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Home Office

Country Information and Guidance

**Iraq: humanitarian situation in
Baghdad, the south (including Babil)
and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq**

Version 1.0

June 2015

Preface

This document provides guidance to Home Office decision makers on handling claims based on – as well as country of origin information (COI) about – the humanitarian situation in Iraq. This includes whether claims are likely to justify the granting of asylum, humanitarian protection or discretionary leave and whether – in the event of a claim being refused – it is likely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under s94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

Decision makers must consider claims on an individual basis, taking into account the case specific facts and all relevant evidence, including: the guidance contained with this document; the available COI; any applicable caselaw; and the Home Office casework guidance in relation to relevant policies.

Country Information

The COI within this document has been compiled from a wide range of external information sources (usually) published in English. Consideration has been given to the relevance, reliability, accuracy, objectivity, currency, transparency and traceability of the information and wherever possible attempts have been made to corroborate the information used across independent sources, to ensure accuracy. All sources cited have been referenced in footnotes. It has been researched and presented with reference to the Common EU [European Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI), dated April 2008, and the European Asylum Support Office’s research guidelines, Country of Origin Information report methodology, dated July 2012.

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The Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI) was set up in March 2009 by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration to make recommendations to him about the content of the Home Office’s COI material. The IAGCI welcomes feedback on the Home Office’s COI material. Information about the IAGCI’s work and a list of the COI documents which have been reviewed by the IAGCI can be found on the Independent Chief Inspector’s website at <http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/country-information-reviews/>

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Guidance

Date Updated: 16 June 2015

1. Introduction

1.1 Basis of Claim

- 1.1.1 That the severe humanitarian conditions in Baghdad, the south (including Babil) or the Kurdistan Region of Iraq make removal a breach of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
- 1.1.2 In considering a claim for protection, decision makers must first consider whether the person qualifies for protection as a refugee. If a person is unable to establish a need for protection under the Refugee Convention, decision makers should go on to consider whether the person qualifies for humanitarian protection. For guidance on considering humanitarian protection see the [Asylum Instruction on Humanitarian Protection](#).
- 1.1.3 For consideration of Article 15c of the Qualification Directive see Country Information and Guidance, [Security situation in Baghdad, southern governorates and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq \(KRI\), April 2015](#).
- 1.1.4 Given the levels of human rights violations and the general security situation in those areas controlled by the Islamic State (ISIL) or which are being contested by the government of Iraq and ISIL decision makers should only consider if a person can return to the 'non contested areas' of Iraq, including Baghdad, the southern governorates and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)
- 1.1.5 For information on identifying the non-contested areas see Country Information and Guidance, [Security situation in the 'contested' areas of Iraq, August 2014](#)

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1.2 Summary of Issues to Consider

- 1.2.1 Is the person's account a credible one?
- 1.2.2 Is the general humanitarian situation in Baghdad, the south (including Babil) or the Kurdistan Region of Iraq so severe as to make removal a breach of Article 3 of the ECHR?
- 1.2.3 For further information on how to consider claims based on Article 3, see the [Asylum Instruction on Humanitarian Protection](#).

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2. Consideration of Issues

2.1 Is the person's account a credible one?

- 2.1.1 Decision makers must consider whether the material facts relating to the person's account and of their experiences as such are reasonably detailed, internally consistent (e.g. oral testimony, written statements) as well as being externally credible (i.e. consistent with generally known facts and [the country information](#)). Decision makers should take into account the possible

underlying factors as to why a person may be inconsistent or unable to provide details of material facts.

- 2.1.2 Decision makers should establish where the person originates from in Iraq and where they will return as these will be factors relevant to the considering whether they will become an internally displaced person (IDP) and the risk that they may face on return.
- 2.1.3 For further information on these and assessing credibility more generally, see section 5 of the [Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status](#).

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2.4 Is the general humanitarian situation in Baghdad, the south (including Babil) or the Kurdistan Region of Iraq so severe as to make removal a breach of Article 3 of the ECHR?

- 2.4.1 Iraq continues to have a functioning economy despite having been in an ongoing state of civil instability since 2003. This instability has impacted on the standard of living generally. Unemployment is at 11 per cent and economic growth over recent years has been significantly compromised by the latest civil unrest over 2014 and into 2015. The International Monetary Fund projects growth at 1.3 per cent for 2015, although indicative figures suggest this will grow in future years. Gross Domestic Product for 2013 was US\$229.3bn, with a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of US\$6,720 in 2013, leading the World Bank to categorise Iraq's income level as 'upper middle income'. The majority of jobs in the country are provided by the state, 45 per cent in urban areas and 28 per cent in rural parts of the country. The ISIL insurgency has not halted the expansion of the oil sector with exports expected to rise from 2.5 million barrels per day (mbpd) in 2014 to 3.1 mbpd in 2015.
- 2.4.2 While the economy continues to function, the recent conflict between the government of Iraq and ISIL has led to a deterioration in the humanitarian situation. The UN have categorised Iraq as a level 3 emergency, the highest alert level. At least 2.8 million civilians have been displaced, with a significant number displaced to Baghdad (over 400,000) and the KRI (over 850,000) and lower numbers displaced to the southern governorates. Overall the number of persons of concern in Iraq, as of February 2015, was 5.2 million, a rise of 350 per cent in eight months (i.e. since June 2014). Some sources state that the number of IDPs may be considerably higher, particularly given the 1.1 million IDPs estimated to still be displaced from 2006 and 2008. The volatility of the current security situation also makes tracking displaced populations difficult, with under-reporting likely. (See country information, [Population displacement and persons in need](#).)
- 2.4.3 Living conditions for IDPs remain variable across Baghdad, the south and the three KRI governorates, with the majority accommodated in private settings (including in host communities and rented property) and critical shelters (such as schools, mosques and abandoned buildings), while a minority are in IDP camps (with the exception of Dahuk governorate in the KRI which hosts a sizeable population in IDP camps). The conditions faced

by IDPs vary considerably depending on the social and economic connections and means of those displaced, with some lacking food, shelter and other essential services. Aid relief is being provided through an internationally coordinated operation overseen by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), while the government has also provided some support to the displaced. However there is a serious funding and capacity gap between need and the availability of services, with only 13 per cent funding in place against the United Nation's (UN) Strategic Response Plan (SRP). Some services have reportedly been cut, food aid has been being scaled back and future cuts have been reported. (See country information, [Humanitarian conditions](#).)

- 2.4.4 Iraqi nationals may return to Iraq voluntarily at any time by way of the assisted voluntary return packages operated by Refugee Action under its Choices programme on behalf of the Home Office. Refugee Action provide advice and help with obtaining travel documents and booking flights, as well as organising reintegration assistance in Iraq. This support may assist in the initial period following return, especially if a returnee needs to regularise their stay in a new place of residence and so would be unable to take up work until they had acquired new documents. Information about the Choices programmes is available on [Refugee Action's website](#).
- 2.4.5 In deciding whether the person is entitled to humanitarian protection, decision makers must have regard to a person's ability to cater for his or her most basic needs, such as food, hygiene and shelter, his vulnerability to ill-treatment and the prospect of his situation improving within a reasonable time-frame). In particular they should assess the likely living standards a person returning to Iraq would face and whether or not that person is likely to become an internally displaced person (IDP). Given the fluidity of the humanitarian situation, decision makers must refer to the latest country information to assess each case. (See country information, [Humanitarian conditions](#).)
- 2.4.6 If a person is from a 'contested' area of Iraq they would currently be unable to return to their home owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for a convention reason and/or the general security situation. See: [CIG: Security situation in the 'contested' areas of Iraq, August 2014](#). Consequently they will become an internally displaced person (IDP) and will need to relocate to either Baghdad, the south (including Babil) or the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI).
- 2.1.1 Though the humanitarian situation has deteriorated across Iraq, in general the situation is not so severe in the non-contested areas as to make a removal to Baghdad, the southern governorates, or the KRI a breach of Article 3. However, decision makers must consider, on the facts of each case, whether a returnee by reason of his or her individual vulnerability, may face a real risk of harm contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR as a result of the humanitarian situation. In particular decision makers need to consider whether the person is from a contested area and therefore will be an IDP, since this is likely to have impact on the support they will be able to access in the area of relocation.
- 2.1.2 Decision makers should also take into account a person's:

- family associations;
 - access to financial resources;
 - ability to sustain themselves, including prospects of securing a livelihood, whether that be employment or self employment;
 - housing opportunities;
 - means of support during the time spent in the United Kingdom;
 - why their ability to fund the journey to the West no longer enables the person to secure financial support on return; and
 - access to voluntary return support packages
- 2.4.7 When assessing the personal circumstances of an individual, further factors to be taken into account include age, gender, religious sect, ethnicity, medical conditions, ill- health, disability, the effect on children, other family circumstances, and available support structures.
- 2.4.8 Single women and children returning to Iraq who would become an IDP if returned to Iraq, may be particularly vulnerable because of their gender and age and will be likely to reach the Article 3 threshold if they have no support networks or are unable to support themselves financially.
- 2.4.9 Decision makers must also take into account whether a person can regularise their documents, particularly for those persons not from Baghdad, the southern governorates or the KRI. This will be significant both for employment and in order to allow a person to relocate and reside in a new place of residence, including with relatives/family.
- 2.4.10 For further information on internal relocation and documentation, [CIG: Internal relocation \(and technical obstacles\)](#), December 2014; for guidance on assessing humanitarian situation see Asylum Instruction, [Humanitarian Protection](#) and information on the country situation, see [Humanitarian conditions](#) below

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3. Policy Summary

- **Consideration of humanitarian protection should only take place after it has been concluded that a person does not qualify for protection under the Refugee Convention.**
- **In general the humanitarian conditions in Baghdad, the southern governorates and the KRI, are not so severe as to make return a breach of Article 3 of the ECHR.**
- **However, decision makers must make a careful assessment of the person's circumstances and have regard to their ability to cater for their most basic needs and any particular vulnerabilities.**
- **Persons from a 'contested area' of Iraq would be unable to return home and would therefore need to internally relocate to Baghdad,**

the south (including Babil) or the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI); they would become an Internally Displaced Person (IDP).

- Those persons identified as IDPs, without a support network may face humanitarian conditions which breach Article 3 of the ECHR.
- Single women and children who would become IDPs without a support network and who are unable to support themselves are likely to face humanitarian conditions which breach Article 3 of the ECHR.
- Each case will need to be considered on its specific facts, taking into account the current country information.
- Where a claim falls to be refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as 'clearly unfounded' under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

For further information on certification, see the [Asylum Instruction on Non-Suspensive Appeals: Certification Under Section 94 of the NIA Act 2002](#).

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Country Information

Date Updated: 27 May 2015

4. General living standards

- 4.1.1 Iraq's Gross Domestic Product was US\$229.3bn in 2013 with the World Bank classifying the country's income level as 'Upper middle income'. The Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, based on the Atlas method was US\$6,720 in 2013.¹
- 4.1.2 Iraq's population was 33.42 million in 2013 (World Bank).² Unemployment in Iraq is at 11 per cent nationally (653,000 people), with 7 per cent of males and 13 per cent of females unemployed. Youth unemployment (15-24) is at 18 per cent and higher among youth with a higher education.³
- 4.1.3 The government provides 45 per cent of all employment in urban areas and 28 per cent in rural areas.⁴
- 4.1.4 A report from the UN's Joint Analysis Unit, dated November 2014 reported that the International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook Report of October 2014 projected the largest downward revision in growth for Iraq of any country in the Middle East and North Africa Region.⁵
- 4.1.5 The source listed the reasons for this as follows:

'The security situation has led to an increase of commodity prices, due to the unsettling of local businesses, the disruption of trade, supply and delivery chains and routes throughout the country (both for internal commerce and for imports). Further, the displacement of populations has disturbed the normal balance of supply and demand in re-location areas.

'... The absence of a budget law for 2014, 11 months into the fiscal year, is further destabilizing the economy. This has led to the blocking of investment projects—hindering service delivery, limiting the development of the oil sector, and making it necessary for Iraqi authorities to search for foreign investment. However, while the security situation scares off international companies from investing in 'unstable' terrain, the lack of a budget hurts Iraq's image in international markets, deterring foreign investment.

'... This situation is inflated by a significant rise in the budget deficit due to a decrease in international oil prices, coupled with lower-than- projected oil production, highlighting Iraq's oil dependency and poor budget planning. The lower oil prices, lower production and exports are therefore likely to lead to a

¹ World Bank, Data, Iraq, http://data.worldbank.org/country/iraq#cp_gdp, date accessed: 11 May 2015

² World Bank, Data, Iraq, http://data.worldbank.org/country/iraq#cp_gdp, date accessed: 11 May 2015

³ UNDP, Iraq, <http://www.iq.undp.org/content/iraq/en/home/countryinfo.html>, date accessed: 11 May 2015

⁴ UNDP, Iraq, <http://www.iq.undp.org/content/iraq/en/home/countryinfo.html>, date accessed: 11 May 2015

⁵ JAU, 'Iraq's Fiscal and Economic Situation: Difficult times ahead', November 2014, <http://www.jauiraq.org/documents/1935/Iraq%20financial%20and%20Economic%20situation%20Nov14%20JAU.pdf>, date accessed: 11 May 2015

liquidity crisis as the Government of Iraq (GoI) is unable to respond to current and increasing humanitarian and military costs.

‘... The budget deficit has also made an impact on State-owned enterprises (SOEs), namely in the trading, agriculture, and manufacturing sectors. They are highly subsidized and supported by large transfers from the government, which also hinders economic development.

‘... The long-lasting disputes between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the GoI over oil management and revenue sharing continue to hinder the passing of the budget law, and to block revenue from Kurdistan’s oil exports. This further decreases overall revenue and increases the budget deficit.

‘... The humanitarian consequences of the current conflict for the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I)—which hosts close to 50% of the approximately two million internally displaced people (IDPs) in the country—strain its infrastructure and ability to deliver services. This has a tremendous impact on the local economy in KR-I. This situation, coupled with outstanding Federal budget allocation payments to KR-I, could lead to economic recession in what is now the richest region of Iraq.’⁶

- 4.1.6 The IMF website projected 1.3 per cent growth for Iraq in 2015 rising to 7.6 per cent in 2016.⁷ A press release from the IMF dated 18 March 2015, citing Carlo Sdravovich, who led a mission on Iraq to Amman, noted:

“The ISIS insurgency has not halted the expansion of the oil sector from all oil-producing regions. Exports are expected to rise from 2.5 million barrels per day (mbpd) in 2014 to 3.1 mbpd this year, benefiting from the agreement with the KRG. Nevertheless, due to the decline in economic activity in the areas occupied by ISIS and stagnating government spending, GDP growth is estimated to have contracted by over 2 percent in 2014 and is projected to recover to just over 1 percent this year. Inflation outside ISIS-occupied areas is low, at less than 2 percent at end-2014, but may rise following the ongoing enforcement of higher custom duties.”⁸

- 4.1.7 See also: [Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2011](#) and [Household Socio-Economic Survey 2006-2007](#)

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5. Population displacement and persons in need

- 5.1.1 The UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), reported in February 2015 that 5.2 million persons were ‘in need’ in Iraq, an

⁶ JAU, ‘Iraq’s Fiscal and Economic Situation: Difficult times ahead’, November 2014, <http://www.jauiraq.org/documents/1935/Iraq%20financial%20and%20Economic%20situation%20Nov14%20JAU.pdf>, date accessed: 11 May 2015

⁷ IMF, Iraq, <http://www.imf.org/external/country/IRQ/index.htm>, date accessed: 11 May 2015

⁸ International Monetary Fund, Press Release No.15/121, 18 March 2015, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2015/pr15121.htm>, date accessed: 11 May 2015

increase of 350 per cent since June 2014. This included IDPs, host communities and non-hosts in opposition armed group areas.⁹

- 5.1.2 Between January 2014 and April 2015 the IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) identified 2,834,676 internally displaced individuals (472,446 families).¹⁰ The following table shows IDPs in Baghdad, Babil, southern Iraq and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq:

Governorate	IDPs
Babylon	55,056
Baghdad	412,200
Basrah	11,340
Dahuk	452,496
Erbil	247,878
Kerbala	68,994
Missan	7,548
Muthanna	3,852
Najaf	84,306
Qadissiya	19,920
Sulaymaniyah	168,582
Thi-Qar	8,808
Wassit	34,512
Total	1,575,492

- 5.1.3 The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) provided a data analysis paper on Iraqi IDP figures in January 2015. The report highlighted that as of 15 January 2015, there were at least 3,276,000 Iraqis who were internally displaced. This figure was based on two waves of displacement, namely 2.176 million IDPs displaced from December 2013 to 15 January 2015 and 1.1 million protracted IDPs from between 2006 and 2008, who were affected by earlier sectarian conflict.¹¹
- 5.1.4 The source additionally identified over 1 million pre-2003 IDPs, although IDMC no longer counted these as it was unclear whether they remained displaced and reliable figures no longer existed on them. Additionally IDMC noted: '... considering the volatility of the security situation, the fluidity of population movements and frequent access restrictions, the actual number of IDPs [currently displaced] is difficult to track and figures are often revised.'

⁹ OCHA, Humanitarian Dashboard 28 February 2015, published 10 May 2015 <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/operations/iraq/infographic/iraq-humanitarian-dashboard-04-march-28-february-2014>, date accessed: 11 May 2015

¹⁰ IOM, Response to the IDP crisis in Iraq, 2015, Round XIX – April 2015, <http://iomiraq.net/dtm-page>, date accessed: 11 May 2015

¹¹ iDMC, 'Iraq IDP Figures Analysis', January 2015, <http://www.internal-displacement.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/iraq/figures-analysis>, date accessed: 22 May 2015

As a result and according to OCHA, the location of hundreds of thousands of IDPs remains unknown.’¹²

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6. Funding for humanitarian assistance

- 6.1.1 There are mixed reports over funding for the UN’s humanitarian assistance programme. According to the UN Secretary General, writing to the UN Security Council on 2 February 2015, ‘The United Nations is in urgent need of funding to help meet the needs of the displaced.’ The source reported at the time that US\$715million had been provided, leaving a shortfall of US\$1.5bn to cover needs over the next 15 months.¹³ However an OCHA snap-shot, as of 28 February 2015, detailed the UN’s Strategic Response Plan for Iraq covering 2014-2015 had requested US\$2.23 billion and had received US\$833 million (37 per cent funded).¹⁴
- 6.1.2 A report from IRIN, dated 6 May 2015, cited only 8 per cent of funding as having been made available to support the UN’s Strategic Response Plan (SRP) in 2015. Citing Jeffrey Bates, head of communication for UNICEF Iraq, the article continued: “We are dramatically underfunded for even the most bare-boned life-sustaining approaches and we are facing a fiscal cliff in the next month [June 2015] ... I’ve just returned from Sulaymaniyah governorate, where we’re facing the prospect of cutting salaries for people working at a preventative health centre, and where we are dealing with an inability to complete water and sanitation programmes because the funding simply isn’t there.”¹⁵
- 6.1.3 World Food Programme (WFP) mission in Iraq director, Jane Pearce, further explained:
- 6.1.4 “We are in a terrible state. We basically only have enough food until June [2015] and we have already begun cutting food distributions,” ... As well as reducing food allocations by making parcel distribution bi-monthly instead of monthly, WFP has also had to draw down loans on all outstanding donor pledges as it has already exhausted all its credit, Pearce said. ... “There are just no more loans available and I don’t know what I am going to do,” she said. “No new funding has come in, but meanwhile the needs are only

¹² iDMC, ‘Iraq IDP Figures Analysis’, January 2015, <http://www.internal-displacement.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/iraq/figures-analysis>, date accessed: 22 May 2015

¹³ UN Security Council, Second report of the Secretary General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 2169 (2014), [http://www.uniraq.org/images/SGReports/Second%20report%20of%20the%20Secretary-General%20pursuant%20to%20paragraph%206%20of%20resolution%202169%20\(2014\)%20\(2\).pdf](http://www.uniraq.org/images/SGReports/Second%20report%20of%20the%20Secretary-General%20pursuant%20to%20paragraph%206%20of%20resolution%202169%20(2014)%20(2).pdf), date accessed: 11 May 2015

¹⁴ OCHA, Humanitarian Dashboard, 28 February 2015, <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/operations/iraq/infographic/iraq-humanitarian-dashboard-04-march-28-february-2014>, date accessed: 11 May 2015

¹⁵ IRIN, ‘Iraq aid cuts due to funding shortages’, 6 May 2015, <http://www.irinnews.org/fr/report/101459/iraq-aid-cuts-due-to-funding-shortages>, date accessed: 11 May 2015

getting bigger. That's the issue. While our caseload just goes up and up, the money just goes down and down.”¹⁶

6.1.5 However, more recently the OCHA's Financial Tracking Service, listed as of 18 May 2015 funding for the SRP up to US\$143 million, representing 13 per cent, against a target of US\$1.12bn.¹⁷

6.1.6 The IRIN report dated 6 May 2015 confirmed that a new inter-agency Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for Iraq was currently being drawn up, due to be launched in June 2015. Funding targets for the programme was yet to be announced, however UNICEF's Jeffrey Bates noted: “Even if the HRP is fully funded, we will still be in a position where we'll have to cut back on what we believe are essential services, such as education, preventative health care, hygiene promotion and child protection ...”¹⁸

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7. Humanitarian conditions

7.1.1 The UN's humanitarian assistance mission in Iraq is categorised a level 3 emergency. Level 3 emergencies are defined as a ‘major sudden onset humanitarian crises triggered by natural disasters or conflict which require system-wide mobilisation. Five criteria are used by the IASC to determine whether a humanitarian situation should be identified as L3, these are scale, urgency, complexity, combined national and international capacity to respond and reputational risk.’¹⁹

7.1.2 The UNCHR in their returns paper on Iraq, dated October 2014, observed: ‘As a result of conflict, displacement and interruption of services due to siege tactics and attacks against vital infrastructure, humanitarian needs have escalated rapidly, adding to the already existing significant humanitarian needs in Iraq, including those of the over 200,000 Syrian refugees who sought refuge in Iraq, mostly in the Kurdistan Region. More than 5 million people are currently in need of humanitarian assistance across Iraq. This contrasts with only 1.5 million people that are currently reached by humanitarian actors. Given the scale and complexity of the humanitarian crisis, the UN, on 12 August 2014, declared a “Level 3 Emergency” for Iraq, the highest-level emergency designation.’ The humanitarian situation of populations living in conflict areas is of particular concern. They remain without, or with severely limited access to basic services, food and other commodities and are largely inaccessible for international organizations on

¹⁶ IRIN, ‘Iraq aid cuts due to funding shortages’, 6 May 2015, <http://www.irinnews.org/fr/report/101459/iraq-aid-cuts-due-to-funding-shortages>, date accessed: 11 May 2015

¹⁷ OCHA, FTS, Iraq, undated, <https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=emergencyDetails&appealID=1097>, date accessed: 11 May 2015

¹⁸ IRIN, ‘Iraq aid cuts due to funding shortages’, 6 May 2015, <http://www.irinnews.org/fr/report/101459/iraq-aid-cuts-due-to-funding-shortages>, date accessed: 11 May 2015

¹⁹ OCHA, ‘Where we work: Emergencies’, undated, <http://www.unocha.org/where-we-work/emergencies>, date accessed: 15 June 2015

account of security, bureaucratic and political restrictions. Several key supply routes have reportedly also been blocked and authorities are said to have restricted humanitarian access for administrative reasons or across conflict lines in a number of instances. Information on the current situation in these areas is limited. Armed groups have reportedly targeted basic services and utilities such as water networks and power grids. In many areas the health infrastructure and access to health services have been disrupted due to the conflict, a situation further compounded by the lack of supplies, electricity and water and reported shortages in medical personnel as many have fled.²⁰

7.1.3 Commenting on provision of food supplies across the country, the UNHCR explained in October 2014:

‘Across the country, the disruption of the Public Distribution System (PDS) for food, which remains the main source of food for the poorest Iraqis, and the destruction and confiscation of agricultural produce, disruptions of markets, widespread insecurity and massive displacement have negatively impacted on the ability of civilians to access food. Throughout the country, food security is further threatened as the May/June cereal harvest was compromised in key cereal production areas affected by conflict, such as Ninewa and Salah Al-Din governorates. Recent displacement in Al-Anbar threatens to disrupt the October/November wheat planting season. According to Mohamed Diab, Director of WFP’s Regional Bureau for the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia and Eastern Europe, “[T]he food security situation in Iraq is alarming – the worst that the country has witnessed since the sanctions in the early 1990s.”²¹

7.1.4 Other critical areas cited by the UNHCR in October 2014 as areas of concern included, the availability of shelter, with displaced populations primarily staying with host communities, leading to a rise in the cost of accommodation and forcing newly displaced populations to occupy unfinished or abandoned buildings, schools, mosques and churches or otherwise live in open, overcrowded conditions with limited privacy.²²

7.1.5 The UNHCR paper additionally highlighted a lack of access to education, both for IDP children and host communities (because of displaced populations living in schools); limited access to water, sanitation and hygiene assistance (WASH) for those in open areas, unfinished buildings and other temporary accommodation; overstretched health care services, including access to essential and chronic illness drugs and the need for medical and psychological support for IDPs.²³

²⁰ UNHCR, Position on Returns to Iraq, October 2014, p.6-7, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/544e4b3c4.html>, date accessed: 14 May 2015

²¹ UNHCR, Position on Returns to Iraq, October 2014, p.7, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/544e4b3c4.html>, date accessed: 14 May 2015

²² UNHCR, Position on Returns to Iraq, October 2014, p.7-8, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/544e4b3c4.html>, date accessed: 14 May 2015

²³ UNHCR, Position on Returns to Iraq, October 2014, p.8-9, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/544e4b3c4.html>, date accessed: 14 May 2015

- 7.1.6 Difficulties in reacquiring civil documentation and a lack of income or savings were additionally highlighted by UNHCR as areas of concern, with reports of secondary displacement from KRI because of the high costs of living.²⁴
- 7.1.7 See also: [CIG: Internal relocation \(and technical obstacles\), December 2014.](#)
- 7.1.8 The UNOCHA reporting in February 2015 its priorities for period February to June 2015 observed:

‘The humanitarian crisis in Iraq has been one of the most rapidly unfolding in the world. The number of people requiring life-saving assistance in Iraq last year doubled, and then doubled again. Three massive waves of displacement, starting in January 2014, have put millions of displaced people, refugees and host families at high, and in some cases, extreme risk. The impact on Iraqi infrastructure, political life and social cohesion cannot be under-estimated. Unless addressed, the crisis has the potential to distort efforts at national reconciliation and undermine the country’s capacity to uphold human rights and rule of law in the face of a brutal insurgency, criticized globally for its shocking human rights violations. Actors across the Middle East worry that a failure to deal with Iraq’s humanitarian emergency may result in further internal fragmentation and contribute to deepening regional instability. Addressing the crisis quickly, in a smart targeted way over the course of the next year, has emerged as a collective international responsibility in one of the most volatile regions in the world.

‘The pace, scale, scope and intensity of the 2014 crisis has taken many partners by surprise, forcing agencies to scale-up at a rate difficult to achieve under ideal conditions, let alone those present in Iraq. The timeline of the crisis is telling. Between January and March 2014, over 350,000 additional people were displaced as a result of insecurity in Anbar Governorate, the majority from Falluja and Ramadi. In June and July [2014], the caseload doubled when an additional 500,000 fled ISIL-impacted areas, including Mosul within Ninewa Governorate. Weeks later, a staggering 800,000 additional people were displaced, particularly from Sinjar, bringing the total number of people at extreme risk to over 1.8 million by the end of September. In addition, tens of thousands of refugees fled the fighting in Kobane in Syria to seek safety in Iraq. By early 2015, more than 2.25 million people had been displaced within the previous one-year period...

‘Reaction to the Strategic Response Plan has been mixed. Although major efforts have been made to mobilize resources, only 37 percent of the Response Plan and 35 percent of the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP), which covers the needs of refugees, have been funded. Spread across ten clusters, partners have used the resources generated through the two Plans to reach close to two million people with some form of humanitarian assistance. The impact has been significant. More than a million and a half people have received life-saving food assistance. Tens of thousands have been housed safely in camps. Families who fled their

²⁴ UNHCR, Position on Returns to Iraq, October 2014, p.9, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/544e4b3c4.html>, date accessed: 14 May 2015

homes leaving most, if not all of their assets behind, have received household items and cash grants. Many highly vulnerable households have been helped to grow food and earn income. Mobile clinics have reached thousands and sanitation and potable water have been provided and distributed to people in camps and make-shift shelters. Women and girls who have been victimized have received support and legal assistance, helping them to cope with their trauma...

‘Despite the massive scaling achieved by partners, clusters have not had the resources to fully address the crisis. The education cluster, a key pillar for children, has received only 10 percent of required funding for a projected caseload of 500,000. The water and sanitation cluster, essential for health and dignity, has received 25 percent for a caseload of 3.5 million. The health cluster has received 30 percent; the protection cluster, one of the most important for helping to ensure that people are safe, the same. Particularly worrying, the cluster for camp management has received only two percent, prolonging sub-standard conditions in a number of displaced camps. The cluster that promotes social cohesion and helps households to secure assets and earn income has received 14 percent, a situation that unless addressed, will contribute to a prolongation of the emergency. A number of core pipelines are in trouble. The food pipeline will break in mid-May unless funding is received before March. The essential medicines pipeline at the end of March [2015].

‘Although more than 15 percent of the population is impacted by the crisis, partners, because of constraints, are realistically able to reach half this number

‘Of the five million people currently impacted by the crisis, humanitarian partners aim to reach 2.25 million displaced persons and 235,000 refugees. A further 1.5 million people in host communities and 1.7 million persons in non-host communities under the control of opposition armed groups are also in need of humanitarian assistance but are unlikely to receive it from partners unless access improves and funding increases. In projecting forward, partners estimate that the number of people impacted by the crisis may reach seven million by the end of 2015, with caseloads rising the highest in Anbar, Ninewa and Salah al-Din Governorates.

‘Of the many people displaced in recent months, the poor, particularly those without relatives and friends in safe havens, have been hit hardest. With few assets, and unless housed in camps, many displaced have no choice but to live in abandoned buildings and make-shift shelters, completely dependent on assistance to survive. Those who have been taken in have tended to be initially better-off; within months, however, their vulnerabilities have increased, often dramatically, as have those of the host families protecting them. With the exception of the few well-off displaced, virtually all households have been selling whatever assets they have, impoverishing them further. Unaccompanied children, the elderly, women-headed households and the disabled have been particularly vulnerable. The situation of women and girls is alarming. Thousands have been traumatized, the victims of abductions, forced marriage, and gender-based and sexual violence. Children have been callously targeted, recruited at gunpoint into

militia and armed groups and separated from their homes and communities. Facing overwhelming circumstances, many families have been forced into impossible decisions; already, exploitation, trafficking and criminal activities are on the rise, with deeply troubling implications for personal dignity and social cohesion.

‘Government leadership and financing have been essential in addressing the crisis. Across the country, authorities have coordinated operations and provided generous direct support for the displaced. Support programmes have been funded through the national and Governorate budgets. Families have been welcomed, services extended, camps built and kerosene and cash distributed. In communities with large influxes, however, the institutions responsible for law and order, service delivery and public goods have sometimes struggled to deal with the size and scope of the crisis. Hit by a 40 percent drop in oil revenue and forced to mount costly operations to repel the ISIL insurgency, the government is facing a massive fiscal gap in 2015 that will be nearly impossible to cover. Already, there are instances where schools have been unable to pay teachers and local administrations forced to delay or cut-back basic services. The stress on the social compact, particularly while major efforts are under way to promote national reconciliation, is extremely worrying.’²⁵

- 7.1.9 The UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Iraq Mission, provided the following statistical overview on service delivery as of 28 February 2015²⁶. The source did not provide further explanation on the methodology used to calculate these statistics (including why more people had been reached against camp coordination and management than the total number in need):

	People in Need	People Reached	People targeted
Camp Coordination and camp management	775,000	907,102 (117%)	775,000 (100%)
Education	954,000	111,686 (12%)	500,000 (52%)
Food security	2,800,000	2,065,450 (74%)	2,000,000 (71%)
Health	5,200,000	1,487,925 (29%)	4,000,000 (77%)
Protection	5,200,000	613,102 (12%)	1,400,000 (27%)
Social cohesion/sustainable	5,200,000	23,253 (0.4%)	800,000 (15%)

²⁵ OCHA, Fast Track Priorities Iraq, February - June 2015, February 2015, p3-5, http://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/Fast%20Track%20Priorities%20Iraq%202015_0.pdf accessed on 5 June 2015

²⁶ OCHA, Humanitarian Dashboard, Iraq, as of 28 February 2015, <http://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iraq-humanitarian-dashboard-28-february-2015>, date accessed: 22 May 2015

livelihoods			
Shelter	1,260,000	350,172 (28%)	800,000 (63%)
WASH	5,000,000	655,919 (13%)	3,500,000 (70%)

²⁷

7.1.10 According to OCHA, reporting over the period 29 April to 5 May 2015, only 35 per cent of displaced children were attending formal education.²⁸

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8. Variations in living conditions between IDPs

8.1.1 IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix reported in April 2015 that IDPs were displaced across 3,387 distinct locations across Iraq.²⁹ The IOM source provided at graph 4, total displaced population breakdown by governorate and shelter arrangement (individuals). Refer direct to the source for further information.³⁰


8.1.2 The following map showed displaced populations by 3 shelter types: private settings, camps and critical shelters.

²⁷ OCHA, Iraq Crisis: Situation report no.42, 29 April – 5 May 2015), https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/iraq_crisis_situation_report_no_42_29_april_-05_may.pdf, date accessed: 11 May 2015

²⁸ OCHA, Iraq Crisis: Situation report no.42, 29 April – 5 May 2015), https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/iraq_crisis_situation_report_no_42_29_april_-05_may.pdf, date accessed: 11 May 2015

²⁹ IOM, Response to the IDP crisis in Iraq, 2015, Round XIX – April 2015, <http://iomiraq.net/dtm-page>, date accessed: 11 May 2015

³⁰ IOM, Response to the IDP crisis in Iraq, 2015, Round XIX – April 2015, <http://iomiraq.net/dtm-page>, date accessed: 11 May 2015



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8.1.3 The same source observed:

'Variations in the displaced populations by shelter type are continually observed between each reporting round as displaced populations remain fluid. ... For the purpose of analysis, the DTM clusters shelter categories into 3 groups: private settings (65% of the displaced population or 1,852,757 individuals), critical shelter arrangements (27% or 759,132 individuals) and IDP camps (8% or 232,272 individuals)'... Private settings remain the most common shelter arrangement for those displaced in Iraq with 1,071,270 individuals finding shelter in rented housing (38% of the total displaced population). There is a recorded population of 729,432 individuals (26% of the total displaced population) in host community arrangements and in 42,570 individuals (2%) housed in hotels or motels. ... There are 759,132 individuals (27% of the total displaced population) who remain housed in critical shelter arrangements, out of which 372,396 individuals are sheltered

³¹ IOM, Response to the IDP crisis in Iraq, 2015, Round XIX – April 2015, <http://iomiraq.net/dtm-page>, date accessed: 11 May 2015

in unfinished or abandoned buildings. ... Just over 230,000 individuals (8% of the total displaced population) remain in camps throughout Iraq.’³²

8.1.4 A survey paper from Premiere Urgence- Aide Medicale Internationale (PU-AMI), based on field research of IDP communities in Baghdad and Najaf in July 2014, reported with regards to coping mechanisms that ‘63% of the families encountered in Baghdad stated that they were exclusively living thanks to charitable support and donations (mostly from religious stakeholders and host community members), 23% were supported by families and friends while 14% were living on their own savings.’³³

8.1.5 It further noted that

‘All assessed families are either living in public places in Baghdad and in guest houses in Najaf and have seen their few savings depleted on their way to southern provinces; therefore cash for rent / cash assistance has been mentioned either as first, second or third priority needs for 77% of the families met in Baghdad and 84% of the families met in Najaf. 100% of the surveyed households declared having never received any kind of cash assistance even though 350 IDPs families among the 6,000 located in Najaf benefited from this type of support. Food assistance is also considered as a priority need: 86% of the households in Baghdad and 69% of the families in Najaf mentioned this kind of support as one of their top 3 priority needs.’³⁴

8.2 Baghdad

8.2.1 The IOM’s Displacement Snapshot, Baghdad, dated September 2014 noted:

‘The most common type of shelter arrangement for Baghdad IDPs is staying with relatives; almost 60% of all IDP families in Baghdad are being hosted by relatives across the governorate. All 47 IDP families relocated to Baghdad from the Jurf al-Sakhr and Al-Latifiya districts in the north of Babylon, both of which have seen conflict between government forces and AG, are being hosted by relatives in the district of Karkh. Unsurprisingly, 81% of IDP families assessed noted the presence of family or relatives as the main pull factor to their current location. ... Additionally, close to 500 families are being hosted by Mosques and holy sites with the majority located in Resafa district in 8 different locations. All these families are Shia Muslim, both Turkmen and Arab being hosted in Shia holy sites. Ove 600 families are currently seeking shelter in school buildings exposed to the possibility of having to relocate when the academic year begins soon.

³² IOM, Response to the IDP crisis in Iraq, 2015, Round XIX – April 2015, <http://iomiraq.net/dtm-page>, date accessed: 11 May 2015

³³ Premiere Urgence – Aide Medicale Internationale, ‘2014 – Multi-sectoral rapid needs assessment: Focus on IDPs from northern Iraq, from June 24th to July 23rd, 2014’, 10 August 2014, 2.3.1 Coping Mechanisms p.16, <https://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/PU-AMI%20Iraqi-Crisis%20Assessment%20Report%20IDPs.pdf>, date accessed 18 May 2015

³⁴ Premiere Urgence – Aide Medicale Internationale, ‘2014 – Multi-sectoral rapid needs assessment: Focus on IDPs from northern Iraq, from June 24th to July 23rd, 2014’, 10 August 2014, 2.3.1 Coping Mechanisms p.16, <https://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/PU-AMI%20Iraqi-Crisis%20Assessment%20Report%20IDPs.pdf>, date accessed 18 May 2015

‘A staggering number of over 1,300 families are staying in vulnerable housing, meaning in school buildings, informal settlements, camps, collective centers, abandoned/public building/ spaces under construction exposing them to vulnerabilities such as adequate access to water, food, sanitation facilities, and health facilities.

‘IDPs in Baghdad are reportedly receiving food assistance through local NGOs, religious groups, and community donations. They also generally have access to public services such as water, sanitation and healthcare. ... The main priority needs are non-food items because they left everything behind in their AoO. ... Families have been observed to be sleeping on carpets and borrowing household items from neighbors. The majority of IDPs are living in rented houses and they are struggling to pay the rent.’³⁵

8.2.2 According to IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix, as of April 2015, the majority of IDPs in Baghdad governorate were living in rented houses (170,820) or with host families (199,404).³⁶

8.2.3 OCHA reporting over the period 29 April to 5 May 2015, noted priority food supply needs in Baghdad governorate (Baghdad city, Resafa, Abu Ghraib and Tarmia districts) for new and existing IDPs as well as for returnees (OCHA, 29 April – 5 May 2015)³⁷ The same source also reported a number of IDP collective centres and temporary camps in Baghdad governorate lacked basic WASH services.³⁸ Restrictions on access to safety and IDP registration continued in Baghdad. OCHA also reported that IDPs in Baghdad had reported ‘threats from unidentified armed groups and individuals’ and cited a lack of child protection capacity to respond to the growing child protection needs in Baghdad.³⁹

8.3 Southern Iraq

8.3.1 The IOM Displacement snapshot for Southern Iraq, dated September 2014, consistently highlighted over 90 per cent of IDP families needing Core Relief Items (CRI),⁴⁰ which includes tents, tarpaulins, blankets, jerry cans and other essential items.⁴¹ IDP families noted a need for CRIs as follows: 99

³⁵ IOM, Displacement Snapshot, Baghdad, September 2014, <http://iomiraq.net/reports/baghdad-governorate-profile-september-2014>, date accessed: 18 May 2015

³⁶ IOM, Response to the IDP crisis in Iraq, 2015, Round XIX – April 2015, <http://iomiraq.net/dtm-page>, date accessed: 11 May 2015

³⁷ OCHA, Iraq Crisis: Situation report no.42, 29 April – 5 May 2015), https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/iraq_crisis_situation_report_n_o_42_29_april_-05_may.pdf, date accessed: 11 May 2015

³⁸ OCHA, Iraq Crisis: Situation report no.42, 29 April – 5 May 2015), https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/iraq_crisis_situation_report_n_o_42_29_april_-05_may.pdf, date accessed: 11 May 2015

³⁹ OCHA, Iraq Crisis: Situation report no.42, 29 April – 5 May 2015), https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/iraq_crisis_situation_report_n_o_42_29_april_-05_may.pdf, date accessed: 11 May 2015

⁴⁰ IOM Displacement snapshot, Displacement in Southern Iraq, September 2014, <http://iomiraq.net/reports/southern-governorates-iraq-september-2014>, date accessed: 22 May 2015

⁴¹ UNHCR, Core Relief Items Catalogue, October 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/545ca9049.pdf>, date accessed: 22 May 2015

per cent Missan governorate; 92 per cent Basrah; 90 per cent Thi-Qar⁴². In Missan and Thi-Qar there were sizable groups of IDPs residing in schools and other vulnerable housing, such as religious buildings or informal settlements (37 per cent of IDP families were living in schools in Missan governorate; 16 per cent of families in Thi-Qar were living in vulnerable housing identified as schools, religious buildings, and informal settlements)⁴³

8.3.2 The UNAMI reporting over the period of September to December 2014 noted: 'UNAMI/OHCHR received reports from the southern governorates, where there are smaller concentrations of IDPs that access to basic services by IDPs and strains on the limited resources of host communities remained of concern. The United Nations, in partnership with the Government of Iraq, is working to ensure that the needs of these IDPs are met.'⁴⁴

8.3.3 OCHA reporting over the period 29 April to 5 May 2015 noted food supply needs persisting in southern Iraq (Qadissiya (Diwaniya District); Muthanna, Najaf, Kerbala, Thi-Qar and Missan). The source further explained that in Muthanna governorate IDPs not listed in the Ministry of Trade, Public Distribution System electronic list, were not able to receive their food packages.⁴⁵ Restrictions on access to safety and IDP registration continued in Babil, Kerbala and Najaf (OCHA).⁴⁶

8.4 Kurdistan Region of Iraq

8.4.1 According to IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix, as of April 2015, IDPs in KRI governorate were living in the following main shelter types:

	Rented housing	Host families	Unfinished/Abandoned buildings	Camp
Erbil	171,390	21,222	6,210	9,342
Dahuk	81,852	46,518	163,830	136,536
Sulymaniyah	144,174	54	3,120	15,546

⁴⁷

⁴² IOM Displacement snapshot, Displacement in Southern Iraq, September 2014, <http://iomiraq.net/reports/southern-governorates-iraq-september-2014>, date accessed: 22 May 2015

⁴³ IOM Displacement snapshot, Displacement in Southern Iraq, September 2014, <http://iomiraq.net/reports/southern-governorates-iraq-september-2014>, date accessed: 22 May 2015

⁴⁴ UN Assistance Mission for Iraq/UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 'Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq, 11 September to 10 December 2014', http://www.uniraq.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=itemlist&layout=category&task=category&id=164&Itemid=650&lang=en, date accessed: 11 May 2015

⁴⁵ OCHA, Iraq Crisis: Situation report no.42, 29 April – 5 May 2015), https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/iraq_crisis_situation_report_no_42_29_april_05_may.pdf, date accessed: 11 May 2015

⁴⁷ IOM, Response to the IDP crisis in Iraq, 2015, Round XIX – April 2015, <http://iomiraq.net/dtm-page>, date accessed: 11 May 2015

- 8.4.2 The REACH August 2014 report 'Vulnerability, Needs and Intentions of Internally Displaced Persons in Northern Iraq', based on interviews conducted with 1768 IDP families between 3 and 24 July 2014 in the governorates of Dahuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, as well as accessible areas in Ninewa governorate, found 'A majority (64%) of IDPs reported that at the time of the assessment they were using their own savings to support themselves. [...] Due to the persistently high levels of rented housing among IDPs, reported need for rental support is high, at 26% across the KRI and 21% across all areas assessed. [...] The majority of IDPs assessed reported that they had received no external assistance since being displaced from their place of origin.'⁴⁸
- 8.4.3 Refugees International (RI) similarly notes in an October 2014 report on displaced Iraqis in the KRI that 'While many of the IDPs RI met with confirmed having received a food parcel or mattresses and blankets from community groups or local authorities when first arriving in the KRI, most indicated that no further assistance has been forthcoming, in spite of the fact that many NGOs are undertaking needs assessments. Other than occasional support from a humanitarian agency, people are making ends meet by sharing resources, borrowing money, and through the goodwill of their Kurdish host communities'.⁴⁹
- 8.4.4 The UN's Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq, 11 September to 10 December 2014 observed that the Kurdistan Regional Government and the UN 'have been facing a serious funding shortfall' and that IDPs in some areas had reported being in urgent need of blankets, heaters, food and other non-food items.⁵⁰ The source further observed: 'In some camps, IDPs reported that food supplies were running low and they were forced to buy provisions. This has created frustrations among many IDPs, which, on 30 November resulted in a demonstration at the Shariya IDP camp in the Dohuk governorate.'⁵¹
- 8.4.5 The IOM displacement snapshots for Erbil, dated September 2014, recorded 67 per cent of IDP families in camps and transit camps reporting inadequate access to water, food, sanitation and health facilities, with food a particular

⁴⁸ REACH, 'Vulnerability, Needs and Intentions of Internally Displaced Persons in Northern Iraq', Rapid Assessment Report, August 2014, External assistance p.16
<http://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/vulnerability-needs-and-intentions-internally-displaced-persons-northern-iraq-rapid-0>, date accessed: 11 May 2015

⁴⁹ Refugees International, Waiting for Winter: Displaced Iraqis in the KRI, 29 October 2014
http://www.refugeesinternational.org/sites/default/files/102914_waiting_for_winter_letterhead.pdf, date accessed: 15 May 2015

⁵⁰ UN Assistance Mission for Iraq/UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 'Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq, 11 September to 10 December 2014',
http://www.uniraq.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=itemlist&layout=category&task=category&id=164&Itemid=650&lang=en, date accessed: 11 May 2015

⁵¹ UN Assistance Mission for Iraq/UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 'Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq, 11 September to 10 December 2014',
http://www.uniraq.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=itemlist&layout=category&task=category&id=164&Itemid=650&lang=en, date accessed: 11 May 2015

priority. More than half the population 'expressed a need for child care, especially related to child healthcare and nutrition ...' whilst more than 50 per cent of families residing in school buildings reported a lack of access to water, food, sanitation and healthcare.⁵² In Dahuk, the latest IOM snapshot assessment was reported in April 2015. The report noted:

- 8.4.6 'The majority of IDPs assessed by IOM in Dahuk reported they were in dire need of shelter housing (20%), access to a source of income (18%), NFIs (15%), food(14%) and healthcare (11%).23% of IDPs assesed [sic] by IOM in Amedi [district] and 19% of those residing in Zakho [district] indicated a pressing need for access to income, while families in Dahuk and Sumel [districts] considered sheleter [sic] the top priority need, 20% and 25% of the respondents, respectively. The aforementioned trends are presumably related to the high number of IDPs in Sumel who were accomodated [sic] in camps or abandoned buildings, understandably indicating a need for shelter. In general, housing and a source of income were the most pressing needs for IDPs in other districts, corresponding with the significant number of families who were renting houses and exhausting their savings, and those who are living in critical shelters while looking for better living conditions.
- 8.4.7 'Notably, IDP needs were strongly affected by the sheler [sic] type they were inhabiting, however there was no consistent trend prevailing in the critical shelter types or private settings. Families assesed [sic] by IOM in camps (20%), religious buldings [sic] and rented housing (both 19%) considered access to work as the top priority need, while those staying with host families (21%), motels (22%), informal settlements (27%) and unfinished buildings (25%) indicated a dire need for shelter.'⁵³
- 8.4.8 In Sulymaniyah governorate, IOM reported in September 2014 that food was the 'number one' priority need for 67 per cent of IDP families. NFIs (Non-food items) and CRIs (Core relief items) were also considered a priority need by more than 60 per cent; 6 per cent of families cited water and shelter as their top priority. 'Almost all families reported not having access to food, while only small percentages reported not having adequate access to water, sanitation facilities, and health services.'⁵⁴
- 8.4.9 According to OCHA reporting for the period 29 April to 5 May 2015, food assistance was needed in Dahuk and Erbil governorates.⁵⁵ Restrictions on access to safety and IDP registration continued in Sulyamaniyah and it was reported by OCHA that authorities in Sulymaniyah had 'begun the relocation of IDPs living in informal settlements around Kalar District to Quarato IDP

⁵² IOM, Displacement snapshot, Erbil, September 2014, <http://iomiraq.net/reports/erbil-governorate-profile-september-2014>, date accessed: 22 May 2015

⁵³ IOM. Displacement snapshot, Dahuk, April 2015, <http://iomiraq.net/reports/dahuk-governorate-profile-april-2015>, date accessed: 22 May 2015

⁵⁴ IOM, Displacement snapshot, Sulymaniyah, September 2014, <http://iomiraq.net/reports/sulaymaniyah-governorate-profile-september-2014>, date accessed: 22 May 2015

⁵⁵ OCHA, Iraq Crisis: Situation report no.42, 29 April – 5 May 2015), https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/iraq_crisis_situation_report_no_42_29_april_-05_may.pdf, date accessed: 11 May 2015

camp'.⁵⁶ However the source highlighted that many IDPs were reluctant to relocate as it would disrupt their children's schooling and limit employment opportunities.⁵⁷ Health services in the KRI remained 'overburdened' according to OCHA, because of the high number of IDPs.⁵⁸

- 8.4.10 Commenting on the onset of winter in northern Iraq more generally in late 2014, the UNAMI/OHCHR reported on the period 11 September to 10 December 2014 as follows:

'Since late September the weather in Iraq, particularly in the northern governorates, rapidly changed with the onset of winter. This seasonal change arrived at a time when many IDP families were still living outside in the open, in unfinished structures, schools or public buildings, as well as in camps that were not yet fully operational. The United Nations and its humanitarian partners began a countrywide winterization response, which at the time of writing was ongoing. The authorities of several host governorates prioritized the relocation of IDPs from schools to camps to enable schools to re-open for the new academic year. At the beginning of November, OCHA identified 600,000 IDPs in need of immediate winterization assistance.'⁵⁹

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⁵⁶ OCHA, Iraq Crisis: Situation report no.42, 29 April – 5 May 2015), https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/iraq_crisis_situation_report_no_42_29_april_-05_may.pdf, date accessed: 11 May 2015

⁵⁷ OCHA, Iraq Crisis: Situation report no.42, 29 April – 5 May 2015), https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/iraq_crisis_situation_report_no_42_29_april_-05_may.pdf, date accessed: 11 May 2015

⁵⁸ OCHA, Iraq Crisis: Situation report no.42, 29 April – 5 May 2015), https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/iraq_crisis_situation_report_no_42_29_april_-05_may.pdf, date accessed: 11 May 2015

⁵⁹ UN Assistance Mission for Iraq/UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 'Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq, 11 September to 10 December 2014', http://www.uniraq.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=itemlist&layout=category&task=category&id=164&Itemid=650&lang=en, date accessed: 11 May 2015

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Contacts

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Clearance

Below is information on when this version of the guidance was cleared:

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