and threats.

The recent incidents of violence and abuse have had a chilling effect on Chechen IDPs living in Ingushetia. Many witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch believe that Russian authorities have consciously resorted to what they see as the most effective way of forcing them back to Chechnya—making Ingushetia an equally unsafe place.

Chechen displaced persons are not the only victims of the escalating violence. On June 10, three Ingush civilians—sixty-five-year-old Tamara Zabiya and two of her sons, Ali and Umar Zabiya—were returning from their potato field near the village of Galashki, when their truck came under heavy machinegun fire, injuring Zabiya in the back, neck, and head. The brothers took their mother out of the car and Umar stayed with her while Ali ran to the village for help." (HRW 16 July 2003)

"UNHCR expressed concern over the manner in which sweep operations in IDP tent camps and settlements in Ingushetia had been carried out and intervened with the Ingush authorities on behalf of the detained IDPs. UNHCR advocated for the respect of relevant legislation of the Russian Federation and basic human rights. Following this intervention four IDPs were released." (UNOCHA 7 July 2003)

"Recently, refugees living in so-called compact accommodation points say they have suffered raids in which armed masked men detained many people – an imitation of the 'clean-up' operations that have plagued Chechnya over the last three years.

'Over the last two months so-called 'clean ups' have taken place in all compact accommodation points for refugees,' said Akhmed Barakhoyev of the human rights organisation Memorial in Ingushetia. 'If we just take one month then we had four clean-ups in four camps. And we still know nothing about many people who have been abducted.'

Memorial says 20 internally displaced persons were snatched in June and July and most of them are missing." (IWPR 31 July 2003)

"Ingush courts ruled in favor of another 14 appeals of IDPs against unfair de-registration by the Ingush Migration Service from the lists of persons entitled to government assistance. Vesta lawyers had lodged the appeals to the courts. More frequent security operations in IDP settlements in Nazran and in Sunzhensky Raion of Ingushetia resulted in the detention of IDPs. UNHCR intervenes with the ministry of the interior bodies to ensure that detentions take place in accordance with the law of the Russian Federation and international human rights standards. As a result of UNCHR's intervention with the Ministry of Interior of Ingushetia and the Prosecutor's Office, the prosecutor of Nazranovsky Raion initiated a criminal investigation of the disappearance of two IDPs in Karier settlement after a security operation on 27 August." (UN OCHA 21 October 2003)

"Mr Cavalieri, Senior UNHCR Protection Officer, said that some 2,000 IDPs returned to Chechnya in September. The prospect of receiving compensation for lost housing was probably a big part of that. However, he also acknowledged that violence and detentions of IDPs in Ingushetia has been increasing and this could also be affecting IDPs' decision to return." (UN OCHA 20 October 2003)

See also:

- *Daily kidnappings refute Russian claim of order in Chechnya, Agence France Presse, 11 August 2003 [Internet]*
- *Situation in Ingushetia worsens markedly, Prague Watchdog, 18 July 2003 [Internet]*

Authorities want to accelerate the return of IDPs from Ingushetia and Chechnya (2002-2003)

- Human Rights Watch reports that Russian authorities exert pressure on IDPs in Ingushetia to return to Chechnya
- Authorities also are reluctant to increase the shelter capacity for IDPs in Ingushetia
- In April 2001, the registration of newly arrived IDPs from Chechnya was suspended, depriving them of access to federal assistance
- Authorities in Chechnya and Ingushetia signed a 15 point the Action Plan for the return of IDPs from Ingushetia to Chechnya in May 2002
- The re-deployment of federal troops to Ingushetia, and the increase of ID checks in Ingushetia also signaled the will of authorities to accelerate the return of IDPs to Chechnya

"The pressure exercised on IDPs, in Ingushetia and elsewhere, to return to Chechnya increased markedly after the October 2002 hostage crisis in Moscow. The hostage crisis embarrassed the authorities, revealing how Chechen fighters had been able to freely move in the country, and prepare and execute a complex terrorist operation in the capital. Subsequent measures were taken by the authorities, including a Moscow city-wide search for possible accomplices and the arrest of several suspects, the suspension of military troop cuts in Chechnya by the Ministry of Defence, and the decision to close down IDP tent camps in Ingushetia, suspected by the authorities to harbour some militants and to represent a recruitment-base for Chechen fighters.

Human Rights Watch insists that Russian authorities exert organised pressure on Chechen IDPs in Ingushetia to force them to leave:

*Every day, about thirty representatives from the United Headquarters and the Federal Security Service (FSB) make the rounds at each of the major tent camps in Ingushetia, going from tent to tent explaining the advantages of moving to Chechnya and the disadvantages of remaining in Ingushetia. They continuously pressure families to sign the 'voluntary return' forms provided by the United Headquarters officials and promise those who sign five months of humanitarian supplies. ...In several cases, officials have threatened those reluctant to leave with arrest on false drug and weapons possession charges. ...In late October, Russian federal troops set up permanent positions near all the major tent camps, reinforced with armoured personnel carriers and heavy weapons. [Human Rights Watch, *Into Harm's Way: Force Return of Displaced People to Chechnya*, Vo. 15, No.1/(D), Human Rights Publications, January 2003]*

Ingushetia and Chechnya are contiguous, and Ingushetia has generously hosted the bulk of fleeing IDPs. However, with an influx of over 240,000 IDPs in 1999-2000 for a local population of 360,000 inhabitants, the infrastructure of the Republic of Ingushetia (one of the poorest subjects of the Russian Federation) has been over-stretched. As of 31 December 2002, there were 102,000 IDPs in Ingushetia. Some 55% of these persons are staying with host families, 27% in temporary settlements (former collective farms, abandoned factories and other privatised structures being used as shelter, where the Russian Federation Government is reimbursing the gas and electricity utilities, costs to the owners), and 18% in tent camps. Local social infrastructure has been overwhelmed with the influx of IDPs and the majority of IDPs have limited access, if any, to medical facilities and schools. Tuberculosis in camps and settlements is widespread. UNHCR together with WHO have set up a medical referral system for particularly vulnerable cases (e.g., victims of

torture), where cases are referred to medical institutions outside Ingushetia, as it lacks sufficient capacity. Humanitarian assistance by international organisations is continuing in order to avoid a deterioration of basic living conditions.

[...]

Over time, as tensions developed between the IDPs and the local populations, the proportion of IDPs in spontaneous settlements increased as a result of evictions from host family residences – this often occurs after IDP families exhaust their financial resources. UNHCR and NGOs are confronted daily with such evictions. To the extent possible, UNHCR has been identifying possible alternative shelter arrangements for evicted families in tent camps, providing them an alternative to return to Chechnya for lack of other options.

In 2000, UNHCR negotiated with the Federal Government to build additional tent camps in Ingushetia to accommodate newly arriving IDPs as well as those IDPs accommodated in remote, unsafe or unhealthy temporary settlements. The Federal Government insisted that such camps should be built inside Chechnya before finally agreeing. Although UNHCR and NGOs remain active in the shelter sector and have been able to replace damaged tents, the Government overall remained reluctant to allow provision of additional tent capacity in Ingushetia. UNHCR fears that in the near future IDP families evicted from host families or spontaneous settlements may have no realistic alternatives other than return to Chechnya, remaining illegally (without residency registration) in another region of the Federation, or seeking asylum elsewhere.

The federal authorities have made various attempts to induce the return of IDPs from Ingushetia to Chechnya. On 17 December 1999, under Order No. 110, the Federal Migration Service instructed the Regional Migration Services of Dagestan, Stavropol, Ingushetia and North Ossetia-Alania to suspend registration under Form No. 7 of all new IDP arrivals and to facilitate their return to their place of origin in Chechnya or, alternatively, to safe areas in Chechnya. Subsequently, on 20 January 2000, the Ministry for Civil Defence and Emergencies of the Republic of Ingushetia issued an instruction according to which IDPs coming from regions under the control of federal authorities should be *"deprived from all kind of allowances they were entitled to on the territory of their present accommodation."*

The ban imposed by Federal Order No. 110 on registration of new arrivals was implemented with varying levels of strictness in Ingushetia and eventually was ignored in practice, before being re-enforced. There has been a succession of similar federal orders and instructions, immediately followed in the field by rumours and fears among the IDPs as to possible implications. Such uncertainty has characterised the federal policy regarding registration of IDPs, adding to the insecurity of their situation. In April 2001, the Ingush territorial organ of the Ministry of Federal Affairs, Nationality and Migration Policy suspended registration (under Form No. 7) of all new IDP arrivals. Without registration by the migration authorities, IDPs do not have access to Government assistance, including accommodation in Government managed camps and food. It is estimated by UNHCR that there are currently some 42,000 IDPs in Ingushetia not in possession of Form No. 7. [...]

Recent events in the northern Caucasus include the resignation of Ingush President Aushev in December 2001, the election of President Zyazikov in April 2002, the signature in May 2002 of a 15 point the Action Plan for Return for the return of IDPs from Ingushetia to Chechnya, the re-deployment of federal troops to Ingushetia, and the increase of ID checks by federal forces inside Ingushetia. These indicate a pattern whereby the federal and local authorities are determined to accelerate the return movement of IDPs to Chechnya. Pressure for this return movement was increased after the October 2002 hostage crisis in Moscow.

Most of the provisions of the May 2002 Action Plan for Return relate to creating additional reception capacity in temporary accommodation centres in Chechnya and the provision of construction materials for self-help home repairs, thus ensuring smooth transition from TACs to homes. UNHCR acknowledged the need for shelter for returnees in Chechnya, but is concerned that such reception capacity might develop into IDP settlements of indefinite duration. The creation of safe conditions in Chechnya (entrusted to the Federal Security Service, or FSB) is envisaged, but not yet established.

UNHCR has observed that point No. 5 of the Action Plan provides for the suspension of humanitarian aid in Ingushetia to those IDPs who receive state allowances (i.e., pensions and child allowances) inside Chechnya. This could amount to a measure limiting the IDPs' freedom of choice to stay or return. Point 14 foresees the closing of *temporary accommodation settlements* in Ingushetia, as IDPs return to Chechnya.

Following the signature of the Action Plan, representatives of the Chechen Administration, Ingush Migration Service and Federal Migration Service conducted an intensive campaign among IDPs in the tent camps in Ingushetia. As of 31 December 2002, some 7,404 IDPs from tent camps had returned in an organised manner, with the assistance of the Chechen Administration.

In parallel with the implementation of the Action Plan for return, the control of the 'legality' of the sojourn of IDPs by local bodies of interior in Ingushetia was intensified. IDPs attempting to register their sojourn with the passport and visa services (PVS) of the local bodies of the Ministry of Interior are routinely denied registration if they are not in possession of Form No. 7, issued by the local migration service. Since Form No. 7 is foreseen under a 1997 internal instruction of the Federal Migration Service and is not among the documents otherwise required under federal legislation pertaining to registration, its possession, as a prerequisite for the issuance of sojourn registration, can be called into question. However, local NGOs attempting to challenge the legality of such requirements were unsuccessful in the courts. Among other obstacles, IDPs not in possession of sojourn registration in Ingushetia are currently not able to officially register the birth of children born in Ingushetia. IDPs not in possession of form No. 7 were recently denied accommodation in temporary settlements by the private owners of such settlements on the grounds that they are reimbursed gas and electricity utilities costs from the Federal Migration Service only for those IDPs in possession of form No. 7.

[...]

As a consequence of the October 2002 hostage crisis, the federal authorities re-iterated their determination to close all tent camps in Ingushetia. The Federal Migration Service in November 2002 requested international organisations and NGOs, including UNHCR, to stop the replacement of torn tents. Between 30 November and 2 December 2002, the authorities completely dismantled the 'Imam' tent camp, near the village of Aki-Yurt (district of Malgobek), that had been accommodating some 1,500 IDPs. UNHCR estimates that approximately half returned to Chechnya where they found shelter with host families or were accommodated in TACs. The rest remained in Ingushetia, in self-made mud-brick houses on the site of the former camp, in temporary settlements or with host families in the district of Malgobek or elsewhere in Ingushetia. The United Nations (through its Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs), UNHCR and the European Union all expressed concern regarding the voluntary nature of returns, since the Aki-Yurt 'Imam' tented camp was dismantled without the IDPs being provided alternative accommodation by the Government, in Ingushetia or elsewhere.

Eventually, after the organised return by the authorities of IDPs to Chechnya took place, the Government agreed to UNHCR's deploying some box-tents in Ingushetia to accommodate some of the former Aki-Yurt camp residents who had remained in that republic. In light of the pending closure of remaining tent camps after the winter 2002-2003, and of the planned organised return of camp residents to Chechnya, UNHCR obtained, at the end of December 2002, approval from both the federal and Ingush migration services for pre-positioning additional box-tents on alternative relocation sites selected by the authorities in Ingushetia. However, in February 2003 the Ingush Government ordered the suspension of erection of temporary and/or movable shelter units (including UNHCR's box-tents) by aid agencies until it is determined whether such units meet the technical requirements under the local construction code. (UNHCR February 2003, paras. 26-38)

Forced closure of camps: concerns on the relocation of IDPs (2002-2003)

- Aki-Yurt 'Imam' tented camp was dismantled without the IDPs being provided alternative accommodation (December 2002)
- Chechen official announced that all camps in Ingushetia will be closed in 2003
- UNHCR raised concern about alternative shelter for IDPs evicted from camp B (June 2003)
- Authorities decided to close another tent camp in line with its policy to close tent camps when the number of IDPs there falls below 1,000 (December 2003)
- IDPs who did not wish to leave for Chechnya were offered to move to alternative shelters elsewhere in Ingushetia

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Authorities confirm closure of camps

"In the latest threat to thousands of displaced Chechens living in the North Caucasian republic of Ingushetia, officials have warned that refugee camps there will be closed within the next two months.

Akhmed Zaurbekov, an official with Chechnya's refugee committee, said this week that the camps - which are still home to more than 13,000 displaced persons - will be closed by the beginning of October. He blamed the poor condition of the camps and the risk of disease there. 'The tents are unfit for inhabitation, especially in Bella camp,' said Zaurbekov.

Zaurbekov said that the internally displaced persons would be re-housed in "compact accommodation points" in Ingushetia and also in "temporary settlement points" in Chechnya.

But critics of the plans and refugees themselves see a political background to the decision. Presidential elections are due in Chechnya in October and there are suspicions that the authorities are making a renewed attempt to get rid of the public embarrassment of refugees living in tents on Russian soil almost four years after the beginning of the last Chechen conflict.

The acting leader of Chechnya, former mufti Akhmad Kadyrov, is the clear favourite to win those elections, which have been organised by Moscow. On July 4, at a meeting with President Vladimir Putin,

Kadyrov promised that there 'won't be a single tent' on the territory of Ingushetia by September." (IWPR 31 July 2003)

Tent camp B

"Indications of possible camp closures in Ingushetia are raising again the urgent need for alternative accommodation options for displaced Chechens.

There are indications, for example, that the government may be intending to close Camp B in Slepstovskaya, Ingushetia, close to the frontier with Chechnya, in the near future. As of May 27, 1,958 displaced people were registered in Camp B. The UN refugee agency has repeatedly stressed that unless viable options for alternative shelter in Ingushetia are available in the event of closure of the tented camps, returns to Chechnya could not be considered voluntary. Alternatives are also needed in case of evictions of displaced persons from temporary settlements or private accommodation.

UNHCR is emphasising to the government the need for concrete action on alternative shelter. Non-governmental organisations and donors are also prepared to contribute to alternative shelter options." (UNHCR 2 June 2003)

"Chechen civilians continue to face increasing pressure to leave Bella camp, a displaced persons tented settlement that is gradually being emptied in Slepstovskaya, Ingushetia, a Republic of the Russian Federation. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) witnessed today that only 930 people remain in the camp. Statistics from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) showed that 3,200 people were living there in January and 1,430 at the end of July.

More than 200 people were pressured out of the camps without prior notice in the last three days, and are now living in 45 of the 180 shelters built by MSF to give to people who chose to stay in Ingushetia an alternative to returning to Chechnya. This is only the most recent alarming example of the constant psychological pressure exerted on displaced civilians to go back to war-torn Chechnya. Even though these circumstances are unacceptable for the people pressured to leave Bella camp, MSF logisticians will ensure that the newly occupied shelters will be connected to the gas and electricity networks." (MSF 8 August 2003)

"The last group of the 1,000 Chechens in Ingushetia's Bella camp has been relocated to Satsita camp, ending weeks of uncertainty for the displaced people and marking a positive step towards better co-operation between UNHCR and the local and federal authorities.

Most of the displaced Chechens left Bella for Satsita camp over the weekend. After the last group departed on Monday, Bella camp was closed and its infrastructure dismantled to be moved to Satsita camp, where the UN refugee agency has provided 166 tents for accommodation.

Many of the Chechens told UNHCR they were very pleased with the smooth resolution of what had appeared to be a threatening situation at one point. In the last two weeks, they felt they were being pressured to go back to Chechnya when local authorities cut off supplies of water, gas and electricity at Bella camp. Latrines were also reportedly removed, and a military checkpoint set up at the entrance of the camp.

After extensive negotiations between UNHCR, the local and federal authorities as well as the displaced people themselves, the authorities made a number of guarantees to Bella's inhabitants, most of whom chose to stay in Ingushetia for now instead of returning home.

One point of contention was a group of 85 Chechens who were not registered with the migration authorities and feared that they would be excluded from any relocation within Ingushetia. After UNHCR intervened with the Federal Migration Service (FMS) in Moscow, this group received assurances that they would be registered at their new home in Satsita camp.

The FMS also agreed to restore utilities at Bella camp, calming tensions and making the displaced people feel that their rights were again being respected. As a result, they agreed to relocate voluntarily to Satsita camp.

'UNHCR hopes that this more constructive approach, which took into account the rights and interests of all parties, will be replicated in the future, replacing heavy-handed tactics such as cutting off utilities,' said the agency's spokesman, Peter Kessler, at a news briefing in Geneva Tuesday.

The recent relocation has boosted Satsita camp's population to more than 3,500, making it the largest of the four remaining camps in Ingushetia. In all, there are some 11,000 displaced Chechens in Satsita, Bart, Sputnik and Alina camps, while another 66,000 live in temporary settlements or private accommodation in Ingushetia.

UN refugee agency chief Ruud Lubbers recently proposed a two-pronged approach to help displaced Chechens under pressure to leave Ingushetia. At the opening of the annual Executive Committee meeting in Geneva on Monday, he stressed that the displaced people must continue to be guaranteed a viable safe haven in Ingushetia until they decide that conditions are conducive for them to return home. For those who wish to return, UNHCR will start projects in Chechnya to enable sustainable reintegration." (UNHCR 30 September 2003)

Tent camp A

"The Federation Migration Service (FMS) decided to close tent camp A ('Alina') in line with its previous announced intention to close tent camps when the number of IDPs there falls below 1,000. FMS offered IDPs who did not wish to leave for Chechnya to move to the alternative shelter in Satsita tent camp or in temporary settlements in Ingushetia. UNHCR monitored the voluntary nature of this process and, together with NG partners, assisted with preparing the alternative shelter for IDPs. In addition, UNHCR turned to both FMS in Moscow and the local authorities with a request to remain gas, electricity, and water supplies to camp A until all IDPs accommodated there have voluntarily returned to Chechnya or relocated." (UN OCHA 5 December 2003)

See also:

"Ingushetia: relocation of Chechens from Alina camp completed", UNHCR Briefing Note, 12 December 2003

"Closure of camps and expulsions in Ingushetia: All refugees must have the possibility of relocating to Ingushetia", Médecins Sans Frontières, 3 October 2003

"UNHCR protests forced movements of Chechens in Ingushetia", UNHCR 15 August 2003 [Internet]

"Ingushetia must remain safe haven for displaced Chechens", Amnesty International, 22 August 2003 [Internet]

"Last Chechen refugee camp in Ingushetia to close by October 1", Agence France Press, 14 August 2003

"Refugees placed in former warehouse for pesticides", Prague Watchdog, 11 August 2003 [Internet]

"Chechen refugees complain of pressure to leave tent camp", Agence France Press, 9 August 2003 [Internet]

"Refugees in Ingushetia ordered to remove tent add-ons", Prague Watchdog, 1 June 2003 [Internet]

Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper to the 59th Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights on the Human Rights Situation in Chechnya, 7 April 2003 [Internet]

"Into Harm's Way: Forced Return of Displaced Persons to Chechnya", January 2003 [Internet]

"Resettlement of Chechen refugees and international law: a brief view", Prague Watchdog, 11 December 2002 [Internet]

Insecurity continues to prevail in Chechnya (2003)

- Gross human rights in Chechnya continue to perpetuate a chronic sense of insecurity among civilians, according to Amnesty International
- People reportedly continue to 'disappear' following detention at checkpoints and during nightly raids
- Russian security forces fail to consistently implement measures aimed at protecting civilians during operations
- Killings, torture and indiscriminate attacks against civilians are also committed by both parties in the conflict

"Since the 23 March referendum, the risk for ordinary Chechen civilians of being fatally trapped in the ongoing conflict has not diminished. Indiscriminate attacks by Chechen fighters and attacks attributed to Chechen rebels, including the recent bomb attack in Znamenskoye on 12 May 2003 and in Iliskhan-Yurt on 14 May 2003, as well as special operations and so-called 'targeted measures' by the Russian federal forces, perpetuate the chronic sense of insecurity amongst the Chechen population. Amnesty International remains concerned at reports, including by the Prosecutor of the Chechen Republic, that gross human rights violations during such operations continue unabated.

People reportedly continue to 'disappear' following detention at checkpoints and during nightly raids. These 'disappearances' recently appear to have replaced the notorious large-scale sweep operations by the federal forces. According to an unpublished government report on serious crimes committed on the territory of the Chechen Republic, 126 persons were abducted in January and February 2003, and 19 persons 'disappeared' during the same period.

Amnesty International remains concerned that the Russian security forces fail to consistently implement measures aimed at protecting civilians during such operations, including Order N° 80 and Decree N° 46. Order N° 80 issued in March 2002 by General Moltenskoï prohibits security forces from wearing masks or concealing the identity of their units during raids. It also requires forces of the Ministry of the Interior and the police to announce their name, rank and purpose when entering civilian homes. These requirements, however, do not apply to other security forces, such as officers of the Federal Security Service (FSB) or federal soldiers. Recent cases of 'disappearances' on 5 and 6 May 2003 documented by the Russian human rights organization Memorial also illustrate the failure of Russian security forces to comply with Decree N° 46 issued by the General Procurator in July 2001, which requires the presence of procurators and local authorities during military raids.

[...]

These recent incidents underline the continued and vivid relevance of the assessment by President Putin's Special Representative for Human Rights in the Chechen Republic Abdul-Khakim Sultygov and representatives of the Russian prosecuting bodies of March 2003. They branded human rights violations committed by the federal forces during special operations and the implementation of 'targeted measures', 'disappearances' of persons and the prevailing climate of impunity as the most problematic issues in terms of safeguarding human rights in the Chechen Republic." (AI 31 May 2003)

"The security situation in Chechnya continues to be tense. Since the beginning of June, there have been 49 fatalities (civilian and military) in several attacks by rebel forces, including suicide attacks, landmine explosions and an ambush on a government convoy. The military has carried out sweep operations and bombing raids. Amnesty was approved for rebels who gave-up their weapons and renounced armed separatism. Due to security issues, UN agencies have very limited access to Chechnya.

The escalation of violence in Chechnya continues to adversely affect the return of IDPs to Chechnya." (WFP 20 June 2003)

"Forced disappearances

The forced disappearance of individuals is perhaps the violation of humanitarian law most typical of the current phase of the war in Chechnya. There are no accurate statistics detailing the phenomenon, but all independent monitors confirm that forced disappearances are widespread, especially in the south of the republic. The statistics of MEMORIAL, whose monitors collect information in some parts of Chechnya, give the figure of around 90 people kidnapped during January and February 2003. Many of these individuals disappear.

The statistics of MEMORIAL suggest that there was a slight decrease in grave crimes like forced disappearances and killings in the months preceding the Constitutional Referendum in March, and that there has been an increase in the period following the Referendum which brings the reported number of grave crimes during the summer of 2003 in line with that of late 2002.

The figures provided by MEMORIAL do not represent the total number of the missing. The monitoring of MEMORIAL is present in some of the regions of the Republic – regions where about 40 - 50 percent of the population of Chechnya live – but even in these areas their monitors are unable to collect information on all incidents. Infrastructure is damaged and it is difficult to get access to reliable information, especially in the areas where the fighting goes on. Moreover, victims and eyewitnesses are often unwilling or afraid to report incidents, due to fear of reprisals and a total lack of a faith in the law enforcement and judicial system.

[...]

While previously the victims of forced disappearances, and other violations of humanitarian law, in most cases were men of fighting age, there appears to be a growing number of such crimes against women. Several female IDPs claimed independently of each other that they were more often singled out for checks and searches when traveling through Chechnya after the attacks by female suicide bombers in the spring of 2003. Imran Ezheyev, the commander of a refugee settlement near Karabulak in Ingushetia, stated that an official of the Ingush Ministry of the Interior came to the camp on 13 July in order to register women born in the years 1978 and 1979. He regarded the registration as part of a policy of stricter control with Chechen women after a number of attacks on federal and civilian targets by female suicide bombers in the spring and summer of 2003. In line with the stricter controls and registration regime imposed on Chechen women, there were also reports of disappearances of women.

[...]

Disappearances are typical of the dirty war waged in Chechnya by various groups, some of whom seem to be affiliated with the authorities, a war in which the principal victims is the civilian population.

Killings

The hostage taking in the Dubrovka theatre in November 2002 was the first in a spate of spectacular terrorist attacks, sometimes aimed at civilians and non-combatants, perpetrated by Chechen formations over the last year. Although terrorist actions have been condemned by some of the senior Chechen commanders, like the elected President Aslan Maskhadov, they have continued. There have been indiscriminate attacks in Chechnya and outside of the republic.

A military hospital in Mozdok was attacked by a suicide bomber on 1 August causing the death of 50 people, according to official sources, while two suicide bombers killed at least 13 people at a rock concert in Moscow on 5 July. Both of these attacks represent grave breaches of humanitarian law, and a further deterioration of the conflict, both in terms of the conflict spilling over from Chechnya to neighboring republics and even to the capital of the federation, and in terms of the increased targeting of civilians by Chechen formations. The rise in terrorist activities is, however, only one aspect of the dirty war against the civilian population.

In the months preceding the Referendum the statistics of MEMORIAL indicate a slight decrease in the number of killed civilians. While the number of killed civilians documented by the MEMORIAL monitors in 2002 was about 80 a month, it was between 40 and 70 in the period January to March 2003. However, the number of killings has been rising in the months after the referendum and is now in line with the death

toll of 2002. The pattern suggests that in general there have been no substantial improvements in the security situation for the civilian population over the last three years. Civilians in Chechnya are constantly at risk of being the victims of willful or random violence perpetrated by a number of actors, some of whom seem to be connected with the federal authorities while others seem to be operating outside of federal control. However, because of the reign of impunity currently in place in Chechnya, crimes are not investigated and the identity of the criminals cannot be established with certainty.

[...]

Torture

Torture has been a persistent feature of the present war in Chechnya. In a rare public statement on 10 July 2003 the Council of Europe's Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) described some of the methods of torture employed by the federal forces in Chechnya (such as persistent beatings, suffocation, electroshocks to vulnerable parts of the body), and criticized Russian authorities for failing to stop torture and failing to bring the perpetrators to justice. However, despite its international obligations, despite the mounting evidence of systematic violations of humanitarian law and persistent criticism from international human rights institutions, the Russian authorities have not taken any effective measures against the use of torture by federal forces and the forces of the local administration in Chechnya. Torture remains an integral part of the federal campaign. It is widespread, systematic and so common in Chechnya that it is part of the every day life of the civilian population.

[...]

Indiscriminate Attacks on Populated Areas

There were a number of reports about artillery and aviation attacks on populated areas, sometimes in connection with confrontations between federal forces and armed Chechen formations. It is a violation of Humanitarian Law to use civilian buildings and populated areas from which to attack the opponent, as it appears that the Chechen fighters are doing. But according to witnesses, many of the federal attacks or counter-attacks were either unprovoked or a disproportionate response causing needless civilian casualties and damage to civilian property. These incidents tended to occur in the mountain villages in the south of Chechnya." (IHF September 2003)

See the chronology of major incidents and attacks which occurred in the Chechen Republic after the referendum on 23 March 2003, Council of Europe, 20 June 2003 (in Appendix in 28th interim report by the Council of Europe Secretary General on the presence of the Council of Europe's experts in Chechnya) [Internet]

See also:

- *Public Statement concerning the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation, European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) 10 July 2003 [Internet]*
- *"No human rights improvements in post-referendum Chechnya", International Helsinki Federation, 18 July 2003 [Internet]*
- *Human Rights Briefing Paper to the 59th Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights on the Human Rights Situation in Chechnya, 7 April 2003 [Internet]*
- *"Daily Kidnappings refute Russian claim of order in Chechnya" 11 August 2003, and "Nearly 270 people abducted in Chechnya this year", 19 August 2003, Agency France Press [Internet]*
- *"Chechen partisans continue laying mines and explosives", Prague Watchdog, 18 April 2003 [Internet]*

Chechen IDPs in other parts of the Russian Federation: discrimination and harassment (2003)

- Displaced Chechens in Moscow have encountered serious problems regarding their legal status
- They are also subject to vigorous security checks, evictions and harassment
- Restrictive rulings by the Moscow mayor de facto denies Chechens IDPs access to the forced migrant status
- Public discrimination and targeting by police also result from acts of terrorism committed in Moscow
- Local NGO 'Civic Assistance,' providing legal and social counselling to IDPs, has reported an increase in police harassment on ethnic Chechens, including Chechen IDPs
- In the absence of temporary registration, IDPs in Moscow have not been able to exercise basic social and civil rights
- Very strong anti-Chechen feeling has developed in many parts of the Russian Federation

"According to Russian Government sources, there are several hundred thousand ethnic Chechens in Moscow. Most of them are not IDPs. However, those Chechens displaced because of the current conflict and who have come to Moscow have encountered serious problems regarding their legal status, residence, and sometimes face vigorous and repeated security checks, eviction from their apartments and harassment by other groups of the local population. For example, the 21 September 1999 Resolution No. 875 of the Moscow City Government, expressly referring to recent *'terrorist acts that caused the deaths of many civilians'*, instituted a re-registration procedure for all non-Muscovites staying in the capital. As a result of this regulation, thousands of persons previously registered in Moscow City could not re-register with the authorities. In practice, it became almost impossible for new arrivals, especially IDPs from Chechnya, to register in Moscow.

Another Moscow Mayoral decree of 28 September 1999 stipulates that in order to apply for forced migrant status, the concerned applicants must be in possession of a registration document issued by the competent body of the Federal Ministry of Interior valid for a term of not less than six months. In practice, however, it has been almost impossible for Chechen IDPs to obtain sojourn registration in Moscow. They need sojourn registration to apply for forced migrant status, but sojourn registration is denied in practice. Local NGOs reported numerous instances where Chechen IDPs applying for forced migrant status were told by local migration officers to return to 'safe areas' in Chechnya. Instances were reported where legally resident individuals in Moscow who vouched for IDPs, guaranteeing them housing to facilitate their registration with the authorities, were themselves fined for violating registration regulations.

The restrictive rulings of the mayor of Moscow City should be viewed in the wider context of massive internal migration to Moscow from Russia's economically and ecologically devastated regions in the East and the Far East, as well as from the Caucasus. The city authorities claim that several hundred thousand non-Muscovites are staying or working illegally in Moscow. Each year, the local bodies of the interior are reported to expel (by train) several thousand illegal residents outside the city boundaries. Chechen IDPs, however, must also confront prejudice stemming from the activities of the so-called 'Chechen Mafia' said to occupy a prominent role in drug trafficking and organised crime. Public discrimination and targeting by police also result from acts of terrorism committed in Moscow, such as the August 1999 apartment bombings resulting in the loss of hundreds of lives, blamed on terrorists of Chechen origin, as well as the hostage taking in Moscow's Dubrovka theatre, in October 2002.

The October 2002 hostage crisis in Moscow triggered a number of measures by the federal and local authorities, countrywide, aimed at enhancing security and public order. Both the Ministry of Interior and the General Prosecutor's Office initiated investigations concerning the circumstances of the infiltration into Moscow City by Chechen fighters. After the raid, a city-wide search was launched to capture possible accomplices and dozens of suspects were arrested. Law enforcement officers increased and tightened ID checks in Moscow with the objective of identifying persons without sojourn registration. Such control measures are taking place in a context where the Moscow City police were blamed, officially as well as by

the media, for not being able to prevent the hostage taking, thus inciting the police authorities to exercise particular zeal in the on-going investigations. In this context, ethnic Chechens with identity documents indicating permanent residence in Chechnya are particularly at risk of being fined, detained and expelled from the city.

The local NGO 'Civic Assistance,' providing legal and social counselling to IDPs and forced migrants in Moscow, has reported an increase in police harassment cases on ethnic Chechens, including Chechen IDPs, in Moscow City, in the aftermath of the October 2002 hostage crisis. In particular, cases of apartment searches, administrative detention, denial of sojourn registration, expulsion from schools and sacking from jobs were documented by Civic Assistance. What transpires from the Civic Assistance's report is that, beyond preventive and/or repressive actions carried out by law enforcement agencies, prejudice and mistrust vis-à-vis ethnic Chechens have openly increased among the public, leading to discriminatory attitudes by other institutions such as schools.

In the absence of temporary registration, IDPs in Moscow have not been able to exercise basic social and civil rights, such as access to legal employment, medical care and education. Instances of confiscation of internal passports by the police, detention, and extortion of money have also been reported. The International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights claims that

on the streets of Moscow and other major cities of the Russian Federation, police, along with other law enforcement agencies, adopt blatantly racist attitudes towards Chechens, ethnic groups from the Caucasus and other minorities. Resorting to racial profiling, police stop dark-skinned people, including Chechens and other ethnic minorities on the street on the pretext of identity checks. In some cases, the detained persons have reported being forced by police to pay a bribe for some perceived irregularity in their identity or registration papers. In numerous other reported cases, Chechens and other Caucasus nationalities have complained that police planted drugs or weapons on their person and then demanded a bribe to secure their release. In detention, detainees also complain of being subjected to torture and ill-treatment with the reported aim of extracting a confession.

According to information available from local human rights groups, the situation in Russia's second largest town, St Petersburg, is similar concerning restrictive practices in issuing sojourn registration to Chechen IDPs. In the absence of sojourn registration, Chechen IDPs have no legal access to social welfare. However, the Chechen community in St Petersburg is much smaller than in Moscow and it is acknowledged by human rights groups that police harassment, fines and administrative detention of improperly registered persons is not as acute as in Moscow.

The situation of Chechen IDPs in the rest of the Russian Federation is not as well-documented as in the regions of the Federation mentioned above. However, based upon information available to UNHCR, the following can be said:

- a) Ethnic Chechens traditionally do not reside in areas beyond the northern Caucasus republics and the larger western Russian cities. Chechen IDPs are reluctant to travel to areas where there is no resident Chechen community with whom they could stay, even illegally;
- b) There is a lack of information concerning the possible violation of federal rules on freedom of movement by eastern and far-eastern regions of the Federation as well as on the control of the legality of local regulations in those regions by federal organs. However, the Russian Federation Ombudsman has documented such violations in some instances;
- c) Some border regions of the Federation have specific concerns regarding illegal migration and are very sensitive regarding the movement and status of populations on their territory (e.g. those regions sharing the 6,000-km long 'transparent' border with Kazakhstan, and eastern regions faced with legal and illegal migration flows from China.);

d) Most importantly, a very strong anti-Chechen feeling has developed in many parts of the Russian Federation. This feeling, already present during the previous Chechnya conflict in 1994-96, has re-emerged after the terrorist bombings of August 1999 in Moscow and been reinforced by the October 2002 hostage crisis in Moscow. It has been exacerbated by some national and local media as well as by the relatively high level of casualties among federal troops serving in the military and in the Ministry of Interior special forces deployed to Chechnya, which is randomly affecting soldiers. Families throughout the Federation;

e) Finally, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the USA have led some Government officials and media members to draw parallels with the 'anti-terrorist operation' in Chechnya, which is likely to contribute to increased suspicion towards Chechens in general." (UNHCR February 2003, paras. 48-55)

See also "Kabardino-Balkaria clamps down on refugees", Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 3 April 2003 [Internet]

Reports of IDPs being resettled by local authorities in Chechnya and Ingushetia (June-September 2002)

- 2,000 persons living in two tent camps in Znamenskoe were transferred to temporary accommodation centres in Chechnya (June 2002)
- UN expressed doubts that the relocation can be regarded as entirely voluntary
- IDPs remain concerned about safety and living conditions in Chechnya
- Authorities have also planned the closure of another tent camps in Aki Yurt (September 2002)

Closure of tent camps in Znamenskoe (July 2002)

"A top United Nations relief official today voiced concern over the circumstances surrounding the recent closures of two camps in Chechnya, Russian Federation, and the subsequent transfer of their 2,000 residents to temporary accommodations.

Under-Secretary-General Kenzo Oshima, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, called on the Russian authorities to ensure that all actions were taken to preserve the right of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) to a voluntary return, in safety and dignity, and to comply with the assurances given to the UN in this matter.

According to the statement, the 2,000 IDPs staying at the camps in Znamenskoye were moved to temporary accommodation centres in the Chechen capital of Grozny. According to UN reports from the region, the relocation could not be regarded as entirely voluntary.

The reports also noted that some of the IDPs were very concerned about the security situation in Grozny and that living conditions in the temporary accommodation centres were not satisfactory, the statement said." (UN News Service, 23 July 2002)

See also:

- *Médecins Sans Frontière, "MSF Condemns Relocation of Displaced Persons", 9 July 2002 [Internet]*
- *Médecins Du Monde, "Report on Chechnya", July 2002 [Internet]*

Relocation of IDPs in Ingushetia (September 2002)

"In meetings with UNHCR late last week, Ingushetia authorities gave assurances that Ingushetia will remain a safe haven for people displaced from neighboring Chechnya. The assurances came during meetings with UNHCR Deputy Director for Europe Robert Robinson, who was visiting the area as part of a mission to the Russian Federation. Ingush President M. Zyazikov and other authorities all reconfirmed the

government's policy that the principle of voluntary return would be respected with regard to displaced persons from Chechnya.

Mr. Robinson also met in Nazran with General I. Yunash, First Deputy Head of the Federal Migration Service, who is coordinating the government's assistance in Ingushetia for those displaced who have chosen not to return to Chechnya at this time. In addition to reconfirming the policy of voluntariness, Gen. Yunash outlined the government's plans to improve conditions for those displaced who will spend another winter in Ingushetia. In announcing the government's decision to close the tented camp at Aki Yurt, Gen. Yunash assured Mr. Robinson that the conditions at their new location in Ingushetia – including health and education facilities as well as shelter, water, sanitation, gas and electricity – will be better than the current ones. Aki Yurt currently houses some 400 displaced families. The United Nations will be working closely with all those concerned, including the displaced themselves, to monitor the situation." (UNHCR 17 September 2002)

See also the September 2002 Report of the People in Need Foundation [Internet]

Displaced in Ingushetia under pressure to return to Chechnya (1999-2001)

- Ingushetia has been the only territory opened to the civilians fleeing the war in Chechnya
- Since 1999, Federal authorities have attempted to return the displaced to Chechnya
- Methods used include the transfer of settlements and aid from Ingushetia and the creation of "safe areas" in Chechnya
- Since April 2001, Federal authorities have suspended the registration of newly displaced arriving in Ingushetia
- According to recent survey, most displaced have no intention of returning to Chechnya during 2001
- UNHCR recommends cautious approach to return to Chechnya

"We are extremely concerned that the Russian authorities are again pressing the inhabitants of the Chechen Republic to return.

Since the renewal of military activities in Chechnya in the autumn of 1999 there have been numerous attempts first not to let the peaceful population leave the territory of Chechnya and then to make them return.

Inhabitants of Chechnya, wishing to leave the fighting zone, were forbidden from travelling beyond its borders. At the end of September 1999, a telegram was sent to this effect to the interior ministry authorities for the regions and republics of the Russian Federation. It was signed by the commander of the united "West" federal military group, General Major V Shamanov.

Practically the only Russian region receiving forcibly displaced persons from Chechnya was the republic of Ingushetia. At the beginning of November 1999, its borders were opened to people fleeing the war, on the personal instruction of President of the Republic of Ingushetia, R Aushev. The federal military command opposed this decision for a long time.

As early as 12 November 1999, Deputy Primeminister of the Russian Government and representative of the Russian Government in the Chechen Republic, Nicolai Koshman, stated at a press conference that by 25 December all Chechens who had been forcibly displaced would be relocated from Ingushetia to the territory of Chechnya. Soon thereafter, an attempt was made to send railway carriages with refugees from Ingushetia into Chechnya.

Later various populated areas in Chechnya were declared 'safe zones'. It was recommended to people who had lived in these areas that they could return to them. Both inside Chechnya, and beyond its borders, inhabitants from the "safe zones" were not allowed to register using Form No. 7, essential for receiving minimum welfare benefits. By Order No. 15 of the Federal Welfare Ministry of 25 February 2000, Form No. 7 was abolished completely. However, within three weeks this order was revoked because of the worsening situation in Chechnya and the sharp increase in the flows of refugees.

Appeals and even demands to return are being continually repeated. At the same time, provision of food in the refugee camps in Ingushetia has stopped. Ingushetia is owed between 300 and 500 million roubles by the federal authorities. Meanwhile the return of inhabitants to Chechnya has been accompanied neither by the creation of even basic living conditions nor any relenting in the arbitrary behaviour of the military. Since the start of 2001, in the few temporary living centres to which refugees have been sent from Chechnya since autumn 1999 food has been stopped on a number of occasions.

[...]

Since 13 April 2001, registration of people leaving the Chechen Republic on Form No. 7 has been stopped by a decision of the territorial authority for the federal ministry for Ingushetia. The minister from the Ingushetia Republic Emergency Situations Ministry, V Kuks, has declared that registration will stop for about one month until a new form is available. However, no mention has been made of the new form in any federal documents.

[...]

At the request of the UNHCR, members of the non-governmental organisation 'Vesta' carried out a poll of 624 families of Chechens (4,370 people), living in private homes, camps and other arbitrary accommodation which has sprung up in Ingushetia. Around 24 % of families asked, said that some or all members of their family planned to return to Chechnya this year. Around 75 % of families did not plan to return this year, if the situation remained unchanged, and 9 % of families had no intention of ever returning to Chechnya. On the basis of these results it is easy to conclude that the inhabitants of Chechnya are not ready to return.

People do not wish to return home, not just because of the advice of Ruslan Aushev. The reasons are well known: no guarantees of safety, shootings, people being killed on a daily basis, illegal actions being carried out by representatives of federal forces, especially during the continual 'clean-up' operations." (Memorial 7 June 2001)

See also Memorial, Violations of humanitarian law and human rights; situation of civilians who have fled the conflict zone 20 January 2001 [Internet] and Situation of Internally Displaced Persons in the Republic of Ingushetia, Spring 2001 [Internet]

"The Russian authorities on many occasions assured the delegation that they do not intend to exert any pressure on IDPs to return and there are no reports of direct forced repatriation.

However, some IDPs complain that in order to collect their pensions they have to go to Chechnya even if they are registered in Ingushetia which they feel as a kind of indirect pressure." (COE 23 January 2001, paras. 45-46)

Various organizations have denounced the pressure on IDPs in Ingushetia to return to Chechnya. See for example

- UNHCR, *Paper on Asylum Seekers from the Russian Federation in the Context of the Situation in Chechnya, January 2002 [Internal link]*
- Human Rights Watch, *Russia/Chechnya, Swept Under: Torture, Forced Disappearances, and Extrajudicial Killings During Sweep Operations in Chechnya, February 2002 [Internet]*
- Médecins Sans Frontières, *Chechnya/Ingushetia, Vulnerable Persons Denied Assistance, January 2002 [Internet]*

Reports of security incidents in IDP camps and settlements in Ingushetia and Chechnya (2000-2002)

- There have been reports of security operations conducted by federal forces in IDP settlements and camps in Ingushetia and Chechnya
- Firing and shelling in proximity of villages in southern Ingushetia created anxiety among locals and IDPs (2000-2002)

Incidents in Ingushetia (2002)

"[M]ilitary forces have recently been positioned in the immediate vicinity of the camps for displaced Chechens in Ingushetia (e.g., the newly installed military post of Troitskaya, which is about 5km from the Sputnik and Alina tent camps in Sleptovskaya, eastern Ingushetia). This has coincided with an increased number of arrests of displaced people and the 'disappearance' of others from these camps. These events heighten the climate of insecurity and fear, and further pressure the displaced Chechens to leave." (MSF 30 July 2002)

"NGOs report that troops moved into the area [Ingushetia] in recent weeks are for the first time attacking refugees. Local observers say Russian authorities are telling international agencies that the deployment is related to continued disturbances in nearby Georgia, where U.S. troops are now also stationed, and that troops are merely engaged in exercises. Prague Watchdog, a Czech online news service about the North Caucasus (<http://www.watchdog.cz>), reported night raids have begun on the camps. On 28 May, at about 4 a.m., armed men wearing masks and camouflage uniforms burst into the Satsita refugee camp in the periphery of the Ordzhonikidzevskaya settlement, terrorizing residents, and arresting one young man." (RFE/RL 5 June 2002)

See Prague Watchdog, "Russian soldiers check refugees in Ingushetia", 29 May 2002 [Internet]

"In September 2002, the first serious military confrontation between federal forces and Chechen fighters on Ingush soil took place. During a 26 September 2002 rebel incursion of some 180 fighters from Georgia's Pankisi gorge to Ingushetia, a military helicopter was shot down near the village of Galashi, in southern Ingushetia. The incident was followed by several days of fighting in the surrounding mountain forests. Galashi villagers as well as several hundreds Chechen IDPs who were residing in the area consequently fled to central and northern parts of Ingushetia. While those surviving Chechen fighters were presumed by the Russian authorities to have fled to Chechnya and to the Pankisi gorge, some were suspected by the said authorities to have possibly managed to hide in other parts of Ingushetia." (UNHCR February 2003, para. 39)

"Over the past months there has been a tendency of the federal authorities to intervene more directly in Ingushetia for alleged security reasons. The federal forces have conducted a number of security related operations in IDP settlements and camps, in search of weapons and drugs, arresting a number of persons suspected to belong to Chechen rebel groups. In this respect, young males are particularly exposed." (UNHCR January 2002, para. 29)

Security condition in Temporary Accommodation Centres in Grozny (2002)

"No security guarantee has been given. Snipers have been shooting at one of the centres. The Russian army carries out frequent checks (The re-register refugees...). There have been reports of people being arrested, others disappeared. On July 19, there was a raid by the Chechen police and the Federal forces in one of the TACs. They shot in the air, took and released 6 men. After this 'incident', certain refugees intended to go back to Ingushetia." (MDM July 2002, p. 16)

A special group of concern: the children (2002)

- Special UN representative for children highlighted impact of war on children (June 2002)
- Violence and displacement have left many children traumatized
- Chechen fighters allegedly enlist children into their ranks or use them to plant landmines

"Further to his visit to the Russian Federation, the UN Special Representative for children and armed conflict, Mr. Olara A. Otunnu, concluded that the two periods of armed conflict in Chechnya (1994 to 1996 and 1999 onwards) have clearly left a very extensive and serious impact on children. He indicated that some 50 per cent of internally displaced persons (IDPs) are children. The use and impact of landmines is grave and has been particularly damaging for children, with about 500,000 mines in Chechnya, making it one of the most mine-contaminated areas in the world. Exposure to violence and displacement has left many children traumatized. Moreover, Chechen fighters allegedly enlist children into their ranks and they also provide financial incentives for children to plant landmines and explosives (Office of the UN Special Representative for children and armed conflict, 24.6.2002).

While in the North Caucasus, Mr. Otunnu expressed his concern for the protection and well-being of all children affected by armed conflicts in the region. He pointed out that support and relief must be provided, on a humanitarian and impartial basis, to all who have suffered as a result of armed conflict, regardless of their ethnicity, political or religious affiliations (idem). In this connection, note should be taken of the regular mental health co-ordination meeting held by World Health Organisation (WHO) in Nazran on 29 May 2002, in which twelve NGOs from Ingushetia and Chechnya participated (WHO, April-May 2002)." (COE 16 July 2002, Addendum II)

See also:

"U.N. envoy welcomes firm assurances concerning voluntary return of displaced Chechen populations", UN press release, 24 June 2002 [Internet]

Displaced exposed to insecurity: The case of the sweep operation in Sernovodsk (western Chechnya) (July 2001)

- On 2 July, male displaced persons, including children, were detained and taken away by the federal forces
- Testimonies collected by Human Rights Watch researchers reveals that dozens if not hundreds of detainees were subjected to torture or ill-treatment on 2 and 3 July
- During the night of 3-4 July, Russian troops conducted another operation at the railway carriages
- Many of the IDPs panicked and fled to Ingushetia

"Sernovodsk is a village in western Chechnya, approximately ten kilometers from the border with Ingushetia. After Russian troops were stationed in Sernovodsk in November 1999, the village was relatively peaceful for about eighteen months, and Human Rights Watch documented few serious abuses against civilians there.

In addition to its permanent population of approximately 7,000 people, Sernovodsk for almost two years has also served as the temporary home for thousands of displaced persons from other parts of Chechnya. Shortly after retaking the village, Russian government officials stated that displaced Chechens could safely return to Sernovodsk and, in early December 1999, announced they would build facilities for the displaced there. In late June 2001, 2,611 IDPs were living in Sernovodsk in dozens of railway carriages, a former student home, and in private houses.

[...]

[On the morning of July 2], the soldiers, the soldiers-often in uniforms without any form of identification and, by some accounts, drunk-checked homes and detained men all over town, often without as much as checking their identity papers. They also conducted checks at the temporary residences of IDPs. One IDP living in railway carriages told Human Rights Watch that the soldiers came with big attack dogs to check passports and detained a number of men. The soldiers also came to the so-called tekhnikum, a building that once had housed students but at that time was in use as a residence for IDPs. Soldiers surrounded the building, searched it, and took the men out onto the street where they forced them to kneel on the sidewalk. One IDP estimated some fifty people were eventually taken away. Villagers said that among the detainees were children as young as fourteen or fifteen years old. For example, a local schoolteacher told Human Rights Watch she witnessed the detention of two of her students, fourteen or fifteen years old, on Lenin Street.

A full APC drove up. They [the soldiers] were all sitting on top, the whole APC was full of them. In masks. Armed. They took those children. Their mother fainted and fell... The neighbors were saying: 'Why are you taking them? They're not even fourteen or fifteen years old!' We all cried and screamed: 'Don't take them!' They said: 'We'll check their documents and release them.'

The boys were released that evening. They had apparently not been harmed.

Many villagers asserted that soldiers detained all males between fifteen and fifty-five. The village administrator's account is different, though disturbing enough. Vakha Arsamakov, the head of administration of Sernovodsk, estimated that the soldiers detained 182 IDPs and 438 inhabitants of the town on that day-a large number, but not close to being all the males between fifteen and fifty-five. Some villagers evidently avoided being detained by paying bribes to the soldiers or hiding. Several witnesses also said soldiers had simply checked their papers and not detained them.

The soldiers took most of the detainees to the temporary base that they set up just outside Sernovodsk, not far from the mosque. According to villagers, soldiers had lined up military vehicles in a field and set up a tent camp. Many of the detainees were held in the field while others were taken into an unfinished or partially destroyed building with an open basement. Many of the men on the field were forced to lie face down. Others were forced to kneel on the ground without moving or speaking or face beatings as punishment. The soldiers randomly took detainees from the field or basement to military vehicles or tents where they beat them or subjected them to electric shocks.

In the meantime, female relatives of the detainees gathered at the edge of the field to demand the release of their relatives and were held back by tanks and dogs. When twelve detainees were loaded onto a bus for transportation to a detention center in Achkhoy-Martan, some of the women threw stones at the soldiers.

At around midnight, most of the detainees-with the exception of those transported to Achkhoy-Martan-were released. According to some eyewitnesses, detainees were permitted to go home on the condition that they voluntarily returned to the close-by mosque early the next morning.

July 3

During the night of July 3-4, Russian troops conducted another operation at the railway carriages. Many of the IDPs panicked and fled to Ingushetia. A female IDP, who lived in one of the wagons, told Human Rights Watch that at 4:00 a.m. the soldiers came and started detaining men and searched her compartment thoroughly. They did not ask for any passports, she said, but simply took the men. She left the wagons afterwards and went to Ingushetia.

According to another woman, the word that soldiers were randomly detaining IDP men without even looking at their identity papers immediately spread along the forty-odd railway carriages. She said she and many others decided not to wait for the soldiers but to flee. A third woman, who said she was afraid that

her brothers might be detained the next day, told Human Rights Watch she and her two brothers left at 3:00 a.m. and walked through the hills. These women said they were part of a large group—one estimated several hundred people—that followed trails over the hills for about 90 minutes. Human Rights Watch interviewed them just days later in Ingushetia.

Torture and Other Ill-Treatment

The testimony of former detainees, their relatives and numerous other villagers collected by Human Rights Watch researchers, as well as numerous written appeals from residents or IDPs from Sernovodsk to the local administration, reveal that dozens if not hundreds of detainees were subjected to torture or ill-treatment on July 2 and 3. Detainees suffered sustained beatings, electric shocks, and were forced to sit in painful positions for extended periods of time without moving. Several eyewitnesses said the older men were often treated worse than boys in their mid-teens.

Human Rights Watch conducted detailed interviews with four men who had been detained during the sweep in Sernovodsk and who said they had been beaten severely; three had also been subjected to electric shock. Human Rights Watch conducted further detailed interviews with the relatives of a fifth man, who was detained and ill-treated in various ways, including electric shock. Of the five detainees, two had been held at the temporary base outside Sernovodsk, two at the temporary police precinct in Achkhoy-Martan, and one in a pit not far from Assinovskaya. Two of the detainees were released the day of their detention, one a day later. The two others were held for one week.

Human Rights Watch also reviewed copies of fifty-one appeals from residents or IDPs from Sernovodsk to the local administration, concerning a total of twenty-nine detainees. With regard to twenty of these detainees, the appeals stated clearly that they had been ill-treated or tortured; one stated that the detainee had returned home in a 'state of shock.' According to the appeals, eleven of the twenty detainees were beaten for long periods; nine suffered electric shock; and five had been forced to kneel for hours with T-shirts over their eyes. One detainee was allegedly threatened with execution." (HRW February 2002, pp. 26-28)

Women in Chechnya exposed to rape and sexual violence (2001)

- Collected evidence confirms that Russian soldiers raped Chechen women and sexually assaulted both men and women in detention centers
- Acknowledgement, investigation, and prosecution of such crimes against civilians have been alarmingly few, according to Human Rights Watch

Human Rights Watch Report to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (January 2002)

"Civilians in Chechnya continue to be the victims of systematic violations of human rights and humanitarian law, facing the daily risk of torture, 'disappearance,' and summary executions at the hands of Russian federal forces. Federal soldiers and police on sweep operations arbitrarily detain men and women, and frequently loot and burn homes. Detainees are often taken to makeshift detention facilities such as pits dug into the ground, where they are routinely tortured and denied all due process rights. Human Rights Watch has conducted investigations into abuses committed in Chechnya since the recurrence of major military clashes in the region in September 1999. In the course of this research, Human Rights Watch has documented credible accounts of violence against women in the region, including sexual violence, and wishes to bring these allegations to the attention of the Committee.

Human Rights Watch is concerned that Russia has resisted a meaningful accountability process. Russian law enforcement agencies have failed to launch serious investigations into most cases of abuse, and have

failed to prosecute the perpetrators. The government's failure to investigate abuses against civilians vigorously has fostered an atmosphere of impunity among Russian troops in Chechnya.

Rape and Other Forms of Sexual Violence in Chechnya

Despite cultural taboos against speaking about rape, witnesses provided evidence that Russian soldiers raped Chechen women in areas of Russian-controlled Chechnya and sexually assaulted both men and women in detention centers. In 1999 and 2000, Human Rights Watch researchers found that rapes occurred on the outskirts of villages, at checkpoints, and in detention centers. Fear of rape by Russian forces was pervasive, causing some families, particularly those with young women and girls, to flee and motivating desperate attempts to hide female family members. The cases outlined below draw from direct testimony provided to Human Rights Watch in the field.

[...]

Rape at Checkpoints

Russian military and police forces have hundreds of checkpoints within Chechnya and between Chechnya and neighboring regions of Russia. Federal servicemen are notorious for using the checkpoints to extort bribes from civilians; Human Rights Watch also found several cases of rape at checkpoints.

[...]

Rape and Sexual Violence in Detention Centers

More than half of those interviewed by Human Rights Watch about detention centers alleged that guards raped and sexually assaulted both male and female detainees. Although none of the interviewees explicitly stated that he or she was a victim of rape, several did describe abuse rising to the level of sexual assault and provided credible evidence of rape in the Chernokozovo facility, a particularly notorious detention center. Women reported that male guards forced them to strip inside the detention facility. Sexual violence in the form of forced nudity served to threaten and humiliate detainees, and added to Chernokozovo's environment of terror, intimidation, and degrading treatment. Forced nudity also served as a precursor to additional sexual violence described by both male and female detainees.

[...]

Record of impunity

Human Rights Watch and other nongovernmental organizations have called for accountability in the face of these abuses. Russian authorities have concealed and obstructed the prosecution of government forces for such violations; acknowledgement, investigation, and prosecution of such crimes against civilians have been alarmingly few, and many were conducted in bad faith. In April 2001, a joint Council of Europe-Russian Duma working group compiled a list of 358 criminal investigations into alleged abuses against civilians. But only about 20 percent of the cases were under active investigation and the authorities had suspended more than half of the total investigations. The criminal investigations did not include a single case of torture or ill-treatment and very few abuse cases ever advanced to the courts. Resolutions adopted in April 2000 and April 2001 by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights called for Russia, among other things, to establish a national commission of inquiry to investigate such crimes and to invite U.N. special rapporteurs to conduct investigations in the region. Russia rejected both resolutions and did not fulfill the resolutions' requirements.

The Russian government failed to mention the conditions of women in Chechnya in its fifth periodic report to the Committee. We hope that this omission can be remedied as the Russian government presents its report to the Committee. We ask the members of the Committee to press the Russian government to end impunity for crimes of violence and sexual violence against civilians in Chechnya. In particular:

The Russian government should investigate thoroughly all allegations of rape and ill-treatment of civilians, particularly of women. Soldiers and officers alleged to have committed atrocities and violations of human rights or humanitarian law should face investigation and, if the evidence warrants, should be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.

The Russian government should provide training for all Russian forces in Chechnya on the Geneva Conventions, the Convention against Torture, and the human rights of women.

Victims and witnesses of human rights and humanitarian law violations should receive witness protection if they agree to cooperate with authorities. The Russian government should ensure that witnesses against perpetrators of these crimes do not face retaliation.

The Russian government should remove all obstacles delaying the planned visit to Chechnya of the special rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on violence against women, its causes and consequences." (HRW January 2002)

See also Amnesty International, Russian Federation: Summary of concerns on the human rights of women and girls, 25 January 2002 [Internet]

Freedom of movement

Freedom of movement continues to be de facto restricted (2003)

- Although federal legislation abolished sojourn or residence authorization (*propiska*), many regional authorities continue to apply restrictive local regulation or practices
- The impact on Chechen IDPs is that they continue to be severely restricted in their possibilities to reside legally outside Chechnya and beyond Ingushetia

"The Russian Constitution states in Article 27 that:

(1) Everyone who is lawfully staying on the territory of Russian Federation shall have the right to freedom of movement and to choose the place to stay and reside. (2) Everyone shall be free to leave the boundaries of the Russian Federation. The citizens of the Russian Federation shall have the right to freely return to the Russian Federation.

In light of the tsarist-era restrictions on movements of the subjects of the Empire, as well as of the Soviet-era '*propiska*' regime, the Russian government found it necessary to issue a law in 1993 regarding freedom of movement. The basic concept under this federal law has been to establish a system of registration at the place of sojourn (so-called '*temporary registration*') or at the place of residence (so-called '*permanent registration*'), whereby citizens notify the local bodies of interior of their place of sojourn/residence, as opposed to the former '*propiska*' regime, which empowered the police authorities to authorise (or deny) citizens to sojourn or reside in a given location.

Although federal legislation officially has abolished '*propiska*' requirements, many regional authorities of the Federation nevertheless apply restrictive local regulations or administrative practice. Relevant in this context is the partial failure of the State organs responsible for control of the legality of administrative acts (e.g. the Russian Federation Constitutional Court and the Commissioner on Human Rights of the Russian Federation, or Ombudsman) to effectively correct the violations of federal legislation on freedom of movement perpetrated by the various constituent entities of the Federation. In its October 2000 special report '*On the Constitutional Right to Liberty of Movement and Freedom to Choose a Place of Sojourn and Residence in the Russian Federation*', the Russian Federation Ombudsman deplores that

violations of constitutional rights to liberty of movement and freedom to choose one's place of sojourn and residence by government bodies are due not only to regulations of constituents of the Russian Federation

being contrary to federal legislation regulating this constitutional right, but also to unlawful law-enforcement practices,

which are, by nature, more difficult to document and thus to contest before the courts of law.

As a result of the imperfect transition from the *propiska* regime to a registration system, local authorities throughout the Russian Federation retain the possibility to determine modalities of implementation, sometimes in a restrictive manner, of freedom of movement and choice of place of sojourn or residence. This is particularly the case in regions attempting to protect local labour markets, to control internal migration movements, or to prevent the settlement of economically or politically 'undesirable' migrants. The impact of this on Chechen IDPs is that they continue to be severely restricted in their possibilities to reside legally (i.e., with requisite residency registration) outside Chechnya and beyond Ingushetia." (UNHCR February 2003, paras. 20-23)

IDPs from Chechnya face limitations to their freedom of movement in Northern Caucasus (2003)

- Multiethnic republics in northern Caucasus have been reluctant to receive IDPs from Chechnya
- The republic of Kabardino-Balkaria imposes a ban on the sojourn or residence of Russian citizens from other regions who do not have close family ties with residents
- Slavic regions of Stavropol and Krasnodar have also enforced limitations to the sojourn and residence of non-ethnic Russians
- In North Ossetia-Alania, local restrictive administrative practice prevents Chechen IDPs from sojourning in that republic

"For the purpose of examining the availability of internal relocation beyond Chechnya elsewhere in the northern Caucasus, one should differentiate between those regions where the majority of the population is non-Slavic or of Muslim faith (Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachai-Tcherkessia) and those regions where the majority is Slavic or of Christian faith (North Ossetia-Alania, Stavropol Krai and Krasnodar Krai).

The Republics of Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachai-Cherkessia are multi-ethnic and are regularly confronted with tensions among the various communities. The current conflict in Chechnya was sparked with the infiltration of Chechen rebel groups into Dagestan followed by military confrontation with Dagestani and federal armed forces. Dagestan is currently hosting approximately 8,000 IDPs. Since the beginning of the conflict, Chechen fighters have used the mountainous areas of Dagestan, which borders Chechnya, as base camps. Dagestan has been reluctant to receive any additional IDPs from Chechnya. In May 2002, a powerful anti-personnel mine was detonated at a military parade in the town of Kaspiisk, killing 45 persons. The authorities blame Chechen rebel commander Rappani Khalilov for this attack.

The situation in the republics of Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachai-Cherkessia is characterised by ethnic tensions and political rivalries between the two constituent nationalities (Kabards vs. Balkars and Karachais vs. Cherkess). These two republics are mainly concerned with maintaining the equilibrium among their respective constituencies. This equilibrium is particularly fragile in Karachai-Cherkessia, where a terrorist bombing occurred on 24 March 2001 in Agidehahl village. The Federal authorities blamed Chechen fighters for the incident. Kabardino-Balkaria has been regularly cited by the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation for violating the Constitution as well as federal legislation on freedom of movement and choice of place of sojourn and residence of citizens. Pursuant to a 1994 resolution adopted by the Parliament of Kabardino-Balkaria (amended in 1997), a direct ban (still in force) was imposed on the sojourn or residence in Kabardino-Balkaria of Russian citizens from other regions of the Federation who do not have close family ties with Kabardino-Balkaria residents.

Both the Stavropol and Krasnodar regions have been sanctioned several times by the Russian Federation Constitutional Court, as well as cited by the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation, for violating constitutional and federal legislative provisions related to freedom of movement and freedom to choose a place of sojourn or residence. In particular, the Russian Federation Ombudsman in the October 2000 Special Report *"On the constitutional right to freedom of movement and freedom to choose a place of sojourn and residence in the Russian Federation,"* notes that

the Law of Krasnodar Krai on the Registration Procedure Relating to Sojourn and Residence in Krasnodar Krai implies that a person who arrives in the territories of [this constituent] of the Russian Federation and who does not have kinship or ethnic and cultural ties [in Krasnodar Krai] will face considerable difficulties in realising his/her right to freely choose his residence in [this territory].

The problem for Chechen IDPs who wish to settle or even sojourn in these two regions is not limited to restrictive local regulations. Historically, these two regions have been the bases for Russian expansion and conquest of the Caucasus. There are traditionally strong Russian nationalistic feelings among the local population of these two regions, where Cossack groups as well as the far right Russian Nationalist Union (RNU) are well established and organised. IDPs from the previous 1994-96 conflict present in these regions (where they were granted forced migrant status) are generally ethnic Russians and some of them are actively engaged in anti-Chechen campaigns. Stavropol Krai has been targeted by various terrorist acts presumably connected to the Chechnya conflict and the July 1995 attack, during which a group led by Shamil Basayev seized 1,500 hostages in the Budenovsk town's hospital (Stavropol Krai), remains a traumatic memory for the resident population.

The situation is different in North Ossetia-Alania. It is not so much local restrictive *regulations* on residence registration but rather local restrictive *administrative practice* that is preventing Chechen IDPs from sojourning in that republic. The Republic of North Ossetia-Alania is a Caucasian Republic composed essentially of Ossets (Caucasian people mainly of Christian faith) and ethnic Russians, with a significant Ingush (Muslim) minority. Most of the 35,000 Ingush were driven out of North Ossetia-Alania (to Ingushetia) during the 1992 inter-ethnic riots in Prigorodny district. More than half of them has returned since then, but returnees are encountering various obstacles with their re-registration at their place of former residence in Prigorodny. There are approximately 7,000 Chechen IDPs in North Ossetia-Alania, most of whom reside in the district bordering Chechnya (Mozdok). This is a cause of concern for local authorities who fear that the presence of Chechens puts at risk the ethnic balance in the district." (UNHCR February 2003, paras. 42-47)

Freedom of movement in Northern Caucasus (2001-2003)

- Russian President acknowledged high number of checkpoints (2003)
- IDPs enjoy improved freedom of movement between Chechnya and Ingushetia
- However, registration documents are only valid for specific sectors
- Memorial reports a growing level of extortion at checkpoints in Chechnya (September 2001)
- Other northern Caucasian republics have also restricted access to their territory for Chechens

"On February [2003] 25, Russian president Vladimir Putin pointed at a too high a number of checkpoints in Chechnya, during a federal Security Council meeting. Consequently the decision was taken to decrease the number of checkpoints in Grozny by 20%, the implementation of which started almost immediately." (PINF January-February 2003)

"There is today more freedom of movement allowing travel in and out of Chechnya than in previous months, although check-points are operating in an inconsistent and arbitrary manner." (IHF 23 July 2002)

Illegal extortion at checkpoints

"Freedom of movement of persons between Chechnya and Ingushetia has improved, and several thousand IDPs shuttle monthly between the two Republics to visit relatives, check on property, to trade, and for other reasons." (UNHCR January 2002, para. 5)

"The level of illegal extortion at checkpoints in Chechnya is growing. Since the very start of the 'anti-terrorist operation', servicemen and police at many of the checkpoints on the roads of Chechnya have been subjecting the drivers of passing cars to extortion.

In recent months, apparently because of rising prices, the level of illegal demands being made at checkpoints has risen sharply.

For example, until recently, at three checkpoints on the Rostov – Baku route (the checkpoints Kavkaz-1, at the junction with the Achkhoi-Martan road and at the junction with the Urus-Martan road), each humanitarian aid lorry (sent into Chechnya from Ingushetia by foreign and international organizations) was made to pay 50 roubles.

At the end of the Summer, the amounts demanded rose. Now servicemen and police demand 300 rouble per lorry.

The same thing is happening with private cars. The amounts demanded have multiplied several times. For example, at the checkpoint between the villages of Kurchula and Mairtup, drivers of minibuses used to have to pay 10 roubles to pass through and drivers of private cars five roubles. Now, since mid-September, soldiers charge 50 roubles for a minibus and from 20 to 30 roubles for private cars." (Memorial 14 September 2001)

Document requirements hamper free movement in Chechnya

"While the provision of registration documents is a condition for the movement of people within Grozny and for the receipt of social benefits, people entitled to them stressed the long waiting time before they are issued and their geographically limited validity. For example, one woman with whom we spoke told us that her husband was not able to join her in the housing centre because he had not been issued a registration document valid for entering her sector in Grozny because he originated from outside the Chechen Republic." (COE 22 September 2002, part II).

"Apart from the Russian military forces, the Head of Administration informed us, there are 80,000 people deployed on the ground from the Russian Ministry of the Interior and the locally recruited armed civil militia. Checkpoints are evident throughout Grozny and registration documents are constantly required. When we visited School Number Seven in Grozny we were told that within the precincts of the school itself there was no sense of immediate security risks. By contrast, at a centre for returned displaced people we were told that the building was locked at night and that after that in order to go the lavatory it was necessary to be given the permission of the guard on the door before crossing open land to the small building containing the several pit latrines (no seats) at the disposal of five hundred families." (COE 22 September 2002, part II)

See also "Travel of motor vehicles on Chechen territory is temporarily stopped, entry to Grozny closed", Pravda.ru, 28 September 2002 [Internet]

"Although the borders in the region are administrative ones, there are permanent police checkpoints and often the military police monitors the movement in the region. Cars with number plates from Chechnya are being stopped and people have to show their IDs (i.e. internal passports), registration and have to answer questions like: 'Why do you come here? Where do you go?' There is absolutely no guarantee that a car coming from Chechnya would be allowed to pass the administrative border. Given that all the republics of

the region – North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia – have been the area of terrorist incidents the situation is tense, regardless of what the federal law on freedom of movement guarantees." (ACCORD/UNHCR June 2002, p. 260)

SUBSISTENCE NEEDS (HEALTH NUTRITION AND SHELTER)

Food

IDPs remain dependent on external food aid (2003)

- Poor harvest in 2003 will result in price increase for staple commodities
- Less than 25% of beneficiaries sell any of their food aid, confirming that IDP and poor households use as much of their produce as possible for their own consumption

"Household food economy surveys and other regular assessment missions show that the food security situation for much of the population in Chechnya and for the IDP population in Ingushetia has deteriorated. Some 140,000 persons are displaced within Chechnya and 70,000 IDPs now reside in Ingushetia, most of whom have little or no access to employment. [DRC Household Economic Assessment 2003 estimated a 90% formal unemployment or underemployment rate among residents of Ingushetia.] Over 99% of the population of Chechnya and nearly all the IDPs in Ingushetia and Dagestan live under the poverty line (roughly US \$67 per person per month) and have difficulties in meeting their basic food needs [DRC Household Economic Assessment and Surveys in Chechnya 2003, DRC survey of IDPs in Ingushetia, June 2003]. The traditional coping mechanisms of the extended local family, mutual assistance and sale of assets are largely exhausted. According to a DRC survey, food represents about a third of the 'very poor' and 'poor' household budget. [DRC Household Economic Assessment, April 2003, pg. 10.]

Damage to the agriculture and food-processing sectors has led to a basic diet for most people of bread, potatoes and other food containing a low share of animal proteins and vitamins. With the poor harvest in 2003, local experts predict that wheat flour (and consequently bread) prices will increase this winter, therefore compounding the problem of access to food for the most vulnerable sectors of society.

In rural areas, crop production is limited not by access to land but by access to agricultural inputs. While seeds and tools are generally available in the local markets, most IDP and poor households are not in a position to pay the relatively high prices for low- quality seeds. Access to fertilizer is not considered a problem due to the widespread use of manure and compost. In Chechnya, most livestock is now held by private owners, with even poor households in rural areas rearing sheep, goats and exceptionally cows, but access to adequate veterinary services is lacking.

Beneficiaries see the need for additional food sources as high. Less than 25% of beneficiaries sell any of their food aid and only some five to ten percent of the crops grown under the FAO project in 2003 were marketed. This share is relatively low, confirming that IDP and poor households use as much of their produce as possible for their own consumption and is a clear indicator of the low level of household food security." (UN OCHA November 2003, pp. 26-27)

Shelter

Alternative housing solutions to IDPs evicted from camps in Ingushetia (2003)

- UNHCR and international NGOs ensure that IDPs evicted from camps have relocation options to other camps in Ingushetia
- The capacity of existing camps is expanded while rooms in temporary settlements are rehabilitated
- These efforts also benefit IDPs under threat of eviction from private accommodation
- UNHCR monitors the registration of the relocated IDPs and that utilities are provided in the camps

"UNHCR and Médecins Sans Frontières have been installing new tents in Satsita camp for the [families relocating from the Alina Camp (Camp A) to be closed in December 2003]. So far, 54 new tents have been installed, of which 35 have been connected to gas supply and 15 to electricity. Space in Satsita for new tents, however, is becoming scarce. According to MSF, there is room for only five more tents in Satsita. UNHCR will meet with the Migration Department and the Satsita camp administration to try to identify additional space for tent installation. Another relocation option for Alina camp residents is to move to temporary settlements. Twenty rooms have already been rehabilitated and could accommodate 150 to 160 people. The Danish Refugee Council and other groups continue to repair additional rooms." (UNHCR 9 December 2003)

"The Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) – Holland rehabilitated the first ten rooms intended for IDPs in two settlements in Ingushetia. Another 12 rooms were under repair. The Chechen Migration Department, the Ingush Government, UNHCR and several international NGOs had identified a total of 141 rooms to be made available to IDPs during a joint assessment of alternative shelter in Sunzhensky Raion of the republic in September. UNHCR together with the Ingush Migration Department will choose beneficiaries for the rehabilitated rooms among the most vulnerable IDP families. Gas and electricity supply was provided to the 166 new tents installed by UNHCR in Satsita camp for former B camp inhabitants. (UN OCHA 21 October 2003)

"UNHCR continued working closely with NGO partners and the authorities to ensure that tents in IDP tent camps in Ingushetia are in good condition for the next winter and/or that alternative shelter is available in Ingushetia for IDPs choosing not to return to Chechnya. There are 2,443 tents in the five tent camps in Ingushetia, and over 1,800 of them were replaced in 2002. UNHCR assessed 363 tents are being in need of replacement, though 308 of them were in camp B, from which the majority of organized returns are currently taking place. In addition, the agency, together with DRC and the International Rescue Committee (IRC), had already installed over 400 prefabricated 'box' tents for IDP families facing eviction from private accommodation and temporary settlements." (UN OCHA 25 July 2003)

On 29 September, the last of approximately 1,000 IDPs who had remained in IDP camp B moved to camp Satsita following negotiations between UNHCR, the federal and local authorities, and IDPs themselves. IDP not registered by the migration authorities were particularly hesitant about relocating from B camp, fearing that they would not be granted alternative shelter in Ingushetia. At a meeting with the Federal Migration Service (FMS) on 23 September in Moscow, UNHCR obtained assurances that this group would be registered in Satsita and the IDPs were thus informed the next day. In addition, FMS agreed to restore utilities in B camp, while UNHCR undertook to provide tents for those who chose to relocate to Satsita. [...]

UNHCR provided 166 new tents to accommodate former inhabitants of B camp in Satsita IDP camp. Since most of the tents in B camp needed to be replaced, this voluntary relocation of IDPs to Satsita improved their living conditions and accelerated preparations for the winter. (UN OCHA 7 October 2003)

Reported improvements in Temporary Accommodation Centres in Chechnya (2003)

- Temporary Accommodation Centres have been mainly used for the relocation of IDPs returning from Ingushetia
- A UNHCR mission in November 2003 reported "generally satisfactory" conditions in to centres in Grozny
- Some returning IDPs have been forced to sleep on the streets of Grozny as alternative accommodation was not available for them
- There have also been reports of IDPs being evicted from one centre because of disputed ownership of the building

"UNHCR on 29 November [2003] undertook a mission to Grozny to monitor the situation of voluntary returnees in two temporary accommodation centres (TACs). Conditions were generally satisfactory, with the gas and electricity supplies regular and the heating functioning properly except in one building, where it was under repair. Water is supplied several times a day. Hygiene inside the TACs was good, but garbage collection outside needs improvement. The major concerns of the IDPs were no longer the conditions in the TACs but rather compensation for their destroyed houses and property and education facilities for their children." (UNHCR 5 December 2003)

"As far as housing is concerned, twenty-two Temporary Accommodation Centres (TACs) (14 in Grozny), housing 21,000 people, are operational in Chechnya. Five more centres are to open before the end of September. Yet, some 200 Chechen IDPs returning from the Bella camp were forced to sleep on the streets of Grozny over the weekend of 10 August, despite promises that they would be given accommodation if they returned to Chechnya." (COE 17 September 2003, para. 21).

Another temporary accommodation center was opened in the Staropromyslovsky District of Grozny on 9 September 2003. It will provide accommodation for 200 people. Another four apartment houses for those who had to stay in tent camps on the territory of Ingushetia after their dwellings were destroyed, will be opened in Grozny before the end of September 2003. A total of 21,000 people were staying at 22 temporary accommodation centres for displaced persons early December 2003. (ITAR TASS 9 September 2003)

"Last week VESTA informed UNHCR of the evacuation of all IDPs from one of the Temporary Accommodation Centres (TACs) in Sernovodsk. Most IDPs have been moved to another TAC in Sernovodsk, which is now facing capacity problems. The reason given for the evacuation is the disputed ownership of the building. More such cases are expected to take place in the near future. UNHCR is looking into the matter." (UNOCHA 7 July 2003)

"Recently, new rumors about an imminent closure of other IDP camp began spreading and it is commonly agreed that with the summer season coming increased pressure will be put on the IDPs to return to Chechnya. While the UN keeps pushing for a voluntary return, this was not the case in the past, and the risk for forceful return is quite likely. While more TACs are available, mainly in Grozny, and their status is slowly improving, still their capacity is extremely limited and most of the IDPs are reluctant to return to Chechnya due to lack of security and the continuing tensions there." (UNICEF 2 May 2003)

Tent camps in Ingushetia need to be upgraded for the winter season (2002-2003)

- However, authorities have been reluctant to allow international agencies to use prefabricated box tents
- Heating devices for IDPs in tent camps and spontaneous settlements in Ingushetia are insufficient for the winter cold weather (January 2003)
- Temporary settlements remain substandard

"For the winter of 2002-2003, 110,000 IDPs are expected to remain in Ingushetia. Among these, about 54% live with host families, 21 % in organised camps, and 25 % in settlements.

Since 2000 UNHCR has run a substantial shelter programme to ensure that settlements in Ingushetia provide warm, dry, habitable living conditions. Tent camps were upgraded in 2002. However, the aid provided was unable to cover all requirements. Tent camps, while cheaper to provide than housing, incur considerable maintenance and servicing costs and require regular upgrading. To develop more cost-effective and sustainable structures, UNHCR, with DRC, and Mercy Corps, started the production of box-tents, which can replace canvas tents and be used by the returnees in Chechnya. Support with shelter is crucial to maintain the ability of Ingushetia to offer temporary haven to IDPs. Need is most acute among:

- IDPs living in tents where living conditions have deteriorated significantly this year;
- IDPs living in temporary settlements, which remain sub-standard; and
- IDPs facing the risk of eviction by their host families." (UNOCHA November 2002, p. 31)

"Although over 500 tents still need to be replaced in IDP tent camps in Ingushetia to complete the 'winterisation' of the camps, the process came to a halt in early November, because NGOs exhausted their stocks of tents, and the authorities did not permit UNHCR to use its stock of pre-fabricated 'box-tents'. Pending the arrival of additional canvas tents, UNHCR surveys the families whose tents remain to be replaced to determine whether they want to stay in Ingushetia for the winter or to voluntary return to Chechnya." (UNOCHA 25 November 2002)

"By mid-January [2003], UNHCR erected 11 'box tents' in Aki-Yurt village in Ingushetia, which are all now occupied by IDPs, who had lived in the former Iman camp either in adobe huts or in tents. Two more 'box-tents' were erected on the territory of the former camp, where 11 families (65 persons) are still residing in 8 adobe huts. In addition, UNHCR was assessing the situation of 37 families from the Iman camp, residing with host families in Aki-Yurt village, who wanted to move to 'box-tents'. Gas, electricity, and water continued to be supplied to IDP settlements in Aki-Yurt, as well as to a school, a canteen, and a rehabilitation centre on the territory of the former Iman camp." (UN OCHA 15 January 2003)

"The available heating devices for IDPs in tent camps and spontaneous settlements in Ingushetia are insufficient for the uncommonly cold weather that has prevailed in the area for the past few weeks. The death of a child in the IDP camp 'Bart' (Karabulak) was considered to be a result of the cold weather." (WFP 10 January 2003)

Lack of alternative accommodation for IDPs leaving tent camps (2002)

- Many of the sites listed as temporary accommodation centres by the authorities are non-existent or uninhabitable
- Some of these sites appear inferior to the tents in which IDPs live in Ingushetia
- Displaced persons have also not been informed about the possibility to move to temporary shelters in Ingushetia

"[Officials from the 'United Headquarters for Creating Conditions for Returning People from Tents in the Republic of Ingushetia', consisting of Russian, Ingush and pro-Moscow Chechen officials] have repeatedly claimed that dismantling of the tent camps is for the benefit of the displaced persons, because conditions in the camps are substandard. In response to charges that they are compelling people in tent camps to return to Chechnya, they claim that they are forcing no one to return, but rather that they give each displaced person the choice of alternative shelter in TACs in Chechnya or in Ingushetia, or subsidies to rent housing in Chechnya. [...] Human Rights Watch tested these claims through site visits. Many of the sites in

Ingushetia that officials listed as TACs were non-existent or uninhabitable. In many cases, official promises of shelter and assistance in Chechnya have also proven illusory.

Human Rights Watch received from a Federal Migration Service official a list of eighteen temporary resettlement alternatives in Ingushetia, with an alleged capacity to accommodate 224 families, and visited twelve of the sites in the Karabulak and Sunzha districts.

Of those twelve, ten were non-existent, uninhabitable, or occupied. Some consisted of concrete walls without windows, roof, electricity, or gas. Another facility had a roof, but no walls. Even two of the better facilities appeared inferior to the tents in which displaced people are currently residing, and these two facilities were filled to capacity.

Moreover, United Headquarters officials do not appear to be informing camp residents about the choice, even in the remote future, of moving to TACs in Ingushetia. Human Rights Watch interviewed dozens of camp residents, asking them specifically whether they were aware of housing alternatives in Ingushetia. All replied that they had been informed only about options in Chechnya, not Ingushetia. None of the camp residents interviewed by Human Rights Watch was aware of the existence of the FMS list of resettlement alternatives within Ingushetia.

Some returnees to Chechnya have found that the promises migration officials make of compensation, shelter, and humanitarian assistance to encourage returns are unfulfilled. Since so many homes have been destroyed due to the bombing and shelling, many people rely on TACs for shelter. But an assessment of nine TACs in Chechnya done by Vesta, an Ingush nongovernmental organization subcontracted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to monitor conditions in TACs, found only two of the buildings near completion, although one still did not have gas, electricity, toilets, or a sewage system (The use of this building was also problematic because the workers who repaired the building had not been paid in months and refused to let it be occupied before they were paid). A third building was 'seriously damaged,' with the fourth and fifth stories destroyed: 'Its builders warn it is still dangerous to go into the building.' A fourth building, designated to house 2,500 persons was 'a framework of a building only.' A fifth, designated to house more than 800 people, had no heating, gas, electricity, and was completely uninhabitable: 'At the moment of monitoring, construction work had been suspended. ... The precise number of rooms is unknown due to the danger of entering the building.' A sixth was being restored, but had no water or electricity. The seventh TAC had no water supply, had not yet been repaired, and was already in use as a teacher's training institute. A eighth TAC, slated for more than 1,000 people had not yet begun to be renovated, and had no water, electricity, or gas. The ninth TAC could not be located by the NGO or the Chechen state committee on refugee affairs.

Two residents of the Satsita tent camp who were members of a delegation of displaced persons sent to Chechnya to check conditions in TACs found a severe shortage of space in them. On November 27 they went to Grozny, where they spoke to Ruslan Kaplanov, head of the Chechen Migration Service, and other officials responsible for settling returnees. The two delegation members, interviewed separately, each told Human Rights Watch that they were not shown TACs, but were instead given the addresses of several TACs that were not ready for occupation. One of the delegation members said, 'We have the list of TACs with the number of vacant rooms, which can be occupied by refugees. In the entire republic there are eighty-eight vacant rooms.' On the doors of Kaplanov's office at the Chechen Migration Service they found an announcement saying: 'Due to the lack of space in temporary accommodation centers, we are not accepting requests for TAC placement and allowances.' " (HRW January 2003, pp. 8-9)

ICRC survey highlights vast shelter needs in Chechnya (2002)

- More than 75% of the assessed population in Chechnya report partial or total destruction of their houses as a result of hostilities

- Existing collective centres need structural and water sanitation assistance to meet minimum standards
- The return of IDPs from Ingushetia will require a major housing reconstruction effort in Grozny
- Hope for state compensation and instability in the republic result in people being unwilling to invest in full scale reconstruction of their home

"More than 75 % of the population report their houses being partially or completely destroyed due to hostilities, while as much as 80 % of [households] have either returned to or never left their homes. Less than 60 % of the [households] have sufficient financial flexibility to pay for the restoration of their homes independently. [...]"

A total of 3 % of the assessed population report living in collective centres, which in Chechnya are state-provided collective housing units. There are over 10 of these centres located in Grozny, Shali and Gudermes, with additional centres presently being developed to house returning IDPs. Some of these longer established collective centres are urgently in need of both structural and water sanitation assistance to secure minimum living standards for those within these centres.

In more general terms, the level of physical destruction in Grozny is enormous, with more than 85 % of [households] from the city reporting partially or completely destroyed houses due to the hostilities, suggesting the potential for an extensive housing crisis, particularly if further IDPs return to the city. Considering that 10,000 IDP [households] in Chechnya, along with another 12 000 IDP [households] originating from Grozny and presently living in Ingushetia could potentially return to Grozny in the near future, 22,000 additional dwellings must be identified and repaired to provide the necessary 'liveable dry space' for the approximately 132,000 individuals concerned. Restoration of housing options for those who previously lived in now flattened apartments will be a significant undertaking for the future.

The state policy concerning provision of compensation for loss and damages incurred during the hostilities remains unclear, with less than 10% of [households] having received it. Nonetheless, the hope of potentially receiving state compensation, combined with a continuing mistrust in the stability of the context, results in people being unwilling to invest in full scale reconstruction of their homes. Instead, they prefer to concentrate on the restoration of a minimal dry living space for the [household], and therefore the type of assistance provided must reflect this. If future trends indicate a stabilizing of the environment, larger scale reconstruction may be undertaken, which would require different types of larger quantities of materials. The sector trends must be monitored and anticipated to allow for the provision of timely and appropriate humanitarian assistance." (ICRC July 2002 Chechnya, p. 36)

Collective centres in Dagestan require immediate rehabilitation (2002)

- IDPs are also exposed to threats of rent increases, interruption of utilities and eviction

"There are some 15 Collective centres in Dagestan. These are collective housing units that have been made available to the IDPs at little or no charge by either the state or private owners. Many of these structures are in desperate conditions and require immediate rehabilitation. Typically, the arrangements in these centres are very vague with the IDPs reporting being frequently threatened with rent increases, interruption of utilities or eviction." (ICRC July 2002, Dagestan, p. 11)

"More immediate are the pressing and urgent needs within several collective centres of the IDPs in Khasavyurt that have critical structural problems such as plastic sheeted walls, poor roofing, flooding and dysfunctional sanitation systems. Short-term and small-scale repairs are undertaken periodically by the IDPs, causing additional stress on the [household] budget, without effectively solving the problems." (ICRC July 2002, Dagestan, p. 30)

Internally displaced in Ingushetia face high risk of eviction from their temporary accommodation (2001-2002)

- The share of IDPs living in camps and spontaneous settlements increased significantly between 2001 and 2002
- Owners of spontaneous settlements want to recuperate their property
- Evictions of individual families from private accommodation were reported to take place on a daily basis (August 2001)
- UNHCR tries to help negotiate with host families or find alternative accommodation
- Deregistration of IDPs increases risks of eviction since authorities stop reimbursement for the accommodation and utilities provided (2003)

"According to the most recent UNHCR/DRC registration data (August 2002), about 116,000 IDPs from Chechnya are sheltered in Ingushetia. The majority of them (56 percent) stay either with host families or in rented accommodation; 20 percent live in tent camps and the remainder live in spontaneous settlements. During 2001 many of the IDPs living with host families moved to camps and spontaneous settlements, as they were no longer in a position to contribute to rent and utility charges. Consequently, during 2001 and 2002 the combined percentage of IDPs living in camps and spontaneous settlements went up from 19 percent to 44 percent (WFP 2002, p. 17)

Eviction of IDPs from temporary settlements

"UNHCR and its partner, the Caucasian Refugee Council, continued assisting 38 families (235 persons), who were under immediate threat of eviction from a temporary settlement in Sleptsovsakaya, to find alternative accommodation. Alternative shelter was already found for 2 IDP families, evicted from host families in Bert Yurt and Nazranovsky raion." (UN OCHA 15 January 2003)

"In Ingushetia, UNHCR continued looking for alternative accommodation for 60 IDP families, evicted from spontaneous settlements by the owners. The agency identified about 1,700 beneficiary families to continue assisting with shelter materials in 2002." (UN OCHA 31 August 2002)

"[UNHCR] found alternative shelter for 6 IDP families (35 persons), evicted from a spontaneous settlement in a former factory building, when the owner decided to resume production." (UN OCHA 30 September 2002)

"The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) continued to monitor the situation of IDP families in Ingushetia, who are threatened with eviction from their current places of accommodation, primarily in spontaneous settlements. In April [2002], UNHCR assisted about 250 IDPs evicted from a spontaneous settlement near Nazran, finding alternative accommodation for them. The agency provided IDPs with construction materials and non-food items to improve their living conditions, and is installing the necessary infrastructure." (UNOCHA 30 April 2002)

"According to UNHCR, for the first time the number of IDPs returning from Ingushetia to Chechnya is greater than that of new arrivals from Chechnya to Ingushetia. More than 700 IDPs, mostly living with host families, returned to Chechnya during November. About 600 IDPs who had been living with host families for the past two years moved to camps and spontaneous settlements because they were no longer able to pay rent to host families." (WFP 7 December 2001)

"An increasing number of IDPs living with host families and in spontaneous settlements in Ingushetia are becoming insolvent. According to EMERCOM of Ingushetia, about 1,850 IDP families requested them to move to camps since they are no longer able to pay rents to owners of the spontaneous settlements and host

families. On the other hand, some host families can no longer afford to keep displaced families with them, and they should be helped so as to avoid eviction." (UNOCHA 30 November 2001)

"Another large group of displaced persons from Chechnya has been evicted from their settlement in Ingushetia. Some 80 displaced persons, including women, children and elderly people, were left without shelter last week in Malgobek, Ingushetia, when the building they had been staying in was torn down. The group had been living at the site since 1999, but the building was bought by a new owner who wanted to set up a new structure on the site. UNHCR, in coordination with local authorities, provided 17 tents for the displaced people in a nearby settlement which had already been selected by UNHCR and the Ingushetia authorities for improvement work. Eighteen families have now moved into the new tents, and currently flooring and other facilities are being provided. UNHCR expects to provide tents to a few more families in this site in the coming days. Gas, electricity and sanitation facilities will be installed with support from UNHCR before winter.

This eviction comes just a week after a similar group of 100 persons was evicted from their settlement near Nazran. UNHCR is also aware of several other group settlements under immediate threat of eviction, including one building in the Nazran area which houses more than 120 people. UNHCR is concerned that these group evictions could be a new trend, as owners of the various spontaneous settlement sites realize that the displaced people will not be returning to Chechnya before the winter, and they will therefore remain in the sites for the third winter in a row. In an effort to avoid such evictions, UNHCR has provided a number of settlements with building materials to improve the facilities, which benefits both the displaced persons living there as well as the owner of the site.

Meanwhile, evictions of individual families from private accommodation also continue on an almost daily basis. Some evicted families are able to find other places to stay on their own. UNHCR also tries to help negotiate with host families or find alternative accommodation, particularly when vulnerable people are facing eviction. Alternative accommodation can be somewhat easier to identify for individuals than for the larger groups evicted at once." (UNHCR 28 August 2001)

"In Ingushetia, UNHCR was interviewing IDPs in temporary settlements, who had been de-registered by the migration service from the lists qualifying them for government assistance. When de-registered IDPs become vulnerable to eviction since the authorities stop to reimburse the owners of temporary settlements premises for the accommodation and utilities provided. UNHCR will use the results of the interviews to follow up with the authorities on the matter, and, if necessary, to provide legal counseling to IDPs on the protection of their rights in local court." (UN OCHA 31 March 2003)

See also "Assistance scheme to host families in Ingushetia (2001-2002)" [Internal link]

Discrimination against the displaced Chechen displaced reportedly impedes their access to accommodation in Moscow (1999-2001)

"Chechen IDPs and the Civic Assistance Committee for migrants reported that Chechens face difficulty in finding lodging in Moscow and frequently are forced to pay at least twice the usual rent for an apartment." (U.S.DOS March 2002, sect. 5)

See also "The Propiska system remains de facto in place (2002)" [Internal link]

"Chechen internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the Civic Assistance Committee for migrants reported that Chechens face great difficulty in finding lodging in Moscow and frequently are forced to pay at least twice the usual rent for an apartment. The St. Petersburg Times in April [1999] reported that a similar pattern of discrimination exists against person from the Caucasus in St. Petersburg, although the housing

law forbids discrimination, according to human rights lawyer Yuriy Shmidt, the chances of a would-be tenant winning a lawsuit are low because there is no legal precedent." (U.S. DOS 25 February 2000)

Health

Measles among IDPs in Ingushetia and Chechnya (2003)

- Increases in measles cases in IDP camps and settlements in Ingushetia and collective centres in Chechnya were reported in May 2003
- UNICEF, WHO, local authorities and other partners took measures to improve immunization in Ingushetia and Chechnya
- The number of measles cases radically decreased in the summer 2003

"According to medical NGOs working in IDP camps and settlements in Ingushetia, there has been an increase in measles cases in Sputnik, Bart, Lgovaz, and Rassvet camps during the reporting period [6-20 May 2003]. Data seven times higher than the monthly averages have been reported. A similar situation was observed in Chechnya, where 18 measles cases have been registered in the Temporary Accommodation Centre (TAC) located on Ponyatkova Street in Grozny

The Chechen Ministry of Health reported an increase of morbidity among children in Grozny: 1,465 cases of acute respiratory infections registered in March and 2,258 cases in April; 16 cases of chicken pox in March and 20 cases in April; 90 cases of measles registered in March and 54 cases in April. The under-reporting of measles seems to be mainly due to the low number of people approaching hospitals as well as to incorrect diagnosing of measles (as measles rubella) by medical staff in both Chechnya and Ingushetia." (UNICEF 20 May 2003)

"UNICEF, in close cooperation with local authorities, WHO and other partners – has continued to monitor the measles situation among children residing in IDP camps and settlements in Ingushetia. In response to the recent disease outbreak, the Ingush Ministry of Health (MoH) took measures towards the improvement of the immunization status among IDP children. In particular, mobile teams were sent to all major settlements to carry out measles, parotitis and polio vaccination campaigns. 3,814 IDP children in Nazran district have been vaccinated against various preventable diseases to date. The MoH also reported that the polio immunization coverage among IDP children has reached 103%.

Although a decrease in the cases of measles has been observed during the past few weeks, the Ingush Sanitary and Epidemiological Station (SES) reported that 74 cases have been registered in June in Sunzha district only. The records coming from Nazran and Malgobek children hospitals are lower, with a total of 100 cases registered in all three districts of Ingushetia." (UN OCHA 4 June 2003)

"On 5 June, the World Health Organization (WHO), together with representatives of the Ingush Ministry of Health, sanitary epidemiological surveillance service (SES), and NGOs, carried out an assessment mission to B tent camp in Ingushetia to identify the number of children in need of measles vaccination. A similar study had been conducted in Satsita camp earlier. Members of the group filled in a specially developed questionnaire for every child. According to the survey, 73% of 642 children under 15 identified in camp B claimed they had not been vaccinated and/or did not know whether they had been vaccinated. Fifty-four children had measles. The Ministry of Health of Chechnya reported 295 measles cases registered in the first four months of 2003. Most of the cases were registered in Grozny, and 53 of those infected reside in temporary accommodation centres (TACs)." (UN OCHA 23 June 2003)

"Although the measles outbreak in Ingushetia is under control, no decrease in measles cases has been noticed in the TAC's in Chechnya. Over May 2003 some 161 cases have been registered according to the information received by local health structures." (OCHA 7 July 2003)

"UNICEF has continued to follow the measles situation both in Chechnya and Ingushetia. For this purpose, regular monitoring visits have been conducted to various hospitals and IDP settlements in Ingushetia, and close contacts have been maintained with the Sanitary Epidemiological Centres of Chechnya and Ingushetia, WHO and NGO partners. The Ingush Ministry of Health and NGOs operating in the area have reported a decrease of measles cases among children, including IDPs. In Chechnya, the incidence of the disease for the first half year of 2003 has reached 907 cases among children under 18.

With regard to the recent measles 'outbreak' in Ingushetia, UNICEF supplied to the Ingush Ministry of health vitamin A for 10,000 children. The distribution of the vitamin A will be organized by the Ministry through the routine contacts of IDPs with health facilities that provide immunization and Mother and Child Health (MCH) services. The five main district hospitals in Ingushetia have been involved in the implementation of this initiative." (UNICEF 31 July 2003)

UNICEF Has been working closely with the Ministries of Health of Chechnya and Ingushetia, as well as with WHO and medical NGOs, to strengthen the vaccination coverage in both Republics. Meanwhile, the Chechen SES reported a decrease in the number of measles cases (40 registered in September). (UNICEF 30 September 2003)

The possible closure of tent camps and the consequent relocation of thousands of IDPs into TACs – with shortage of potable water and adequate sanitation, crowded living conditions and poor waste removal – would expose the population to increase risk of communicable diseases, as the mid-2003 measles outbreak in both republics has proven. (UN OCHA November 2003, p. 38)

Ingush health Ministry reports on status of children and women (2003)

- Infant mortality in Ingushetia is twice higher than the average in the Russian Federation
- Prevailing diseases among IDP children are caries, respiratory and blood diseases
- Vaccination coverage remains low among IDPs

"The Ingush Ministry of Health released a report on the health status of children and women in the republic. According to the data report, in 2002 children accounted for 32,7% of the total population. The number of children born was 8,116, of which 2,534 were IDPs. Among the main causes of child mortality, the MoH mentioned pathologies of the perinatal period, as well as acute respiratory diseases (including pneumonia), traumas, acute intestinal diseases and congenital defects. The infant mortality rates per 1,000 live births in Ingushetia stands at around 28, i.e. twice higher than the average in the Russian Federation.

The all-Russian clinical examination of children conducted in 2002 demonstrated that the first three diseases prevailing among IDP children in Ingushetia were caries (affecting 50% of the children examined), respiratory diseases (12 %), and blood diseases (10%)." (UNICEF 31 July 2003)

"With regard to the epidemiological situation in Ingushetia, the local SES [Sanitary Epidemiological Station] reported about the extremely low vaccination coverage achieved among the IDPs residing in camps and temporary settlements. The vaccination campaign carried out by the local health care workers during the second quarter of 2003, in fact, turned out to be insufficient, which has led to the further deterioration of the measles situation. The SES, for instance, revealed that only 7 out of 462 children residing in the 'Altievo' IDP settlement in Nazran were vaccinated against measles; as a consequence, more than 80 children suffered from measles in June and July. According to the SES estimates, only 18% of the children

residing in 'Tanzila', 'Kamaz Centre', 'Logovaz', and 'Internationalnaya' settlements were vaccinated against measles." (UNICEF 16 August 2003)

Precarious health situation prevailing in Chechnya (2003)

- Chechnya holds the record for TB, as a result of inadequate living conditions in IDP settlements in Ingushetia and water and sanitation system in Chechnya
- Acute respiratory infections remained the most widely spread infectious diseases among children in Chechnya

"According to the Russian Deputy Minister of Health, tuberculosis, venereal diseases, hepatitis and other social diseases are easing their grip on Chechnya. The republic, however, still holds the record for TB, with 160 cases for 10,000 people, as opposed to the national average of 90. The living conditions in IDP camps in Ingushetia and the inadequacy of the water and sanitation system in Chechnya seem to be among the various factors that may be responsible for this phenomenon.

The Chechen Health Minister reported that the birth rate in Chechnya is exceeding the death rate; consequently, the population increase stood at 1,800 per 1 million in 2002. The Minister also stated that the restoration of 62 health care facilities is currently under way." (UNICEF 16 September 2003)

"The Chechen Ministry of Health reported to UNICEF about the measles situation in the republic. According to this report, 685 children under-18 have been affected during the last five months. Out of the total number of cases, 54.3% were school children aged 6-14. Measles cases have been prevalent in 11 administrative zones of Chechnya, including Grozny, Urus-Martan, and Achkhoy-Martan districts. According to the authorities, 55 measles cases among children under-14 were registered in 6 Temporary Accommodation Centres (TACs) in Grozny.

Health officials reported that, out of the total number of children affected by measles, 41.7 % have been vaccinated and 11.5% re-vaccinated. The situation has been aggravated by the fact that some 28.7 % of the children affected presented an unknown immunization anamnesis. The Chechen MoH is taking measures to decrease the morbidity level, and the overall situation is reported to have stabilized considerably." (UNICEF 22 July 2003)

"Acute respiratory infections remained the most widely spread infectious diseases among children in Chechnya, with more than 15,000 children affected over one month. In total, some 27,000 children have suffered from different types of infectious pathologies, including acute intestinal infections and viral Hepatitis A and B, during the last 5 months. The NGO Hammer Forum, which is a UNICEF partner, reported deficiency problems being observed among 22.9% of 3,008 children who applied for medical assistance in various hospitals of Grozny." (UNICEF 4 July 2003)

Prohibitive costs of healthcare affects IDPs and poorest households (2002)

- The poorest households are forced to go without essential medical care due to high costs of health care services
- Interventions aimed at improving availability, access and/or quality of the health care services will help to remove significant stress on household budgets

"IDPs [in Dagestan] do not have access to the health insurance scheme, and the cost of health care is a more prohibitive factor, with physical access to essential services reported as irregular. In Khasavyurt only, a small number of [households] report having access to secondary services through a voucher system that has

been developed and supported by MSF. Those IDPs outside the city report often going without essential services due to prohibitive costs, especially if there are associated travel costs as well. " (ICRC July 2002, Dagestan, p. 29)

"The healthcare system in Chechnya offered sophisticated and reasonable quality care in the past. As a result of the hostilities and the general collapse of systems, the quality and capacity of the healthcare system has reportedly drastically declined. Many concerns were raised by the population regarding decreased availability of services and the limited technical capacity of the remaining health personnel. This combined with the increasing costs of both consultations and supplies, has spurred especially the poor to more regularly opt for self-treatment options when faced with medical concerns. If this does not work, at least a quarter of the poorest [households] are then forced to go without essential and potentially life saving services due to prohibitive costs.

Medical concerns represent the extraordinary expense of [households] assessed. Some 58% of [households] report facing medical emergencies within the past year, with the majority of those facing an average cost of 3,000 to 7,000 rubles per incidents. Medical concerns represent a consistent and significant stress on the [household] budget and therefore, interventions aimed at improving either availability, access and/or quality of the health care services will help to limit the heaviest budgetary strain." (ICRC July 2002, Chechnya, p. 37)

WHO reports growing number of HIV cases in Ingushetia and Chechnya (2001-2003)

- The number of HIV cases increased by 3-4 times among the IDPs and the local population in Ingushetia during 2001
- The major constraint is the lack of testing reagents to implement HIV screening in Ingushetia
- HIV morbidity rate in Chechnya increased significantly in 2003
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"WHO completed collection of data on HIV registered cases in Ingushetia. The data showed that in 2001, the number of HIV cases increased by 3-4 times both among IDPs and the local population, as compared to 1999. WHO distributed educational material on HIV/AIDS prevention, and is working with the ministry of health of Ingushetia on an HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention campaign." (UN February 2002)

"AIDS: As of 1 October 2001, 216 HIV-infected persons were officially registered in Ingushetia. 36 of them are IDPs from Chechnya, and 11 are IDPs from North Ossetia. Among this number there are six women and two children." (WHO November 2001)

"HIV/AIDS update: The first cases of HIV were officially registered in Ingushetia in 1999. In 2000, their number increased considerably. In January-July 2001, 102 new cases (of them 29 IDPs) of HIV were registered, bringing the official total number of HIV-infected in the republic to 160, of them 36 (23%) were IDPs from Chechnya. According to the head doctor of the republican HIV/AIDS center, they are experiencing major difficulties while working with the IDP population, as usually two to four weeks pass from the moment when the analysis is taken to Nazran to when the confirmation is received from Rostov-upon-Don, where screening for HIV is carried out. During this period, IDPs often either move within Ingushetia or return to Chechnya, leaving no opportunity to inform them of the results of their analysis, with the danger that should they be positive, they will continue to infect other people. The major constraint is the lack of testing reagents to effect HIV screening in the republican HIV/AIDS centre in Ingushetia. Should they be available, it would be possible to decrease the diagnosis period from 2-4 weeks to 3-4 days." (WHO September 2001)

"The Chechen HIV/AIDS Prevention Centre reported on the situation related to the first 5 months of 2003. According to the data provided, the HIV morbidity rate increased in 2003 to some 8.2 per 100,000 people, against 2.9 in 2002. The Centre noted that only half of the 77 medical facilities eligible for reporting on HIV/AIDS submitted regular information.

The Ingush HIV/AIDS Prevention Centre provided data according to which Ingushetia would take the leading place on HIV/AIDS infection rate in the North Caucasus. The morbidity indicator recorded in 2002, in fact, reached 17.8 per 100,000 people. Furthermore, 9.2% of total HIV-infected persons were women of fertile age. The prevailing age group among the infected is the 20-30 years old one." (UNICEF 15 October 2003)

UNICEF issues reports on children health in Ingushetia (2001)

- UNICEF conducted a survey on the health and nutritional status of children under 5 and their mothers among residents and IDPs in Ingushetia (July-August 2001)
- The survey indicated encouraging results as far as the prevalence of stunting and the immunization coverage are concerned
- There is however a widespread, although not severe micronutrient problems
- UNICEF immunization programme in Ingushetia is not attaining the necessary coverage (fall 2001)

"In July-August 2001, UNICEF, in collaboration with the National Research Institute for Food and Nutrition in Rome, conducted a survey to investigate the health and nutritional status of children under five and their mothers in Ingushetia. Below, the survey results are summarised.

The general objective of the survey was to evaluate the nutritional status of children under five and their mothers among residents and IDPs and to evaluate immunization coverage in children. The specific objectives were:

- to carry out an analysis of the health and nutritional status of the population;
- to compare nutrition and health indicators of resident and IDPs;
- to measure indicators of micronutrient deficiencies of public health relevance;
- to evaluate feeding patterns of infants and young children; and
- to identify criteria for screening vulnerable groups and vulnerable individuals.

A two-stage cluster sampling procedure was applied to select a representative sample of households in two strata (residents and IDPs).

The survey was carried out on 1 417 households and included 1 052 children under 5 (6-59 months), 1 389 children under 2 (0-24 months) and 1 464 women of reproductive age (15-45 years). The survey involved the administration of a questionnaire, the implementation of physical measurements in children under five (weight and height, or length) and their mothers (weight, height) and biochemical assessment of micronutrient status (serum haemoglobin in women and children, serum retinol in children).

The survey showed that:

- low body mass index (BMI) ($<18.5 \text{ kg/m}^2$) was observed only in about 2% of the mothers, while more than one-third of the women aged 25 and above were overweight or obese (42%). Higher degrees of obesity were uncommon (12% with BMI 30.1-40 kg/m^2 and 0.5% with BMI $>40 \text{ kg/m}^2$);
- anaemia was present in more than half the mothers, with a higher prevalence in IDPs (54%) than in residents (51%). Severe forms of anaemia were uncommon, with a higher prevalence in residents (1.4%) than in IDPs (0.2%);

- low height-for-age was observed in 9% of the entire sample of children (6-59 months), with a higher proportion in IDPs (14%) than in residents (8%);
- the overall prevalence of low weight-for-height was 6%, and no difference was detected between the two strata nor between gender;
- anaemia was observed in 34% of the children (6-59 months) without differences between population strata. Severe cases were detected in less than 1% of the population;
- poor night vision in children was reported by 3% of the mothers, with a higher prevalence in residents (4%) than in IDPs (1%). However, low values of serum retinol were very uncommon, with a prevalence lower than 1% and without differences between population strata;
- the vast majority of children under 2 years of age were being breastfed, at least partially (86%), with no significant differences between residents and IDPs. Nine per cent of the children under four months were exclusively breastfed. Exclusive breastfeeding dropped to 6% at the age of six months. In IDPs exclusive breastfeeding was more common (14% at four months of age and 9% at six months of age) than in residents (8% at four months of age and 5% at six months of age). The administration of other liquids in addition to breast milk increased up to the age of four months, when 50% of the resident children and 60% of the IDPs children were fed in this way. After the age of four months, predominant breastfeeding dropped progressively in both strata reaching the prevalence of 35% in residents and 47% in IDPs at the age of six months;
- one-fifth of the children were using infant formula, usually as a substitute for breast milk, with significant differences between residents (30%) and IDPs (25%). Cow's milk was used as an alternative to breast milk for infants under six months in 32% of the cases among residents and in 15% among IDPs. Cow's milk became a major food item after the age of six months; however, even in the second year of age, 20% of the children were not consuming it. Fermented milk was not used in the first six months of life and was therefore not used as a breast milk substitute;
- the early introduction of liquids other than breast milk was a very popular habit in Ingushetia, both with residents and IDPs. Water was introduced as early as from the first week of life and by the age of three months almost all the children were given water. It is important to note that infants were often given black tea. Fruit juices were popular as well, and they were introduced at around 1-2 months of age, especially in resident children;
- solid or semi-solid complementary foods were given to the children since the second month of life. Biscuits and fruit were introduced first. Vegetables were started earlier in residents than in IDPs. Bread, pasta and rice were introduced in the second semester of life. Protein rich foods were introduced earlier in residents than in IDPs. Meat was consumed by 20% of resident children in the first semester of life and introduced after the age of six months in IDPs. Fish was introduced at five months in residents and in the second semester in IDPs. Cheese consumption was common in residents in the first semester of life, while IDPs reported consumption only in older infants. Eggs were the only protein rich food introduced before the age of six months in both group; bread was the staple food in both residents and IDPs even if the general diet was significantly different in the two groups. IDPs had a carbohydrate rich diet with almost daily consumption of bread and pasta. The consumption of protein rich foods such as meat or milk was significantly greater in residents than in IDPs. Pulses were more frequent in IDPs. Vegetables and fruit were consumed more frequently in residents than in IDPs.

On the whole, the survey indicated solid progress towards the achievement of the year 2000 goals of the World Summit for Children as far as the prevalence of stunting and the immunization coverage are concerned. There is, however, a widespread although not severe micronutrient problem, which can be dealt with by dietary modifications and improvements.

Outstanding objectives for the future in the context of this survey may be outlined as follows:

- breastfeeding promotion should be carried out in order to achieve timely initiation of breastfeeding, exclusive breastfeeding up to six months and continued breastfeeding after six months. The early introduction of liquids should be strongly discouraged;

- complementary feeding guidelines should be developed and promoted through the health staff, particularly regarding the introduction of meat, dairy products, fruit and vegetables from about six months;
- dietary guidelines for adults should be promoted, aimed at the control of body weight and the promotion of fruit and vegetable consumption;
- the establishment of a nutritional surveillance system by using local resources should be carried out. The data collected are to be used to develop adequate and effective nutrition policies;
- public health measures should be taken to ensure maintenance and surveillance of the immunisation programme;
- as an intervention that is part of an overall integrated strategy for preventing and controlling iron deficiency anaemia, the use of fortified foods (in particular, fortified wheat flour in the country where bread and pasta are staple foods) can be promoted." (WHO December 2001)

"The chief paediatrician of Ingushetia reports an increase in child mortality. The reasons responsible for such increases are: war traumatism, respiratory track infections (RTI), malnutrition, developmental anomalies, infectious diseases (measles, viral hepatitis, rubella) and pregnancy disorders. The high incidence of diseases is due to the environmental factors to which the Chechen population is exposed: overcrowding, inadequate quantities and qualities of water, poor sanitation, inadequate shelter and an inadequate food supply (UNICEF)." (WHO December 2001)

"Findings of an ad hoc assessment of immunization coverage among IDP children in Ingushetia carried out by the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) reveals that the extended programme of immunization (EPI) is not attaining the necessary coverage among IDP children who are subject to frequent immunization status of their children is identified as a key factor to consider when tackling this issue.

An increased number of cases of Hepatitis A among children were reported in several IDP settlements in Ingushetia in September. In view of this the World Health Organization (WHO) arranged the distribution of prevention awareness educational leaflets to the medical institutions, schools, kindergartens, and the Sanitary Epidemiological Services (SES) of Ingushetia and Chechnya." (WHO November 2001)

7,000 persons in need of prosthetic or orthopaedic help in Chechnya and Ingushetia (2000)

- 400 amputees are among the internally displaced population (IDP) in Ingushetia

"As a result of hostilities in the Republic of Chechnya during the last decade, approximately 7,000 citizens of the republic have lost or damaged a limb and are currently in need of prosthetic and/or orthopaedic aid. In addition, approximately 400 amputees are among the internally displaced population (IDP) in Ingushetia." (WHO January 2001, p. 3)

"Unfortunately, in the near future it is unlikely that the political situation in Chechnya will improve significantly. Ambushes, acts of terror and mines/UXOs will also further contribute to an increase in the number of people in need of prosthetic and/or orthopaedic assistance." (WHO January 2001, p. 4)

Psychosocial needs of the displaced children and their families (2000-2002)

- About half of the displaced population in Northern Caucasus is affected by some degree of mental disorders
- Psychological rehabilitation centres run by NGOs mostly focus on child care, rarely on women and young men (February 2002)
- Many children have witnessed the killing of relatives, have left family members behind, or have been separated from their parents
- Chechen Association of Psychiatrists and Neurologists reveals severe problems in Chechnya (2000)
- Other areas of serious concern is gender-based violence and drug abuse

"Turning to the mental health of IDPs, an estimated that about a half of the displaced population is affected by some degree of mental disorders with more serious consequences if left unattended remain valid, in particular as one enters the third year since hostilities renewed in Chechnya. To date, psychological rehabilitation centres run by NGOs mostly focused on child counseling and care, rarely involving women and young men. WHO is also supporting a children's rehabilitation centre in Grozny, where about 300 children have already received services. the parent of these children are now also getting training on how to cope with the stress related disorders. Also in the field of psychosocial support, UNICEF continues its partnership with CARE International focusing on IDP children outside the school system in Ingushetia (drop-outs) and on the mental problems of child mine victims. WHO, in cooperation with relevant NGOs, provides psychosocial and psychiatric training to medical staff from Chechnya and Ingushetia." (UN OCHA February 2002)

"In a late February report, *Medecins du Monde* (MDM), in commenting on the state of mental health among IDPs in Ingushetia, noted that virtually the entire population had fallen victim in some form or another to psychological trauma and that 25 percent were seriously affected. This analysis confirms in substance earlier data collected by UNHCR in their household survey of IDP settlements in Ingushetia. MDM emphasised that the trauma was linked to the direct effects of extreme violence affecting the civilian population, the living conditions of displaced persons outside Chechnya, as well as the revisiting of recent psychological injuries, especially for children, linked to the deadly war in 1994-1996.

In a statement still applicable to the present situation, MDM noted: 'For many, on top of the heavy difficulties of everyday life are piled the still uncertain prospects for the future and a fear of returning to Chechnya'. Regarding survivors of the bombing in Grozny who were exposed to devastating human and material destruction, or who were victims of violence, the report concludes that, 'The psychological trauma is deep and will probably lead to irreversible psychological consequences'." (UN July 2000, sect. 3.3.7)

See also WHO newsletter on health action in North Caucasus, February/March 2002, special focus on psychiatric care in the Chechen Republic [Internet]

See also MDM report "Chechnya - Ingushetia: Testimonies and sanitary data", 23 February 2000 [Internet]

"Since January 2000, the Chechen Association of Psychiatrists and Neurologists has been carrying out research and rehabilitation activities in IDP camps in Chechnya and Ingushetia. They have examined 500 children and teenagers and found out that the number of stress disorders with children and teenager IDPs inside Chechnya is three times higher than with children from Ingushetia (87 percent in Chechnya compared to 26 percent in Ingushetia). The number of children suffering from post-traumatic stress disorders is 58 percent and 15 percent respectively. The Association works in IDP camps and spontaneous settlements in Pravoberezhnoe and Tolstoy-Yurt in Chechnya, and in Troitskaya, Ingushetia. 103 young patients are presently undergoing rehabilitation. 124 children with mild symptoms of stress disorders receive assistance from the teachers working at the Association. Most commonly used methods of

treatment are: art therapy and acupuncture, combined with child festivals and establishing contacts with children from other countries through exchange of correspondence." (UN OCHA 30 June 2000)

"Fighting always leaves behind trauma victims of all types. Many children have witnessed the killing of relatives, have left family members behind, or have been separated from their parents. The displaced children, as well as those who are being directly exposed to acts of violence, live in fear, anxious for their own life and security. They have gone through a psychologically traumatic experience that will negatively impact their development.

There are no qualitative and quantitative data on the magnitude of the psychosocial impact of the fighting on children and their families. However, discussions with NGOs providing assistance, interviews with health personnel and teachers, as well as direct contact with the affected population, have revealed that the situation is very serious. Yet, with the exception of some programmes by NGOs, no mechanism is in place to help the affected population cope with the stress and meet their psychosocial needs.

Another area of serious concern is gender-based violence, which is being increasingly documented. An assessment of this area needs to be undertaken and support provided, as necessary." (UN March 2000, p. 16)

"Children and adults from Chechnya are prone to develop deep and serious psychological traumas due to the conflict, as the traumatic events have been occurring over such a long period of time. (It is only three years since the end of the last conflict.) Although no assessment has been conducted, there can be no doubt that recent events will have a long lasting impact, not at least on the children, - some of whom have just relived their second war experience and had wounds reopened.

From the UNHCR household survey of non-camp settlements [11-13 December 1999], it is worth noticing, - although no questions pertaining to mental health were asked, that:

- 7 % of the IDPs had relatives who were killed or injured in Chechnya
- 16 % of the IDP family members remained in Chechnya, - the majority of the IDPs has no contact with their relatives inside Chechnya,
- 13 % of the IDPs indicated that they had witnessed harassment of women
- 8 % of the IDP children are separated from their parents and under the care of friends and relatives.

[...].

Drug abuse has creased in Ingushetia lately, and is said to be linked to the much wider abuse inside Chechnya. According to MoH/I data for 1999, there are 26.4 registered cases of drug abuse per 100,000 population." (WHO/UNICEF/IOM 5 February 2000)

Water and sanitation

International support still needed to meet minimum standards (2002)

- Significant assistance has been provided to ensure access to clean water to all IDP settlements in Ingushetia
- The emergency garbage disposal system and the pest-vector control programme helped to maintain minimum sanitation requirements
- Pit latrines in IDP camps and settlements need to be provided and maintained

- The need for safe water and sanitation facilities is a high priority for residents, returnees and IDPs in Chechnya

Ingushetia

"The international humanitarian community has provided significant assistance in the water and sanitation sector since 1999. To prevent outbreaks of water-borne diseases and sanitation-related infections, approximately 150,000 litres of clean water are trucked daily to one hundred IDP locations. The sixty water bladders installed in 2001 were maintained in 2002, and drinking water quality was monitored. An additional seven water bladders were installed in 2002, and over 300 latrines will be constructed before the end of the year. The majority of the beneficiary population is now connected to the government-operated water supply network. Some towns operate their own networks, while in more remote areas people rely on wells and UNHCR has helped to increase the capability of groundwater extraction. Both ICRC and the International Rescue Committee (IRC) make potable water available to major concentrations of IDPs in Ingushetia, but some settlements still remain in need of water. ICRC has also improved the hygienic conditions of the IDPs by building shower installations when needed. Water bladders and washing facilities at IDP camps and settlements need to be maintained and upgraded, or turned into more permanent facilities. Water trucking to points not served by the regular water network needs to continue.

Solid waste disposal and pest-vector control are essential sanitation requirements. The government and private sector agencies which carried out these activities prior to the emergency have been unable to cope with the needs of the IDP population. In 2002 the emergency garbage disposal system and the pest-vector control programme helped to maintain minimum sanitation standards. The international community will support a further extension of the system where medium to long-term stay is possible, and will eventually hand over to the government.

Reticulated sewerage systems are only available in the central parts of the few major towns. The majority of the beneficiary population relies on latrines unconnected to these systems and IRC sewage trucks, provided by UNHCR, are servicing these latrines. This activity needs to be strengthened. Although emergency pit latrines were installed at IDP camps and settlements, some of these do not yet comply with minimum standards and are suitable only for short-term use. Significant health hazards exist due to the inadequacy of the human waste disposal system. Latrines need to be provided, upgraded, and maintained to meet minimum humanitarian standards and adapted to more long-term use. Hand-washing facilities are needed, and latrine-emptying programmes, together with public education in hygiene practices, should be continued. UNICEF has supported initial operations in the sector with emergency water and sanitation supplies. Further, the agency, with its partners and local institutions, has specific environmental and personal hygiene products during the last two years." (UNOCHA November 2002, p. 45)

Chechnya

"The need for safe water and sanitation facilities is a high priority for residents, returnees and IDPs in Chechnya. According to NGOs operating in Chechnya, as well as local officials, public health is threatened by a lack of clean water and poor sanitation. While the situation outside the capital in general is not as alarming, in Grozny all water treatment and distribution stations have been damaged or even destroyed. The public water supply (Vodokanal-Chechnya) can only provide parts of the city with treated water. UNICEF and the Polish Humanitarian Organization (PHO) started a potable water production and distribution system at the end of 2000 in Grozny. Later on, the IRC started supporting the distribution system by trucking water in Chechnya. Also, IRC and Vodokanal are working together on the rehabilitation of the primary water network in the Oktyabrsky raion in order to improve access to water for residents and returnees. IRC is planning to repair small parts of water pipelines, and is considering the rehabilitation of water pipelines in other raions of Grozny. Many hospitals and health facilities rely on trucked water and suffer from poor sanitation facilities. Garbage and sewage collecting systems are also largely destroyed, posing further threats to public health. The only working system is that developed by UNICEF and PHO, focusing mainly on health and educational facilities in Grozny, where pit-latrines and incinerators for medical wastes have been built." (UNOCHA November 2002, p. 46)

Sanitation and water in temporary accommodation centres not satisfactory (2002)

- UN reports absence of running water, lack of water delivery, functioning toilets and garbage collection
- Conditions increase risk of outbreaks of infectious diseases
- Residents in TACs also complain about lack of food and medical facilities
- Space available per persons is below the minimum humanitarian standard
- About 15,000 residents have moved from tent camps in Ingushetia and Northern Chechnya to these centres (September 2002)

"In early July [2002], the authorities dismantled two camps hosting 2,200 people in Znamenskoe (Chechnya) and forcibly moved the IDPs back to temporary accommodation centres (TACs) in Grozny. UN missions reported that the returnees remained extremely concerned about the persisting insecurity, and that living conditions in the TACs were inadequate. Under these circumstances, the UN decided not to provide assistance to these centres." (IASC WG 10 September 2002)

"In mid-July a UN mission visited four TACs in Chechnya. The mission confirmed that there are serious problems with living conditions in the TACs: no running water is available, regular water delivery is not organized, toilets are not properly functioning (on average there is one outside latrine per 75 people), and garbage is not collected. All of this, coupled with overcrowding and the summer heat, increases the risk of outbreaks of infectious diseases and is fraught with the worsening of the overall epidemiological situation. The residents of TACs complain about the lack of food delivery and insufficiency of medical facilities." (WHO July 2002)

"The international humanitarian community retained its focus on the Temporary accommodation centers (TAC's) in Chechnya where IDPs from Ingushetia and northern Chechnya were resettled. According to WHO data, out of 15 000 spots at the currently opened TAC's in Grozny, 14 772 were occupied in early September, although sanitary and water condition in some TAC's remained to be alarming. The UN agencies continue to refrain from providing humanitarian assistance to the TAC's as this is the responsibility of the local authorities, although some relief agencies are actively working in the centers and covering basic needs of their inhabitants." (PINF September 2002, p. 2)

"Number of occupants on July 16 in the seven operating centres (the eighth being under repair): 4,900 persons plus two convoys from Ingushetia on July 16 and 17. (Figures provided by the Chechen Committee in Grozny)

In total, 5,300 persons including the Grozny June floods victims who lost their houses but never left Chechnya.

B) General remarks on the TACs:

- The requisitioned buildings are former dormitories or workers centres, a kindergarten, buildings which are still standing, an abandoned technical college.
- In all those buildings, the mains are out of use, water and lavatories are outside, in the yard. The TACs doors close at 10pm. Because of the curfew, so refugees have no access to the lavatories between 10pm and 6am.
- The TACs are guarded by armed Chechen militiamen. Some accept to escort people to the lavatories in case of emergency, at the guards' free will.
- Particularly precarious sanitary conditions and permanent promiscuity could rapidly increase the risk of epidemics. In all the TACs there are cases of tuberculosis, the sick are not isolated or medically treated.

- In two of the 7 TACs there is no health point, therefore, there is no free access to health care. Polyclinics ask for 30 rubbles per consultation. The other five do have a primary health point, either in the buildings themselves or close. They are supported either by the MchS or one of the Grozny polyclinics, but supplies are totally inadequate.

- Water is distributed once a day by the "Polish Humanitarian Action": Bladders are placed in yards or in entrance halls. Two hours later, reserves are depleted.

- The Migrations Service (under the Chechen Home Affairs Ministry) distributes the equivalent of 15 rubbles of food per registered person every 10 days.

- Renovation is more cosmetic than lasting (A spattering of paint on the walls, and it is already peeling off, linoleum on the floor, doors whose locks do not work. Electricity works every now and again, there is no gas supply in every building or, where there is gas, people do not dare use it for fear of blowing everything up.

Basins and showers are unusable, as used water cannot be disposed of).

[...]

- Children born in Ingushetia or having left Chechnya at the beginning of the war are terrified by the constant night shooting. Their mothers spend nights trying to calm, reassure them and stop their shouting. Refugees in the most exposed TACs are in a terrible state of nerves.

Remarks: Sanitary conditions are deplorable. In Grozny there is a general water disposal problem. It is not a specific TACs problem." (MDM July 2002, pp. 16-17)

"The international humanitarian community has also repeatedly voiced its concerns over the living conditions in the Temporary Accommodation Centers [...], i.e. dormitories where a great part of IDPs returned to. Most of those have been built or reconstructed in Grozny and especially water and sanitation conditions where are very dissatisfactory. Space calculated per person is 3.2 m² (humanitarian Sphere standards indicate 3.5-4.5 m² as minimum), there is little or no running water, insufficient number of toilets, some of those even not dug out etc. At the moment the TAC's are already overcrowded mostly with the IDPs from Znamenskoe." (PINF July 2002)

"At the shelter sector meeting the delegation pointed out that the situation in the TAC in terms of water provision and sanitation had not improved as compared to the previous visits." (UN OCHA 30 September 2002)

ACCESS TO EDUCATION

Ingushetia

Good school performance of displaced children in Ingushetia (2003)

- The majority of the children admitted in UNICEF supported schools for IDPs in Ingushetia received good and excellent marks for their final exams
- 28 % continued education at universities and medical and technical colleges in Chechnya, Ingushetia and Moscow
- The rest live in Ingushetia and Chechnya and have problems in finding a job

"The majority of students of the 9th and 11th grades at UNICEF-supported schools for IDPs in Ingushetia successfully passed their final exams. At schools run by the Centre for Peacemaking and Community Development (CPCD), only 4 out of 239 students admitted failed to pass the exams, while at schools operated by the Hilfswerk Austria (HWA), 67% of 187 pupils admitted received good and excellent marks. Such good performance was achieved thanks to professional skills and commitment of teachers." (UN OCHA 7 July 2003)

In Ingushetia, a survey conducted by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) on the situation with graduates of IRC-managed and UNICEF supported IDP schools in 2003 showed that 28% of them continued education at universities and medical and technical colleges in Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Moscow. Most of the remaining 72 % live in Ingushetia or Chechnya and have problems with finding a job. (UN OCHA 5 December 2003)

IDP schools in Ingushetia under pressure from the authorities (2003)

- IDP schools should be equipped with fire safety equipment, Ingush authorities request
- NGO reports gas and electricity cut off in one IDP school

"New school year has started also at PINF-operated IDP schools in Ingushetia located at 23 spontaneous settlements in Malgobek, Nazran and Sunzha districts. During the summer time all old and worn-out school tents were replaced with the so-called box-tents, fiber-board constructions of a size of approximately half a classroom. Altogether 22 double box-tents were installed, while in most locations the old tents were preserved for after-school activities and work of PINF psychologists. Referring to a regulation according to which all schools in the Russian Federation are obliged to be equipped with fire boards, water tanks and sand boxes, fire-safety authorities of Ingushetia issued an ultimatum that all IDP schools will be closed if the fire regulations are not observed. PINF has then installed all necessary equipment and consequently will carry out training on evacuation from tents and box-tents among all school-children.

At several locations, threats were made by the owners of the territory that gas and electricity may be cut off, as the Migration Service of Ingushetia does not cover the costs, while it does so in case of the IDPs' individual dwellings. In a school in Sagopshi the threats materialized to cutting off the gas, which did not yet have any major consequences on the educational process, while such a step in autumn and winter months would lead to a closure of schools due to no heating." (PINF September 2003)

"On April 21, one tented school, located in Troitskaya IDP settlement, was temporarily sealed off by the local fire department, officially because of non-adherence to fire regulations of the Russian Federation. In reality, a local employee of the fire department had previously requested a bribe for allowing classes in an inflammable tent, which was denied. After one week without classes, the school was re-opened to improve its fire safety. Remaining 19 PINF-operated tented as well as three wooden schools in Ingushetia continue to function with tents being gradually replaced at eight of those." (PINF April 2003)

Satisfactory school enrolment rates for the displaced children in Ingushetia (2002)

- School attendance rate for IDP children ranges from 80 and 90 percent
- There is a need for recreational activities to keep children away from illegal and dangerous activities
- Pre-school facilities are also needed to give parents time for income generating activities
- Humanitarian agencies have observed traumatic disorders and slow social integration in many IDP children of all ages
- Schools are considered by the camp population as the safest place for their children

"Continuous monitoring of school enrolment rates give the present number of IDP children between seven and seventeen years old (primary and secondary school age) in Ingushetia as 27,000. Approximately 9,000 of these children are attending classes in regular schools, while 10,000 are enrolled in NGO-run alternative school facilities, located in tents and wooden buildings funded and equipped mainly by UNICEF. Most of the remaining 8,000 non enrolled children, sometimes defined as 'drop-outs', are adolescents of secondary school age or children with special physical, mental, or social problems.

Non enrolled children, and others too in after school hours, have little to do, and are therefore particularly vulnerable to becoming involved in illegal and dangerous activities. After three years of life in tents or settlements this risk is even higher. UNICEF, in collaboration with its partners, has developed and maintained sports and recreational facilities throughout the republic of Ingushetia, catering for more than 3,000 IDP children and adolescents. Together with alternative schools, these recreational facilities constitute the main protective environment existing in the IDP camps. Small-scale vocational training projects, improving prospects of employment, have also started. Nonetheless, there is still an urgent need to increase the capacity of these facilities.

Approximately 13,000 children between three and six years old are part of the IDP community in Ingushetia. In a normal environment these children would probably be attending kindergarten or other pre-school facilities, thus giving their parents time for income generating activities. Unfortunately, nine existing kindergartens are still occupied by IDPs. While UNICEF has already rehabilitated five such buildings, and with its partners has developed kindergartens in several camps and settlements, these facilities only offer places for 2,000 children.

UNICEF and its partners have observed traumatic disorders and slow social integration in many IDP children of all ages. Although educational and recreational facilities provided to IDP children have contributed significantly towards overcoming these negative effects of conflict, specialised approaches which offer relief to displaced children remain scarce and more needs to be done in this direction." (UNOCHA November 2002, p. 51)

"Currently UNICEF is supporting directly or partially 59 schools located in the tent camps or spontaneous settlements in Ingushetia. Number of children enrolled stays around 10,000. According to the reports of UNICEF implementing partners, the overall attendance rate for IDP school network in Ingushetia ranges from 82% to 91,4%. This be considered as satisfactory for the winter season taking into consideration the

problems with gas, electricity, seasonal increase of child illness and IDP families migration under political pressure of the official authorities.

On 14 January 2003 the winter vacations at IDP schools were over and the educational process in alternative schools resumed. It should be noted that during the holidays nearly all schools stayed open because they are still considered by the camp population as the safest place for their children. The children are encouraged by their parents to stay at school the major part of the day and to be involved in different recreational activities and hobbies." (UNICEF 26 January 2003)

"Education was suspended for two days at IDP school in camp Bart since teachers had not been paid salaries for three months. Just before her abduction, the head of NGO 'Druzhba' Nina Davidovich handed over the schools to the Chechen Ministry of Education. The MoE officials just confirmed on 30 November that salaries will be paid." (UNICEF 30 November 2002)

"Education in Chechnya and Ingushetia slowed down due to the autumn holidays, but children located in the temporary IDP camps kept attending schools for the recreational and sport activities. The situation with the military presence close to some IDP camps in Ingushetia has not changed. UNICEF through the implementing partners keeps monitoring the situation for possible decreases of enrolment rates." (UNICEF 17 November 2002)

Chechnya

Classroom capacity in Chechnya is still insufficient (2002)

- Despite rehabilitation efforts, many schools remain at least partly destroyed or unusable
- The risk of children and adolescents becoming involved in dangerous and illegal activities is high
- Very few kindergartens are active in the Republic
- A lack of clothing has a direct relationship with decreased attendance in school
- The population in Chechnya is well educated and shows a strong interest in capacity building projects

"According to the Chechen Ministry of Education, the current number of pupils in Chechnya is 220,000, enrolled in 420 schools. It is however difficult to obtain precise data on the magnitude of the 'drop-out' problem in Chechnya. More than fifteen school buildings were rehabilitated during 2002 with the help of the international community, coordinated by UNICEF and the Ministry of Education. Nevertheless, many schools remain at least partly destroyed or unusable, with higher percentages in the towns and villages most affected by the conflict. Assessments carried out by UNICEF and UNESCO show that classroom capacity in schools is still insufficient in relation to the high number of pupils. Alternative premises are used where schools are not suitable for proper teaching but rented houses, sheds or tents are by no means satisfactory premises for education.

The risk of children and adolescents becoming involved in dangerous and illegal activities is even higher in Chechnya than in Ingushetia. Moreover, large parts of the republic, including Grozny, are affected by the presence of landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). Although UNICEF, together with its partners, has developed some recreational and sport activities in rehabilitated school buildings, efforts in this area should be expanded in order to cope with the real needs.

Regarding pre-school facilities, the situation in Chechnya is critical. No clear data are available, but in any case very few kindergartens are active in the Republic. UNICEF and one of its partners have so far

reactivated seven children's centres in Grozny, providing an environment of normality in an otherwise extremely troubled city to about 350 children. These are at present the only functioning pre-school institutions in Grozny despite the evident need for much greater capacity. The Ministry of Education has said it is ready to progressively take on the responsibility for revitalised kindergartens. Two of the seven facilities have already been handed over, thus ensuring the sustainability of the programme." (UNOCHA November 2002, pp. 51-52)

"A lack of clothing has a direct relationship with decreased attendance in school, which is of course compounded by a lack of essential school supplies. The need for clothing potentially has a significant impact on a [household], as dressing children to high standards is a show of dignity, and often enough, [households] cut back on food to purchase clothing for children in order to send them to school." (ICRC July 2002, Chechnya, p. 37)

"The population in Chechnya is largely well educated. Many IDPs are professionals from Grozny, which was once an economic center for the North Caucasus. While there have been two successive interruptions in the education of many children, the education system functions and literacy rates are still very high. Many teachers in IDP schools are IDPs themselves. In general, the vulnerable population shows strong interest in participating in different capacity building/community development projects implemented by aid agencies. There are many local NGOs with a proven track record of programme implementation." (UN OCHA November 2003, p. 13)

Other areas

Local authorities deny access to displaced children in Russian cities (2001)

- Children of unregistered displaced Chechens have been excluded from the education system in Moscow

"Although the Constitution of Russia guarantees everyone (specifically, everyone, and not just citizens of Russia) 'the accessibility of free availability of pre-school, general secondary and vocational secondary education in public and municipal educational institutions and enterprises', many children of migrants find themselves out of the system of education only because their parents are not registered with internal affairs bodies.

Children of forced migrants are, as a rule, not admitted to either children's homes or boarding schools, where they can stay while their parents look for temporary housing and job.

Order of the Moscow Committee on Education No. 567 of September 9, 1999 'On strengthening safety in educational institutions', Sub-item 1.1 of which says: 'Children from outside Moscow are admitted to schools and boarding schools only if registered.' This Order was issued the next day after military actions started in Chechnya.

The ministry of education as well as the General Prosecutor's Office on many occasions have confirmed that actions of local authorities are illegal." (COE 12 October 2001, paras. 88-91)

ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Self-reliance

Destitution in Ingushetia and Chechnya (2003)

- 90 percent of IDPs in Ingushetia are unemployed, according to an April 2003 survey
- 6.5 percent of displaced families rely entirely on humanitarian aid
- 63 percent of the population in Chechnya qualify as poor or very poor and in need of humanitarian assistance, according to the Danish Refugee Council
- The urban population of Chechnya is poorer than those living in rural areas
- There are very limited economic opportunities for IDPs in Ingushetia, who do not have residency status and thus are not able to be legally employed

"In spring 2003 [the Danish Refugee Council] conducted a survey of the IDP population in Ingushetia, which addressed living conditions. Household expenditures, sources of income and coping mechanisms of IDP families. The overwhelming majority of surveyed IDPs (90%) reported that they are unemployed or underemployed. Only a third have temporary jobs. About half of IDP families have at least one pensioner. Pension income contributes significantly to families' household economy. While three quarters of IDPs live on less than 486 RUR (US\$16.2) per person per month (about a quarter of the official subsistence level in Ingushetia), 6.5% of IDP families in Ingushetia do not have any income and rely entirely on humanitarian aid. Nearly all IDP families in Ingushetia regularly sell their household assets to complement their income. Every third IDP family receives remittances from relatives or friends, be it cash, clothing or food." (UN OCHA November 2003)

"[The Danish Refugee Council] has used a methodology for determining vulnerability in Chechnya based on cash salaries, food income and other economic indicators such as cars, jewellery, household items, etc. Out of five categories from very poor to wealthy, DRC classifies the very poor and poor households as in need of humanitarian assistance. According to estimates, those classified as very poor have an average monthly income of 444 RUR (US \$14.8) per person, while the poor earn approximately 600 RUR (US \$20) per person. Statistics provided by DRC as of 1 August 2003 indicate that some 63% of the surveyed population in Chechnya qualifies as poor or very poor. According to DRC statistics, people in the highest income category, classified in this survey as wealthy and comprising 0.4% of the population, have an average per person monthly income of 2112 RUR (US \$70.4). With the officially established subsistence level for Chechnya at 2,125 RUR12 (US \$70.8), well over 99% of Chechnya's population lives below the poverty line. Unemployment stands at 85%. At the same time, DRC shows socially vulnerable groups – defined as pregnant women, lactating women, infants and children from 0 to 36 months of age, invalids, elderly without adequate social support, orphans, and children in single-parent families – to make up 16% of the population. DRC also compared average income in different geographic regions, finding that the urban population of Chechnya, with a total average income of 1,954 RUR (US \$62), is poorer than those living in rural areas of the republic." (UN OCHA November 2003, pp. 11-12)

"Pensions and allowances continue to be the major sources of cash income for the population in Chechnya. More than 40% of the population live in poverty and 32% face severe difficulties in maintaining minimum livelihoods and meeting basic food needs. Food is considered as the greatest need followed by shelter and health requirements." (UN OCHA 24 May 2003, pp. 6)

"The number of IDPs returning to Chechnya has increased. Further, the Government is assuming increasing responsibilities and provides more funds for infrastructure rehabilitation.

These developments are extremely tentative, however, and the high levels of physical destruction of the industrial, agricultural, financial, commercial, and public infrastructure make prospects for a sustained economic recovery in the foreseeable future unlikely. Inside Chechnya, it is estimated that up to 60 % of the working age population is unemployed and the same proportion of the population reports being regularly unable to meet regular household expenses. Chechen households with a very low level of income (about RUR 2,200 or US\$ 70 per month or less) rely on a variety of sources of income. In a context of persistent insecurity, many individuals engage in small trade activities to generate additional income.

In Ingushetia, 73 % of the population is currently unemployed and some 36,000 IDPs are expected to settle there. At present, there are very limited economic opportunities for local residents, let alone IDPs who do not have residency status and thus are not able to be legally employed." (UN OCHA 24 May 2003, p. 12)

Limited income sources for most households in Chechnya (2002)

- 60 percent of the working age population is unemployed
- The capacity to boost small income generating activities is very limited
- According to ICRC survey, 10 percent of the population is extremely poor and heavily dependent on external assistance
- Extremely poor households do not receive state benefits as a result of complicated administrative procedures
- Vulnerability of IDPs and returnees is aggravated by the lack of access to kitchen gardens
- Theft, bootlegging and other criminal activities are widespread in Grozny

"The last decade has seen destabilisation and economic collapse in Chechnya. As of September 2002, an estimated 180,000 Chechens remain displaced outside Chechnya in other republics of the Russian Federation, thereby weakening the work force potential of the republic. Although the government is assuming increased responsibilities and provides more funds for infrastructure rehabilitation, the levels of physical destruction of the industrial, agricultural, financial, commercial, and public infrastructure remain high and will prevent a sustained economic recovery in the foreseeable future. Inside Chechnya, it is estimated that up to 60% of the working age population is unemployed and the same proportion of the population reports being regularly unable to meet regular household expenses. Chechen households with a very low level of income (about RUR 2,200 per month or less) rely on a variety of sources of additional income. In descending order of importance they are: borrowing (27% of income); humanitarian assistance (24%); work income, state benefits, and cash donations (12% each); and in-kind donations (10%). Home-grown food also represents a significant additional resource for households living in the rural plains and in the mountains.

In a context of persistent insecurity, many individuals engage in small trade activities to generate additional income. Although local coping mechanisms such as donations, credit, and borrowing from friends and family exist, access to financial and productive capital is extremely limited. The first retail bank to offer financial services in Chechnya opened on 23 September 2002. The capacity to boost small income generating activities (i.e. petty trade, collection of empty bottles, etc.) is very limited." (UNOCHA November 2002, p. 63)

ICRC economic security survey in Chechnya (July 2002)

"The extent of [household] economic vulnerability is relatively comparable throughout the assessed area.

60 % of the assessed population have a monthly income of less than 3,000 rubles and are regularly unable to meet their expenses and are considered vulnerable as they have no [household] reserves and are therefore dependent on external assistance including humanitarian aid.

10 % of the population have a monthly income of less than 700 rubles (extremely poor [households] and are extremely economically vulnerable, being heavily dependent on external assistance and humanitarian aid to survive." (ICRC July 2002 Chechnya, p. 18)

"State benefits

Since 2000, benefits have been regularly paid by the state and, in some vulnerable [households], benefits surpass employment as the key reliable source of [household] income. Over 90% of the assessed [households] report receiving state benefits, but, once again, the extremely poor [households] are largely excluded from this source of [household] income, with the exception of child allowances. Extremely poor [households] indicate that due to the complicated application procedures and high 'administrative' costs, applying for pensions is often their reach. Nonetheless, state benefits provide an important source of [household] income within vulnerable [households] and the lack of access to state benefits is an important factor contributing to the extent of vulnerability within an extremely poor [household]." (ICRC July 2002 Chechnya, p. 20)

"Humanitarian assistance

About 75% of [households] assessed report receiving some form of humanitarian assistance. Bulk food is by far the most regular and significant humanitarian assistance provided, with about 65% of assessed [households] reporting receiving food, although it is notable that only 55% of the extremely poor [households] report receiving bulk food, indicating a problem in effectively accessing humanitarian assistance for the extremely poor [households] [...]" (ICRC July 2002 pp. 20-21)

"Household level production

About 60% of [households] report having some degree of food production capacity, decreasing to about 50 % or less in the extremely poor [households]. This is a significant factor in both the rural plains and the mountains, providing as much as 30% or more of the [household] food, while Grozny reports having about two thirds the [household] production capacity of other areas. The majority of food produced is consumed in the [household], decreasing food expenses and increasing [household] dietary diversification, although about 20% is usually given to family and friends. Only negligible amounts of the product are reportedly sold. Extremely poor [households] have relatively limited production capacity because of limited access to land and required inputs with only 25% of extremely poor IDPs and 43% of extremely poor returnees reporting having kitchen gardens, which is yet another factor that contributes to the cumulative vulnerability of these [households]." (ICRC July 2002 Chechnya, p. 22)

"Characteristics of an extremely poor household

Poverty results from the combined effect of a number of factors contributing negatively towards the economy by either decreasing income generating capacity or increasing expense burdens within the [household]. The following outlines some of the key factors that contribute to extreme poverty in Chechnya:

- loss of house and possessions during hostilities, during [household] have no productive assets and no [household] level production capacity (e.g.: loss of home, animals, tools, land, etc.)
- exclusion of [household] from local network (no local contacts, no family support – typically due to displacement)
- [household] members frequently lack official documents or local registration often due to displacement (thus facing increased security threats and exclusion from work opportunities and entitlements)
- [households] are often single headed (particular difficulties when [household] is headed by a female)

- [households] often have unemployed or unemployable adults (disabled, elderly, unskilled, occupied within [household], etc.)
- a [household] member often suffers a serious illness (cost, burden of care, decreased income generating potential)
- [households] have many children (including orphans), disabled and/or elderly who received no state pensions
- the majority of these [households] were already vulnerable with limited [household] income prior to the crisis, while the impact of this ongoing crisis has served to enhance the [household] economic vulnerability.

[Household] vulnerability results from a complex interaction of a multitude of factors including the above which combine to prevent extremely poor [households] from exploiting positive possibilities that could be available to them." (ICRC July 2002 Chechnya, p. 31)

"A subtle improvement of living conditions is noticeable in Grozny. The local market is growing every month, offering essential food and non-food goods at affordable prices, some items even lower than in Ingushetia. An increasing number of people are arriving in the town, many of them attempting to reside here. However, security risks are still considerable for Grozny inhabitants and coming winter is also a great source of worry to many. The unemployment rate currently exceeds 90%. Pensions are distributed rather regularly, social benefits are sometimes paid to families with children. Other sources of income include trading at the local market and small businesses, such as cafes and garage rentals. Another widespread source of income is the sale of low-grade gasoline. However, majority of Grozny inhabitants are still dependent on humanitarian aid. Theft, bootlegging and other criminal activities are widespread." (PNIF October 2001, para. 1.3.3)

ICRC survey highlights difficult access to state assistance for IDPs in Dagestan (2002)

- Poor households are primarily living in collective centres
- IDPs can only collect State benefits in Chechnya but half of them renounce to travel because of security risks and travel costs

"[A]s much as 12% (or 120 [households]) of the total 1,000 Chechen IDP [households] in Dagestan are facing extreme poverty, living on a [households] cash income of 600 rubles per month or less. Geographically, over 50% of these extremely poor IDP [households] are located in the collective centres in Khasavyurt." (ICRC July 2002, Dagestan, p. 15)

"State benefits are a significant source of reliable [household] income for both [residents affected by the hostilities and Chechen IDPs], with over 90% of the assessed [households] reporting some form of state benefits. State benefits are reported as the main source of income for 38% of the [residents affected by the hostilities], and 28% of the IDP [households].

Benefits are paid regularly by the state in both Dagestan and in Chechnya since 2000. Over 95% of the entitled [resident households affected by the hostilities] collect their benefits locally and on a monthly basis, while over 80% of the entitled IDP [households] receive their benefits in Chechnya [27]. Just over half of the IDP households collect their benefits monthly due to the costs and security risks related to traveling in Chechnya.

[...][W]ith the exception of access to child allowances [28], the poorest IDP [households] are largely excluded from receiving state benefits. This is primarily due to complicated and expensive application procedures, which is further enhanced by the fact that IDPs must apply and receive their benefits in Chechnya which has cost and security implications that can prove to be overwhelming. Many IDPs receiving only child allowances do not collect them because the transport cost equal the value of the

allowances. Additionally, in order to reduce travel costs, about 20% of entitled IDPs try to collect their benefits on a quarterly basis, although this has many bureaucratic complications and often they are unable to obtain the full amounts due to them.

[...][The resident population affected by the hostilities] in general has better access to state benefits as compared to the IDPs, largely due to the above described limitations faced by the IDPs. Some 50% of the [residents affected by the hostilities], with the exception of the very poor, have access to elderly pensions, while 20-30% also have access to invalid pensions. Each of these pensions represent a minimum of 600 rubles per month for the receiving [household], while child benefits, the majority of the benefits received by IDPs, have a value of 70 rubles per month."


[Footnote 27: 20% of IDP households who arrived in Daghestan after the first war benefited from the forced migrant status and are therefore able to collect their benefits in Daghestan]

[Footnote 28: Child allowances are valued at 70 rubles per month per registered child, while most other benefits are significantly more substantial, generally having a starting value of about 600 rubles, and increasing from that according to previous work history and other factors outlined by the law.] (ICRC July 2002, Dagestan, p. 19)

Action Contre la Faim reports a degradation of the economic situation of the displaced households in Ingushetia (2002)

- A typical displaced household generates a monthly revenue of 2,500 to 3,000 rubles
- This revenue is generated by regular incomes (pensions, subsidies), irregular income (seasonal work, petty trade, resale of humanitarian goods), and the sale of personal goods
- This covers only half of the basic needs of a six-person family
- Expenditures for healthcare, clothing and fresh food are usually postponed
- Displaced households have become extremely vulnerable to any change of circumstances: illness of the head of household, reduction of aid, increasing rent
- One third of the population currently living in collective settlements were accommodated with host families only a few months ago

"Origine des sources de revenu - Illustration par le cas typique d'une famille déplacée de six personnes vivant dans un camp [13] (en % du revenu total) :



Le graphique ci-dessus illustre la situation d'une famille typique vivant en camp. Cette famille est composée d'un chef de famille actif et de son épouse, d'une personne âgée et de trois enfants :

- **La part de revenus réguliers** mais à risques correspond aux pensions et allocations touchées à Grozny. La pension pour les personnes âgées est touchée mensuellement, tandis que les allocations pour les enfants ne sont perçues qu'un mois sur deux en moyenne.

- **La part de revenus irréguliers** correspond à l'activité saisonnière du chef de famille (3 à 4 mois de contrats en tant que manoeuvre agricole), et aux activités de petit commerce exercées par son épouse : revente d'une partie de la farine distribuée par les agences humanitaires, collecte et revente de canettes vides trouvées dans les poubelles.
- **La part décapitalisation** correspond à la vente de biens personnels (ici les bijoux de l'épouse).

Dans ce cas typique, la famille génère un revenu mensuel de 2 500 à 3 000 roubles, soit la moitié environ des dépenses nécessaires à une famille de six personnes pour couvrir ses besoins de base. C'est donc près de 50% des dépenses essentielles -notamment soins médicaux, habillement, et produits alimentaires frais- qui sont reportées.

L'économie familiale des déplacés tchétchènes est à bout de souffle et l'extrême érosion de leur capital les rend vulnérables au moindre choc : maladie du chef de famille, diminution de l'aide alimentaire, expulsion d'un logement collectif ou augmentation du coût du loyer pour les déplacés en secteur privé ; la survenue d'un seul de ces aléas est susceptible de précipiter les familles dans la détresse. Ainsi, dans l'incapacité de continuer à assurer le paiement du loyer, de nombreuses familles qui vivaient dans le secteur privé n'ont eu d'autre choix que de rejoindre des camps spontanés, les 'kompaktnik', habitations collectives et insalubres, symboles de la dégradation économique au sein des familles déplacées. Des familles entières sont ainsi agglutinées dans des usines délabrées, des vieux hangars, des anciens kolkhozes, des caves ou des étables. **Action Contre la Faim estime qu'environ un tiers de la population résidant aujourd'hui dans les centres collectifs vivait encore dans le secteur privé il y a quelques mois.**"

[Footnote 13: Source : entretiens de groupes et entretiens individuels menés par Action Contre la Faim dans les camps et dans les centres collectifs en décembre 2001 et janvier 2002. Le graphique illustre une situation typique d'une famille de déplacés : les revenus ont été estimés annuellement puis 'écrasés' sous la forme de revenus mensuels.]

(Action Contre la Faim September 2002)

ICRC identifies coping mechanisms of IDPs in Ingushetia (October 2001)

- IDPs living in spontaneous settlements and with host families feel that they lack support and information
- Coping mechanisms include selling of personal belongings, borrowing money, small business, selling humanitarian assistance and work of children
- All IDPs are considered to be in need of some degree of assistance, especially the newly arrived IDPs in the month following their arrival
- IDPs cannot be legally employed without resident status

"In Ingushetia, the ICRC conducted focus group discussions with beneficiaries living in camps, spontaneous settlements, and with host families in order to analyse their problems and identify their coping mechanisms.

IDPs identified the following problems: the security situation in Chechnya – while there is a genuine willingness among the IDPs to return to Chechnya the prevailing situation is the major constraint which keeps them in Ingushetia; legal status and legal documents – unlike those living in camps, the IDPs living in spontaneous settlements and with host families feel that they lack support and information on administrative and legal procedures; food, non-food, health, education assistance, unemployment; living conditions in Ingushetia; and assistance to children and orphans.

The main conclusions of the assessment include: the provision of assistance to the camps is the most complete and regular; in the spontaneous settlements the assistance has to be further improved by: better coordination among the organizations involved in order to provide for more regularity; filling in gaps in basic health care; assistance to children below the age of 5 years; habitat; and access to primary and secondary school and playrooms for children."

Coping mechanisms of IDPs

Selling of personal belongings is the prime coping mechanism of the IDPs living in camps and with host families;

Borrowing money comes right after the sale of private belongings for both IDPs in camps and spontaneous settlements, whereas taking a credit is a much less important strategy for the IDPs living with host families which confirms their better financial situation;

Small business, the labour market, and work of children are a common sequence when all three strategies need to be combined to cover basic expenditures. Among the coping mechanisms the work of children always come before selling humanitarian assistance.

(UN OCHA 31 October 2001)

ICRC main conclusions:

"Whilst all registered IDPs receive humanitarian assistance in the form of food and non-food items, in general the economic security situation of these IDPs did not improve in the last year. This trend may well continue in 2002 for those IDPs who remain in Ingushetia.

It is not possible to identify those who are most in need of humanitarian assistance by viewing IDP groups by habitation sector alone as there are poor, average and better-off IDPs in every habitation sector. All IDPs are considered to be in need of a certain level of outside assistance but there are certain groups who are more in need than others. For these groups humanitarian assistance plays a vital part in their economic security. The aim should be to best identify and provide additional assistance to these most vulnerable living in all three sectors in Ingushetia.

Despite the fact that the economic security for a number of IDPs has not improved in the last twelve months it appears that they are still able to cope with extraordinary expenses be it through community solidarity (through borrowing small amounts from family and friends) but in the worst case this can lead to debt. However, some IDPs are learning to cope better with their general situation – this is particularly the case in the camps and collective centres where the solidarity factor plays a part. The study found that there is a real need to assist newly arrived IDPs with both food and hygienic kits in the month following their arrival.

Food continues to be the most useful form of humanitarian assistance provided and this will remain the case for the coming year. Beyond the nutritional element of food distribution there is an additional economic reasoning behind the provision of food assistance through sale or exchange. Food is the item which IDPs spend the most money on and will sell assets for and borrow money to buy.

After food, clothing has been identified as the most useful form of assistance, particularly during winter which is the most financially difficult time of year.

Hygiene items, which are provided on a regular basis by IR and ICRC, are rarely sold or exchanged as they are consistently used within the household.

According to the CAP there are approximately 30 humanitarian organisations active in assisting the IDP population in Ingushetia today. Whilst some form of assistance reaches all registered IDPs, there are concerns that poor co-ordination in certain sectors, particularly in the case of one-off distributions, means that some are assisted more than others and it is not necessary those who are most in need who receive the most assistance." (ICRC February 2002, p. 26)

"In Ingushetia, 73% of the population is currently unemployed and some 35,000 IDPs are expected to settle there. At present, there are very limited economic opportunities for local residents, let alone IDPs who do not have residency status and are thus not able to be legally employed." (UNOCHA November 2002, p. 63)

Displaced face discriminatory access to the labour market in Russian cities: the example of Moscow (2001)

- Unregistered displaced in Moscow can only be employed illegally
- However, new regulations issued by the Moscow government do not mention registration of residence as a precondition for legal employment
- Absence of registration at the place of residence deprives forced migrants of access to unemployment allowance

"Access to employment is strictly dependent on the registration. This practice is secured in Moscow and Moscow Oblast by the Rules of Registration that contain a clause that establishes high penalties for heads of enterprises, institutions and organizations of all types of ownership for employing citizens who are not registered. This clause is a direct violation of Article 16 of the Labour Code that prohibits limitation of rights of citizens to employment due to circumstances that are not connected with professional qualities of workers, including their place of residence. Still, this clause, which was included in the Rules of Registration adopted in 1995, stayed unchanged in the Rules of Registration approved in May 1999.

All this leads to a situation where refugees who find job are employed illegally, without due processing of all their documents. This means that they are deprived of all social and legal benefits linked to the job.

Absence of registration at the place of residence deprives forced migrants of the possibilities guaranteed by the Laws 'On Refugees' and 'On Involuntarily Displaced Persons' to receive unemployment allowance, to get free professional training and additional training improving their chances for employment. Employment agencies deny them in the above referring to the fact that the Law 'On Employment' provides for making decision on registration of a citizen as unemployed at the place of his residence, which is traditionally treated as registration at the place of residence. The RF Ministry of Labour and Social Development is of the same opinion. Attempts of public organisations to achieve realisation of the right of unemployed refugees and forced migrants to obtain state support give no results as yet. As a rule, courts of justice also share the opinion of administrative agencies. There is only one case known that, after a court ruling, they managed to register a forced migrant as unemployed and provide him with respective allowance.

However, in the new regulations issued by the Moscow government, the registration of residence is not mentioned as a precondition for legal employment. Thus, the problem of access to employment for asylum-seekers might be fixed in Moscow. Since the regulations are very recent, it still remains to be seen how their provisions will be implemented in practice. UNHCR office in Moscow concluded agreements with some enterprises which are ready to employ refugees. These agreements have been approved by the Moscow government. This programme is expected to begin in 2001." (COE 12 October 2001, paras. 94-97)

Participation

Participation of IDPs in the political process in Chechnya: ballot stations in Ingushetia (March 2003)

- IDPs from Chechnya accommodated in Ingushetia could vote at ballot stations set up in this republic for the referendum (March 2003)
- Between 3 and 15 percent of IDPs in Ingushetia participated in the referendum, according to local human rights activist
- Human rights groups reported ballot stuffing, voting by unregistered voters, and pressure from local authorities during presidential elections (October 2003)

Referendum 23 March 2003

"The March referendum on the draft Constitution is expected by some observers to have a positive impact on the political, economic, and security environment in the republic. According to official figures, some 80% of the 580,000 eligible voters, including IDPs in neighbouring Ingushetia and Dagestan, took part in the referendum and nearly 96% voted in favour of the constitution, as well as the laws on presidential and parliamentary elections. However, some observers, noting irregularities in voting and tabulation procedures, have questioned these figures. Both federal and Chechen authorities have seen the results of the referendum as very positive, and have announced intentions to grant the republic broad autonomy and to consider an amnesty for the militants. Nevertheless, tensions and insecurity in the region have not subsided." (UN OCHA May 2003)

"A referendum on the draft of the Chechen constitution and the draft laws on the presidential and parliamentary elections took place in the Republic of Chechnya on 23 March. The Chechen electoral commission reported that nearly 96% of those who voted supported the constitution, 95.4% backed the law on the election of the president, and 96.05% - the law on the election of the parliament. About 90% (510,000 people) of nearly 580,000 eligible voters took part in the referendum. IDPs from Chechnya accommodated in the neighbouring Ingushetia could vote at ballot stations set up in this republic. According to the head of the Central Electoral Commission, Alexandre Veshnyakov, the presidential election will be held not earlier than six months after the referendum and is expected to coincide with the federal election to the State Duma in December 2003. The republic will elect its new parliament at least three months after the presidential election. The event is likely to coincide with the federal presidential election in March 2004." (UN OCHA 31 March 2003)

"Two polling precincts have been made available for Chechen refugees in Ingushetia. One will be for all those living in the private sector; the other precinct will be for people living in tent camps in the Ordzhonikidzevskaya village and the 'Bart' camp near Karabulak, said Eyla Vakhidov, a member of the Chechen Election Committee.

According to the Ingush Interior Ministry, a total of 19,000 Chechens are registered to vote in Ingushetia; and since about 8,000 have already submitted their applications, they too are eligible to vote." (Prague Watchdog 23 March 2003)

"In Ingushetia, nearly 3,000 people had submitted applications that made them eligible to vote; yet the actual turnout totaled 5,500.

Ruslan Badalov, the chairman of the Chechen Committee for National Salvation, thinks the difference was caused by incorrect figures provided by the election committee. 'There are 50,000 eligible voters among Chechen refugees in Ingushetia, so given that figure, one 3,5 % of the refugees took part in the referendum,' he stated.

'Even if we use the figures of the Ingush Interior Ministry, that there were 20,000 eligible voters in Ingushetia, then the turnout does not exceed 15%,' Badalov added.

Badalov claims that the figures are fictitious, like the ones in last year's census. 'In fact, the majority of Chechens boycotted the referendum,' he asserted." (Prague Watchdog 24 March 2003)

See also "Memorial's poll shows only 12 % of Chechens had intended taking part in referendum", Prague Watchdog 27 March 2003

Presidential elections 5 October 2003

"The Chechen Electoral Commission announced the victory of Akhmat Kadyrov in the presidential elections in the Chechen Republic on 5 October. According to the commission, the turnout was 87.7%, and Kadyrov won 80.8% of votes. The Electoral Commission Chairman, Abdul-Kerim Arsakhanov, said that there had been no complaints from observers, which could influence the ballot outcome. However, human rights groups reported instances of ballot stuffing, voting by unregistered voters, and pressure from local authorities. Commenting on the elections outcome, the European Union Presidency expressed the hope that the political settlement process in Chechnya continues, while noting 'negative development as the lack of real pluralism of candidatures to the presidency and the absence of independent media.'" (UN OCHA 21 October 2003)

"[IDPs] will vote in the Chechen president election on October 5 by the same rules as were in effect in the constitution referendum in March, Chairman of the Russian Central Electoral Commission Alexander Veshnyakov said on the Ekho Moskvy radio on Friday.

It was planned at first to bring [IDPs] to the nearest polling stations in Chechnya by bus, but the number of refugees wishing to take part in the referendum was so large that it was agreed with the Ingush authorities to open polling stations right where the refugees stayed, Veshnyakov said. Not a single violation was registered at those polling stations, he remarked." (TASS 5 September 2003)

See also, "Chechnya's 'free and fair' poll", BBC, 11 October 2003

IDPs in Ingushetia voice their concerns (2001)

- Chechen IDPs created a congress of displaced persons (March 2001)
- Small group of displaced went on hunger strike, demanding peace negotiations be initiated (June 2001)
- Displaced persons from camp in Ingushetia organised protest march (August 2001)

"In Ingushetia, IDPs from Chechnya have set up a congress of displaced persons. The committee intends to examine issues related to the situation for Chechens in Ingushetia, as well as the situation on the territory of Chechnya. The congress will convene in Ingushetia 4-5 March." (UNHCR 1 March 2001)

"On 15 June 2001, a group of 12 internally displaced persons, six men, four women and two girls went on a hunger strike in Ingushetia, demanding that federal authorities put an end to the war in Chechnya and initiate negotiations with the Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov.

Internally displaced persons (IDPs) set up a tent between the IDP camps "Sputnik" and "Satsita" in the Sunzhensky district of Ingushetia and vowed to fast to their death for peace. In late June, the number of strikers increased to 66.

The situation was continuously monitored by the World Health Organization and information was released daily. WHO also arranged for coordinated round-the-clock medical assistance as the strikers' health gradually deteriorated, mainly due to dehydration. Islamic Relief, Hammer Forum, MDM, MSF-France and others took an active part in care provision. Upon receiving information from WHO, MoH I entrusted the Sunzha district hospital with helping to maintain the strikers' health, including their hospitalisation if deemed necessary.

Ultimately, quite a number of strikers had to stop protesting due to health problems. A total of 15 IDPs were hospitalised. By 30 July, 17 strikers remained and they planned, together with other IDPs, to start a peace march to Moscow on 1 August 2001. However, authorities refused to grant them permission to march on the republic's territory and on 30-31 July the Ingush police removed the strikers and dismantled their tents.

At present, no strikers are hospitalised and all IDPs have returned to their tents." (WHO August 2001, p. 1)

"Ingushetian police on 2 August halted a group of Chechen displaced persons who had begun a protest march from a displaced persons camp in Ingushetia to demand that the Russian leadership begin peace talks with Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov, AP reported. Two of the organizers of the protest were detained. Ingushetian President Ruslan Aushev has previously defended the interests of the displaced persons and repeatedly called on the Russian leadership to begin talks with Maskhadov. LF" (RFE/RL 3 August 2001)

Participation of the internally displaced population to the presidential elections (26 March 2000)

- No arrangements were made to establish special polling stations at the camps in Ingushetia where displaced were housed
- Many of those who had registered as internally displaced persons had already been added to the voter lists of the polling stations in the regions where they had relocated
- Voter registers in Chechnya are outdated, but citizens could register on the day of election
- Polling officials would be flexible on documentation requirements
- Standard conditions for elections and pre-electoral activities did not exist in Chechnya due to the ongoing military campaign

"One of the major challenges related to compilation of voter lists. According to data on the last lists prepared for the Chechen Republic under President Maskhadov there were 380,000 voters. According to the Central Election Commission, however, the voter lists for the presidential election included closer to 460,000 voters. This number included federal forces in the military units serving in the region. A major concern expressed by critics of the move to hold elections in the Chechen Republic was that the data on the resident population was seriously outdated. In addition, much of the population had been displaced by the conflict. In practical terms, it would probably have been impossible to accurately remove those who had left the area given the stressed and time constricted situation. In addition, the CEC [Central Election Commission] decided that refugees should remain on the lists because many were 'returning every day.' Their refuge in neighboring areas was considered temporary and most voters, it was believed, had full intentions to return. Plans called for internally displaced persons to be added back on the lists as they returned.

Another concern was that many citizens of the Republic had lost their passports and other forms of identification. A joint OSCE/ODIHR and CEC assessment mission to the Chechen Republic on 20 March established that special efforts were made by the Ministry of Interior to provide passports or special certificates that indicated that persons had officially applied for replacements. The mission also established that these certificates would be acceptable as ID on election day. Polling officials would be flexible on documentation requirements, and voters would be permitted to cast ballots on the basis of almost any form of identity, including even pension books so long as the document reflected residence in the Republic.

In spite of thousands of refugees displaced in neighboring regions, no arrangements were made to establish special polling stations at the camps where they were housed. Rather, residents of the camps were given

status as residents which was noted by a stamp in their passports (propiska) or their residency certificates. Displaced voters cast ballots at regular polling stations. Many of those who had registered as internally displaced persons had already been added to the voter lists of the polling stations in the regions where they had relocated. Anyone else with a stamp in their passport or certificate indicating their being domiciled in a camp located in the area served by the polling station but whose name did not appear on the voter list was added to the "additional" voters register on election day." (OSCE 19 May 2000, Chapter V)

"The CEC decided to conduct the presidential elections in 12 of Chechnya's 15 districts for the estimated 460,000 voters there. On 20 March, the [International Election Observation Mission (IEOM)] observed the challenging circumstances under which the CEC was preparing all technical requirements for elections in Chechnya. Voter registers in Chechnya are outdated, but citizens could register on the day of election. Also, special measures were in place for displaced persons to take part in the voting within Chechnya and in the neighboring regions. However, standard conditions for elections and pre-electoral activities do not exist in the territory as a whole due to the ongoing military campaign in some areas and security conditions in others. In particular, election campaign activities in the territory did not take place, although the acting President visited there. Moreover, the population in Chechnya had very limited access to electronic and print media, had limited freedom of movement, and the potential for intimidation and fear could not be ruled out.

On election day, the IEOM did not deploy observers to Chechnya or the neighboring regions, though the CEC invited observers." (OSCE 19 May 2000, "Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions")

Displaced in Ingushetia were allowed to vote for the election of the Chechnya representative in the State Duma (August 2000)

- Few displaced persons made use of this opportunity

"On 20 August elections for the State Duma were held in Chechnya. Mr. Aslanbek Aslakhonov won the position with a clear margin, however, doubts have been raised with regard to the level of participation among the Chechen population. IDPs in Ingushetia were allowed to vote on the Chechen side of the Kavkaz-1 border checkpoint, however few persons made use of this opportunity. Although it appears that Mr. Aslakhonov (generally considered pro-Russian) enjoys some support among the Chechen population, the result of the vote is not expected to have any significant immediate effect on the general situation in the republic." (UNHCR 25 August 2000)

See also the section on the political participation of internally displaced persons in the Russian Federation in: "Internally Displaced Persons and Political Participation: the OSCE Region" published by the Brookings Institution Project on Internal Displacement in September 2000 [Internet]

DOCUMENTATION NEEDS AND CITIZENSHIP

Documentation needs

Several thousand IDPs are not properly registered at the place of sojourn in Ingushetia (2003)

- As a result, many IDP parents were refused birth certificates for their children
- Local branches of the Interior Ministry have issued temporary identification documents (so-called Form 2II) to IDPs who were not in possession of internal passports
- Issuance of temporary identity documents in Ingushetia greatly improved the situation of undocumented IDPs with regard to travelling to and from Chechnya
- IDPs are also registered for the purpose of statistics and distribution of state humanitarian assistance (Form No. 7)
- As old Soviet passports will expire and no longer be valid at the end of 2003, UNHCR is seeking to better understand what impact this could have on IDPs

"Registration by the departments of visas and registrations under the Ministry of Interior (OVIR): Under the 1993 RF Law on Freedom of Movement, every citizen of the Russian Federation shall be registered by interior organs at his/her *place of residence* and, in case of temporary stay in another location, at his/her *place of sojourn*. The registration system is aimed at facilitating the enjoyment by citizens of their rights in their place of residence or sojourn. Possession of registration conditions access to medical care, education, social allowances, etc. Non-possession of registration in one's place of sojourn is an administrative offence that can be punished by a fine. While several thousand IDPs are not properly registered at their 'place of sojourn' in Ingushetia, this has generally not affected their access to medical care or education services. However, several instances were documented where registry offices (ZAGS) refused to issue birth certificates for babies born from IDP parents who did not have sojourn registration in Ingushetia.

Temporary identification documents: The legal age in Russia for possession of an identification document (in Russian: 'passport') is 14. Local bodies of the Interior have been issuing temporary identification documents (so-called Form 2II) to IDPs who were not in possession of (internal) passports (e.g. because they had lost it). Form 2II is of limited validity (generally six months) and is renewable. Issuance in Ingushetia of identification documents ('passports') to teenagers turning 14 and of temporary identification documents to IDPs who had lost them, has been an essential endeavour of the local bodies of the Interior: it greatly enhanced the freedom of movement of the concerned IDPs, by allowing them to visit (or return to) Chechnya or travel onwards to other regions of the Russian Federation." (UN OCHA November 2003, p. 151)

"An internal instruction was reportedly issued by the Federal Ministry of Interior in November 1999 not to issue or renew identity documents to IDPs from Chechnya, allegedly to prevent possible Chechen militants or infiltrators from obtaining official documents. This measure limited freedom of movement for undocumented IDPs outside Chechnya, given the registration regime applicable in Russia, which requires all Russian citizens to register with the local bodies of the Ministry of Interior if they sojourn outside their place of permanent residence. Undocumented IDPs were also unable to return to, or visit, Chechnya, for fear of being detained at military checkpoints.

In June 2000, a mobile team from the Federal Ministry of Interior started issuing temporary identity documents and sojourn registration for Chechen IDPs in Ingushetia. These temporary identity documents are provided for under Russian Federation Government Regulation No. 821 of 8 July 1998 '*On approval of the statute of the passport of the citizen of the Russian Federation*,' and are referred to as the *Temporary Certificate of Citizen of the Russian Federation* (so-called Form No. 2-II). Form No. 2-II is issued to serve as a provisional identity document where a citizen's passport is lost or damaged. The temporary certificate is valid for a period of up to six months, during which period the citizen is expected to be issued with a new passport at their place of permanent residence.

In September 2000, the mobile team of the Federal Ministry of Interior suspended its mission in Ingushetia and handed over the task to the Ingush Ministry of Interior. Issuance of temporary identity documents in Ingushetia greatly improved the situation of many undocumented IDPs with regard to travelling to and from Chechnya. Although the total figure of temporary documents issued is not available, it has been indicated that 4,000-5,000 persons have been issued such documents in Ingushetia during the period from June to December 2000. A provisional office of the Passport and Visa Service (PVS) of the Chechen Ministry of Interior was established in Ingushetia and started to issue and/or renew (internal) passports to/for IDPs from Chechnya. Also, in the first quarter of 2001, with the local bodies of interior inside Chechnya resuming their administrative functions, (internal) passports gradually started to be issued to citizens in Chechnya. Government sources have advised that 80,000 new passports have been issued in Chechnya since.

Form No. 7, entitled '*Registration of a family arriving under emergency situations*,' is issued by the local migration bodies for the purpose of statistics and distribution of Government's humanitarian assistance. It is provided for under Letter of Instruction No. 19 of 31 March 1997 issued by the Federal Migration Service. It is not an identity document. It is meant to be used by the migration authorities during situations of mass influx and reception, on the territory of the Russian Federation, of citizens who left their place of permanent residence for reasons stipulated under Article 1 of the Russian Federation Law '*On Forced Migrants*'. Form No. 7 is issued to all members of a family including children above the age of 14 years. Persons who are under 14 years of age are recorded on their parents' form.

The travel document issued to Russian citizens to *travel abroad* is the *Passport*. It is issued by the local bodies of Ministry of Interior and, under certain circumstances, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Russian citizens can travel to CIS countries without a visa, [Except to Turkmenistan and Georgia] using their 'internal' passport (i.e., the Passport of the Citizen of the Russian Federation)." (UNHCR February 2003, paras. 66-70)

"Mr Cavalieri, UNHCR Senior Protection Officer, noted that UNHCR is planning to do a survey of documentation among IDPs in tent camps. As old Soviet passports will expire and no longer be valid at the end of this year, UNHCR is seeking to better understand what sort of impact this could have on IDPs." (UN OCHA 25 September 2003)

Lack of documentations deprives IDPs from state assistance (2002)

- Sojourn registration is often denied to IDPs who are thus unable to access basic public services
- In Chechnya, bureaucratic obstacles related to documentations hampers access to state benefits
- There is a need for affordable assistance to help poor households in their relation with authorities
- In Dagestan, the lack of formal recognition and resultant lack of documentation/registration limits IDPs' access to employment, social services and housing
- The Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria has introduced temporary restrictions suspension on issuing birth certificates for non permanent residents

"The Constitutional Court has reminded once and for all that registration or absence of registration should not be linked to the enjoyment of rights. So in theory one does not have to show one's registration to be able to get medical care, but in practice it does not work this way. To enrol one's children at school one needs to have registration. An employer cannot employ someone who is not registered; eventually the registration is asked for by any potential employer. Hence, in practice most of the basic civic rights are linked to the possession of registration. If someone's place of residence registration is Grozny and he wants to register his sojourn somewhere else, but the authorities do not want to register him there, basically he is not only a second class citizen, but - using the absurd neologism - an illegal citizen. Difficult as this situation is to imagine, it is the sad reality for many IDPs." (ACCORD/UNHCR June 2002, p. 259)

"With the present Chechen environment, there is an opportunity for the officials to assume a greater role in representing the interests and promoting the protection and well being of the civilian population. Humanitarian actors could begin by encouraging officials to address a number of bureaucratic complications related to documentation. Presently, if a citizen does not hold valid and official local registration, s/he will likely face various difficulties and potential security problems. People report having little voice of protest, while the few attempts towards protest have reportedly been met with threats in response.

Limited access by the extremely poor to state compensation for damages continues to be a pending issue. Additionally, the difficulties in accessing entitled state benefits have been repeatedly highlighted. Even though the qualifying criteria for these benefits is reportedly clear, many difficult-to-attain documents are required. It is reported that these limitations can be overcome if the applicant is willing to pay the required fees which especially overwhelm the extremely poor. There is a need for affordable and legitimate facilitation particularly to assist the extremely poor [households] in accessing pensions that they rightfully qualify for." (ICRC July 2002, Chechnya, p. 38)

"Given that most IDPs reside close to their homes in Chechnya, returns take place in a phased manner, whereby some family members go ahead to review the situation in their area of origin leaving other family members in their current places of sojourn. It is important that the authorities adopt flexible registration and de-registration procedures as well as quick procedures to issue identity documents in the areas of displacement." (UNOCHA November 2002, p. 8)

"The majority of Chechen IDPs have no official registration in Daghestan, while the Authorities officially report no IDP in the Republic. This lack of formal acknowledgement and resultant lack of documentation/registration results in limited access to employment, social services and housing, as well as increased risks of harassment and exploitation for the IDPs. Even though the [residents affected by the hostilities] do not face the same extent of difficulties related to registration, they do continue to face limited access to work and services due to the consequences to the impact of their poverty." (ICRC July 2002 Daghestan, p. 16)

"The Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria has introduced temporary restrictions on immigration to its territory, RTR reported on 11 January. Civil-registration offices will no longer register marriages if either of the spouses is not permanently registered in the republic. In addition, a ban has been imposed on issuing birth certificates for babies whose parents are not permanently resident in the republic, and nonresidents will also not be able to lease, buy, or sell property." (RFE/RL 13 January 2003)

Displaced from Chechnya face restricted access to the status of forced migrants (1999-2002)

- Very few persons displaced as a result of the second Chechen conflict (from 1999) have been granted the forced migrant status

- Applications based on allegations of mistreatment by federal forces were rejected on account of the antiterrorist campaign
- Most of the IDPs who were granted forced migrant status reported fear of persecution from Islamic fundamentalist groups and are ethnic Russians
- US Committee for Refugee also reported that federal authorities restricted the forced migrant status to those displaced who "did not intend to return"

"Subsequent to the renewal of hostilities in September 1999, there were, at the beginning of 2000, some 240,000 persons displaced out of Chechnya. Very few of those displaced as a result of the latest round of violence have been granted forced migrant status. Although precise information is not available, government statistics indicate that, between 30 September 1999 and 30 June 2001, some 11,851 persons were granted forced migrant status. Because of protracted procedures, this number also includes IDPs from the 1994-96 conflict who were granted forced migrants status in 1999, 2000 and 2001.

According to information available to UNHCR from local NGOs and implementing partners, most of the forced migrant status applications based on allegations of mistreatment by federal forces, lost property and/or 'mass violation of public order' were rejected by the competent migration authorities on the grounds that the on-going 'anti-terrorist campaign' as waged by the Russian government, by definition, do not constitute a 'mass violation to public order', nor can the federal forces who conduct such campaign be considered as committing such violations to public order. Most of the IDPs who were granted forced migrant status reported fear of persecution from Islamic fundamentalist groups and not from the federal troops.

While the forced migrants status determination procedure is conducted by the territorial organs of the Ministry for Federal Affairs, National and Migration Policy, the official policy referred to above has been clearly stated at the federal level. Human rights groups and local NGOs have highlighted the divergence in treatment accorded to IDPs from the previous conflict, who were broadly granted forced migrant status, and IDPs from the current conflict, most of whom are ethnic Chechens, who have been refused status after alleging massive destruction of civilian infrastructure and property by the federal forces as a ground for being granted forced migrant status. [9]

IDPs who were granted forced migrant status between September 1999 and June 2001 received such status in some 79 regions of the Russian Federation. While official statistics do not provide a breakdown by ethnicity, most of them, according to information available to UNHCR, are ethnic Russians. However, UNHCR is also aware of ethnic Chechens who were granted forced migrant status on the above-mentioned grounds (fear of persecution by Islamic fundamentalist or 'Wahabi' groups)."

Footnote [9]: "See Olga Plikina, local NGO 'Faith, Hope and Love': 'Overview of the legal status of internally displaced persons in the northern Caucasus', Pyatigorsk, October 2001. In Moscow, the local NGO 'Civic Assistance', which is providing legal and social counselling to IDPs and refugees, is aware of only one instance of forced migrant status being granted to an ethnic Chechen IDP family (mixed Chechen/Georgian couple), by the court of law, after being denied status by the Moscow migration authorities." (UNHCR January 2002, paras. 12-15)

"Under Point 2 of the [Article 1 of the 1995 Federal Law 'On Forced Migrants', it is further stipulated that, '(...) shall be recognised as a forced migrant (...) a citizen of the Russian Federation who was forced to leave the place of his/her permanent residence on the territory of a subject of the Russian Federation and came to the territory of another subject of the Russian Federation'. Hence, persons who were displaced within Chechnya itself (approx. 160,000) cannot, under the current law, do not qualify for forced migrant status." (UNHCR January 2002, footnote 6)

"Official statistics provided by the Ministry of Federal Affairs, National and Migration Policy, indicate that 12,464 IDPs from Chechnya were granted forced migrant status in some 79 regions of the Russian

Federation, between 1 October 1999 and 30 September 2001. According to information available to UNHCR, from its implementing partners as well as from local human rights NGOs, those IDPs from Chechnya who were granted forced migrant status as a result of the current conflict are almost all ethnic Russians. Such information is partly corroborated by looking at the regions where forced migrant status was granted. For the most part, these are regions where there is traditionally no Chechen resident community. At the same time, UNHCR is aware of isolated instances where Chechens displaced by the current conflict were granted forced migrant status (having claimed fear of persecution from Islamic fundamentalists).[41]"

Footnote [41]: "UNHCR is aware of one case in Pyatigorsk (Stavropol Krai) where an ethnic Chechen, Lieutenant Colonel in the Russian Federal forces, was granted migrant status on such grounds by the court of law, after being denied status by the local migration service in a first instance administration decision." (UNHCR January 2002, para. 61)

For more information on the denial of the forced migrant status to IDPs from Chechnya, you can also consult "The Internally Displaced Persons from Chechnya in the Russian Federation", by S.A. Ganushkina, Moscow 2002, section II [Internal link]

Reports of problems of access to documents for IDPs in Ingushetia (1999-2002)

- Federal authorities suspended the registration of new IDPs from Chechnya as of April 2001
- In November 1999, the federal ministry of interior also suspended the issuance or renewal of identity documents to IDPs from Chechnya
- Upon UNHCR's intervention, federal authorities created mobile teams (June 2000) and opened offices to facilitate access to legal documentation

"The federal migration authorities, as of April 2001, halted the registration of new IDPs leaving Chechnya. This has been preventing IDPs' access to temporary shelter and government assistance. UNHCR has been addressing this matter by mediating with the authorities on a case-by-case situation. Another issue of concern to displaced persons is the issuance of identity documents to undocumented displaced persons in Ingushetia. UNHCR is continuing to advocate on behalf of IDPs and provide support to enhance national mechanisms for the issuance of legal documentation. On 2 November, the visa and passport department of the Ministry of Interior set up an office for IDPs from Chechnya in Nazran. IDPs who lost their documents now have access to the Ministry of Interior and are no longer obliged to go to their former place of residence to obtain new documents. This is an important improvement in finding a solution to the legal status of IDPs." (UNOCHA 30 November 2001)

"A (non-public) instruction was reportedly issued by the Federal Ministry of Interior in November 1999, not to issue or renew identity documents to IDPs from Chechnya, allegedly to prevent possible Chechen militants or infiltrators from obtaining official documents. This measure limited freedom of movement for undocumented IDPs outside Chechnya, given the registration regime applicable in Russia, which requires all Russian citizens to register with the local bodies of the Ministry of Interior if they sojourn outside their place of permanent residence. Undocumented IDPs were also unable to return to, or visit, Chechnya, for fear of being detained at military checkpoints.

In June 2000, a mobile team from the Federal Ministry of Interior started issuing temporary identity documents and sojourn registration for Chechen IDPs in Ingushetia. These temporary identity documents are provided for under Russian Federation Government Regulation No. 821 of 8 July 1998 "On approval of the statute of the passport of the citizen of the Russian Federation", and are referred to as **Temporary Certificate of Citizen of the Russian Federation** (so-called Form No.2-Ī). Form No.2-Ī is issued to serve as a provisional identity document where a citizen's passport is lost or damaged. The temporary certificate

is valid for a period of up to six months, during which period the citizens are expected to be issued with a new passport at their place of permanent residence.

In September 2000, the mobile team of the Federal Ministry of Interior suspended its mission in Ingushetia and handed over the task to the Ingush Ministry of Interior. Issuance of temporary identity documents in Ingushetia greatly improved the situation of many undocumented IDPs with regard to travelling to Chechnya and back. Although the total figure of temporary documents issued is not available, it has been indicated that 4,000 - 5,000 persons have been issued such documents in Ingushetia during the period June - December 2000. Also, in the first quarter of 2001, with the resumption by the local bodies of interior inside Chechnya of their administrative functions, (internal) **passports** gradually started to be issued to citizens in Chechnya. Government sources have advised that 80,000 new passports have been issued in Chechnya since then." (UNHCR January 2002, paras. 54-56)

"The Government of Ingushetia has maintained strong cooperation with the humanitarian community and is continuing to allow those displaced from Chechnya and residing in Ingushetia the same level of access to the health care and education systems that is available to their own citizens. The Chechen branch of the Passport and Visa Service (PVS) opened an office in Sleptsovskaya during 2002 thus allowing those IDPs in Ingushetia not having official documentation or passports the possibility to obtain new ones. This has increased the possibility for movement for IDPs both within the region and throughout the Russian Federation." (UNOCHA November 2002, p. 9)

"Given that most IDPs reside close to their homes in Chechnya, returns take place in a phased manner, whereby some family members go ahead to review the situation in their area of origin leaving other family members in their current places of sojourn. It is important that the authorities adopt flexible registration and de-registration procedures as well as quick procedures to issue identity documents in the areas of displacement." (UNOCHA November 2002, p. 8)

For more information on problems of access to documents, passports, etc, faced by IDPs from Chechnya, you can also consult "The Internally Displaced Persons from Chechnya in the Russian Federation", by S.A. Ganushkina, Moscow, 2002, section II [Internal link]

ISSUES OF FAMILY UNITY, IDENTITY AND CULTURE

Family unity

Between 1,000 and 2,000 persons were missing in Chechnya at the end of 2001

"According to Memorial, government sources varied in their estimates of the number of missing persons. Memorial noted that in 2000 the office of Special Presidential Representative for Human Rights in Chechnya, Kalamonov, recorded an increase in the number of reported cases of missing persons from approximately 900 in early 2000 to approximately 3,000 at the end of that year. At the end of 2001, the local department of the Ministry of the Interior in Chechnya had recorded approximately 700 missing persons (i.e., persons for whom the Ministry was searching). Also at the end of 2001, the Chechen administration's missing persons commission had recorded approximately 1,400 reports of missing persons. On the basis of these sources, Memorial concluded that between 1,000 and 2,000 persons were missing in Chechnya at the end of 2001. Memorial also compiled its own list of missing persons on the basis of verified reports, but it is not comprehensive; that list contained approximately 300 records at the end of 2001. Memorial reports that 654 people were reported missing in the first 9 months of the year." (U.S. DOS 31 March 2003, sect. 1g)

Displaced in Ingushetia gathered into "families" averaging 9 members (1999-2000)

- It took several months for these "families" to form, as members trickled into Ingushetia throughout the winter

"The influx of displaced persons into Ingushetia peaked between mid-September and mid-October [1999]. Since then smaller peaks have been recorded, following increases in fighting, threats, and rumors.

One in Ingushetia, the displaced gathered into 'families' (defined here as a group of IDPs living together regardless of kinship) averaging 9 members. Half of the families count 5 to 9 members, while about a fourth have less than 5 members. It took several months for these 'families' to form, as members trickled into Ingushetia throughout the winter."

[MSF teams conducted a survey in June 2000 among displaced Chechens in the district of Malgobeck, located in northwestern Ingushetia. This district harbors about one fourth of the total population of IDPs (internally displaced persons), which is currently estimated at more than 150,000.]
(MSF 15 August 2000)

Reports of Chechen men separated from their families at the Chechen-Ingush border and checkpoints (January 2000)

- Males between ten and sixty rigorously checked in detention centres in Chechnya or not allowed access back to Chechnya

"Human Rights Watch strongly condemned today a new Russian order forbidding male Chechen refugees the ages of ten and sixty from entering or leaving Chechnya. Today border police began enforcing the order at checkpoints and border crossings.

The new order gives rise to fears that the Russians may undertake mass detention in 'filtration camps,' where many Chechens were systematically tortured during the 1994-96 Chechen war.

'Chechen males are now effectively trapped in a dangerous war zone,' said Holly Cartner, Executive Director of the Europe and Central Asia division of Human Rights Watch. 'It is fundamentally unacceptable to deny civilian males, including children as young as ten, the right to flee from heavy fighting. And it's against international standards.'

Following a Chechen counteroffensive and significant Russian military setbacks in early January, General Viktor Kazantsev, Commander for the North Caucasus Group of Forces, reportedly blamed the Russian 'mistakes' on 'our soft-heartedness.' On January 11 he ordered that only children under ten, men over sixty, and girls and women would henceforth be considered refugees. Gen. Kazantsev also ordered males between ten and sixty to be rigorously checked in detention centers for guerilla affiliation.

In the first Chechen war, Russian forces operated three official detention centers in Grozny, Mozdok, and Pyatigorsk, although many smaller camps existed unofficially throughout the region. These centers were known as 'filtration camps' because fighters were supposed to be 'filtered' out from civilians; they became notorious as centers for systemic torture, beatings and ill-treatment of thousands of Chechen males.

Soldiers at the main Chechen-Ingush border crossing confirmed to Human Rights Watch that they had received orders to turn back all men between the ages of ten and sixty who tried to enter or leave Chechnya, and Chechen civilians told Human Rights Watch that their male family members were stranded as a result. Datu Isigova, a refugee from Grozny, told Human Rights Watch that she was forced to leave her eleven-year-old son, Arbi, and her husband, Suleman, inside Chechnya today due to the new restrictions. Zura Mumayedova, a mother of three from Shatoi who arrived by bus at the Chechen-Ingush border on January 11, told Human Rights Watch researchers that four men she had been traveling with were ordered off the bus by Russian border guards, citing the new restrictions on Chechen males. Held at the border overnight, Mumayedova said that 'the Russian soldiers said that no men aged between ten and sixty would be allowed through.' She stated that the border guards prevented a fifty-nine-year-old man from crossing the border. She said that two boys, aged twelve and thirteen, made it past the border guards into Ingushetia only by concealing themselves on the bus. Other refugees reported that many other men had been turned back from the border, and that mothers with young children had often decided not to cross the border because they did not want to leave their young children behind.

Chechen men on the Ingushetia side of the border have been separated from their families, unable to cross back into Chechnya. Thirty-six-year-old Vayit Zagayev told Human Rights Watch that he arrived in Ingushetia in late December to get medicine for his bed-ridden mother and to obtain supplies for his family, currently living in Katyr-Iurt. Russian border guards today refused to allow him into Chechnya. Mauli Murtadaliyev, also thirty-six, said that the border guards would not let him escort the body of a deceased female relative back to Chechnya for burial." (HRW 12 January 2000)

PROPERTY ISSUES

General

Compensation schemes for properties lost during the first Chechen conflict (1994-1997)

- IDPs with "Forced Migrant" status are entitled to subsidies for housing
- A special procedure was also created to compensate for the lost property of those who left Chechnya during the first conflict and who have no intention to return

"Forced migrant status provides for the right to specific integration allowances and loans, irrespective of the status of the property in the place of original residence. In compliance with the 1995 Law on Forced Migrants, Resolution No. 845 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 8 November 2000 establishes a procedure for the provision of housing to forced migrants. A complementary Act was adopted on 11 October 2002, Order No. 971 of the Ministry of Interior of the Russian Federation, for the provision of subsidies for the construction and purchase of housing by forced migrants. Both these acts exclusively concern persons who were recognized as forced migrants, therefore they remain non-applicable to the overwhelming majority of the persons displaced by the current conflict.

Regarding the victims of the 1994-96 conflict, the Government has taken complementary steps to provide for compensation for *lost property*. Under Russian Federation Resolution No. 510 of 30 April 1997, the Government established a procedure to compensate for the lost property of those who left Chechnya between 12 December 1994 and 23 November 1996 and who have no intention to return. Access to compensation under this Resolution is based upon objective facts (proof of damage to property and proof for residence in Chechnya) and is independent from the granting of forced migrant status." (UNHCR February 2003, paras. 15-16)

Authorities take measure to compensate for properties lost during current conflict (2002-2003)

- Several hundred families in Chechnya benefited the provision of construction materials in 2002
- Almost no displaced person was able to engage the State's responsibility under civil law to obtain compensation for damage to property or for moral damage
- A government decree on 4 July 2003 established criteria for compensation to IDPs from Chechnya that have lost their property as a result of the current conflict
- The federal government began paying compensation under this decree in September 2003
- Some 39,000 families are entitled to compensation, according to the authorities

"The Federal Government has announced its intention to establish a similar mechanism (financial compensation) for the victims of the current conflict who left Chechnya permanently. However, to date, such a compensation scheme is not yet in place. The Russian Federation Ministry for Reconstruction in the Chechen Republic established a mechanism for the provision of construction materials to affected persons within Chechnya. Several hundred families in Chechnya were assisted under this scheme in 2002. According to the federal authorities, part of the difficulty in disbursing all the funds allocated to this

programme under the federal budget resides with strict financial control procedures for the channelling of funds and their disbursement by the recipient republic. In January 2002, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe expressed its concern that *up to 70% of relief aid does not reach directly those to whom it is addressed*. [28] Russian media also reported on disclosed cases of embezzlement: [...]

The above-mentioned schemes established by the Russian Federation Government link the provision of assistance or compensation to objective criteria (obtaining forced migrant status or proof of damage to property). Almost no displaced person was able to successfully engage the responsibility of the State, under the Russian Federation Civil Code, to obtain, before the courts of law, full and fair compensation for damage to property or for moral damage. [30]

[Footnote 28: Council of Europe, Conflict in the Chechen Republic, Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1270 (2002), 23 January 2002, <http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta02/ERES1270.htm>.]

[Footnote 30: UNHCR is aware of one single positive court case, decided by the Leninsky District Court of Stavropol Krai, on 22 March 2001, on a case related to a victim of the 1994-96 Chechnya conflict, where the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence and the Russian Federation Ministry of Interior were ordered by the court to compensate the plaintiff for moral damage (perhaps most akin to pain and suffering in so-called Anglo-Saxon legal systems) as well as for damage to property.] (UNHCR February 2003, paras. 17-18)

"[UNHCR] stated that a government decree on 4 July [2003] established criteria for compensation to be assigned to IDPs from Chechnya that have lost their house and property as a result of the current conflict. 300,000 rubles will be offered for destroyed houses and 50,000 for lost property. Applications for compensation can be submitted after 15 August. However, the procedure for submitting applications and their consideration is not clear yet. While the decree does not mention deadlines specifically, it does mention that funds for compensation must be given out by the end of 2003. Furthermore, there is no requirement that a person, applying for compensation, travel to Chechnya as long as his or her permanent registration is in Chechnya." (UN OCHA 20 August 2003)

"Russian Government starts compensating for the lost property and housing in Chechnya

On 25 September [2003], the Government of the Russian Federation began paying compensation to Chechen residents for the destroyed housing and property. The compensation amounts to RUR 300,000 (US \$9,800) for destroyed housing and RUR 50,000 (US\$1,600) for lost property. The Federal Minister for Chechnya, Stanislav Ilyasov, said the authenticity of the lists of people who had applied for compensation was being checked and that the money had already started to be transferred to Chechen residents' accounts. According to earlier reports, over 39,000 families expected to receive compensation." (UN OCHA 7 October 2003)

"Compensation payment for lost housing in Chechnya was not suspended

The payment of compensation to residents of Chechnya for lost housing was never suspended, Chechen Prime Minister Anatoly Popov told Interfax.

'Payments are continuing. 150 people have received them already,' he said. Compensation for housing lost in the process of the crisis settlement in Chechnya has been being paid since the end of September through the banking network operating in the republic.

The federal government is assigning 14 billion rubles for compensation payment to be given out in 2003-2004. Some 39,000 families are entitled to compensation, federal minister for Chechnya Stanislav Ilyasov announced earlier. He said the size of compensation to people permanently living in Chechnya for lost housing and property is 350,000 rubles; 50,000 rubles for lost property and 300,000 rubles for lost housing." (Government of the Russian Federation 8 October 2003)

Limited compensation for destroyed properties in Dagestan (2002-2003)

- In Dagestan, 90 percent of the local residents who had their houses destroyed received substantial compensation
- Villagers complain that compensation was insufficient or was not paid

ICRC economic security survey in Dagestan (July 2002)

"State compensation for damages and loss of housing and property during the hostilities has been promised by both the Dagestani and Chechen authorities. Over 80% of the [residents affected by the hostilities] and other 90% of the IDP [households] report that their house was damaged or destroyed during the hostilities. Almost 90 % of [the residents affected by the hostilities] who had damaged houses have received substantial compensation, although only 1% of IDPs have received compensation for their damaged/destroyed houses in Chechnya.

Compensation funds received by the [residents affected by the hostilities] have been largely used to either purchase a new house, rebuild/repair the damaged house or repurchase lost possessions, enabling the majority of these [households] to regain their self-sufficiency, although some of these funds have been put into savings and play an important role in the monthly economy of these [households]. The majority of both [the residents affected by the hostilities] and IDP [households] who have not yet received their entitlements are economically vulnerable and the lack of ownership of a house, land and productive assets continues to negatively impact on these [households]." (ICRC July 2002, Dagestan, p. 21)

"Four years ago, the Dagestan mountain village of Tando was briefly at the centre of world attention, as the then Russian prime minister Vladimir Putin publicly praised the residents for their spirited resistance to Chechen militants.

Those clashes in the west of Dagestan marked the beginning of the second war in Chechnya in October 1999 - and also the swift political rise of Putin, who was elected Russian president soon after.

However, Tando still lies in ruins. The village was destroyed in the fighting and only a few piles of stones mark its former location in a mountain gorge. And, along with the residents of a further three villages which suffered during the clashes, its people complain that they have been forgotten.

Today, 126 families live in the new village of Tando, built from scratch near what used to be the orchard of a collective farm. It was too dangerous to rebuild in the old location, as locals still give a wide berth to the ruins of their former homes for fear of mines.

Five people - some of them children - have been killed by ordnance in the Botlikh district in the past two years.

The lives of the villagers here were turned upside down in August 1999, when groups of heavily armed Chechen guerrillas led by warlord Shamil Basaev and his Saudi comrade-in-arms Khattab invaded. Brandishing the banner of fundamentalist Islam, they declared Dagestan an independent Islamic state.

Russian troops, backed by heavy artillery and warplanes, drove the Chechens out in September. Putin personally took charge of the operation, and within a month, federal forces were moving back into Chechnya.

Three more villages - Rakhata, Ansalta and Shodroda - are around a kilometre away from the district administrative centre Botlikh, which found itself in the thick of fighting in 1999. Unlike Tando, these villages survived, but the damage was very heavy and life has not yet returned to normal.

More than a thousand families live in Rakhata. Aside from a few crippled armoured personnel carriers littering the streets, there is little reminder of the fierce fighting that took place here four years ago. In Ansalta, which has a similar population, many houses are still in ruins.

The government promised to compensate the local residents whose homes were destroyed or badly damaged. However, many families affected say they have only received small sums for repairs. In Shodroda, 83 people were never compensated for their lost property. In Ansalta the figure is 60 and in Rakhata, 42.

One Botlikh district official, who would give his name only as Abdurakhman, told IWPR, 'The district court has been flooded with claims from the local villagers, and I have been personally involved in 150 hearings.'

Majid Gamzatov from Rakhata used to keep a shop, but this was looted and destroyed during the fighting - and he's now out on the street.

He claimed that the lists of villagers entitled to compensation were drawn up clandestinely by local officials, saying, 'They told us nothing, and did not show us any papers.'

'No one knew what they were entitled to. Many villagers were gullible enough to trust the officials and no one claimed anything,' he said, adding that he and his five brothers were eventually granted a one-off compensation sum.

Some villagers in the district lost their entire apricot harvest - for many, their only form of income - in the fighting, but the government has not compensated private businessmen such as fruit farmers. Junaud Omargajiev from Ansalta is a tractor driver with five children who worked hard to provide two houses for his extended family. All of his property - including four cows - was destroyed in the fighting. While one home remained standing after the initial assault, the guerrillas seized it for use as a field hospital, and later wrecked it completely.

He received around 1,300 US dollars per family member in damages for the lost house, and only around 40 dollars for the cattle. 'I never even tried to claim compensation for my second house,' he said. 'A government official warned us that each family would be compensated for only one.'

Villagers who believe that they have been cheated besiege government offices every day to press their claims, which are believed to exceed 1.7 million dollars. But in most cases, officials simply shrug their shoulders and say they are unable to help." (IWPR 19 July 2003)

Courts reject claims for compensation for lost properties in Chechnya (2002)

- Several hundred cases have been lodged to courts
- Most claims have been rejected so far

"So far all attempts to recover compensation for material losses and moral damage through courts according to Art. 53 of the Constitution of the RF and the Code of Civil Procedure proved futile. Not infrequently courts reject such claims. Still, the Network lawyers managed, with great difficulties, to start several hundreds of such court cases. The Russian lawyers elaborated a special form of claim. The claims are legally well founded yet the courts rarely side with the claimants, they prefer to reject their claims.

In Pskov the head of the Chechen diaspora Z. Okunchaev asked the state structures to compensate for the lost housing in Grozny. He was refused and went to court. His claim was rejected, the regional court supported this decision.

Alievina Doronina, 60-year-old teacher of Russian from Grozny, was kidnapped, managed to escape, and reached her friends in Moscow. After a lot of trouble she got the forced migrant status yet all branches of power refused to compensate for her losses and to give her housing because she had left Chechnya after military actions. Today she is employed by the Civic Assistance Committee, draws a small salary and teaches Russian to Chechen children and children of other migrants. She is still living with friends.

There were two typical court cases of famous attorney Abdula Hamzaev and Hamidov brothers (see Appendix 13 and Appendix 14)." (Ganushkina 2002, sect. II)

Savings Bank suspended the payments to deposits in Chechnya (1995-2002)

- In 1995, the Federal government suspended payments to deposits in the Chechen branch offices of the Savings Bank
- Only a small number of persons have been able to recuperate their deposits with the help of the judicial system
- The government decided to review the list of account holders (2002) but many were left out because they cannot register as residents

"There is another important question: **the responsibility of the Savings Bank of the RF for the deposits made to its branches in Chechnya.** The Savings Bank is a unified state structure functioning across the country, therefore it is responsible for its closed branches and deposits in them.

In 1995 the Government of the RF stopped payments on deposits. This was accompanied by repeated assurances that the Central Bank of Russia would renew payments if the banking system in Chechnya would not be restored in the nearest future. This has not happened yet.

There were several cases when people got their money back through courts with the help of Network lawyers who had to work hard to make this possible. I regret to say that the courts stopped this practice even in places where positive decisions had been passed. In Volgograd one of the judges said that he was instructed 'to leave the Savings Bank alone.'

There was an inquiry to the government; the Ministry of Federation answered that on October 25, 2001, the governmental commission for restoring the social sphere and economy of Chechnya approved a draft order compiled by the Savings Bank and coordinated with all interested structures.

On January 15, 2002, the order 'On Organizing Work to Compile Lists of Depositors of the Former Chechen Bank of the Savings Bank of Russia who Left Chechnya' was signed by Deputy Interior Minister A. Chekalin and Deputy Chairman of the Board of the Savings Bank G. Melikian and sent out to all ministers of the interior, chiefs of state departments of the interior of the subjects of the Russian Federation, chairmen of the territorial banks of the Savings Bank of Russia.

To be included into the list the citizen should present:

- a savings bank book issued by one of the departments of the former Chechen bank of the Savings Bank of Russia;
- a passport or other identity document;
- a document that confirmed that the citizen lived in Chechnya;
- registration at new place of residence or habitation.

The branches had to compile lists, authenticate them and present to the migration structures.

Conciliatory commissions that included officials of migration structures, the ministry of the interior and the Savings Bank were set up in the subjects of the Russian Federation to consider applications and resolve disagreements.

The work was expected to be finished in two months (from January 21 to March 22, 2002).

It was clear from the very beginning that the mechanism was too complicated to allow the structures involved to complete the task in two months. Our apprehensions proved to be correct. The Network was flooded with complaints: people were not included in the lists because they had no registration, no stamps in the newly issued passports about their previous addresses in Chechnya, no passport, etc. Since many people from Chechnya have no registration at place of their present residence they are deprived of any hope to recover their money. Some of them who found housing in new places, got new passports there and were registered are unable to prove that they lived in Chechnya where all archives were destroyed. Those of the migrants from Chechnya who left Russia cannot get their money back because the Savings Bank has no foreign branches.

To be included in the lists and to get money back are two different things: nobody knows when the bank will start payments.

This shows that restoration of the property rights of those who used to live in Chechnya is stalling." (Ganushkina 2002, sect. II)

Reports of widespread looting by Russian forces inside Chechnya (1999-2001)

"Russian forces have looted homes in several of the districts under their control, Human Rights Watch said today. Internally displaced persons interviewed at the Chechen-Ingush border told of widespread looting in Sernovodsk (near the border), Ermolovskii (southwest of Grozny), and in the Naurskii district (north of the Terek river).

Dozens of people interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that their homes had been stripped of all foodstuffs and valuables -- sometimes including the floorboards -- by groups of armed soldiers, who sometimes came ready with military vehicles to carry away their loot.

'Looting was a terrible problem in the 1994-1996 war in Chechnya,' said Holly Cartner, executive director of Human Rights Watch's Europe and Central Asia division. 'It is a violation of international humanitarian law, and it must be stopped.'

Soldiers have not only looted basic food supplies stored for winter, but also taken anything of value from homes, often after their inhabitants have fled. As displaced persons have begun to filter back into Russian-controlled areas, they have found their homes emptied. Some of those people have then returned to Ingushetia in search of food and shelter." (HRW 14 November 1999)

For more recent occurrences of looting and pillages, see for instance: "Swept Under: Torture, Forced Disappearances, and Extrajudicial Killings During Sweep Operations in Chechnya", Human Rights Watch, February 2002

PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT

Return to Chechnya

Majority of IDPs in Ingushetia do not want to return for security reasons (2003)

- 47 percent of IDPs in Ingushetia visit their houses back in Chechnya (spring 2003 survey)
- 85 percent of the IDPs do not want to return to Chechnya for security reasons
- More than 98% of the IDPs in Ingushetia do not want to return to Chechnya in the near future (February 2003 survey)

"In Spring 2003, DRC carried out a survey of Chechen IDPs population in Ingushetia. The survey looked at living conditions, family information, household expenditures, food availability, sources of income and coping mechanisms of IDPs in Ingushetia.

[...]

According to the findings of the survey, more than half IDPs (60,0 %) fled their places of residence during military operations in Chechen Republic. As for the reasons for remaining in Ingushetia, an overwhelming majority (85 %) of the IDPs indicates that they do not want to return to Chechen Republic due to security concerns. Only 6,4 % IDPs regard humanitarian aid to be the decisive factor for staying in Ingushetia. About half IDPs (47,3 %) regularly visit their houses back in Chechnya. Only insignificant number of the IDPs receives aid from the Diaspora (Chechen community living outside the Chechnya). Approximately 10% of IDPs' personal documents have expired and half of surveyed IDPs have problems getting new documents." (DRC 9 September 2003)

"Survey carried out by Médecins Sans Frontières between the 3rd and 16th of February 2003 in the eight tent camps of displaced Chechens in Ingushetia

The main purpose of this survey was to identify the most vulnerable families in order to provide them with alternative housing in the perspective of the planned closure of tented camps.

A total of 16,499 persons were seen and counted by MSF monitors (out of the 19,035 people reported by the displaced families interviewed) and 3,209 families interviewed for the survey, covering almost all the displaced population living in eight tent camps (including Logovaz, Rassviet, and Uchkhoz). Only 39 families were not interviewed as they were not found after repeated visits.

More than 98% of the interviewed population, do not want to return to Chechnya in the near future.

Insecurity is the main reason why the displaced from Chechnya living in the tent camps in Ingushetia do not want to go back to Chechnya. 93% of those who declare they do not want to go back to Chechnya express fear for their family's safety.

Lack of housing in Chechnya is the second main reason why the displaced do not want to go back to Chechnya. 74 % of families stated having no home in Chechnya as a reason for not going back.

Humanitarian Aid is not a decisive element in people's choice to go back to Chechnya or to stay in Ingushetia. 88 % of families did not talk about aid at all as a reason for them not to go back to Chechnya.

Most families interviewed continue to live in poor conditions, with 52% of families living in tents that either leak, do not have cold protection or even have no floor.

Out of the 98% of families who do not plan to go back to Chechnya, 90% do not know of an alternative shelter where they can stay in Ingushetia. This represents 2,827 families out of 3,151 families, or 14,443 people, that are in need of immediate shelter.

In spite of this, it is visible in the camps that families have been returning to Chechnya, without prior knowledge of possible alternative shelter. Till this day the provision of alternative shelter in Ingushetia continues to be blocked." (MSF April 2003, p. 7)

Government's return policy: pressure on IDPs in Ingushetia (2003)

- The Russian Federation Government has consistently maintained the official position that IDPs should return to Chechnya, according to UNHCR
- But authorities have also actively pursued a policy of inducing IDPs to return to Chechnya
- The pressure exercised on IDPs, in Ingushetia and elsewhere, to return to Chechnya increased markedly after the October 2002 hostage crisis in Moscow

"UNHCR and other international organisations have stressed the principle of voluntary return to Chechnya. In general, UNHCR defines the principle of voluntary return as meaning that, besides expressing their consent, IDPs be properly informed of the conditions upon return as well as being provided with a genuine alternative to return. The Russian Federation Government has declared its respect for the need to preserve the voluntary nature of return of IDPs to Chechnya. Since the events of late 1999 and early 2000, when hundreds of IDPs in Ingushetia were forcibly returned to Chechnya aboard the train wagons they were accommodated in, there have been no instances of IDPs being physically forced to return to Chechnya.

At the same time, the Russian Federation Government has consistently maintained the official position that IDPs should return to Chechnya. In support of this position, the Russian Federation Government argues that federal forces control most of the Chechnya territory, that Chechen IDPs should take part in the reconstruction and administration of the Republic and that IDPs constitute a destabilising factor in the host regions. Specifically regarding IDPs in tented camps in Ingushetia, the federal and local authorities, starting in 2002, expressed the strong concern that the camps were representing a health and fire hazard. Hence, while officially adopting the position of voluntariness of return, the authorities have actively pursued a policy of inducing IDPs to return to Chechnya. This policy has been particularly pursued in the Republic of Ingushetia, where the majority of the IDPs are located.

The pressure exercised on IDPs, in Ingushetia and elsewhere, to return to Chechnya increased markedly after the October 2002 hostage crisis in Moscow. [37] The hostage crisis embarrassed the authorities, revealing how Chechen fighters had been able to freely move in the country, and prepare and execute a complex terrorist operation in the capital. Subsequent measures were taken by the authorities, including a Moscow city-wide search for possible accomplices and the arrest of several suspects, the suspension of military troop cuts in Chechnya by the Ministry of Defence, and the decision to close down IDP tent camps in Ingushetia, suspected by the authorities to harbour some militants and to represent a recruitment-base for Chechen fighters.

Human Rights Watch insists that Russian authorities exert organised pressure on Chechen IDPs in Ingushetia to force them to leave:

Every day, about thirty representatives from the United Headquarters and the Federal Security Service (FSB) make the rounds at each of the major tent camps in Ingushetia, going from tent to tent explaining the

advantages of moving to Chechnya and the disadvantages of remaining in Ingushetia. They continuously pressure families to sign the "voluntary return" forms provided by the United Headquarters officials and promise those who sign five months of humanitarian supplies. ...In several cases, officials have threatened those reluctant to leave with arrest on false drug and weapons possession charges. ...In late October, Russian federal troops set up permanent positions near all of the major tent camps, reinforced with armoured personnel carriers with heavy weapons. [38]

[Footnote 37: On 23 October 2002, some 50 armed Chechens, led by Movsar Barayev, seized a theatre in Moscow, holding some 700 persons hostage. In the night from 26 to 27 October, Federal Security Service (FSB)'s elite Alpha and Vypel units stormed the theatre, using an incapacitating gas. Forty-one hostage takers, including 19 women, were killed during the raid. According to the Moscow City Prosecutor's office, 129 hostages died, of whom at least 118 died from gas poisoning. Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev publicly acknowledged having masterminded the hostage-taking operation.]

[Footnote 38 Human Rights Watch, *Into Harm's Way: Forced Return of Displaced People to Chechnya*, Vol. 15, No. 1(D), *Human Rights Watch Publications*, January 2003, <http://hrw.org/reports/2003/russia0103/>.] (UNHCR February 2003, paras. 24-27)

"Authorities dismantled the Iman IDP camp at Aki-Yurt in Ingushetia in December 2002 and pledged to commission additional temporary accommodation centres (TACs) in Chechnya. This fell in line with the Russian Government's plan to accelerate the return of IDPs to TACs or other accommodation in Chechnya and to close IDP tent camps. The humanitarian community has been closely monitoring the situation and emphasising the need to observe the principle of voluntary return. During the early months of 2003, pressure on IDPs to return decreased, and UN delegations visiting Chechnya have noted improvements in TAC conditions. Since January 2003, several thousand people have returned to Chechnya, and the number of IDPs registered for international assistance in Ingushetia has dropped by about 20% since the launch of the CAP. Insecurity and lack of proper accommodation in Chechnya remain the major reasons for IDPs' unwillingness to return. The unresolved issue of alternative shelter for IDPs wishing to stay in Ingushetia remains a priority for the humanitarian community." (UN in the Russian Federation May 2003, p. 2)

See also:

"Moscow to help migrants return to Chechnya", Government of the Russian Federation, 4 July 2003 [Internet]

IDPs return to Chechnya despite insecurity (2003)

- Prospects of compensation for lost housing may explain a part of the return movements to Chechnya, according to UNHCR
- Returning IDPs wanted to secure a place in one of the temporary accommodation centres being built in Chechnya

"Mr. Cavalieri, Senior Protection Officer, said that some 2,000 IDPs returned to Chechnya in September. The prospect of receiving compensation for lost housing was probably a big part of that. However, he also acknowledged that violence and detentions of IDPs in Ingushetia has been increasing and this could also be affecting IDPs' decision to return." (UN OCHA 20 October 2003)

"Meanwhile, some displaced Chechens have been returning from Ingushetia in organised return movements arranged by the Chechen Forced Migrants Committee or on their own. The numbers returning picked up in April and May, following a slowdown in March in the period leading up to the March 23 constitutional referendum in Chechnya.

Over 1,600 displaced Chechens returned in April and almost 1,000 returned from May 1 through 27. This compares to less than 600 returns in March. The March figure reflected a sharp drop from the first two months of the year, with 1,400 returning in January and 1,200 in February. By comparison, in all of 2002, according to some sources, nearly 9,500 displaced Chechens returned from Ingushetia, 7,404 of them in organised returns.

At the same time, new displaced people continue to arrive in Ingushetia from Chechnya, with 953 new arrivals from January 1 through May 27.

According to monitors from UNHCR's implementing partner, Vesta, interest in the organised returns has picked up, due at least in part to rumours of camp closures and a sense of fatigue and resignation among the displaced people. Some of them say they would like to secure a place in one of the temporary accommodation centres being built in Chechnya." (UNHCR 2 June 2003)

"Despite the well-known tenuous security situation in Chechnya, an average of 1,200 IDPs have returned from Ingushetia to Chechnya from the tented camps, temporary settlements, and private accommodation. UNHCR systematically interviews the returnees, and where there is evident pressure resulting from rumours of camp closure and in some instances de-registration, there has been no evidence of forced returns in recent months. Most IDPs are returning to secure a place in a newly opened Temporary Accommodation Centres (TAC) or hope to benefit from the recently announced plan to compensate for lost property." (UN OCHA 24 June 2003, p. 5)

UNHCR provides tents to returnees (2003)

- This pilot project helps IDPs while they rebuild their houses

[During a mission to Chechnya on 29 November 2003], UNHCR also visited one of the returnee families who have benefited from the 'pilot project' through which UNHCR, together with Vesta, is providing 15 prefabricated 'box tents' to voluntary returnees in Chechnya for use as temporary shelter while they rebuild their private accommodation. This family had managed to connect gas and electricity to the box tents which were installed inside the courtyard of their previous residence. (UNHCR 5 December 2003)

UNHCR expresses concern upon closure of camps in Ingushetia (November 2002)

- UNHCR questions voluntary nature of return movements to Chechnya
- Refugee agency deplores atmosphere of fear, tension and insecurity in camps
- There is no immediately available and viable alternative accommodation for those who prefer to stay in Ingushetia
- Non-registered IDP camp residents risked being overlooked by the authorities

"UNHCR is asking Russian authorities to postpone their announced closures of tent camps in Ingushetia, including one that the Russians have said would be closed this weekend. We are also requesting a joint assessment of alternative accommodation sites to determine their suitability, as had been previously agreed with the authorities before any relocation would take place.

Our most immediate concern is the Aki Yurt camp, which houses over 1,500 people, and which authorities said could be closed on Sunday. Given that lows of -5°C. are predicted for the area this weekend, it is imperative that real alternatives are available for the displaced people before gas and electricity are cut.

Other recent statements by Russian authorities indicate that they intend to close all tent camps in Ingushetia by the end of the year.

Authorities continue to offer assurances that any return to Chechnya will be voluntary. However, UNHCR has stressed that return can only be considered voluntary if displaced persons are fully informed about conditions for return and if they have a genuine alternative available to allow them to remain in Ingushetia. We have repeatedly underlined that, regarding return to Chechnya, assistance should follow the people, not the other way around. We again raise these concerns and reiterate our desire to work with the authorities to resolve these issues and meet the humanitarian needs of the displaced. While some people have returned voluntarily, others continue to express fears about returning to Chechnya because of the security situation there.

In the camps, a number of factors are contributing to an overall atmosphere of fear, tension and insecurity. These include repeated official statements that the camps are to close imminently; active campaigns by migration authorities supported by the Chechnya administration and religious leaders promoting return to Chechnya; the increased military presence near the camps; and the harsh winter weather in the area.

For those displaced persons in Aki Yurt camp who do not want to return to Chechnya, UNHCR is concerned that there is no immediately available and viable alternative accommodation in Ingushetia. A UNHCR technical team had earlier assessed the relocation sites in Ingushetia proposed by the federal and Ingush migration authorities and found they would need significant improvements to bring them up to a standard suitable for winter use. On Wednesday, our team updated these assessments and identified three sites which could most quickly be brought up to minimum standards. But they also estimate that, even using our pre-fabricated 'box tents,' it would take at least three weeks to provide alternative winter shelter at these sites for just 300 to 400 people. There are over 1,500 people currently in Aki Yurt. Another – possibly quicker – option could be to set up the box tents in existing settlements which already have gas, water and electricity. Currently, we have a stock of some 150 box tents which could house approximately 900 people.

Another serious concern is the fate of a large number of displaced people currently living in Aki Yurt camp who are not officially registered by the migration authorities. UN statistics indicate that over 1,500 displaced people were living in the camp as of early this week, while only 716 are reported to be officially registered by the authorities. We are very concerned that viable alternatives are available to all the displaced people physically present and actually living in the camp, not only those who are registered.

UNHCR has repeatedly raised these concerns with both Ingush and federal authorities. On 22 November, when the Federal Migration Service announced that gas and electricity would be cut in Aki Yurt by 30 November, UNHCR immediately approached the federal authorities to stress that the principle of voluntary return should continue to be respected and safe haven should continue to be provided in Ingushetia for those not wanting to return at this time. In the letter, UNHCR also reminded the authorities of their previous assurances that any relocation sites for people living in Aki Yurt would offer better conditions than those currently in the camp. On 25 November, UNHCR and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) met with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to express our concerns and explain the situation on the ground according to our daily monitoring reports. We have also raised these concerns in Geneva with the mission of the Russian Federation." (UNHCR 29 November 2002)

No viable alternatives for IDPs forced to leave tent camps in Chechnya (2002)

- Despite assurances from the government that the return of IDPs would be voluntary, tent camps in Znamenskoe (Chechnya) were closed in July 2002.
- The relocation of tent residents to temporary accommodation centres amounts to second displacement, according to the UN

"Apart from maintaining stability and 'restoring normality' inside Chechnya, one of the authorities' stated aims this year was to enable displaced persons in Ingushetia to return to Chechnya. On 29 May, the Russian Government's minister for Chechnya, Vladimir Yelagin, the President's representative in the Southern Federal Okrug, Viktor Kazantsev, the appointed head of the Chechen administration, Akmad-Khadzhi Kadyrov, and the newly elected president of Ingushetia, Murat Zyazikov, signed an action plan to return IDPs to Chechnya. Between 16 May and 25 September 2002, the Chechen administration's IDP Committee organised the return of 3,929 IDPs from Ingushetia to Chechnya. Return within Chechnya was also on the authorities' agenda. The authorities closed two camps in Znamenskoye during the first week of July, and provided transport to move some 2,200 IDPs to temporary accommodation centres (TACs) in Grozny. Viable alternatives to moving to Grozny were not provided." (UNOCHA November 2002, p. 5)

"Despite these achievements, one issue remains of serious concern: the respect for the principle of voluntary return. Despite assurances from the government that the return of IDPs would be voluntary, tent camps in Znamenskoye (Chechnya) were closed during the second week of July 2002 and 2,200 IDPs were left with no other option but to relocate to TACs in Grozny. While the idea of moving people from tents into solid structures is sound, it hinges on the conditions in and around TACs being safe and offering easy access to standard and acceptable services. Interviews conducted with people who had been moved to TACs indicated that many had not wanted to leave Znamenskoye. As for IDPs in Ingushetia, many continue to have difficulties registering as IDPs in Ingushetia and feel increasingly under pressure to return home. They state that they are reluctant to do so as the security environment and living conditions are precarious, and the level of services, in particular water and sanitation, and food support is insufficient. Until now, there has been very limited transit through the TACs: those IDPs who were relocated to the TACs still remain there, for lack of an effective compensation scheme or provision of construction materials which would allow them to move on to their own homes. Without appropriate assistance towards a more durable solution, the relocation to the TACs is merely a second displacement. That said, it is the case that many IDPs, perhaps as many as 30,000-40,000, who were moving between Ingushetia and Chechnya, have now decided to stay more permanently in Chechnya itself." (UNOCHA November 2002, pp. 7-8)

Action plan adopted by Ingush and Chechen authorities foresees return of IDPs by October 2002 (May 2002)

- Federal, Chechen and Ingush authorities adopted measures to implement return of IDPs (29 May 2002)
- Since then, various pressures have been exerted on the IDPs, particularly those living in collective settlements.
- IDPs in two tent camps in Chechnya have been transferred to temporary centres
- UN agencies decided not to provide assistance to these centres

"There are currently about 115,000 IDPs in Ingushetia, mostly from Grozny or mountainous regions in Chechnya. Some 23,000 of them live in tented camps, 27,000 in spontaneous settlements and some 64,000 with local host families. These IDPs are extremely concerned about the security situation inside Chechnya and claim that they have very little - if any - shelter to which to return. Therefore, their preferred option is to continue to be provided with a 'safe haven' in Ingushetia. During the first half of this year the United Nations - most recently the Secretary-General, his Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict and the ERC - received from the Russian authorities repeated assurances that the return of IDPs to Chechnya will be voluntary and will take place in safety and with dignity. On the other hand, on 29 May 2002 the federal, Chechen and Ingush authorities signed an Action Plan for the return of these IDPs to Chechnya 'by October 2002'. Since then, pressure of various types, including electricity cuts and withholding of government food aid, as well as misleading information about conditions in Chechnya, has been exerted on IDPs so that they return. In early July, the authorities dismantled two camps hosting 2,200

people in Znamenskoye (Chechnya) and forcibly moved the IDPs back to temporary accommodation centres (TACs) in Grozny. UN missions reported that the returnees remained extremely concerned about the persisting insecurity, and that living conditions in the TACs were inadequate. Under these circumstances, the UN decided not to provide assistance to these centres." (IASC-WG 10 September 2002)

Plan of Activities of Federal Bodies of Executive Power, Government of the Republic of Chechnya, Government of the Republic of Ingushetia, on final measures for return of IDPs from Ingushetia to Chechnya (unofficial translation) [Internet]

For more information on the pressure exerted by the authorities on the IDPs to return and on the conditions in areas of return, see also:

- *"On the return of IDP from the camps of Ingushetia to Chechnya (according to the materials of lawyers of the 'Migration and Law' Network)", Memorial, August 2002 [Internet]*
- *Report on Chechnya, Médecins du Monde, July 2002 [Internet]*
- *"Adequate security conditions do not exist in Chechnya to allow the return of displaced citizens – A pattern of increasing disappearances 'Bordering on Genocide'", International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, 23 July 2002 [Internet]*

For UNHCR's position regarding the Action Plan, see "UNHCR Position on the May Action Plan in the context of current developments in the North Caucasus", 21 June 2002 [Internet]

Return assistance of international agencies supports voluntary movements (2002)

- Following the transfer of IDPs to temporary accommodation centres in Chechnya, UN agencies have strengthened their advocacy efforts to preserve safe have for IDPs in Ingushetia
- The UN will not provide assistance to the temporary accommodation centres
- However, a return package is provided to the displaced who return voluntarily
- The assistance provided covers the first months following return
- During this period, an assessment takes place to determine whether these beneficiaries are eligible for further assistance
- False information on the amount of help available to returnees has been disseminated in the camps

"In early July [2002], the authorities dismantled two camps hosting 2,200 people in Znamenskoe (Chechnya) and forcibly moved the IDPs back to temporary accommodation centres (TACs) in Grozny. UN missions reported that the returnees remained extremely concerned about the persisting insecurity, and that living conditions in the TACs were inadequate. Under these circumstances, the UN decided not to provide assistance to these centres.

A recent meeting with the federal minister for Chechnya suggested that the international community's advocacy efforts to uphold the principle of voluntary return might be bearing fruits. Federal authorities seem to recognize that conditions for the return of IDPs are not yet in place (albeit mostly for logistical reasons), thus no longer expecting a return 'by October'. The situation, however, needs to be watched closely, so that the 'safe haven' for IDPs in Ingushetia is preserved. Advocacy should continue to be pursued at all levels, including to encourage the Russian authorities to provide the internally displaced with the assistance they are entitled to. Our monitoring and protection presence is being strengthened, but further efforts are needed. The ongoing winterization of IDP camps should also proceed swiftly. At the same time, consideration should be given to the need to heighten preparedness measures for all possible scenarios." (IASC WG 10 September 2002)

"The IDP return from Ingushetia has led to several innovations in the approach of the humanitarian community in order to ensure that the humanitarian assistance follows the IDPs who decide to return voluntarily to their homes. UNHCR and WFP have been working closely together to prepare a return package for the first several emergency months before the returnees get fully included in the system of distribution of humanitarian assistance in their home communities. To start with, all returnees receive their food rations for the first three months after their return regardless their vulnerability, social and economic status. During this period, an assessment takes place to determine whether these beneficiaries are eligible for assistance also on the basis of the distribution criteria valid in their communities. The assistance by UNHCR has so far been done on an individual basis. PINF has e.g. transported and distributed 16 tents to returnee families in Grozny." (PINF June 2002)

UNHCR's objectives

"Ingushetia: The objectives of the UNHCR's operation in Ingushetia are to preserve a safe haven for IDPs in that republic and to safeguard the principle of voluntariness of return, in safety and dignity.

Given continued reports of insecurity in Chechnya, UNHCR is not promoting return but assists individuals who wish to return of their own accord. In broad terms, assistance will follow the people, not the reverse.

Voluntariness of decisions implies the need to maintain viable options for legal stay outside Chechnya, including the pursuit of possible integration for IDPs who do not wish to return to Chechnya.

Chechnya: the objectives of the UNHCR's operation in Chechnya are to promote the re-establishment of institutions mandated with the protection of citizens' rights, and to alleviate the human suffering of IDPs who have made the free and informed choice to return to Chechnya as well as other vulnerable IDPs groups." (UNHCR 21 June 2002)

False promises to the displaced returning to Chechnya

"Within the camps for displaced Chechens in Ingushetia, the Russian Federation's Ministry of Interior has been circulating leaflets containing information from Chechen Prime Minister Ilyasov on the facilities available to those wishing to repatriate to Chechnya. The leaflet claims that, for those wishing to return to Chechnya, food will be provided on a constant basis by the World Food Programme, and that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees will provide non-food packages, monitor living conditions, and provide tents and construction materials where conditions are inadequate.

Neither agency has made any commitment to provide these services, nor has a public stand been taken by either the WFP or the UNHCR to refute the claims put forward." (MSF 30 July 2002)

See also Report on Chechnya, Médecins du Monde, July 2002, section "Propaganda and indirect pressure". [Internet]

Insecurity in Chechnya remains the main concern of the displaced (2002)

- Displaced return to Grozny from nearby villages
- Most inhabitants remain dependent on humanitarian aid and live while security has shown no signs of improvement
- Only a small minority of IDPs in Ingushetia are planning the return in the near future, according to WFP (June 2002)
- Most candidates for return are women and children, while men prefer to stay in Ingushetia for security reasons
- There is no information on the movements of IDPs who have not been registered

- Some displaced go back to Ingushetia after just a few days in the Grozny

"The general climate in Grozny was however relatively optimistic with more inhabitants returning to the city, mainly from nearby villages where they had found safer environment since the conflict resumed three years ago. Many returnees indicate that moving back to Grozny is for them the only chance – they come in search of work, to start small enterprises, to file official requests to the government for compensation for their destroyed houses, etc. Small-scale reconstruction activities in the city continue, local markets are growing, offering essential food and non-food goods at reasonable prices. Pensions, social benefits and salaries are paid more or less regularly. Most Grozny inhabitants are however still dependent on humanitarian aid and no improvements in the security remain the main concern." (PINF August 2002)

"WFP Monitors carried out a rapid survey in IDP camps to find out whether IDPs were willing and prepared to return to Chechnya. Only 5 percent expressed that they were preparing to return home in the near future. Others were reluctant to return, mainly due to security concerns." (WFP 21 June 2002)

"According to the Chechen Committee for Displaced Persons from Slepsovskoie in Ingushetia, 6000 to 7000 requests for return have been received. Besides, new families, victims of brutality from the Federal forces are arriving at the camps. According to the new law enacted in April 2001, they cannot be registered and therefore are not entitled to any humanitarian assistance.

The Temporary Accommodation Centres (TACs) in Grozny, which the Migrations Federal Service officially planned for 5,160 persons, are full with about 5,300. The June floods have hampered return: in Grozny, 2,500 houses can no longer be used. There are 9,000 victims to be re-housed: this figure justifies the impossibility of carrying out the return plan. The Migration services reckon that 12,000 out of the 30,000 refugees living in tents in Ingushetia no longer have a house in Chechnya.

Since June 35th, 2,500 to 3,000 refugees have officially left the Ingush territory. These figures were provided by the UNHCR and Vesta and confirmed by Letter Gidizov, the president of the Chechen Committee for Displaced Persons in Grozny.

The immense majority of return candidates are women and children. Men remain in Ingushetia for security reasons. People are transferred with their belongings to Grozny by bus or truck. Then they are left at the TACs or they go back to their houses when they are still standing.

No control is possible in the private sector (non-registered refugees who are not entitled to humanitarian assistance). These persons go back and forth and do not go through the procedure proposed by the Chechen Committee.

Some refugees go back to Ingushetia after just a few days in the Grozny TACs. Insecurity is permanent in Grozny as well as in the rest of the Republic. Automatic rifle shooting, shells and rockets are frequently fired during the day and are constant during the night. Conditions in certain TACs are unacceptable. No gas, haphazard electric power, shortage of water, no distribution of beds or mattresses, waiting lines are extremely long to be assigned a room." (MDM July 2002, p. 4)

Large majority of IDPs in Ingushetia has no immediate plans to return home (July 2001)

- Risks for life and health are cited as the main reasons for not returning

"Despite the attempts by the Russian government agencies to use carrot and stick measures to encourage IDPs to return to Chechnya, as of October 2001, 146,278 registered IDPs from Chechnya remained in Ingushetia [Note by HRW: In January 2001, the number was 146,782. Figures provided by the Danish

Refugee Council] A Human Rights Watch survey among IDPs in Ingushetia showed that the overwhelming majority had no immediate plans to return home, preferring to wait for the security situation to improve.

In July 2001, Human Rights Watch conducted a survey among 232 IDPs from various camps, spontaneous settlements, and the private sector regarding their feelings about return. Only thirteen respondents said they had concrete plans to return to Chechnya. Nineteen said they did not want to return at all. The remaining 200 said they eventually wanted to return to Chechnya but currently had no plans to do so, overwhelmingly citing a perceived risk to life and health as the primary reason. One hundred ninety-six of these respondents cited these risks as the most important or second most important reason for not returning. They also cited other reasons for not returning at that time: the loss of their homes was cited as an important reason (seventy-one participants), as was the unclear future of Chechnya (approximately two-thirds). About one-third also cited psychological trauma due to losses suffered during the war as an important obstacle to return. Interestingly, very few of the displaced cited the lack of infrastructure, employment opportunities or properly functioning schools as reasons for not returning." (HRW February 2002)

Return to the Prigorodny district (North-Ossetia)

Reconciliation needed in return areas in North Ossetia (2003)

- Many Ossetians who live in the conflict zone still maintain that the two communities cannot live side by side
- The slow process of resettling the Ingush IDPs has not been matched by any actual improvement in relations between the Ingush and Ossetian communities
- International humanitarian organizations are present in Ossetia and Ingushetia, but they focus their activities on Chechen IDPs

"In the fall of 1992, a violent inter-ethnic conflict took place between the Ossetian and Ingush communities. The basis for this conflict, which had deep roots, was a dispute over territory in the Suburban district of North Ossetia (which the Ingush claim because it was part of the Chechen-Ingush republic before both peoples were deported to Siberia and Central Asia in 1944). Since 1993, a process of reconciliation between the two communities has been underway – but it has proceeded very slowly. There have been times when a resurgence of tensions has threatened to overwhelm the progress that has been made in the process of post-conflict recovery.

The goal of civil peace-building programs in this region has been primarily to improve the moral atmosphere, to get rid of negative ethnic stereotypes, and to overcome the psychological barriers between the two communities. Many Ossetians who live in the conflict zone still maintain that the two communities cannot live side by side – a position that was officially voiced by the former leadership of their republic.

The very slow process of resettling the Ingush refugees, which is far from being complete, has not been matched by any actual improvement in relations between the communities. Thus, if some of the obvious material consequences of the conflict are slowly being taken care of, this does not lead to an overall reduction in tension in the region. The return of Ingush refugees to their homes (which in most cases were destroyed) is not accompanied by genuine progress in the area of conflict management.

Besides, the Suburban district of North Ossetia and the dispute over it are currently overshadowed by the war in Chechnya. Despite the difficult situation in the area, no international organizations are currently working there on a day-to-day basis. A number of international humanitarian organizations are present in Ossetia and Ingushetia, but they focus their activities on other tasks, mainly on the situation in Chechnya and refugees from that region (though some of them are carrying out short term programs in the Suburban

district on an irregular basis). Nongovernmental organizations in Ingushetia are also primarily focused on the problems that are related to the war in Chechnya. The same is true of North Ossetia; there are a number of experts monitoring the situation, but until recently there have been no long-term NGO programs aimed at improving the situation in the Suburban district.

Nevertheless, some short-term projects on this issue have been carried out quite successfully. In January 2001 the NGO 'Caucasus Refugee Council' implemented a highly successful project to start a dialogue between Ossetian and Ingush young journalists. A similar project was implemented to establish contacts between scientists of the two republics. The experience of these projects turned to be very valuable for the development of the complex peace-building program in the region.

The work of the complex program in this region has involved the mobilization of local non-governmental organizations in five specific areas: working with local media; working with children, teachers and social workers; building a dialogue between students in North Ossetia and Ingushetia; developing contacts between NGO's in both areas; and giving legal advice to the population of the Suburban district and refugees. It is hoped to build on these efforts to create broad coalitions in both communities who are committed to a co-operative approach to reducing tensions." (Kamenshikov April 2003, pp. 21-22)

Cooperation agreement signed between North Ossetia and Ingushetia (October 2002)

- Both parties have agreed to accelerate the repatriation of the displaced Ingush

"At separate ceremonies in Vladikavkaz and Magas on 11 October, the presidents of North Ossetia and Ingushetia, Aleksandr Dzasokhov and Murat Zyazikov, signed two documents intended to 'mark the beginning of a new stage' in bilateral relations and to draw a line under the interethnic clashes of October 1992, during which some 700 people were killed and between 35,000-65,000 Ingush fled or were forcibly expelled from North Ossetia. An 'Agreement on the Development of Cooperation and Good-Neighborly Relations' obliges both sides to adopt necessary measures to eliminate the consequences of those clashes, including expediting the repatriation of the displaced Ingush, preventing the formation of illegal armed or separatist groups, and establishing mechanisms for consultation to prevent the emergence and escalation of new tensions, according to ingushetia.ru. The agreement, which exists only in Russian, also stresses the commitment of both republics to peace throughout the North Caucasus and to preserving the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. In a subsequent declaration, the two presidents affirm their commitment to 'a policy of constructive dialogue'; to peace, mutual understanding, and economic cooperation among all regions of the North Caucasus; and to protecting the rights of all citizens of both republics regardless of their ethnicity." (RFE/RL 15 October 2002)

Most displaced will return but a small portion is likely to stay durably in Ingushetia (2001-2002)

- Programme of Action signed by authorities in North Ossetia and Ingushetia in October 1997 to facilitate return of the displaced
- Number of villages in North Ossetia where Ingush displaced can return has increase progressively
- Some 20,000 Ingush have returned permanently to Prigorodny, as of October 2002 More than 20 000 IDPs have applied for assistance to return to the area
- Several thousand displaced are likely to settle in Ingushetia permanently
- Return movements continue to be hampered by violence in North Ossetia (2001)

Number of returnees (figures compiled by the Special Representative of the Russian President to Prigorodny)

Total of return movements to North Ossetia since August 1994: 20,782 persons (3,741 families) (UNHCR 18 October 2002)

2000: 2,392 persons (424 families) (UNHCR 7 March 2001)

2001: 1,867 persons (353 families) (UNHCR 1 April 2002)

2002: 831 persons (165 families) (as of 1 October 2002) (UNHCR 18 October 2002)

A total of 11,088 persons who suffered from the 1992 Osset-Ingush Conflict have registered as 'forced migrants', as reported by the Ingush government on February 2003. The Special Representative of the Russian President for the Osset-Ingush Conflict stated that these people would be provided with all kind of state assistance for their return and reintegration in their previous place of residence, including housing support. According to the Ingush government, 21,000 persons have been granted state aid since 1994. All funds allocated in 2002 for housing construction and social, cultural and municipal facilities (202 million rubles) have been have been used. According to the 2003 federal budget, this sum will reach a total sum of 200 million rubles. (Government of Ingushetia, 7 February 2003)

"Return of ethnic Ingush IDPs from Ingushetia to North Ossetia has been fraught with problems since it started. Since 1994 when 'official' return involving federal authorities started, wagon settlements guarded by federal army soldiers were created by federal authorities in villages where safety of returnees could not be guaranteed otherwise, which resulted in numerous security incidents. In 1996, following the agreement to increase the number of villages for Ingush return to eight, two more new wagon settlements were created. One in Prigorodny district itself, in Tarskoye where the village population is openly hostile to the returning Ingush and another 'transit' settlement in Mayskoye, unilaterally established by the local Ingush authorities and where IDPs were moved on the assumption that they would eventually return to their villages of origin. While the Mayskoye transit camp became a bone of contention between Ingush and Ossets over return, the Tarskoye settlement was eventually burnt down by Ossets in July 1997.

The Federal Governmental regulation No. 274 of 6 March 1998, on opening bank accounts for those displaced as a result of Osset-Ingush conflict to rebuild their destroyed houses or to purchase new housing especially enabled Ingush IDPs to return and rehabilitate their former houses. As of 31 December 2000, 2,993 bank accounts were opened for 14,270 persons. The first instalments had been paid to 2637 persons, second instalment 1 162 persons, and the third instalment to 665 persons.

During 2000 the return process and the relationship between Ingush and North Ossetian authorities saw signs of improvement. The number of villages Ingush returned to expanded, in accordance with the Plan of Action of 15 October 1997. In 2000, IDPs continued to return to Kartsa, Chernen, Dachnoye, Dongaron, Kurtat, Balta, Redant, Chmi, Vladikavkaz and Sputnik.

During 2000 a total of 2 392 persons (424 families) returned in an organised manner to Prigorodny. As of 31 December 2000, (since 1994) some 18 234 Ingush have returned permanently to Prigorodny, according to the office of the Federal Presidential Representative to Prigorodny. In addition, more than 20 000 IDPs have applied for assistance to return to the area. Also, several thousand IDPs are likely to settle in Ingushetia permanently." (UNHCR 7 March 2001)

"On 15 October 1997, a Programme of Action by the State Bodies of the Russian Federation, the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania and the Republic of Ingushetia and the Republic of Ingushetia was signed to facilitate refugee return and improve local morale. The legal relationship is determined by a Treaty Regulating Relations and Cooperation between the Republic of North-Ossetia-Alania and the Republic of Ingushetia, signed in September 1997. The Ossetian side has abolished one law and three pieces of legislature which obstructed repatriation. The constitution of Ingushetia still contains Article 11, which insists on the 'return of the territory which Ingushetia was illegally deprived of'. This article contradicts federal legislation and the Ossetian side could appeal to the Federal Constitutional Court to abolish it. But

the existence of such a provision equally serves the interests of those Ossete nationalists who want to paint an image of the Ingush as aggressors." (Matveeva 1999, p. 28)

Reports of violence against returnees (2001)

"Ossetians thwart Ingush repatriation"

Some 400 Ossetians blocked a border crossing with neighboring Ingushetia on 23 May [2001] to prevent the return to the village of Ir in North Ossetia's disputed Prigorodny Raion of some 87 Ingush families who fled the district during the fighting on late 1992, Russian agencies reported. At a subsequent meeting, North Ossetian Prime Minister Kazbek Kardinov and his Ingushetian counterpart Akhmet Malsagov agreed that 10 Ingush families will return to Ir every week, Interfax reported. The North Ossetians have systematically sought to prevent the return of any Ingush to Prigorodny Raion. LF" (RFE/RL 25 May 2001)

"Explosion hits passenger bus"

A blast tore through a passenger bus on the border between two rival southern Russian republics Tuesday, injuring three women, police said.

The explosion hit in the evening in a neutral area between border checkpoints in the republics of Ingushetia and North Ossetia, near the Ossetian village of Chermen, said Magomed Ozdoyevm duty officer of the Ingush regional police department.

The cause of the blast was not immediately clear. Ozdoyev said it may have been a bomb placed in a nearby tree.

The bus had been travelling from the Ingush city of Nazran in Kurtal in Ossetia, and was heading into the disputed Prigorodny region when it exploded." (The Russia Journal 5 September 2001)

Resettlement

Non-ethnic Chechens resettle outside Chechnya (2003)

- Almost all non-ethnic Chechens have left Chechnya during the first conflict and resettled elsewhere in the Russian Federation
- The Government of Ingushetia is willing to facilitate the local integration of some 30,000 ethnic Ingush displaced from Chechnya
- Ingush families from Chechnya were allocated plots of land by the Ingush government and received construction materials from international agencies

"In November 1991, when independence was unilaterally proclaimed, Chechnya-Ingushetia still formed a single Republic with a population of approximately 1,270,000 persons. According to the 1989 census, some 16 nationalities were represented in that Republic, including 734,000 Chechens, 293,000 Russians and 163,000 Ingush (all three nationalities representing 94% of the total population, and each of the other nationality components representing 1% or less of the population).

The Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation assessed that some 450,000 persons fled the 1994-96 conflict in Chechnya. It is further estimated that most non-Chechen IDPs did not return to Chechnya after that conflict. According to estimates, in the beginning of 2000, some 240,000 persons were displaced outside of Chechnya (some of whom returned to Chechnya since then), including some 30,000 ethnic Ingush, who fled to neighbouring Ingushetia and who are still staying in that Republic. The Ingush Government has declared on several occasions its willingness to facilitate the local integration of ethnic

Ingush IDPs from Chechnya. Some projects have started, with the support of UNHCR, to facilitate the local integration of (primarily ethnic Ingush) IDPs from Chechnya.

Official statistics provided by the Federal Migration Service indicate that 13,232 IDPs from Chechnya were granted forced migrant status in some 79 regions of the Russian Federation between 1 October 1999 and 31 December 2002. According to information available to UNHCR, from its implementing partners as well as from local human rights NGOs, those IDPs from Chechnya who were granted forced migrant status as a result of the current conflict are almost all ethnic Russians. Such information is partly corroborated by looking at the regions where forced migrant status was granted. For the most part, these are regions where traditionally there is no Chechen resident community. At the same time, UNHCR is aware of isolated instances where Chechens displaced by the current conflict were granted forced migrant status (having claimed fear of persecution from Islamic fundamentalists).[70]

Some local NGOs defending the rights of forced migrants report that ethnic Russian IDPs are not always well received by the local population and local authorities in their areas of destination. Many of them have reported difficulties in obtaining issuance or renewal of sojourn registration. However, there is no indication of widespread police harassment, as is the case in many regions for Chechen IDPs. In those regions that condition sojourn registration upon the presence in that territory of close relatives, ethnic Russian IDPs may be able to rely upon the presence of family members displaced during the previous 1994-96 conflict."

[Footnote 70: UNHCR is aware of one case in Pyatigorsk (Stavropol Krai) where an ethnic Chechen, Lieutenant Colonel in the Russian Federal forces, was granted forced migrant status on such grounds by the court of law, after being denied status by the local migration service in a first instance administrative decision.] (UNHCR February 2003, paras. 71-74)

"Twenty IDP families from Chechnya (93 persons), who were allocated plots of land by the Ingush government, were completing the construction of houses with materials provided by DRC under the UNHCR's 2002 local integration project. In 2003, UNHCR will support another 20 IDP families in constructing houses in Ingushetia. Under the same project, UNHCR supported the construction of a carpentry workshop, providing IDPs with jobs, which is essential for a sustainable local integration." (UN OCHA 31 March 2003)

"On 5 June President of Ingushetia, Murat Zyazikov, signed an agreement with the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation/Swiss Humanitarian Unit (SDC/SHA), a Swiss government structure, which provides for a joint programme between the Republic of Ingushetia and SDC/SHA, assisted by UNHCR. The programme is aimed at integrating IDPs from Chechnya who decided to settle down in Ingushetia. Under the programme, the Ingush authorities will provide land plots for individual houses construction and finance the construction works, while SDC/SHA will be responsible for planning and will contribute with construction materials." (UN OCHA 23 June 2003)

"The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation/Swiss Humanitarian Unit (SDC/SHA), a Swiss government structure, together with the Ingush authorities, continued realizing the joint programme aimed at integrating IDPs from Chechnya who decided to settle down in Ingushetia. A joint SDC/government commission selected four companies to be responsible for the construction of the first 8 houses in Barsuki village and approved the list of the first eight beneficiaries." (UN OCHA 6 August 2003)

Successful integration of the ethnic Russians displaced from Chechnya in the Stavropol region (2000)

- Local communities and the Orthodox Church has largely contributed to this integration

"Other neighbouring regions, namely the Republic of North Ossetia-Alanya, the Republic of Dagestan and the Stavropol region accommodate in total approximately 10 000 people displaced after the recent conflict. However, certain areas have been accommodating large numbers of Chechen IDPs since 1992. According to the Russian official figures, as many as 300 000 ethnic Russians have left the Chechen Republic since 1992. For example, in the Stavropol region alone, the number amounts to 76 000 people. The delegation visited some settlements of Russian IDPs from Chechnya in the area of Budennovsk constructed with the assistance of local communities. The Orthodox Church has largely contributed to this integration. Undoubtedly, living conditions in these settlements are much better than those in IDP camps and the majority of IDPs have been successfully integrated into the local communities. Many of them have found employment." (COE 23 January 2001, para. 5)

About 35,000 ethnic Ingush displaced will be permanently resettled in Ingushetia (2000-2001)

- Ingush authorities will receive support from various international agencies for the resettlement of this population

"[A]s many as 30,000-40,000, who were moving between Ingushetia and Chechnya, have now decided to stay more permanently in Chechnya itself." (UNOCHA November 2002, p. 8)

"The Government of Ingushetia has indicated that it will allow some 9,000 ethnic Ingush IDPs from the current emergency to resettle permanently in Ingushetia along with a further 28,000 IDPs of Ingush origin from previous hostilities. Once the necessary legal grounds have been prepared for the IDPs' integration into Ingushetia, UNHCR in co-operation with UNDP and FAO will assist with various multi-sectoral activities." (UN November 2000, pp. 24, 43)

"In the beginning of December 2000, following a meeting with group of people living in the Yuzhny settlement, Sunzhensky District of Ingushetia, DRC/ASF carried out an assessment of the situation in the settlement. The Yuzhny settlement is located at the border with Chechnya and has no particular infrastructure. Presently 65 families are residing in the village of Yuzhny in very poor conditions. This village has been established at the initiative of the Ingush administration with the intention that eventually 2000 IDP families of Ingush IDPs from Chechnya will be resettled. Though the land plots are in the process of being allocated, however, at present the facilities of the village are extremely limited with no running water or gas and only limited electricity supply. There is also no school, which is of great concern to the families. Hence, it is the intention of DRC/ASF to build a school and community centre in the village as a means of stimulating activity in the village and to ensure that the children have access to education. On December 30, 2000, DRC/ASF accomplished construction of the school. At the Opening Ceremony, both republican and regional officials greatly appreciated attention given by DRC/ASF to the settlement. The school is the first institutional facility built in the Yuzhny settlement since its establishment." (DRC 12 January 2001)

HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

Access to North Caucasus

Aid workers exposed to insecurity in northern Caucasus (2003)

- The United Nations have designated a security coordinator (UNSECOORD), who took over sole responsibility for UN security in the North Caucasus in 2003
- Humanitarian aid workers are exposed to threats of kidnapping and abduction, targeting by militants and criminal gangs, and mines and unexploded ordnance
- 2002 and 2003 have seen more abduction of humanitarian aid workers in the region with local staff members from NGOs and the ICRC becoming victims
- Aid workers may also become accidental victims of an incident be caught while undertaking their humanitarian activity
- Preventive security strategies include an international staff ceiling, irregular staff rotations and armed static and mobile security escorts at all times

"Russian military forces re-entered Chechnya in late 1999 and have been engaged in violent hostilities with Chechen militants over the ensuing four-year period. This has produced military and civilian casualties on a daily basis from combat, landmines and explosives, convoy ambushes, assassinations and abductions. Russian military operations and the militants' acts of terrorism and violence occur not only in Chechnya but also in the surrounding Republics of Ingushetia, North Ossetia-Alania, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, Dagestan and the Territory of Stavropol Krai.

In January 2000, the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD) established its presence in the Russian Federation to support the UN Designated Official for Security and the Security Management Team, by developing, managing, coordinating and facilitating systems, practices, policies and procedures that are necessary for the safety and security of UN staff and property. In 2003, UNSECOORD took over the management of the UN's radio communications infrastructure and its armoured vehicle fleet and accepted sole responsibility for UN security in the North Caucasus when UNHCR withdrew its professional Safety Advisor. To achieve all of this, UNSECOORD maintains an office in Moscow, and sub-offices in the North Caucasus in Nazran (Republic of Ingushetia) and Vladikavkaz (Republic of North Ossetia-Alania).

The security situation in the North Caucasus in 2003 continued to be extremely dangerous. Besides the ongoing crisis, the North Caucasus also suffers from a high rate of serious general crime that includes: abduction and kidnapping for ransom and/or political purposes; robbery; theft and murder. The prevalence of serious crime is due in part to the high proportion of the North Caucasus population possessing weapons ranging from handguns and domestic hunting rifles to heavy calibre military weapons including sub-machine guns.

The current risk to the UN and humanitarian aid workers is assessed as deriving from three main sources of threat:

Kidnapping and abduction;
Targeting by militants and criminal gangs;
Mines and unexploded ordnance.

2002 and 2003 have seen more abduction of humanitarian aid workers in the region with local staff members from a number of NGOs and the ICRC becoming victims. Another significant issue of concern to UNSECOORD is that humanitarian aid workers, and UN staff members in particular, may be caught 'at the wrong place at the wrong time' while undertaking their humanitarian activity and thus become accidental victims of an incident. The likelihood of this occurrence has risen exponentially since late 2002 when militants increased their tactical use of landmines and re-introduced suicide bombing attacks against military and government installations and at other public locations and events.

In 2003, UNSECOORD and WFP conducted a number of security assessment missions in rural districts of Chechnya that now allow the UN and its implementing partners to deliver aid to beneficiaries outside of Grozny. This expansion, together with an anticipated expanded UN presence in the region in 2004 with a number of new agencies proposing to establish programmes, increases UNSECOORD's day-to-day security responsibilities and commitments. To ensure appropriate safety and security standards are maintained for aid workers, UNSECOORD proposes in 2004 to recruit a second extra-budgetary professional Field Security Coordination Officer for the North Caucasus (this initiative is subject to the availability of donor funding). The expanded area of programme delivery in Chechnya and a desire to increase the frequency of UN missions to the republic are contingent upon the prevailing security situation and UNSECOORD receiving strong donor support to meet the challenges that these additional imposts will place upon its human, financial and physical resources.

To provide a relatively safe living environment for UN staff operating in the North Caucasus, UNSECOORD has introduced, and continues to apply, stringent preventive security strategies including: an international staff ceiling; irregular staff rotations to ensure an element of unpredictability in movement; and armed static and mobile security escorts at all times. The UN offices and staff member private accommodation are equipped with modern security technology including camera monitors, sensor lighting, alarm systems and metal bars and grilles to all external doors and windows, all of which is fully and solely funded from donor contributions. UNSECOORD maintains around-the-clock radio rooms in Nazran and Vladikavkaz that offer communications support to UN and humanitarian aid workers in the region. Regular liaison and close contact between UNSECOORD and local law enforcement, militia and security officials has further supported the UN and its partners' ability to move around Ingushetia, North Ossetia and Chechnya.

The role of UNSECOORD extends beyond security coordination and management. The office has become a security focal point providing information, guidance and advice to the humanitarian community at large. UNSECOORD has disseminated threat assessments, security and travel advisories, and daily security reports. It also offers professional security expertise to all humanitarian aid agencies present in the North Caucasus." (UN November 2003, pp. 18-19)

For more information on security conditions facing humanitarian workers in northern Caucasus, see:

"Arjan Erkel, more than 14 months in captivity", 5 November 2003, Médecins Sans Frontières [Internet]

"Local aid worker shot dead in Grozny", 4 July 2003, Prague Watchdog [Internet]

"If you are a Chechen, whether you are a doctor or not, you are guilty anyway", 7 April 2003, Médecins du Monde [Internet]

"Local worker of Czech relief agency disappears in Grozny; kidnapping suspected", 13 March 2003, Prague Watchdog [Internet]

Authorities restrict access to Chechnya for humanitarian NGOs (2003)

- Most NGOs working in Chechnya receive a one-year work permit

- These organisations are nonetheless required to apply to monthly access permits for their staff members and cargo
- Access to Chechnya has also been hindered by the lack of authorisation to use radio frequencies for radio communication

"Throughout 2003, the humanitarian community worked in a highly challenging operational environment. Aid agencies' access to civilians in Chechnya was dependent on receiving work and access permits. Most NGOs working in Chechnya received in 2003 a one-year work permit to carry out humanitarian activities on Chechen territory. Nonetheless, these organisations are still required to apply to monthly access permits to Chechnya for international staff, national staff, and cargo. Many international humanitarian organisations, preferring to have open dates of travel to Chechnya due to the prevailing insecurity, were often restricted to a limited number of specific days. Other received access permits for national staff and cargo only. Access to Chechnya has also been hindered by the lack of authorisation to use radio frequencies for communications in the region. The UN has consistently raised the issue of access with both local and federal authorities at all high level meetings throughout the year. (UN OCHA November 2003, p. 6)

Human rights activists and observers in Chechnya under threat (2003)

- Authorities have detained several Chechen human rights activists
- International human rights NGOs are denied access to Chechnya
- Council of Europe experts were targeted by a terrorist attack and left Chechnya (April 2003)
- Federal authorities limit journalists' access to war zones and confiscate reports and equipment

"Russia continues to bar most outside scrutiny of the conflict in Chechnya by international monitors and journalists. In an apparent attempt to limit the flow of information on human rights abuses from the region, authorities have also detained several Chechen human rights activists, one of whom has since 'disappeared.' [...]

In March 2003, the Russian government for the tenth time denied Human Rights Watch official access to Chechnya. During his January 2003 trip to Washington D.C., presidential advisor Sergei Yastrzhembskii told Human Rights Watch that his office supported access to Chechnya for human rights and humanitarian nongovernmental organizations and would consider facilitating a visit for Human Rights Watch. However, after a follow-up meeting in Moscow to discuss the details of such a visit, Yastrzhembskii's staff informed Human Rights Watch that, due to 'changed circumstances,' permission would not be granted and that the office would "discontinue its dialogue" with Human Rights Watch. Previously, Human Rights Watch had approached the Russian government on nine occasions with requests to visit Chechnya. All requests, made to several government agencies, were denied or ignored.

In the past three months, Russian troops and government officials have detained or harassed several Chechen human rights activists, disrupting their fact-finding and advocacy work. These include:

- **Abduction of Imran Ezhiev.** On March 15, 2003, armed and masked men speaking unaccented Russian stopped the car of Imran Ezhiev, who works for the Russian-Chechen Friendship Society and the Moscow Helsinki Group, near the village of Serzhen-Yurt. They handcuffed him, put a sack on his head, and threw him into their vehicle. For the next three days, the men interrogated him intensively about his work and political associations, and threatened him with torture and execution. After a local and international outcry, the abductors dumped Ezhiev on March 18 on the roadside in the middle of the night.

- **Detention and possible disappearance of Sulumbek Tashtamirov, persecution of Sitar activists.** On March 13, 2003, Ingush police detained Sulumbek Tashtamirov, head of a local human rights group, Sitar ('The Seedling'), after he participated in a referendum-related protest. The protest was held in the Satsita

tent camp for displaced people in Ingushetia. Police officials later claimed Tashtamirov escaped from custody the next day. However, neither his relatives nor colleagues have seen him since, leading some to conclude that he 'disappeared' in custody. Other Sintar activists who participated in the protest also reported repercussions. For example, 'Elza E.' told Human Rights Watch that Ingush police had detained her for several hours, interrogated and released her only after she signed a paper saying she would discontinue her activities at Sintar." (HRW 7 April 2003, pp. 9-11)

Attacks against the experts of the Council of Europe

"On 21 April [2003], while leaving the Grozny Office of the Special Representative, a roadside bomb targeted the convoy of four vehicles transporting the Council of Europe experts and their protection unit. The two experts did not suffer any physical injury, but four members of the protection unit suffered contusions and were hospitalized in Rostov-on-Don. The experts returned to Strasbourg.

The Secretary General has asked the Russian authorities to provide him urgently with a full report on the results of the investigation. The incident is considered as extremely serious in that it is the first time that the Council of Europe staff were deliberately targeted in an attack." (COE 14 May 2003, paras. 3-4)

Access for journalists

"The northern Caucasus region continued to be one of the most dangerous regions for journalists. Kidnapping and assaults remained serious threats. On September 26, British free-lance television journalist Gervaise Roderick John Scott was killed during fighting in Ingushetia between Chechen fighters and government forces. Federal authorities--both military and civilian--limited journalists' access to war zones and confiscated reports and equipment. On August 16, government soldiers confiscated accreditation documents and equipment belonging to ORT and TV Tsentr journalists as they were interviewing Chechens fleeing their village. The Government required reporters to obtain special accreditation besides the usual Foreign Ministry accreditation for entry to the region. Foreign journalists have also publicly complained that military officials in the northern Caucasus region made it excessively difficult for them to obtain local press accreditation." (U.S. DOS 31 March 2003, sect. 2a)

"Human rights defenders, humanitarian workers and journalists remain at risk in Chechnya and the surrounding republics, as witnessed, inter alia, in the kidnapping of the Dutch physician Arjan Erkel in Dagestan in August 2002, the kidnapping of Imran Ezhev of the Russo-Chechen Friendship Association in Chechnya in March 2003 (he was released after being held captive for three days), and the kidnapping of Ali Astamirov, a reporter of the Agence France-Presse, in Ingushetia on 4 July. There is no indication that the initiation of a 'political process' has led to more safety for human rights defenders. There are persistent reports of harassment and threats against individuals involved in human rights related activities." (IHF September 2003, p. 17)

Authorities limit access to tent camps in Ingushetia (2003)

- Ingush migration service instituted access permits to the camps (October 2003)
- Authorities have also undertaken several checks in several NGOs and international organizations

"The access problem for humanitarian organizations seeking to work in IDP tent camps in Ingushetia persisted. The Ingush Migration Service recently instituted access permits to camps for security reasons, indicating that this was a temporary measure. However, the humanitarian community considered it as seriously hampering humanitarian activities. The recent checks by the Ingush law enforcement structures in several NGOs and international organizations was another reason for concern. The officials were looking for unlicensed software installed on computers, and at least in two cases computers were confiscated." (UN OCHA 21 October 2003)

"The humanitarian community was faced with an access problem in Ingushetia when the Ingush Migration Service banned aid workers from entering IDP camps for security reasons after the recent bombings in the republic. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) addressed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a request that access to IDPs be guaranteed to relief agencies. The UN negotiated with the authorities the possibility to get monthly access permits to visit camps and provide assistance, and stepped up its efforts to reinforce the principle of unconditional access to people in need." (UN OCHA 7 October 2003)

The response to lack of access by international agencies: from the 'remote control' concept to a more active presence (1999-2000)

- Because of the insecure environment prevailing in North Caucasus, UN programmes were initially managed by local staff *in situ* ('remote control'), which, however, impeded adequate monitoring and reporting
- In December 1999, following negotiations and high-level UN visits, the federal authorities made security arrangements that permitted international staff to undertake regular visits to Ingushetia

"Monitoring and reporting on the implementation of activities is of fundamental importance to the UN as it helps to ensure the appropriate use of resources and enables the UN to remain accountable to beneficiaries and donor governments. At the initial stages of the current operation, the UN based its programmes on the 'remote control' concept, i.e. programmes were to be managed by local staff *in situ*, primarily because of the insecure environment that prevented visits by international staff. 'Remote control', however, impeded adequate monitoring and reporting: on the one hand, local staff was inexperienced to handle a sizeable operation and on the other, the demands on the staff were excessive.

In December 1999, following negotiations and high-level UN visits, the federal authorities made security arrangements that permitted international staff to undertake regular visits to Ingushetia. As such, the UN strengthened its ability to discuss its operations with the authorities and to monitor and report in a more regular and reliable manner. This has a considerable impact on overall performance and effectiveness.

The implementing arrangement between UNHCR and DRC strengthened the capacity to monitor and report considerably. The two organisations now have over sixty local monitors in Ingushetia, enabling them to oversee distributions of assistance and provide daily information to the UN offices in Moscow. WFP has contracted World Vision International (WVI) to monitor the receipt, storage, and dispatch of commodities to and from the extended delivery point at Vladikavkaz, and to spot check distributions.

During January, UNICEF and WHO hired local staff *in situ* and supported them with regular visits by expatriate staff. This field presence further strengthened the UN's overall capacity to monitor programmes and evolving needs in a wider range of sectors than had previously been the case. Similarly, more NGOs have opened offices in the northern Caucasus, thereby further enhancing implementation modalities, monitoring and reporting of activities.

In sum, the operation has shifted from a 'remote control' mode to one of a more active presence. However, it still falls short of normal standards for monitoring. Therefore, monitoring still needs to be improved for example by: standardising distribution reports by sector; by making the quality, number, frequency of reports more consistent; making reports available to the government, donors, aid agencies, and beneficiary groups; and including host family members and displaced persons in the monitoring process.

The operational monitoring described above is complemented by strategic monitoring of the overall context and programme, mostly undertaken at the Moscow level, via the Resident Coordinator and agency representatives. Together these efforts ensure a better understanding of the effects on IDPs and host families of the evolving situation, as well as of the coverage and effectiveness of the humanitarian response." (UN March 2000, p. 8)

"UN humanitarian action has increased substantially since November 1999, despite insecurity, which has limited the number of UN international staff stationed in the areas to eight. National staff of UN Agencies now number over 200, including those currently employed under the UNHCR-WFP-DRC logistics operation and under WHO's health surveillance initiative. The overwhelming majority of staff is based in Nazran (Ingushetia) and Valdikavkaz (North Ossetia). The ICRC have five international staff in the region, and, combined with its partner the Russian Red Cross, has over 400 volunteers throughout the northern Caucasus. In addition to the presence of UN Agencies and ICRC, over 20 international NGOs now work in Ingushetia. Some one dozen of these carry out programmes in Chechnya. Organisations have few international staff, relying mostly on national staff to implement programmes. While the operation has shifted away from "remote control" to a more active international presence at the field level, this could change very quickly if the security situation worsens. As such, one of this UN programme's overall goals is to boost the capacity of local staff to become emergency relief 'managers'." (UN July 2000, sect. 3.2.1)

A practice shared by international NGOs: the example of Médecins du Monde:

"Humanitarian action rests on a few principles, one of which is free access to victims and unimpeded evaluation of their needs. In war-torn Chechnya, this is difficult, sometimes impossible (risk of abduction, bombing...). Without the presence of permanent expatriates, Médecins du Monde has relied, since 1998, on local personnel and has introduced 'remote control': linked with the organization, since the beginning of its intervention in Chechnya (1995), the coordinator or the administrators, doctors, psychologists, logistic staff and nurses, all Chechen, share the values and practices of Médecins du Monde. [...] All the same, expatriates go regularly to support their action with evaluation mission." (MDM 23 February 2000)

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

Legal background

The CIS Conference: A regional process to address the problems of displacement (May 1996)

- Conference attended by delegates from 87 States (including all 12 CIS countries) under the joint auspices of UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
- The Programme of Action calls for equal rights for internally displaced persons, the right to a nationality, the right to citizenship for anyone who was a member of a predecessor state, and the right to return for formerly displaced persons
- Governments and NGOs expressed broad consensus in June 1999 that there should be some form of continuation of the consultative and networking mechanism beyond 2000

"In line with General Assembly resolution 50/151 of 21 December 1995, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees convened on 30 and 31 May 1996 in Geneva a Regional Conference to address the problems of refugees, displaced persons, other forms of involuntary displacement and returnees in the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States and relevant neighbouring States (hereafter referred to as the CIS Conference). The Conference was the culmination of an ongoing process that had begun in 1994. It was held under the joint auspices of UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (through its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)). The Conference was attended by delegates from 87 States (including all 12 CIS countries), 27 international organizations (in addition to UNHCR, IOM and OSCE), 2 other governmental organizations and 77 non-governmental organizations. The Conference adopted a Programme of Action, which had been endorsed by a Preparatory Conference held in Minsk (Belarus) on 8 May 1996.

The three main objectives of the Conference, cited below, are considered to have been met.

(i) Providing a reliable forum for the countries of the region to discuss problems of population displacement in a humanitarian and non-political manner: This was achieved through a series of sub-regional meetings and expert meetings to discuss such problems and identify solutions, and the establishment of a Drafting Committee tasked with the formulation of a wide plan for action to address those problems, based on a declaration of principles.

(ii) Reviewing population movements in the region, and clarifying categories of concern: The discussions held among CIS countries and between them and other countries, as well as with international and non-governmental organizations, were based on an analysis of the different movements of population, and led eventually to the identification of the various categories of populations displaced in the CIS countries. Definitions were developed, and were included in the Programme of Action adopted by the Conference.

(iii) Devising an integrated strategy which would enable the CIS countries to cope better with and prevent population displacement, as well as manage and regulate other types of migratory movements in the region: The Programme of Action, which was adopted by consensus by the Conference, is a framework for action by the CIS countries, in addressing displacement problems, on the basis of internationally recognized

principles, in a spirit of international cooperation, solidarity and burden-sharing." (UNHCR EXCOM 8 August 1996, paras. 1-2)

"The non-binding Program of Action affirms the right to leave and return to one's country, to move freely within a country, to seek and enjoy asylum in other countries, and commit its signatories to uphold the principle of nonrefoulement. The program also calls for equal rights for internally displaced persons, the right to a nationality, the right to citizenship for anyone who was a member of a predecessor state, and the right to return for formerly [deported] persons (the term given to people forcibly moved during the Soviet era)." (USCR 1999, p. 227)

"The Programme of Action also provides a basis for UNHCR's work in the CIS countries for the next few years. During the preparatory process, UNHCR and IOM developed a joint operational strategy that envisages both organizations collaborating closely in all their activities in the region, either by working together, or through sharing information and complementing each other. The joint approach should allow for a more effective distribution of tasks in the countries of the region and a more efficient use of limited resources." (UNHCR EXCOM 8 August 1996, para. 2)

See the full text of the Programme of Action [Internet].

"A Steering Group, composed of representatives of participating states and international organizations, was established to reconvene after the Conference to monitor the follow-up process. It met once a year from 1996 to 2000, to review progress reports submitted by the Follow-up Unit. Non-governmental organizations were invited to participate as observers and to submit independent reports. On 13-14 July 2000, the Steering Group met at its fifth and last session to review the achievements of the CIS Conference process in the implementation of the Programme of Action, areas necessitating further attention, and to take a decision on the future activities. A set of recommendations was adopted for future action, moving the process to a more advanced level of cooperation in the search for concrete solutions." (UNHCR November 2000, p. 6)

See also Joint UNHCR/IOM Document: Assessment Report of the Conference Process (1996-2000) (pdf format) [Internet]

An official category for IDPs and involuntary migrants from the former Soviet Union: the status of "forced migrant"

- Internally displaced persons (except as a result of natural or human-made disasters) globally fall under the category of 'Forced Migrant' as defined in the Law of 20 December 1995
- Forced migrant status is also open to involuntary migrants from former Soviet Republics with Russian citizenship or who could obtain it by virtue of being former Soviet citizens
- The status is primarily meant to facilitate the integration of displaced persons in their new place of residence but does not preclude return

Law on the Introduction of Amendments and Additions to the Law of the Russian Federation on "Forced Migrants", 20 December 1995:

Article 1. Notion of "forced migrant"

"1. A forced migrant shall be a citizen of the Russian Federation who was forced to leave his/her place of permanent residence due to violence committed against him/her or members of his/her family or persecution in other forms, or due to a real danger of being subjected to persecution for reasons of race,

nationality, religion, language or membership of some particular social group or political opinion following hostile campaigns with regard to individual persons or groups of persons, mass violations of public order.

Taking into account the facts stipulated in point 1 of the present article, the following persons shall be recognised as a forced migrant:

- 1) a citizen of the Russian Federation who was forced to leave the place of his/her permanent residence on the territory of a foreign state and came to the Russian Federation;
- 2) a citizen of the Russian Federation who was forced to leave the place of his/her permanent residence on the territory of a subject of the Russian Federation and came to the territory of another subject of the Russian Federation.
3. Recognition of a forced migrant shall be also extended to a foreign citizen or a stateless person, permanently staying on legal grounds on the territory of the Russian Federation, who left the place of his/her permanent residence on the territory of the Russian Federation for reasons set forth in Point 1 of the present Article;
4. Recognition of a forced migrant shall be also extended to a citizen of the former USSR, who used to reside on the territory of a former constituent republic of the USSR, who received refugee status in the Russian Federation and lost it, as he had acquired the Russian citizenship, upon availability of factors which prevented him/her from settling down on the territory of the Russian Federation during the time when his/her refugee status was in force."

"As a result of the 1994-96 conflict in Chechnya, some 162,000 IDPs were granted the status of forced migrant, in approximately 80 regions (subjects) of the Russian Federation. The status of forced migrant is primarily meant to facilitate the integration of such persons in their new place of residence, through the allocation of special allowances, assistance with housing, job placement, loans, and related support [7]".

Footnote [7]: "The status of forced migrant does not preclude voluntary return to the former place of permanent residence. Indeed Article 7.2(5) of the Law on Forced Migrants imposes upon local executive bodies the obligation to 'render assistance to a forced migrant at his/her request in the return to his/her former place of residence'." (UNHCR January 2002, para. 11)

See also Law on Forced Migrants, as amended in 1995 (unofficial translation) [Internal link]

The Russian version of the Law on Forced Migrants, as amended in 1995, is available on the website of Memorial [Internet]

For the validity of statistics based on the forced migrant status, see "Populations figures of the Federal and regional Migration Services flawed by inconsistent practices" [Internal link]

Local and national authorities

Reconstruction efforts for Chechnya from the government (2002-2003)

- Public expenditures in Chechnya include both reconstruction projects and humanitarian assistance
- A special effort has also been made to ensure the payment of pensions, wages in the public sector, child and unemployment benefits

- As a support to the return of IDPs, funds have also been allocated to the reconstruction of housing and utilities
- The government also claims progress in the rehabilitation of road infrastructure, the farming sector, healthcare and educational facilities
- The government however recognizes that money transfers to Chechnya have been slower than planned
- There have also been reports of misuse of federal funds in Chechnya, and slow disbursement

2002-2003

The Russian government has allocated significant funds for rebuilding Chechnya's infrastructure. According to Federal Minister for Chechnya Stanislav Ilyasov, the 2003 federal target programme for the rehabilitation of Chechnya for the first half of the year was 100% fulfilled as compared with just 20% realisation of the programme for the same period in 2002. The government has continued to rebuild infrastructure, including Temporary Accommodation Centres (TACs), which are primarily designed to accommodate returnees. Government assistance to IDPs, returnees, and socially vulnerable persons inside Chechnya has increased, including food and non-food relief items. Payment of pensions and salaries is regular. In July, the Russian Prime Minister signed a decree for providing financial compensation for residents of Chechnya whose housing has been destroyed – as many as 39,000 families could be eligible. (UN November 2003, p. 5)

For a more detailed overview of the public reconstruction efforts in Chechnya, see "Summary of the Russian Government's Programme", in: UN Consolidated Inter-agency Appeal for 2004, November 2003, Annex 1, pp. 140-143 [Internet]

See also:

"Chechen official deplore delay in reconstruction", Radio Free Europe, 6 November 2003 [Internet]

"MSF claims displaced Chechens afraid to go home as audit chamber head says Grozny resembles Stalingrad's ruins", Radio Free Europe, 30 April 2003 [Internet]

2001-2002

"In November 2002, amendments were introduced to Russian Federation Government Resolution No. 163 of 3 March 2001, for the provision of Government assistance to IDPs in Chechnya and beyond. The Resolution makes budgetary provisions for the procurement and delivery of food and bread for IDPs, for the rental and maintenance of shelter in the TACs, for the transport of IDPs and their assets back to Chechnya, and cash allowances (RUR 20 per person per day) for IDPs returning to Chechnya after 1 November 2002 and who are renting private accommodation. This latter provision (cash allowances) represents a substantial help in enhancing the possibility for IDPs to rent private accommodation and/or to indemnify host families. However, it may also be seen as an inducement for IDPs to return to Chechnya, since such cash allowances are not foreseen for IDPs staying with host families in Ingushetia (where some 52,000 IDPs are staying in such private accommodation) or elsewhere. Also, all assistance provided under Resolution No. 163 is available only to those IDPs registered both with the local migration services (Form No. 7), as well as with the passport and visa services (PVS) of the local bodies of the Ministry of Interior (sojourn registration). UNHCR estimates that up to 40,000 IDPs in Ingushetia may not be in possession of Form No. 7 and/or sojourn registration with the PVS." (UNHCR February 2003, para. 19)

"The Russian Government is directing major efforts towards restoring normal life in the Republic of Chechnya. Activities of the federal and local authorities to achieve this goal are financed mostly from the 'Federal Target Programme on the Reconstruction of the Economy and the Social Sector of the Republic of Chechnya'. The Government Commission for the Reconstruction of the Economy and the Social Sector of the Republic of Chechnya, led by Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, Viktor

Khristenko, is responsible for the implementation of this programme. In 2002, the federal government allocated RUR 4.5 billion (about US \$142.4 million) for the programme: RUR 1.8 billion (about US \$57 million) for housing and utilities, about RUR 600 million (about US \$19 million) for the agro-industrial sector, RUR 250 million (about US \$7.9 million) for electricity, RUR 216 million (about US \$6.8 million) for public health, and RUR 120 million (about US \$3.8 million) for education. In 2003 it will allocate RUR 5.175 billion (about US \$163.7 million). In addition, considerable funds come from extra-budgetary sources, including the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation. The Pension Fund has fully paid pensions for 2001 to the extent of RUR 1.6 billion (about US \$50.6 million) and liquidated arrears of previous years amounting to more than RUR 800 million (about US \$25.3 million). In addition, the export sales of oil produced in Chechnya are a new source of extra budgetary revenues used to develop the social sphere (RUR 232 million, or about US \$7.3 million, in 2001). The third extra-budgetary source are economic agents (RAO Unified Energy Systems of Russia, OAO Gazprom gas concern, and the Russian Ministry of Railways), who are setting aside RUR 2.74 billion (about US \$86.7 million), which is 52.2 percent of the total amount, for the restoration of electrical energy, gas supply, oil industry and transport facilities.

In the eyes of the government, a major task which remains to be accomplished is the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to Chechnya. This is seen as an indispensable condition for normalizing the political and social situation. Federal executive bodies and the Chechen Government have adopted an action plan on the return of IDPs to Chechnya. In 2002, the federal centre has allocated RUR 1.826 billion (about US \$57.8 million) for the reconstruction of housing and utilities. Apart from the provision of housing, the economic recovery of Chechnya contributes to the return of people, with a special emphasis on job creation. Since October 2001 there are twenty functioning employment centres and more than 60,000 new jobs. In total, there are more than 150,000 jobs in Chechnya. Public sector workers' wages, pensions, and child and unemployment benefits are paid.

The Russian Ministry of Energy has carried out considerable work on the gas transport system of the republic (RUR 130 million, or about US \$4.1 million, in 2001). There is an agreement with Unified Energy Systems Russia to construct a power plant in Argun for RUR 400 million (about US \$12.7 million). 544 kilometres of high-voltage power transmission lines have been built. A total of nearly RUR 1 billion (about US \$31.6 million) has been spent on the reconstruction of electricity generating facilities. Twenty oil wells are operating. Regarding the restoration of the transport system, 120 bus routes are now open and the full 400 kilometre section of the railway system is operating. Fourteen bridges have been restored.

The farming sector has started working in Chechnya. So far, the harvest has amounted to more than 350,000 MTs of grain. The Argun Grain Reception Centre and a milling plant have started operating. Reconstruction of canning and wine making plants is ongoing. A workshop for fruit beverages and juices is due to be launched in Shalinsky raion this year.

Over the first seven months of 2002, the amount of tax and non-tax receipts rose 3.7 times to RUR 1.4 billion (about US \$44.3 million) in comparison to a similar period last year. Moreover, the federal share of receipts in Chechnya for the past seven months constituted RUR 785.3 million (about US \$24.9 million) - a ten-fold rise - and that of the republic RUR 626.5 million or about US \$19.8 million (a two-fold rise). Receipts in the Chechen Republic in 2002 became comparable to those in the other regions of the Caucasus.

In the public health system, there are fifty seven hospitals (4,800 beds), thirty two polyclinics, forty six dispensaries and 175 medical assistant-obstetrician stations. Grozny has nine hospitals and sixteen polyclinics. Under the federal programmes of combating tuberculosis, diabetes and other diseases, necessary drugs have been supplied to the medical establishments of Chechnya. The republic's medical college and its branches provided training to local junior medical personnel. In 2001, 51,000 children from Chechnya received sanatorium-and-health-resort treatment. In 2002 this number is expected to rise to 70,000. The Russian Government has voted for allocating RUR 150 million (about US \$4.7million) in compulsory social insurance funds for these purposes. There are 455 general education schools operating in Chechnya (356 in rural areas), including twenty seven evening schools, ninety six consultation centres and

five boarding schools. Chechnya has three institutions of higher learning and nineteen specialized secondary educational establishments. In addition, telephone communication has been restored. A Kizlyar-Gudermes-Argun-Grozny digital fibre-optic line has been laid." (UNOCHA November 2002, pp. 89-90)

"Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Nikolai Patrushev has announced that his agency and the Audit Chamber have uncovered evidence that his agency and the Audit Chamber have uncovered evidence that 700 million rubles (\$23.3 million) in federal funding allocated for Chechnya was misspent, nns.ru reported on 3 December. The funds were intended to pay for restructuring the republic's social-welfare infrastructure. He did not say who was responsible for the misuse of the funds of what they had been spent. Patrushev said that he believes for more federal spending has actually been misappropriated in the republic. In 2000, the federal government allocated 7.5 billion rubles for reconstruction there, and in 2001 it allocated 11.4 billion rubles." (RFE/RL 3 December 2002)

See also "Audit Chamber to create permanent inspection team for Chechnya", RFE/RL Newsline, 10 December 2002 [Internet]

Government's reconstruction programme for Chechnya aims to facilitate return (2001-2002)

- Federal government adopted a programme of reconstruction on 25 January 2001 and a similar programme was adopted for 2002 and subsequent years in August 2001
- 1.8 billion roubles (US \$62 million) was allocated in 2001 for housing reconstruction
- The Programme aims to bring living conditions inside Chechnya back to normality, and to create an environment favourable to the return of all IDP
- The government reports progress in the restoration of economic activities and public services
- According to the Federal Minister for Chechnya, the 2001 targets have been fulfilled by 80%, with the worst result in the health and education sectors
- The government also recognises that transfers from the federal centre to Chechnya are slower than they should be

"The Government of Russia is implementing the Programme to Restore the Economy and the Social Sector of the Chechen Republic, approved on January 25, 2001. For these purposes a sum of 14.4 billion roubles (US\$496.4 million) has been set aside for the current year; 4.5 billion roubles (US\$155.1 million) is to come from the federal budget, the remaining sums from off-budget sources. As of now, over 2 billion roubles (US\$68.9 million) of budgetary funds has been transferred. In August-September, another 1.5 billion roubles (US\$51.7 million) will be allocated. For the practical realization of the Programme a federal state unitary enterprise Directorate for Construction and Rehabilitation Works in the Chechen Republic has been established within the State Committee for Construction (Gosstro) of Russia.

On August 23, 2001, the Government endorsed a similar programme for 2002 and subsequent years." (UN November 2001, pp. 94-95)

"The Government of the Russian Federation allocated RUR 14.4 billion (US \$500 million) as part of the Federal Targeted Programme for Social and Economic Rehabilitation of the Republic of Chechnya in 2001. The Programme aimed to bring living conditions inside Chechnya back to normality, and to create an environment in which all IDPs would be able to return to their place of origin. These efforts resulted in a number of significant improvements: people in Chechnya are regularly receiving their salaries, pensions, and child allowances; and some important branches of the regional economy and infrastructure, such as oil production, transport, and communication systems are working again, thereby providing employment for parts of the civilian population and generating additional financial resources for rehabilitation. However,

the government has recognised that transfers from the federal centre to Chechnya are slower than they should be and this issue needs to be resolved." (UN November 2001, p. 10)

"The federal programme aimed at rebuilding Chechnya is about to be stopped. 'The situation has considerably aggravated: the funding has been suspended for three months,' Anatoliy Popov, the head of the federal enterprise in the charge of the rebuilding work in Chechnya, told a news conference in Moscow on Thursday. 'In this situation, we have to suspend the work. It is going slowly, and if the problem of funding is not resolved, the work will have to be stopped,' Popov said. [Interfax]" (DRC 31 March 2002)

See also

- *Order No. 1707-r (25 December 2001), on financing of the federal target program for the restoration of the economy and the social sphere of the Chechen Republic in 2001 [Internet]*
- *Order No.1740-r (29 December 2001), on the implementation of the Federal Migration Program in the territories of the Chechen Republic and the Republic of Ingushetia [Internet]*

See also "Reported diversion of aid (2001-2002)" [Internal link]

"The Government Commission on Economic and Social Reconstruction of Chechnya, which met on 30 July, discussed mid-year results of the 2002 federal target programme of reconstruction of the republic. According to the Deputy Prime Minister, Victor Khristenko, who chaired the meeting, they are 'not fully satisfactory' despite the fact that there is an improvement as compared to last year. The Federal Minister for Chechnya, Vladimir Yelagin, said that the programme for which the government had allocated RUR 4.5 billion (about US \$145 million) was fulfilled only by 17%. The situation with housing reconstruction is slightly better, as this programme has been fulfilled by 30%. According to government officials, the measures to rebuild the republic's infrastructure are lagging due to problems with financing procedures." (UN OCHA 8 August 2002)

See also Government of the Russian Federation, Factsheet on the situation in the Chechen Republic, 8 October 2002 [Internet]

Federal institutions mandated with the issue of internal displacement (2000-2001)

- Functions related to the implementation of the federal migration policy have been transferred to the Ministry of the Interior (October 2001)
- The Ministry for Federal Affairs, National and Migration Policy was responsible at the federal level for the policy regarding IDPs between June 2000 and October 2001
- The Ministry has planned to enhance coordination mechanisms for the provision of humanitarian assistance (October 2000)
- The Ministry of Civil Defense, Emergencies and Natural Disasters (EMERCOM) coordinates and channel international aid in the Northern Caucasus
- The general policy of the government is to encourage Chechen IDPs to return to their place of origin by concentrating assistance in Chechnya

"The Federal Ministry of Federal Affairs, National and Migration Policy was created by Presidential Decree No. 867 of 17 May 2000, to replace the former Federal Migration Service. By another Presidential Decree of 16 October 2001, the Ministry was liquidated and those functions related to the implementation of the federal migration policy were transferred to the Ministry of the Interior." (UNHCR January 2002, footnote 8)

"Duma Speaker Gennadyi Seleznev, former President of Ingushetiya Ruslan Aushev, and human rights NGO's concerned with IDP's criticized the plan, charging the Interior Ministry could not address adequately

the needs of internal refugees, and that it was appropriate to entrust law enforcement organs with humanitarian programs for internal refugees. The Duma's International Relations Committee chair Dmitry Rogozin welcomed the move, arguing that law enforcement would be more effective in preventing illegal immigration." (U.S.DOS 4 March 2002, sect. 2d)

"As part of ongoing government reforms, the Federal Migration Service was dissolved in July 2000. The Ministry for Federal Affairs, National and Migration Policy of the Russian Federation has been designated to take over the responsibility for all migration and refugee matters. This may result in changes in state migration and asylum policy as well as personnel changes. UNHCR is concerned that this may affect FMS eligibility officers from various regions of the country who have been trained by UNHCR on refugee status procedures and on many aspects of refugee protection." (UNHCR November 2000, p. 45)

"According to the information received from some humanitarian agencies, the recent restructuring of the federal administration and transfer of competence regarding IDP camps from EMERCOM to the Ministry for the Federation and Minorities as from 1 October 2000 seem to have contributed to this unsatisfactory situation. The Russian authorities admit that the restructuring might have caused some momentary bureaucratic confusion but they have confidence in the advantages of the new structure in a long run." (COE 23 January 2001, para. 37)

"In late 1999 and early 2000, in the first stage of the crisis, the Ministry of Civil Defence, Emergencies and Natural Disasters (EMERCOM) promptly provided relief assistance to the affected population. This assistance included the building and organisation of camps for displaced persons, and the provision of basic relief supplies, including food. EMERCOM has distributed a total of 21,000 tons of food commodities in the Northern Caucasus - 12,000 tons in Ingushetia, and the remaining quantity in Chechnya and Dagestan. In comparison, WFP has distributed, between February and October 2000, about 16,000 MT of commodities (most of it in Ingushetia). The Russian Government appointed EMERCOM to co-ordinate and channel all international humanitarian relief assistance in the Northern Caucasus.

Under its winterization programme, EMERCOM, in collaboration with UNHCR, is presently establishing a new tent camp in Ingushetia in order to accommodate about 12,000 IDPs shifting from two train camps and other settlements. EMERCOM has also made plans to establish new camps inside Chechnya in order to accommodate IDPs returning from Ingushetia and Dagestan.

The general policy of the Government of the Russian Federation is to encourage Chechen IDPs to return to their place of origin. In line with this policy, and as a result of resource constraints, EMERCOM has tended to reduce the level of assistance it provides in Ingushetia and to concentrate resources in Chechnya. WFP and the UN, based on an assessment of the security situation in Chechnya, have refrained from any actions that would effectively 'push' IDPs back.

To begin the reconstruction of Chechnya, the Government approved Resolution 639 titled 'On the Complex of Top Priority Measures to Ensure Normal Functioning of the Economic and Social Sphere of the Republic of Chechnya in 2000'. The resolution envisages expenditures worth US\$ 290 million for various reconstruction programmes in Chechnya. However, implementation is significantly behind schedule for want of funds." (WFP 2001, paras. 15-18)

See also Factsheet on the situation in the Chechen Republic, Government of the Russian Federation, 8 October 2002 [Internet]

See also "Government's reconstruction programme for Chechnya aims to facilitate return (2001-2002)" [Internal link]

Distribution of food aid in Ingushetia regularly suspended because of disrupted payments from the Federal authorities (2000-2001)

- Delay in the payment of the food suppliers by the Federal authorities obliges Ingush administration to suspend the distribution of hot meals and bread
- This situation provokes unrest among the displaced population in camps and spontaneous settlements

"Termination of complementary food distributions for IDPs in Ingushetia, by the Government, provoked public unrest among IDPs in the camps and spontaneous settlements of Karabulak municipal district. Some 20,000 people have reportedly been left without hot meals and bread and this could create a worrying humanitarian situation with the coming winter." (WFP 12 January 2001)

"On November 9 The Head of the Ingush Territorial Representative Office of the RF Ministry for Federal Affairs, Migration and Nationality Issues, Mr. Gireev, reported that from 13 November state deliveries of hot meals and bread for the Chechnya IDPs in Ingushetia would be resumed. By that time, it is expected that the Federal Authorities will transfer 43 mln. rubles to pay existing debts to the suppliers of food in the republic. However, this sum is not enough to cover all the debts, which presently constitute over 40 mln. rubles." (DRC 10 November 2000)

"The Ingush Migration Service, on October 12, suspended provision of hot meals and bread to the IDPs in Ingushetia because of the Russian government's debt of over 400 million rubles. However, on October 17, the Minister for Federal Affairs, National and Migration Policy, Aleksandr Blokhin, dismissed the information of the Ingush officials concerning the 400 million rubles debt saying that 'we don't have such information, and this figure (400 mln. RR) lies on the conscience of those who voice it'. According to the Minister, the official number of IDPs in Chechnya is 181,000 persons, whereas in the neighboring Ingushetia the figure constitutes 122,450 individuals. Out of them, around 40,000 IDPs will be living in tent camps in the territory of Ingushetia. The information obtained at the Ingush Ms indicates that on October 18, provision bread to the IDPs in Ingushetia was resumed. But, unless the MS receives money by October 23, the distribution of bread will be suspended again." (DRC 24 October 2000, p. 2)

Recent reports of aid suspension:

"According to the Ingush authorities, they suspended bread distributions to IDPs from Chechnya as of 1 March because of the arrears to Ingush companies and organizations providing IDPs with food. In 2001 alone, the arrears totaled RUR 200 million (about US\$6.45 million). There is a risk that electricity and natural gas supply to all IDPs camps will be cut off for the same reason." (UNOCHA 15 March 2002)

"Around 3,000 Chechen refugees have been denied food since the beginning of the year in the neighbouring Russian republic of Ingushetia, following a suspension of deliveries by aid organizations, an senior aid worker said Friday.

The organization responsible for providing food to the refugees in the eastern district of Sunzhensky, close to Ingushetia's border with Chechnya, had suspended delivery of food supplies because it had not received payment, the official, Zendi Umalatov, told Itar-Tass news agency.

Technically, the Russian federal government is responsible for providing financial backing to support the provision of services to the Chechen refugees." (AFP 11 January 2002)

"Stanislav Ilyasov, the chairman of the government of the Republic of Chechnya, told ITAR-TASS on 1 November that a shortage of funding from Moscow had prevented the republic from being able to get ready for winter. He said that some 1 billion rubles (\$34 million) are needed over the next two months." (RFE/RL 2 November 2001)

Neighbouring republics reluctant to host more Chechens, except Ingushetia (1999-2001)

- Stavropol Region, Dagestan, and North Ossetia tightened border controls and set rules of transit, stipulating the 'temporary' nature of their hospitality
- Despite its limited resources, Ingushetia hosts the bulk of the Chechen displaced population

"In early October [1999], with prospects waning for preventing a protracted, bloody war, neighboring Stavropol Region, Dagestan, and North Ossetia tightened border controls and set rules of transit, stipulating the 'temporary' nature of their hospitality.

'Until recently, Russians mostly fled from Chechnya. Now, Chechens are leaving too,' FMS director in Stavropol, Viktor Dulin, told Itar Tass on September 28. In response, he said, Stavropol authorities set up 'temporary' accommodations in Mineralnyye Vody and Kurskiy districts on the Chechen border 'as resting points before they transit out of Stavropol.' According to Dulin, Stavropol cannot host more Chechens because some 300,000 unregistered migrants and 74,000 registered 'refugees' from previous conflicts strain Stavropol's acute shortage of schools, medical facilities, jobs, and housing. Dulin emphasized that Stavropol serves as 'a transit point' for fleeing Chechens, on their way to official reception centers in Astrakhan, Saratov, Orenburg and other regions farther north.

North Ossetia also envisioned a temporary, transit-based role for itself. On September 29, Deputy of the North Ossetian parliament, Viktor Ishchenko, told Itar Tass that the entire border between North Ossetia and Chechnya was patrolled. Fleeing Chechens, he said, 'are received by the [local FMS], registered, and dispatched to the Mineralnyye Vody railway station to be sent to various Russian regions.'

Dagestan—which hosts thousands of displaced ethnic Chechens from the previous war—closed its borders. On September 29, Dagestani authorities reported housing about 2,000 Chechens in 'temporary' camps set up in the Kizlyar and Nogaisky districts bordering Chechnya. On September 30, Itar Tass reported, 'The administrative [Dagestani] boundary with Chechnya has been closed.' Less than one week later, the New York Times talked to displaced civilians trapped in Dargo and Benoy, just inside Chechnya's eastern border with Dagestan. 'No one from our village went to fight [with the Wahhabis] in Dagestan. We don't believe in fighting our neighbors. If we go to Dagestan, they shoot at us now.'" (USCR October 1999)

"The difficult economic situation in Ingushetia does not allow for the provision of sufficient assistance to the victims of the conflict. Ingushetia is one of the poorest republics of the Russian Federation (it was rated third poorest in 1992). With a local population of 320,000, the Republic is not in position to provide for 160,000 displaced persons. The utilities (water, electricity, gas) are over-stretched, public services (schools, hospitals) are strained and the labour market is saturated. Despite limited resources, the Government and the people of Ingushetia are committed to providing all possible support and assistance to Chechen displaced persons.

More than 80% of the displaced persons are staying in private accommodation. This means anything from a little bit of space in a crowded cow shed to a heated room in the host's residence. For better accommodation, rent is usually paid. The poorest IDPs tend to stay with the poorest hosts and not pay rent. A large number of poor host families have now exhausted their reserves. There have already been cases of eviction because IDPs were not able to pay rent and utility charges." (WFP 2001, paras. 5-6)

International response

Coordination effort within the international humanitarian community (2003)

- International humanitarian activities are coordinated by the UN Humanitarian Coordinator, with the support of OCHA
- Regular relations are maintained between the UN and authorities in Chechnya and Ingushetia
- Donor countries are also closely briefed by the UN on humanitarian developments
- The United Nations, the ICRC, and NGOs have agreed that one focal point should be the custodian to ensure coordination in each relevant sector
- UNHCR ensures coordination for protection, human rights and rule of law activities

"Strong coordination among the various groups of actors is the key for a successful aid operation. OCHA works towards ensuring that the Russian government, the international donor community, UN agencies and NGOs are involved in all stages of the operation, from assessment to project implementation.

The UN Humanitarian Coordinator and the UN Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator, whom OCHA supports with offices in Moscow and in Nazran (Ingushetia), work both at the federal and at the regional level to promote a coordinated approach to relief operations. In Ingushetia, the aid community meets the local government weekly. Since April 2003 the Ingush leadership has again started inviting the UN to meetings of its Coordination Council created by the President of Ingushetia to deal with the issue of IDPs from Chechnya. Regular relations are maintained with the authorities in Chechnya as well. In Moscow the United Nations has frequent meetings with the federal government to establish a framework within which humanitarian assistance is carried out.

Another important component of the coordination process is maintaining relations with donor countries. The UN meets with foreign missions in Moscow to share information and exchange views on assessment, analysis, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and contingency planning throughout project cycles. Aid monitoring missions to the North Caucasus are facilitated by OCHA.

Cooperative efforts strengthen the extent to which needs can be addressed. Some aid agencies provide services by supporting government structures, while others are more engaged in encouraging the authorities to assume their responsibilities towards the population. For example, the World Food Programme is involved in the direct provision of goods. In contrast, an NGO like Memorial works closely with the host government to draw its attention to the duties it has towards its citizens. In order to have a well-coordinated approach to these two spheres of action, the United Nations, the ICRC, and NGOs have agreed that one focal point should be the custodian to ensure coordination in each of the following sectors.

Sector	Focal Point
Protection, Human Rights, and Rule of Law	UNHCR
Food	WFP
Shelter	UNHCR
Non-Food Items	ICRC
Health	WHO
Water and Sanitation	IRC
Education	UNICEF
Mine Action	UNICEF
Economic Recovery and Infrastructure	UNDP

Focal points organise meetings in Nazran in which Chechen and Ingush authorities participate, weekly, fortnightly, or monthly. These meetings should take place regularly in Chechnya as well, but due to security constraints this has so far not been possible. Monitoring is another important activity in each

sector. Activities are monitored on a regular basis by all agencies in the field and consolidated fortnightly by sector focal points. The aim of this exercise is to analyse the extent to which programmes meet the needs of the affected population and to identify problems or gaps in humanitarian response.

A dynamic and thorough flow of information is vital to guarantee programme complementarity and efficient provision of assistance to the needy. Besides liaising with humanitarian actors, information exchange comprises: fortnightly information bulletins covering projects implemented by all aid agencies, notes on coordination meetings, ad hoc documentation on specific activities, as well as a database kept on the OCHA website (www.ocha.ru), which enhances transparency in the aid community. The database is regularly updated with figures on the provision of assistance for each sector in both Chechnya and Ingushetia." (UN November 2003, p. 18)

ICRC: planned activities in northern Caucasus for 2004

- ICRC expects to shift more of its activities to Chechnya in 2004, although security and access is likely to remain a key constraint
- Following assessments in 2002, ICRC no longer targets beneficiaries in Chechnya based on social criteria (such as IDPs) but on economic vulnerability
- However, complementary food and non-food aid will be delivered to IDPs in Ingushetia and Dagestan
- Hygiene facilities for IDPs in Ingushetia will also be maintained
- Support to public infrastructure, such as water supply systems and health services in Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan will continue

"The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been active in the Russian Federation (Moscow and North Caucasus) since 1993. In the North Caucasus, the ICRC is running a major humanitarian operation comprising both assistance and protection programmes as well as promotion of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). From its regional delegation in Moscow, the ICRC is also carrying out a range of programmes aimed at the integration of IHL treaties in national legislation as well as their teaching and promotion amongst the armed and security forces, universities and secondary schools. The ICRC supports the Russian Red Cross and implements a number of its programmes with this partner.

[...]

The programmes for 2004 were defined taking into consideration the following elements that marked the year 2003:

The shift of activities into Chechnya took place as expected. However, due mainly to security constraints, some activities there - such as rehabilitation of the water network - could only be implemented partially, while the planned rural assistance programme and the primary health care programme were not started. Access and security thus remain a key constraint.

Following the assessments carried out in 2002, assistance programmes shifted from social to economic criteria in Chechnya. Verification and re-registration were completed.

The ICRC continued to play its unique role in the field of protection by visiting persons detained in relation with the security operation. The ICRC also monitored the situation of the civilian population and collected allegations of arrest of persons whose families were without news since their arrest, and approached the authorities on the issue.

In 2004 the ICRC plans to reinforce its protection action and to continue its assistance programmes almost at current levels, but with a decrease vis-à-vis the 2003 budget. To ensure precise monitoring of assistance and contacts, the ICRC will maintain the current personnel set-up and offices across the region.

Overview of ICRC Operations in 2004:

The ICRC will pursue and reinforce its **protection** activities along the lines developed in 2003.

The ICRC will **assist** almost 140,000 most vulnerable persons by delivering complementary food and non-food aid to the resident population in Chechnya, while in Ingushetia and Dagestan efforts will be concentrated on IDPs.

Support to **public infrastructure** will continue for the **rehabilitation** of **water supply** and sewerage systems in Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan. Hygiene facilities for IDPs will be maintained in Ingushetia, while hospitals and collective centres will be rehabilitated in Chechnya and Dagestan.

In the field of **health activities**, the ICRC will assist 12 hospitals, and continue providing support to the Grozny Central Blood Bank and clinical laboratories at 12 hospitals. An emergency medical stock will be maintained (enough to treat 1,000 wounded). The ICRC will support training for health workers and doctors as well as for orthopaedic technicians at Grozny Orthopaedic Centre, which will also receive material support.

In order to protect the civilian population from the dangers of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), **mine awareness** programmes will be implemented in favour of the population in general and children in particular, in both Chechnya and Dagestan.

Programmes aiming at **promoting IHL** for armed and security forces as well as universities and schools will continue.

The ICRC will pursue its **cooperation** with the Russian Red Cross branches in the North Caucasus as well as with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

In order to implement its programmes in the North Caucasus, the ICRC needs funding for an estimated CHF 30 million. For its programmes implemented via the Regional Delegation based in Moscow (resource of and/or technical support for the North Caucasus operation and promotion of IHL), an additional CHF 5 million is required." (UN November 2003, pp. 180-181)

More information on ICRC's activities in northern Caucasus is available on the section "The ICRC in Russia" of ICRC's website [Internet]

Protection-related activities for 2004: UN monitors the return process

- The UN will aim to ensure the principle of safe and voluntary return of IDPs to Chechnya
- UNHCR will continue to support Memorial and the Collegium of Advocates in operating counselling centres in Chechnya, providing legal support to IDPs and returnees
- Topics of concerns include access to legal status, documentation, registration and other civil and social entitlements

Beneficiary Population	Number
IDPs in Ingushetia	70,000
Residents in Chechnya	800,000
Total	870,000

"The international community and local NGOs work to enhance respect for human rights in several ways. The Office of the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for Human and Civil Rights and Freedoms in the Chechen Republic operates from field offices in Chechnya and cooperates with the EU, Council of Europe (CoE), UNHCR, and OSCE. International staff of the ICRC carry out visits to detention centres in Chechnya and in the surrounding republics. The OSCE withdrew from Chechnya in early 2003. Since then, international presence in the republic has consisted of only occasional missions. Memorial and the Collegium of Advocates, with support from UNHCR, operate counselling centres in several locations in Chechnya, providing legal support to IDPs and returnees [In Chechnya, Memorial operates from three counselling centres and the Collegium of advocates from nine]. VESTA, also with the support of UNHCR, monitors TACs and IDPs returning from Ingushetia.

Objectives

To preserve a safe haven for IDPs in Ingushetia.

To ensure the right of IDPs to choose their place of residence within their own country and to enjoy their rights as citizens in their place of sojourn.

To ensure the principle of voluntary return to Chechnya, in safety and with dignity.

To promote possible integration schemes for those IDPs in Ingushetia (and elsewhere) who are not able or willing to return to Chechnya.

To assist those institutions and organisations mandated with the protection of citizens' rights to ensure a safer environment for returnees and IDPs in Chechnya.

Proposed action

The activities described below will be implemented in Chechnya and Ingushetia either by UNHCR or governmental and non-governmental partners. Coordination of activities with the [Council of Europe] will be maintained. In the field of protection and promotion of International Humanitarian Law, the ICRC will continue in 2004 to operate according to its working modalities and its mandate.

Advocacy and promotion of the rights of IDPs, returnees and other affected populations

UNHCR will, together with its strategic partners, continue to liaise with relevant authorities at the local, regional, and federal level in order to ensure that IDPs are granted basic rights in accordance with international norms and Russian legislation.

Protection monitoring and action

By strengthening protection presence on the ground, UNHCR will facilitate a coordinated approach to protection issues in the region.

By working with its implementing partners, who monitor the situation, UNHCR will have an overview of the living conditions and protection situation of IDPs, and will undertake timely protection actions when required.

Access to legal status, documentation, registration and other civil and social entitlements

UNHCR will support local NGOs and the Collegium of Advocates to provide legal counselling to IDPs and returnees, as well as legal representation before the courts and access to legal documentation.

A local UNHCR partner will disseminate public information relating to the civil and social rights and allowances of IDPs and returnees through the media in Chechnya.

In parallel, support will be provided to enhance national mechanisms for the issuance of legal documentation to IDPs, as well as for the implementation of applicable legislation defining the status of IDPs and related rights and allowances.

UNHCR will continue to advocate on behalf of IDPs wishing to remain permanently or temporarily in Ingushetia or elsewhere in the Russian Federation. It will seek to legalise their residence status and avoid forced return to unsafe areas. UNHCR, in cooperation with the local authorities, will continue activities to

facilitate integration of IDPs who do not wish to return to Chechnya, in Ingushetia or in other regions. Community-based activities will support and sustain integration initiatives.

Capacity building

UNHCR will, in close coordination with the [Council of Europe] and OSCE/ODIHR, assist institutions and organisations in Chechnya mandated with the protection of citizens' rights, in order to ensure a safer environment for returnees and IDPs in Chechnya. This will be done by organising law refreshment courses for advocates active in Chechnya and equipping counselling centres and selected courts in Chechnya.

Indicators

Return movements are voluntary and take place in safety and with dignity.

Secondary displacement is avoided to the extent possible. If unavoidable, the conditions at the new location should be better than those IDPs previously had.

Undocumented IDPs are issued documents and IDPs are properly registered by the relevant authorities. Returnees in possession of temporary IDs are issued with permanent identification documents.

IDPs and returnees in Chechnya receive appropriate legal counselling and have effective access to legal remedies.

Opportunities for IDPs to integrate locally in their new place of residence remain available."

(UN November 2003, pp. 22-23)

UN Agencies' financial requirements for protection-related activities (US\$)

UNHCR	2,417,298
Sector total	2,417,298

NGO financial requirements for protection-related activities (as included in the UN consolidated inter-agency appeal for 2004) (US\$)

Danish Refugee Council	992,075
Non-violence International	590,000
NIISO	54,766
Sector totals	1,627,841

(UN November 2003, pp. 3-4)

IDPs in Ingushetia and Dagestan will continue to receive international food aid in 2004

- Programmes will aim at developing self-reliance by distribution food and agriculture inputs
- Food aid will also focus on "exchange-based" programming such as school feeding
- In Chechnya, food aid will be distributed to the most vulnerable households
- In Ingushetia, basic food supplies will be distributed to IDPs by WFP through NGO implementing partners
- In Dagestan, food aid will be distributed by the Danish Refugee Council to 4,500 IDPs

Beneficiary Population	Number
Chechnya	
Basic food supplies	321,000
Complementary food	162,300

Agriculture inputs	330,000
Ingushetia	
Basic food supplies	70,000
Complementary food	59,900
Agriculture inputs	10,000
Dagestan	
Basic food supplies	4,500

"Objectives

Enhance the food security of internally displaced and most vulnerable households by coordinated delivery of food aid and agricultural assistance, as well as contributing to the capacity of civil society to become more self-reliant in the long term through community mobilisation and empowerment initiatives.

Contribute to the improvement of education standards and school environment, and enhance child nutrition, through the provision of school feeding and school gardens in both Chechnya and Ingushetia.

Improve animal productivity and public health by increasing the capacity of the local veterinary services and quality of breeding livestock.

Assess needs, monitoring and coordination of activities and associated impacts within the food sector.

Proposed action

"In 2004 aid agencies will enhance the integrated participatory approach both with other aid agencies and with relevant stakeholders (beneficiaries and government authorities). In order to minimise aid dependency, the programmes will work towards developing self-reliance by distributing food and agriculture inputs as assistance to the most vulnerable and as a tool to reach longer-term objectives. Food aid will, therefore, gradually refocus on 'exchange-based' programming such as school feeding and on the distribution of agricultural inputs to allow those with access to land to produce food for their own consumption. Community participation and mobilisation will be a key aspect of WFP's food-for-work activities as well as WFP and DRC's school feeding programmes.

Food aid and development activities will be carried out with the humanitarian agencies coordinating according to the same geographic and thematic approaches followed in 2003. The combination of basic and complementary food assistance will provide some 2,200kcal per person per day for the most vulnerable households.

In Chechnya, basic food supplies will be distributed by DRC (176,500 vulnerable persons); WFP (125,000 vulnerable people as well as three months' rations to all returnees to ensure a minimum 1200kcal per person per day); and ACF (18,000 people in the southern regions of Itum-Kaly, Shatoy, and Sharoy and 1,500 people in Chechen institutions).

Complementary feeding will be distributed by the ICRC (55,000 beneficiaries in the urban areas of Chechnya as well as 500 people in institutions); DRC (20,000 children and 500 persons in elderly houses, orphanages and hospitals); Caritas Internationalis (hot meals for 750 pre-school children and orphans); CPCD (1,300 vulnerable IDPs in Sernovodsk); Islamic Relief (1,000 people in TACs); and PINF (HIV and TB patients, pregnant and postnatal women). In addition, WFP will also distribute hot meals and mineral-fortified biscuits through its school feeding programme to 78,000 children. UNESCO will cooperate with WFP in the school feeding programme by undertaking capacity building of school kitchens.

In Ingushetia, basic food supplies will be distributed by WFP through NGO implementing partners (70,000 IDPs). Complementary feeding will be distributed by the ICRC (40,000 beneficiaries); Islamic Relief (11,000 people in tented camps); ACF (baby food to 900 children under two living in the tented camps); Caritas Internationalis (hot meals for 750 pre-school children and orphans); and CPCD (4,500 IDP school

children through hot meals). WFP will distribute hot meals and mineral-fortified biscuits to 8,000 school children in IDP schools through its school feeding programme in IDP schools.

In Dagestan, basic food supplies will be distributed by DRC to 4,500 IDPs.

WFP will also continue small-scale food for work/training activities in Ingushetia and Chechnya through its NGO partners. WFP will continue to act as the focal point for the monitoring of the food security situation and the impact of assistance at the field level as well as coordination of all food aid issues with the government, the ICRC and the NGO community.

As far as agricultural activities are concerned, FAO will supply farming inputs through NGO implementing partners to complement basic food rations with fresh food for 22,000 households in Chechnya and Ingushetia. This project aims at reducing food aid dependency and fostering farming skills. FAO will also provide seeds for school gardens in conjunction with the WFP school feeding programme, as initiated by the Chechen Ministry of Education. DRC will distribute seeds and simple agricultural tools to some 46,000 households and provide training on their use and seed preservation. In assisting Chechnya and Ingushetia with the rehabilitation of veterinary services, FAO will focus on fostering governmental structures responsible for providing veterinary services to livestock owners. As a result the production of animal foods will increase. A DRC livestock breed improvement programme will aim at increasing production of milk and meat in Chechnya.

Indicators

School attendance and educational performance.

Number of food for work / training projects implemented and the number and type of assets created.

Number and quality of tests carried out by veterinary laboratories.

Number of field veterinarians trained and equipped.

Stakeholders using coordinated targeting and implementation methodologies.

Information on food security at household level utilised in the design and implementation of all programme activities.

Number of schools with active school feeding programmes, operational parent committees and productive school gardens.

Number of beneficiaries who have received food aid and agricultural inputs.

Quantity of aid delivered.

UN agencies' financial requirements for food-related programmes (US\$)

FAO	693,450
WFP	15,646,221
Sector total	16,339,671

NGO financial requirements for food-related programmes (as included in the UN consolidated inter-agency appeal for 2004)(US\$)

Centre for Peacemaking and Community Development	742,859
Danish Refugee Council	12,408,800
Islamic Relief	434,448
People in Need Foundation	733,000
Sector total	14,319,107

(UN November 2003, pp. 3-4)

International activities with regard to shelter and non-food items in 2004: support to evicted IDPs

- International organisations face problems in providing alternative accommodation to IDPs evicted from camps or other settlements
- UNHCR and its partners have adopted a flexible approach by providing box tents which can also be taken to Chechnya in the event that the IDPs decide to return
- Non-food items are mainly distributed by the ICRC and the NGO HELP
- UNHCR will continue to coordinate the shelter sector in 2004

Beneficiary Population in Ingushetia	Number
Type of accommodation	Number of IDPs
Tented camps	9,100
Temporary settlements	20,900
Private accommodation	40,000
Total	70,000

Beneficiary Population in Chechnya	
Shelter: returnees or IDPs	5,000 families or 20,000 people

"Provision of alternative shelter for IDPs [in Ingushetia] that have been evicted from camps, private accommodation and temporary settlements, as well as those living in substandard conditions, has been a major objective during 2003. While UNHCR, DRC, and IRC successfully distributed over 500 box tents to IDP families in private accommodation and temporary settlements in the summer of 2003, success in providing alternative accommodation for IDPs in the tented camps has been limited. This situation has been further complicated by the government of Ingushetia's recently adopted policy restricting establishment of new shelter for IDPs.

Providing alternative shelter will remain the priority in 2004, primarily benefiting:

IDPs living in substandard tents or living in camps under the threat of closure.
IDPs living in temporary settlements in substandard condition or under threat of eviction.
IDPs facing the risk of eviction by their host families/landlords.

UNHCR and its partners are adopting a flexible approach to meeting this need by rehabilitating existing spaces in temporary settlements and providing box tents, which can serve as a temporary residence in Ingushetia and also be taken to Chechnya in the event that the IDPs decide to return.

In Chechnya, the effective and efficient implementation of the government's programme to compensate for lost housing and property is by far the most important factor in efforts to provide shelter to IDPs in need. UNHCR will play a complementary role by providing, in limited instances, box tents to returnees provided that return is voluntary and the environment conducive to such a programme.

Despite the fact that no extensive needs assessments for non-food items (NFI) have been carried out over the last few years, local assessments reveal that non-food needs remain largely unmet. Household needs include a wide range of items including hygienic supplies, bed sheets, mattresses, blankets, household utensils, and children's clothing. The two main agencies providing assistance in the form of NFI are the

ICRC and the non-governmental organisation HELP. Other organisations are working mostly on an ad hoc basis with distributions early summer and/or winter.

Objectives

Ingushetia

All IDPs will have access to warm, dry, safe, sanitary, and hygienic living conditions.

Proposed relocation sites will be monitored and if necessary rehabilitated so that IDPs are provided with better living conditions than they currently enjoy.

Where the potential for more permanent settlement exists, shelter conditions will be adapted and advice given to IDPs on how to handle their shelter needs themselves.

Accurate data on the shelter and living conditions of IDPs in targeted camps and communities will be regularly updated.

Integration activities will be further developed together with the authorities of Ingushetia.

All IDPs in Ingushetia and Dagestan will be assisted with non-food items, regardless of whether they are living in the private sector, temporary settlements, or tent camps.

Chechnya

Those IDPs returning voluntarily will receive adequate shelter, which will complement (and in no way exclude them from) the government compensation programme.

The most vulnerable fringe of the population will be identified on the basis of economic criteria and assisted with non-food items.

Proposed action

UNHCR will continue to coordinate the shelter sector. UNHCR will continue to support, mediate, and liaise between beneficiaries, NGOs, and local government partners to promote the shelter-related rights of IDPs. These rights include registration and access to acceptable shelter and living standards and physical safety (to be provided by the government) in camps and other places of residence.

Partner organisations will upgrade temporary settlements in Ingushetia.

Alternative accommodation will be provided to IDPs evicted from host families, temporary settlements, or relocated from existing tent camps.

UNHCR's implementing partners will assist the most vulnerable IDP families returning to Chechnya by providing basic building materials as well as box tents where required.

IDPs who wish to reside permanently in Ingushetia will be given opportunities to integrate.

The ICRC will continue to manage NFI coordination. Assistance will be distributed after proper needs assessments are carried out to determine the exact nature of needs. HELP will provide the most vulnerable households in Grozny with non-food items, whereas the ICRC will be targeting the most vulnerable in other urban areas of Chechnya. In Ingushetia, HELP will assist all IDPs living in private accommodation with household items, whereas the ICRC will assist the most vulnerable households according to social criteria. In Dagestan, HELP will assist all IDPs with household items, whereas the ICRC will assist them with other non-food items.

Indicators

All IDPs in Ingushetia have basic, warm, dry accommodation.

Evicted families and new arrivals have alternative shelter in Ingushetia.

Families relocated benefit from improved living conditions.

Returnees to Chechnya can live in warm, dry conditions while repairing their homes.

Major NFI needs of all IDPs in Ingushetia and Dagestan, and of the most vulnerable population in Chechnya, are met.

UN Agencies' financial requirements for shelter and non-food items programmes (US\$)

UNHCR	841,636
Sector total	841,636

NGO financial requirements for shelter and non-food items programmes (as included in the UN consolidated inter-agency appeal for 2004)(US\$)

Danish Refugee Council	4,146,138
Islamic Relief	2,000,000
People in Need Foundation	362,720
Sector total	6,508,858

(UN November 2003, pp. 3-4)

Planned health-related activities for 2004: focus on the primary health care system

- The promotion of a primary health care approach to manage most common diseases will be the core of WHO's strategy
- WHO and UNICEF will focus on maternal and child health, sexually transmitted diseases, and immunisation
- Support to psychosocial rehabilitation will also be intensified

Beneficiary Population	Number
Residents in Ingushetia	350,000
IDPs in Ingushetia	70,000
Population in Chechnya	800,000
Total	1,220,000

Objectives

In order to have a positive impact on the health status and well-being of the most vulnerable group, the main objectives are:

- ☞ To enhance equitable access to quality health care.
- ☞ To improve capacity of preventive and curative services at primary and secondary level, with a special focus on mother and child health and communicable disease control.
- ☞ To raise health awareness of the general population (health promotion).

Proposed action

The health sector aims to protect civilians in the ongoing armed hostilities and ensure their right to sustained and equitable access to quality health care.

Coordination

WHO will continue its strong commitment to local and federal health authorities, active partnership between national and international organisations and cohesive approach to priority health needs. Promotion of a primary health care approach to manage most common diseases, stressing rational use of drugs and appropriate technology, will be the core of WHO's strategy. The main pillars of response are:

- ☉ Capacity building through training and technical support.
- ☉ Physical rehabilitation of selected health facilities.
- ☉ Provision of medical supplies and equipment.
- ☉ Health promotion, education and raising awareness among the general population.

Maternal and child health

Pregnant and breastfeeding women and young children, as two of the most vulnerable groups, need continuous support through programmes sensitive to the cultural setting and status of women in society. WHO and UNICEF, with their partners, will continue to implement the Integrated Management of Childhood Illnesses (IMCI) and Mother Empowerment Programme (MEP). Capacity building in obstetrical and neonatal care will be intensified. UNICEF will procure essential medical equipment, medical consumables and infant starter kits for paediatric and obstetric units and increase community involvement, which is essential to ensure optimal care for mothers, newborns, infants and older children. The MoHs of Chechnya and Ingushetia, as well as medical NGOs, will be major contributors through their outreach programmes.

Sexually transmitted disease and HIV/AIDS control

WHO and UNICEF with their partners will continue to improve prevention, early diagnosis and treatment of sexually transmitted diseases. Medical staff will further receive training in HIV and STI case management and counselling. Clinics will be equipped with diagnostic kits and adequate treatment. UNICEF and WHO will work to raise young people's awareness about HIV/AIDS prevention. The activities will be supported by a variety of health promotion campaigns targeted specifically at adolescents and the general population (within their cultural context).

Communicable and vaccine preventable disease control

WHO will further assist local health structures to strengthen epidemiological surveillance and response in Chechnya and Ingushetia. Staff will be trained in data management, reporting, and appropriate and timely response to disease outbreaks. UNICEF will continue to support the Expanded Programme of Immunization in both republics by distributing basic cold chain equipment and consumables, training health care workers and raising mothers' awareness on the importance of vaccination.

Tuberculosis control

Coming now to its third year, the WHO/MoH TB control programme will continue to achieve sustainable results in Ingushetia and will expand further into Chechnya through local capacity building in recording, reporting and monitoring. Case management and social support for patients will be continued to increase patients' adherence to the strict treatment regime.

Rehabilitation of health structures

Health authorities, UN agencies, the ICRC and NGOs will continue to help local health systems to cope with the most important emerging needs at the primary level, through providing basic medical supplies and medicines, training staff in evidence-based medicine and supporting the physical rehabilitation of selected health facilities.

Psychosocial rehabilitation

UNICEF, in cooperation with its partners, will intensify its efforts for psychosocial support to traumatised children and child victims of mine incidents in Chechnya. WHO will continue with its programme for adult mine survivors. Capacity building of staff at traumatology centres to treat victims of mine explosions and other related injuries will continue (see mine action). Coordination of mental health and psychosocial

rehabilitation programmes is ongoing. Special care will be taken to address the problem of integration of physically and/or mentally disabled into normal societal structures. Support will be given to the extended community (MoH, MoE) to fight against stigmatisation and discrimination, while taking into account the needs of especially vulnerable people. WHO will continue to collaborate with leading Russian institutes to promote specialised training on clinical psychology for specialists in Chechnya to provide the population with qualified psychological care.

Indicators

- Perinatal, infant and maternal morbidity and mortality.
- EPI coverage in vulnerable population.
- Incidence of vaccine preventable diseases.
- Number of trained lay people in community-based care.
- Number of trained health workers.
- Number of TB patients who completed treatment.
- Number of children/adults who received prostheses.
- Level of HIV/AIDS awareness in vulnerable population.
- Number of IDPs who received psychosocial counselling.

(UN November 2003, pp. ...)

UN Agencies' financial requirements for health-related activities (US\$)

UNICEF	1,183,100
WHO	1,376,640
Sector total	2,559,740

NGO financial requirements for health-related activities (as included in the UN consolidated inter-agency appeal for 2004)(US\$)

Handicap International	600,000
International Medical Corps	850,000
Islamic Relief	197,589
People in Need Foundation	320,000
Vesta	102,300
World Vision International	40,000
Sector total	2,109,889

(UN November 2003, pp. 3-4)

Water and sanitation in 2004: international community helps meet basic needs in Ingushetia and Chechnya

- IRC and ICRC will continue to make water available to major IDP settlements in Ingushetia
- UNICEF and its partners will also continue to distribute personal and environmental hygienic products to health facilities and IDP settlements
- IRC will continue collaboration with local partners to rehabilitate the water network in Grozny
- Collective centres in Chechnya will be rehabilitated

Beneficiary Population	Number
Chechnya	

Water	82,238
Sanitation	9,332
Ingushetia	
Water	41,805
Sanitation	41,450

Analysis of need

Ingushetia

Since 1999 the international humanitarian community has provided significant assistance in the water and sanitation sector. To prevent outbreaks of water-borne diseases and sanitation-related infections, approximately 180,000 litres of potable water are trucked daily to 138 IDP locations. Both the ICRC and the International Rescue Committee (IRC) make potable water available to major concentrations of IDPs in Ingushetia, but some settlements still remain in need of water. As the local water network does not serve many water points, water trucking needs to be continued.

Solid waste disposal and pest control are essential sanitation activities. IDP locations are not provided with any sanitation services by the local government or private agencies, which lack the capacity to meet the needs of the IDPs. In 2003 the IRC emergency garbage disposal programme helped to maintain minimum sanitation standards.

IRC sewage trucks, provided by UNHCR, continue to service latrines unconnected to the central sewage system. This activity still needs to be strengthened as currently significant health hazards exist due to inadequacy of the human waste disposal system. Previously constructed latrines need to be upgraded and maintained.

In 2003, UNICEF has continued to support ongoing operations through the provision of personal and environmental hygienic products (chloramide, medifox and soaps) to the Sanitary Epidemiological Stations (SES) in the republic and to some 90,000 vulnerable beneficiaries, with a special focus on IDP women with children.

Chechnya

The need for safe water and sanitation facilities is still a high priority for residents, returnees and IDPs in Chechnya. While the water facilities in Grozny have improved somewhat over the course of the past year, there is still a pronounced need for water throughout the city. IRC, in collaboration with Grozny Vodokanal, a local water company, has rehabilitated the main water lines in the Oktyabrski district of Grozny. 24% of the district population can now get water from these lines. In addition, the population in areas surrounding the Oktyabrski district indirectly benefits from the repaired network. IRC is planning to continue collaboration with Grozny Vodokanal to rehabilitate other parts of the water network. The ICRC has also collaborated with Grozny Vodokanal by giving them access to heavy equipment needed in rebuilding efforts.

UNICEF and its key implementing partner, the Polish Humanitarian Organisation (PHO), have continued to produce and distribute pure potable water (jerry cans and water containers) to health facilities, schools and residents in Grozny. IRC also continued its water trucking in the city. Many hospitals and other health centres rely on trucked water.

Most of the population and health facilities suffer from poor sanitation facilities. To meet this need, UNICEF and PHO have continued their garbage and sewage removal, mainly in hospitals and schools

while also building some 48 latrines and 12 incinerators for medical waste. The ICRC is rehabilitating community centres (including rehabilitation of water and sewage systems and construction of hygienic points) in Shali, Argun and Gudermes.

Objectives

To make available and maintain in good order water and sanitation (toilets, showers, water capacities, waste removal, etc.) facilities in Ingushetia and Chechnya in order to decrease health risks.

Proposed action

Ingushetia

IRC will continue trucking water. The international community will continue to support local authorities with garbage and sewage removal. Maintenance and installations of new shower facilities, latrines and water points will be conducted throughout the year. Garbage containers will be installed. IRC is currently seeking funding for a project to rehabilitate part of the main water network in Ingushetia. This project would be conducted in coordination with the republic's water company, Vodokanal.

UNICEF and its partners will continue to distribute personal and environmental hygienic products to health facilities and IDP camps and settlements. In addition, UNICEF will conduct sensitisation workshops and disseminate posters and leaflets on appropriate hygiene practices.

The ICRC will also continue to truck water. Water points and shower facilities will be maintained regularly. New connections to the main water network will be installed. New hygienic points will be built. IDP settlements will be connected to water lines.

Chechnya

The ICRC water-filling station in Grozny will continue operation. IRC and private trucks will receive water from this filling station. Support to PHO and IRC in the installation of similar water-filling stations will be rendered. Access to water in four towns in Chechnya will be provided. Collective centres will be rehabilitated. Five schools will be provided with water and sanitation facilities.

UNICEF and PHO will further strengthen their water production and distribution programme for some 60,000 residents in Grozny, with the additional provision of water supplies. The collection of garbage and sewage as well as the construction of latrines will also continue. Awareness-raising activities on safe hygienic habits and appropriate modalities for the use and storage of water will be launched, including through local media.

IRC will continue water trucking. Collaboration with the water company Vodokanal will be continued. Rehabilitation of the main water line is planned, as are circle connections of three main water-pumping stations. Additional concrete water reservoirs will be constructed and connected to the main water lines. Distribution of hygienic kits will be conducted. Garbage removal in hospitals and schools will be provided.

Indicators

At least 15 litres of water per person per day are provided, and water tests indicate low risk of faecal or other contamination.

Potable water is available through city water lines in at least one of the districts in Grozny.

The number of water and sanitation facilities upgraded for long-term use.

There is at least one water point per 250 people.

Public toilets are in place and maintained properly.

Domestic and medical refuse is removed from the settlements or buried on site before it becomes a nuisance or a health risk.

Number of schools and health facilities in Grozny with access to potable water and safe latrines and served by the garbage and sewage collection system."

(UN November 2003, pp. 48-49)

UN Agencies' financial requirements for water and sanitation programmes (US\$)

UNICEF	1,111,400
Sector total	1,111,400

NGO financial requirements for water and sanitation programmes (as included in the UN consolidated inter-agency appeal for 2004) (US\$)

Danish Refugee Council	287,330
Islamic Relief	202,823
IRC	469,887
Sector total	960,040

(UN November 2003, pp. 3-4)

Planned education-related activities for 2004 in Chechnya and Ingushetia

- The Chechen and Ingush ministries of education have made considerable efforts to address education needs of the children affected by the crisis
- In Chechnya, UNICEF and its partners have been engaged in the rehabilitation of schools with limited damages
- In Ingushetia, UNICEF will continue its support to the network of parallel schools for IDP children
- Kindergartens for IDP children and vocational training projects for IDP adolescents will be implemented by NGOs

Beneficiary Population	Numbers
IDP children in Ingushetia (age 3 – 17)	30,000
Children in Chechnya (age 3 – 17)	270,000
Total	300,000

"The Chechen and Ingush Ministries of Education have made considerable efforts to address the education needs of the children affected by the crisis, including through the rehabilitation of school buildings in Chechnya and the strengthening of the capacity of regular schools in Ingushetia. In addition, school furniture and essential education materials, as well as textbooks (both in Russian and Chechen languages), have also been provided to school children in both republics. The Chechen Ministry of Education has supported existing school parents' committees, while the Chechen Institute for Teacher Retraining has provided or supported training for primary and secondary school teachers, including in camps and settlements in Ingushetia.

Despite these efforts, the situation in the education sector remains difficult. In Ingushetia some 9,000 IDP children attend 'parallel' primary and secondary schools, supported by UNICEF and its partners, located in tents or wooden buildings. Approximately the same number of children are enrolled in regular schools, but

these need material assistance. More than 7,000 children are not enrolled in school because of their particular physical, mental or social conditions. Due to their vulnerability, these children are likely to become involved in dangerous or illegal activities. This risk is even higher in Chechnya, where insecurity plays a key role, and landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) make the environment more volatile. The current availability of kindergartens or other pre-school facilities remains seriously insufficient in both republics.

Over the past four years, the international humanitarian community, in close cooperation with the Chechen and Ingush Ministries of Education, has invested considerable resources to address the needs of affected children. In Chechnya, UNICEF and its implementing partners have been engaged in the rehabilitation of schools with limited damage (13 schools and kindergartens will be rehabilitated in the course of 2003) and in the provision of furniture and educational supplies. In Grozny, with support from UNICEF, Caritas Internationalis has reactivated seven *Child Friendly Spaces*, two of which are now run by the Ministry of Education. Stress-relieving activities and individual psychosocial counselling to school children have also been carried out.

In Ingushetia, UNICEF and its partners (HWA, PINF, IRC, CPCD and ARD) have established a network of 53 'parallel' schools for IDP children, and provided material support to regular schools (furniture, textbooks, 'school-in-a-box' kits, visual aids, stationery, toys) with a view to increasing their enrolment capacity. UNICEF has also contributed to the creation of five kindergartens for IDP children, and carried out extra-curricular recreational activities to reduce the risk of children's involvement in dangerous or illegal activities. Vocational training projects (English language, computer skills) for IDP adolescents have also been successfully implemented.

Objectives

Enhance access to pre-school, primary and secondary quality education for affected children in Chechnya and IDP children in Ingushetia.

Increase the enrolment capacity and improve the learning environment in existing education facilities.

Strengthen the quality of education and psycho-pedagogical assistance in existing institutions in Chechnya by providing training and equipment.

Decrease children's involvement in dangerous and illegal activities by improving available recreational services and vocational training for vulnerable children and adolescents, including IDPs.

Promote children's social integration and a healthy mental and physical development through the provision of appropriate psychosocial support and counselling.

Proposed action

In its capacity as focal point for education, UNICEF will further strengthen the existing partnership with other UN agencies (such as UNESCO and WFP, which runs a school feeding programme), the Ministries of Education of Chechnya and Ingushetia, local communities, local and international NGOs and relevant donors.

Areas of action in the education sector will include: the rehabilitation and restoration of additional pre-school and school facilities; the revitalisation of the capacity (including in terms of training, planning and management) of local institutions active in the educational and psychosocial fields; the continued provision of material support to existing education facilities; the strengthening of recreational and vocational programmes; the intensification of psychosocial rehabilitation initiatives for affected and traumatised children. A synergistic effect may also be expected from the combination of education enhancement and school feeding programmes [...]. While taking into account the constraints imposed by the security situation, education agencies will aim at further expanding their actions in Chechnya and improving the availability of critical data.

In Ingushetia, UNICEF will continue to support, through its established partners, the network of 'parallel' schools for IDP children in camps and temporary settlements, and provide regular schools with furniture, textbooks and other educational supplies. UNICEF will support the Chechen MoE's efforts to provide school children with Chechen language and literature textbooks, so as to promote their right to develop the knowledge of their mother tongue and culture. In cooperation with the Chechen Institute for Teacher Retraining, UNICEF will also contribute to the training of IDP school teachers. In Chechnya, in consultation with the authorities, UNICEF will rehabilitate and re-equip up to 15 schools and kindergartens with a low or medium degree of damage. It will also support an age-appropriate psychosocial rehabilitation project run by one of its partners, with the involvement of trained psychologists, in ten schools in Chechnya.

In Grozny, UNICEF and one of its partners are also working towards enhancing the accommodation capacity of one child centre, and will look into the possibility of opening additional ones. UNICEF will continue to support recreational and vocational projects, and promote the implementation of child-centred teaching methodologies as well as the adoption of the Child Friendly School Initiative (CFSI) programme in selected schools. It will also launch a pilot training programme on the Convention on the Rights of the Child for primary and secondary school teachers, so as to promote awareness of children's rights and lay the foundations for future initiatives on child protection issues.

UNESCO will undertake initiatives aimed to strengthen the capacity of the Chechen Institute for Teacher Retraining. Key fields of action will be teacher training and education system development, which will be addressed with specific training programmes for MoE staff, school principals and laboratory mentors. Training and equipment will also be provided to the Centre for Psycho-Pedagogical and Medico-Social Rehabilitation (PPMS) of the Chechen Republic, with a view to launching training programmes for psychologists, socio-pedagogical professional staff and medical personnel.

Several NGOs will also launch or continue to manage, in close coordination with UN and governmental actors, various education projects. PINF will focus on confidence-building and civic education activities targeting mainly high-school youth in Grozny, with the involvement of educators, parents and other stakeholders. DRC will implement a sub-regional programme focused on fostering a climate of tolerance, dialogue and multicultural awareness in the area. IMC plans to expand its Adolescence Initiative Programmes both in Ingushetia and, security permitting, in Chechnya. CPCD will continue to rehabilitate/equip schools and kindergartens in Chechnya as well as provide essential psychological care and home teaching for disabled children." (UN November 2003, pp. 53-55)

UN Agencies' financial requirements for education-related activities (US\$)

UNESCO	797,532
UNICEF	3,606,000
Sector total	4,403,532

NGO financial requirements for education-related activities (as included in the UN consolidated inter-agency appeal for 2004)(US\$)

Centre for Peacemaking and Community Development	930,000
Danish Refugee Council	318,000
IMC	150,000
People in Need Foundation	101,600
Vesta	17,960
Sector total	1,517,560

(UN November 2003, pp. 3-4)

Mine action in 2004 : mine clearance, prevention and assistance

- UNICEF, WHO, the ICRC and various NGOs will continue strengthening programmes designed to limit the impact of mines and UXOs on civilians
- Mine risk education and survivor assistance are still required
- UNICEF will continue to coordinate mine action activities in Chechnya and neighbouring republics

Beneficiary Population	Number
Mine/UXO at-risk population in Chechnya (including mine/UXO survivors)	800,000
Mine/UXO at-risk population (IDPs) in Ingushetia	70,000
Total	870,000

"UNICEF, WHO, the ICRC and various NGOs (DRC/DDG, HI and PINF) will continue strengthening ongoing programmes designed to limit the impact of mines/UXO on civilians. While mine risk education and survivor assistance (physical and psychosocial) have been successfully carried out over the past three years, they are still required. In an effort to foster national capacities, several local partners have been supported and trained; in particular, a network of competent and motivated national NGOs ('Voice of the Mountains' (VoM), 'Let's Save the Generation' and MINGA) has been created to further improve actions in the field of mine action.

Objectives

- ☞ To collect and analyse accurate victim data in order to ensure the effective planning and targeting of all project activities.
- ☞ To contribute to the reduction of mine- and UXO deaths and injuries through mine risk education and other risk reduction activities.
- ☞ To ensure the physical and psychosocial rehabilitation of mine- and UXO-affected children and adults and facilitate their social and economic reintegration through vocational training, sport and cultural activities.

Proposed action

Coordination

As sector focal point, UNICEF will continue to coordinate mine action activities in Chechnya and neighbouring republics, in close partnership with WHO, the ICRC, DRC/DDG, HI, CARE, PINF and local NGOs. Collaboration with governmental counterparts in the region will be further strengthened. The inter-agency mine action coordination group will aim to develop a common strategy which includes agreed geographical responsibilities and appropriate implementation guidelines, to ensure a well-coordinated and effective action.

Victim data collection and analysis

The existing network for the collection of data will be further strengthened. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining will be consulted to update the MRE section of the IMSMA software, thereby facilitating the coordination process. The possibility of mapping victim data will also be explored. The analysis and use of victim data will be developed through the mine action coordination group.

Mine Risk Education (MRE)

UNICEF will launch a campaign through local media to seek access to civilians residing in remote areas of Chechnya. At the same time, UNICEF and its partners will further develop the current MRE methodology

of 'direct presentations' according to a community-based, risk-reduction approach. The theatre project will continue, but also shift from direct presentations towards the development, within at-risk communities, of drama based on local situation and needs. The same community-based approach will be adopted in schools, building on the ongoing MRE basic course that has been included by the Chechen Ministry of Education in its school curricula. Particular emphasis will also be placed on the creation of drama groups in schools located in dangerous areas. Posters, leaflets and a booklet with stories of mine survivors will be created to support this new approach. The further strengthening of the existing inter-agency coordination will ensure the complementarity of the efforts undertaken by all agencies involved in the sector. In particular, the ICRC will continue its mine awareness programme in Chechnya, working with local media, religious leaders and teachers as well as with the 'Child-to-Child' Puppet Theatre. DRC/DDG will continue conducting MRE workshops at cultural, educational, financial and children's institutions in all districts of Chechnya, thus targeting approximately 90,000 people.

Community liaison

Through a community-based approach, UNICEF will aim at developing specific projects to reduce the physical risk for particularly at-risk groups. These groups will be identified through the analysis of mine- and UXO victim data. Other initiatives may include the creation of safe play areas for children and short-term firewood distribution in villages located near mine/UXO-contaminated forests. These activities are intended to compensate for the absence of demining, and provide short-term solutions to mine/UXO contamination.

Victim assistance

UNICEF and WHO and their NGO partners will continue providing prosthetic-orthopaedic aid as well as psychosocial assistance to mine survivors. Existing capacities inside Chechnya will be strengthened, in close coordination with government counterparts, the ICRC, and other actors. By the end of 2004, security situation permitting, the main focus of the physical and psychosocial rehabilitation of victims is therefore planned to shift from the surrounding republics to Chechnya.

HI will continue to train medical staff, distribute assistive devices, disseminate MRE material and provide support to the prosthetic workshop in Nalchik (Kabardino-Balkaria). The ICRC will continue to provide mine survivors with crutches and wheelchairs as well as supply equipment to the orthopaedic centre in Grozny. UNICEF will also strengthen its vocational training projects in Ingushetia and Chechnya and combine them with projects aiming to provide the disabled with income-generating opportunities.

Indicators

Accuracy and inclusiveness of victim data gathering and analysis.

Number of victims among target groups.

Number of survivors benefiting from vocational training and gaining access to employment.

Percentage of survivors receiving appropriate physical and psychosocial assistance." (UN November 2003, pp. 58-60)

UN Agencies' financial requirements for mine action programmes (US\$)

UNICEF	789,400
WHO	40,000
Sector total	829,400

(UN November 2003, p. 3)

UNDP and UNHCR plan to assist the long term integration of IDPs in 2004

- This will be done in particular through skill training project, community mobilization and support to self-help projects
- Assessments of infrastructure in communities designated for IDP integration and other affected areas have been planned

"The UNDP strategy addresses both the immediate needs of people affected by the hostilities, including the integration of IDPs, and broader local and regional poverty reduction and development needs. UNHCR will work in close collaboration with UNDP and focus on the provision of shelter wherever integration in Ingushetia is possible. UNDP will provide methodologies to conduct small economic development surveys. FAO will provide means for small-scale agricultural activities.

DRC, PINF and Open Continent will continue to support small and medium-size income generating activities by providing small equipment and agricultural input grants, as well as vocational training or subsidised micro-credits, both in Ingushetia and Chechnya. These activities will focus on the needs of vulnerable disabled persons.

Objectives

Assist the long-term integration of IDPs.

Support economic and social recovery in affected areas.

Strengthen the capacity of local civil society and government institutions for recovery.

Proposed action

Assist the long-term integration of IDPs:

Support the government of Ingushetia's programme for provision of long-term IDP residence in selected communities.

Conduct a skills survey of the beneficiary population and a parallel survey of income generation potentials and local demands and shortages of specific skills in Ingushetia and Chechnya.

Establish vocational training and a micro-credit enterprise giving priority to vulnerable populations in the community.

Establish and maintain a micro-finance programme.

Mobilise and provide training for community-based associations among the IDPs that will help increase their self-help capacity and coping mechanisms; assist such associations to formulate, and mobilise resources for specific self-help projects.

Mobilise local enterprises and identify income-generating potential, which will produce employment with modest investment of resources; mobilise and empower community-based associations to strengthen self-help capacity and coping strategies.

Support economic and social recovery in affected areas:

Analyse pre-conflict economic systems in affected areas, including trade patterns, and the development of strategies to revive local and regional capacities.

Implement trust-building activities across communities and institutions, including the partnering of communities and military bodies in joint projects for recovery and public-private dialogue.

Award social grants for community-based organisations supporting recovery.

Conduct assessments of infrastructure in communities designated for IDP integration and other affected areas.

Strengthen the capacity of local civil society and government institutions for recovery:

Build capacity of local government bodies in IDP settlement communities.

Provide technical assistance to vulnerable individuals, local NGOs and communities for the preparation of business plans and project proposals; facilitate resource mobilisation from international financing sources for their business plans and specific projects.

Establish databases on NGO activities and capacities; advocate for local NGO/local and regional authority/international community partnerships.

Build capacity and conduct skills development training, including "Sphere" training, for local NGO and government representatives.

Indicators

Number and percentage of IDPs and surrounding families undergoing training activities.

Number of employment opportunities and turnover of newly created enterprises.

Number of joint projects promoting confidence-building across affected communities and institutions.

Number of business plans and proposals presented to micro-credit institutions." (UN November 2003, pp. 63-65)

UN Agencies' financial requirements for economic recovery programmes (US\$)

UNDP	490,000
Sector total	490,000

NGO financial requirements for economic recovery programmes (as included in the UN consolidated inter-agency appeal for 2004)(US\$)

Danish Refugee Council	353,510
International Medical Corps	300,000
Open Continent	105,000
People in Need Foundation	229,800
Sector total	1,988,310

(UN November 2003, pp. 3-4)

2003 inter-agency consolidated appeal for northern Caucasus: good donor response (November 2003)

- As of October 2003, 87 percent of the UN financial requirements were covered by the international donor community
- Projects more directed towards promoting the self-reliance potential of civilians could not be fully implemented due to lack of funds

"The United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal 2003 for Chechnya and Neighbouring Republics (North Caucasus – Russian Federation) initially sought US \$33.7 million from the international community to enable UN agencies to complement humanitarian relief provided by the Russian government, international organisations, and NGOs in the following sectors: protection, food, shelter and non-food items, health, water and sanitation, education, mine action, and economic recovery and infrastructure. During the mid-year review of the Appeal, the UN reconsidered contributions received during the first six months of the year, and the annual financial requirements for 2003 were revised down to US \$30.3 million. This highlighted the need for early contributions to enable aid agencies to implement their projects from the beginning of the year. As of 10 October, the donor community had pledged US \$26.33 million, or 86.97% of the UN requirements.

Despite the continued interest in the aid operation in the North Caucasus, there has been a decrease in the number of countries actively funding aid programmes since the beginning of operations in October 1999. Twenty-three countries contributed to the *1999-2000 Appeal*, sixteen to the *2001 Appeal*, thirteen to the *2002 Appeal* totalling approximately US \$150,000,000 in three years. As of September 2003, only twelve donors have provided financial backing to the current *Appeal*. This, fortunately, was not reflected in decreased quantitative support, and the generous contributions of the international community ensured effective provision of relief assistance. However, projects more directed towards promoting the self-reliance potential of civilians could not be fully implemented due to lack of funds. " (UN November 2003, p. 7)

For updated information on the donors' response to the UN inter-agency appeal for 2003, consult Reliefweb's Financial Tracking System [Internet]

Assistance scheme for host families in Ingushetia (2001-2003)

- The Swiss humanitarian agency implements a programme of cash payment to about 11,000 host families

"During the winter of 2001-2002 the Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit (SHA, part of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation within the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs) repeated its cash for shelter programme (CfSh) with UNHCR. Host families who provided shelter to IDPs from Chechnya on a private basis received retroactive, unconditional compensation of the equivalent of US \$100 via the postal system in Ingushetia. Some 11,000 host families benefited from the programme by the end of June 2002."

In addition, SHA financed various projects for vulnerable people in Ingushetia and Chechnya. Moreover, in North-Ossetia, SHA has supported medical facilities with equipment and staff training. These initiatives are planned to continue in 2003." (UNOCHA November 2002, p. 16)

See also "Swiss assistance for displaced Chechens in Ingushetia : Support for 16,000 host families", Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, 10 December 2001 [Internet]


FEWER reviews objectives of UN and government policy in Northern Caucasus (2001)

- There has been a downward trend in donor interest
- Agriculture and economic recovery sectors did not receive any support and were therefore not implemented in 2001
- Little or no progress was achieved in the political settlement of the conflict, the establishment of effective and transparent reconstruction mechanisms, and the creation of adequate security and human rights conditions


"The donor response to *The UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for the Northern Caucasus (Russian Federation)* has been uneven. First, there was a downward trend in donor interest, reflecting changing donor priorities. Second, because the agriculture and economic recovery sectors did not receive any support, projects in these sectors were not implemented in 2001. While the survival of population was not affected by this, the projects planned under these sectors could have played an important role in providing civilians in need with alternative means of subsistence, and provided in some measure a basis for temporary integration thereby reducing tensions and lowering reliance on humanitarian assistance. The 2002 Appeal seeks \$31,946,549: including \$780,000 for projects on economic recovery and infrastructure, \$2,268,271 on protection/human rights/rule of law, and \$1,118,500 on agriculture, addressing the above concern.

A brief analysis of how the projects implemented in the region correspond to the Response Directions identified in the Plan follows below:

The UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for the North Caucasus (Russian Federation) spent a total of \$37,871,324 (as of 5 February 2002) on 30 projects in the region in 2001. Of these, 24 projects (89,44% of funds) focused on *providing humanitarian aid for civilians, IDPs or refugees*, addressing Response Direction 5. Only 1 project (2,5%) addressed Response Direction 3 aiming to *optimise coordination between humanitarian actors in the region*, 2 (3%) focused on *Security* (Response Direction 6) and 4 (5,5%) – addressed Response Direction 1, *instituting job-creation schemes and educational programmes*.




Additional Humanitarian Assistance for the Northern Caucasus (Russian Federation) was \$41,962,547 (as of December 2001). Of the 62 projects, four with 4,6% of the total funds spent, addressed Response Direction 1, Job creation and education schemes. Only one project (0,04%) addressed the Response Direction 3, Media and transparency of reconstruction and settlement efforts. The rest of the projects addressed Response Direction 5 Providing humanitarian aid for civilians, IDPs or refugees, accounting 95,4% of the funds spent.



The 3rd graph demonstrates, that funding in the North Caucasus is predominantly focused on projects aimed to meet the basic needs of civilians, IDPs and refugees (92,5% of funds). Only few projects were oriented on Job creation and educational schemes (5,2%) addressing Response Direction 1, Transparency regarding settlement efforts – Response Direction 3 (1,2% of the total funds spent); and Security, addressing Response Direction 6 (1,1% of the total funds spent).

Response Direction 2 (Initiate a Political Settlement Process) and Response Direction 4 the Autonomy of Chechnya) were not addressed by any of the projects analysed.

Graph 3: Percentage of Funding in relation to UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal & Additional Humanitarian Assistance to Caucasus



The government of Russia is implementing the Programme on Restoring the Economy and the social Sector of the Chechen Republic, approved on 25 January 2001 with a total budget of 14.4 billion roubles (\$496,5 million) of which \$155,1 million was allocated from the federal budget and the rest was to come from off-budget sources. According to the Foreign Ministry Press and Information Department in 2001, 2 billion roubles (\$68,9 million) of budgetary funds has been transferred in early 2001 with another 1,5 billion roubles (\$51,7 million) allocated in August-September 2001. A federal state unitary enterprise Directorate for Construction and Rehabilitation Works in the Chechen Republic has been established within the State Committee for Construction (Gosstroj) of Russia. On 23 August 2001, the government endorsed a similar support programme for 2002 and subsequent years. The governmental programme addressed mostly the economic reconstruction, transportation, fuel and energy, as well as the communications sector. Important progress was also reached in restoring the educational system (447 schools, 3 higher education colleges and 12 professional vocational schools began operation) and public health system (53 hospitals, 32 polyclinics, 46 doctor's outpatient clinics and 175 medical assistant-obstetrician stations were set up). The programme is addressing also the media sector in Chechnya. The newspaper circulation ranges from 3,000 to 10,000 copies (1 republic wide newspaper and 10 district newspapers), whereas television covers approximately 70% of the territory and 80% of the population of Chechnya at present.

The Russian Prosecutor General's office has opened 293 probes of crimes committed against the civilian population during the 1999-2001 counter-terrorist operation in the Chechen Republic. An investigation, however, is being conducted only on 179 cases and 57 cases have reached a pre-trial stage. So far, 11 servicemen have been found guilty and sentenced to different terms of imprisonment.

Programmes under UN Inter-Agency Appeal and the government of the Russian Federation cover all response directions outlined in this Post-conflict Reconstruction Plan, however, very little or no progress was achieved on the following directions due to the lack of political will, lack of coordination on programme design and implementation or insufficient allocation of resources:

- *Transitional and developmental activities* including income-generating projects in non-agricultural sectors;
- *Political settlement through negotiated agreements* with groups of combatants on: (a) decommissioning of weapons; and (b) reintegration/emigration based on an amnesty for combatants who have not committed war crimes. Furthermore, settlement has to involve *the participation of the Chechen population in broad-based political consultations*;
- *Security sector reform* involving gradual transfer of policing functions to local Chechen militias controlled by the regional administrations and abandoning the mop-up operation strategies that bring about serious violations of human rights;
- *Establishment of mechanisms to ensure the effectiveness and transparency of reconstruction efforts by the Federal and Chechen authorities; and the introduction and enforcement of special rules for military and law enforcement activities in the Republic*;
- *Resolving the problem of access to the population of Chechnya by humanitarian relief providers with guarantees of personnel security.*" (FEWER February 2002, pp. 10-13)

NGOs

Over 30 local and international NGOs address consequences of Chechen conflict (2002-2003)

- NGO emergency programmes include distribution of food and non-food items, shelter assistance, health care, water, education, psychosocial assistance, mine awareness
- Ingushetia, a few NGOs have started implementing income generation, as well as small agricultural projects
- Two NGOs, MSF-Switzerland and DRC, are providing some assistance to displaced persons living in Dagestan
- Insecurity and lack of freedom of movement within Chechnya are hindering the humanitarian operations despite NGO will to expand their operations

"Well over thirty local and international NGOs are working to address the consequences of the situation in Chechnya, thereby complementing emergency relief being provided by the authorities, bilateral donors such as SDC/SHA, UN agencies, and international organisations such as ICRC and SARC. NGO humanitarian action in the region is based on assessment of needs, independent access to the affected population, and staff safety and security, and guided by the humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality, and independence. To ensure efficient operations, NGOs continue to enhance relations with target communities and regional and district authorities, and strengthen collaboration with other organisations. Frequent discussions about policy and programmes among the NGO community, and between NGOs and the UN and its agencies, promote complementarity, and help the humanitarian community at large to develop a coherent and strategic approach to alleviate the suffering of the affected population.

The emergency programmes carried out by the NGO community in Chechnya and Ingushetia include distribution of food and non-food items, winterisation and improvement of living conditions in the IDP camps and spontaneous settlements, provision of medicines and medical materials, running mobile medical clinics, provision of water tanking services, operation of wooden or tented schools, repair of school and health facilities, psychosocial rehabilitation for both children and adults, as well as mine awareness campaigns. In Ingushetia, a few NGOs have started implementing income generation, as well as small agricultural projects. In addition, various surveys and assessments, such as household survey and school assessments have been conducted in Chechnya. Two NGOs, MSF-Switzerland and DRC, are providing

some assistance to displaced persons living in Dagestan. Several NGOs have created partnerships with the UN agencies to deliver, distribute, and monitor the end-use of assistance provided by the UN.

Given the vast humanitarian needs inside Chechnya, the NGOs are willing to increase their operations in the republic. However, the continuing problems of access to and freedom of movement within Chechnya are hindering the humanitarian operations there. Major progress on the issue of access was made when after various months of talks between the NGO community and the Chechen Government a Letter of Understanding was signed on 31 October 2001. Further, insecurity in general and lack of access to VHF communications in particular continue to hinder NGOs' ability to work in the republic." (UNOCHA February 2002, p. 13)

For a detailed description of activities planned by national and international NGOs in Chechnya and Ingushetia, consult the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for 2004, Chechnya and Neighbouring Republics, November 2003, Annex VIII (Inter-governmental community overview) [Internet]. You can also consult envelopes by sector in the subsection "International response" of the "National and International Responses".

Czech NGO provides assistance to the "cellar people" in Grozny (2002)

- People in Need Foundation assists vulnerable persons living in cellars in Grozny
- Assistance includes food and non-food distributions, and legal aid

"Cellar People – Podvalshchiki: "There is one group among the vulnerable whose situation is rather specific. In the beginning of the warfare a great number of civilians did not manage to leave Grozny before the massive bombing and hid in the cellars of their or their neighbors' houses.

Many managed to move forward once the heaviest bombing and shelling was over but many remained, some of them still living in the extremely difficult conditions of cellars. Some have gradually moved to upper floors of their destroyed houses. The issues concerning these people are rather complex. Having lived in extremely poor conditions for 2 years, they are totally reliable on what they find in the ruins or receive from others. Ironically enough, a big portion of these people is of Russian nationality. During the military operations they also lost their IDs and other documentation certifying their situation and vulnerability status, which excludes them from the possibility of receiving regular humanitarian assistance. Even many of those who possess IDs and registered for food assistance have been deleted from the beneficiary lists, unable to pick up their aid portions themselves. For the same reason, attention to their problems either by the state administration or other agencies is very limited if any as it requires individual assessment of all persons and continuous attention to their problems." (PINF 2002)

"The support to this special group of most vulnerable inhabitants of Grozny has continued throughout the whole month. The project now benefits approximately 940 people, including children, elderly and handicapped, who are regularly visited by PINF monitors in Grozny and provided with all basic assistance ranging from WFP dry food distribution, distribution of cloths and other non-food items to medical care and psycho-social consultations. The intensified effort to ensure these beneficiaries proper documents which would make them eligible for reception of state social benefits and humanitarian assistance resulted in decreasing the number of food aid beneficiaries to 350 as the rest now receives their rations through regular distribution points.

In December, PINF has continuously distributed food rations and winter non-food items, kindly provided by other relief and UN agencies. Four stoves and 939 hygienic kits were donated by German organization HELP, 65 winter children jackets by World Vision and 400 children socks, and 650 bedding sets by the UNHCR. PINF has also distributed New Year's presents to children, partly donated by UNICEF, and winter shoes for the elderly." (PINF December 2002, p. 5)

The Danish Refugee Council helps the Ingush displaced to resettle in Ingushetia (2000-2002)

- Assistance includes housing aid and the provision of basic infrastructure

The Danish Refugee Council providing some assistance to the estimated 30,000 Ingush IDPs willing to resettle durable in Ingushetia. DRC distributed building materials for 31 houses in Bed-yurt to be built by the IDPs themselves. DRC also builds a primary school in Bed Yurt. (DRC 31 January 2003)

"UNHCR and its partners are also assisting with the integration of IDPs from Chechnya who wish to reside permanently on land plots generously provided by the government of Ingushetia. The government has provided basic infrastructure and the international community is assisting with shelter materials for individual house construction, community facilities, and income generation activities." (UNOCHA November 2002, p. 31)

"In the not too distant future DRC is planning to implement a rehabilitation project for some of the around 15,000 ethnic Ingush IDPs from Chechnya that have been displaced in Ingushetia and who plan to remain in this republic. Another group of great concern is the over 23,000 Ingush IDPs from the Prigorodny region of North Ossetia that were displaced during the 1992 Ossetian-Ingush conflict. DRC is now planning activities on job creation and a shelter projects in order to improve the living conditions for these groups of IDPs and create grounds for them to increase self-sufficiency. According to Mr. Malsagov [Prime Minister of Ingushetia], it has been long since his Government tried to raise the issue of assistance to the displaced people willing to reside in Ingushetia, especially the ethnic Ingushes from both Chechnya and Prigorodny Region, but they were afraid of addressing that problem to the Russian Government. The Ingush government representatives expressed great interest in the DRC plan to start the rehabilitation project in Ingushetia." (DRC 4 April 2000)

Committee 'Civic Assistance', a local NGO providing assistance to the displaced in Moscow

- Committee 'Civic Assistance' (CCA) provides legal counseling for refugees and forced migrants and plays the intermediary role for the relations between the refugees and governmental official structures
- During 2,5 years, CCA helped 15 thousands of refugees at its receptions in Moscow and in Centers for Temporary Reception of the Federal Migration Service

"The Committee 'Civic Assistance' (CCA) was formed in 1990 in connection with the appearance in Moscow of the first refugees - the Armenian victims of the pogroms in Azerbaijan when it became clear that the powers were not ready and could not protect and help refugees.

From the very beginning CCA took on the tasks of legal consulting for refugees and forced migrants and played the intermediary role for the relations between the refugees and governmental official structures, provided defense in the courts, and defended the rights of refugees for housing and work. In conjunction with these tasks, the members of the committee had constant contact with all structures dealing with refugee problems: the Federal Migration Service (FMS), the regional migration services, and the Commission on Refugees at the State Duma. At the moment one co-chair of the committee, Lydia Graphova, represents the interest of refugees in the President's Social Chamber, the other co-chair, Svetlana Garnushkina, invited as an expert consultant in the Duma's Commission on Refugees, takes part in the development of legislation in the field of refugees' and forced migrants' rights and the third co-chair of the

committee Deputy of the State Duma, the member of 'Yabloko' (an apple) section Vyacheslav Igrunov defends refugees' rights at the meetings of the State Duma. CCA is accredited at the UNHCR and is in a constant contact with it and other international bodies.

This collaboration allowed the Committee to achieve some fruitfull results: From the beginning of 1998 the Committee got an exclusive right to use blanks signed by S. Gannushkina, for sending refugees, who have no status, to hospitals . It is a great achievement showing the fruitful collaboration of the CCA and governmental medicine institution. It is a pity that we cannot say the same about our collaboration with the official education structures.

On the base of legal expertise made by the members of the Independent Legal and Expert Council, CCA attained the abolition of a few governmental decrees pinching the refugee's rights.

In 1990, CCA began to hold twice a weekly reception of refugees. At the reception, because of the extreme need, CCA distributed some financial help, including some clothing and kitchen utensils. Besides, two professional lawyers, psychologist and therapist have taken part in the committee's weekly receptions. At the CCA works a small adjusting and educational center for refugees' children.

Since the beginning of the Chechen events, the influx of refugees to CCA has greatly increased, this made the activity of the committee even more important. During 2,5 year period it managed to help 15 thousands of refugees at its receptions in Moscow office and in Centers of Temporal Placing belonging to the Federal Migration Service. Human Rights Center of Memorial, led by Svetlana Gannushkina, visited Chechen refugees in the Centers of Temporary Placement. This work was conducted under the Memorials' program called 'Survey of the Situation of Forced Migrants from Chechnya.' The data base of CCA developed by volunteers was based on the search of the relatives of the inhabitants of Chechnya, with whose help about 200 people were found.

Financing of all mentioned above programs are based on UNCHR donations (\$1000 a month), individual donations (contributions of the CCA members constitute about one third of the entire sum of money distributed among refugees) and funds given by international bodies such as Sorec Foundation, the Tides Foundation, which allowed the Committee to survive during the first two years of the Chechen war, Mission in Moscow of the Union of Friends, a group of English Quakers, Basel canton, German 'Greens-90'.

Over 150 articles and reports have been published about the rights of refugees in the main human rights newspapers by Lydia Graphova, Svetlana Gannushkina, Elena Burtina, Elena Zaks. As much material was also publicizes on the TV and on the radio programs 'Freedom,' 'Radio Rossia,' and 'Echo Moskv.' CCA also prepared in due times materials for reports for the President's Commission on Human Rights (PCHR) which were used by the chair of the commission Sergei Kovalyov. Committee played an active role in the preparation of the UN Conference on problems of involuntary migration in SIC and its follow up.

In 1997 members of the Committee created the first electron historical archive titled 'Man-in-the-street: what was in Store for Them in Armed Conflicts in the Former USSR. Chechen war 1994-1997'. This work was funded by the Open Society Institute." (Ganushkina March 2000)

See the website of the Committee 'Civic Assistance' for more information [Internet]

Response to human rights concerns

UN Representative on IDPs visits the Russian Federation (September 2003)

- The objective of the visit was to study the situation with regard to internal displacement in the Russian Federation, with a particular focus on northern Caucasus
- The visit included a trip to Ingushetia and Chechnya
- Dr Deng mentioned the necessity for authorities to reaffirm their commitment to the right of IDPs to voluntary return

"From 7-12 September [2003], the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on IDPs, Dr Francis Deng, visited the Russian Federation at the invitation of the government. The objective of the visit was to study the situation with internal displacement in the Russian Federation, in particular with regard to the North Caucasus and to conduct a constructive dialogue with the government, UN agencies, NGOs, and other aimed at ensuring effective responses to internal displacement. During the mission, the Representative met in Moscow government officials, including representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Migration Service, and visited Chechnya and Ingushetia. The trip to the North Caucasus included visits to sites hosting IDPs and meetings with high authorities of the both republics. Visits to temporary accommodation centres (TACs) in Chechnya and IDP camps in Ingushetia, as well as discussions with humanitarian agencies and NGOs revealed significant discrepancies between positive official statements and the perspectives of the displaced. IDPs in camps in Ingushetia were apprehensive that the camps might be closed that they might be forced to return to Chechnya, which they consider unsafe. Returnees in TACs in Grozny confirmed that they had not been forced to return but many of the promises by the authorities regarding compensations and humanitarian assistance had not been fulfilled. Among the challenges facing the authorities in relation to the situation Dr Deng mentioned the necessity to reaffirm their commitment to the right of IDPs to voluntary return, to provide IDPs with adequate and accurate information about the situation, and to ensure to the returnees conditions of greater security." (UN OCHA 22 September 2003)

See also "United Nations Secretary-General's representative on internally displaced persons ends visit to Russian Federation", UN press release, 15 September 2003 [Internet]

Council of Europe closely monitors the situation in Chechnya (2001-2003)

- The Council of Europe has agreed to second experts to the office of the presidential human rights representative in Chechnya
- The Parliamentary Assembly has been critical of the violence against civilians in Chechnya
- Human rights commissioner issued recommendations to authorities on arrest and detention of persons
- The number of complaints from victims of human rights violations in Chechnya to the European Court of Human Rights continues to rise
- Chechen applicants to the court have been under threat in the Russian Federation

Developments in 2003

Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1600 (2003) – The human rights situation in the Chechen Republic [Internet] The Assembly said that so far everyone involved had "failed dismally" to protect the people of Chechnya from human rights abuses, and said the main reason why both Russian soldiers and Chechen fighters went on committing such abuses was that "they nearly always get away with them". Among other recommendations, the Assembly called on Council of Europe members states to lodge inter-state complaints against the Russian Federation before the European Court of Human Rights and consider proposing the creation of an ad hoc tribunal to try war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the Chechnya. See also the report by the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights – The human rights situation in Chechen Republic, 13 March 2003 [Internet]

The European Committee for the Prevention against Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT): public statement concerning the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation, 10 July 2003 [Internet]. The Committee reported that there was a continued resort to torture and other forms of ill-treatment by members of the law enforcement agencies and federal forces operating in Chechnya. It also stated that the action to bring to justice those responsible has proved largely unproductive. This is the second public statement by the Committee concerning the Chechen Republic. The first one was issued in July 2001.

Developments in 2002

"Most Council of Europe institutions continued to monitor the situation in Chechnya, but their efforts yielded few tangible results.

The Council of Europe's agreement with Russia to second experts to the office of the Russian president's special representative for human rights in Chechnya was extended throughout the year. However, as the position of special representative remained vacant for months, the experts spent several months of the year at Council of Europe headquarters in Strasbourg. An extended mandate for the experts which the Council of Europe managed to agree on with Russia covered areas such as cooperation in the field of education and reform of the judiciary, raising concern that the crucial accountability component might become diluted as a result of these changes.

The Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) continued to monitor closely the situation in Chechnya. In January, it asked the Russian government to provide by April 10 a detailed list of investigations into violations against civilians; toward the end of April the Russian government provided partial statistical information of only limited use. PACE rapporteur Lord Judd carried out several trips to the region, repeatedly criticized Russia for continuing abuses and the lack of accountability, and expressed concern about the forced IDP return.

Human Rights Commissioner Alvaro Gil-Robles issued a constructive report in May which expressed concern about continuing reports of forced 'disappearances' and about the near-total lack of access to justice for those detained during sweep operations. The report recommended that the procurator general take steps to remedy this situation." (HRW 2002, Russian Federation)

See also:

Visit by the Human Rights Commissioner from 10 to 16 February 2003: Council of Europe, "Human Rights Commissioner to visit Moscow, Chechnya and Ingushetia", 6 February 2003 [Internet]

Report of the Commissioner for Human Rights on his visit to Moscow, 19 September 2001, and "Recommendation of the Commissioner for Human Rights concerning certain rights that must be guaranteed during the arrest and detention of persons following 'cleansing' operations in the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation", 30 May 2002 [Internet]

Joint OSCE-Council of Europe Mission to Chechnya prior to the planned 23 March 2002 Referendum: "Council of Europe and OSCE plan joint action on Chechnya and trafficking in human beings", 6 February 2003 [Internet]

Parliamentary Assembly: Resolutions 1315, 1593 and order no. 584, 30 January 2003 [Internet]: The Parliamentary Assembly calls upon relevant authorities to refrain from forcibly returning IDPs from Ingushetia to Chechnya. It also identifies measures to be taken to achieve necessary conditions for holding a referendum on the draft Chechen constitution on 23 March 2003. About the circumstances of the resolutions' adoption, see also "Lord Judd calls for postponing referendum", 31 January 2003, and "Lord Judd's resignation: English spin, Russian Duck", 6 February 2003, Chechnya Weekly, Jamestown Foundation [Internet]

Latest report from the Council of Europe's experts in the Office of the Presidential Human Rights Representative in the Chechen Republic, 24 January 2003 [Internet]

Parliamentary Assembly, "Evaluation of the prospects for a political solution of the conflict in the Chechen republic", Report by Lord Judd, Political Affairs Committee, 28 January 2003 [Internet]

For more information on the work of the Parliamentary Assembly and other institutions of the Council of Europe regarding the conflict in Chechnya, see "The conflict in the Chechen Republic: Work of the Parliamentary Assembly", 5 September 2002 [Internet]

European Court of Human Rights

"Citizens may file appeals to the ECHR about alleged human rights violations that occurred after May 1998, when the European Convention on Human Rights entered into force. Complainants were not required to exhaust all appeals in domestic courts before they could turn to the ECHR but must have exhausted 'effective and ordinary' appeals, which usually include two appeals (first and cassation) in courts of ordinary jurisdiction and three (first, appeal, and cassation) in the commercial court system. By October 2001, the ECHR had received more than 7,000 complaints from Russia, including dozens from Chechnya. Many applications were rejected at the first stage of proceedings as being clearly incompatible with the formal requirements of the European Convention." (U.S. DOS 31 March 2003, sect. 4)

"The number of complaints from victims of egregious human rights violations to the European Court of Human Rights continues to rise, yet the Court is ill-equipped to deal with the large numbers of applications that stem from armed conflict. More disturbingly, there are growing numbers of serious incidents against Chechens who have filed complaints to the European Court: in separate cases known to the IHF, in 2003, an applicant to the Court was extra-judicially executed at home by Russian security forces; in mid 2002, an applicant was detained by Russian forces in front of witnesses and has since 'disappeared'; and in five other cases, applicants have received death threats against themselves and their relatives and demands that the withdraw their applications to the Court." (IHF 27 October 2003)

"On 19 December 2002, the European Court of Human Rights (EcHR) declared admissible six cases concerning alleged crimes committed by the Russian federal forces against civilians in the Chechen Republic in 1999-2000, in particular extra-judicial executions, torture and indiscriminate bombings. More than 120 similar applications have been submitted to the Court." (COE 24 January 2002, add)

See also "Six complaints against Russia concerning events in Chechnya declared admissible", press release by the European Court of Human Rights, 16 January 2003 [Internet]

UN human rights mechanisms address human rights violations in Chechnya (2000-2003)

- UN High Commissioner for Human Rights visited Chechnya in March 2000
- UN Human Rights Commission condemned violations of humanitarian law and human rights in Chechnya by federal forces (2000 and 2001)
- As of February 2002, the federal government failed to invite UN rapporteurs to undertake visits to northern Caucasus, including the UN representative on IDPs
- The Special Representative for children and armed conflicts visited Chechnya in June 2002
- The visit of the UN Representative on IDPs has been postponed for security reasons

High Commissioner for Human Rights and Commission for Human Rights

"In December 1999, Human Rights Watch called on the Security Council to establish a commission of inquiry to investigate violations of the laws of war in Chechnya. The Security Council, however, never formally discussed Chechnya.

In late March [2000], U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson travelled to the area after an earlier refusal of her request for a visit sparked an international outcry. Robinson became the first senior international official to acknowledge receiving evidence of summary executions, torture, and rape. Although Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov at the end of the trip told Robinson she was welcome to visit Chechnya again in a few months, a formal invitation had not yet been extended at the time of writing.

The U.N. Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution criticizing Russia for violations of human rights in Chechnya—the first time a resolution was adopted regarding a permanent member of the Security Council. The resolution, among other things, called on the Russian government to establish 'according to recognized international standards' a national commission of inquiry and mandated five special mechanisms of the Human Rights Commission to visit Chechnya and report to the commission and the General Assembly. At the time of the General Assembly session in the fall, none of the special mechanisms had been able to visit. The Russian failure to implement the resolution was raised at a one-day commission session in September but no public record of the discussion was issued." (HRW December 2000, pp. 318-319)

"Human Rights Watch welcomed a resolution adopted today by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights expressing grave concern about human rights violations in Chechnya. The 22 to 12 vote, with 19 abstentions, followed fresh reports detailing Russia's failure to investigate atrocities. [...]

Introduced by the European Union and cosponsored by 16 countries, the resolution strongly condemns the use of disproportionate force and serious human rights violations by Russia's forces and calls on Russia to ensure that both civilian and military prosecutors undertake credible and exhaustive criminal investigations of all violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. It also raises concern about the pattern of forced disappearances, torture and summary executions perpetrated by Russia's forces in Chechnya.

But the resolution stops short of calling for an international commission of inquiry, a body for which Human Rights Watch and other groups had advocated." (HRW 20 April 2001)

"At the commission's September 25 [2001] session, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson spoke about Russia's noncompliance with the resolution, specifically its failure to create a national commission of inquiry and to issue invitations to special mechanisms. The Russian delegation responded that the Russian Federation does not consider itself bound by the resolution." (HRW 2002, p. 346)

"The Commission reiterated its request that the relevant special mechanisms of the Commission undertake missions to the Republic of Chechnya of the Russian Federation without delay [Resolution 2001/24, April 2001]. The High Commissioner has been in contact with the Government of the Russian Federation with a view of facilitating the visits.

[...]

The remaining mandates mentioned in the Commission's resolution in Chechnya – the Special Rapporteur on torture, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons – requested in the first half of 2000 to undertake missions to the Republic of Chechnya and neighbouring regions. None of these mandates has received an invitation." (UN CHR 26 February 2002, paras. 7-9)

See also "UN Representative on IDPs visits the Russian Federation (September 2003)" [Internal link]

See also:

"U.N. Rights body in serious decline", Human Rights Watch, 25 April 2003 [Internet]

Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation in the Republic of Chechnya of the Russian Federation, E/CN.4/2002/38, 26 February 2002 [Internet]

Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/24, "Situation in the Republic of Chechnya of the Russian Republic", E/CN.4/RES/2001/24, 20 April 2001 [Internet]

Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation in the Republic of Chechnya of the Russian Federation, E/CN.4/2001/36, 1 February 2001 [Internet]

Statement by the High Commissioner for Human Rights "Situation of Human Rights in Chechnya in the Russian Federation", 5 April 2000 [Internet]

Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/58, "Situation in the Republic of Chechnya of the Russian Federation", E/CN.4/RES/2000/58, 25 April 2000 [Internet]

"Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons call on the Russian Authorities to observe the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement", UN Press Release, 20 December 1999 [Internet]

UN treaty bodies

In December 2003, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights expressed its concern regarding the living conditions of IDPs in Ingushetia and highlighted the need to ensure alternative accommodation to IDPs evicted from tent camps. It also deplored the delays in the payment of compensation for houses destroyed during the conflict in Chechnya.

See full text of the concluding observations of the Committee of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, E/C.12/1/Add.94, 12 December 2003 [Internet]

In November 2003, The Human Rights Committee said in a concluding report that it was "deeply concerned about continuing substantiated reports of human rights violations in the Chechen Republic, including extrajudicial killings, disappearances and torture including rape". It also warned that 54 police and military personnel had been prosecuted for crimes committed against civilians in Chechnya, but the sentences did "not appear to correspond with the gravity of the acts". The Committee also highlighted that the government should ensure that IDPs in Ingushetia "are not coerced into returning to Chechnya, including the provision of alternative shelter in case of closure of camps".

See full text of the concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee, CCP/CO/79/RUS, 6 November 2003 [Internet]

In March 2003, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) expressed its concern about reports that displaced persons have been pressure into leaving camps while conditions of safety are not ensured for their return to Chechnya. The Committee recommended that the Russian authorities take effective measures to ensure that the return of displaced Chechens to Chechnya be voluntary and take place under conditions of safety and dignity. (COE 19 May 2003, para. 40)

See full text of the concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, CERD/C/62/CO/7, 21 March 2003 [Internet]

Developments in 2002

"A mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General (RSG) on IDPs, Francis Deng, to the North Caucasus region, which was planned to start on 30 September after an initial postponement of almost a month, has again been cancelled by the Russians at the last minute for reasons of security. The mission, together with the UN Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Radhika Coomaraswamy, was seen as a significant opportunity to raise the plight of Chechen IDPs with the Russian authorities." (ICVA 25 September 2002)

Visit by the Special Representative on children and armed conflicts (June 2002)

"At the conclusion of a week-long (17-24 June) visit to the Russian Federation including the Northern Caucasus, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Mr. Olara A. Otunnu, welcomed assurances concerning the voluntary return of displaced populations from Chechnya. He stated: 'I raised the question of voluntary return of displaced populations from Chechnya with the Deputy Prime Minister and senior ministers of the Russian Federation, the President of the Republic of Ingushetia and the Government of the Republic of Chechnya; they all gave me direct and firm assurances that the displaced persons will not be forced to return against their will. All the displaced persons I met are very eager to return to their homes, they remain very concerned about their own security.'"

The main objective of the visit was to assess first-hand the situation of children affected by the armed conflict in Chechnya. [...]

In the Northern Caucasus, Mr. Otunnu visited the three Republics of Ingushetia, Chechnya, and North Ossetia-Alania. In Ingushetia, he toured the tent camps and spontaneous settlements for the internally displaced persons as well as schools, health and recreation facilities. In Chechnya, Mr. Otunnu visited hospitals, children's trauma centers, and he met with displaced families at one of the temporary accommodation centers." (UN 24 June 2002)

OSCE mission in Chechnya: contribution to the restoration of human rights (2001-2002)

- Mandate of the OSCE Assistance Group includes assistance for the speedy return of refugees and displaced persons
- OSCE Assistance Group in Chechnya has been allowed to return to Chechnya in June 2001 after its evacuation in December 1998
- Assessment visits to IDP camps in Ingushetia and Chechnya have been conducted
- In Chechnya, the OSCE Assistance Group receives human rights complaints which are transmitted to Chechen and federal authorities
- Federal authorities have so far refused any OSCE involvement in the search for a political solution to the conflict
- The Russian Federation refused to extend the mandate of the OSCE mission, which expired on 31 December 2002

"The OSCE Assistance Group (AG) was established by the Permanent Council on 11 April 1995 (PC.DEC/35), which set forth the following tasks for the AG:

- (a) To promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the establishment of facts concerning their violation; help foster the development of democratic institutions and processes, including the restoration of the local organs of authority; assist in the preparation of possible new constitutional agreements and in the holding and monitoring of elections;

(b) To facilitate the delivery to the region by international and non-governmental organizations of humanitarian aid for victims of the crisis, wherever they may be located;

(c) To provide assistance to the authorities of the Russian Federation and to international organizations in ensuring the speediest possible return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes in the crisis region;

(d) To promote the peaceful resolution of the crisis and the stabilization of the situation in the Chechen Republic in conformity with the principle of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and in accordance with OSCE principles, and pursue dialogue and negotiations, as appropriate, through participation in 'round tables', with a view to establishing a ceasefire and eliminating sources of tension;

(e) To support the creation of mechanisms guaranteeing the rule of law and order.

The OSCE AG began working in Grozny on 26 April 1995 and operated from there until 6 December 1998, when its international staff was evacuated to Moscow owing to the deteriorating security situation. During the year 2001, the immediate priority of the AG's activities was to ensure the return of its international staff to Chechnya. The negotiation process that began in 2000 to solve technical problems impeding the Group's return led to the signing of a memorandum of understanding on security between the AG and the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation. On 15 June 2001, after almost 2½ years of evacuation, the AG returned to Chechnya.

Currently, the AG focuses its activities on stabilizing its presence in Chechnya, maintaining relations with federal authorities in Moscow and establishing new contacts with local and federal authorities in Chechnya and adjacent regions. Through these activities, the AG can monitor and assess the latest developments in the political, economic and human dimension fields.

In Grozny the AG has met with representatives of the Chechen administration. Discussions have focused on the general situation in the Republic and on IDPs living in Ingushetia. The large high number of IDPs in Chechnya and adjacent regions remains a source of serious concern to the AG. In this regard, the AG has conducted assessment visits to IDP camps in Ingushetia and Chechnya, also meeting with relevant federal and local officials. In Znamenskoye, permanent contacts are also maintained with the Office of the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for Human and Citizens' Rights in the Chechen Republic, Vladimir Kalamonov.

In Moscow the AG meets with representatives of the Russian federal authorities on issues related to Chechnya. Additionally, the AG has attended parliamentary hearings organized by the Parliamentary Commission on Normalizing the Socio-political Situation and Human Rights in Chechnya, where the problems of a safe and speedy return of IDPs to their permanent places of residence were discussed. The AG cooperates closely with human rights organizations such as Memorial and Human Rights Watch, exchanging information on the human rights situation in Chechnya. Documented allegations of human rights violations in Chechnya are also regularly reported by the AG to the OSCE participating States.

In the Znamenskoye office, the AG receives complaints on the human rights situation. The complaints received by the AG cover more than 200 cases of disappearances and several cases of killings, as well as mistreatment, torture and robberies. All the cases have been registered in a database and handed over to the Chechen authorities, as well as to Mr. Kalamonov's office. It was agreed with that office to hold meetings every two weeks to exchange information and views concerning human rights violations. In order to combine efforts, the AG meets regularly with Council of Europe experts working in Mr. Kalamonov's office in Znamenskoye.

The AG works to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to the victims of the crisis. The Group participates in coordination meetings with United Nations agencies in Nazran/Ingushetia and in Moscow, and cooperates closely with international organizations and NGOs.

Before and after its return to Chechnya, the AG sought to identify programmes directed towards post-conflict social, psychological and professional rehabilitation of victims. Owing to the limited financial resources, the AG has targeted programmes at children and young people, who represent the most vulnerable and affected group. Projects were funded from the budget of the AG as well as from voluntary contributions from participating States and private companies.

The AG stands ready to assist the conflicting parties in the search for a political solution to the crisis. Thus far, however, the Russian authorities have not appeared prepared to accept OSCE involvement in these processes, arguing that the political part of the Group's mandate has already been exhausted. Conversely, Chechen rebels call regularly for OSCE mediation." (UN CHR 26 February 2002, paras. 57-65)

Consult also the website of the OSCE Assistance Group in Chechnya [Internet]

"The OSCE mission mandate expired December 31 [2002] after Russia and the OSCE failed to agree to extend it. The six-person mission had been tasked since mid-2001 with promoting respect for human rights, facilitating humanitarian aid, and promoting peaceful resolution of the crisis in Chechnya. Russian officials reportedly stated that the mission would cease to exist.

[...]

Negotiations over renewing the OSCE mandate collapsed after Russia insisted that the mission relinquish its human rights and political dimension." (HRW 1 January 2003)

"Following talks in Moscow on 4 February with Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Netherlands Foreign Minister Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, who is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) chairman-in-office, said that the OSCE will send a 'special mission' to Chechnya to determine whether conditions on the ground are conducive to holding the planned referendum, Reuters reported. He also said that the OSCE and Russia will continue discussions, which he predicted will not be easy, on a long-term OSCE presence in Chechnya. Moscow has refused to extend the mandate of the OSCE mission in Chechnya, which expired on 31 December." (RFE/RL 5 February 2003)

See also:

Open letter to the President of Russian Federation Mr. Putin, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, International Helsinki Federation, International League for Human Rights, 23 January 2003 [Internet]

"Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs regarding the closure of the OSCE Assistance Group in Chechnya", Government of the Russian Federation, 4 January 2003 [Internet]

Federal government under international pressure to improve human rights records in Chechnya (2000-2002)

- Further to international pressure, President Putin appointed Vladimir Kalamonov as his special representative on human rights in Chechnya (February 2000)
- The Russian Parliament elected an Independent Commission on human rights in northern Caucasus (April 2000)
- Several thousand complaints from citizens, ranging from destruction or theft of property to rape and murder have been registered in Chechnya
- Neither organization was empowered to investigate or prosecute alleged offenses and had to refer complaints to the military or civil prosecutors
- The number of cases of investigation and prosecution of crimes committed by the federal servicemen against civilians are pale in comparison to the total number of complaints

- The Prosecutor General issued two decrees, providing for new regulations to be applied during search operations (July 2001, March 2002)
- International observers report that the decree has failed to stop human rights abuses to be perpetrated during these operations

"In response to international criticism of the human rights situation in Chechnya, several federal government bodies were established to examine alleged domestic human rights violations. In February 2000, President Putin appointed Vladimir Kalamonov as Special Presidential Representative for Human Rights in Chechnya. Kalamonov's office, with a staff of 25 persons, including 3 experts from the Council of Europe, opened branches in Moscow and in a number of locations in the northern Caucasus to take complaints about alleged human rights violations. In April 2000, Pavel Krashenninnikov, Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Legislation, was elected head of a newly created Independent Commission on Human Rights in the northern Caucasus. In September 2000, the Commission opened nine offices in Chechnya and three in Ingushetiya. Together Kalamonov's office and Krashenninnikov's commission heard several thousand complaints from citizens, ranging from destruction or theft of property to rape and murder; however, neither organization was empowered to investigate or prosecute alleged offenses and had to refer complaints to the military or civil prosecutors." (U.S.DOS 4 March 2002, sect. 1g)

On 11 July 2002, President Putin appointed Abdul-Khakim Sultygov his Special Representative for Human and Civil Rights in the Chechen Republic.

"Under pressure from the international community, Russia's civilian and military procuracies began opening criminal investigations into many reported abuses of human rights [49]. On March 5, 2002, the military procuracy announced that it had opened 11 criminal investigations into crimes by military servicemen against civilians since the beginning of the current anti-terrorist operation in Chechnya; [50] as of April 2001, the civilian procuracy had opened 294 investigations. [51] The numbers of investigations opened, however, cannot obscure their inadequacies. Human Rights Watch's analysis of a list of 359 cases, and research on specific individual cases, found that the vast majority of cases had either been suspended or lacked vigor. Human Rights Watch is not aware of a single investigation into evidence of torture or ill-treatment.

In April 2001, the Joint Working Group of the State Duma and Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe prepared a list of all criminal investigations into alleged abuses by Russian troops against civilians in Chechnya. According to the list, the civilian and military procuracies had begun 294 and 65 criminal investigations respectively. However, of the 359 investigations, only seventy were under active investigation – forty-nine by the civilian and twenty-one by the military procuracy – and no fewer than 191 investigations had been suspended. Out of 110 investigations into 'disappearances', seventy-nine (seventy-two percent) were suspended. Procuracies had transferred case materials to the courts in only nineteen cases. By March 5, 2002, military courts had convicted twenty-three military servicemen for abuses against civilians, although as of this writing, the government has not provided details regarding the nature of the crimes and sentences. [52]"

Footnote [49]: The military procuracy is responsible for investigating crimes committed by those serving in the armed forces, including the army, as well as by those serving in the Ministry of Internal Affairs' armed forces. Crimes committed by other Ministry of Internal Affairs personnel (including Otriady Militsii Osobogo Naznacheniia (OMON) and Spetsnaz) are under the jurisdiction of the civilian procuracy.

Footnote [50]: "V Chechne za prestuplenia protiv mirnogo naselenia privilecheno k ugovovnoi otvetstvennosti 55 voennykh (Fifty-five military servicemen are being prosecuted for crimes against the civilian population in Chechnya), Interfax news agency, March 5, 2002.

Footnote [51]: Updated figures on investigations by the civilian procuracy were not made available as of this writing.

Footnote [52]: "V Chechne za prestuplenia protiv mirnogo naselenia privilecheno k ugolovnoi otvetstvennosti 55 voennykh (Fifty-five military servicemen are being prosecuted for crimes against the civilian population in Chechnya), Interfax news agency, March 3, 2002. In September Rossiskaia Gazeta, the State Duma newspaper, published Russian government information regarding eleven out of fifteen convictions, which at that point was a comprehensive accounting. Of the eleven, six had either been amnestied or paroled, and five were serving active sentences-one for looting, two for murder, one for attempted murder, and one for mishandling a weapon. See www.rg.annons/anons/arc_2001/0920/3.shtm, (accessed September 20, 2001). (HRW 18 March 2002, p. 11)

"The figures provided by the Russian authorities on the investigation and prosecution of crimes committed by the federal servicemen against civilians pale in comparison to the hundreds of complaints of serious human rights violations which NGOs such as Memorial receive after each and every new mop-up operation, regardless of which federal forces carried out (army, militia, or FSB). Several mop-up operations sparked criticism and promises of investigations even by military commanders (such as those in Sernovodsk and Assinovskaya in July 2001, or in Argun and Tsotsin-Yurt in December 2001/January 2002). As a result of some of the allegations raised in connection with the former cases, the Prosecutor General issued a decree (Order No. 46 of 25 July 2001), in accordance with which mop-up operations require the presence of a prosecutor. This decree seems now to be applied in the Chechen Republic, but has failed to stop human rights abuses to be perpetrated during these operations. The representatives of the prosecutor's office seem to be unwilling or unable to prevent them happening, let alone to investigate them in due form afterwards and bring those responsible to justice". (COE 21 January 2002, para. 7)

"On March 27, 2002, Gen. Moltenskoi issue a decree to improve the conduct of servicemen in Chechnya. The decree acknowledged that 'unlawful actions by military servicemen toward civilians have had an extraordinarily bad impact on the process of stabilization in the republic, and has completely reversed the efforts by the military command regarding guaranteeing security, law and order, and favorable conditions for economic renewal.' [198] Among other things, the decree required all police and Ministry of Internal Affairs troops to give their first and last names while on search-and-seizure operations. It did not require the same for Ministry of Defense, Federal Security Service, or other personnel who may be involved in detaining individuals or searching private homes. The decree also required all vehicles, including military transport vehicles, to clearly display registration numbers. [199]

Footnote [198]: "Decree No. 80 of the Command of the United Group of Forces in the Northern Caucasus Region of the Russian Federation, on Measures to Enhance Efforts by Local Governmental Authorities and Law Enforcement Agencies of the Russian Federation in the Fight Against Unlawful Actions and Accountability for Officials for Violations of Law and Law and Order in the Conduct of Special Operations and Targeted Operations in Settlements in the Chechen Republic. Issued March 27, 2002, Khankala."

Footnote [199]: "The decree also reinforced elements of Decree No. 46, by requiring that sweep and targeted operations involve the local military commandant, head of the local civilian administration, a representative of the village elders, and a representative of the military procuracy. Like Decree No. 46, Decree No. 80 requires a commander, upon completing a sweep or targeted sweep, to sign a report including, among other things, a list of those detained during the operation and of all arms and ammunition seized. The list must also be signed by other local officials." (HRW April 2002, pp. 37-38)

About the functioning of the judicial system in Chechnya, see "Operation in the courts in the Chechen Republic", Memorial, 15 October 2001 [Internet]

See also "Prosecutor's Office launches a number of criminal cases dealing with infringements of law by military men in Chechnya", Government of the Russian Federation, 31 January 2002 [Internet]

See also

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Source: The Brookings Institution Project on Internal Displacement - Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences - Partnership on Migration

Date: 25-26 April 2002

Documents:

- Concluding Statement - International Conference on Internal Displacement in The Russian Federation [Internet]

Availability of the Guiding Principles in local languages

The Guiding Principles have been translated into the Russian language.

Date: 1998

Documents:

- GP in Russian [Internet]
- Handbook for Applying the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (OCHA, Brookings), Russian Version [Internal link]

Training on the Guiding Principles

None

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACF	Action contre la Faim
ACT	Action by Churches Together
AFP	Agence France Presse
ASSR	Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
CCA	Committee "Civic Assistance"
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
COE	Council of Europe
CPCD	Centre for Peacemaking and Community Development
DP	Displaced Person
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
ECPT	European Convention for the Prevention of Torture
EDP	Extended Delivery Point
ERMEDCOM	Ministry of Civil Defense, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters
FDP	Final Distribution Point
FMS	Federal Migration Service
FO	Field Office
HF	Host family
HIA	Hungarian Interchurch Aid
HIV	Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICCPR	International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ID	Identity Document
IDP	Internally displaced person
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IR	Islamic Relief
IRP	Involuntary Relocated Person
MDM	Médecins du Monde
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoH/I	Ministry of Health Ingushetia
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MS	Migration Service
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
MT	Metric tonne
MTchS	Russian Ministry for Disasters and Emergencies
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODHIR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OSCE	Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe
PHC	Primary Health Care
PINF	People in Need Foundation
POW	Prisoner of War
RF	Russian Federation
RFE/RL	Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
SES	Sanitary and Epidemiological Station
STI	Sexually Transmitted Infections

TB	Tuberculosis
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNSECOORD	United Nations Security Coordinator
USCR	U.S. Committee for Refugees
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
VAT	Value Added Taxes
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WVI	World Vision International

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