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COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

THE LEBANON

JULY 2006

RDS-IND

COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION SERVICE

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1. Scope of document

- 1.01 This Country of Origin Information Report (COI Report) has been produced by Research Development and Statistics (RDS), Home Office, for use by officials involved in the asylum/human rights determination process. The COI Report provides general background information about the issues most commonly raised in asylum/human rights claims made in the United Kingdom. It includes information available up to 30 April 2006.
- 1.02 The COI Report is compiled wholly from material produced by a wide range of recognised external information sources and does not contain any Home Office opinion or policy. All information in the Report is attributed, throughout the text, to the original source material, which is made available to those working in the asylum/human rights determination process.
- 1.03 The COI Report aims to provide a brief summary of the source material identified, focusing on the main issues raised in asylum and human rights applications. It is not intended to be a detailed or comprehensive survey. For a more detailed account, the relevant source documents should be examined directly.
- 1.04 The structure and format of the COI Report reflects the way it is used by Home Office caseworkers and appeals presenting officers, who require quick electronic access to information on specific issues and use the contents page to go directly to the subject required. Key issues are usually covered in some depth within a dedicated section, but may also be referred to briefly in several other sections. Some repetition is therefore inherent in the structure of the Report.
- 1.05 The information included in this COI Report is limited to that which can be identified from source documents. While every effort is made to cover all relevant aspects of a particular topic, it is not always possible to obtain the information concerned. For this reason, it is important to note that information included in the COI Report should not be taken to imply anything beyond what is actually stated. For example, if it is stated that a particular law has been passed, this should not be taken to imply that it has been effectively implemented unless stated.
- 1.06 As noted above, the COI Report is a collation of material produced by a number of reliable information sources. In compiling the COI Report, no attempt has been made to resolve discrepancies between information provided in different source documents. For example, different source documents often contain different versions of names and spellings of individuals, places and political parties etc. COI Reports do not aim to bring consistency of spelling, but to reflect faithfully the spellings used in the original source documents. Similarly, figures given in different source documents sometimes vary and these are simply quoted as per the original text. The term 'sic' has been used in this document only to denote incorrect spellings or typographical errors in quoted text; its use is not intended to imply any comment on the content of the material.
- 1.07 The COI Report is based substantially upon source documents issued during the previous two years. However, some older source documents may have been included because they contain relevant information not available in more recent documents. All sources contain information considered relevant at the time this COI Report was issued.
- 1.08 This COI Report and the accompanying source material are public documents. All COI Reports are published on the RDS section of the Home Office website and the

great majority of the source material for the Report is readily available in the public domain. Where the source documents identified in the Report are available in electronic form, the relevant web link has been included, together with the date that the link was accessed. Copies of less accessible source documents, such as those provided by government offices or subscription services, are available from the Home Office upon request.

- 1.09 COI Reports are published every six months on the top 20 asylum producing countries and on those countries for which there is deemed to be a specific operational need. Inevitably, information contained in COI Reports is sometimes overtaken by events that occur between publication dates. Home Office officials are informed of any significant changes in country conditions by means of Country of Origin Information Bulletins, which are also published on the RDS website. They also have constant access to an information request service for specific enquiries.
- 1.10 In producing this COI Report, the Home Office has sought to provide an accurate, balanced summary of the available source material. Any comments regarding this Report or suggestions for additional source material are very welcome and should be submitted to the Home Office as below.

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ADVISORY PANEL ON COUNTRY INFORMATION

- 1.11 The independent Advisory Panel on Country Information was established under the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 to make recommendations to the Home Secretary about the content of the Home Office's country of origin information material. The Advisory Panel welcomes all feedback on the Home Office's COI Reports and other country of origin information material. Information about the Panel's work can be found on its website at www.apci.org.uk.
- 1.12 It is not the function of the Advisory Panel to endorse any Home Office material or procedures. In the course of its work, the Advisory Panel directly reviews the content of selected individual Home Office COI Reports, but neither the fact that such a review has been undertaken, nor any comments made, should be taken to imply endorsement of the material. Some of the material examined by the Panel relates to countries designated or proposed for designation for the Non-Suspensive Appeals (NSA) list. In such cases, the Panel's work should not be taken to imply any endorsement of the decision or proposal to designate a particular country for NSA, nor of the NSA process itself.

Advisory Panel on Country Information

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2. Geography

2.01 The Republic of Lebanon is situated in western Asia, bordered by Syria to the north and east, and by Israel and the Palestinian Autonomous Areas to the south. Lebanon has a coastline of about 220 km (135 miles) on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea. [1a] (**Location, Climate, Language, Religion, Flag, Capital**) With a total area of only 10,452 sq km, Lebanon is one of the smallest countries in the region. [1a] (**Lebanon**) Its capital is Beirut and population was recorded as 4,497,669 in mid-2003. [1a] (**Lebanon**) Other principle cities detailed on a July 2005 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) map included Tripoli, Tyre and Juniyah. [15]

2.02 The Europa World online Country Profile states that:

“The official language is Arabic, which is spoken by almost all of the inhabitants. French is widely used as a second language, while Kurdish and Armenian are spoken by small ethnic minorities. At December 2004 there were 399,152 Palestinian refugees registered in Lebanon. The major religions are Islam and Christianity, and there is a very small Jewish community. In the early 1980s it was estimated that 57% of Lebanon’s inhabitants were Muslims, with about 43% Christians. The principal Muslim sects are Shi’a and Sunni, while there is also a significant Druze community. By the 1980s it was generally considered that Shi’a Muslims, totalling an estimated 1.2m., constituted Lebanon’s largest single community. Most Christians adhere to the Roman Catholic Church, principally the Maronite rite. There are also Armenian, Greek and Syrian sects (both Catholic and Eastern Orthodox) and small groups of Protestants.” [1a] (**Location, Climate, Language, Religion, Flag, Capital**)

2.03 There are now 18 officially recognised religious sects in Lebanon, which are listed in Annex D of this report. [1a] An academic paper presented at a Symposium on ‘Religions and the World’s Legal Traditions’ in October 2005 stated that:

“Historic recognition is the best status any religion can have in Lebanon. Decision 60 [a 1936 legislative decision that granted the religious law of the 18 historic religions the same force and effect as civil regular law] explicitly and restrictively lists religious Denominations historically recognized in Lebanon. It recognizes specifically five Islamic Denominations, three Jewish Synagogues, and eleven Christian Denominations.” [50] (p3)

2.04 A *New York Times* article of June 2005 illustrated the close-knit nature of, not only the various politico-religious groups, but also the communities within those groups by stating that:

“It [Lebanon] is at once the most urbane and Westernized of Arab countries, but also a place where power has long been held by near-feudal local strongmen known as zaims, and where the primordial loyalties lie with one's sect. ‘The plain fact remained that the religious communities in Lebanon were essentially tribes, or in any case behaved as tribes, and the game that came to be played between them was a tribal game,’ the Lebanese historian Kamal Salibi wrote in ‘A House of Many Mansions.’” [51]

See also Section 6.A: Freedom of religion; Section 6.B: Ethnic and national groups; Annex D: Religious groups

For further information on geography, refer to Europa: Regional Surveys of the World – Middle East and North Africa, source [1c].

MAP OF LEBANON [15]


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3. Economy

- 3.01 According to the US Central Intelligence Agency's World Factbook entry on Lebanon (CIA World Factbook), "The 1975-91 civil war seriously damaged Lebanon's economic infrastructure, cut national output by half, and all but ended Lebanon's position as a Middle Eastern entrepot and banking hub. In the years since, Lebanon has rebuilt much of its war-torn physical and financial infrastructure by borrowing heavily – mostly from domestic banks." [39] (**Economy-Overview**) The Foreign and Commonwealth Office's Country Profile (FCO Profile), which was last updated on 2 June 2005, states that "Lebanon's economy is beset by difficulties, especially the public sector. The debt burden continues to climb. Lebanon's national currency is pegged to the US dollar (at the rate of approximately 1500 to 1). Lack of confidence and speculation about the risk of devaluation placed the currency under considerable pressure as local investors switched to US dollars." [6a] (**Economy**)
- 3.02 Information retrieved from Europa World online's Lebanon Country Profile (Europa World) on 29 November 2005 states that:
- "Following a decline in domestic demand and inadequate levels of job creation, no overall growth was recorded in the Lebanese economy in 2000. The withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon in May of that year brought about an acceleration of the country's economic reconstruction, despite the high costs involved in rehabilitation projects for the south. The return of Rafik Hariri to the Lebanese premiership in October afforded further optimism, particularly in the construction sector. The new Government pledged to stimulate growth by reducing taxation and import duties, by encouraging the privatization of state-owned enterprises, and by controlling public expenditure in order to reduce the state debt. Liberalization of trade, both regionally and through association with the EU, was also identified as a priority. In October 2001 the IMF recommended a devaluation of the Lebanese pound as a means of easing the Government's fiscal crisis. A value-added tax of 10% was introduced in February 2002. Although the National Assembly approved the Budget Law 2003 in January of that year, the Cabinet continued to debate the proposed economic reforms, which included tax increases, further privatization of state concerns and reductions in public spending, and a failure to reach a consensus led to the resignation of Hariri and his Cabinet in April (although he subsequently led a new Government until his resignation and replacement by Omar Karami in October 2004). In February 2005 concern was expressed regarding the possible impact on the Lebanese economy of the assassination of Hariri, who had contributed greatly to Lebanon's reconstruction process, both as a member of the Government and as a business executive." [1a] (**Economic Affairs**)
- 3.03 An International Crisis Group (ICG) December 2005 report, 'Lebanon: Managing the Gathering Storm' reported that "Since Hariri's assassination, an economist [Marwan Iskander, Beirut], told Crisis Group, the economy has contracted by 2 to 3 per cent. The government has been unable to agree on a budget for 2005, let alone 2006." [7c] (p7) Although the report did also state that "He [Iskander] nevertheless was relatively upbeat about underlying economic trends, citing bank deposits as recovering to the pre-assassination level, and issues on the Beirut stock market as heavily over-subscribed." [7c] (p7)

See also Section 4: [History/Syrian Withdrawal: April – May 2005](#)

- 3.04 The CIA World Factbook recorded that the currency in Lebanon is the Lebanese pound (LBP). [39] A currency converter on the website Oanada.com recorded that the exchange rate, as of 16 December 2005, was:

Currency	No.	Currency	No.
British Pound (Sterling)	1	Lebanese Pound	2668.93
US Dollar	1	Lebanese Pound	1505.64

[26a-26b]

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4. History

1975–2005: CIVIL WAR; ISRAELI OCCUPATIONS; SYRIAN OCCUPATION

- 4.01 According to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's (FCO) Country Profile on Lebanon, last updated on 2 June 2005:

"In 1970, large numbers of PLO fighters expelled from Jordan sought refuge in Lebanon leading to further destabilisation. In 1975/1976 there was a civil war which pitted a coalition of Christian groups against the joint forces of the PLO, left-wing Druze and Muslim militias. It ended in Syrian intervention, at the Lebanese government's request, initially to prevent a Christian defeat. The presence of the Syrian forces was subsequently authorised by an Arab League mandate as the 'Arab Deterrent Force'. But despite its presence, intermittent fighting continued, and between 1975 and 1982 an estimated 10% of the Lebanese population was killed or wounded." [6a] (History since Independence)

- 4.02 FCO's Country Profile continues, "In 1982, the PLO presence in Lebanon led to an Israeli invasion." [6a] (History since Independence) Europa's Regional Surveys of the World – Middle East and North Africa: Lebanon (Europa 2005), published in 2005, records that "Israel, faced with the financial burden of keeping a force in Lebanon and with its troops increasingly the target of attacks by Lebanese resistance groups, pledged in September 1984 to withdraw from Lebanon." [1c] (p737) Europa 2005 stated that, although Israel completed its withdrawal in June 1985, it left a buffer zone 10 to 20 kilometres wide north of the international border controlled by the pro-Israeli South Lebanon Army (SLA). [1c] (p737) The British Broadcasting Corporation's (BBC) Timeline also recorded that most Israeli troops had withdrawn at this time but some had remained to support the SLA led by Maj-Gen Antoine Lahd. [21w]

- 4.03 FCO's Country Profile recorded that, following continued tension, fighting and political crises, a virtual partition along sectarian lines occurred in September 1988, in which former Prime Minister Selim Hoss's Muslim government was based in West Beirut, while General Michel Aoun's Christian Government occupied the Presidential Palace at Baabda in the East. [6a] (History since Independence) The Profile continues, "The rivalry erupted into fighting in March 1989 following Aoun's blockade of the Muslim ports in South Beirut. There was heavy shelling of the Christian enclave by Syrian forces, returned by Aoun's troops." [6a] (History since Independence)

- 4.04 Europa 2005 states that "The crisis in the Gulf region, which was precipitated by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, had important repercussions for Lebanon. Syria was effectively granted freedom of action in Lebanon, in return for its participation in the US-led multinational force deployed against Iraq and received assurances of US support for its continued dominance in Lebanon." [1c] (p739) FCO's Profile records that "After sixteen years of civil war, peace returned to Lebanon at the end of 1990. There has been no significant fighting in the country (excepting the troubles in South Lebanon) for some years and the main political groupings accept the Taif Accord as the basis of a post-war settlement." [6a] (History since Independence)

- 4.05 The BBC Timeline noted that, following the collapse of the SLA and the rapid advance of Hizbollah forces, Israel's remaining troops were withdrawn from southern Lebanon in May 2000, more than six weeks before its stated deadline of 7 July 2000, and the following day – 25 May 2000 – was declared an annual public holiday, called 'Resistance and Liberation Day'. [21w]

See also Section 5: [Political System](#); **Section 6C:** [South Lebanon Army \(SLA\); Hizbollah \(Hezbollah\)](#); **Annex A:** [Chronology of Major Events](#)

SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL: APRIL – MAY 2005

- 4.06 FCO's Country Profile of June 2005 recorded that the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1559 (UNSCR 1559) on 2 September 2004 and that "This resolution called for respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout Lebanon; all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon; and the disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militia." [6a] (**Recent Political Developments**)

- 4.07 In February 2005 various news organisations, including the BBC and the *Daily Star* (Lebanon), reported on the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, blamed by many on the Syrian authorities and pro-Syrian Lebanon government, on 14 February 2005. [21a] [23f] The same news outlets reported that the death of Hariri led to large anti-Syrian demonstrations organised by the opposition, and counter-demonstrations by pro-Syrian Hizbollah – the two largest of which were held on 8 and 14 March. [21b] [23g-h] The FCO's Country Profile records that:

"On 28 February [2005], in the face of public protests, including a general strike, the Lebanese government resigned. Following a period of political limbo, President Lahoud appointed Najib Mikati as Prime Minister on 15 April. Mikati has committed himself to holding elections according to the provisions of the Lebanese constitution; to co-operating with the UN Investigation Commission; and to safeguarding the economic stability of the country." [6a] (**Recent Political Developments**)

- 4.08 In March and April 2005, the BBC and the *Daily Star* (Lebanon) reported on the staggered withdrawal of Syrian forces, while the FCO Profile records that "A UN verification team reported on 23 May 2005 that all Syrian troops had withdrawn from Lebanon but it was uncertain whether all intelligence personnel had." [21c-d] [23i] [6a] The UN report itself also noted that the verification mission was denied access to Qoussaya, a Palestinian-controlled area in the eastern hills of the central Bekaa valley, not far from the border with the Syrian Arab Republic, by two Palestinian guards. [3b] (para 14) However, during a later visit to another Palestinian-controlled area, a small valley in the area of Naame that is 15 kilometres south of Beirut, "Palestinian representatives indicated that the team were the first outsiders to enter the complex, regretted any misunderstanding at Qoussaya and afforded the team every assistance at Naame." [3b] (para 17) The October 2005 UN report on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1559 recorded that the latest verification mission had ascertained, to the best of its ability, that all Syrian troops had been completely withdrawn from Lebanese territory, although the status of the intelligence apparatus remained unclear. [3c] (para 12-13)

See also Section 6.A: [Extrajudicial Killings and Assassinations](#); **Section 6.C:** [Relations with Neighbouring Countries/Syria](#); **Annex A:** [Chronology of Main Events](#)

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ELECTIONS: MAY – JUNE 2005

- 4.09 The US Central Intelligence Agency's World Factbook entry on Lebanon (CIA World Factbook), the BBC and the *Daily Star* (Lebanon) all reported on the holding of elections in four rounds between 29 May and 19 June 2005. [39] [21ab] [23a-23b, 23j-

23k] The *Daily Star* (Lebanon) noted, on 30 May 2005, “[But] the start of Lebanon’s first free elections in more than 30 years was marred by a very low voter turnout of just 28 percent, the smallest participation in an election 13 years.” **[23j]** On 20 June 2005, the online newspaper further recorded that, whilst one EU observer had described the 19 June 2005 poll as “a very democratic and peaceful process”, “Accusations of vote-buying continued to be thrown about in Batroun amid fierce competition between the two main lists in this coastal area of 55,822 eligible voters.” **[23b]**

- 4.10 The seats won by party or group, as recorded by the CIA World Factbook, were as follows:

Party/Group	No.	Party/Group	No.
Future Movement Bloc	36	Syrian National Socialist Party	2
Democratic Gathering	15	Kataeb Reform Movement	2
Development and Resistance Bloc	15	Tachnaq Party	2
Loyalty to the Resistance	14	Democratic Renewal Movement	1
Free Patriotic Movement	14	Democratic Left	1
Lebanese Forces	6	Nasserite Popular Movement	1
Qornet Shewan	5	Ba’th Party	1
Popular Bloc	4	Kataeb Party	1
Tripoli Independent Bloc	3	Independents	5

[39] (Government-Legislative branch)

- 4.11 International Crisis Group’s (ICG) December 2005 report ‘Lebanon: Managing the Gathering Storm’ remarked that “Significantly, the elections witnessed an intensification of sectarian polarisation at candidate and voter level. To some extent, this was inevitable in a country that allocates legislative seats and key official positions on the basis of confessional affiliation.” **[7c] (p3)**

See also Section 5: [Political System](#); Section 6.A: [Freedom of Association and Assembly](#); Annex B: [Political Organisations](#)

OTHER RECENT EVENTS: 2005-2006

- 4.12 The UN report of October 2005 noted that “In the last six months since my last report of 26 April 2005 (S/2005/272), the situation in Lebanon has remained volatile. There have been a number of worrying developments affecting the stability of Lebanon, particularly in the form of terrorist acts and the illegal transfer of arms and people across the borders into Lebanon.” **[3c] (para 5)** Sporadic clashes and continuing tension between Hizbollah and Israeli forces along Lebanon’s southern border continued to be reported by international news agencies during 2005. **[21e-f, 21p 21x]**

See also Section 6.A: [Abuses by Hizbollah \(Hezbollah\)](#); Section 6.C: [Hizbollah \(Hezbollah\)](#)

- 4.13 In addition to the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, three other ostensibly politically motivated assassinations or attempted assassinations, all bombings, were reported on by the BBC in the first six months of 2005. **[21n-o, 21q]** It was reported that two of the five victims, journalist Samir Qasir [Kassir] and politician

George Hawi, both killed in June 2005, were anti-Syrian activists. [21n-o] The other failed assassination attempt targeted pro-Syrian MP, Elias Murr. [21q] Other apparently less deliberately targeted bombings in the Christian sector of Beirut were also reported in March, April, May and September 2005. [21g-k, 21y]

- 4.14 The BBC reported that the opposition leader of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), Michel Aoun (Awn) returned to Lebanon in May 2005 after 14 years spent in exile in France. [21l-m] Also that, in July 2005, Samir Geagea – a former warlord – was granted an amnesty and released from prison sparking violence in Beirut. [21r-s] The BBC stated that “The clashes took place along the old Green Line which used to separate Christian East and Muslim West Beirut during the 1975-90 civil war.” [21r] On 25 September 2005 another car bomb attack occurred, against May Chidiac the outspoken anchor woman of the prominent anti-Syrian media outlet, the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation. [21u]
- 4.15 International Crisis Group’s (CG) ‘CrisisWatch’ of 1 November 2005 summarised the events of October 2005 that concerned Lebanon:

“Head of UN commission Detlev Mehlis presented report into killing of former PM Rafik Hariri 21 October [2005], implicating top-ranking Syrian security officials and their Lebanese allies. Police arrested 5 in connection to Hariri’s death. Mehlis commission’s mandate extended to December 2005. Rise of tensions between Lebanese armed forces and pro-Syrian Palestinian fighters outside refugee camps; PM Siniora met with Palestinian leader Abbas in Paris, called for closure of Palestinian military bases and regulation of fighters inside refugee camps. ... Long-awaited UN interim report on assassination of former Lebanese PM Rafik Hariri published 21 October, implicating top-ranked Syrian and Lebanese security officials, including members of ruling Assad family, and faulting Damascus on lack of cooperation. Syria strongly denied accusations. UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 31 October demanding Syria cooperate fully with investigation or face ‘further action’. Thousands participated in government-sponsored protests 24 October. Earlier in month, Interior Minister and former Syrian intelligence chief in Lebanon Ghazi Kanaan reportedly committed suicide.” [7a] (p10, 11)

- 4.16 In November 2005, the BBC reported on the renewed border clashes between Israeli troops and Hizbollah militants. [21x] The BBC also noted that Israel had dropped leaflets over Hizbollah-controlled areas of Lebanon and Lebanese cities, including Beirut “‘Hezbollah is causing enormous harm to Lebanon. Who lies to you?, [sic] Who is the tool in the hand of his Syrian and Iranian masters?, [sic] the leaflets said.” [21x] Whilst in December, the BBC covered two more bomb attacks, an unsuccessful attempt on the life of a member of pro-Syrian Hizbollah, Hussein Assaf – an official said to be in charge of training Hizbollah guerrillas – and the killing of anti-Syrian journalist and MP, Gibran Tueni. [21t, 21aa] The attempt on Assaf was blamed on Israel, whilst Tueni’s death sparked a mass protest at his funeral during which “Some in the crowds of tens of thousands denounced Syria, accused of killing Mr Tueni, and the pro-Syrian president.” [21t, 21aa]

See also Section 5: [Political system](#); See also Section 6.A: [Extrajudicial Killings and Assassinations](#); [Freedom of Association and Assembly](#); [Leading political activists](#); **Annex B: [Political Organisations](#); **Annex C: [Prominent People](#)****

- 4.17 Also in December 2005, the UN released the second of its reports on the investigation into Rafik Hariri’s assassination in February 2005, and the UN Security Council unanimously voted to extend the commission of enquiry by a further six months. [3f] [21v] “Speaking to the BBC, [chief investigator] Mr [Detlev] Mehlis said

that after seven months of investigation into the deaths of Hariri and 22 others it was 'pretty clear that nothing of this size... could have happened without the knowledge of the intelligence agencies, the Lebanese and the Syrians'. The commission, he said, had a 'foot in the door' in Syria and sooner or later would be able to 'open up the door fully' but pressure would be needed." (BBC, UN extends Hariri killing inquiry, 16 December 2005) [21v]

- 4.18 On 16 January 2006, the Associated Press (AP) reported that Lebanon's top military magistrate, Rashi Mezher, officially charged 13 Muslim extremists – seven Syrians, three Lebanese, a Saudi, a Jordanian, and a Palestinian who had been arrested earlier the same month – with planning to carry out terror attacks. [59] IRIN reported, in March 2006, on the continued resistance of Hizbollah and Palestinian armed groups to disarmament, a move called for by UN resolution 1559 of September 2004. [29r] Hezbollah justifies its defiance to this demand by referring to itself as a 'resistance movement' not a 'militia', which is the specific wording used by the resolution. [29r] The report concludes "While most of Lebanon's parties continue to pressure Hezbollah to give up its arms, Hezbollah – with the support of rival Shi'ite party Amal – categorically refuses to do so. Consequently, the cabinet, of which both are part, has been paralysed for months." [29r] In April 2006 the BBC reported on the continuing discussions regarding the future of pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud. [21af]

For further information on history prior to 1975, refer to Europa: Regional Surveys of the World – Middle East and North Africa: Lebanon, source [1c].

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5. State Structures

THE CONSTITUTION

5.01 Information retrieved from Europa World online on 4 November 2005 recorded that:

“The Constitution was promulgated on 23 May 1926 and amended by the Constitutional Laws of 1927, 1929, 1943, 1947 and 1990. According to the Constitution, the Republic of Lebanon is an independent and sovereign state, and no part of the territory may be alienated or ceded. Lebanon has no state religion. Arabic is the official language. Beirut is the capital. All Lebanese are equal in the eyes of the law. Personal freedom and freedom of the press are guaranteed and protected. The religious communities are entitled to maintain their own schools, on condition that they conform to the general requirements relating to public instruction, as defined by the state. Dwellings are inviolable; rights of ownership are protected by law. Every Lebanese citizen over 21 is an elector and qualifies for the franchise.” [1a] (**Directory: Government and Politics-The Constitution**)

THE TAIF (TA'IF/TAEF) AGREEMENT

5.02 The European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation (MEDEA) outlined the creation and basic premise of the Taif Agreement in a November 1996 online article:

“At the end of September 1989 the Lebanese National Assembly met in Taif, Saudi Arabia, to discuss a charter of national reconciliation. The session was an initiative of the Arab League and was attended by 62 MPs (31 Christian and 31 Muslim). On 22 October, the charter of national reconciliation, better known as the Taif Agreement, was endorsed by 58 of the 62 deputies attending the session. The charter provides for the disbanding of the militias within six months and the revision of the Constitution of 1943 in order to adapt the political system to the demographic weight of the different communities. The main constitutional reform[s] are:

- transfer of power from the President (Maronite Christian) to the Prime Minister (Sunni Muslim) and the Chairman of the National Assembly (Shia Muslim);
- executive power is to be exercised by the Council of Ministers and the portfolios divided equally among Christians and Muslims;
- an increase in the number of seats in the National Assembly, from 99 to 128, to be divided equally among Christian and Muslim deputies.

“As in the past, the key posts will be divided amongst the main religious groups of the country:

- the President of the Republic will be a Maronite Christian,
- the Prime Minister will be a Sunni Muslim,
- the Chairman of the National Assembly will be a Shia Muslim.

“The Taif Agreement was incorporated in the Lebanese Constitution in August 1990.” [35b]

CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONALITY

5.03 The US Office of Personnel Management's March 2001 'Citizenship Laws of the World' recorded that Lebanese citizenship can be acquired through descent from the father or by applying for, and being granted, a Decree from the Lebanese Council of

Ministers. Birth within the Republic of Lebanon does not confer citizenship and a child of Lebanese descent born outside Lebanon must be registered at a Lebanese embassy for the child's citizenship to be automatically granted. Dual citizenship is recognised. [38] A Canadian Research Directorate information response of April 2004 noted that Baha'is cannot officially call themselves Lebanese. [17g] A professor at the Lebanese University of Beirut stated that:

"This was one of the reasons behind a proposed bill that would recognize optional citizenship (a choice that would be offered to all Lebanese who did not want to belong to any particular religious group, but did want to have the same rights as other Lebanese). Currently [in April 2004], this bill is considered organic, and it will have to overcome strong opposition from religious Lebanese (especially Muslims) before it can be implemented." [17g]

- 5.04 The US Department of State Report on Human Rights Practices 2005 (USSD 2005), published on 8 March 2006, noted that "Only men may confer citizenship on their spouses and children. Accordingly children born to citizen mothers and foreign fathers are not eligible for citizenship. Citizen widows may confer citizenship on their minor children." [2f] (Section 5: Women) In January 2006, the UN's Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) reported on the difficulties faced by the children of foreign fathers, which include the requirement to obtain a residency permit every three years, their inability to access public health care and social welfare, and the unequal treatment they face with regards to education and employment. [29i] The report recorded the launch of a November 2005 campaign aimed at gaining full citizenship rights for women but notes that:

"Politicians fear that if women are allowed to pass their nationality onto their husbands, many Palestinians will take advantage of this and start marrying Lebanese women en masse,' said Ahmad Halimi of the Popular Aid for Relief and Development NGO [Non-Governmental Organisation] that works with Palestinians in Lebanon. ...

"The two pretexts given are that allowing Lebanese women to give their nationality to their husband and children could have an impact on the sectarian balance, but also that it would help Palestinian refugees gain Lebanese nationality, ' explained Abou Habib, the Director of the Collective for Research and Training on Development." [29i]

KURDS

- 5.05 US organisation Refugees International reported in February 2005 that "Up until the mid-1990s, the large majority of this population was without citizenship. A naturalization decree was issued in June 1994, whereby 10,000 to 18,000 Lebanese Kurds acquired citizenship. Unfortunately, an estimated 3,000 to 5,000 Kurds were unable to join due to factors including cost and inability to return to Lebanon." [33] (p45) The Tharwar Project's July 2005 feature on 'The Kurdish Community in Lebanon' stated that "In 1994, [Rafik] Hariri's government issued a naturalization decree to settle the legal status of all qualified non-naturalized individuals living on Lebanese territory. This decree allowed for the majority of Kurds to gain citizenship. Although many of the Kurds could not afford the application fee, or simply did not believe in the process, it is thought that since 1996 around 60 percent of the Kurds in Lebanon hold Lebanese citizenship." [34] (Citizenship)

See also Section 6.B: [Ethnic groups/Kurds](#)

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PALESTINIANS

- 5.06 The Freedom House 2005 World Report covering events in 2004 states “Nearly 350,000 Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon are denied citizenship rights and face restrictions on working, building homes, and purchasing property – restrictions that reflect Lebanese sensitivities about the impact of mostly Muslim Palestinian assimilation on the country’s precarious sectarian balance.” [10a] (p367) The US organisation Refugees International (RI) concurred, stating in February 2005 that “Palestinians are forbidden to become Lebanese citizens.” [33] (p45) RI’s report also states that “A 1994 law allowed some Palestinians to apply for citizenship, but few people were aware of this chance. Also, women cannot give their citizenship to their children. If they are Lebanese and marry a Palestinian, their children are not Lebanese citizens. Men, on the other hand, are allowed to transfer their citizenship.” [33] (p45)
- 5.07 According to Are Knudsen’s 2003 paper, ‘Islamism in the Diaspora: Palestinian refugees in Lebanon’, “The refugees demand ‘civic rights’, that is the right to live and work in Lebanon, but do not seek citizenship (which, *inter alia*, includes the right to vote). This is because naturalisation would compromise the right of return and symbolically erase the Palestinian refugee community, as well as being construed as a victory for the Israeli authorities, who categorically reject the refugees’ ‘right of return’.” [56] (p6) Nevertheless, “Since 1994 decrees by the Lebanese authorities have naturalised about 30,000 Palestinians, the majority of them from the former security zone to the south of the country (Peteet 1996: p. 29).” [56] (p6) Knudsen also stressed that both the Christian and Muslim Lebanese communities considered that mass-naturalisation of the Palestinians would endanger the delicate ethno-religious balance that underwrites the consociational democracy, thus threatening the country’s stability. [56] (p7)

See also Section 6.B: [Ethnic groups/Palestinians](#)

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POLITICAL SYSTEM

- 5.08 In political terms, the two most important articles of the Lebanese constitution of 1926 (as amended) are Articles 9 and 95, which effectively established what is known as the Lebanese Confessional System – article 9 guarantees that “There shall be absolute freedom of conscience. The state in rendering homage to the Most High shall respect all religions and creeds and guarantees, under its protection, the free exercise of all religious rites provided that public order is not disturbed. It also guarantees that the personal status and religious interests of the population, to whatever religious sect they belong, is respected.” [20] (Chapter II) Article 95 is theoretically concerned with the eventual abolition of the Confessional System and guarantees that, until the supplanting of the current system is achieved, “The confessional groups are to be represented in a just and equitable fashion in the formation of the Cabinet.” [20] (Part F)
- 5.09 Europa World online records that “Legislative power is exercised by one house, the National Assembly, with 108 seats (raised, without amendment of the Constitution, to 128 in 1992), which are divided equally between Christians and Muslims.” [1a] (Directory: Government and Politics-Legislative Power) The same source states:

“With the incorporation of the Ta’if agreement into the Lebanese Constitution in August 1990, executive power was effectively transferred from the presidency to the

Cabinet. The President is elected for a term of six years and is not immediately re-eligible. He is responsible for the promulgation and execution of laws enacted by the National Assembly, but all presidential decisions (with the exception of those to appoint a Prime Minister or to accept the resignation of a government) require the co-signature of the Prime Minister, who is head of the Government, implementing its policies and speaking in its name. The President must receive the approval of the Cabinet before dismissing a minister or ratifying an international treaty. The ministers and the Prime Minister are chosen by the President of the Republic in consultation with the members and President of the National Assembly. ... The President of the Republic must be a Maronite Christian, and the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim; the choice of the other ministers must reflect the level of representation of the communities in the Assembly.” [1a] (**Directory: Government and Politics-Executive Power**)

- 5.10 The US State Department Report on Human Rights Practices for 2005 (USSD 2005), dated 8 March 2006, added that the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies is a Shi'a Muslim. [2f] International Crisis Group's (ICG) December 2005 report 'Lebanon: Managing the Gathering Storm' states that "Power, positions and parliamentary seats all are allocated according to specific sectarian criteria that often are at odds with demographic realities. Although the formula helped preserv[e] relative calm for over a decade, it is fragile and covers rather than resolves underlying fractures." [7c] (p1)
- 5.11 A UN Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) report of January 2006, briefly examined the historical causes behind Lebanon's electoral system and highlighted its flaws, such as the constant altering of electoral districts, the 'winner-takes-all' principle, and confessional nature of the system. [29k] The US State Department (USSD) Country Background Note of August 2005 concurred, recording that political parties were "Organized along sectarian lines around individuals whose followers are motivated primarily by religious, clan, and ethnic considerations." [2e] ICG's December 2005 report noted the intensification of sectarian polarisation during the 2005 elections and states that "Both Sunni and Christian political leaders denounced the intermingling of religion and politics, arguing that endorsement of a candidate by a religious figure [which had reportedly occurred in some areas] was tantamount to instructing worshippers how to vote." [7c] (p3-4) The USSD Background Note states "Suffrage: 21 years; compulsory for men, authorized for women with elementary education." [2e]

See also Section 5: [The Constitution](#)

JUDICIARY

- 5.12 The CIA World Factbook (last updated, 1 November 2005) states that the legal system is a "mixture of Ottoman law, canon law, Napoleonic code, and civil law". [39] Information retrieved from Europa World online on 4 November 2005 recorded that there are 56 'Single-Judge Courts' and 11 Courts of Appeal, to deal with civil and criminal cases. There are four Courts of Cassation, three dealing with civil and commercial cases and the fourth with criminal cases. There is also the Council of State, which deals with administrative cases and the Court of Justice, which deals with matters affecting the security of the state and whose verdicts do not carry a right of appeal. There are also Islamic (Shari'a), Christian and Jewish Religious Courts, which deal with personal status issues such as marriage, death and inheritance. Military courts can try cases involving the armed and security forces. [1a] (**Directory: Government and Politics-Judicial System**)
- 5.13 The Freedom House 2005 World Report covering events in 2004 states:

“The judiciary is strongly influenced by Syria, which directly appoints key prosecutors and investigating magistrates. Consequentially, trials of dissidents are heavily tainted by political pressure, and acts of violence by Syrian-backed groups in Lebanon are rarely investigated. The judicial system consists of civilian courts, a military court, and a judicial council. International standards of criminal procedure are not observed in the military court, which consists largely of military officers with no legal training, and cases are often tried in a matter of minutes. In recent years, the nominally independent Beirut Bar Association (BBA) has become less willing to confront the judiciary, allegedly because of widespread corruption.” [10a] (p367)

- 5.14 An editorial of 16 June 2005 by the Lebanese *Daily Star* also referred to the undue Syrian influence on the judiciary in an article, stating that “Now that the Syrian occupation has come to an end, there is nobody left to blame but ourselves for the pitiful state of the judiciary. ... The judiciary will be one of the key elements of concern if the Lebanese aspire to build a properly functioning democracy. [23d] An Amnesty International (AI) report of January 2006 states:

“Amnesty International has repeatedly expressed concern about the Lebanese military court system whose trials fall far short of international standards for fair trials. In particular, contrary to Lebanese legislation, military courts have been granted wide jurisdiction to try civilians; fail fully to explain their verdicts; use summary proceedings which undermine defence rights; and have judges who are predominantly military officers with inadequate legal training. The military courts’ proceedings are not subject to independent judicial review, an essential requirement for fair trial.” [41]

LEGAL RIGHTS/DETENTION

- 5.15 The US State Department Report on Human Rights Practices for 2005 (USSD 2005), dated 8 March 2006, states “Although the law requires judicial warrants before arrests, except in immediate pursuit situations, the government arbitrarily arrested and detained persons.” [2f] (Section 1d) The same source notes that “Security forces continued the practice of arbitrary arrest and detention. On several occasions during the year, security forces detained and arrested citizens on grounds of national security. There were credible reports that security force personnel detained individuals on the instruction of Syrian intelligence agencies, a situation that was essentially eliminated with the departure of the Syrian forces in April [2005].” [2f] (Section 1d)

- 5.16 USSD 2005 also records that:

“The law provides the right to a lawyer, to a medical examination, and referral to a prosecutor within 48 hours of arrest. If a suspect is held more than 48 hours without formal charges, the arrest is considered arbitrary and the detainee must be released. In such cases officials responsible for the prolonged arrest may be prosecuted on charges of depriving personal freedom. A suspect caught in hot pursuit must be referred to an examining judge, who decides whether to issue an indictment or order the release of the suspect. Bail is available in all cases regardless of the charges. Many provisions of the code were not observed in practice.

“While there was no state-funded public defender's office, the bar association operated an office for those who could not afford a lawyer, and a lawyer was often provided for indigent defendants.” [2f] (section 1d)

- 5.17 “Palestinian refugees were subject to arrest, detention, and harassment by state security forces and rival Palestinian factions. For example Palestinian refugees living

in camps were not allowed for most of the year to bring in construction material to repair damaged houses. Security services used this circumstance as leverage to recruit informers and buy their allegiance.” (USSD Report on Human Rights Practices – 2005, 8 March 2006) [2f] (section 1d) The USSD report of the previous year notes, on the subject of juveniles, that “In 2002, a law was passed regarding the protection of juveniles exposed to danger.” [2b] (Section 6d) USSD 2005 records “In cooperation with the UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, the Government inaugurated the Center for Juvenile Victims of Physical Abuse. As such, juveniles will no longer be interrogated at police stations but rather at the center, which was equipped according to international norms, in the presence of a social worker.” [2f] (Section 6d)

See also Section 6.A: [Arbitrary arrest and detention](#); [Torture](#)

DEATH PENALTY

- 5.18 The Amnesty International (AI) 2005 report, covering events in 2004, stated that Lebanon retains the death penalty and “At least three people were sentenced to death. Three men – Ahmad Mansour, Badea’ Hamada and Remi Antoan Za’atar – were executed in Rumieh prison in Beirut in January. The executions were the first since 1998.” [4a] The same source also stated “A draft law calling for the abolition of the death penalty was presented to parliament by seven members of parliament as part of a national campaign to end the death penalty.” [4a]
- 5.19 The Hands Off Cain 2005 Report stated that “Lebanon resumed executions after 5 years of de facto moratorium in January 2004.” [40]

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INTERNAL SECURITY

- 5.20 The US State Department Report on Human Rights Practices for 2005 (USSD 2005), dated 8 March 2006, states:

“The security forces consist of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) under the Ministry of Defense, which may arrest and detain suspects on national security grounds; the Internal Security Forces (ISF) under the Ministry of the Interior, which enforce laws, conduct searches and arrests, and refer cases to the judiciary; and the State Security Apparatus, which reports to the Prime Minister and the SG [Sûreté Générale] under the MOI [Ministry of the Interior], both of which collect information on groups deemed a possible threat to state security.” [2f] (Section 1d)

- 5.21 An International Crisis Group (ICG) report of December 2005 indicated that, since the departure of the Syrian forces from Lebanon and the 2005 elections, “Unsure whose orders to obey, deprived of their senior commanders, and waiting to see who will prevail, officials in the security apparatus often choose the safest path, which is to do nothing.” [7c] (p6) The report continues:

“Inaction reflected in part the institutional vacuum resulting from fifteen years of civil war followed by another fifteen years of Syrian hegemony. Orders often emanated from Damascus or its agents and allies in Lebanon. Even the most basic equipment, such as forensic tools required to perform DNA tests, were lacking. According to an [unnamed] Arab diplomat, ‘when we asked military intelligence what they were doing, they replied they could not do a thing, because Syria used to do everything for them’.” [7c] (p6)

- 5.22 ICG's report records that "‘Informers and *mukhabarat* [Syrian Intelligence Service] are still present but they no longer work for the government', complained [Atif Majdalani] an influential parliamentarian and member of Saad al-Hariri's Future Bloc." [7c] (p6) The same source further states that "[Marwan] Hamadeh, the minister of telecommunications, complained of continued resistance to government initiatives: 'Many ministers are completely under the control of Syrian and Lebanese security officials. As long as President Lahoud is in place, the remnants of the security system will survive'." [7c] (p6)

See also Section 5: [Judiciary](#); Section 6.A: [Arbitrary arrest and detention](#)

PRISONS

- 5.23 The World Prison Brief by the International Centre for Prison Studies reports that the ministry responsible for prisons was the "Ministry of the Interior (to be transferred to the Ministry of Justice in due course)" and that prison administration was the responsibility of the "Prison Division of the Lebanese 'Gendarmerie' (also known as 'Darak')." [43] The same source reported on prison statistics and population, stating that there were "23 penal institutions and 8 temporary detention centres". [43] The report also noted that the prison occupancy rate was 115 per cent in May 2004; that there were 2,515 prisoners in 1993, and that the prison population total including pre-trial detainees and remand prisoners was 5,375 in November 2004. [43] Amnesty International reported in August 2001 that "The international organization, Penal Reform International (PRI), has for several years been working with the Lebanese Government in the field of prison reform, visiting prisons, holding important seminars and visiting prisons, including women's prisons." [4f] (p5)
- 5.24 The US State Department Report on Human Rights Practices for 2005 (USSD 2005), dated 8 March 2006, states:

"Prison conditions were poor and did not meet minimum international standards. Prisons were overcrowded, and sanitary conditions in the women's prison, in particular, were very poor. There were no serious threats to health, but indirect threats were noted, such as physical and mental stress; the latter was especially noteworthy in Yarze prison, southeast of Beirut. The government did not consider prison reform a high priority. The number of inmates was estimated to be five thousand, of whom one third had yet to be tried or convicted. The government made a modest effort to rehabilitate some inmates through education and training programs.

"Although there was some effort to keep pretrial detainees separate from convicted prisoners, overcrowding often prevented such separation. The government held security detainees and prisoners in regular prisons. The four senior security officials arrested in the al-Hariri investigation were initially held in substandard conditions in the facilities of the Internal Security Forces, but after complaints were filed by their families and inquiries made by diplomatic missions, these prisoners were transferred to regular facilities. ...

"Unlike in previous years, the government permitted independent monitoring of prison conditions by local and international human rights groups and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)." [2f] (section 1c)

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WOMEN IN PRISON

- 5.25 In 2001, Amnesty International (AI) released a detailed report on the torture and ill-treatment of women in pre-trial detention. [4f] AI's report states that:

"There are four women's prisons in Lebanon located in Ba'abda, Tripoli, Zahle in the Beqa'a, and in Barbar al-Khazen in Beirut. Conditions in all four institutions may amount to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. There are serious shortcomings, particularly regarding a large number of sick prisoners who are not receiving adequate medical attention and are held in conditions falling short of international standards, including the Standard Minimum Rules, as well as provisions of Lebanese law. Conditions in these institutions, especially as regards hygiene, sanitation, and ventilation, are said to be seriously inadequate. Dormitories are overcrowded and damp, leading to serious health hazards including infestation by insects." [4f] (p8)

- 5.26 The same source notes that "Recently the Lebanese authorities have started to take seriously calls by NGOs and members of parliament for the improvement of prison conditions. The visit in May 2001 by members of the PHRC [Parliamentary Human Rights Committee] and the PCRWC [Parliamentary Committee on the Rights of Women and Children] of all prisons in Lebanon, including women's prisons in Ba'abda and Barbar al-Khazen, called on the Government to take immediate action to rectify the 'appalling situation' in these institutions." [4f] (p8)

MILITARY SERVICE

- 5.27 Information retrieved from Europa World online on 4 November 2005 states that:

"In August 2004 the Lebanese armed forces numbered 72,100 (army 70,000, air force 1,000, navy 1,100). Paramilitary forces included an estimated 13,000 members of the Internal Security Force. Hezbollah's active members numbered some 2,000 in August 2004. At that time there were also an estimated 16,000 Syrian troops in Lebanon. However, following several Syrian redeployments, it was reported in late April 2005 that Syria had withdrawn all of its troops from Lebanon; a UN team was dispatched to the country to verify the withdrawal (for further details, see Recent History). Israeli armed forces and the Israeli-backed South Lebanon Army (SLA) withdrew from Lebanon in May 2000. Government expenditure on defence was budgeted at £L796,000m in 2004." [1a] (Country Profile-Defence)

- 5.28 The CIA World Factbook (last updated 1 November 2005) states that military age and obligation was "18-30 years of age for compulsory and voluntary military service; conscript service obligation – 12 months (2004)." [39] A report of April 2003 by the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board stated that women were not subject to compulsory conscription as their military service, and its conditions, had yet to be decided by the government. [17b]

- 5.29 The Lebanese Embassy in Washington published information accessed on 15 November 2005 from the Lebanese Army official website about liability for the military draft. [41] [42] The Embassy information includes the following advice:

"All Lebanese male citizens born in the year 1973 or later (over 18 years old) are called for military service. As of November 5, 2002, citizens who live abroad and are called for the Military service can make a deferral or exemption in two ways:

“By personally contacting a lebanese *[sic]* Embassy or Consulate in their jurisdiction or by delegating their parents to contact the military headquarters in Lebanon while they are still living abroad.” [42]

- 5.30 The same source stated that one of the grounds for deferment was on account of “Legal permanent residence outside Lebanon for nine months or more, during which the cumulative stay in Lebanon should not exceed 3 months per year.” [42]
- 5.31 The Embassy information also stated that grounds for exemption include “Being a legal resident outside Lebanon for the past five years or more during which the cumulative stay in Lebanon did not exceed 3 months per year.” [42]
- 5.32 A report of 14 April 2003 by the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board stated that there was no compulsory conscription for women. [17b] “There is no alternative service and no option to pay a fee to avoid compulsory conscription in Lebanon. Lebanon does not recognize conscientious objection.” [17b]

HIZBOLLAH (HEZBOLLAH)

- 5.33 On the subject of recruitment by Hizbollah, a March 2005 Canadian Research Directorate information response used uncorroborated information from a Middle East Intelligence Bulletin editor, which states that:
- “People in southern Lebanon know that if they join the Hezbollah, they will receive better protection and financial security. The population in this region knows not to go against the Hezbollah because it depends on it. Since the Hezbollah is supported by most of the population in southern Lebanon, there is generally no need to force people to join the group. However, [according to the editor], some people have been punished for not joining the Hezbollah.” [17c]
- 5.34 The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (CSC) released a Global Report in 2004 which noted that Hizbollah did not believe that there was a specific age when a child should be considered an adult as it depends on each individual, but the report also states that, whilst “Hizbollah did claim responsibility for several armed attacks carried out by minors up to 1994. However, the Israeli withdrawal in 2000 seemed to have ended this practice.” [52] (Lebanon/Armed political groups)

See also Section 6.A: [Abuses by Hizbollah \(Hezbollah\)](#); **Section 6.C:** [South Lebanon Army \(SLA\)](#)

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MEDICAL SERVICES

- 5.35 The World Health Organisation (WHO) published country health indicators for Lebanon. This included a life expectancy at birth of 70 years in 2003, also a significant private health sector. [18a] The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) Travel Advice for British Citizens (last updated, 4 October 2005) stated “Medical treatment can be expensive. Most hospitals are well equipped. Doctors are generally well qualified though nursing standards vary.” [6c] A January 2006 UN Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) report noted that only 86 out of 160 of Lebanon’s hospitals had received accreditation but that non-accredited hospitals continued to receive health ministry contracts, and that “According to a public official who requested anonymity, ‘many factors – including political, financial and, last but

not least, political sectarian influence – prevent the law from being properly applied.” [29g]

- 5.36 An article in the *Daily Star* dated 4 August 2004 referred to “Lebanon's first comprehensive publication on health resources and statistics.” [23e] It was stated that the report was to be financed by the Italian government and compiled by an Italian university. [23e]
- 5.37 This report notes that “The state has a limited role in delivering health services, and both ambulatory and hospital care are mostly private.” [44] (p4-5) It also stated that “Today, ninety percent of hospital beds are in the private sector.” and “The war led to the closure of most state health centres and triggered the expansion of the private sector. The healthcare sector is now dominated by ambulatory care, mostly provided by private medical practitioners and to a small extent by non-governmental organisations.” [44] (p6)
- 5.38 The report also notes that:
- “The health sector in Lebanon is characterized by high public expenditure; fragmented, inefficient resource allocation and service delivery; excessive investment in hospital capacity and high technology; lack of quality assurance and consumer protection; and high out-of-pocket costs (50 percent of the population lacks health insurance). The Ministry of Public Health does not provide (except for a few public primary health care centres) or finance (as a third party payer) outpatient health services; and, practically does not extend preventive care. Studies also show that a large percentage of household expenditures goes *[sic]* on medication and private doctors fees.
- “Accessibility to health services is not a problem in Lebanon [due to the high level of urbanisation] ... This situation yields a Maternal Mortality Rate and Infant Mortality Rate better than most countries of the region. However, emergency care is still poorly coordinated and there is no referral system, necessitating urgent action. Affordability is also a problem, especially due to rising health care cost in an open health market. ... Under present arrangements, accessibility to health services and resources allocated to the health sector vary considerably, creating inequality among different social strata and regions in terms of availability of medical services. The same differences are also observed in quality of service.” [44] (p7-8)
- 5.39 The UNAIDS 2004 country factsheet states that “The total cumulative number of HIV and AIDS cases detected until 2000 was 613, and the majority were male aged 30-49 and 8% occurred among drug users.” [16] (p1) The report recorded that 353 people with advanced HIV infection were receiving anti-retroviral therapy in June 2004. [16] (p3)
- 5.40 The US State Department Report on Human Rights Practices for 2005 (USSD 2005), dated 8 March 2006, reports that “There are no discriminatory laws against persons with HIV/AIDS.” [2f] (Section 5: Other Societal Abuses and Discrimination) However, the UN's Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) reported on the continued societal discrimination against persons who were HIV positive, as did a Canadian Research Directorate information response of April 2004, which also reported that doctors and hospitals were sometimes reluctant to treat persons with HIV/AIDS. [29b] [17h]
- 5.41 The WHO Mental Health Atlas 2005 reports that “Though the national mental health programme had been initiated in 1987, its progress has not been satisfactory due to

the war.” [18b] The survey noted that mental health facilities were present in the primary health care system and that some therapeutic drugs were available at primary health care level. [18b]

- 5.42 USSD 2005 also states “Many persons with mental disabilities were cared for in private institutions, many of which were subsidized by the Government.” [2f] (Section 5: Persons with Disabilities)

See also Section 6.B: [People with disabilities](#)

PALESTINIANS

- 5.43 The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) overview states that: “Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict, UNRWA, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, was established by United Nations General Assembly resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949 to carry out direct relief and works programmes for Palestine refugees.” [28a] (Overview, Establishment of UNRWA) The Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA for Palestinians in the Near East, covering the period 1 July 2004—30 June 2005 (UNRWA 2005) records that “The UNRWA health programme aims to protect, preserve and promote the health status of Palestine refugees and meet their basic health needs consistent with basic WHO principles and concepts and with the standards of public sector health services in the Agency’s area of operations.” [28f] (Chapter II, Health, para 65)
- 5.44 UNRWA states that, regionally, the primary health care “Services provided include outpatient medical care, disease prevention and control, mother-and-child health, family planning advice and health education. UNRWA also offers help with secondary care, especially emergency and life-saving treatment through contractual agreements with non-governmental and private hospitals or through partial reimbursement of treatment costs.” [28a] (Overview, Health) The organisation published the following statistics concerning the health facilities it provided in Lebanon on its website, which were correct as of 30 June 2005:

HEALTH	LEBANON
Primary Health Care Facilities (PHCF)	25
Health Staff	575
PHCFs with Dental Services (incl. 8 mobile units)	17
PHCFs offering MCH and Family Planning	25
PHCFs offering Diabetes/Hypertension Care	25
PHCFs offering Laboratory Services	15
Annual Patient Visits (2004)	1,023,841
CS connected to Water Networks (%)	97
CS connected to Sewerage Networks (%)	64

[28c]

- 5.45 UNRWA 2005 records that “In Lebanon, the Agency maintained its environmental health services in refugee camps throughout its areas of operation, introducing and/or improving sewage disposal, storm water drainage, provision of safe drinking water and refuse collection.” [28f] (para 25) UNRWA’s camp profiles also state that “The majority [of Palestinians] rely entirely on UNRWA as the sole provider of

education, health and relief and social services.” [28b] (**Lebanon Refugee Camp Profiles**) Also “Physical disabilities and mental and psychological problems, especially among children in the occupied Palestinian territory and Lebanon, were on the increase.” [28f] (para 68)

- 5.46 The same source also reported on the developments in the Agency’s health programmes, between 1 July 2004 and 30 June 2005, including primary medical care, secondary care, health protection and promotion, and disease prevention and control. [28f] (paras 65-111) A 2005 brief on the living conditions of Palestinians in Lebanon by Fafo reported in detail on mother and child health, chronic illness and psychological health, and the facilities available to Palestinians. [55b] (p18-22) It states that, whilst Palestinian mother and child health in Lebanon was comparable to the region, “According to other health indicators, particularly chronic illness and disability, health failure is a large problem among the camp and gathering [communities of 25 or more households that live outside of the camps] population in Lebanon. It is also a type of health problem for which there is little access for the refugees to long-term and comprehensive care.” [55b] (p18)
- 5.47 Fafo also noted that the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon were less content with their local medical facilities than their compatriots in Jordan and Syria stating, in reference to the dissatisfaction specifically with UNRWA’s provision of health care, that “One weak point of UNRWA’s services might be the extremely low number of doctors relative to demand, which leaves the doctors with very little time for each patient.” [55b] (p22) In January 2006, the UN’s Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) reported on UNRWA’s termination of its contracts with a number of hospitals outside the capital, Beirut. [29i] The agency received criticism for signing an agreement with the Beirut University Hospital instead:

“By ending its contracts with some of the hospitals outside the capital, [the UNRWA decision] has led to a true crisis in the patient’s lives,’ said Abou Fadi Menawar, Vice President of the Popular Committees in South Lebanon, which serve as a liaison between the camps, the UNRWA and the Lebanese government. ... The UNRWA, meanwhile, defended the move, saying the decision had been taken after numerous complaints from the refugee community about the administrative, financial and quality problems experienced at other hospitals.” [29i]

See also Section 5: Medical Services/Palestinians; Educational system/Palestinians; Section 6.A: Employment Rights/Palestinians; Section 6.B: Ethnic groups/Palestinians

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EDUCATION

- 5.48 The Right to Education human rights resource reported that a law of 1998 provides as follows “Education shall be free and compulsory in the initial primary stage and is a right of every Lebanese person of primary school age. The conditions for such free compulsory education shall be determined by a decree adopted by the Council of Ministers, as shall its regulation.” [47]
- 5.49 The Institute for Statistics of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) reported that 75 per cent of children were in pre-primary school, 90 per cent of girls and 91 per cent of boys are in primary school, secondary enrolment was 79 per cent (2002-3 figures). [45] The UN Development Programme reported that the adult literacy rate in 2001 was 86.5 per cent. [46]

- 5.50 The US State Department Report on Human Rights Practices for 2004 (USSD 2004), dated 28 February 2005, states “The Government did not restrict academic freedom, and the country had a strong private educational system.” [2b] (Section 2a) The USSD report of the following year notes that “Education was free in public schools and compulsory until the completion of the elementary level at age 12. However, implementation decrees were not issued. Public schools generally were inadequate, lacking proper facilities, equipment and trained staff. Although private schools are widespread in the country, the cost of private education was a significant problem for the middle and lower classes.” [2f] (Section 5: Children)

PALESTINIANS

- 5.51 The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) overview states that “Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict, UNRWA, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, was established by United Nations General Assembly resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949 to carry out direct relief and works programmes for Palestine refugees.” [28a] (Overview, Establishment of UNRWA) The UNRWA overview also reports that “Education is UNRWA's largest area of activity accounting for half its regular budget and two-thirds of its staff.” [28a] (Overview, Education)
- 5.52 The Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA for Palestinians in the Near East, covering the period 1 July 2004—30 June 2005 (UNRWA 2005) states that:
- “Through four main educational areas, namely, general education; teacher education; vocational and technical education; and education planning and management, the Agency seeks to empower Palestine refugees with the knowledge base and skills that will enable them to become self-reliant and productive members of their communities. The education programme seeks to embody the identity and cultural heritage of the refugees, and endeavours to engender a spirit of interdependence and tolerance, in particular by fostering awareness of fundamental human rights, means of conflict resolution, the necessity of gender equity and the elements of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.” [28f] (Chapter II, Education, para 42)
- 5.53 The organisation published the following statistics concerning the educational facilities it provided in Lebanon on its website, which were correct as of 30 June 2005:

EDUCATION 2004/2005 ACADEMIC YEAR	LEBANON
Schools (Elem, Prep + 5 Secondary in Lebanon)	87
Educational Staff	1,609
Pupil Enrolment	40,549
Female Pupils (%)	50.7
Cost Per Elementary Pupil (US\$)	517.7
Cost Per Preparatory Pupil (US\$)	797.9
Vocational & Technical Training Centres (VTTC)	1
VTTC Training Places	673
Educational Sciences Faculties (4 year course)	

Pre-service Places	100
Number of In-service Teachers in Training	162

[28c]

- 5.54 UNRWA also states that “The majority [of Palestinians] rely entirely on UNRWA as the sole provider of education, health and relief and social services.” [28b] (**Lebanon Refugee Camp Profiles**) USSD 2005 notes that “Many Palestinian children reportedly were forced to leave school at an early age to help earn income. Other reasons for dropouts were marriage (especially for minor girls), frustration, and hopelessness. Poverty, drug addiction, prostitution, and crime reportedly prevailed in the camps, although reliable statistics were not available. [2f] (**Section 5: National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities**) A 2003 paper by Are Knudsen, ‘Islamism in the Diaspora: Palestinian refugees in Lebanon’, also noted how the Palestinian population were unable to access higher education and that this, along with the official exclusion from seeking employment in over 70 professions (although this restriction was lifted on 50 occupations by a June 2005 Ministry of Labour memorandum), has condemned them to the position of being a permanent underclass. [56] (p7) [2f] (**Section 5: National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities**)
- 5.55 UNRWA 2005 reported on the developments in the Agency’s education programmes, between 1 July 2004 and 30 June 2005, including elementary and preparatory schooling, remedial and special education, secondary schooling, and education reform. [28f] (**Chapter II, Education, paras 42-64**) A 2005 brief on the living conditions of Palestinians in Lebanon by Fafo states that “The educational status of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon has improved over time in parallel to the region as a whole.” [55b] (p14) The brief attributed this improvement to UNRWA’s work but continues “Despite this development over the long term, education achievements among refugees in Lebanon are much lower than among refugees elsewhere. Highest completed education levels are lower, and for youth and children at school ages grade repetition and dropout rates are high.” [55b] (p14-15) The source then examined Palestinian literacy, school enrolment and educational achievement in more detail. [55b] (p15-17)

See also Section 5: Medical services/Palestinians; Section 6.A: Employment Rights/Palestinians; Section 6.B: Ethnic groups/Palestinians; Ethnic groups/Palestinians/Refugee Camps

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6. Human Rights

6.A HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES

GENERAL

- 6.01 The US Department of State (USSD), international human rights organisations such as Freedom House (FH) and Amnesty International (AI), and the Canada-based Lebanese human rights organisation, Rassemblement Canadien pour le Liban (RCPL), all reported on the general human rights situation in Lebanon during 2004 and 2005. [2b, 2f] [10a] [4a] [30a-30n] USSD's Human Rights Report 2005 (USSD 2005) noted that "Despite the end of the Syrian military occupation of Lebanon, some Syrian interference in the country continued. Palestinian and Lebanese militias, particularly the terrorist organisation Hizballah, often acted as Syrian proxies and retained significant influence over parts of the country." [2f] (p1) An International Crisis Group (ICG) report of December 2005, reporting on events since the Syrian withdrawal, remarks that:

"... Siniora and the country as a whole must now contend with deeply rooted sectarian loyalties and antagonisms in a context of enhanced regional and international stakes. In the absence of direct Syrian control but with active indirect interference, and with the political situation in flux, fractious confessional leaders have struggled to fill the vacuum, eager to protect and promote their status, leading to more divisiveness, in the eyes of many, than at any point since the civil war. As always in such circumstances, foreign actors both rush in and are pulled in, while Lebanon inches toward its traditional role as the locale for proxy wars. The level of intermingling between the domestic and the international is conveyed by a statistic: according to an opinion poll, more than 80 per cent of Sunnis and Christians trust Detlev Mehlis's investigation, but two-thirds of Shiites did not. From a spate of car-bombs to prolonged gunbattles around Palestinian camps, from sectarian suspicion to international stakes, Lebanon abounds with dynamite fuses, all threatening to ignite a conflagration." [7c] (p7-8)

- 6.02 USSD's Human Rights Report 2004 (USSD 2004), FH's World Report 2005 (FH 2005) and AI's Annual Report 2005 (AI 2005) all reported on events in 2004, prior to the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanese territory. [2b] [10a] [4a] USSD 2004 stated that "The Government's overall human rights record remained poor; although there were some improvements in a few areas, serious problems remained." [2b] (p1) Amnesty International's Annual Report 2005 (AI 2005), covering events from January to December 2004, reported that:

"Scores of people, including Islamist activists and members of opposition groups, were arrested for political reasons. Most were released after short periods. Trials of Sunni Islamist activists accused of 'terrorism' and other state security offences continued. There were reports of torture and ill-treatment, and at least two detainees died in custody. There was an apparent increase of violence against women. Attacks on freedom of expression and association continued." [4a] (p1)

TORTURE

- 6.03 AI's May 2005 report, 'A Human Rights Agenda for the Parliamentary Elections', stated that Article 401 of the Lebanese Penal Code forbids torture and provides for punitive measures against officials found responsible for torture or ill-treatment. However, torture and ill-treatment continue to be reported in Lebanon." [4d] (p4) AI's

May 2005 report also registered its concern that confessions allegedly obtained as a result of torture continued to be accepted as evidence in trials and stated that “Insufficient measures appear to have been taken to protect detainees against torture and ill-treatment or to curtail the use of incommunicado detention which facilitates the practice of torture.” [4d] (p4) Amnesty International released an extensive report on the torture and ill-treatment of women in pre-trial detention in August 2001, which states that:

“In Lebanon large numbers of women held in pre-trial detention in the custody of police, the general security and the military intelligence face the risk of being tortured and ill-treated while held in prolonged incommunicado detention, sometimes for as long as several weeks, without access to lawyers or being brought before a judge. Amnesty International’s research shows that women detainees held on charges of a political nature including ‘collaboration’ with Israel, and criminal offences such as murder and drug dealing appear to be most at risk of torture or ill-treatment so that they may be coerced to confess guilt or testify against themselves at a time when they lack the protection of the law.” [4f]

6.04 USSD 2005 reports that:

“The law does not specifically prohibit torture, and security forces abused detainees and in some instances used torture. Human rights groups, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, reported that torture was a common practice. During the period of Syrian control prior to April [2005], former detainees at the Lebanese Ministry of Defense Detention Center and in Syrian jails stated that they were routinely tortured during interrogation. Methods of torture frequently included severe beating, food and sleep deprivation, and hanging by the wrists which were tied behind the back.” [2f] (Section 1c)

6.05 AI 2005 also states that “There were reports of torture and ill-treatment, and at least two detainees died in custody [in 2004].” [4a] (p2) USSD 2005 continues “The Government acknowledged that violent abuse of detainees usually occurred during preliminary investigations conducted at police stations or military installations, in which suspects were interrogated without an attorney. Such abuse occurred despite national laws that prevent judges from accepting any confession extracted under duress.” [2f] (Section 1c) A May 2003 AI report on Torture and unfair trial of the Dhinniyyah detainees reports that:

“Categories of political prisoners particularly targeted include members of opposition parties and groups, both from Christian and Sunni Muslim communities, and people held in connection with their alleged ‘collaboration’ or ‘contact’ with Israel. They are normally detained incommunicado for weeks and, in some cases, even their names or places of detention are not made public. These categories of people, according to research carried out by Amnesty International, are more vulnerable to human rights abuses for their political opposition to the government and/or the Syrian military presence in Lebanon. In pre-trial detention members of Sunni Muslim groups are often labelled by the media and government officials as ‘terrorists’ or affiliates of *al-Qa’ida*, and Christian political activists risk being labelled as ‘collaborators’ with Israel.” [4b] (p1)

6.06 AI used the individual accounts of the Dhinniyyah detainees to illustrate the types of torture commonly used in such cases, stating that “Amnesty International’s findings in relation to the Dhinniyyah case show that the detainees apparently were invariably subjected to torture and/or ill-treatment during various stages of their detention, particularly when held incommunicado, apparently because members of the Military

Intelligence wanted to obtain as much ‘evidence’ from the detainees as possible to be used in court against them.” [4b] (p11)

6.07 The methods of torture and ill-treatment described by AI in its reports on the Dhinniyyah and female detainees included:

- restriction of movement or position abuse (including forcing the victim to sit still in one place for hours or being held for prolonged periods in fixed positions in underground cells); [4b] (p12) [4f] (p7)
- electric shocks;
- the *ballanco* (hanging by the wrists which are tied behind the back); [4b] (p12)
- beatings (including with solid objects); [4b] (p13) [4f] (p7)
- verbal abuse and threats;
- sexually abusive threats against their female relatives;
- denigration of religious beliefs and being prevented from praying;
- deprivation of food and sleep;
- blindfolded and handcuffed for long periods; [4b] (p13)
- *farruj* (chicken) where the victim is strapped to a revolving wooden bar resembling a roasting spit and beaten with sticks;
- *dullab* (tyre) which involves hanging the victim from a suspended tyre and beating;
- *falaqa* or beating on the soles of the feet; [4f] (p6)
- extinguishing cigarettes on parts of the body;
- prolonged solitary confinement;
- intimidation;
- denial of access to medication. [4f] (p7)

6.08 AI’s 2001 report on the treatment of women in detention, which concerned not only political or ‘terror’ detainees but also ordinary criminal detainees, especially those accused of major criminal offences, listed gender-specific methods of torture or other ill-treatment:

- rape and attempted rape;
- insertion of objects into the body;
- beating by solid objects and burning of cigarettes on sensitive parts of the female body;
- forcible stripping and exposing of sensitive parts of the female body by male guards;
- use of sexually abusive language;
- psychological torture including torture of relatives in front of or in the hearing of female detainees;
- constant invasion by male guards of female privacy;
- deprivation of access to female-designated toilets;
- denial of access to women’s hygiene and medication;
- lack of adequate facilities for pregnant women. [4f] (p6)

6.09 In January 2006, AI reiterated its concerns on the ill-treatment to which detainees were subjected “Over the years Amnesty International has also repeatedly documented the use of torture and ill-treatment in Lebanese detention centres particularly during pre-trial detention and as a means of obtaining ‘confessions’. The United Nations’ Human Rights Committee has also expressed concerns about Lebanon’s military courts and well-substantiated allegations of torture and ill-treatment by Lebanon’s police and security forces.” [4f]

ARBITRARY ARREST AND DETENTION

- 6.10 According to Article 8 of the Lebanon's Constitution, "Individual liberty is guaranteed and protected by law. No one may be arrested, imprisoned, or kept in custody except according to the provisions of the law. No offense may be established or penalty imposed except by law." [20] (Part A, Chapter 2) AI's May 2005 report asserted that the use of incommunicado detention in Lebanon must be curtailed, stating that "Detainees must not be subjected to prolonged incommunicado detention as this facilitates torture and can in itself constitute a form of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. Detainees must be held in recognizable places of detention in humane conditions." [4d] (p4-5)
- 6.11 Prior to the Syrian withdrawal, USSD 2004 reported that "Security forces continued the practice of arbitrary arrest and detention. On several occasions during the year [2004], security forces detained and arrested citizens on grounds of national security. Protestors were also arbitrarily detained and arrested. The Government also detained, interrogated, and harassed journalists; however, in contrast to previous years, there were no instances of physical abuse." [2b] (Section 1d) The Freedom House (FH) Freedom in the World Survey 2005 states that "Arbitrary arrest and detention by Lebanese security forces (and, occasionally, Syrian troops and Syrian-backed paramilitary groups) are commonplace, and the use of torture to extract confessions is widespread. According to a 2004 report by Lebanon's Parliamentary Commission on Human Rights, there are more than 1,500 people in prison who have never been convicted of a crime." [10a] (p367)
- 6.12 USSD 2005, which covered the human rights situation of 2005, concurs with both USSD 2004 and FH's World Survey 2005 excepting that "Since the withdrawal of Syrian forces there appears to be no indication that the government detained, interrogated, or harassed journalists. [2f] (Section 1d) Further, "During the uncertain times preceding Syrian withdrawal, and in the months thereafter, the security services demonstrated respect for the rights of antigovernment and proindependence demonstrators in Beirut. These security forces nonetheless committed numerous serious human rights abuses, sometimes acting independently and other times on instruction of senior government officials." [2f] (Section 1d)
- 6.13 USSD 2004 notes that "Again, during the year [2004], there were no allegations that the Government transferred citizens to Syria, and the nine persons arrested by Syrian forces during and after the civil war and turned over in 2000 to the Government were reportedly released quietly at the end of the year." [2b] (Section 1d) However, HRW's January 2005 Country Summary on Syria states that "The [Syrian] government has never acknowledged responsibility for an estimated 17,000 persons—Lebanese citizens and stateless Palestinians—who were 'disappeared' in Lebanon in the early 1990s and are known or believed to be imprisoned in Syria." [5a] (p1) USSD 2005 reported that once more there were no allegations of the transferral of Lebanese citizens to Syria but noted that "Human rights activists believed that there were numerous Lebanese, Palestinians, and Jordanians in prolonged and often secret detention in Syria. According to credible reports, Syrian forces operating in the country carried out searches, arrests, and detentions of citizens outside any legal framework, until their departure from the country in late April." [2f] (Section 1d)

See also Section 5: [Legal Rights/Detention](#); Section 6.A: [Torture](#); [Disappearances](#); [Freedom of Speech and the Media](#); [Freedom of Association and Assembly](#)

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EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS AND ASSASSINATIONS

- 6.14 The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and USSD 2005 reported on a number of apparently politically-motivated assassinations and assassination attempts during 2005. (BBC news reports, 14 February 2005—14 December 2005) [21a, 21n-o, 21q, 21t-21u, 21aa] [2f] (Section 1a) Former Prime Minister, and anti-Syrian politician, Rafiq Hariri was killed by a car bomb on 14 February 2005. (BBC news reports, 14 February 2005, USSD 2005) [21a] [2f] (Section 1a) His death sparked mass protests against the Syrian occupation of Lebanon, which led to the full withdrawal of Syrian forces from the country in April 2005. (BBC, news reports, 14 March—26 April 2005; UN Security Council report, 24 March 2005) [21b-21d] [3d]

See also Section 4: Syrian Withdrawal;
Section 6.C: Relations with Neighbouring Countries

- 6.15 During March, April and May 2005, bombings occurred in the Christian sector, although there was no one obvious target for these attacks. (BBC news reports, 23 March 2005—7 May 2005; USSD 2005) [21g-21k] [2f] (Section 1a) Samir Qasir, a prominent journalist renowned for his critical writing including of the Lebanese authorities and Syria's activities in Lebanon, was killed on 2 June 2005. (BBC news report 2 June 2005; Al 2 June 2005; USSD 2005) [21n] [4e] [2f] (Section 1a) On 21 June 2005, anti-Syrian former leader of the Lebanese Communist Party, George Hawi was assassinated. (BBC news report, 21 June 2005; USSD 2005) [21o] [2f] (Section 1a) On 12 July 2005, the outgoing pro-Syrian defence minister, Elias Murr was injured in an attempt on his life. (BBC news report, 12 July 2005; USSD 2005) [21q] [2f] (Section 1a) On 25 September 2005, May Chidiac – an outspoken anti-Syrian anchor woman – survived a bomb attack but had to have an arm and a leg amputated due to the injuries she received. (BBC news report, 25 September 2005; USSD 2005) [21u] [2f] (Section 1a) Hussein Assaf, a leading militant of pro-Syrian Hizbollah, survived a car bombing in December 2005. (BBC news report, 11 December 2005) [21aa] However, anti-Syrian journalist and MP, Gibran Tueni, did not survive the attack on his life only days later. (BBC news report, 14 December 2005; USSD 2005) [21t] [2f] (Section 1a) USSD 2005 reports that, "While no arrests were made in these cases, it was widely believed that these attacks were carried out by elements directed by the Syrian regime." [2f] (Section 1a)

See also Section 6.A: Journalists; Leading political activists

- 6.16 USSD 2005 continues:
- "After the April Syrian withdrawal, there were no reports of arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life by the government or its agents. However, prior to April, four government intelligence and security officials, working in conjunction with the Syrian government, were reportedly implicated in high-profile arbitrary and unlawful deprivation of life. These four security chiefs were arrested and remained imprisoned at year's end after being declared suspects in the al-Hariri assassination by the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIC)." [2f] (Section 1a)
- 6.17 USSD 2004 states that "There were no reports of the arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life committed by the Government or its agents [in 2004]." [2b] (Section 1a) The report did record that killings by unknown assailants, a suspicious death in custody and the killing of several protestors all occurred in 2004, and Al 2005 reporting on events in 2004 remarked on the death of at least two detainees in custody, and reported on the killing of protestors by the security forces. [2b] (Section 1a) [4a] (p2)

DISAPPEARANCES

- 6.18 The Lebanese organisation, Support of Lebanese Detained Arbitrarily (SOLIDA), published a number of short reports in 2004 and 2005 on the suspected continued detention of Lebanese citizens in Syrian prisons, who ‘disappeared’ during the 1975—1990 civil war, and during the early 1990s. [27a-27f]

- 6.19 Human Rights Watch’s (HRW) World Report stated that “The [Syrian] government has never acknowledged responsibility for an estimated 17,000 persons—Lebanese citizens and stateless Palestinians—who were ‘disappeared’ in Lebanon in the early 1990s and are known or believed to be imprisoned in Syria.” [5a] (**Arbitrary Arrest and Detention, Torture, and ‘Disappearances’**) A November 2005 UN Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) report concurred, stating that:

“In the past, the Syrian-controlled Lebanese government also denied the existence of Lebanese prisoners in Syria. In 1995, it even issued a law declaring anyone who disappeared during the Civil War as officially dead. An estimated 17,000 people went missing over the course of the ruinous, 15-year-long conflict.

“In 1998, however, Syria released 121 Lebanese prisoners, some of whom had been known to AI and Solide. Again, in 2001, the Lebanese leaders of the Sunni Tawfid Party, held, were released along with 46 others. Since then, Damascus has admitted the existence of at least some Lebanese prisoners in Syrian jails.

“Syrian Prime Minister Najj Otari, in a June interview with Spanish daily El Pais, defended the detentions. ‘Those detained all fought on the Israeli side [of the war], and killed Syrian soldiers,’ he was quoted as saying. ‘Of course we punished them – just like terrorists in Spain or any other countries are punished.’” [29a]

- 6.20 IRIN’s report also noted that:

“According to Marie Daunay, president of Solida the Paris-based Support for Lebanese Detained Arbitrarily (Solida), appearances are not so much to silence the detainee, but to intimidate his or her family. ‘If friends or family dare to talk,’ she said, ‘the one who disappeared could be harmed.’ ... According to Daunay, people from all walks of life and from all parts of the country have disappeared. These have included Christians, Palestinians and members of Sunni fundamentalist groups.” [29a]

- 6.21 USSD 2005 states that “There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances [during 2005].” [2f] (**Section 1b**) The report also notes that “The Government had not disclosed the findings of a 2000 report investigating cases of disappearance during the 1975-89 civil war.” [2f] (**Section 1b**) According to reports by AI and HRW, it was believed that Syria still held Lebanese political detainees in 2004. [4a] (p3) [5a] (p1) USSD 2004 concurred; “Human rights activists believed that there were numerous Lebanese, Palestinians, and Jordanians in prolonged and often secret detention.” [2b] (**Section 1d**) The following year’s USSD report records that “Beginning in April [2005], hundreds of friends and relatives of disappeared persons participated in a sit-in in front of UN offices in the country, calling on the UN Security Council to establish an international commission of inquiry into the cases of the disappeared. In August the government appointed a security/judicial committee to follow up with Syrian authorities on the cases of those Lebanese believed to have been detained in Syrian jails.” [2f] (**Section 1b**) HRW’s January 2005 Country Summary on Syria states that “The [Syrian] government has never acknowledged responsibility for an estimated 17,000 persons—Lebanese citizens and stateless Palestinians—

who were 'disappeared' in Lebanon in the early 1990s and are known or believed to be imprisoned in Syria." [5a] (p1)

6.22 IRIN's November 2005 report records that:

"Since the Syrian pullout, relatives of Lebanon's disappeared have assembled every day in front of UN headquarters in the capital, Beirut, in hopes of finding out what happened to their loved ones.

"The faces of hundreds of men, along with some women, who disappeared over the last 30 years stare out from a makeshift wall of photos. Their relatives, meanwhile, say that many of them were at one point held in jails in Syria. ... 'Before the Syrian retreat in April, we knew of about 290 cases,' said Ghazi Aad, chairman of the Paris-based NGO Support for Lebanese in Detention and Exile, or Solide. 'But since people are no longer afraid to talk, that number has grown to 643.'" [29a]

See also Section 6.A: Torture; Arbitrary Arrest and Detention; Section 6.C: Relations with neighbouring countries/Syria

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ABUSES BY HIZBOLLAH (HEZBOLLAH)

6.23 USSD 2005 reports that:

"Despite the end of the Syrian military occupation of Lebanon, some Syrian interference in the country continued. Palestinian and Lebanese militias, particularly the terrorist organization Hizballah, often acted as Syrian proxies and retained significant influence over parts of the country. UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions 1559 and 1614 require the government to take effective control of all Lebanese territory and disarm militia groups operating in Lebanese territory. The government had begun by the end of the year taking steps to isolate and limit Palestinian arms; however, citing the need for an internal dialogue, the government had not taken steps to disarm extra-legal armed groups or to disarm Hizballah." [2f] (p1)

USSD 2004 and USSD 2005 both recorded the continuation of cross-border attacks between Hizballah (as well as Palestinian and other unidentified armed groups) and the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) during both 2004 and 2005. [2b] (Section 1a) [2f] (Section 1a) The 2004 Annual Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) also records that "[In 2004,] Sporadic cross-border skirmishes persisted between Israeli forces and Hezbollah militants seeking to end the Israeli occupation of the disputed Shebaa Farms region in the foothills of the Golan Heights." [48] (p292)

6.24 A Human Rights Watch report released in June 2000, the month that followed the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon, reported on the kidnapping of persons believed to have some connection with the South Lebanon Army (SLA), and the suspicion that Hizballah was responsible for the kidnappings. [5c] The report states that:

"In separate interviews, several local residents speculated that the men were abducted and questioned on the basis of intelligence files left behind in the SLA's security office in Aitaroun after the withdrawal. These views were substantiated by the comments of a man who was released after one week. He told Human Rights Watch that he was interrogated three times while blindfolded and that it seemed his

interrogator was making statements and asking questions based on information he was reading from a file. The wife of another victim testified that she visited Hizballah's office in Aitaroun and was told this about her husband: 'Don't worry. He is with us. They treat them very well and they are not beaten.' The woman said that she was also told that 'every person who had a file in Aitaroun's SLA security office will be asked some questions and will return.'" [5c]

- 6.25 USSD 2004 reports that "During the year, there were several reports that Hizballah subjected former SLA operatives who returned to their villages to regular harassment including arrest. In July [2004], one parliamentarian publicly criticized Hizballah for detaining Fouad Mazraani on the accusation of cooperating with the Israelis. Although Mazraani was released, the parliamentarian argued that any such action was the responsibility of the Government." [2b] (Section 1e) However, USSD 2005 states that "Unlike in previous years, there were no reports that Hizballah subjected former Southern Lebanese Army (SLA) soldiers who returned to their villages to harassment." [2f] (Section 1e)
- 6.26 The same source records that "Internet usage and access was reportedly restricted in Hizballah-controlled areas in south Lebanon and in the Palestinian-controlled refugee camps." [2f] (Section 2a) Also, that "Some human rights groups reported harassment and intimidation by the government or Hizballah." [2f] (Section 4) "On several occasions, Hizballah operatives interfered with the freedom of movement of UN Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) personnel. According to the UN secretary general's 2004 report, no action had been taken against the 15 Hizballah operatives who injured 3 UNIFIL observers in 2002, despite government assurances that the perpetrators would be arrested and brought to trial." (USSD 2005) [2f] (Section 2d) Nevertheless, International Crisis Group (ICG) remarked in its December 2005 report that, following the Syrian withdrawal and recent elections, "The state gradually is extending its presence to no-go zones, those run by Syrian allies, and in particular those being held by pro-Syrian Palestinian groups." [7c] (p5)

See also Section 5: Military service/Hizbollah (Hezbollah); Section 6.C: South Lebanon Army (SLA); Hizbollah (Hezbollah); Relations with Neighbouring Countries

ABUSES BY PALESTINIAN GROUPS

- 6.27 USSD 2004 reported that Palestinian militias held significant influence over some areas of the country; "Palestinian groups, including armed factions, operated autonomously in refugee camps throughout the country [in 2004]." [2b] (p1) It also stated that Palestinian security forces operated independently of Lebanese security forces and committed numerous, serious human rights abuses. [2b] (p1) The World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) reported in December 2005 on the intimidation of the Palestinian Human Rights Organisation (PHRO) by the Pro-Syrian Palestinian Alliance Parties, which encompasses the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), Islamic Struggle Movement – Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Sae'ka, Struggling Frontier (Al-Nidal), Fatah Movement-Intifada and Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF). [25b] USSD 2005 notes that:

"Palestinian and Lebanese militias, particularly the terrorist organization Hizballah, often acted as Syrian proxies and retained significant influence over parts of the country. UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions 1559 and 1614 require the government to take effective control of all Lebanese territory and disarm militia groups operating in Lebanese territory. The government had begun by the end of the year taking steps to isolate and limit Palestinian arms; however, citing the need for an

internal dialogue, the government had not taken steps to disarm extra-legal armed groups or to disarm Hizballah.” [2f] (p1)

- 6.28 Nevertheless, the International Crisis Group (ICG) remarked in its December 2005 report that, following the Syrian withdrawal and recent elections, “The state gradually is extending its presence to no-go zones, those run by Syrian allies, and in particular those being held by pro-Syrian Palestinian groups.” [7c] (p5)
- 6.29 USSD 2005 reported that, “During the year [2005] there were reports that members of the various groups that controlled specific camps detained their Palestinian rivals. Rival groups, such as Fatah and Asbat al-Nur, regularly clashed over territorial control in the various camps, sometimes leading to exchanges of gunfire and the detention of rival members.” [2f] (Section 1c) Further, “Palestinian groups in refugee camps operated an autonomous and arbitrary system of justice not under the control of the state. For example, local popular committees in the camps attempted to solve disputes using tribal methods of reconciliation. If the case involved a killing, the committees occasionally used their good offices to hand over the perpetrator to Lebanese authorities for trial.” [2f] (Section 1c)
- 6.30 The same source records that “Internet usage and access was reportedly restricted in Hizballah-controlled areas in south Lebanon and in the Palestinian-controlled refugee camps.” [2f] (Section 2a) USSD 2004 and 2005 reported that cross-border incidents involving members of Palestinian militias and the Israeli Defence Forces continued to occur. [2b] (Section 1a) [2f] (Section 1a)

See also Section 6.B: [Ethnic groups/Palestinians](#); **Section 6.C:** [Palestinian groups](#)

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FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MEDIA

- 6.31 According to Article 13 of the Lebanon’s Constitution, “The freedom to express one’s opinion orally or in writing, the freedom of the press, the freedom of assembly, and the freedom of association are guaranteed within the limits established by law.” [20] (Part A, Chapter 2) Reporters Sans Frontières’ (RSF) October 2005 report on press freedom states that:

“Lebanon (108th [in the Worldwide Press Freedom Index 2005]) is traditionally the region’s top-ranking country on the Index but it dropped more than 50 places in two years because of the murder of journalist Samir Kassir in June. An attack that seriously mutilated journalist May Chidiac in mid-September boded ill for the future. Journalists have become targets since the assassination of former prime minister Rafiq Hariri in February and are paying the price of the poor security situation. For the first time for years, several fled the country fearing for their lives.” [11e] (Little improvement in Middle East)

- 6.32 The US State Department’s Human Rights Report for 2005 (USSD 2005), published on 8 March 2006, states that:

“The law provides for freedom of speech and of the press; however, the government limited the exercise of these rights prior to the withdrawal of Syrian military forces in April. Syrian security services in the country intimidated journalists. Journalists were victims of violence during the year. The reduction of Syrian interference lessened the desire and ability of authorities to censor the press; however, journalists continued to exercise self-censorship, although to a far lesser degree than in previous years. The

killings of prominent journalists and the failure to apprehend those responsible created a climate of intimidation.” [2f] (Section 2a)

6.33 Further:

“The government may prosecute offending journalists and publications in the Publications Court. The 1991 security agreement between the government and Syria, still in effect, contains a provision that prohibits the publication of any information deemed harmful to the security of either state. The withdrawal of Syrian troops and a decrease in Syrian influence encouraged Lebanese journalists to be open in their criticism of Syrian and Lebanese authorities alike. Dozens of newspapers and hundreds of periodicals were published throughout the country that were financed by and reflected the views of various local, sectarian, and foreign interest groups.” [2f] (Section 2a)

- 6.34 A 2005 Freedom House (FH) report on Freedom of the Press in 2004 concurred, recording that “All of Lebanon’s national daily newspapers are privately owned, many by political interests...Access to regional and international satellite television channels has grown substantially over the last decade.” [10b] The report also noted that the private media market had become increasingly diverse and that the press had been able to issue stronger criticism of the Government towards the end of 2004. [10b] The report did recount one incidence of censorship by the Sûreté Générale (SG) of a song video in March 2004. [10b]

- 6.35 Reporters Sans Frontières’ (RSF) Annual Report 2005 also acknowledged the existence of privately-owned media in Lebanon “But many topics remain out-of-bounds, including relations with ‘friendly’ countries such as Syria and Saudi Arabia.” [11c] (Introduction to North Africa and the Middle East) The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) report ‘Attacks on the Press 2004’ noted the political ownership of much of the media in Lebanon and remarks that “The fact that politicians own many news outlets in Lebanon has resulted in highly politicized coverage.” [13b] (p2)

“Following the departure of Syrian troops, the government did not restrict radio and television broadcasts. In August [2005] parliament overwhelmingly passed a bill ending a nearly three-year ban against Murr Television (MTV). However, the Publication Appeals Court ruled on October 21 that MTV should cease its broadcasts because the station had harmed relations with Syria and the dignity of the head of state, as well as violated the electoral law. In November, the station won a decision on appeal and recommenced its broadcasting services.” (USSD 2005, 8 March 2006) [2f] (Section 2a)

- 6.36 Amnesty International’s Annual Report 2005 (AI 2005), covering events from January to December 2004, reports that “Attacks on freedom of expression and association continued.” [4a] (p1) The report recounted one specific example in which the launch of the book of a former detainee of the Syrian authorities was halted by detaining the author, and the book was banned, copies confiscated and charges brought against its publishers. [4a] (p3)

JOURNALISTS

- 6.37 In July 2004, RSF reported on an attempt to intimidate Ali Hashisho, a Lebanese journalist working as a correspondent for New TV (NTV) in Saida, southern Lebanon and for Reuters news agency. [11a] CPJ’s ‘Attacks on the Press 2005’ recounted the targeting of journalists critical of the Syrian regime noting that “Some journalists

believed that criticism of Syrian officials and politicians linked to Damascus, such as Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, would be possible [following the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanese soil]. ‘The gloves are now off,’ said one journalist. He and his colleagues soon learned, however, that it was the enemies of press freedom who were geared up for a fight.” [13d] AI, RSF, CPJ and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) all reported on the June 2005 assassination of Samir Qasir. [4e] [11b] [13a] [21n] CPJ reports that “In his popular newspaper column, Qassir [Qasir] was a vigorous critic of Syria, its Lebanese allies, and Syria’s 29-year military and political presence in Lebanon, which ended with the withdrawal of troops this April [2005]. He was threatened and harassed for his outspoken writing.” [13a] RSF’s report also notes that “Kassir [Qasir] was one of the founders of the opposition Movement of the Democratic Left and was an active participant in the anti-Syrian protests in the spring of this year [2005].” [11b] (p1)

- 6.38 RSF and CPJ reported that, on 25 September 2005, another journalist known for her critical views on Syria was targeted by a bomb explosion. [11f] [13a-13b, 13d] CPJ reports

“Lebanese news anchor May Chidiac, a strong critic of Syria, was seriously wounded when a bomb exploded in her car near the port city of Jounieh. She was the third journalist who has criticized Syrian influence in Lebanon to be attacked since the February 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. ... On the morning of the attack Chidiac had hosted a show addressing Syria's possible involvement in Hariri's assassination and public fears of violence ahead of a report by U.N. investigators into the killing.” [13a]

- 6.39 The same report also notes that:

“Ten days ago, Ali Ramez Tohme, a journalist who had just published a book about Hariri, escaped a similar assassination attempt. A bomb exploded under the driver's seat of his car, but he was not in the vehicle. ... Tohme found a statement threatening to kill him outside his parent's house in Mazboud from the ‘Jund Ash-Sham,’ a previously unknown terrorist group that claimed responsibility for Hariri's murder, *The Daily Star* reported.” [13a]

- 6.40 On 12 December 2005 AI, RSF and CPJ issued press releases condemning the killing, again using a car bomb, of another critic of Syria, Gebran Tueni – the Chief Executive Officer of An-Nahar – who had been elected as a parliamentary representative for Beirut in June 2005. [4k] [11d] [13c, 13d] CPJ states that “Tueni was killed the day after he returned home from Paris where he had spent considerable time in recent months because of fears for his safety amid a spate of unsolved killings that have targeted Lebanese journalists and politicians. The Lebanese opposition has blamed the attacks on Syria, which has denied them.” [13c] A January 2006 IRIN report noted that a Syrian man had been arrested in connection with the assassination, but in March 2006 RSF released a short report decrying the lack of progress in the investigation into Tueni’s assassination. [29f] [11g]

See also Section 4: Syrian Withdrawal; Other recent events: 2005

Section 6.A: Extrajudicial Killings and Assassinations; Political Activists

- 6.41 Published prior to the Syrian withdrawal, USSD 2004 states that “Although the Government did not censor broadcasts directly, government officials effectively exerted pressure on journalists to practice self-censorship.” [2b] (Section 2a) USSD 2005 reports that “Journalists were victims of violence during the year. The reduction of Syrian interference lessened the desire and ability of authorities to censor the

press; however, journalists continued to exercise self-censorship, although to a far lesser degree than in previous years. The killings of prominent journalists and the failure to apprehend those responsible created a climate of intimidation.” [2f] (Section 2a) The report went on to describe the legal mechanisms for the control of freedom of expression that were available to the Government and recounted prosecutions against journalists that were ongoing during 2005. [2f] (Section 2a)

- 6.42 FH’s Freedom of the Press report also remarked on the direct and indirect Governmental pressure on print and broadcast outlets, and that journalists were subject to occasional harassment. [10a] CPJ’s report ‘Attacks on the Press 2004’ noted the type of topics that triggered Governmental interference and states that “Officials often threaten to prosecute journalists for libel and slander, but relatively few cases reach sentencing, and those that do usually end with suspended prison sentences or fines. No Lebanese journalists are currently known to be in prison.” [13b] (p1) In March 2006, CPJ reported on the criminal charges filed against the daily Lebanese newspaper *Al-Mustaqbal* (owned by the Hariri family), its editor-in-chief, and a staff reporter for defaming President Emile Lahoud. [13e]

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FREEDOM OF RELIGION

- 6.43 According to Article 9 of the Lebanon’s Constitution, “There shall be absolute freedom of conscience. The state in rendering homage to the Most High shall respect all religions and creeds and guarantees, under its protection, the free exercise of all religious rites provided that public order is not disturbed. It also guarantees that the personal status and religious interests of the population, to whatever religious sect they belong, is respected.” [20] (Part A, Chapter 2) Article 10 of the Constitution also states that “Education is free insofar as it is not contrary to public order and morals and does not interfere with the dignity of any of the religions or creeds. There shall be no violation of the right of [r]eligious communities to have their own schools provided they follow the general rules issued by the state regulating public instruction.” [20] (Part A, Chapter 2)
- 6.44 The US State Department’s International Religious Freedom Report 2005 (USSD RF 2005), which was published on 8 November 2004, states that:
- “The Government permits recognized religions to exercise authority over matters pertaining to personal status such as marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance. The ‘Twelver’ Shi’a, Sunni, Christian, and Druze each have state-appointed clerical bodies to administer family and personal status law through their own religious courts, which the Government subsidizes. There is no state religion; however, politics are based on the principle of religious representation, which has been applied to nearly all aspects of public life. The unwritten ‘National Pact’ of 1943 stipulates that the President, the Prime Minister, and the Speaker of Parliament be a Maronite Christian, a Sunni Muslim, and a Shi’a Muslim, respectively. The 1989 Taif Accord, which ended the country’s 15-year civil war, reaffirmed this arrangement but resulted in increased Muslim representation in Parliament and reduced the power of the Maronite President.” [2a] (Section II, Legal/Policy Framework)
- 6.45 According to USSD RF 2005, “Many families have relatives who belong to different religious communities, and intermarriage is not uncommon; however, intermarriage may be difficult to arrange in practice between members of some groups because there are no procedures for civil marriage. However, the Government recognizes civil

ceremonies performed outside the country.” [2a] (Section II, Restrictions on Religious Freedom)

- 6.46 USSD RF 2005 states that “There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom during the reporting period. There is no state religion; however, discrimination based on religion is built into the system of government. The Government appoints and pays the salaries of Muslim and Druze judges, as the judicial system is historically part of the state apparatus.” [2a] (p1)

- 6.47 USSD RF 2005 also records that:

“The Government promotes interfaith understanding by supporting a committee on Islamic-Christian dialogue, which is co-chaired by a Muslim and a Christian, and includes representatives of the major religious groups. Leading religious figures who promote Islamic-Christian dialogue and ecumenism are encouraged to visit and are received by government officials at the highest levels. Clerics play a leading role in many ecumenical movements worldwide.” [2a] (Section II, Legal/Policy Framework)

- 6.48 The USSD’s Report on Human Rights Practices 2005, published on 8 March 2006, reports that “Since the political system is based on confessionalism, all parliamentary seats are primarily allotted on a sectarian basis. The smallest recognized confessions are allotted at least one seat in parliament.” [2f] (Section 3) Freedom House’s World Report 2005, on events in 2004 prior to the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, reports that “Freedom of religion is guaranteed in the Lebanese constitution and protected in practice, though sectarianism is formally enshrined in the political system. Religious leaders frequently come under political pressure from Syrian officials in Lebanon.” [10a] (p366)

ABUSE AND RESTRICTION OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

- 6.49 USSD RF 2005 also noted that, although there are provisions for state recognition and such recognition conveyed certain benefits, this was not a requirement for religious worship or practice. [2a] (Section II, Legal/Policy Framework) The same report records that “Decisions on granting official recognition of religious groups do not appear to be arbitrary; in recent years, the Government has recognized such groups as the Alawites and the Copts.” [2a] (Section II, Legal/Policy Framework)

- 6.50 USSD RF continues:

“There are no legal barriers to proselytizing; however, traditional attitudes and edicts of the clerical establishment strongly discourage such activity. The clerical establishments are appointed by the religious authorities to which they are affiliated. The nomination of the Sunni and Shi’a Muftis is officially endorsed by the Council of Ministers, and they receive monthly salaries from the Government. The Government does not require citizens’ religious affiliations to be indicated on their passports; however, the Government requires that religious affiliation be encoded on national identity cards.” [2a] (Section II, Restrictions on Religious Freedom)

- 6.51 The report also records that “There were no reports of religious prisoners or detainees during the reporting period [1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005]. [2a] (Section II, Restrictions on Religious Freedom)

FORCED RELIGIOUS CONVERSION

- 6.52 USSD RF 2005 reports that “There were no reports of forced religious conversion, including of minor U.S. citizens who had been abducted or illegally removed from the United States, or of the refusal to allow such citizens to be returned to the United States [between 1 July 2004 and 30 June 2005].” [2a] (Section II, Forced Religious Conversion)

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RELIGIOUS GROUPS

- 6.53 USSD RF 2005 states that:

“The 1989 Taif Accord called for the ultimate abolition of political sectarianism in favor of ‘expertise and competence;’ however, little substantive progress has been made in this regard. Christians and Muslims are represented equally in Parliament, the Cabinet, and first category civil service positions, which include the ranks of Secretary General and Director General. One notable exception is the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), which, through universal conscription and an emphasis on professionalism, has significantly reduced the role of confessionalism in that organization. Seats in Parliament and the Cabinet, and posts in the civil service, are distributed proportionally among the 18 recognized religious groups.” [2a] (Section II, Restrictions on Religious Freedom)

See also Annex D: [Religious Groups](#)

- 6.54 The report also states that:

“The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom; however, there were periodic reports of friction between religious groups, which may be attributed to political or religious differences, and citizens still struggled with the legacy of a 15-year civil war fought largely along religious lines [between 1976 to 1990]. The 2005 parliamentary elections [in May and June 2005] brought out political tensions that arose in many cases along sectarian lines.” [2a] (p1)

- 6.55 A June 2005 *New York Times* article also highlighted the politico-religious hostilities, and the divisions within the sects themselves:

“Maronite Christians to the north and along the mountain ridges who fear being submerged in a sea of Muslims; Shiite Muslims, a mostly rural underclass in the south and the Bekaa, who are resentful because they were probably the majority; Sunni Muslims and Greek Orthodox Christians, the more sophisticated city dwellers; and the smaller group of Druse mountain tribesmen whose belief in reincarnation made them fearless fighters and thus not to be ignored. There has been no census since 1932, because of the potentially unsettling political ramifications.

“Those religious differences led to civil war from 1975 to 1990, in which about 150,000 people died. The cliché used to explain the fight was Christian right versus Muslim left, but it was far more complicated. Some of the most vicious fighting came within communities, as when the Shiite Hezbollah took on the rival Amal movement and the Christian militia loyal to the Gemayel family massacred members of those loyal to the Chamoun and Franjeh families.” [51]

- 6.56 A November 2004 information response by the Canadian Research Directorate recorded the opinion of an anthropologist specialising in Lebanese culture on the subject of mixed marriages, stating that the consequences of such marriages tended to rely on the families involved. [17k] The assistant professor also pointed out that Druze families are generally known to be particularly strident when it came to only marrying other Druze. [17k] She also stressed that “Being disowned by one’s family can have serious consequences in Lebanon, given the importance of family networks to a person’s economic survival.” [17k]
- 6.57 USSD RF 2005 states “Officially unrecognized groups such as Baha’is, Buddhists, Hindus, and some evangelical denominations may own property and assemble for worship without government interference; however, they are disadvantaged under the law because legally they may not marry, divorce, or inherit in the country.” [2a] (Section II, Legal/Policy Framework) The same source also remarked that, due to the confessional nature of the political system, the political rights of unrecognised religious groups was insecure:
- “For example, a Baha’i cannot run for Parliament because there is not a seat allocated for this confession, neither can he/she secure a senior position in the Government as these are also allocated on a confessional basis. However, a number of religious faiths are recorded under the existing recognized religions. For example, most Baha’i are registered under the Shi’a sect, and thus Baha’i can run for office to fill a seat allocated to the Shi’a sect. Similarly, Mormons are registered under the Greek Orthodox faith.” [2a] (Section II, Legal/Policy Framework)
- 6.58 A professor of sociology at the Lebanese University of Beirut provided information concerning the situation of the Baha’i in Lebanon to the Canadian Research Directorate in April 2004:
- “The professor stated that Baha’is practise their religion freely but that, since they do not belong to one of the religious groups recognized by the government, they cannot obtain an official place of worship. As for the protection offered to them by the government in cases of discrimination, the professor said that Lebanese legislation protects anyone who is a victim of discrimination in the labour market, but it does not protect individuals against discrimination in access to housing. The professor did not believe that Lebanese society treats Baha’is poorly. He did say, however, that they cannot officially call themselves Lebanese and that being a member of the Baha’i faith can cause problems.” [17g]
- 6.59 USSD RF 2005 notes that “Religious groups administer their own family and personal status laws. Many of these laws discriminate against women. For example, Sunni inheritance law provides a son twice the inheritance of a daughter. Although Muslim men may divorce easily, Muslim women may do so only with the concurrence of their husbands.” [2a] (Section II, Restrictions on Religious Freedom)

See also Section 6.B: [Women](#)

- 6.60 The report also records that:
- “In October [2004], the outgoing Minister of Education yielded to years of pressure from Muslim leaders and ordered the closure of public schools on Fridays, the Muslim day of prayer. The decree stipulated that if students, teachers, and the neighborhood religious authority agreed, a local public school could continue to operate on Fridays and close over the Saturday-Sunday weekend, which Christians generally prefer. The result of the decree was respect for Muslim sensibilities in those

neighborhoods where Muslims are the majority.” [2a] (Section II, Improvements in Respect for Religious Freedom)

- 6.61 USSD RF 2005 recounted incidents of sectarian or confessional violence that had occurred since 1999, of which at least three remained unresolved at the end of June 2005. [2a] (Section III, Societal Attitudes) It reports that, “Unlike in the previous reporting period, there were no incidents of violence against religious persons [between 1 July 2004 and 30 June 2005].” [2a] (Section III, Societal Attitudes)
- 6.62 The report also records that “There were no reported abuses targeted at specific religions by terrorist organizations during the reporting period [1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005].” [2a] (Section II, Abuses by Terrorist Organizations)

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FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND ASSEMBLY

- 6.63 According to the Lebanon’s Constitution, “The freedom to express one’s opinion orally or in writing, the freedom of the press, the freedom of assembly, and the freedom of association are guaranteed within the limits established by law.” [20] (Part A, Chapter 2)
- 6.64 The US State Department’s Human Rights Report for 2005 (USSD 2005), published on 8 March 2006, recorded that the law provided for both freedom of assembly and association; however, the Government restricted the former and imposed limits on the latter. [2f] (Section 2b) The report notes that “The prior approval of rallies by the MOI was required, and groups opposing government positions sometimes were denied permits.” [2f] (Section 2b) In February 2006 protests, which resulted in the resignation of Lebanon’s Interior Minister Hassan Sabeh, were sparked by the publication of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in a Danish newspaper. (AI, 16 February 2006; BBC news report, 6 February 2006) [4j] [21ad] AI reported that the violent protests of 5 February, after which 47 people required hospital treatment, resulted in over 400 people being arrested, allegedly subjected to ill-treatment in detention and more than 200 people tried before the Military Court in Beirut. [4j]
- 6.65 The USSD report of 2004 recounted the details of six demonstrations that were violently suppressed, whilst USSD 2005 noted that the anti-Syrian demonstrations that followed the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri passed off peacefully including the largest the Lebanese history during which, “Unlike in previous years, military personnel did not use force to disperse protesters on March 14, and according to observers, defied orders and allowed the demonstrations to proceed peacefully.” [2b] (Section 2b) [2f] (Section 2b) The UN’s Integrated Regional Information Network reported in December 2005 on the ‘freedom camp’ organised by the Lebanese Forces, Future Movement and Progressive Socialist Party, which called for the resignation of pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud and the removal of pro-Syrian elements from the Lebanese security apparatus. [29c]
- 6.66 Amnesty International’s Annual Report 2005 (AI 2005), covering events from January to December 2004, also reported on three incidents involving the arrest and/or violent suppression of demonstrators during 2004. [4a] (p1, 2-3) The World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), Rassemblement Canadien pour le Liban (RCPL) and Support of Lebanese Detained Arbitrarily (SOLIDA) all reported on the April 2004 violent suppression of a peaceful Beirut rally. [25] [30a] [27f] The OMCT report stated that the protestors wished to deliver a petition demanding the liberation of the

minimal estimation of more than 200 Lebanese prisoners in Syria. [25] The report continues:

“According to information received, the participants were violently dispersed by the army who used water jets. Many among them were hit with truncheons, including elderly people, members of the families of the prisoners, as well as Mr Ghazi AAD, a manager of SOLIDE [Support of Lebanese In Detention and Exile], whose wheelchair was broken. At least one student was taken to hospital. The delegation was not able to attend the meeting which had been fixed for them with Mr Rawdha, in charge of Human Rights at ESCWA [United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia].” [25]

6.67 With regard to freedom of association, USSD 2005 notes that:

“The law requires every new organization to submit a notification of formation to the MOI, which issues a receipt. In addition to what is provided by law, the MOI imposed on organizations further restrictions and requirements that were not enforced consistently. The ministry in some cases sent notification of formation papers to the security forces, which then conducted inquiries regarding an organization's founding members. The ministry may use the results in deciding whether to approve the group. The ministry at times withheld the receipt, essentially transforming a notification procedure into an approval process.” [2f] (Section 2b)

POLITICAL ACTIVISTS

6.68 International Crisis Group's (ICG) December 2005 report on the situation in Lebanon since the withdrawal of Syrian forces records that “Rumours concerning ongoing rearmament of various factions abound. An Aoun adviser expressed alarm: ‘People are saying that, if Hizbollah has arms, why shouldn't we? When one side has weapons, others have an excuse for acquiring them. Ultimately, we will have three states in one’. An Amal militiaman alleged that training had resumed in preparation for a potential showdown, and his movement was coordinating with smaller pro-Syrian movements.” [7c] (p6)

6.69 USSD 2004, on events prior to the Syrian withdrawal, reports that “The Government scrutinized requests to establish political movements or parties and to some extent monitored their activities. The Army Intelligence Service monitored the movements and activities of members of opposition groups. During the year [2004] the Government granted licenses to several political parties. The Government closely monitored groups critical of Syrian policies, and their members were subject to harassment and arrest by the Government.” [2b] (Section 2b) However, USSD 2005 states that “Under popular pressure, following the April [2005] withdrawal of Syrian military and security forces, the government ceased to monitor groups critical of Syrian policies, and the government stopped harassing members of such groups.” [2f] (Section 2b)

6.70 AI 2005 records that:

“Scores of people, mostly Sunni Islamist activists and members of opposition groups, were arrested for political reasons. Among them were members of two banned opposition groups, the Free Patriotic Movement [FPM] and the Lebanese Forces [LF], most of whom were released after shorted periods. Dozens of members of the banned Islamist Hizb al-Tahrir (Liberation Party) were detained for days or weeks and released on bail pending trials including before the Military Court. They were

arrested for the peaceful expression of their political and religious opinions, including organizing a sit-down in July [2004] in Tripoli, northern Lebanon, to protest against the visit to Lebanon of the interim Iraqi Prime Minister, Iyad 'Allawi." [4a] (p1)

- 6.71 The report also recounted the arrest, without due legal process, of dozens of Sunni Islamist activists in September 2004. [4a] (p1) The report stated that they were being held incommunicado and that "The former Interior Minister accused them of involvement in 'terrorism' and plots to bomb embassies, the Justice Palace and other places." [4a] (p1-2) Al stated that at least one of these detainees died in custody during 2004, and there was a strong likelihood that his death was caused by treatment amounting to torture. [4a] (p2) The report also noted that the trials of such persons, whose charges carried the death penalty, fell short of international standards and that "There appeared to be no prospect of the detainees receiving a fair trial." [4a] (p2)
- 6.72 According to information collected by the Canadian Research Directorate, published in January 2004, Hiras Al-Arz (Guardians of the Cedars), is the only opposition party in Lebanon forbidden from undertaking public activity, although Amnesty International reported that there were three other banned opposition parties in Lebanon: the Free Patriotic Movement, the Lebanese Forces, and the Islamist Hizb al-Tahrir (Liberation Party). [17d] [4a] The Canadian information response stated that Hiras Al-Arz's founder and leader, Étienne Sacre, who was residing in Israel as of January 2004, was originally sentenced to death in absentia, but this was later commuted to 15 years in prison, although Sacre was also stripped of his Lebanese civil rights. [17d]

LEADING POLITICAL ACTIVISTS

- 6.73 The BBC and USSD 2005 reported on a number of apparently politically-motivated assassinations, and attempted assassinations, that occurred between February and December 2005. [21a, 21n-21o, 21q, 21t-21u, 21aa] [2f] All but two of the attacks targeted anti-Syrian politicians and journalists; only Elias Murr and Hussein Assaf – who survived bomb attacks in July and December 2005 respectively – were pro-Syrians. (BBC news report, DATES; USSD 2005, 8 March 2006) [21q, 21aa] [2f] Former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri was killed in February 2005; journalist and founding member of the opposition Movement of the Democratic Left, Samir Qasir and politician George Harawi, were both killed in June 2005; whilst anti-Syrian journalist and MP, Gibran Tueni was killed in December 2005. (BBC news report, DATES; USSD 2005, 8 March 2006) [21a, 21n-21o, 21t] [2f]
- 6.74 ICG's December 2005 report records that "In an atmosphere of relative insecurity and fear, ordinary citizens increasingly look to their sectarian communities for succour and protection; meanwhile, many leaders have either withdrawn to mountain-top bases or taken temporary refuge abroad." [7c] (p6)

"Saad al-Hariri shuttles between Paris and Jeddah; Elias Murr, the defence minister, was until recently in Switzerland, recuperating from an armed attack; claiming to be on a hit-list, Jibran [Gebran] Tueni, Greek Orthodox editor of *An-Nahar*, a daily newspaper partially owned by the Hariri family, spent time in Paris; Nabih Berri has cordoned off the neighbourhood surrounding his house in the Beirut suburb of Ain al-Tini, while Michel Aoun and Walid Jumblatt have retreated to their respective mountain tops in Rabieh and Mukhtara." (ICG, 'Lebanon: Managing the Gathering Storm', 5 December 2005) [7c] (p6)

- 6.75 Since ICG published its report, Reporters Sans Frontières' (RSF), the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) and the BBC all reported that Gibran Tueni was killed in a car bombing, the day after he returned from Paris. [11d] [13c] [21t]

See also Section 4: Syrian Withdrawal: April – May 2005, Other Recent Events: 2005; **Section 6.A:** Extrajudicial Killings and Assassinations; Journalists

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EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS

- 6.76 The Lebanon's Constitution did not contain any Articles that concerned employment rights. [20] The US State Department's Human Rights Report for 2005 (USSD 2005), which was published on 8 March 2006, records "The government sets a legal minimum wage; during the year it was approximately \$200 (300 thousand pounds) per month, but it was not enforced effectively in the private sector. The minimum wage did not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family." [2f] (Section 6e)

- 6.77 The report continues:

"The law prescribes a standard 48-hour workweek, with a 24-hour rest period per week. In practice workers in the industrial sector worked an average of 35 hours per week, and workers in other sectors worked an average of 30 hours per week. The law includes specific occupational health and safety regulations. Labor regulations require employers to take adequate precautions for employee safety. The MOL [Ministry of Labour] was responsible for enforcing these regulations but did so unevenly. Labor organizers reported that workers did not have the right to remove themselves from hazardous conditions without jeopardizing their continued employment." [2f] (Section 6e)

- 6.78 USSD 2005 notes that "The law does not specifically prohibit forced or compulsory labor, including by children; however, articles within the law prohibit behavior that constitutes forced or compulsory labor. Nevertheless, children, foreign domestic workers, and other foreign workers sometimes were forced to remain in situations amounting to coerced or bonded labor." [2f] (Section 6c) The report also detailed the mistreatment and abuse, including rape, of foreign domestic workers who are not protected by the labour laws, and received little protection from the authorities. [2f] (Section 5: **Trafficking in Persons, Section 6e**) Amnesty International's Annual Report 2005 (AI 2005), covering events from January to December 2004, reports that "Information was received on alleged torture, including rape, of Filipina maids working in Lebanon." [4a] (p2)

- 6.79 On the subject of Lebanese women and employment, USSD 2005 reports that:

"The law prohibits sexual harassment; however, it was a widespread problem, and the law was not effectively enforced. Social pressure against women pursuing careers was strong in some parts of society. Men sometimes exercised considerable control over female relatives, restricting their activities outside of the home or their contact with friends and relatives. Women may own property, but often ceded control of it to male relatives for cultural reasons and because of family pressure. The law provides for equal pay for equal work for men and women, but in the private sector there was some discrimination regarding the provision of benefits." [2f] (Section 5, **Women**)

See also Section 6.B: Women

6.80 Whilst on child labour the report continues:

“Child labor was a problem. The minimum age for child employment is 14 years. Under the law juveniles are defined as children between 14 and 18 years of age. The law prohibits the employment of juveniles before they undergo a medical exam to ensure their fitness for the job for which they are hired. The labor code prohibits employment of juveniles under the age of 18 for more than 6 hours per day, and requires 1 hour of rest if work is more than 4 hours. The law entitles them to 21 days of paid annual leave. ... Juveniles are prohibited from working between the hours of 7 p.m. and 7 a.m.

“The law prohibits juveniles under the age of 17 from working in jobs that jeopardize their health, safety, or morals. It also prohibits the employment of juveniles under 16 in industrial jobs or jobs that are physically demanding or harmful to their health. The Ministry of Labor (MOL) was responsible for enforcing these requirements; however, it did not enforce the law effectively. ... Children worked in predominantly trade-related jobs. The percentage of working children between the ages of 10 and 14 was estimated at 1.8 percent. The percentage of working children between the ages of 15 and 18 was 11.3 percent. There were no recent reliable statistics on the number of child workers.” [2f] (Section 6d: Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment)

See also Section 6.B: Children

TRADE UNIONS AND THE RIGHTS TO STRIKE

6.81 USSD 2005 records that “The law provides that all workers, except government employees, may establish and join unions, and workers exercised this right in practice.” [2f] (Section 6a) However, the report also notes “Antiunion discrimination was a common practice. In October 2004, two labor leaders were fired from the Lebanese Postal Service for union activities. The GCL [General Confederation of Labour] interceded on numerous occasions to address the firing of unionists from companies but failed to reverse the decision.” [2f] (Section 6a)

6.82 USSD 2005 states that “The right of workers to organize and to bargain collectively exists in law and practice. Most worker groups engaged in some form of collective bargaining with their employers. Stronger federations obtained significant gains for their members and on occasion assisted nonunion workers. No government mechanisms promoted voluntary labor-management negotiations, and workers had no protection against antiunion discrimination. The law provides for the right to strike, but unlike in previous years, the GCL did not organize any demonstrations.” [2f] (Section 6b) The previous year’s report recounted that two demonstrations and one general strike, including a peaceful march, had occurred in 2003 and 2004; “The demonstration [in May 2004] became violent, and clashes with security forces resulted in the death of five persons.” [2b] (Section 6b)

PALESTINIANS

6.83 On the subject of employment restrictions, prior to June 2005, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and the US organisation Refugees International (RI) concurred, with UNRWA stating that “Considered as foreigners, Palestine refugees are prohibited by law from working in more than 70 trades and professions. This has led to a very high rate of unemployment amongst the refugee population.” [28b] (Lebanon Refugee Camp Profiles) [33] (p45) A 2003 paper by Are Knudsen, ‘Islamism in the Diaspora: Palestinian refugees in Lebanon’, also noted how this, along with

their inability to access higher education, has condemned the Palestinian population to the position of being a permanent underclass. [56] (p7)

- 6.84 A 2005 brief on the living conditions of Palestinians in Lebanon by Fafo also reported on the employment and economic situation of the Palestinian population, stating that “Labour force participation among Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is relatively low.” [55b] (p22) It states that “Trade and construction are the two most important sectors of work. Agriculture is much more important for refugees in Lebanon than refugees elsewhere. Restriction in the professions and sectors open to refugees in Lebanon plays a key role not only in overall participation rates, but also in the main sectors of refugee employment.” [55b] (p22-23)

- 6.85 The Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA for Palestinians in the Near East, covering the period 1 July 2004–30 June 2005 (UNRWA 2005) records:

“Palestine refugees in Lebanon are among the most disadvantaged in the region. ... Unemployment among refugees is high and living conditions poor. ... Recently, the Government of Lebanon announced that restrictions on access to the Lebanese labour market for Palestine refugees would be eased. While certain professions would still be excluded, this is a welcome development that should serve to ease the economic hardship facing the Palestine refugee population living in Lebanon. [28f] (para 38)

- 6.86 USSD 2005 also records that:

“Very few Palestinians received work permits, and those who found work usually were directed into unskilled occupations. Some Palestinian refugees worked in the informal sector, particularly in agriculture and construction. Palestinian incomes continued to decline. The law prohibited Palestinian refugees from working in 72 professions. However, on June 7, the minister of labor issued a memorandum authorizing Palestinian nationals born in the country and duly registered with the MOI [Ministry of Interior] to work in 50 (out of 72) professions banned to foreigners. However, there were no indications that this memorandum was implemented consistently.” [2f] (Section 5, National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities)

Section 5: Medical services/Palestinians; Educational system/Palestinians;

Section 6.B: Ethnic groups/Palestinians; Ethnic groups/Palestinians/Refugee Camps

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PEOPLE TRAFFICKING

- 6.87 The Lebanon’s Constitution did not contain any Articles that concerned people trafficking. [20]

- 6.88 According to the US State Department's Human Rights Report for 2005 (USSD 2005), which was published on 8 March 2006, “The law does not specifically prohibit trafficking in persons, and although the government made significant progress stemming some forms of trafficking in persons, it remained a problem.” [2f] (Section 5: **Trafficking in Persons**) The report continues:

“The country was a destination for East European and Russian women, contracted as dancers in adult clubs. Most of these women engaged in voluntary illegal prostitution and were at risk as targets of abuse. The country was also a destination for women from Africa and Asia, usually contracted as household workers. Women

are required by law to have good faith work contracts and sponsors, but often found themselves in coercive work situations with little practical legal recourse. If forced prostitution or forced rendering of sexual services occurred as a result of abduction, the Penal Code stipulates that the abductor be sentenced to at least one year in prison; however, this law was applied inconsistently. Many women became illegal workers because their employers did not renew their work and residency permits or because they ran away from their employers' house, therefore becoming subject to detention and deportation. Unscrupulous employers sometimes falsely accused the employee of theft to relinquish responsibility for the employee as well as the taxes and return airline ticket" [2f] (Section 5, Trafficking in Persons)

- 6.89 The US State Department's Trafficking in People Report of June 2005 (USSD Trafficking 2005) records that "Some of the abuses that these workers might experience are late or nonpayment of wages, physical and sexual abuse, lack of freedom of movement, and confiscation of their passports. Workers who run away from an abusive work environment automatically become illegal and subject to detention and deportation, because their visa is valid only as long as they are working for their sponsors." [2d] (p142)

PROTECTION, PROSECUTION AND PREVENTION

- 6.90 USSD 2005 notes that "The country made some progress in protecting victims of trafficking. The government did not provide foreign workers with relief from deportation, shelter, or access to legal, medical, or psychological services. However, in January [2005] the SG signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with two NGOs that set up a safe house for migrant worker victims of significant abuse and began referring trafficking victims to the safe house." [2f] (Section 5, Trafficking in Persons) USSD Trafficking 2005 states that:

"The Government of Lebanon markedly improved its efforts to protect victims of trafficking over the reporting period. As noted above, it signed a Memorandum of Understanding with international NGOs 'CARITA' and 'International Catholic Migration Commission' for the opening of a safe house for trafficking victims. The government also began allowing government-salaried social workers to assist foreign workers during interrogations by immigration officials, and it granted source country embassies improved access to victim detention facilities. In 2004, the government repatriated 147 foreign workers in cooperation with NGOs and source countries." [2d] (p143)

- 6.91 USSD Trafficking 2005 states that "During the reporting period, the Government of Lebanon took minimal steps to prosecute trafficking and related cases." [2d] (p143) The report notes that:

"The Ministry of Justice and the Office of the State Prosecutor lag behind in acknowledging and actively combating trafficking. In December 2004, the Surete Generale granted amnesty and waived penalties for up to 1,700 South Asians who did not hold valid visas, thereby facilitating their return home. The Ministry of Labor closed 11 employment agencies for fraudulent practices or mistreatment of workers and took administrative actions against another 18. In addition, it adjudicated 35 contract disputes, 23 in favor of the workers." [2d] (p143)

- 6.92 USSD Trafficking 2005 continues:

"However, there is evidence that a far greater number of cases go unresolved, and workers are sometimes repatriated without receiving outstanding wages. Similarly,

the government has not investigated reports of suspicious deaths of Philippine and Ethiopian domestic workers. The government has not prosecuted or punished any abusive employers, despite evidence of physical and sexual abuse of domestic workers. Lebanon should revamp its prosecution efforts to more effectively combat trafficking.” [2d] (p143)

- 6.93 The same source also notes “The Government of Lebanon does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so.” [2d] (p142)

“In 2004, the Government of Lebanon notably increased its anti-trafficking prevention activities. It produced and distributed booklets and brochures spelling out regulations governing migrant workers, including descriptions of their rights and responsibilities; produced and distributed pamphlets on trafficking to inform victims about various sources of assistance; and markedly improved its cooperation with NGOs and source country embassies in protection and repatriation efforts. Source country representatives, NGOs, academics, and volunteers formed a working group to work with the government to standardize employment contracts and to provide an arrival seminar and a pre-departure debriefing to migrant workers.” (USSD Trafficking 2005) [2d] (p143)

See also Section 6.A: [Employment Rights](#)

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FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

- 6.94 The Lebanon’s Constitution did not contain any Articles that concerned freedom of movement. [20]
- 6.95 According to the US State Department's Human Rights Report for 2004 (USSD 2005), which was published on 8 March 2006, the law provides for the right to freedom of movement within the country, foreign travel, emigration and repatriation, and the Government respected these rights in practice, although there were some limitations. [2f] (Section 2d) The report recounted these limitations, which included the prohibition of travel to Israel, the presence of checkpoints throughout the country, and the necessity of men aged between 18 and 21 years to obtain an authorisation document before leaving the country. [2f] (Section 2d)
- 6.96 USSD 2005 also notes “The law prohibits forced exile, and it was not used. There were no legal restrictions on the right of citizens to return to the country.” [2f] (Section 2d) The USSD report of the previous year states that “However, many émigrés were reluctant to return for a variety of political, economic, and social reasons.” [2b] (Section 2d) Whilst International Crisis Group’s (ICG) December 2005 report ‘Lebanon: Managing the Gathering Storm’ records that “In an atmosphere of relative insecurity and fear, ordinary citizens increasingly look to their sectarian communities for succour and protection; meanwhile, many leaders have either withdrawn to mountain-top bases or taken temporary refuge abroad.” [7c] (p6) The report’s footnotes expand upon this point:

“Saad al-Hariri shuttles between Paris and Jeddah; Elias Murr, the defence minister, was until recently in Switzerland, recuperating from an armed attack; claiming to be on a hit-list, Jibran Tueni, Greek Orthodox editor of *An-Nahar*, a daily newspaper partially owned by the Hariri family, spent time in Paris [Tueni was killed on his return

to Lebanon]; Nabih Berri has cordoned off the neighbourhood surrounding his house in the Beirut suburb of Ain al-Tini, while Michel Aoun and Walid Jumblatt have retreated to their respective mountain tops in Rabieh and Mukhtara.” [7c] (p6 – footnote 43)

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6.B Human Rights: Specific Groups

ETHNIC AND NATIONAL GROUPS

6.97 The Lebanon's Constitution did not contain any Articles that concerned ethnicity. [20]

KURDS

6.98 The US organisation, Refugees International (RI), reported in February 2005 that "Lebanon is home to a few thousand Kurds [who] live without citizenship despite decades of family lineage in the country. The precise Kurdish population in Lebanon is very difficult to attain in light of the absence of a census. However, current population estimates are mostly below or around 60,000." [33] (p45) On the subject of land ownership, the US State Department's Human Rights Report for 2005 (USSD 2005), which was published on 8 March 2006, states that "Other foreigners [non-Palestinians] may own a limited-size plot of land, but only after obtaining the approval of five different district offices. The law applies to all foreigners, but it was applied in a manner disadvantageous to the 25 thousand Kurds in the country." [2f] (Section 5, National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities)

6.99 The Tharwa Project's July 2005 feature on 'The Kurdish Community in Lebanon' records that "Due to the high illiteracy rate, very little education, and very few skills other than agriculture among the Kurdish community in Lebanon, most of them settled into the slum quarters of Beirut. Excluding the 300,000 plus Palestinians, the Kurds probably comprised around 35 percent of the remaining slum dwellers." [34] (Historical Background) The Tharwa Project also stated that "Over 50 years of residence in Lebanon have passed and the majority of the Kurds in the country still suffers [*sic*] from scanty socioeconomic means and is considered among the most illiterate communities in the country." [34] (Historical Background)

6.100 The Project's July 2005 feature concludes that:

"Due to discrimination by most Lebanese communities towards the Kurds, it was difficult for the community to integrate into the political system, denying them access and representation. Moreover, the Kurds suffered during the civil war, while waiting to be naturalized, by all groups in the country. The Christians denied them citizenship, fearing a change in the delicate sectarian balance, while the Sunnis still do not see them as equals. Both the Sunnis and the Druze used the Kurds to fight their wars without benefits in return. Nonetheless, the Kurds seem to have acquired 'a dual-lifestyle and have not given up the effort to identify themselves as both Kurds and Lebanese.'

"Comparing the Kurds in Lebanon with those in other countries, Lebanon has been a safe haven that allowed them to create their own political parties and social organizations, establish social facilities and use their own language and celebrate their culture openly." [34] (Conclusion)

See also Section 5: [Citizenship and nationality/Kurds](#)

PALESTINIANS

- 6.101 USSD 2005 reports that “According to the UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency], an estimated 402 thousand Palestinian refugees were registered in the country; however, credible sources believed that approximately 250 thousand to 300 thousand Palestinians actually resided in the country.” [2f] (Section 5, National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities) In February 2005, the US organisation Refugees International (RI) recorded similar figures, stating that “The number of Palestine refugees registered with UNRWA in Lebanon is nearly 400,000, or an estimated 10 percent of the population.” [33] (p45) Nevertheless, a 2003 paper by Are Knudsen, ‘Islamism in the Diaspora: Palestinian refugees in Lebanon’ concurred with USSD 2004, stating that “Recently, some Palestinians have left the country voluntarily so that the total number of refugees may now (unofficially) be around 200,000.” [56] (p7) The Norwegian organisation, Fafo, noted in a 2005 brief, based on its own extensive report of 2003, ‘Difficult Past, Uncertain Future. Living Conditions Among Palestinian Refugees in Camps and Gatherings in Lebanon’, that out-migration was an important factor to be considered when estimating the size of the Palestinian population in Lebanon and stressed that:

“The exact size of the Palestinian refugee population actually *residing* in Lebanon is not known, although several estimates based on various sources and methodologies exist. A moderate population estimate gives around 200,000 people altogether, while other estimates are even lower. Of these, about 140,000 people live in the camps and other refugee conglomerations covered by our survey. This population is predominantly urban.” [55a] [55b] (p11)

- 6.102 UNRWA’s own figures, as of 30 June 2005, recorded the following registered Palestinian refugee presence in Lebanon:

GENERAL	LEBANON
Registered Refugees (RR)	401,071
Increase in RRs over previous year (%)	1.1
RR as % of Total RRs	9
Existing Camps	12
RR in Camps (RRCs)	211,593
RRCs as % of RRs	53

[28c]

- 6.103 Amnesty International’s December 2003 report on the Economic and Social Rights of Palestinians in Lebanon records that:

“In addition [to the registered refugees], Lebanon has between 10,000 and 40,000 Palestinian refugees that are not registered with UNRWA and not receiving any assistance from it. In addition, thousands more do not have any form of identification and are not receiving assistance from UNRWA; they are commonly referred to as non-ID Palestinian refugees. Some 20,000 Palestinians are believed to have been naturalized as Lebanese; however it appears that the status of some of the naturalized Palestinians is not secure as there were reports that their Lebanese nationality may be annulled.” [4i]

- 6.104 The 2005 Fafo brief stated that there are 57 refugee communities in Lebanon, which consisted of the 12 refugee camps – including areas around the camps that were, for all intents and purposes, part of the camp – and 45 neighbourhoods separate from the camps where 25 or more Palestinian households resided together. [55b] (p12) The brief states that:

“The latter places, what we have called ‘gatherings’, are relatively homogenous refugee communities. For example, gatherings may be small villages, households living in the same multi-storey residential building, or a group of households living along the same street. Exceptions are gathering refugees in Bequaa and Tripoli where many are in gatherings located in predominantly Lebanon communities. Almost eight in ten refugees live in camps, while two in ten live in gatherings.” [55b] (p12)

- 6.105 Knudsen (2003) explains that the “Palestinian refugee identity is not only individual and social but to a large degree communal and political. The three pillars of Palestinian political activism in Lebanon are as follows: the provision of civic rights to the refugees, resisting naturalisation, locally referred to as ‘implantation’ (Ar. *tawteen*), and upholding the ‘right of return’ to their homeland/natal villages.” [56] (p6) He continues:

“These claims may at first glance seem contradictory. The refugees demand ‘civic rights’, that is the right to live and work in Lebanon, but do not seek citizenship (which, *inter alia*, includes the right to vote). This is because naturalisation would compromise the right of return and symbolically erase the Palestinian refugee community, as well as being construed as a victory for the Israeli authorities, who categorically reject the refugees’ ‘right of return’. Upholding the right of return is therefore a highly charged symbolic issue, especially for the older generation, and bridges past wrongdoings (forced exodus) with future redemption (returning to Palestine). Nonetheless, a large number of Palestinians have been naturalised in recent years. Since 1994 decrees by the Lebanese authorities have naturalised about 30,000 Palestinians, the majority of them from the former security zone to the south of the country (Peteet 1996: p. 29).” [56] (p6)

- 6.106 USSD 2005 states that:

“Palestinian refugees do not have the right to own property in the country. Palestinians no longer may purchase property and those who owned property prior to 2001 will be prohibited from passing it on to their children. The parliament justified these restrictions on the grounds that it was protecting the right of Palestinian refugees to return to the homes they fled after the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. ... The Government did not provide health services or education to Palestinian refugees, who relied on UNRWA for these services.” [2f] (Section 5, **National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities**)

- 6.107 RI and UNRWA concurred, with UNRWA stating that “Palestine refugees in Lebanon face specific problems. They do not have social and civil rights, and have very limited access to the government’s public health or educational facilities and no access to public social services.” [28b] (**Lebanon Refugee Camp Profiles**) [33] (p45) The Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA for Palestinians in the Near East, covering the period 1 July 2004–30 June 2005 (UNRWA 2005) records that:

“Palestine refugees in Lebanon are among the most disadvantaged in the region. They have limited access to government services or the labour market, and have to depend almost entirely on the Agency for basic services. ... While entry of

construction materials to camps is subject to approval from the Lebanese army, this did not cause delays during the reporting period. Legislation preventing Palestine refugees from buying immovable property remains in force. ... The Government of Lebanon has reported expenditure of approximately \$30 million on behalf of Palestine refugees. The UNRWA regular budget allocation for the Lebanon field was \$54.6 million in 2005 compared with \$52.8 million in 2004.” [28f] (Chapter I, Overview, para 38)

- 6.108 International Crisis Group (ICG) reported in December 2005 that “In a sharp departure with the past, he [Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora] has met with [Palestinian] President Mahmoud Abbas to discuss the status of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees, striving to bolster the roles of both the Palestinian Authority and Fatah at the expense of Syrian-affiliated groups.” [7c] (p5) The report continues:

“They agreed to place Palestinian weapons inside the camps under the combined control of the Lebanese Army and Fatah command and remove any weapons outside their boundaries. The agreement is potentially as significant for the refugees as for Lebanon, though pro-Syrian factions have refused to submit to Fatah oversight and tensions remain high. Regularisation of the refugees’ status requires extending basic civil rights to them, including removing onerous employment and property restrictions. This is highly controversial, as some Lebanese view it as a start to tilting the demographic balance toward Sunnis and lessening job opportunities.” [7c] (p5)

- 6.109 Knudsen (2003) noted that the refugee camps have been branded ‘security islands’ by the Lebanese, as – inside the camps – the residents are beyond the reach of Lebanese law, harbouring weapons and sheltering criminals and assassins. [56] (p5) However, the refugees viewed the camps more as ‘islands of insecurity’ which served to isolate them from the Lebanese population. [56] (p5) Knudsen opined that:

“This has intensified the distrust between Palestinians and the host population as well as the Lebanese government. ... The general feeling of despair and misery among the Palestinians in Lebanon and the refusal to address their plight by the Lebanese government has been likened to a ‘ticking bomb’ (Nasrallah 1997: p. 358). So far, however, there has not been any open protest from the refugee community, a reflection of their precarious situation and constant threat of expulsion. The Palestinian diaspora in Lebanon is an impoverished and disenfranchised minority, living in a hostile environment.” [56] (p5)

See also Section 5: [Citizenship and nationality/Palestinians](#); [Medical services/Palestinians](#); [Educational system/Palestinians](#); **See also Section 6.A:** [Employment Rights/Palestinians](#); **Section 6.C:** [Palestinian groups](#)

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UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY (UNRWA)

- 6.110 The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) overview states that:

“Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict, UNRWA, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, was established by United Nations General Assembly resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949 to carry out direct relief and works programmes for Palestine refugees. The Agency began operations on 1 May 1950. In the absence of a solution to the Palestine refugee problem, the General Assembly has repeatedly renewed UNRWA’s mandate, most recently

extending it until 30 June 2008. ... Today, UNRWA is the main provider of basic services – education, health, relief and social services – to over 4.1 million registered Palestine refugees in the Middle East.” [28a] (Overview, Establishment of UNRWA)

6.111 The organisation’s website states that, regionally:

“UNRWA supports Palestine refugee families unable to meet their own basic needs and helps promote the self-reliance of the refugee community through community social development. Direct material and financial assistance including food is given to families in special hardship. These are families without a male adult medically fit to earn an income and without other identifiable means of financial support sufficient to cover food, shelter and other basic needs.” [28a] (Overview, Relief & Social Services)

6.112 UNRWA 2005 records that “In addition to regular UNRWA services, special hardship cases are eligible for basic food support, shelter rehabilitation, cash assistance (one time per calendar year), and preferential access to other UNRWA services, such as admission to vocational training centres. A total of 433 special hardship cases [in the region], 143 of them women, qualified for such preferential access during the reporting period.” [28f] (para 118) UNRWA published the following statistics on social care provided by the organisation in Lebanon:

RELIEF & SOCIAL SERVICES	LEBANON
Special Hardship Cases (SHCs)	45,849
SHCs as % OF RR *	11.4
Women's Programme Centres	10
Community Rehabilitation Centres	1
Relief and Social Services Staff	127
Poverty Alleviation Prog. Projects (since 91/92)	2,045

* RR = Registered Refugees [28c]

6.113 UNRWA 2005 reported on the developments in the Agency’s relief and social services programmes, between 1 July 2004 and 30 June 2005, including the special hardship programme, food support, shelter rehabilitation, and the social services programme. [28f] (paras 112-144) The report states that “The mission of the relief and social services programme is to provide the most disadvantaged Palestine refugees with humanitarian assistance and to promote the self-reliance of less advantaged members of the refugee community, especially women, children, young people and persons with disabilities.” [28f] (para 112)

See also Section 6.B: [Women/Palestinians](#); [Children/Palestinians](#); [People with Disabilities/Palestinians](#)

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REFUGEE CAMPS



[28b]

6.114 USSD 2005 reports that:

"Most Palestinian refugees lived in overpopulated camps that suffered repeated heavy damage as a result of fighting during the civil war, during the Israeli invasion of the country, and during on-going camp feuds. The Government generally prohibited the construction of permanent structures in the camps on the grounds that such construction encouraged refugee settlement in the country. Refugees frequently feared that the Government might reduce the size of the camps or eliminate them completely." [2f] (Section 5, National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities)

6.115 The Fafo brief of 2005 concurred, describing the housing conditions of Palestinians in Lebanon as being, in many ways, the worst in the region. [55b] (p29-31) Whilst the Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA for Palestinians in the Near East, covering the period 1 July 2004–30 June 2005 (UNRWA 2005) records that "Palestine refugees in Lebanon are among the most disadvantaged in the region. ... While entry of construction materials to camps is subject to approval from the Lebanese army, this did not cause delays during the reporting period. Legislation preventing Palestine refugees from buying immovable property remains in force. [28f] (Chapter I, Overview, para 38) Knudsen (2003) states that:

"The refugees living in the 'official camps' run by UNRWA are provided with a meagre package of services and welfare benefits (schooling, medical care etc.) which are insufficient in relation to their present needs (Abbas et al. 1997). The most comprehensive study of present living conditions among camp-dwelling Palestinian refugees to date (Ugland 2003) finds that the refugees suffer from widespread unemployment, poor living conditions, ill health, low education levels and rising illiteracy. Lebanon has the highest percentage of camp-dwelling refugees (55.4%) of

all the countries hosting Palestinian refugees. This is because of stringent policy measures in Lebanon designed to keep the refugees trapped inside cramped and squalid camps and shanty towns from which there is no escape – except by leaving the country.” [56] (p3)

6.116 UNRWA’s official figures on the total number of registered camp residents in Lebanon, accurate as of 31 March 2005, are as follows:

LOCATION			OFFICIAL REGISTERED		
AREA	CENTRE		FAMILIES	PERSONS	INFANTS
Beirut	3150	Mar Elias camp	175	612	3
Area Total			175	612	3
Mountain	3250	Burj Barajneh camp	3,965	15,484	137
	3251	Dikwaneh camp*	2,217	9,178	47
	3252	Dbayeh camp	1,097	4,002	15
	3253	Chatila camp	1,967	8,212	77
Area Total			8,976	36,876	276
Saida	3350	Ein el Hilweh camp	10,383	45,004	519
	3351	Nabatieh camp*	1,622	7,104	57
	3352	Mia Mia camp	1,092	4,473	43
Area Total			13,097	56,581	619
Tyre	3450	Buss camp	2,188	9,287	79
	3451	Rashidieh camp	5,868	25,745	299
	3452	Burj Shamali camp	4,214	18,625	209
Area Total			12,270	53,657	587
Tripoli	3550	Nahr el Bared camp	2,188	30,439	405
	3551	Bedawwi camp	3,537	15,641	144
Area Total			9,921	46,080	549
Beqaa	3651	Wavel camp	1,725	7,551	46
Area Total			1,725	7,551	46
UNRWA employees and refugee women married to non-registered husbands. Distributed within field camps.			2,307	9,595	102
Field Total			48,471	210,952	2,182

* While Dikwaneh & Nabatieh camps were completely destroyed in the 1970s, refugees originally registered in these camps will still maintain their registration numbers with these centres until UNRWA’s new Refugee Registration Information System (RRIS) is developed. [28d]

6.117 The Fafo brief of 2005 made note of the locations of, not only the official UNRWA-run camps, but also other Palestinian gatherings in the country:

“All but one of Beirut’s refugee communities are within the geographic boundary of the capital. In the Tripoli area, two camps are located north of the city and several

gatherings are found inside the city boundaries. In the Bequaa, there is one camp in the outskirts of the city of Baalbek, and we find gatherings in two major locations in its suburbs as well as in the Zahle area. In the south, the major refugee concentrations are located around Saida and Tyre. In both places, camps and gatherings are located near the city centres. The largest refugee concentrations are found in the camps of Saida and Tripoli, while the camps of Tyre and Beirut also host a substantial number of refugees.” [55b] (p12)

6.118 According to Knudsen (2003):

“Unable to leave, the majority of the refugees pass their lives in increasingly overcrowded refugee camps. Some camps, like Shatila in Beirut, are still heavily scarred from the civil war and the ‘war of the camps’ and many residents still lack potable water, electricity and sanitary facilities. Because the camp areas cannot be enlarged, the residents need to find alternative ways of fitting more people into the already cramped space. Their remaining option is to add additional stories to existing houses, although building regulations prohibit this.” [56] (p3)

6.119 UNRWA’s camp profiles also report that:

“Of the original 16 official camps in Lebanon, three were destroyed during the years of conflict and were never rebuilt or replaced: Nabatieh camp in south Lebanon, and Dikwaneh and Jisr el-Basha camps in the Beirut area. Most of the displaced refugees in Lebanon, approximately 6,000 families, are originally from these three camps. A fourth camp, Gouraud in Baalbeck, was evacuated many years ago and its inhabitants were transferred to Rashidieh camp in the Tyre area. Today, all 12 official refugee camps in the Lebanon Field suffer from serious problems – no proper infrastructure, overcrowding, poverty and unemployment.” [28b] (**Lebanon Refugee Camp Profiles**)

See also Section 5: [Medical services/Palestinians](#); [Educational system/Palestinians](#) and **Section 6.A:** [Employment Rights/Palestinians](#)

6.120 In relation to the political and social situation within the camps, Knudsen’s 2003 paper, ‘Islamism in the Diaspora: Palestinian refugees in Lebanon’ recounts how “In order to create a symbolic continuity with the past, the refugees have organised space so that the camp’s quarters carry the names of the villages they have left behind.” [56] (p5) Knudsen also states that:

“Refugee camps have their own bureaucracy and leadership, the most important being the camp manager and popular committees (PC). The popular committees are quasi-official bodies mostly concerned with the daily running of the camps, conflict resolution and arbitration, dispensing social provisions (together with UNRWA) and being the camps’ mouthpiece vis-à-vis Lebanese authorities and law enforcement agencies. The popular committee’s main function is to ensure law and order within the camps.” [56] (p4)

6.121 However, he cautions:

“The phrase ‘popular committees’ is misleading because the leadership in the camps is not based on a popular vote or the projected strength of one group or party vis-à-vis others. Instead, the make-up of the committees tends to reflect the strength of third-party interests, in particular those of Syria, to which the Lebanese authorities as well as Palestinian political groups remain subservient. ... Instead of openly challenging the leadership of popular committees, a common strategy is creating rival

committees with similar names and functions; this diffuses the political and social authority of the committees and makes solving social problems more difficult and time-consuming (Suleiman 1999: p. 76).” [56] (p4)

6.122 The same source reports that:

“Since the camps function largely as autonomous bodies, internal ‘policing’ is left to the political leadership of the camp. Conflict resolution is mostly local and follows customary rules and regulations rather than those inscribed in the Lebanese penal code (see, Peteet 1987). This does not mean that the camps and their residents are out of reach of Lebanese laws. With the lifting of the Cairo Accords by the Lebanese authorities in 1987, the right to conduct military activities from Lebanese soil ended, as did the refugees’ formal right to bear arms. At one point a deal to surrender arms in return for civic rights was close to being accepted by the Lebanese authorities but then fell through. The demand for surrendering arms was therefore never enforced. To this day the refugee camps are flooded with light arms. While the Lebanese security forces can, and sometimes does [*sic*], enter the camps to round up suspects or search for weapons, the authorities prefer monitoring and surveillance instead of military involvement in the camps.” [56] (p4)

6.123 USSD 2004 and 2005 report that “Rival groups, such as Fatah and Asbat al-Nur, regularly clashed over territorial control in the various camps, sometimes leading to exchanges of gunfire and the detention of rival members.” [2b] (Section 1c) [2f] (Section 1c)

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NAHR EL-BARED

6.124 UNRWA’s camp profile states that:

“Nahr el-Bared camp is situated 16 km north of Tripoli near the coastal road. The camp was originally established by the League of Red Cross Societies in 1949 to accommodate Palestine refugees from the Lake Huleh area of northern Palestine. UNRWA started providing services for the refugees in 1950. Factional violence in the early 1980s inflicted a heavy toll on this camp.

“The camp is very overcrowded and the infrastructure is poor. Although all shelters have indoor water mains, these are linked to a very inadequate water supply which is pumped from the ground source. All shelters are connected to a sewerage system which discharges untreated sewage into the sea.” [28b] (Nahr el-Bared Refugee Camp)

6.125 UNRWA also records that “A number of NGOs are active in Nahr el-Bared, including Al-Najda, Beit Atfal Al-Soumoud, Ghassan Kanafani Cultural Foundation and the Khaldieh National Association, and Community-based Rehabilitation Programme (CBR) for disabled. The services they provide include sponsorship programmes for orphans, vocational training and kindergartens.” [28b] (Nahr el-Bared Refugee Camp)

BEDDAWI

6.126 UNRWA’s camp profile stated that “Beddawi camp is situated in the hills 5 km north of Tripoli and was established by UNRWA in 1955. The camp’s main problems are poverty and unemployment. All shelters have indoor water supplies. The camp’s sewers flood frequently and sewage is discharged directly into the sea.” [28b] (Beddawi Camp)

- 6.127 UNRWA also records that “A number of NGOs are active in Beddawi, including Al-Najda, Beit Atfal Al-Soumoud, Ghassan Kanafani Cultural Foundation, Lina Nabulsi National Association and the Palestinian Red Crescent Society. The services they provide include sponsorship programmes for orphans, vocational training, medical services and hospitalization and kindergartens.” [28b] (**Beddawi Camp**)

WAVEL

- 6.128 UNRWA’s camp profile states that:

“Wavel camp is situated 90 km east of Beirut in the Beqaa Valley, near the city of Baalbeck. Originally a French army barracks, the camp is accommodated in a walled area of 42,300 square meters. The French authorities provided shelter to the refugees in 1948 in the original 12 buildings and in 1952 UNRWA took over responsibility for providing services in the camp. Although the camp suffered less structural damage than other camps during the years of civil conflict, living conditions are particularly severe.

“Housing conditions in the camp are unhealthy as most shelters, situated in the former army barracks lack daylight and ventilation. Poverty combined with difficult living conditions results in a number of social problems. Students often drop out of school in order to support their families. The Beqaa Valley is a remote rural area with severe winter weather conditions. Palestine refugees are only able to find seasonal work in agriculture and construction.” [28b] (**Wavel Refugee Camp**)

- 6.129 UNRWA also records that “In addition to the facilities UNRWA provides there are a number of NGOs active in Wavell [*sic*], including Al-Najda Al-Ijtimayia, Ina’ash and Beit Atfal Al-Soumoud, Bilal Bin Rabah Centre. The services they provide include cash assistance to orphans, kindergartens and a training centre.” [28b] (**Wavel Refugee Camp**)

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DBAYEH

- 6.130 UNRWA’s camp profile states that:

“Dbayeh camp is situated 12 km east of Beirut on a hill overlooking the Beirut-Tripoli highway. It was established in 1956 for refugees who originally came from the Galilee in northern Palestine. It is the only remaining Palestine refugee camp in the Eastern suburbs of Beirut.

“Due to its location, the camp suffered a great deal of violence and destruction during the years of civil conflict. In 1990 alone 25 percent of the shelters were destroyed or severely damaged and over 100 of its principally Christian Palestine refugee families were displaced. Although the Agency provides assistance for shelter rehabilitation and continues to provide basic services the camp is quite far from UNRWA’s main service centres. ... The refugees live in severe economic hardship; many of them are unemployed. A few men are able to find work as casual labourers and some young women work in shops in the area or as cleaners.” [28b] (**Dbayeh Refugee Camp**)

- 6.131 UNRWA also records that “In addition to the facilities UNRWA provides a number of NGOs are active in Dbayeh, including Mar Mansour Association, the Little Sisters of Nazareth, and the Pontifical Mission, Popular Aid for Relief and Development

(PARD). The services they provide include social and medical services and a kindergarten. Special care is provided for the young and elderly.” [28b] (**Dbayeh Refugee Camp**)

- 6.132 Knudsen (2003) recounted that, due to the influence of Syria, the chairmanship of the popular committees in the camps in Beirut, such as Dbayeh, were seated with pro-Syrian parties. [56]

SHATILA (CHATILA)

- 6.133 UNRWA’s camp profile states that:

“Shatila camp is situated in southern Beirut and was established by the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1949 to accommodate the hundreds of refugees who poured into the area from the Galilee in northern Palestine after 1948. The camp was devastated during the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and was the scene of a major massacre in September of that year. During the years of conflict the camp was frequently targeted, which resulted in the destruction of property, displacement of refugees and a siege.

“Environmental health conditions are extremely bad with damp, overcrowded shelters and open drains. The sewerage system needs considerable expansion while the camp’s residents drink unreliable potable water supplied through a poor distribution network provided by Beirut Municipality. Most of the men work as labourers or run grocery stores and many of the women are able to find work as cleaners.” [28b] (**Shatila Refugee Camp**)

- 6.134 UNRWA also records that “In addition, a number of NGOs are active in Shatila, including Al-Najda, Beit Atfal Al-Soumoud, Norwegian Peoples’ Aid and the Palestinian Red Crescent Society, Children and Youth Centre. The services they provide include health clinics, cash assistance, summer activities, kindergartens and rehabilitation centres.” [28b] (**Shatila Refugee Camp**)

- 6.135 Knudsen (2003) recounted that, due to the influence of Syria, the chairmanship of the popular committees in the camps in Beirut, such as Shatila, were seated with pro-Syrian parties. [56] He noted that, at the time he was writing, over half the composition of Shatila was comprised of Syrian guest workers. [56] However, since the Syrian withdrawal, large numbers of Syrian workers have left Lebanon for fear of attack; consequently the ethnic composition of Shatila may have now changed. [4c]

MAR ELIAS

- 6.136 UNRWA’s camp profile states that:

“Mar Elias camp is the smallest Palestine refugee camp in Lebanon and covers an area of 5,400 sq. metres. It is situated in south west Beirut and was established in 1952 by the Mar Elias Convent to accommodate Palestine refugees from the Galilee in northern Palestine.

“Most of the men work as casual labourers or run grocery stores and car maintenance workshops. Some women work in sewing factories and as cleaners. There is a high incidence of chronic diseases in this camp and many refugees suffer from hypertension, cancer and diabetes.” [28b] (**Mar Elias Refugee Camp**)

- 6.137 UNRWA also records that:

“In addition to the services provided by UNRWA, a number of NGOs are active in Mar Elias, including Beit Atfal Al-Soumoud, Norwegian Peoples' Aid, Palestinian Martyrs' Association, Ghassan Kanafani Cultural Foundation, Vocational and Technical Training Committee, Al Inaach and the Palestinian Red Crescent Society. The services they provide include cash assistance to martyrs' families and orphans, rehabilitation and vocational training for refugees with disabilities, training in craft work and kindergartens.” [28b] (**Mar Elias Refugee Camp**)

- 6.138 Knudsen (2003) recounted that, due to the influence of Syria, the chairmanship of the popular committees in the camps in Beirut, such as Mar Elias, were seated with pro-Syrian parties. [56] He also notes that “A number of flats and houses in tiny Mar Elias camp in Beirut are now used as office space for political parties while many of the original residents have moved out.” [56]

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BURJ EL-BARAJNEH

- 6.139 UNRWA's camp profile states that:

“Burj el-Barajneh camp is situated near Beirut International Airport in south Beirut. It was established by the League of Red Cross Societies in 1948 to accommodate Palestinian refugees from the Galilee in northern Palestine. The camp suffered extensive property damage and displacement of nearly a quarter of its population during the years of civil conflict.

“The men mainly work as casual labourers or manual workers and women find work in sewing factories and as cleaners.” [28b] (**Burj el-Barajneh Refugee Camp**)

- 6.140 UNRWA also records that:

“In addition to the facilities UNRWA provides, a number of NGOs are active in Burj el-Barajneh, including the Palestinian Martyrs' Association, Ghassan Kanafani Cultural Foundation, Najdeh, Al-Ina'sh, Beit Atfal Al-Soumoud and the Palestinian Red Crescent Society. Women's Humanitarian Organization, Brotherhood Institution for Social Education. The Disability Programme carried out needs assessment for the local KGs in coordination with the Women's Humanitarian Organization and Norwegian People's Aid to identify children with special needs enrolled in the KGs for further necessary intervention.” [28b] (**Burj el-Barajneh Refugee Camp**)

- 6.141 According to Knudsen (2003), Burj el-Barajneh is the only camp in Beirut that remained a 'pure' Palestinian camp, in terms of ethnic composition. [56] He also recounted that, due to the influence of Syria, the chairmanship of the popular committees in the camps in Beirut, such as Burj el-Barajneh, were seated with pro-Syrian parties. [56]

EIN EL-HILWEH (AIN AL-HILWEH/AYN HILWA)

- 6.142 UNRWA's camp profile states that:

“Ein el-Hilweh is the largest Palestine refugee camp in Lebanon, both in area size and population. It is situated near the town of Saida 45 km south of Beirut. It was originally established by the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1948/49 when tents were provided for the Palestine refugees arriving from northern Palestine.

UNRWA began operations in the camp in 1952 and the Agency gradually replaced the tents with concrete shelters.

“There are many displaced Palestine refugee families in this camp who were forced to flee from Tripoli and other areas of the country during the hostilities in the eighties. Ein el-Hilweh has endured much violence, particularly between 1982-1991, which resulted in a high number of casualties and near total destruction of the camp. Shelters are small and very close to each other. Some still have zinc sheet roofing. UNRWA constructed a multi-storey housing complex in 1993-1994 to accommodate 118 displaced families mainly from Nabatieh camp, which was destroyed during the *[sic]* 1973 by Israeli military action. A number of displaced refugees continue to live on the edge of the camp in extremely poor conditions.” [28b] (Ein el-Hilweh Refugee Camp)

- 6.143 UNRWA’s camp profile continues “Ein el-Hilweh's inhabitants mainly work as daily-paid labourers on construction sites and in orchards, in embroidery workshops and as cleaners. There is quite a high school drop-out rate as students are often forced to leave school in order to support their families.” [28b] (Ein el-Hilweh Refugee Camp)

- 6.144 UNRWA also records that:

“A number of NGOs are active in Ein el-Hilweh, including Al-Najda, Beit Atfal Al-Soumoud, Ghassan Kanafani Cultural Foundation, the Palestinian Women's Union, Terre des Hommes, Naba', the YMCA, Al Karamah Association For Disabled Al-Hamshari Hospital, and Vocational and Technical Training Committee. The services they provide include literacy courses, vocational training and rehabilitation for refugees with disabilities, summer camps, medical services and kindergartens.” [28b] (Ein el-Hilweh Refugee Camp)

- 6.145 A 2003 paper by Are Knudsen, ‘Islamism in the Diaspora: Palestinian refugees in Lebanon’, states that “Ayn Hilwa, the most conflict-ridden camp in the country is surrounded by barbed wire and legal entry is only possible through a few checkpoints guarded by the Lebanese army, with secondary checkpoints manned by armed guards representing the popular committees.” [56] (p4-5)

- 6.146 According to Knudsen’s 2003 paper, Ein el-Hilweh’s political actors can be divided into three groups: loyalist, Islamist and oppositional. [56] (p8) Knudsen detailed the different groups as follows:

“The ‘loyalists’ are secular groups formed around PLO’s largest faction Fateh and share its secular ideology and political programme. The ‘Islamists’ are a heterogeneous mix of Palestinian and Lebanese Islamists with divergent ideologies and political agendas. While some remain ideologically opposed to Fateh and its policies vis-à-vis Israel (Hamas, Islamic Jihad), others seek to break Fateh’s political hegemony in Lebanese refugee camps, if necessary by violent means (Osbat al-Ansar). The ‘oppositional’ camp is likewise a heterogeneous coalition of secular parties, many of them breakaway factions from Fateh itself, which find a common ground in their difference with Fateh and the loyalists over their policy of appeasement vis-à-vis Israel. In the camps there is also a diverse range of committees and groups whose main function is not political but bureaucratic. Still, control of the popular committees and trade union groups does provide political gains and leadership of them is therefore coveted and sometimes turns violent.” [56] (p8)

- 6.147 The same source also contained a table listing the various political actors in Ein el-Hilweh, which categorised them into the ‘loyalist’, ‘Islamist’ or ‘oppositional’ groups:

Loyalist	Islamist	Oppositional
Fatah	Hamas	Palestinian National Alliance *
Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)	Islamic Jihad	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) **
People's Party (Communist)	Islamic Group (Jamaa al-Islamiyya)	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) **
Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF)	Islamic Philanthropic Association (al-Abash)	[Trade Union Groups]
Arab Liberation Front (ALF)	Ansar Group	[Village Committees]
	[Miscellaneous Islamist Groups]	[Popular Committees]
* Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC), Fateh-Intifadah, Sa'eka, Palestine Liberation Front, Palestine Popular Struggle Front (PPSF), Revolutionary Communist Party, Hamas and Islamic Jihad. ** PFLP and DFLP, both leftist secular parties, oscillate between the opposition and the loyalist (Fateh) camp.		

[56] (p9)

- 6.148 A June 2003 Middle East Intelligence Bulletin (MEIB) article recounted, in detail, the various groups and power struggles within Ein el-Hilweh over the last two decades. [58] The article states that “Ain al-Hilweh, the largest Palestinian refugee camp in [then] Syrian-occupied Lebanon, has been linked to virtually every case of al-Qaeda activity in Lebanon, while renegade terrorists residing in the camp have been tied to the global terror network’s operations in Jordan, Turkey and elsewhere in the region.” [58] The article noted that, despite the status of Ein el-Hilweh as a ‘zone of unlaw’ serving Syrian interests, Damascus did not directly control most operatives within the camp and that the most radical groups were in fact anti-Syrian. [58]
- 6.149 The article also reported that Ein el-Hilweh was the stronghold of the Fatah movement during the late 1980s, that the Abu Nidal Organisation [ANO] had been defeated by Fatah in a bloody three-day war for control of the camp in September 1990 and also recounted the rebellion of Col. Mounir Maqdash against Yasser Arafat’s command. With Iranian finances and Hezbollah logistical support, he began training his own militia and “By 1995, Maqdash’s dissident faction [the Black September 13 Brigade], backed by pro-Syrian leftist groups, had established dominance over mainstream Fatah forces in the camp, in part because many of Arafat’s most loyal commanders had been transferred to the West Bank and Gaza.” [58] MEIB noted that “Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which had only a limited presence in the camp until the mid-1990s, coordinated closely with Maqdash and were allowed to distribute Iranian funds to expand their bases of support.” [58]
- 6.150 Esbat al-Ansar, the League of Partisans, has also had a presence in Ein el-Hilweh for over two decades and, “In the [sic] late 1998, Esbat al-Ansar began receiving significant funding from al-Qaeda, thoroughly transforming both its infrastructure and its goals. The group’s military wing, which now paid recruits monthly salaries for the first time, grew to a force of 150-300 fighters, dozens of whom were sent to bin Laden’s training camps in Afghanistan.” [58] Due to its increased financial resources, the group was able to buy weapons and also move more freely, as members could now pay the bribes needed to pass through Lebanese security checkpoints. [58] The latter benefit meant that “It quickly established close links with radical Islamists in the northern port of Tripoli and the nearby Badawi and Nahr el-Bared refugee camps.” [58]

- 6.151 Syrian concerns over the rise of Islamist groups in the camp resulted in the Syrian authorities allowing Fatah to reassert its authority in the Ein al-Hilweh, which included Mounir Maqdah who had rejoined Fatah in late 1998, primarily by pouring Palestinian Authority (PA) funds into the camp. [58] However, with the in absentia conviction of Fatah's leader in Lebanon, Sultan Abu al-Aynayn [based in Rashidieh camp], of forming an armed gang and the subsequent arrest of three senior Fatah officials, Syrian support of Fatah's authority in Ein el-Hilweh was again curtailed, seemingly in favour of Esbat al-Ansar. [58]
- 6.152 MEIB also recounted the presence of other groups in Ein el-Hilweh, such as Jamal Suleiman's Fatah's Martyrs' Battalion; the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP); the 10 to 20 fighters who constituted the remnants of the Dinniyeh Group – initially a 200-300 strong group of Islamic militants who, in January 2000, had failed in an attempt to establish an Islamic 'mini-state' in north Lebanon – who fled to Ein el-Hilweh following the defeat of the group by 13,000 Lebanese troops; and the Esbat al-Ansar breakaway group – Esbat al-Nour – which was led by the eldest son of the original group's founder: "[Abdullah] Shreidi attracted only a few dozen of the [Esbat al-Ansar] movement's fighters, as well as the Dinniyeh militants for whom he had provided shelter." [58] The article states that "Another small, but important al-Qaeda affiliate is Al-Haraka al-Islamiya al-Mujahida (The Islamic Struggle Movement), led by Sheikh Jamal Khattab, the imam of Al-Nour Mosque in the Safsaf neighbourhood of Ain al-Hilweh." [58]
- 6.153 MEIB detailed the fluctuating nature of power within the camp, reporting on the various outside influences of the Syrian and Iranian regimes, Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda, and also the political and physical conflicts between the groups inside Ein el-Hilweh. [58]

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MIEH MIEH

- 6.154 UNRWA's camp profile states that:

"Mieh Mieh, which was established in 1954, is a small camp situated in the hills 4 km east of Saida in south Lebanon. The camp sustained considerable damage during the years of conflict, particularly in July 1991 when 15 per cent of its shelters and UNRWA's school and distribution centre were destroyed.

"The socio-economic situation of the refugees is extremely difficult. Men find work as daily-paid labourers on construction sites and in orchards. Women work in orchards, in embroidery workshops and as cleaners. All shelters are supplied with water through a network connected to the Agency's water plant." [28b] (Mieh Mieh Refugee Camp)

- 6.155 UNRWA also records that "Al-Najdeh Al-Sha'bieh is the only NGO active in Mieh Mieh and provides house decorating courses for Palestinian youths." [28b] (Mieh Mieh Refugee Camp)

EL-BUSS

- 6.156 UNRWA's camp profile states that:

“Buss camp is only 1.5 km south of the city of Tyre. The camp was originally built by the French Government in 1939 to accommodate refugees from Armenia. In 1948 Palestine refugees from the Acre area in the Galilee arrived. Due to its location and small size the camp was spared much of the violence experienced by other camps during the years of civil conflict.

“The camp’s inhabitants live in concrete block shelters, some of which were built by the refugees themselves. The Agency has not been able to assist in shelter rehabilitation due to a ban on entry of building material imposed by the Lebanese Government since 1998. The refugees mainly find daily-paid seasonal work in agriculture and construction. All shelters are supplied with water and electricity and have private toilets but only 60 percent are connected to the unfinished sewerage system. The rest use percolating pits.” [28b] (El-Buss Refugee Camp)

6.157 UNRWA also recorded that:

“A number of NGOs are active in El-Buss, including Al-Najda, Beit Atfal Al-Soumoud, Naba’, Tyre Public Hospital, the Palestinian Red Crescent Society, Nabil Badran Association for the Disabled, Community Rehabilitation Development Centre for Disabled Children. The services they provide include medical assistance and hospitalization, kindergartens, training centres, rehabilitation centres for refugees with disabilities and cultural clubs.

“The Disability Programme carried out needs assessment for the local KGs in coordination with the Community Rehabilitation Development Centre for Disabled Children and Nabil Badran Association for the Disabled to identify children with special needs enrolled in the KGs for further necessary intervention.” [28b] (El-Buss Refugee Camp)

BURJ EL-SHEMALI

6.158 UNRWA’s camp profile stated that:

“Burj el-Shemali camp is located 3 km east of Tyre in south Lebanon. The camp was set up after the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict to provide tented shelter for Palestine refugees from Hawla and Tiberias in northern Palestine. UNRWA started providing services in the camp in 1955. The camp also houses displaced Palestine refugees from other parts of Lebanon. The camp suffered a great deal of damage during the years of civil conflict and much work still needs to be done to improve the infrastructure. While most shelters were built with concrete blocks, there are also many make-shift shelters with zinc roofing. The Agency has not been able to assist in shelter rehabilitation due to a ban on entry of building material imposed by the Lebanese Government since 1998.

“Unemployment is extremely high in Burj el-Shemali. Men find seasonal work in agriculture and construction and some are manual workers. Women work in seasonal agriculture and as house cleaners. All shelters are supplied with electricity. Water is supplied from three wells operated by UNRWA. All shelters have private toilets connected to percolating pits. Sewage and waste water runs into open storm run-off drains along roads and pathways.” [28b] (Burj el-Shemali Refugee Camp)

6.159 UNRWA also records that “A number of NGOs are active in Burj el-Shemali, including Al-Najda, Beit Atfal Al-Soumoud, the General Palestinian Women’s Union, Ahmad Rahyal, Palestinian Martyrs’ Association and the Palestinian Red Crescent

Society. The services they provide include cash and medical assistance and hospitalization, kindergartens and training centres.” [28b] (Burj el-Shemali Refugee Camp)

RASHIDIEH

6.160 UNRWA’s camp profile states that:

“Rashidieh camp lies on the seashore 5 km from the southern port of Tyre. The older part of the camp was built by the French Government in 1936 to accommodate Armenian refugees. The ‘new camp’ was built by UNRWA in 1963 for Palestine refugees evacuated from Gouraud camp in the Baalbeck and who originally came from Deir al-Qassi, Alma an-Naher and other villages in northern Palestine. Rashidieh camp was heavily affected by the conflict between 1982-1987, which resulted in the total or partial destruction of nearly 600 shelters and the displacement of over 5,000 refugees. The Agency has not been able to assist in shelter rehabilitation due to a ban on entry of building material imposed by the Lebanese Government since 1998.

“The camp’s inhabitants are only able to find work in seasonal agriculture and construction. Almost all shelters in the camp are ventilated and are supplied with water and electricity. Although they all have private toilets there is no sewerage network and sewage flows into open ditches along roads and pathways.” [28b] (Rashidieh Refugee Camp)

6.161 UNRWA also records that “A number of NGOs are active in Rashidieh, including Al-Najda, Beit Atfal Al-Soumoud, Naba’, Al-Quds, Al-Wazir Foundation, General Palestinian Women’s Union and Red Crescent. The services they provide include cash assistance to orphans, kindergartens, a training centre and a rehabilitation centre for refugees with disabilities.” [28b] (Rashidieh Refugee Camp)

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RESIDENCE STATUS AND DOCUMENTS

6.162 According to the report of the Danish fact-finding mission of May 1998, there are, in effect, four categories of refugee residence status in Lebanon:

“1948 refugees registered with UNRWA, the Directorate-General for Palestinian Affairs (DGPA) and the Sûreté Générale;

“1948 refugees not registered with UNRWA, but registered with the DGPA and the Sûreté Générale;

“1967 refugees also not registered with UNRWA, but only with the authorities;

“refugees not registered with UNRWA or with the authorities.” [49] (p25)

6.163 The same report also noted that UNRWA only registers those who were made refugees by events in 1948, and their descendants but, at that time, the number of Palestinians not registered with either UNRWA or the authorities was believed to be very small. [49] (p25)

6.164 On the issue of identity documentation, the fact-finding mission report records that “The DGPA reported [in May 1998] that it issues blue identity cards to all Palestinian refugees, whether such as a result of events in 1948 or in 1967.” [49] (p26) These

cards do not note what kind of Palestinian the holder is and, if lost, can be replaced without difficulty upon request. The DGPA also issued birth, family and civil status certificates. [49] (p26) The report noted that the only exceptions are 1948 refugees registered only with the Sûreté Générale and the DGPA, who are issued with white identity cards. [49] (p26)

6.165 The report of the Danish fact-finding mission of May 1998 states that:

“According to a Lebanese source wishing to remain anonymous, the Sûreté Générale issues 1948 Palestinians five-year travel documents, renewable without difficulty for further five-year periods. The DGPA explained that the Sûreté Générale issues such travel documents on the basis of the DGPA's register. According to that same source, the Sûreté Générale thus issues travel documents only to Palestinians registered with the UNRWA. The 1967 Palestinians, registered with the Lebanese authorities but not with the UNRWA, are issued one-year laissez-passers, as are also white card holders.” [49] (p26)

SYRIANS

6.166 Amnesty International (AI) reported in late April 2005 that:

“On 13 April [2005] Amnesty International received a response from Lebanese General Security regarding its request for information related to attacks, including killings, on Syrians since 14 February [the date Lebanese ex-Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated], as well as about whether any of the alleged perpetrators are being brought to justice. Details received of officially recorded attacks include: 31 separate incidents of Syrian workers' temporary housing being burnt between 27 February and 23 March; 43 separate physical attacks on Syrian workers – including with stones, sticks, guns and grenades and at times with associated robbery – between 1 March and 6 April; two Syrian men abducted and one Syrian woman raped; a number of Syrian workers' vehicles being burnt or attacked; and 17 cases of threats against individuals to force them to leave the country.” [4c]

6.167 AI also notes that “... the [Lebanese General Security's] response does not include any information on killings, including those in 'Aramoun, Beirut and Tyre, nor on attacks outside of those dates, nor on any arrests.” [4c]

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GENDER

6.168 According to Article 7 of the Lebanon's Constitution, “All Lebanese are equal before the law. They equally enjoy civil and political rights and equally are bound by public obligations and duties without any distinction.” [20] (Part A, Chapter 2) Two reports by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), published in September 2004 and February 2005, recounted the situation of women in Lebanon with regard to issues such as equality before the law and in civil affairs, and any improvements made in terms of changes in law and society. [31a-31b] Whilst a July 2005 UN study on Personal Status Laws in the Middle East explained how Lebanese legislation affected women, and noted the different Status Laws as applicable to the various sects in Lebanon – with particular reference to marriage. [32] (p15-19)

6.169 The US Department of State's Report on Human Rights Practices 2004 (USSD 2004), published on 28 February 2005, reports that “Women have the right to vote, and there are no legal barriers to their participation in politics; however, there were

significant cultural barriers. Prior to October [2004], no woman had held a Cabinet position; however, at that juncture, two women were named to the Cabinet. Since 1992, there have been only 3 women in the 128-seat Parliament.” [2b] (Section 3) The USSD report of the following year, published on the 8 March 2006, adds that “... at year’s end [2005] there was one woman in the cabinet. In the parliamentary elections, women’s representation increased from three members to five members.” [2f] (Section 3)

- 6.170 On the subject of sexual abuse against women, USSD 2005 records “The law prohibits rape, and the minimum sentence for a person convicted of rape is 5 years in prison. The minimum sentence for a person convicted of raping a minor is 7 years. The law was effectively enforced.” [2f] (Section 5, Women) A March 2005 Canadian Research Directorate information response stated that, according to the December 2000 edition of *The Middle East Quarterly*, marriage to the person who raped or otherwise violated her, or to another man, can save her honour. [17m] CEDAW’s 2005 report states that “Victims of sexual assault include those who are forced by violence or threat to endure or carry out an indecent act. The Lebanese legislator has laid down the requirement that an offender must compensate his victim. The amount of compensation is at the discretion of the court on a case-by-case basis.” [31b] (p40) USSD 2005 notes that “The law prohibits sexual harassment; however it was a widespread problem, and the law was not effectively enforced.” [2f] (Section 5, Women)

- 6.171 On domestic abuse, the CEDAW 2005 report states that “There is no legally recognized competent authority to which women may have recourse, for instance, if they are subjected to violence in the home.” [31b] (p40) Whilst USSD 2005 reports that:

“The law does not specifically prohibit domestic violence, and domestic violence against women was a problem. There were no authoritative statistics on the extent of spousal abuse; however, most experts noted that it was a problem. Despite a law prohibiting battery with a maximum sentence of three years in prison for those convicted, some religious courts legally may require a battered wife to return to the house in spite of physical abuse. Many women were sometimes compelled to remain in abusive marriages because of economic, social and family pressures.” [2f] (Section 5, Women)

- 6.172 A Canadian Research Directorate information response of February 2004 recorded information, regarding Lebanese single mothers, supplied by a political science professor from the American University of Beirut:

“Single mothers [translation] ‘are not tolerated by Lebanese society.’ In the same correspondence, he also stated that [translation] ‘people with different socio-economic backgrounds have a variety of opinions on pre-marital sexual relations, but that a woman who raises her child outside of marriage is unlikely to be accepted in Lebanese society.’ The professor also stated that he would not exclude the possibility that a woman raising her child alone could be the victim of an honour crime. According to him, the Lebanese government provides absolutely no protection to single mothers.” [17f]

- 6.173 The same information response, quoting a Beirut lawyer, continues:

“With regard to the risks incurred by a single Christian mother, the lawyer stated that

[translation] ‘Lebanon is made up of many heterogeneous communities and societies, and there are many very different mindsets throughout the country.

One can therefore find tribal communities that have very strict laws on a woman's virginity ... but there is also—particularly among Lebanese Christians—a very open mentality that indulges and even permits common-law relationships. One would also have to take into consideration that a woman's age and financial situation play a large role in determining the risks she faces. A woman of 40 or even 35 years may be spared, as well as a divorced woman.” [17f]

- 6.174 CEDAW's February 2005 report states that “The security forces ... do not intervene if the subject of the violence is a family member, except where it is one of them who makes the complaint.” [31b] (p40) USSD 2005 records that “The Government had no separate program to provide medical assistance to battered women; however, it provided legal assistance to victims who could not afford it regardless of their gender. In most cases police ignored complaints submitted by battered or abused women. A local NGO, the Lebanese Council to Resist Violence Against Women, worked actively to reduce violence against women by offering counseling and legal aid and raising awareness about domestic violence.” [2f] (Section 5, Women)
- 6.175 USSD 2005 also reports that “Social pressure against women pursuing careers was strong in some parts of the country. Men sometimes exercised considerable control over female relatives, restricting their activities outside of the home or their contact with friends and relatives. Women may own property, but often ceded control of it to male relatives for cultural reasons and because of family pressure.” [2f] (Section 5, Women) In March 2006, the UN's Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) reported on the illegal sex trade in Lebanon, citing the patriarchal nature of Lebanese society, sexual abuse and domestic violence as reasons why women leave home, and the difficulties such women face in terms of unemployment as the main reason why they then turn to prostitution. [29n] An October 2005 study compiled for Save the Children Sweden, ‘Woman or Child? Voices of teenage girls in the Middle East’, examined the social situation of girls and young women in Lebanon from the viewpoint of the children themselves. [54]

‘HONOUR’ KILLINGS

- 6.176 CEDAW reported in September 2004 that:

“Article 562 of the Lebanese penal code provides that whoever catches his wife, or one of his parents or offspring, or his sister, in the act of witnessed adultery, or during illegal sexual intercourse, and kills or injures one of them without premeditation, shall benefit from the mitigating excuse; and whoever catches his wife, or one of his parents or offspring, or his sister in a suspicious situation with another person and kills or injures one of them shall benefit from the mitigating excuse. Article 562, which requires mitigation of the penalty, encourages killing and injuring and contradicts the principles of freedom, justice and equality.” [31a] (p28)

- 6.177 USSD 2005 reports that:

“The legal system was discriminatory in its handling of ‘honor crimes.’ According to the Penal Code, a man who kills his wife or other female relative may receive a reduced sentence if he demonstrates that he committed the crime in response to a socially unacceptable sexual relationship conducted by the victim. For example while the Penal Code stipulates that murder is punishable by either a life sentence or the death penalty, if a defendant can prove it was an honor crime, the sentence is commuted to one to seven years’ imprisonment. While several honor crimes were

reported in the media, no person has been convicted in a case legally considered an honor crime.” [2f] (Section 5, Women)

- 6.178 A Beirut-based lawyer, who specialised in honour crimes, provided information to the Canadian Research Directorate in February 2004 which states that “Most deaths linked to honour crimes are not reported to the police and are covered up by the family as suicides or accidents. The shame brought upon a family should the socially [translation] ‘unacceptable’ behaviour of the woman killed ever be discovered, as well as the will to protect the killer from potential legal repercussions, lead to the silencing of many honour killings.” [17f] The Research Directorate response also states that “With regard to the protection available from the government or other organizations to potential female victims of violence, the lawyer is of the opinion that [translation] ‘no protection is offered at any level. If she is going to be killed, nothing will protect her.’” [17f]

PALESTINIANS

- 6.179 The Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA for Palestinians in the Near East, covering the period 1 July 2004–30 June 2005 (UNRWA 2005) states that, regionally:

“Sixty-five of the community-based organizations are women’s programme centres, in which refugee women gain knowledge and skills that enhance their participation in the community. The mainstays of the training, as prioritized by surveys of community preferences conducted by the centres, are still rather traditional activities — sewing, knitting, embroidery, food processing and catering — but increasingly women express interest in training in such areas as computer skills, business and photography, which has led to an expansion in course offerings. Awareness-raising is another critical area of activity in the centres. Sessions focus on health, nutrition, hygiene, legal matters, gender, the environment and good parenting. These sessions have increased demand for further activities, which the centres have taken on, namely legal counselling, psychosocial counselling, physical fitness classes, and social and recreational activities. In addition, the 44 kindergartens and 28 nurseries in the centres provide a much needed service for working mothers and those who wish to participate in women’s programme centre activities.” [28f] (para 127)

- 6.180 UNRWA 2005 also reports that “In Lebanon, a comprehensive brochure outlining the main activities of the women’s programme centres was issued to the community and all stakeholders.” [28f] (para 127)

See also Section 6.B: [Ethnic groups/Palestinians](#)

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CHILDREN

- 6.181 The Lebanon’s Constitution did not contain any Articles that concerned the rights of children. [20]
- 6.182 The US Department of State’s Report on Human Rights Practices 2005 (USSD 2005), published on 8 March 2006, reports that:

“The plight of children was a growing concern for the Government. Education was free in public schools and compulsory until the completion of the elementary level at age 12. However, implementation decrees were not issued. Public schools generally were inadequate, lacking proper facilities, equipment and trained staff. ... In some

families with limited incomes, boys received more education than girls. During the year [2005] the Higher Council for Childhood (administered by the Ministry of Social Affairs), in cooperation with several NGOs, organized five regional workshops to discuss the right to education and the obstacles that hinder the application of the law on compulsory education and ways to overcome them.” [2f] (Section 5, Children)

- 6.183 USSD 2005 continues “An undetermined number of children were neglected, abused, and exploited. There are periodic reports that parents force children to beg in the streets or work in the fields to help support the family. Poor children often were compelled by their parents to seek employment and often took jobs that jeopardized their safety.” [2f] (Section 5, Children) The report further states “Again, during the year, NGO's throughout the country reported that child prostitution was a problem. The authorities discovered and broke up three child prostitution rings. In two of the cases, the perpetrators were charged with facilitation, in the third, with child prostitution. At year's end [2004], the cases were pending prosecution.” [2f] (Section 5, Children) An October 2005 study compiled for Save the Children – Sweden, ‘Woman or Child? Voices of teenage girls in the Middle East’, examined the social situation of girls and young women in Lebanon from the viewpoint of the children themselves. [54]

CHILD CARE ARRANGEMENTS

- 6.184 On the subject of social care and adoption, USSD 2004 notes that “The normal procedure for adoption was through religious homes or institutions authorized to arrange adoption; however, the demand to provide infants for adoption abroad resulted in illegal international adoptions. There were no statistics available concerning the prevalence of the illegal adoption of infants. The Government did not have specific child protection laws to remove children from abusive situations and did not grant NGOs adequate legal standing to litigate on behalf of abused minor children.” [2b] (Section 5, Children)

PALESTINIANS

- 6.185 The Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA for Palestinians in the Near East, covering the period 1 July 2004–30 June 2005 (UNRWA 2005) states that, regionally:

“Efforts continued to enhance the well-being of children and youth through various activities in the community-based organizations and the community at large, encouraging their participation in constructive activities. During the reporting period, 48 awareness-raising sessions relating to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, mainly the right to express views freely, the right to dignity for children with disabilities, protection from abuse and children's rights to access information and enjoy cultural and art activities, were conducted for 2,836 children, their parents and the community. Many of the awareness activities involved plays or puppet shows. Additionally, 25,241 underserved refugee children and young people took advantage of various training or tutoring and skills-building activities in computers, languages, leadership training, sports, theatre, music, and summer and winter camps [28f] (para 133)

- 6.186 UNRWA 2005 reports that “Also in Lebanon, the child-to-child methodology was used to involve children in planning, implementing and evaluating activities under the supervision of skilled animators. In Lebanon, a directory listing all the operating clubs and play centres located in camps was produced and distributed to all stakeholders.” [28f] (para 133)

See also Section 6.B: [Ethnic groups/Palestinians](#)

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LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER PERSONS

- 6.187 The Lebanon's Constitution did not contain any Articles that concerned the rights of homosexuals. [20] The US Department of State's Report on Human Rights Practices 2005 (USSD 2005), published on 8 March 2006, states that "Discrimination against homosexuals existed during the year [2005]. The law prohibits unnatural sexual intercourse, which is punishable by up to 1 year in prison. The law was sometimes applied to homosexuals. Citizens' sexual preferences reflected societal norms, not legal rulings." [21] (Section 5, Other Societal Abuses and Discrimination) Amnesty International's Annual Report 2005 (AI 2005) notes that "A campaign led by human rights group Hurriyyat Khasah (Private Liberties) to promote respect for the rights of lesbians and gay men was stepped up during the year. It included calls for reform of provisions of the Penal Code that criminalize homosexuality." [4a] (Background)
- 6.188 However, the International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA) reported that, due to the existence of article 534 of the Lebanese penal code which punishes 'all physical contact and union against nature', homosexuality was in fact illegal as most Lebanese, including the authorities, viewed homosexual acts as being 'against nature'. [12] (Description of discriminatory sexual offence laws and their application) The organisation, Lebanese Equality for Gays and Lesbians (LEGAL), states that "The law is enforced by a special vice-squad of the 'Police Des Moeurs' (Morals Police). The Morals Police is indiscernible from the other police squads and sometimes operate undercover. Still, Lebanon is maybe the only Arabic country alongside with Egypt to have a somewhat active gay scene; active but extremely secretive and risky." [9]
- 6.189 The UK-based website, Gay Times, produced a profile on homosexuality and Lebanon, last updated on 21 November 2005, which states that:
- "In Lebanon homosexual acts are illegal, though there is greater tolerance than other Middle Eastern countries. However, homosexuality is still not that accepted by Lebanese society and there are virtually no gay organisations. Most gay life is secret and closeted. However, in 2004 a human rights group called Hurriyyat Khassa or Private Liberties campaigned for the repeal of Article 534 of Lebanon's penal code by screening the film 'Victim'.
- "The Lebanese gay scene is concentrated in Beirut. There are a number of mixed pubs, clubs, cafes, beaches and baths where you can meet other gays and lesbians. Visitors are however advised to be discreet." [8] (Scene and culture)
- 6.190 The Lebanese Protection for Lesbian, Gays, Bisexuals and Transgenders (Helem) website contained an undated report on human rights, with particular reference to the gay community in Lebanon. [36a-36e] The report detailed information on Lebanese law and practice, law enforcement practices, the treatment of homosexuals in Lebanese society and recorded the existence of other human rights reports on the same subject. [36a-36e] According to Helem, homosexuals cannot avail themselves of police protection, and homosexual detainees are at risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. [36c] (p2, 3) The website, Gay Middle East, reproduced a number of news reports on the situation for gays in Lebanon, the most recently dated – at the time of writing – was a 13 November 2005 report on the arrest of persons in two Beirut gay clubs. [37] A Canadian Research Directorate information response of

October 2004 explored the situation of homosexuals in relation to matters such as legislation, police treatment and societal discrimination, referring to a large variety of sources. [17j]

PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES

6.191 The US Department of State's Report on Human Rights Practices 2004 (USSD 20040, published on 28 February 2005, stated that the National Association for the Rights of the Disabled was one of several human rights groups allowed to operate freely without overt government restriction and to carry out investigations and publish their findings. [2b] (Section 4) It continues "The Constitution provides for equality among all citizens; ... Although the law reserves a percentage of private sector and government jobs to persons with disabilities, there were few accommodations made for them." [2b] (Section 5) A January 2006 UN Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) report noted the results of a study which recorded that the disabled in Lebanon, who constitute approximately 10 percent of the population, continued to be marginalised in terms of education and employment. [29h]

6.192 The USSD report for 2005, published on 8 March 2006, also reports:

"Discrimination against persons with disabilities continued. For example, the Civil Service Board, which is in charge of recruiting government employees, refused to receive applications from disabled persons. The law mandates disabled access to buildings; however, the government failed to take steps to amend building codes to conform to this law. Approximately 100 thousand persons were disabled during the civil war. Families generally cared for their own family members with disabilities. Most efforts to assist persons with disabilities were made by approximately 100 private organizations. These organizations were relatively active, although poorly funded.

"The law on persons with disabilities stipulates that at least 3 percent of all government and private sector positions should be filled by persons with disabilities, provided that such persons fulfill the qualifications of the position. However, there was no evidence that the law was enforced in practice. In 2002 the Ministry of Finance informed all firms and companies that it would not settle obligations with them unless they proved that 3 percent of their workforce was composed of persons with disabilities. However, there was no evidence that the law was enforced in practice." [2f] (Section 5)

PALESTINIANS

6.193 The Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA for Palestinians in the Near East, covering the period 1 July 2004–30 June 2005 (UNRWA 2005) states that, regionally "The Agency's remedial and special education programmes ensure that children with learning disabilities receive specialized attention, including audio-visual programmes, curriculum enrichment materials and self-learning kits." [28f] (para 45) The same source also records that "Through a network of 39 community-based rehabilitation centres, the disability programme promotes a social approach to disability, provides rehabilitation services, and works to equalize opportunities for people with disabilities." [28f] (para 128)

See also Section 5: [Medical services/Palestinians](#); **Section 6.A:** [Employment Rights/Palestinians](#); **Section 6.B:** [Ethnic groups/Palestinians](#); [Women/Palestinians](#); [Children/Palestinians](#)

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REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS

- 6.194 The US State Department's Human Rights Report for 2005 (USSD 2005), which was published on 8 March 2006, records that "The law does not provide for the granting of asylum or refugee status in accordance with the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol." [2f] (Section 2d) Nevertheless, the report continues:

"In practice, the Government provided some protection against *refoulement*, the return of persons to a country where they feared persecution, and granted refugee status to a limited number of Sudanese. The government cooperated with the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees and asylum seekers. The government also provided temporary protection to individuals who may not qualify as refugees under the 1951 Convention/1967 Protocol to approximately three thousand persons during the year [2005]." [2f] (Section 2d)

- 6.195 The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) released a report on Discrimination against Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Lebanon, prepared by Frontiers Center, in March 2004. [19] USSD 2005 recounted the details of a 2003 agreement between the Lebanese authorities and UNHCR that afforded more protection, but not permanent asylum, to non-Palestinian asylum seekers recognised as refugees by the UN agency. [2f] (Section 2d) FIDH's report was critical of the Lebanese authorities' current and previous record in its dealings with refugees and asylum seekers residing in the country, and also of the September 2003 Memorandum of Understanding with the UNHCR:

"In general, Lebanon has opted for a very limited agreement with UNHCR, which though a step forward, does not bring Lebanon into compliance with international law. And, because Lebanon only signed a bilateral agreement with UNHCR, it still has not recognized any form of refugee status in its legislation. Hence, refugees' capacity to actually assert and enjoy their rights remains highly impaired." [19]

- 6.196 USSD 2005 notes that "Most refugees were Palestinians." [2f] (Section 2d) Also:

"According to the UNHCR, there were 2,541 non-Palestinian refugees, primarily Iraqis, Somalis and Sudanese, registered with the UN and residing in the country. However, this number did not include a substantial number of refugees from Iraq who entered the country illegally in search of jobs, education and security. ... The SG [Sûreté Générale] detained approximately 200 Iraqi refugees during the year for return to Iraq. The UNHCR was granted access to them." [2f] (Section 2d)

See also Section 6.B: [Ethnic groups/Kurds](#); [Ethnic groups/Palestinians](#)

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6.C Human Rights: Other Issues

ARMED GROUPS

PALESTINIAN GROUPS

6.197 An International Crisis Group (ICG) report of December 2005, 'Lebanon: Managing the Gathering Storm' recorded the measures taken by Prime Minister Fouad Sinoira since coming to power in June 2005. [7c] The report states that "In a sharp departure with the past, he [Sinoira] has met with President Mahmoud Abbas to discuss the status of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees, striving to bolster the roles of both the Palestinian Authority and Fatah at the expense of Syrian-affiliated groups." [7c] (p5) The report continues "They agreed to place Palestinian weapons inside the camps under the combined control of the Lebanese Army and Fatah command and remove any weapons outside their boundaries. The agreement is potentially as significant for the refugees as for Lebanon, though pro-Syrian factions have refused to submit to Fatah oversight and tensions remain high." [7c] (p5)

6.198 ICG's report, noting and remarking on events since the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon, states that "It [Syria] also has a long history of sponsoring Palestinian militant groups with an armed presence in Lebanon, most notably the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command [PFLP-GC], led by Ahmad Jibril." [7c] (p10) On Islamist groups in Lebanon, the same source stated that "Numerically, Islamists do not appear to be a significant threat. Still, in the words of a Palestinian observer [Ghassan Abdullah]: 'Esbat al-Ansar has only 200 members, but they are more powerful and more committed than 2,000 Fatah [Palestinian] fighters. Fatah's fighters fight for their salary, the Islamists fight for their existence. They will fight to the end'." [7c] (p13)

6.199 According to the US Department of State's Report on Human Rights Practices 2005 (USSD 2005), published in March 2006, "Palestinian refugees had no political rights. An estimated 17 Palestinian factions operated in the country and were generally organized around prominent individuals. Most Palestinians lived in refugee camps controlled by one or more factions. Refugee leaders were not elected, but there were 'popular committees' that met regularly with UNRWA [UN Relief and Works Agency] and visitors." [2f] (Section 3) ICG's December 2005 report notes that:

"During Syria's military presence in Lebanon, Palestinian groups were – like Hizbollah – spared from the Taef Accord's disarmament requirement. They took charge of seven of Lebanon's twelve Palestinian refugee camps and maintained bases in the Bekaa Valley and south of Beirut. In the largest camp, Ain al-Halwe, Fatah has a dominant though not exclusive presence. On a visit, Crisis Group saw portraits of the late Hamas leader Ahmed Yassin vying for space in alleyways with Yasser Arafat's. Fatah leaders appeared confident of their control, and uniformed Palestinian police patrolled the main thoroughfare. However, plain-clothes gunmen predominated in the back streets, and camp residents said Fatah was challenged politically by Hamas and Islamic Jihad through their social networks and militarily by *jihadi* groups." [7c] (p10-11)

6.200 The same source continues:

"While observers acknowledge that pro-Syrian groups have hundreds rather than thousands of armed followers, camp residents spoke of their concern that any Lebanese army move against pro-Syrian bases would quickly affect the refugee

camps: 'All it will take is for ten refugee camp members of the PFLP-GC to go out and shoot at the Lebanese army. The army will shoot back, and then anyone with weapons will go and start fighting. Fatah would not be able to control them' [Ghassan Abdullah, Palestinian observer].” [7c] (p10-11)

- 6.201 The USSD's Country Report on Terrorism (USSD CRT 2004), published in April 2005, prior to the completion of the Syrian withdrawal, states that “Lebanon remains host to numerous US-designated terrorist groups. Beirut continued to demonstrate an unwillingness to take steps against Lebanese Hizballah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), the Abu Nidal organization (ANO), and HAMAS.” [2c] (**Chapter 5B, Lebanon**) However, the USSD CRT published the following year notes that “Since July [2005], when the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora took office, Lebanon has taken small but important steps against several terrorist groups, specifically the PFLP-GC and Fatah al-Intifada.” [2g] (**Chapter 5, Middle East and North Africa Overview**)
- 6.202 Nevertheless, In December 2005, the BBC reported on an Israeli air strike on the base of the pro-Syrian PFLP-GC in the al-Naima area, south of Beirut which was carried out “...in response to the firing of projectile rockets last night towards Israeli communities,” the [Israeli] army said.” [21ac] The PFLP-GC denied carrying out the attacks in which “At least four rockets fired from Lebanese territory hit Israeli towns close to the border on Tuesday evening [27 December] without causing casualties.” [21ac] Both Hezbollah and Fatah also denied the involvement of Palestinians in the attacks. [21ac]
- 6.203 USSD CRT 2004 states that “The Lebanese security forces remain unable or unwilling to enter Palestinian refugee camps, the operational nodes of terrorist groups such as Asbat al-Ansar and other Palestinian terror groups, and to deploy forces into areas dominated by Lebanese Hizballah, including the Beka’a Valley, southern Beirut, and the south of the country up to the UN-demarcated Blue Line.” [2c] (**Chapter 5B, Lebanon**) The report notes that “Syria’s predominant role in Lebanon facilitated the Lebanese Hizballah and Palestinian terrorist presence in portions of Lebanon. In addition, Syrian and Iranian support for Lebanese Hizballah activities in southern Lebanon, and for Palestinian terrorist groups throughout the country, help promote an environment where terrorist elements flourish.” [2c] (**Chapter 5B, Lebanon**)
- 6.204 USSD CRT 2005 recorded the government’s attempts to gain more control over all of Lebanese territory, citing the surrounding of Palestinian militia bases and strengthened border control in an attempt to restrict access and the flow of weapons to terrorist groups. [2g] (**Chapter 5, Middle East and North Africa Overview**) Nevertheless, the report goes on by remarking that “Even with the advances Lebanon has made against terrorism, considerable work remains.” [2g] (**Chapter 5, Middle East and North Africa Overview**) The UN’s Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) reported in March 2006 that the national dialogue, the first held by all of Lebanon’s political factions, had agreed that all Palestinian militants in locations other than the 12 refugee camps would be disarmed within six months. [29p]

See also Section 6.A: Abuses by Palestinian groups; Section 6.C: Relations with neighbouring countries/Syria; Annex B: Main political organisations/Palestinian groups

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HIZBOLLAH (HEZBOLLAH)

- 6.205 The US Department of State Report on Human Rights Practices 2004 (USSD 2004), published on 28 February 2005, records that "In 2000, following the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) withdrawal from the south, the Government deployed more than 1,000 police and soldiers to the former Israeli security zone. However, the Government has not attempted to disarm Hizballah, a terrorist organization operating in the region, nor have the country's armed forces taken sole and effective control over the entire area." [2b] (p1) USSD's April 2005 Country Report on Terrorism (USSD CRT 2004) states that "The Lebanese Government recognized as legitimate resistance groups organizations that target Israel and permitted them to maintain offices in Beirut. Lebanon also exempts what it terms 'legal resistance' groups, including Lebanese Hizballah, from money laundering and terrorism financing laws. [2c] (Chapter 5B, Lebanon) Hizballah's position as a resistance movement in Lebanon was protected to an extent by the Lebanese Government, as evidenced by reports such as USSD's human rights and terrorism reports of 2004 and 2005, and the International Crisis Group's (ICG) 'Lebanon: Managing the Gathering Storm'. [2b-2c, 2f-2g] [7c]
- 6.206 For example, USSD 2004 states that "On May 7 [2004], Hizballah attacked IDF positions in the Sheba' farms with heavy rocket, mortar, and small arms fire. One Israeli soldier was killed and five others were wounded in the attack. Lebanese authorities asserted that the Hizballah firing had been preceded by an Israeli army foot patrol crossing the Blue Line." [2b] (Section 1a) USSD CRT 2005 states that "A number of Lebanese leaders, including pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud, reject categorizing Hizballah's activities as terrorist, even though the groups leaders openly admitted to providing support for terrorist attacks inside Israel, the West bank, and Gaza. [2g] (Chapter 5, Middle East and North Africa Overview) Nevertheless, ICG's December 2005 report noted a shift in Hizballah's position, stating that whilst "Hizballah, the powerful Shiite movement that heretofore had rejected ministerial portfolios, [it] is in the government, and the cabinet has agreed that the issue of its eventual disarmament would be resolved solely by consensus." [7c] (p5) In March 2006, a UN Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) report seemed to confirm this position, stating that the subject of Hezbollah laying down its arms was due to be addressed during the next round of the national dialogue talks between all the political factions, including Hezbollah itself. [29p]
- 6.207 The USSD CRT 2004 report also notes that "Syria's predominant role in Lebanon facilitated the Lebanese Hizballah and Palestinian terrorist presence in portions of Lebanon. In addition, Syrian and Iranian support for Lebanese Hizballah activities in southern Lebanon, and for Palestinian terrorist groups throughout the country, help promote an environment where terrorist elements flourish." [2c] (Chapter 5B, Lebanon) Despite the complete withdrawal of Syrian armed forces from Lebanon, USSD 2005 stated that some Syrian interference in the country continued with Hizballah, among other militias, acting as a Syrian proxy. [2f] (p1)
- 6.208 USSD 2004 reports that "On July 19 [2004], a man identified as Hizballah member Ghalib Awwali was killed by a bomb planted in his car in the Mu'awwad area of the southern suburbs of Beirut. Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah accused Israel of masterminding the killing; at year's end, there were no arrests." [2b] (Section 1a) The same source also states that "On August 2, 2003, a man identified as 42-year-old Hizballah member Ali Hussein Saleh was killed in a car bomb explosion in Beirut's southern suburbs. Some government officials and Hizballah accused Israel of carrying out the killing; at year's end [2004], there were no new developments in the case." [2b] (Section 1a) The USSD report of 2005, published in March 2006,

recorded that no developments had been made into the killing of Awwali or Saleh. [2f] (Section 1a) Further, the BBC reported, in April 2006, that Lebanese military intelligence had arrested a number of Lebanese and Palestinian suspects who were allegedly planning to attack Nasrallah during the next sitting of the Lebanese national dialogue talks. [21ae]

See also Section 6.A: Abuses by Hizbollah (Hezbollah)

SOUTH LEBANON ARMY (SLA)

- 6.209 The European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation (MEDEA) recorded in December 2001 that the South Lebanon Army was an “Armed militia founded and led by South Lebanese Christians (some of its militia men were Muslim) and financed and trained by Israel with a view to control the Israeli security zone in the South of Lebanon.” [35a] MEDEA also states that “In early May 2000, as soon as Israeli [*sic*] began to withdraw from the ‘Security Zone’, fearing to fall in the hands of Hezbollah, half of SLA’s militia men surrendered to the Lebanese army, whilst the other half sought the asylum [*sic*] for themselves and their families in Israel.” [35a] A report released by Human Rights Watch at the time of the Israeli withdrawal notes that:

“Lebanese lawyers reported to Human Rights Watch last week that the intelligence branch of the Lebanese army has interrogated former SLA combatants in incommunicado detention, sometimes for weeks, before lawyers were allowed to meet with them. ‘Former members of the SLA have the right of access to defense lawyers,’ said [executive director of the Middle East and North Africa division of Human Rights Watch, Hanny] Megally.’ In no case should former combatants be subjected to reprisals and summary justice.’ Former soldiers who live in villages that are now coming under the control of Hizballah are in danger of such reprisals.” [5b]

- 6.210 Amnesty International reported, in June 2000, that “Those who surrendered to Hizbullah were handed over to the Lebanese army. Others were arrested. Now more than 2,300 SLA and alleged ‘collaborators’ are said to be held in detention by the Lebanese government.” [4g] The US Department of State Report on Human Rights Practices 2004 (USSD 2004), published on 28 February 2005, states that “The Government initially held incommunicado most of the 3,000 SLA [South Lebanon Army] members who surrendered to the authorities following the IDF’s withdrawal in 2000; however, lawyers and family members have since been provided access.” [2b] (Section 1d) The report notes:

“During the year [2004], the Military Court concluded the cases of the remaining SLA militiamen who surrendered to the Government following the IDF withdrawal. Domestic human rights groups and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) reported that the trials were open to journalists and members of the public but were not fair. The standard defense presented by lawyers was that the Government had been unable to defend citizens living under Israeli occupation, and the residents had no choice but to work with the occupiers.

“Approximately one-third of the former SLA members received 1-year prison sentences and approximately one-third received sentences of 3 to 4 weeks. The Military Court denied every recommendation for the death sentence. Most SLA members have served their sentences and have been released; others continued to serve their sentences as regular prisoners.” [2b] (Section 1e)

- 6.211 USSD 2004 also records that “Some former Southern Lebanese Army (SLA) detainees reported that they were abused or tortured.” [2b] (Section 1c) “During the year [2004], there were several reports that Hizballah subjected former SLA operatives who returned to their villages to regular harassment including arrest. In July, one parliamentarian publicly criticized Hizballah for detaining Fouad Mazraani on the accusation of cooperating with the Israelis. Although Mazraani was released, the parliamentarian argued that any such action was the responsibility of the Government.” (USSD Report on Human Rights Practices, 2004) [2b] (Section 1e) However, the USSD report of the following year, published on 8 March 2006, records that “Unlike in previous years, there were no reports that Hizballah subjected former Southern Lebanese Army (SLA) soldiers who returned to their villages to harassment.” [2f] (Section 1e)

See also Section 6.A: [Abuses by Hizbollah \(Hezbollah\)](#)

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OTHER GROUPS KNOWN OR BELIEVED TO BE IN LEBANON

- 6.212 The USSD’s Country Reports on Terrorism (USSD CRT), published in April 2005, prior to the completion of the Syrian withdrawal, reports that “In contrast [to their treatment of [Hizbollah and Palestinian groups], the Lebanese Government moved vigorously through legal and operational initiatives against Sunni extremist groups, including those similar in ideology to al-Qa’ida.” [2c] (Chapter 5B, Lebanon)
- 6.213 A July 2004 information response by the Canadian Research Directorate reported information from various news articles (of 2000 to 2003), on the alleged terrorist activities of a Sunni Islamic fundamentalist group, Takfir wa al-Hijra, which had alleged links to Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaida. [17i] The response states that:

“With regard to Lebanon, *The Christian Science Monitor* indicated in a 20 May 2003 article that some Takfir wa al-Hijra members in the Dinnieh mountains in the northeast of the country) had been arrested by government authorities for mounting a series of bomb attacks against western targets, particularly restaurants in Beirut and in Tripoli, a city located in northern Lebanon. Other articles published between 2000 and 2003 reported that this fundamentalist group in northern Lebanon had launched attacks against the Lebanese army.” [17i]

Annex B: [Main political organisations/Other groups known or believed to be in Lebanon](#)

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RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

SYRIA

- 6.214 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Country Profile (FCO Profile), last updated in June 2005, records that:

“Under Syrian pressure the Lebanese parliament passed a constitutional amendment to extend President Lahoud’s term in office in September 2004. Hariri resigned in October 2004 and was replaced by former Prime Minister Omar Karamah.

”Prior to the extension of President Lahoud’s mandate, the UN Security Council

adopted resolution 1559 (UNSCR 1559) on 2 September 2004. This resolution called for respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout Lebanon; all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon; and the disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militia. A UN verification team reported on 23 May 2005 that all Syrian troops had withdrawn from Lebanon but it was uncertain whether all intelligence personnel had.” [6a] (**History, Recent Political Developments**)

- 6.215 The FCO Profile later remarks that “As explained above Lebanon’s relationship with Syria is currently going through a transformation, the recent departure of Syrian troops is the first time since 1976 that Syrian forces have not been present in Lebanon.” [6a] (**International Relations, Lebanon’s Relations with Neighbours**) However, the US Department of State’s 2005 report on Counter-Terrorism (USSD CTR 2005) remarks that Syria maintains a covert intelligence presence in Lebanon and continued to offer support, including the facilitation of arms smuggling, to Hezbollah. [2g] (**Chapter 5, Middle East and North Africa Overview**) The International Crisis Group’s (ICG) December 2005 report notes that:

“There is a potentially explosive combination of renewed sectarian anxiety born of the collapse of the Syrian-sponsored system, intense regional competition, and almost unprecedented foreign involvement – Security Council Resolution 1559 mandating Syrian withdrawal and disarmament of militias; the UN-sponsored [Detlev] Mehlis investigation; Western aid; and Iranian and Syrian support for Hizbollah and Palestinian organisations. Groups are lining up behind competing visions for Lebanon and the region’s confessional and ideological future. Domestic politics is being dragged into wider contests while foreign actors are pulled into Lebanon’s domestic struggles.” [7c] (pi)

- 6.216 The UN investigation, now led by Detlev Mehlis, into the February 2005 assassination of Rafiq Hariri has so far produced two reports; in May 2005 and October 2005. [3d, 3f] The reports reached the conclusion that the attack could not have taken place without, at the very least, the Syrian and Lebanese Intelligence Services being aware of the plot. [3d, 3f] The October 2005 report also remarked that “It is the Commission’s view that the assassination of 14 February 2005 was carried out by a group with an extensive organization and considerable resources and capabilities. The crime had been prepared over the course of several months. For this purpose, the timing and location of Mr. Rafik Hariri’s movements had been monitored and the itineraries of his convoy recorded in detail.” [3f] (para 7) The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reported, on 16 December 2005, the “The United Nations Security Council has voted to extend the inquiry into the killing of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri by six months. In a unanimous vote, it said Syria had still to provide the UN’s commission with ‘the full and unconditional co-operation’ it had demanded. The resolution passed also authorised the commission to help Lebanon investigate other prominent killings.” [21v]

- 6.217 In January 2006, the UN’s Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) reported on the disquiet in Syria over the UN investigation into Hariri’s killing, including statements by the Syrian Information Minister, Mehdi Dakhilallah in response to the UN investigators’ request to interview President Bashar al-Assad: “This [interrogation of al-Assad] is a red line that cannot be crossed.” [29j] Nevertheless, in March 2006, IRIN and *The Guardian* (UK) reported that the Syrian authorities had agreed to co-operate with the investigation, including an agreement that President al-Assad would meet with the commission. [29o] [14b] When “Asked if Syria would hand over any of its officials for trial in Lebanon if they were formally accused, the [Syrian] president

initially said: 'They must be subjected to Syrian law,' but then added that the question could be discussed 'from a legal point of view'. Failure to hand over suspects would almost certainly lead to a clash with the UN security council." (*The Guardian* (UK), 17 March 2006) [14b]

- 6.218 On the subject of US and French-led international coercion, the ICG report continues "Pressure on the Syrian regime also might increase its incentive to destabilise Lebanon, something Paris is keen to avoid. [French diplomats remarked] 'We look at Syria through a Lebanese lens; the Americans look at Lebanon through a Syrian one. That is the difference'." [7c] (p10)
- 6.219 Regarding Syrian support for Palestinian groups in Lebanon, ICG states that "Israeli, U.S. and PA sources all claim that Bashar has encouraged Damascus-based Palestinian groups to step up attacks in order to lessen pressure on Syria." [7c] (p11) The report also records that "Columnists [such as George Nassif, *An-Nahar*] in the Hariri-owned press told Crisis Group that pro-Syrian Palestinians had smuggled weapons into Lebanon, expanded their bases in the Bekaa and Naama, turned Oussiya near Zahla into a fortress, and resumed training in Baalbek." [7c] (p11) The UN's October 2005 report on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1559 notes that "...I have concluded that no visible or significant Syrian intelligence presence remains in Lebanon. However, reports have surfaced on occasion, suggesting that Syrian intelligence continued to operate in Lebanon and that the Syrian intelligence apparatus continued to influence events in Lebanon. [3c] (para 17)

For a detailed examination of the history of Syrian-Lebanese relations, see source [57] 'The Syrian Involvement in Lebanon: An analysis of the role of Lebanon in Syrian regime security, from Ta'if to the death of Hafiz al-Asad (1989-2000).

See also Section 4: Syrian Withdrawal: April – May 2005; Section 6.A: Disappearances; Extrajudicial killings and assassinations; Section 6.C: Palestinian groups; Annex B: Main political organisations/Palestinian groups

ISRAEL

- 6.220 The FCO Profile, on Lebanon's relationship with Israel, states that "Although Israel withdrew from Lebanon in May 2000, Lebanon has yet to sign a peace agreement following the Arab-Israel war of 1948." [6a] (**International Relations, Lebanon's Relations with Neighbours**) Relations between the two countries were not alleviated by the continued border clashes between Hizbollah and the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) during 2004 and 2005, as reported on by the US Department of State, the UN and the BBC. [2b] [3a, 3e, 3g] [21e-f, 21p, 21z, 21ab, 21x] The US Department of State Report on Human Rights Practices 2005 (USSD 2005), published on 8 March 2006, remarks that "Hizballah, through its media outlets, regularly directed strong rhetoric against Israel and its Jewish population and characterized events in the region as part of a 'Zionist conspiracy.'" [2f] (Section 2c)

- 6.221 Nevertheless, USSD 2005 also records that:

"In January [2004], Hizballah and Israel carried out the first phase of a prisoner exchange involving 21 Lebanese prisoners, the remains of 59 Hizballah fighters, the remains of 3 Israeli soldiers and [released] IDF reservist Elhann Tannenbaum. A second phase, a promised Hizbollah investigation into the fate of Israeli airman Ron Arad and the release of additional Lebanese prisoners by Israel, had not materialized at year's end [2005]." [2f] (Section 1b)

- 6.222 The UN's Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) reported in February 2006 that the mandate of the UN Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) had been extended for a further six months. UNIFIL is responsible for monitoring the Blue Line, a border demarcation created by the UN in order to determine whether Israel had withdrawn from Lebanon, across which the border clashes between Hezbollah and the IDF continued to occur. [29m]

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INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPs)

- 6.223 The Global IDP Project recorded in August 2004 that:

"The Lebanese civil war of 1975–1990 and Israeli invasions in 1978 and 1982 displaced a total of almost one million people. When the civil war ended in 1990, some 500,000 people remained internally displaced, and Israeli attacks, particularly on south Lebanon, caused further displacement as late as 1996. Most of the displaced originated from the Mount Lebanon region (62 per cent) and from southern Lebanon (24 per cent). No updated reliable survey exists to determine the current number of internally displaced people (IDPs). Estimates range, hugely, between 50,000 and 600,000. According to the Lebanese Ministry of the Displaced, 79,500 people have been able to return since the end of the conflict, excluding returnees to the South and West Bekaa areas. A number of factors have slowed the pace of return, including lack of finances, political rivalries, difficult socio-economic conditions, security concerns, and a steady decrease in initiatives targeting displaced populations since 2000. The return of the displaced remains a challenge for the sustainability of Lebanon's post-war development." [22] (p1)

- 6.224 The US Department of State Report on Human Rights Practices 2005 (USSD 2005), published on 8 March 2006, reports that "The Government encouraged the return to their homes of over 600 thousand persons internally displaced during the civil war. Although some persons began to reclaim homes abandoned or damaged during the war, the vast majority had not attempted to reclaim and rebuild their property due to concerns about physical security and a hazardous social and economic situation in some areas." [2f] (Section 2d)

MOUNT LEBANON

- 6.225 On 5 January 2006, the UN's Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) reported on the continuing difficulties facing the displaced people of Mount Lebanon, citing lack of infrastructure and high unemployment as the two main issues of concern. [29d] The Global IDP Project records:

"A recent survey undertaken by Caritas in 110 villages in the Alley, El-Chouf and Baabda areas of Mount Lebanon, indicates that of a total of 28,400 displaced families, only 5,396 people had returned. The survey found that many IDPs were losing hope of return due to a lack of educational and health services and economic opportunities. Although compensation has been offered to IDPs to rebuild homes, the vast majority of the displaced have reportedly not yet reclaimed their properties. The survey found that many people have in practice only received partial compensation due to shortages in government funds and are unable to return because their homes continue to be uninhabitable.

“Return to the Mount Lebanon region in particular has also been impeded by a lack of reconciliation between residents of villages and people who wish to return as a result of sectarian divisions caused by the war. Militias displaced populations during the war to create homogenous communities creating tensions along confessional lines. This has mostly been the case in Breeh in the El-Chouf, Kfar Selouan in the Metn, and Kfar Matta.” [22] (p6)

SOUTH LEBANON

6.226 The Global IDP Project also states that:

“Return to south Lebanon has been possible since mid-2000, yet return movements to this area have also been slow. Remaining landmines and unexploded shells continue to affect the confidence of people living in the area and those who might otherwise return. Mine clearance assessments undertaken in the area indicate that most villages and towns have not reached their pre-conflict populations. The assessments also indicate that mainly elderly people have returned and that while property construction has increased, many of those who are rebuilding homes do not reside in them on a permanent basis. Returns to South Lebanon have also been affected by inadequate security. Crossborder clashes between Hizbollah and Israeli security forces continue to pose a physical threat to civilians.” [22] (p6)

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS

NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANISATIONS

6.227 The US Department of State’s Report on Human Rights Practices 2005 (USSD 2005), published on 8 March 2006, states that:

“A number of local human rights groups generally operated freely without overt government restriction, including the Lebanese Association for Human Rights, the Foundation for Human and Humanitarian Rights-Lebanon, the National Association for the Rights of the Disabled ... investigating and publishing their findings. Government officials generally were cooperative, except when some of these groups sought to publicize the detention in Syria of hundreds of citizens. The bar association and other private organizations regularly held public events that included discussions of human rights issues. Some human rights groups reported harassment and intimidation by the government or Hizballah.” [2f] (Section 4)

6.228 Amnesty International (AI) and the UN’s Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) documented the case of Muhammed al-Mugraby, a human rights defender and lawyer who, according to AI’s January 2006 report, has been repeatedly harassed by the Lebanese authorities for over 10 years. [41] [29e, 29q] Most recently:

“Human rights lawyer Dr Muhamad Mugraby is due to appear before the Military Court in Beirut on 9 January [2006] charged with slandering the ‘military establishment and its officers’. If found guilty he may be sentenced to up to three years’ imprisonment. The charge relates to a statement he made to the European Parliament’s Mashreq Delegation in Brussels on 4 November 2003, in which he criticised the military court system in Lebanon including for, he stated, the inadequate legal training of the courts’ judges, and for the torture suffered by suspects tried before military courts in order to force them to ‘confess’.” (AI, 5 January 2006) [41]

- 6.229 “Human Rights Watch also expressed concern that Mugarby’s trial before the same military court system that he is charged with having criticized will not conform to international fair trial standards. The Human Rights Committee – the body authorized to interpret and monitor compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Lebanon is a state party – has stated that the trial of civilians by military courts should be very exceptional and occur only under conditions that genuinely afford full due process. Lebanon’s military courts do not meet such conditions.” (HRW, 18 March 2006) [5d] IRIN reports that “The in-absentia trial of Lebanese lawyer and human rights activist Muhamed Mugarby began on Monday [20 March 2006], in a military court. He is accused of slander for having criticised the authorities['] use of military courts to prosecute government critics.” [29q]

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANISATIONS

- 6.230 USSD 2004 records that “The Government generally cooperated with international NGOs and met with them during the year. In 2002, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights met with senior government officials. The ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] and AI [Amnesty International] maintained offices in the country. During the year, government officials discussed human rights problems with representatives of foreign governments and NGOs.” [2b] (Section 4) USSD 2005 also noted that the ICRC and Amnesty International operated without obvious government interference and were able to perform investigations and publish their findings. [2f] (Section 4)

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Annexes

ANNEX A: CHRONOLOGY OF MAIN EVENTS

This chronology should not be viewed as exhaustive.

- 1943 March:** The foundations of the state were set out in an unwritten National Covenant which states that Lebanon is an independent Arab country with ties to the West but which cooperates with other Arab states while remaining neutral. The 1932 census which had shown that Christians were 54 per cent of the population was used as the basis for the distribution of seats in the Chamber of Deputies (later known as the National Assembly) on a ratio of six to five (later extended to other public offices). [1a]
- 1944** France transferred power to the Lebanese government from **1 January 1944**. [21w]
- 1958 14 July:** Faced with increasing opposition which developed into a civil war, President Shamun asked the US to send troops to preserve Lebanon's independence.
15 July: The US, mindful of Iraq's overthrow of its monarchy, sent marines to re-establish the government's authority. [21w]
- 1967 June:** Lebanon played no active role in the Arab-Israeli war but was affected by its aftermath when Palestinians used Lebanon as a base for activities against Israel. [21w]
- 1968 28 December** - In retaliation for an attack by two members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) on an Israeli plane in Athens, Israel raided Beirut airport, destroying 13 civilian planes. [21w]
- 1969 November:** Army Commander-in-Chief Emile Bustani and Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat sign an agreement in Cairo which aims to control Palestinian guerrilla activities in Lebanon. [21w]
- 1970** Large numbers of PLO fighters who were expelled from Jordan sought refuge in Lebanon, which led to further destabilisation. [6a]
- 1973 10 April:** Israeli commandos raid Beirut and kill three Palestinian leaders, close associates of Arafat. The Lebanese government resigns the next day. [21w]
- 1975 13 April:** Phalangist gunmen ambushed a bus in the Ayn-al-Rummanah district of Beirut, killing 27 of its mainly Palestinian passengers. The Phalangists claimed that guerrillas had previously attacked a church in the same district. (These clashes are regarded as the start of the civil war). [21w]
- 1976 June:** Syrian troops entered Lebanon to restore peace but also to curb the Palestinians.
October: Following Arab summit meetings in Riyadh and Cairo, a ceasefire was arranged and a predominantly Syrian Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) is established to maintain it. [21w]
- 1978 14/15 March:** In reprisal for a Palestinian attack into its territory, Israel launched a major invasion of Lebanon, occupying land as far north as the Litani river.
19 March: UN Security Council (UNSC) passes Resolution 425, which called on Israel to withdraw from all Lebanese territory and established the United Nations

Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to confirm the Israeli withdrawal, restore peace and help the Lebanese government re-establish its authority in the area.

By **13 June** Israel hands over territory in southern Lebanon not to UNIFIL but to its proxy mainly Christian Lebanese militia, the South Lebanon Army (SLA), under Maj Sa'd Haddad. [21w]

1982 6 June: Following the attempted assassination of Shlomo Argov, Israeli ambassador to Britain, Israel launched a full-scale invasion of Lebanon, 'Operation Peace for Galilee'.

14 September: President-elect, Bashir al-Jumayyil, was assassinated. The following day, Israeli forces occupied West Beirut, and from 16 to 18 September, the Phalangist militia killed Palestinians in Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in West Beirut.

21 September: Bashir's elder brother, Amin al-Jumayyil, was elected president.

24 September: The first contingent of a mainly US, French and Italian peacekeeping force, requested by Lebanon, arrived in Beirut. [21w]

1983 17 May: Israel and Lebanon signed an agreement on Israeli withdrawal, ending hostilities and establishing a security region in southern Lebanon.

23 October: 241 US marines and 56 French paratroopers were killed in two bomb explosions in Beirut, responsibility for which was claimed by two militant Shia groups. [21w]

1985 By 6 June most Israeli troops had withdrawn but some remained to support the SLA led by Maj-Gen Antoine Lahd which operated in a 'security zone' in southern Lebanon.

16 June: A TWA plane landed in Beirut after having been hijacked on a flight from Athens to Rome by two alleged members of Hezbollah demanding the release of Shia in Israeli jails. The crisis was resolved with the help of Syrian mediation. [21w]

1987 21 May: Lebanon abrogated the 1969 Cairo agreement with the PLO as well as officially cancelling the 17 May 1983 agreement with Israel.

1 June: After Prime Minister Rashid Karami was killed when a bomb exploded in his helicopter, Salim al-Huss became acting prime minister. [21w]

1988 22 September: When no candidate was elected to succeed him, outgoing President Amin al-Jumayyil appointed a six-member interim military government, composed of three Christians and three Muslims, though the latter refused to serve. Lebanon now had two governments - one mainly Muslim in West Beirut, headed by Al-Huss, the other, Christian, in East Beirut, led by the Maronite Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Gen Michel Awn.

14 March: Awn declared a 'war of liberation' against the Syrian presence in Lebanon. [21w]

1989 28 July: Shaykh Abd-al-Karim Ubayd, Hezbollah leader in Jibshit, was abducted by Israeli forces.

22 October: The National Assembly, meeting in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, endorsed a Charter of National Reconciliation, which reduced the authority of the president by transferring executive power to the cabinet. The National Assembly now had an equal number of Christian and Muslim members instead of the previous six to five ratio.

November: President-elect Rene Mu'awwad was assassinated on **22 November** and succeeded by Ilyas al-Hirawi on **24 November**. The following day, Salim al-Huss became prime minister and Gen Emile Lahoud replaced Awn as Commander-in-Chief of the Army on **28 November**. [21w]

- 1990 13 October:** The Syrian air force attacked the Presidential Palace at B'abda and Awn took refuge in the French embassy. (This date is regarded as the end of the civil war.)
24 December: Umar Karami headed a government of national reconciliation. [21w]
- 1991** The National Assembly ordered the dissolution of all militias by **30 April** but Hezbollah was allowed to remain active and the South Lebanon Army (SLA) refused to disband.
22 May: A Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination was signed in Damascus by Lebanon and Syria and a Higher Council, co-chaired by their two presidents, was established.
1 July: The Lebanese army defeated the PLO in Sidon so that it now confronted the Israelis and the SLA in Jazzin, north of the so-called 'security zone'.
26 August: The National Assembly granted an amnesty for all crimes committed during the civil war, 1975-1990. Awn received a presidential pardon and was allowed to leave for France. [21w]
- 1992 16 February:** Shaykh Abbas al-Musawi, Secretary-General of Hezbollah, was killed when Israeli helicopter gunships attack his motorcade on a road south-east of Sidon. By **17 June** all Western hostages held by Shia groups had been released.
20 October: After elections in **August** and **September** (the first since 1972), Nabih Birri, secretary-general of the Shia Amal organisation, became speaker of the National Assembly.
31 October: Rafik Hariri, a rich businessman, born in Sidon but with Saudi Arabian nationality, became prime minister, heading a cabinet of technocrats. [21w]
- 1993 25 July:** Israel attempted to end the threat from Hezbollah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) in southern Lebanon by launching 'Operation Accountability', the heaviest attack since 1982. [21w]
- 1994 21 May:** Mustafa Dib al-Dirani, head of the Believers' Resistance, a breakaway group from the Shia Amal organisation, was abducted by Israeli commandos from his house in eastern Lebanon. [21w]
- 1996 11 April:** 'Operation Grapes of Wrath', in which the Israelis bomb Hezbollah bases in southern Lebanon, the southern district of Beirut and the Biqa.
18 April: An Israeli attack on a UN base at Qana resulted in the death of over 100 Lebanese refugees sheltering there.
26 April: US negotiated a truce and an 'understanding' under which Hezbollah and Palestinian guerrillas agree not to attack civilians in northern Israel, and which recognised Israel's right to self-defence but also Hezbollah's right to resist the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. Lebanon and Syria did not sign the 'understanding' but the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group (ILMG), with members from the US, France, Israel, Lebanon and Syria, was set up to monitor the truce. [21w]
- 1998 1 April:** Israel's inner cabinet voted to accept UN Security Council Resolution 425 of 1978 if Lebanon guarantees the security of Israel's northern border. Both Lebanon and Syria rejected this condition. [21w]
- 1998 24 November:** Army head Emile Lahoud was sworn in as president, succeeding Ilyas al-Hirawi.
4 December: Salim al-Huss became prime minister heading a cabinet which included no militia leaders and only two ministers from the previous administration. [21w]

- 1999 3 June:** South Lebanon Army (SLA) completed its withdrawal from the Jazzin salient (north of the 'security zone') occupied since 1985. [21w]
- 2000 24 May:** After the collapse of the SLA and the rapid advance of Hezbollah forces, Israel withdrew its troops from southern Lebanon, more than six weeks before its stated deadline of **7 July**. [21w]
25 May was declared an annual public holiday, called 'Resistance and Liberation Day'. [21w]
October: Rafiq Hariri took office as prime minister for a second time. [21w]
- 2001 March:** Lebanon began pumping water from a tributary of the River Jordan to supply a southern border village despite opposition from Israel. [21w]
- 2002 January:** Elie Hobeika, a key figure in the massacres of Palestinian refugees in 1982, died in a blast shortly after disclosing that he held videotapes and documents challenging Israel's account of the massacres.
September: Row with Israel over Lebanon's plan to divert water from a border river. Israel said it cannot tolerate the diversion of the Wazzani, which provided 10 per cent of its drinking water, and threatened the use of military force. [21w]
- 2003 August:** Car bomb in Beirut killed a member of Lebanon's militant Hezbollah group. Hezbollah and a government minister blamed Israel for the blast. [21w]
- 2004 September:** UN Security Council adopted a resolution – aimed at Syria – demanding that foreign troops leave Lebanon. Syria dismissed the move. Parliament voted to extend President Lahoud's term by three years. Weeks of political deadlock ended with the unexpected departure of Rafiq Hariri – who had at first opposed the extension – as prime minister. [21w]
- 2005 February:** Former prime minister Rafik Hariri was killed in a massive car bomb attack in Beirut. The cabinet of Prime Minister Omar Karami resigned after two weeks of anti-Syrian rallies sparked by the assassination. There were growing calls for Syria to withdraw its troops.
March: Hundreds of thousands of Lebanese rallied in Beirut to show support for Syria. Days after his resignation, pro-Syrian former PM Omar Karami was asked by the president to form a new government.
April: Omar Karami resigned as PM after failing to form a government. Moderate pro-Syrian MP Najib Mikati was named as his successor. Syria said it had withdrawn all of its military forces from Lebanon, as demanded by the UN. [21w]
May-June: Elections for the Lebanese National Assembly were held over four consecutive weekends beginning in Beirut on **29 May** and finishing in northern Lebanon on **19 June**. [6a]
June: Prominent journalist Samir Qasir, a critic of Syrian influence in Lebanon, was killed by a car bomb. Anti-Syrian alliance led by Saad al-Hariri won control of parliament following elections. New parliament chose Hariri ally, Fouad Siniora, as prime minister. George Hawi, anti-Syrian former leader of the Lebanese Communist Party, killed when his car was blown up. [21w]
July: Lebanese PM Siniora met Syria's President Assad; both sides agreed to rebuild relations. [21w] Leader of the Christian Militia, the Lebanese Forces, and the only warlord to have been tried in connection with the civil war, Samir Geagea, was granted an amnesty and released after spending 11 years in solitary confinement. [21s]
September: Four pro-Syrian generals were charged in connection with the assassination of former PM Rafik Hariri. [21w] UN interim report on assassination of

former Lebanese PM Rafik Hariri published **21 October**, implicating top-ranked Syrian and Lebanese security officials. [7a]

December: Two more bomb attacks occurred, an unsuccessful attempt on the life of a member of pro-Syrian Hizbollah, Hussein Assaf – an official said to be in charge of training Hizbollah guerrillas – and the killing of anti-Syrian journalist and MP, Gibran Tueni. [21t, 21aa]

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ANNEX B: POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS

This list should not be viewed as exhaustive.

Al-Abash ('The Ethiopian' – due to the group's founder, Sheikh Abdallah al-Abdari (a.k.a. al-Abashi) being of Ethiopian origin) [1a] (Political Organizations)

Amal (Hope — Afwaj al-Muqawamah al-Lubnaniyyah — Lebanese Resistance Detachments) www.amal-movement.com

Founded in 1975 as a politico-military organization. Europa World Online (accessed on 12 December 2005) stated that the Amal, a Shi'ite political party, contested the 2005 legislative elections with Hezbollah as the Resistance and Development Bloc. The leader was Nabih Berri. [1a] (Political Organizations) Amal held 15 seats after the legislative elections and Berri was re-elected as Speaker. [7c] (p3, 16)

Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) (Tashnag)

Founded in 1890. Europa World Online (accessed on 12 December 2005) reported that the ARF was the principal Armenian party. The party had socialist ideology and a collective leadership. [1a] (Political Organizations)

Al-Baath (Baath Arab Socialist Party)

Founded in 1948. Europa World Online (accessed on 12 December 2005) noted that Al-Baath was a local branch of secular pro-Syrian party with policy of Arab union. Its leader was Assem Qanso. [1a] (Political Organizations)

Al-Baath (Baath Arab Socialist Party)

Founded in 1966 following split in Syrian branch of Al-Baath. Europa World Online (accessed on 12 December 2005) informed that Al-Baath was part of pro-Iraqi faction of Al-Baath. Its Secretary-General was Abd al-Majid Rafei. [1a] (Political Organizations)

Bloc national libanais (National Bloc)

Founded in 1943. Europa World Online (accessed on 12 December 2005) stated that Bloc national libanais was a right-wing Lebanese party with policy of power-sharing between Christians and Muslims and the exclusion of the military from politics. Its President was Carlos Edeh. [1a] (Political Organizations)

Hiras Al-Arz (Guardians of the Cedars)

Founded in 1975 by Étienne Sacre (Abu Arz). Banned [17d]

A Canadian Research Directorate Information Response (CRDIR), published in January 2004, notes that:

"In September 2003, Étienne Sacre described his party's ideology in an interview with the Lebanese-Canadian Coordinating Council (LCCC). According to him, the Guardians of the Cedars is a lay movement that believes that the Lebanese people are a unique nation in the world, with 7,000 years of history. He believes that Lebanon should expel foreign residents, in particular, Palestinians and Syrians. Though Sacre wants 'to build a professional army that believes in God and in Lebanon,' he also hopes 'to establish a secular state that has nothing to do with sectarian religious quotas and apportioning,' which are prevalent in the country today." [17d]

Étienne Sacre (Abu Arz) still headed the organisation as of January 2004, at which time he was living in Israel where he had sought refuge after Israeli troops withdrew

from south Lebanon. [17d] [21w] Forced to limit their activities to 'the political and diplomatic arenas, always aimed at the liberation of Lebanon from the Syrian hegemony and its local agents', since the Israeli withdrawal. Estimated membership, in the late 1980s, was approximately 500. [17d]

Hizb al-Tahrir (Liberation Party)

Islamist. Banned. [4a]

Hizbollah / Hezbollah (Party of God)

a.k.a. Islamic Jihad, Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine. Received financial, training, weapons, explosives, political, diplomatic, and organisational aid from Iran; diplomatic, political, and logistical support from Syria. Closely allied with, and often directed by, Iran but has the capability and willingness to act independently. Though Hizballah did not share the Syrian regime's secular orientation, the group has been a strong ally in helping Syria advance its political objectives in the region. [2c] (Chapter 6)

Founded in 1982 in response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, who were sent to Lebanon. [1a] (Political Organizations) [2c] (Chapter 6) Europa World Online (accessed on 12 December 2005) noted that it was a militant Shi'ite faction, which became the leading organisation of Lebanon's Shi'a community and a recognised political party. [1a] (Political Organizations) Hizbollah demanded the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Shebaa Farms area of southern Lebanon and the release of all Lebanese prisoners from Israeli detention. [1a] (Political Organizations) Dedicated to liberating Jerusalem and eliminating Israel, has formally advocated ultimate establishment of Islamic rule in Lebanon. Has actively participated in Lebanon's political system since 1992. [2c] (Chapter 6) The movement is well known for its its extensive social development programme, as well as its armed and political wings. [29r] It contested 2005 legislative elections with Amal as Resistance and Development Bloc. [1a] (Political Organizations) Hizbollah held 14 seats after the 2005 legislative elections. [7c] (p3)

Known or suspected to have been involved in numerous anti-US and anti-Israeli terrorist attacks, including the suicide truck bombings of the US Embassy and US Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983 and the US Embassy annex in Beirut in 1984. Hizbollah continued launching small-scale attacks across the Israeli border, resulting in the deaths of several Israeli soldiers. In March 2004, Hizbollah and HAMAS signed an agreement to increase joint efforts to perpetrate attacks against Israel. [2c] (Chapter 6)

The Chairman was Muhammad Ra'd, the leader and Secretary-General was Hasan Nasrallah – who led the Majlis al-Shura, or Consultative Council, the group's highest governing body – and the spiritual leader was Ayatollah Muhammed Hussain Fadlallah. [1a] (Political Organizations) [2c] (Chapter 6) Estimated membership of several thousand supporters; a few hundred terrorist operatives. [2c] (Chapter 6)

Operated in the southern suburbs of Beirut, the Beka'a Valley, and southern Lebanon. Has established cells in Europe, Africa, South America, North America, and Asia. [2c] (Chapter 6)

Al-Katae'b (Phalanges Libanaises, Phalangist Party)

Founded in 1936 by the late Pierre Gemayel. [1a] (Political Organizations) Europa World Online (accessed on 12 December 2005) reported that Al-Katae'b was a nationalist, reformist, democratic social party. It was the largest Maronite party with 100,000 members. The President was Karim Pakradouni. [1a] (Political Organizations)

Lebanese Democratic Movement www.ldm.org.lb

The President of the Lebanese Democratic Movement was Jacques Tamer and the Secretary-General was Naji Hatab. [1a] (Political Organizations)

Lebanese Forces Party www.lebanese-forces.org/

Banned. Founded in 1990 as the political successor to the Lebanese Forces (LF), which was a coalition of Maronite militias founded in 1976, still active in Lebanon, despite proscription by the Government in 1994 and the arrest, conviction and imprisonment of its leader, Samir Geagea, on murder charges. [1a] (Political Organizations) Geagea had been serving combined sentences totalling 120 years for crimes he was convicted of committing during the civil war but was released in July 2005. [17e] [21s] The British Broadcasting Corporation recorded on the day of his release that "The LF is still banned but several of Mr Geagea's allies as well as his wife now have seats in parliament." [21s]

An-Najjadé (The Helpers)

Founded in 1936. Europa World Online (accessed on 12 December 2005) stated that An-Najjadé was an Arab socialist unionist party with 3,000 members. Its Founder and President was Adnane Moustafa al-Hakim. [1a] (Political Organizations)

National Lebanese Front

Founded in 1999. The President was Ernest Karam. [1a] (Political Organizations)

Parti communiste libanais (Lebanese Communist Party) www.lcparty.org

Founded in 1924. Europa World Online (accessed on 12 December 2005) reported that the Parti communiste libanais was officially dissolved between 1948–71. The Marxist party has much support among intellectuals. The President was Maurice Nohra and the Secretary-General was Khalid Haddadeh. [1a] (Political Organizations) The Guardian (UK) online newspaper's June 2005 obituary on the party's former leader George Hawi states that "The Lebanese Communist party (LCP) was never a mass movement. It was outlawed in 1948, and forced to split from its sister Syrian party in 1961. Only legalised in 1969, it was, however, famously efficient; it provided a home for western-educated members of Lebanon's intelligentsia and held sway over the Lebanese trade union movement, universities, publishing and the arts." [14]

Parti national libéral (PNL) (Al-Wataniyin al-Ahrar) www.ahrar.org.lb/

Founded in 1958. Europa World Online (accessed on 12 December 2005) noted that the PNL was a liberal reformist secular party, although has traditionally had a predominantly Maronite Christian membership. Its president was Dory Chamoun. [1a] (Political Organizations)

Parti socialiste nationaliste syrien www.ssnp.com

Founded in 1932. Europa World Online (accessed on 12 December 2005) stated that the party was banned between 1962 and 1969. Parti socialiste nationaliste syrien advocated a 'Greater Syria'. It was composed of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine and Cyprus. The leader was Jibran Arajji. [1a] (Political Organizations)

Parti socialiste progressiste (At-Takadumi al-Ishteraki) (PSP) www.psp.org.lb

Founded in 1949. Europa World Online (accessed on 12 December 2005) mentioned that the PSP was a progressive party, which advocated the constitutional road to socialism and democracy. The PSP had over 25,000 members, made up mainly of Druze support. The party contested the 2005 legislative elections as part of the Tayar al-Mustaqbal electoral bloc. The PSP president was Walid Joumblatt and the Secretary-General was Sharif Fayad. [1a] (Political Organizations)

Qornet Shehwan Gathering

Founded in 2001. Europa World Online (accessed on 12 December 2005) stated that it was a Christian coalition incorporating parties of diverse political persuasions and including Maronite, Orthodox and Greek Catholic members. The party advocated full national sovereignty for Lebanon and supported the establishment of a Palestinian state. However, it rejects violence as a means of solving disputes. Qornet Shehwan Gathering contested the 2005 legislative elections as part of the Tayar al-Mustaqbal bloc. Maronite Christian Patriarch Cardinal Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir is the group's unofficial patron. [1a] (Political Organizations) The coalition won five seats in the elections. [39] (Government-Legislative branch)

Resistance and Development Bloc

The Resistance and Development Bloc, an electoral bloc consisting of Amal and Hezbollah, contested the 2000 and 2005 elections. Its leader was Nabih Berri. [1a] (Political Organizations)

Tayar al-Mustaqbal (Future Movement)

Europa World Online (accessed on 12 December 2005) reported that the party was opposed to Syrian influence in Lebanese affairs. It contested the 2005 legislative elections as part of an electoral bloc with the Qornet Shehwan Gathering, Lebanese Forces and Parti socialiste progressiste. The leader was Saad ed-Din Hariri. [1a] (Political Organizations)

Tayar al-Watani al-Horr (Free Patriotic Movement) www.tayyar.org/tayyar/index.php

Still banned at end of 2004. [4a] Europa World Online (accessed on 12 December 2005) mentioned that the party aimed to recover sovereignty and complete independence for Lebanon. [1a] (Political Organizations) The majority of its leaders and supporters are from the Christian community. It contested the 2005 legislative elections in alliance with various groupings and individuals during the four rounds and FPM won 14 seats in the elections. [1a] (Political Organizations) [39] (Government-Legislative branch) The leader was General Michel Aoun [Aoun] who returned from his 15-year exile in France in May 2005. [1a] (Political Organizations) [21w]

Al-Wa'ad (National Secular Democratic Party—Pledge)

Founded in 1986 by the late Elie Hobeika. Europa World Online (accessed on 12 December 2005) stated that Al-Wa'ad was a pro-Syrian splinter group of Lebanese Forces. [1a] (Political Organizations)

Europa World Online (accessed on 14 December 2005) noted that:

“Other parties include the Independent Nasserite Movement (Murabitoun; Sunni Muslim Militia; Leader Ibrahim Qulayat) and the Lebanese Popular Congress (Pres. Kamal Shatila). The Nasserite Popular Organization and the Arab Socialist Union merged in January 1987, retaining the name of the former. The Islamic Amal is a breakaway group from Amal, based in Ba'albak (Ba'albek) (Leader Hussein Moussavi). Islamic Jihad (Islamic Holy War) is a pro-Iranian fundamentalist guerrilla group (Leader Imaad Moughnieh). The Popular Liberation Army (f. 1985 by the late Mustafa Saad) is a Sunni Muslim faction, active in the south of Lebanon. Tawheed Islami (the Islamic Unification Movement; f. 1982; Sunni Muslim) and the Arab Democratic Party (or the Red Knights; Alawites; pro-Syrian; Leader Ali Eid) are based in Tripoli.” [1a] (Political Organizations)

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PALESTINIAN GROUPS

This list should not be viewed as exhaustive.

The introduction to a 2002 paper on 'Palestinian Political Parties' contained a detailed description of the known Palestinian parties and underground groups as of 2002:

"The PLO [Palestinian Liberation Organisation] is the umbrella organization of most groups. The largest and best known groups are probably the Fateh, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and PFLP [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine]. The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine [DFLP] and the PFLP-GC [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Council] also gained notoriety due to several terrorist missions. The major political platforms and preoccupations of each group, and their activities, are related to destruction of Israel or ending of the occupation. PLO and Fatah were formed before the occupation began and carried out terrorist raids beginning in 1964. The groups differ from each other in the following dimensions:

"Islamist (Hamas and Islamic Jihad) versus secular (such as Fatah) and Marxist (such as PFLP, PFLP-GC and DFLP).

"Support for radical destruction of Israel versus support for interim two state solution versus sincere support for two state solution.

"In accordance with the above, support for Oslo peace process and or participation in the Palestine Authority versus rejection and membership in the rejectionist front organized by Syria.

"Reliance on different countries such as Syria, Iraq or Iran for active support versus partial or complete independence.

"Based in the occupied territories versus based in surrounding countries, especially Syria and Iraq.

"Widely based popular political movements versus small guerilla and terrorist factions.

"All the groups support armed struggle against Israel as long as the occupation continues. Some promise a hudna (truce) if Israel withdraws from the occupied territories. Some groups such as the PPP support a two state solution. Political stands of the groups change from time to time, and may be stated differently in their charters, in publications, and by different members. Attributions of various terrorist actions to different groups are based on intelligence and claims of the groups, and are sometimes conflicting. This information is believed to be reasonably correct." [53]

Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)

a.k.a. Fatah Revolutionary Council, Arab Revolutionary Brigades, Black September, Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims. Supported by Iraq, Libya, and Syria (until 1987).

Has carried out terrorist attacks in 20 countries, killing or injuring almost 900 persons; assassinated a Jordanian diplomat in Lebanon in 1994, and has been linked to the killing of the PLO representative there. The group has not staged a major attack against Western targets since the late 1980s.

Founded by Sabri al-Banna (a.k.a. Abu Nidal) after splitting from the PLO in 1974. In November 2002 Abu Nidal died in Baghdad; the new leadership of the organisation remained unclear at time of writing. Estimated membership of a few hundred plus limited overseas support structure.

Nidal relocated to Iraq in December 1998 where the group maintained a presence until Operation Iraqi Freedom; its current status in country is unknown. Known members have an operational presence in Lebanon, including in several Palestinian refugee camps. Financial problems and internal disorganisation have significantly reduced the group's activities. [2c] (Chapter 6)

Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (al-Aqsa)

a.k.a. al-Aqsa Martyrs Battalion. Suggestion that Iran and Hizballah were providing support to al-Aqsa elements.

The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade consists of an unknown number of small cells of terrorists associated with the Palestinian Fatah organisation. Al-Aqsa emerged at the outset of the 2000 Palestinian intifadah to attack Israeli targets with the aim of driving the Israeli military and settlers from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem, and to establish a Palestinian state.

Leadership and membership unknown.

Operated in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip, and has only claimed attacks inside these three areas. It may have followers in Palestinian refugee camps in southern Lebanon. [2c] (Chapter 6)

Asbat al-Ansar/Usbat al-Ansar/Osbat al-Ansar

a.k.a. the League of the Followers or Partisans' League. Probably receives financial support through international Sunni extremist networks, and possibly Usama Bin Ladin's al-Qa'ida network.

A Lebanon-based Sunni extremist group composed primarily of Palestinians with links to al-Qa'ida and other Sunni extremist groups. Followed an extremist interpretation of Islam that justified violence against civilian targets to achieve political ends; some of the group's goals included overthrowing the Lebanese Government and thwarting perceived anti-Islamic and pro-Western influences in the country. Has carried out multiple terrorist attacks in Lebanon since it emerged in the early 1990s.

Led by Abu Muhjin; until his death in March 2003, Mahir al-Sa'di worked in cooperation with Abu Muhammad al-Masri, the head of al-Qa'ida at the 'Ayn al-Hilwah refugee camp, where fighting has occurred between Asbat al-Ansar and Fatah elements. Estimated 300 fighters in Lebanon.

Primary base of operations is the 'Ayn al-Hilwah Palestinian refugee camp near Sidon in southern Lebanon. [2c] (Chapter 6)

Asbat al-Noor/Asbat al-Nour/Usbat al-Noor/Osbat al-Nour

Break-away group from Asbat al-Ansar. Led by the eldest son of the original group's founder: "[Abdullah] Shreidi attracted only a few dozen of the [Esbat al-Ansar] movement's fighters, as well as the Dinniyeh militants for whom he had provided shelter." [58]

Fatah/Fateh (Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini)

Literally means 'victory' or 'conquest' and is also the reverse acronym of Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastin – Palestinian National Liberation Movement. Founded in 1950s by Yasser Arafat, Khalil Al Wazir (Abu Jihad) Farouq Kadumi, Khalid al-Hassan and other Palestinian refugees in Kuwait. The Fatah entry in the 2002 paper by Jamal Suleiman on 'Palestinian Parties', which had been updated in 2006, stated that:

"Fatah's success has been due to its lack of emphasis on ideology, leading to support from all sectors of society, and its principle of non-interference in affairs of other Arab States resulting in support from most of them, ; *[sic]* generally opposed violent attacks outside the ME, especially from 1974. Main splits in Fatah in 1983 and Nov 1993, when half of Fatah-RC, including Farouk Qaddumi (as Secretary-General), boycotted the meeting to protest the Oslo accords. Fateh began to disintegrate after the death of founder Yasser Arafat. In January of 2006, it lost Palestinian Legislative Council elections to candidates representing the Hamas movement. Voters were unhappy with corruption and nepotism in the Fateh and chaos in the Palestinian authority. Mahmoud Abbas, who succeeded Arafat was not an effective leader of either Fatah or the PLO. The Hamas promised to end chaos and corruption." [53]

HAMAS (Harakat al-Muqawima al-Islamiyya) Hamas means 'zeal'. [53]

a.k.a. Islamic Resistance Movement. Some financial support from Iran but primarily relied on donations from Palestinian expatriates around the world, and private benefactors in Saudi Arabia and other Arab states.

Formed in late 1987 as an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Various HAMAS elements have used both violent and political means, including terrorism, to pursue the goal of establishing an Islamic Palestinian state in Israel. Loosely structured, with some elements working clandestinely and others operating openly through mosques and social service institutions to recruit members, raise money, organise activities, and distribute propaganda. HAMAS terrorists, especially those in the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, have conducted many attacks, including large-scale suicide bombings, against Israeli civilian and military targets. Continued to confine its attacks to Israelis inside Israel and the occupied territories.

Two of the group's most senior leaders in the Gaza Strip, Shaykh Ahmad Yasin and Abd al Aziz al Rantisi, were killed in Israeli air strikes in 2004. The group retained a cadre of senior leaders spread throughout the Gaza Strip, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, and the Gulf States. Official membership unknown; tens of thousands of supporters and sympathisers. Strength was concentrated in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

Currently limited its terrorist operations to Israeli military and civilian targets in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Israel. [2c] (Chapter 6)

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

Received safe haven and some logistical assistance from Syria.

Formerly part of the PLO, the Marxist-Leninist PFLP was founded by George Habash when it broke away from the Arab Nationalist Movement in 1967. The PFLP does not view the Palestinian struggle as religious, seeing it instead as a broader revolution against Western imperialism. The group earned a reputation for spectacular international attacks; since 1978, the group has conducted attacks against Israeli or moderate Arab targets. Stepped up its operational activity since the

start of the current intifadah, including multiple joint operations with other Palestinian terrorist groups.

Current leadership and membership unknown.

Operated in Syria, Lebanon, Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. [2c] (Chapter 6)

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command (PFLP—GC)

Closely tied to both Syria and Iran; received logistical and military support from Syria and financial support from Iran.

Split from the PFLP in 1968, claiming it wanted to focus more on fighting and less on politics. Originally violently opposed to the Arafat-led PLO. Carried out dozens of attacks in Europe and the Middle East during the 1970s and 1980s. Primary focus now on guerrilla operations in southern Lebanon and small-scale attacks in Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip.

Led by Ahmad Jabril, a former captain in the Syrian Army, whose son Jihad was killed by a car bomb in May 2002. Estimated membership of several hundred.

Headquartered in Damascus with bases in Lebanon. [2c] (Chapter 6)

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

a.k.a. Islamic Jihad of Palestine, PIJ-Shaqaqi Faction, PIJ-Shalla Faction, Al-Quds Brigades. Received financial assistance from Iran and limited logistical assistance from Syria.

Formed by militant Palestinians in the Gaza Strip during the 1970s, committed to the creation of an Islamic Palestinian state and the destruction of Israel through attacks against Israeli military and civilian targets inside Israel and the Palestinian territories. Has conducted many attacks, including large-scale suicide bombings, against Israeli civilian and military targets; maintained operational activity in 2004.

Leadership and membership unknown.

Primarily based in Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Primary leadership resided in Syria, though other leadership elements resided in Lebanon, as well as other parts of the Middle East. [2c] (Chapter 6)

Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)

a.k.a. PLF—Abu Abbas Faction. Received support mainly from Iraq; has previously received support from Libya.

Broke away from the PFLP—GC in the late 1970s and later split again into pro-PLO, pro-Syrian, and pro-Libyan factions. Has become more active since the start of the al-Aqsa intifadah and several PLF members have been arrested by Israeli authorities for planning attacks in Israel and the West Bank.

Pro-PLO faction was led by Muhammad Abbas (a.k.a. Abu Abbas), until his death in April 2004, and was based in Baghdad prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Current leadership and membership of the relatively small PLF appears to be based in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories.

Based in Iraq since 1990, has a presence in Lebanon and the West Bank. [2c] (Chapter 6)

Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) (Munazzimat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya)

Umbrella organisation of the Palestinian Resistance. Founded in 1964 with Egyptian backing. Ahmed Shukhairy was the original chairman. After the collapse of the Arab war effort in the six-day war, Yasser Arafat and the Fatah took over the PLO. Formally recognised as 'the only legitimate representative of the Palestine people' by almost all Palestinian groups until it agreed to recognise Israel, abandon violence and opted for a two-state solution in the 1993 Oslo Agreements.

A 2002 source, 'Palestinian Parties', published on MidEast Web recorded that "The PLO became, essentially, the Palestine National Authority (PNA) through the Oslo agreements. The PLO charter calls for destruction of Israel. Though it was revised following the Oslo Agreements to remove the offending paragraphs, the organization['s] Web sites and the Web Site of the PNA delegation to the UN still show the original sections of the charter." [53]

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OTHER GROUPS KNOWN OR BELIEVED TO BE IN LEBANON

This list should not be viewed as exhaustive.

Al-Jihad (AJ)

a.k.a. Jihad Group, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, EIJ. Funding and support unknown, although since 1998 AJ received most of its funding from al-Qa'ida, and these close ties culminated in the eventual merger of the groups.

Active since the 1970s, AJ's primary goal has been the overthrow of the Egyptian Government and the establishment of an Islamic state. Merged with Usama Bin Ladin's al-Qa'ida organisation in 2001. Primary targets, historically, have been high-level Egyptian Government officials as well as US and Israeli interests in Egypt and abroad; regular Egyptian crackdowns on extremists have significantly reduced AJ capabilities in Egypt.

Usama Bin Ladin's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was the former head of AJ. Membership unknown, but probably has several hundred hard-core members inside and outside of Egypt.

Historically AJ operated in the Cairo area. Most AJ members were now outside Egypt in countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, the United Kingdom, and Yemen. AJ activities have been centered outside Egypt for several years under the auspices of al-Qa'ida. [2c] (Chapter 6)

Al-Qa'ida / Al-Qaeda

a.k.a. Usama Bin Ladin Organisation. Al-Qa'ida maintained moneymaking front businesses, solicited donations from like-minded supporters, and illicitly siphoned funds from donations to Muslim charitable organisations. US and international efforts to block al-Qa'ida funding have hampered the group's ability to obtain money.

Al-Qa'ida was established by Usama Bin Ladin in 1988 with Arabs who fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. Helped finance, recruit, transport, and train Sunni Islamic extremists for the Afghan resistance. Goal is to unite Muslims to fight the United States as a means of defeating Israel, overthrowing regimes it deems 'non-Islamic', and expelling Westerners and non-Muslims from Muslim countries. In 2004, the Saudi-based al-Qa'ida network and associated extremists launched at

least 11 attacks, killing over 60 people, including six Americans, and wounding more than 225 in Saudi Arabia.

Merged with al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad) in June 2001, renaming itself 'Qa'idat al-Jihad.' Merged with Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's organisation in Iraq in late 2004, with al-Zarqawi's group changing its name to 'Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn' (al-Qa'ida in the Land of the Two Rivers). Also served as a focal point or umbrella organisation for a worldwide network that included many Sunni Islamic extremist groups, including some members of Gama'a al-Islamiyya, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and the Harakat ul-Mujahidin.

Organisational strength difficult to determine in the aftermath of extensive counterterrorist efforts since the attack on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon near Washington D.C. on 11 September 2001. However, probably had several thousand extremists and associates worldwide inspired by the group's ideology.

Has cells worldwide and is reinforced by its ties to Sunni extremist networks. Based in Afghanistan until Coalition forces removed the Taliban from power in late 2001. Has since dispersed in small groups across South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Africa. [2c] (Chapter 6)

Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)

a.k.a. Devrimci Sol, Dev Sol, Revolutionary Left. Widely believed to have training facilities or offices in Lebanon and Syria. DHKP/C financed its activities chiefly through donations and extortion.

Membership estimated at several dozen terrorist operatives inside Turkey, and a large support network throughout Europe.

Operated in Turkey, primarily Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Adana. [2c] (Chapter 6)

Japanese Red Army (JRA)

a.k.a. Anti-Imperialist International Brigade (AIIB). Financial/logistical support unknown.

In 2000, Lebanon deported to Japan four members it arrested in 1997, but granted a fifth operative, Kozo Okamoto, political asylum.

Membership estimated at six hard-core members; undetermined number of sympathisers. At its peak, claimed to have 30 to 40 members. Area of operation unknown, but was considered possibly present in Asia and/or Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon. [2c] (Chapter 6)

Takfir wa al-Hijra (Redemption and dawn of Islam or Excommunication and exile)

a.k.a. Al-Takfir wal Hijra, Takfir wal Hijra. Allegedly linked to Osama Bin-Laden's al-Qaida organisation.

Founded in Egypt in 1960 by the Muslim Brotherhood movement. Involved in the assassination of former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in October 1981 and a number of attacks against western and Lebanese targets in Lebanon between 2000 and 2003. Takfir Wal Hijra advocates the brutal torture and murder not only of 'infidels' but also of Muslims who do not adhere to the Takfir doctrines.

Leadership and membership unknown.

Based in the Dinnieh mountains in northeast Lebanon; believed to have launched a series of bomb attacks in Beirut and Tripoli. [17i]

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ANNEX C: PROMINENT PEOPLE

This list should not be viewed as exhaustive.

The Government, as of August 2005

President: Gen. Emile Lahoud (inaugurated 24 November 1998).

Prime Minister: Fouad Siniora.

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence: Elias Murr.

Minister of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants: Fawzi Salloukh.

Minister of the Interior and Municipalities: Hassan as-Sab.

Minister of Justice: Charles Rizq.

Minister of Industry: Pierre Gemayel.

Minister of Energy and Water: Muhammad Fneish.

Minister of Public Works and Transport: Muhammad as-Safadi.

Minister of Finance: Jihad Azour.

Minister of Economy and Trade: Sami Hadad.

Minister of Education and Higher Education: Khalid Qabbani.

Minister of Culture: Tariq Mitri.

Minister of Information: Ghazi al-Aridi.

Minister of Tourism: Joseph Sarkis.

Minister of Telecommunications: Marwan Hamadeh.

Minister of Youth and Sports: Ahmad Fatfat.

Minister of Labour: Tarrad Hamadeh.

Minister of Agriculture: Talal as-Sahili.

Minister of the Environment: Ya'coub as-Sarraf.

Minister of Public Health: Muhammad Jawad Khalifah.

Minister of Social Affairs: Nayla Mouawad.

Minister of the Displaced: Nehme Tohme.

Minister of State for Administrative Development: Jean Oghasabian.

Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs: Michel Faroun.

[2a] (Government and Politics: The Government)

For other prominent political figures see Annex B: [Political Organisations](#)

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ANNEX D: RELIGIOUS GROUPS

This list should not be viewed as exhaustive.

Information retrieved from Europa Online on 4 November 2005 stated that:

“Of all the regions of the Middle East, Lebanon probably presents the closest juxtaposition of sects and peoples within a small territory. Estimates for 1983 assessed the sizes of communities as: Shi'a Muslims 1.2m., Maronites 900,000, Sunni Muslims 750,000, Greek Orthodox 250,000, Druzes 250,000, Armenians 175,000. There is also a small Jewish community. In 1994 it was estimated that 29%–32% of the population of Lebanon were Shi'a Muslims, 25%–28% Maronites, 16%–20% Sunni Muslims and 3.5% Druzes. The Maronites, a uniate sect of the Roman Catholic Church, inhabited the old territory of Mount Lebanon, i.e. immediately east of Beirut. In the south, towards the Israeli frontier, Shi'a villages are most common, while between the Shi'a and the Maronites live the Druzes (divided between the Yazbakis and the Joumblatis). The Beka'a valley has many Greek Christians (both Roman Catholic and Orthodox), while the Tripoli area is mainly Sunni Muslim.” [1a] (**Society and Media: Religion**)

USSD RF 2005 recorded that:

“Because the matter of parity among confessional groups remains a sensitive political issue, a national census has not been conducted since 1932, before the founding of the modern state. However, the country's leading daily newspaper, an-Nahar, published on February 10, 2005, a demographic statistical study which put the relative percentages of approximately 3 million members of the voting public as 26.5 percent Sunni Muslim, 26.2 percent Shi'a Muslim, 40.8 percent Christian (Maronites representing 21.1 percent) and 5.6 percent Druze. There has been a steady decline in the number of Christians as compared to Muslims. There are also very small numbers of Jews, Baha'is, Buddhists, and Hindus. There are 18 officially recognized groups.” [2a] (**Section I. Religious Demography**)

A Canadian Research Directorate information response of December 2004, on the issue of parental consent for marriage stated that:

“According to a [26 September 2000] report by the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, [UN English version] “[n]o unified personal [status] law was ever elaborated by the Lebanese legislature”. Instead, the authorities [UN English version] ‘charged the confessional groups with the task of regulating matters of personal status, allowing them to draft legislative acts and regulate their own particular justice systems in accordance with their beliefs’. The report also indicates that family consent is generally required for the marriage of a minor and is [UN English version] ‘desirable’ in all other cases.” [17]

The same source also stated that, although an assistant professor specialising in Lebanon opined in December 2004 that the age of majority is open to different interpretations, the aforementioned UN report of September 2000 reported that the Lebanese confessional personal status laws regarded the age of majority as 18 years. [17] The information request concluded by stating that “The assistant professor also pointed out that the confessional laws are not always observed in practice and that it is possible that a woman could marry without parental consent.” [17]

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CHRISTIANITY**The Roman Catholic Church****Armenian Rite**

Patriarchate of Cilicia

Founded 1742; established in Beirut since 1932; includes patriarchal diocese of Beirut, with an estimated 10,000 adherents (31 December 2003).

Patriarch Most Rev. Nerses Bedros XIX Tarmouni.

Protosyncellus Rt Rev. Vartan Achkarian (Titular Bishop of Tokat—Armenian Rite).

[1a] (Society and Media: Religion)

Chaldean Rite

Diocese of Beirut

An estimated 10,000 adherents (31 December 2003).

Bishop of Beirut Michel Kassarji. [1a] (Society and Media: Religion)

Latin Rite

Apostolic Vicariate of Beirut

An estimated 15,000 adherents (31 December 2003).

Vicar Apostolic Paul Dahdah (Titular Archbishop of Arae in Numidia). [1a] (Society and Media: Religion)

Maronite Rite

Patriarchate of Antioch and all the East

Includes patriarchal dioceses of Jounieh, Sarba and Jobbé; the Maronite Church in Lebanon comprises four archdioceses and six dioceses, with an estimated 1,431,983 adherents (31 December 2002).

Patriarch Cardinal Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir.

Archbishop of Antélias Most Rev. Joseph Mohsen Béchara.

Archbishop of Beirut Most Rev. Paul Youssef Matar.

Also representative of the Holy See for Roman Catholics of the Coptic Rite in Lebanon:

Archbishop of Tripoli.

Archbishop of Tyre Most Rev. Chucrallah-Nabil Hage. [1a] (Society and Media: Religion)

Melkite Rite

Patriarch of Antioch

Comprises seven archdioceses, with an estimated 512,850 adherents (31 December 2003).

The Patriarch of Antioch and all the East, of Alexandria and of Jerusalem Most Rev. Grégoire III Laham.

Archbishop of Ba'albek Most Rev. Elias Rahal.

Archbishop of Baniyas Most Rev. Antoine Hayek.

Archbishop of Beirut and Gibail Joseph Kallas.

Archbishop of Saida (Sidon) Most Rev. Georges Kwaïter.

Archbishop of Tripoli Most Rev. George Riashi.

Archbishop of Tyre Most Rev. Jean Assaad Haddad.

Archbishop of Zahleh and Furzol Most Rev. André Haddad. [1a] (Society and Media: Religion)

Syrian Rite

Patriarchate of Antioch

Jurisdiction over about 150,000 Syrian Catholics in the Middle East, including (at 31 December 2002) 14,500 in the diocese of Beirut. Patriarch: Most Rev. Ignace Pierre VIII Abdel Ahad.

Protosyncellus Mgr Georges Masri. [1a] (Society and Media: Religion)

The Anglican Communion

Within the Episcopal Church in Jerusalem and the Middle East, Lebanon forms part of the diocese of Jerusalem. [1a] (Society and Media: Religion)

Bishop The Rt Rev. Riah Abu el-Assal (Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem). [1b] (Society and Media: Religion)

Other Christian Groups

Armenian Apostolic Orthodox

Founded 1441 in Cilicia (now in Turkey), transferred to Antélias, Lebanon, 1930; Leader His Holiness Aram (Keshishian) I (Catholicos of Cilicia).

Jurisdiction over an estimated 1m. adherents in Lebanon, Syria, Cyprus, Kuwait, Greece, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, the USA and Canada. [1a] (Society and Media: Religion)

National Evangelical Synod of Syria and Lebanon

20,000 adherents (2004)

Gen. Sec. Rev. Joseph Kassab. [1a] (Society and Media: Religion)

Patriarchate of Antioch and all the East (Greek Orthodox)

Patriarch His Beatitude Ignatius (Hazim) IV. [1a] (Society and Media: Religion)

Patriarchate of Antioch and all the East (Syrian Orthodox)

Patriarch Ignatius Zakka I Iwas. [1a] (Society and Media: Religion)

Supreme Council of the Evangelical Community in Syria and Lebanon

Pres. Rev. Dr Salim Sahiouny. [1a] (Society and Media: Religion)

Union of the Armenian Evangelical Churches in the Near East

Founded 1846 in Turkey; comprises about 30 Armenian Evangelical Churches in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, Iran, Turkey and Australia.

7,500 mems (1990)

Pres. Rev. Megrdoch Karagoezian.

Gen. Sec. Sebouh Terzian. [1a] (Society and Media: Religion)

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ISLAM

Shi'a Muslims

Leader Imam Sheikh ayed Moussa as-Sadr (went missing during visit to Libya in August 1978) President of the Supreme Islamic Council of the Shi'a Community of Lebanon, Abd al-Amir Qabalan. [1a] (Society and Media: Religion)

A Canadian Research Directorate information response of October 2003 referenced correspondence with a representative of the Shi'ite Islamic Supreme Council of Lebanon in Canada, with respect to child custody following a divorce, stating that the terms set out in the divorce agreement will be respected:

"However, if the spouses do not come to an agreement then [usually]

'[translation] our shariah will impose the following: [child custody] with the mother until the age of two. Then the father will be given child custody of a daughter until she is nine years old, and of a boy until he reaches the age of 15. after *[sic]* that, the children will be able to decide freely which parent they would like to live with.'" [17a] (Society and Media: Religion)

Alawites

A schism of Shi'ite Islam; there are an estimated 50,000 Alawites in northern Lebanon, in and around Tripoli. [1a] (Society and Media: Religion)

Sunni Muslims

Leader SG Sheikh Dr Muhammad Rashid Qabbani. [1a] (Society and Media: Religion)

Druze

Supreme Spiritual Leader Sheikh al-Aql Bahjat Ghaith. Political Leader Walid Joumblatt. [1a] (Society and Media: Religion)

JUDAISM

Leader Chahoud Chreim (Beirut). [1a] (Society and Media: Religion)

The Daily Star (Lebanon) recorded in May 2004 that "Lebanese Jews have been historically an integral part of the Lebanese social fabric, with Judaism being one of the 18 officially recognized confessions. However, after the Lebanese civil war, the then-estimated 20,000 Lebanese Jews shrank to about 200." [23c]

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Annex D: List of abbreviations

AI	Amnesty International
CEDAW	Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CPJ	Committee to Protect Journalists
EU	European Union
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
FH	Freedom House
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IAG	Illegal Armed Group
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICRC	International Committee for Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IRIN	United Nations Integrated Regional Information Network
MSF	Médecins sans Frontières
NA	Northern Alliance
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
ODPR	Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees
OECD	Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
RSF	Reporteurs sans Frontières
STD	Sexually Transmitted Disease
STC	Save The Children
TB	Tuberculosis
TI	Transparency International
UN	United Nations
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USSD	United States State Department
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

ANNEX E: LIST OF SOURCE MATERIAL

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