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Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 February to 20 June 2023

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report provides a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) since the previous report, issued on 10 March 2023 (S/2023/184), including on the provisions of resolution 2650 (2022). Outstanding obligations remain for both parties under resolution 1701 (2006). There was no progress towards a permanent ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel.

II. Implementation of resolution 1701 (2006)

A. Situation in the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

2. On 6 April, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) detected 24 rockets fired from Sma'iyah, Malkiyah, and Zibqin (all Sector West), crossing south of the Blue Line. The Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL subsequently identified and inspected the launch sites and found six rockets that had failed to launch: three near Sma'iyah, one near Malkiyah and two near Zibqin. Separately, UNIFIL personnel heard two explosions from the direction of Metulla, northern Israel, in the vicinity of Sarda (Sector East). Subsequently, the Lebanese Armed Forces informed UNIFIL that three projectiles had been launched from Qulay'at (Sector East) towards Metulla. On 7 April, the Israel Defense Forces conducted air strikes on three locations near the Palestine refugee camp of Rashidiyah, south of Tyre (Sector West). The Israel Defense Forces stated on social media that "the IDF struck targets including terrorist infrastructures belonging to Hamas in southern Lebanon". On 7 April, the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL found six unlaunched rockets near Qulay'at and, on 8 April, found two unlaunched rockets at a second launch site near Malkiyah.

3. Throughout 6 and 7 April, the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander was in constant contact with the parties on both sides of the Blue Line to de-escalate. The caretaker Prime Minister of Lebanon, Najib Mikati, stated on social media on 6 April that Lebanon "rejects the use of its territory to carry out operations that destabilize the situation", adding that "that those who fired the rockets were not organized parties, but rather non-Lebanese elements". On 7 April, the UNIFIL Head



of Mission and Force Commander visited Israel, where the Israel Defense Forces showed him damage stated to be from the impact of rockets at a shopping mall and a road in Shlomi, northern Israel. The Israel Defense Forces subsequently informed UNIFIL that two Israeli civilians were injured on 6 April.

4. In identical letters dated 7 April addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me (S/2023/253), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated, “[y]esterday, a barrage of 34 missiles was fired from Lebanon at Israel ... by a Hamas terror cell”. He added, “Israel holds the Government of Lebanon responsible for all attacks emanating from Lebanese territory and demands that Lebanon fulfil its duties to prevent all hostile activity from its territory”. In identical letters dated 7 April addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me (A/77/861-S/2023/258), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated, “Lebanon condemns the attacks that Israel carried out ... on ... 7 April ... against areas in southern Lebanon”. The Chargé d’affaires a.i. further stated, “Lebanon is always prepared to cooperate with peacekeeping forces in implementing resolution 1701 (2006)” and “rejects the use of its territory as a platform for undermining stability”.

5. UNIFIL observed illumination rounds fired by the Israel Defense Forces in response to what the latter asserted were suspicious activities, affecting north of the Blue Line on three occasions near Wadi al-Khansa (Sector East) on 22 February, Bustan (Sector West) on 16 March and Shab’a (Sector East) on 10 April.

6. Construction and engineering works by the Israel Defense Forces near the Blue Line, including regular maintenance of their infrastructure, saw tensions on several occasions, including between the Israel Defense Forces and individuals near Ayta al-Sha’b (Sector West) and Hula (Sector East). Lebanese Armed Forces and Israel Defense Forces personnel pointed weapons at each other near Marun al-Ra’s and Aytarun (both Sector West) and twice near Blida (Sector East) and Udaysah (Sector East). UNIFIL observed violations of the Blue Line by the arm of an Israeli excavator on four occasions and by individuals from north of the Blue Line on four occasions. In the most serious incident, on 7 March, several individuals crossed south of the Blue Line, threw stones at and pushed Israel Defense Forces soldiers, with one individual snatching a rifle magazine from an Israel Defense Forces soldier. UNIFIL utilized its liaison and coordination mechanisms to reduce tensions in connection with those incidents. UNIFIL interposed between the parties on 1, 5, 7 and 8 March, including together with the Lebanese Armed Forces on 1 and 7 March.

7. Incidents in the occupied Shab’a Farms also contributed to tensions. On 7 May, UNIFIL observed a tent more than 30 m south of the Blue Line near Bastrah (Sector East). UNIFIL subsequently observed individuals repeatedly crossing from north of the Blue Line to gain access to the structure. On 30 May, closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras were installed next to the tent. A second tent was observed on 17 June. UNIFIL has requested the Lebanese Armed Forces to have the tents removed.

8. Between 29 May and 13 June, UNIFIL observed several incidents in connection with ground works by the Israel Defense Forces near Kfar Shuba (Sector East), in the occupied Shab’a Farms, including weapons pointing between the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces, stone throwing and violations of the Blue Line by individuals from north of the Blue Line, and weapons pointing and use of tear gas by the Israel Defense Forces. UNIFIL liaised with the parties to de-escalate, interposing on 29 May and 8 and 9 June. The Lebanese Armed Forces also acted to de-escalate tensions by keeping individuals away from the Blue Line.

9. The Israel Defense Forces continued construction of a T-wall south of the Blue Line, from Shlomi to Hanita and from Zar’it to Biranit (S/2023/184, para. 9). As at 20 June, since construction resumed in April 2022 (S/2022/556, para. 7) the T-wall

had been extended by 20.96 km, including 360 m constructed since 21 February in the Lebanese “reservation area” near Alma al-Sha’b (Sector West). On 27 April, an individual in the vicinity of Marwahin (Sector West) threw a smoke grenade across the Blue Line towards an area where the Israel Defense Forces were erecting a T-wall.

10. On 6 March in Hula, Israel Defense Forces personnel pointed a tank gun at Lebanese Armed Forces personnel, one of whom pointed a rocket-propelled grenade launcher back at the Israel Defense Forces. The Israel Defense Forces fired smoke or stun grenades north across the Blue Line on three occasions after individuals had thrown stones. Israel Defense Forces soldiers fired shots in the air twice after individuals had shaken the Israeli technical fence near Hula, and once as shepherds were tending their flocks north of the Blue Line near Arab al-Luwayzah (Sector East). UNIFIL observed Israel Defense Forces personnel pointing weapons at individuals north of the Blue Line on several occasions, including near Arab al-Luwayzah, Mays al-Jabal, Sarda (all Sector East), Ramyah and Yarun (both Sector West). On 4 April, the Lebanese Armed Forces informed UNIFIL that the Israel Defense Forces had fired a sonic grenade across the Blue Line in the vicinity of Hula. UNIFIL did not observe the incident.

11. UNIFIL launched seven technical investigations during the reporting period regarding the illumination rounds fire on 22 February (see para. 5 above), the incident near Hula on 7 March (see para. 6 above), two investigations of the alleged firing of a sonic grenade near Hula on 4 April (see para. 10 above) and the rocket launches and air strikes on 6 and 7 April, respectively (see paras. 2–3 above).

12. The Israel Defense Forces continued to enter Lebanese airspace in violation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and of Lebanese sovereignty. From 21 February to 20 June, UNIFIL recorded 131 airspace violations, totalling 187 hours and 7 minutes. Uncrewed aerial vehicles accounted for approximately 85 per cent of the violations, fighter aircraft 5 per cent and unidentified aircraft 10 per cent. UNIFIL protested against all air violations to the Israel Defense Forces and urged their immediate cessation. On 17 March, the Israel Defense Forces informed UNIFIL that they had detected an uncrewed aerial vehicle from Lebanon in Israel. UNIFIL did not observe the reported incident.

13. UNIFIL observed 609 ground violations by Lebanese individuals in civilian clothing crossing south of the Blue Line, including 372 violations by shepherds and farmers and 237 by other individuals. Lebanese Armed Forces personnel crossed the Blue Line near Majidiyah, Bastrah and Marwahin (Sector East) on nine occasions, often in connection with defusing tension. UNIFIL observed the arm of an Israeli excavator crossing the Blue Line near Markaba, Mays al-Jabal and Arab al-Luwayzah on 11 occasions (see para. 6 above). The Israel Defense Forces informed UNIFIL that they had apprehended four individuals who had crossed south of the Blue Line on three occasions. The individuals were later released, once with the participation of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

14. The Israel Defense Forces continued to occupy northern Ghajar and the adjacent area north of the Blue Line¹ in violation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#). The Government

¹ In identical letters dated 8 April 2023 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations, addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me ([A/77/844-S/2023/257](#)), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated, “Lebanon requests to amend the reference to ‘Northern Ghajar and the adjacent area north of the blue line’, which is usually mentioned in the relevant reports of the Secretary-General, and to adopt, in all reports and documents issued by the United Nations in this context, the name that Lebanon referred to in the identical letters contained in document [A/77/708-S/2023/49](#), as follows: ‘the occupied lands in the outskirts of the town of Al-Mari, which partly includes the urban expansion of the village of Ghajar’.”

of Lebanon has welcomed the UNIFIL proposal of 2011 for the facilitation of the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from the occupied area, while the Government of Israel has yet to respond. Israeli contractors continued road and construction works in the occupied area ([S/2023/184](#), para. 13), notwithstanding a request by UNIFIL for the Israel Defense Forces to cease such works.

15. To help to keep the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River free of unauthorized armed personnel, assets and weapons, UNIFIL, in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, maintained 16 permanent checkpoints and 79 temporary checkpoints, with an average of 489 counter-rocket-launching operations per month. Following the rocket launches on 6 April, the mission increased counter-rocket-launching operations from an average of 12 to 30 per day from 7 to 24 April. UNIFIL observed unauthorized weapons in its area of operations on 303 occasions, including hunting weapons on 285 occasions. UNIFIL observed a light machine gun, assault rifles and long-range rifles on 18 occasions, unknown weapons on 1 occasion and pistols on 3 occasions. UNIFIL observed non-hunting weapons at the firing range in the vicinity of Zibqin ([S/2023/184](#), para. 14) on eight occasions. Since March, UNIFIL has observed two yellow flags with what appear to be Hizbullah symbols at the Zibqin firing range. UNIFIL informed the Lebanese Armed Forces of each violation.

16. Pursuant to resolution [2650 \(2022\)](#), UNIFIL maintained its high operational tempo and visible presence, undertaking 14,034 operational activities per month, including 6,193 vehicular, air or foot patrols. Air reconnaissance patrols continued over areas where ground patrols had limited access, including private property and land contaminated by explosive remnants of war or anti-personnel mines and wadis. At least one woman peacekeeper was involved in 14.8 per cent of UNIFIL operational activities.

17. While the freedom of movement of UNIFIL was respected in most cases, the mission did encounter several restrictions (see annex I). The most serious incident occurred on 16 April near Mays al-Jabal, where a UNIFIL patrol was stopped by 17 masked individuals, 2 of whom had pistols. The UNIFIL patrol leader was hit on the head by a masked individual, and when the patrol tried to leave individuals damaged the patrol vehicle's windows and tires with an axe. Three peacekeepers were injured slightly.

18. There were several other incidents in which the safety and security of United Nations peacekeepers was endangered, including instances of weapons-pointing. On 22 and 31 March, as well as 6, 18 and 20 June, the Israel Defense Forces pointed weapons, including a tank gun on 31 March, at Observer Group Lebanon personnel in the vicinity of Yarun Kfar Shuba, Blida and Marwahin. Lasers were pointed at UNIFIL patrols, both from inside the area of operations and from south of the Blue Line, on several occasions. In the area of maritime operations on 26 April, a UNIFIL Maritime Task Force vessel detected the electronic signature of a fire control radar of an F-16 aircraft radar in lock-on mode for approximately one minute. Noting that six Israeli Air Force F-16 aircraft, and no others, were detected in the vicinity at that time, UNIFIL protested against the incident to the Israel Defense Forces. No official reply regarding this incident has been received.

19. Notwithstanding repeated requests to the Lebanese Armed Forces, UNIFIL has yet to gain full access to several locations of interest, including Green Without Borders sites, the tunnels crossing the Blue Line (see [S/2019/237](#)) and the four unauthorized firing ranges ([S/2023/184](#), para. 14). UNIFIL has had access to all relevant launch and impact sites, except near Zibqin, in the course of its investigation into the breach of the cessation of hostilities on 6 and 7 April.

20. As at 20 June, there were 18 containers and 6 watchtowers at 19 vantage points north of the Blue Line. Three of the watchtowers are in the same location as containers; the other three are stand-alone installations. Twelve of these sites have signs of Green Without Borders. UNIFIL experienced restrictions on its freedom of movement close to the container sites on several occasions (see annex I). One container was installed near the front gate of a UNIFIL position near Hula on 5 March, inhibiting UNIFIL movement in and out of its position and representing a potential obstacle to mandate implementation. UNIFIL has requested the Lebanese Armed Forces to remove the container, with no response to date. UNIFIL has observed professional cameras at two container sites and CCTV at five other container sites. In identical letters dated 1 March 2023 addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me ([A/77/791-S/2023/176](#)), the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated that "the shipping containers located along the Blue Line ... do not prevent UNIFIL from fulfilling its mandate. They belong to Green Without Borders, an environmental organization ... registered in accordance with official Lebanese legal procedures". In late February and early in March, UNIFIL first observed small ground openings, which can fit a single person, at three sites near Mallul (Sector West). Drilling equipment was observed at one of those sites. In May, a larger ground opening was observed near Alma al-Sha'b (Sector West). UNIFIL has requested access to these sites.

21. The Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL continued their engagement within the framework of the strategic dialogue process. The average percentage of operations that could be conducted in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces was maintained at 19.8 per cent. UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces conducted 145 joint training events, in particular related to non-combat skills. UNIFIL continues to urge the Lebanese Armed Forces to deploy a first company at its model regiment headquarters, drawing on existing troops ([S/2023/184](#), para. 19). As at 20 June, the Lebanese Armed Forces had confirmed the deployment of 70 personnel (11 women), to the model regiment headquarters in Sribbin (Sector West).

22. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force continued to support maritime interdiction operations, hailing 1,272 vessels. The Lebanese Armed Forces inspected and cleared all 223 vessels referred by UNIFIL. The Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy increasingly assumed command functions for maritime interdiction operations, with support by the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force. In this regard, the Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy increasingly assumed hailing and tracking duties in the central maritime corridor. A naval crew departed on 23 May for training in the United States of America with respect to the use of Protector-class patrols boats ([S/2023/184](#), para. 21). UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy conducted 75 joint training sessions and exercises, with an emphasis on the development of a sustainable operational capability, including a mock maritime interdiction operation on 25 April.

23. Pursuant to paragraph 11 of resolution [2650 \(2022\)](#), UNIFIL provided non-lethal material and support to the Lebanese Armed Forces ([S/2023/184](#), para. 23) from September 2022 to 28 February. UNIFIL provided 230,000 litres of diesel fuel, food rations for approximately 190,000 meals and 72 kg of medicine. Provisions were drawn from existing UNIFIL stocks or obtained using existing contracts.

24. Separately, on 10 March and 2 June, following a request from the Lebanese Armed Forces, UNIFIL handed over vehicles, generators, prefabricated buildings and information technology items no longer required by the mission. UNIFIL also provided electrical power for 14 observation posts and checkpoints of the Lebanese Armed Forces situated near UNIFIL positions.

B. Security and liaison arrangements

25. UNIFIL convened tripartite meetings on 30 March and 8 June. UNIFIL engagement with the parties notwithstanding, no substantive progress was made on modalities for resuming talks to resolve the outstanding contentious points along the Blue Line, including the Lebanese “reservation areas”.

26. UNIFIL liaison and coordination channels were utilized to de-escalate tensions on several occasions, including during the rocket launches and air strikes of 6 and 7 April (see paras. 2–3 above), as well as in connection with ground works by the Israel Defense Forces (see paras. 6–8 above) and the tent placed south of the Blue Line (see para. 7 above).

27. Notwithstanding the agreement of Israel to the proposal made in 2008 for a UNIFIL liaison office in Tel Aviv, the establishment of the office remains pending.

28. UNIFIL, through quick-impact projects and outreach initiatives, continued to assist local authorities in the delivery of basic services, such as water and sanitation, electricity and health care. The mission continued to implement quick-impact projects that supported crisis recovery and rehabilitation, with 29.8 per cent of the projects benefiting women directly.

29. UNIFIL continued to support the implementation of resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#) on women and peace and security, including by providing training on gender mainstreaming for 6,676 UNIFIL military and civilian personnel, of whom 467 were women.

C. Disarming armed groups

30. No progress was achieved with respect to the disarmament of armed groups. Hizbullah continued to acknowledge publicly that it maintains military capabilities. The maintenance of arms outside the control of the State by Hizbullah and other groups in violation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) continues to restrict the State’s ability to exercise full sovereignty and authority over its territory.

31. On 21 May, Hizbullah conducted a military drill with weapons, including rocket launchers, on display, while quadcopters simulated attacks on potential “Israeli targets”, in Aramta, Jazzin district, southern Lebanon, outside the UNIFIL area of operations. In identical letters dated 30 May addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me ([S/2023/391](#)), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that “Hezbollah’s provocative exercise, as well as its increased military capabilities and hostile activities, have a growing potential for miscalculation which could lead to escalation”.

32. During 13 counter-terrorism operations undertaken between 21 February and 20 June, Lebanese security forces arrested 18 individuals across Lebanon on terrorism-related charges. On 19 May, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrested an individual in north Lebanon, stating that he was “one of the most prominent leaders of Al-Qaeda and founder of its cells in Lebanon [...] and played a key role in establishing the terrorist Fath al-Islam organization”.

33. Multiple personal disputes escalated into shootings, resulting in 25 fatalities and 125 injuries, mostly in northern Lebanon.

34. On 1 March at Ein El Hilweh Palestine refugee camp, a personal dispute escalated into heavy shooting between groups affiliated with Fath and Islamist factions, resulting in one fatality, seven injuries and damage to a school operated by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Following further violence, involving the use of machine guns and hand grenades, all UNRWA facilities in the camp closed until 12 March. On 29 March, in

Mieh Mieh Palestine refugee camp, a personal dispute escalated into shooting between two persons affiliated with Fath and Hamas factions, resulting in one injury. On 6 May, armed clashes involving heavy weaponry between groups affiliated with Fath and the Arab Liberation Front factions in the Beddawi Palestine refugee camp resulted in two injuries.

35. There was no progress made in dismantling the military bases maintained by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fath al-Intifada. On 31 May, five members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command died in an explosion at its base in Qusaya, eastern Lebanon, near the border with the Syrian Arab Republic. The cause of the explosion remains to be confirmed.

D. Arms embargo and border control

36. Allegations of arms transfers to non-State armed actors continued and remained of serious concern. If confirmed, such transfers would constitute a violation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) (see annex II). While taking allegations of arms transfers seriously, the United Nations is not in a position to substantiate them independently.

37. Reports of Hizbullah's military engagement in the Syrian Arab Republic continued.

38. Lebanese security forces arrested 270 individuals, mostly of Lebanese nationality, in at least 134 operations to counter drug smuggling. On 7 June, in Yammunah, Biqa', eastern Lebanon, the Lebanese Armed Forces seized several drug-manufacturing factories and drugs. The Internal Security Forces thwarted several attempts to smuggle drugs out of Lebanon, including on 14 April in Tripoli, northern Lebanon. On 3 June, in Mount Lebanon, an alleged drug smuggler was killed during an exchange of fire with the Internal Security Forces.

39. As at 13 June, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrested 41 individuals of Lebanese or Syrian nationality during six operations to combat the smuggling of people by sea.

E. Landmines and cluster bombs

40. UNIFIL cleared 7,645 m² of land, finding and disposing of 1,217 anti-personnel landmines and 1 item of unexploded ordnance in its area of operations. Markers and concertina wire placed by UNIFIL deminers were removed by unknown individuals from a location near Hula in May. UNIFIL conducted 98 quality assurance and quality control monitoring assessments of demining and explosive ordnance disposal teams, 1 training support event, 5 accreditation events for demining teams and 5 risk awareness briefings for 53 United Nations military and civilian personnel, including 23 women. UNIFIL supported the Lebanon Mine Action Centre by conducting an explosive ordnance risk education activity, benefiting approximately 150 students.

F. Delineation of borders

41. No progress was made towards the delineation or demarcation of the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. There was no progress in relation to the issue of the Shab'a Farms area. Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic have yet to respond to the provisional definition of the Shab'a Farms area proposed in the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) (S/2007/641, annex).

G. Political and institutional stability

42. On 14 June, a presidential election session, the first since January and twelfth overall, was convened by the Speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berri. Neither candidate, Jihad Azour, a director at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and former Lebanese finance minister, and Sleiman Franjieh, Marada Movement leader, secured the necessary majority. Azour garnered 59 and Frangieh 51 of 128 votes. Azour was supported by the Lebanese Forces, the Kata'ib party, the Progressive Socialist Party, a majority of the Free Patriotic Movement and a number of independent and emerging group parliamentarians. Franjieh was backed by Hizbullah, the Amal Movement, the Marada-led bloc, Hizbullah-aligned Sunnis and some independent parliamentarians. Michel Moawad had earlier withdrawn his candidacy in favour of Azour. Two parliamentarians representing emerging groups continued their open-ended sit-in, launched on 19 January, to "press for the election of a president" (S/2023/184, para. 43).

43. On 16 June, the International Support Group for Lebanon issued a statement from Beirut in which it urged "the political leadership and Members of Parliament to assume their responsibilities and prioritize the national interest by electing a new President without further delay".

44. Amid the presidential vacuum, Parliament convened, exceptionally, on two occasions in its legislative capacity during the reporting period. On 18 April, Parliament adopted a law extending the mandate of the municipal councils and mukhtars until May 2024, effectively postponing the municipal elections, which were slated to be held in May 2023, a second time. The Lebanese Forces and the Kata'ib party, together with independent parliamentarians and parliamentarians representing emerging groups, boycotted the 18 April parliamentary session and filed appeals with the Constitutional Council disputing the extension of the mandate of the municipal councils and mukhtars. The Constitutional Council rejected the appeals on 30 May.

45. On 19 June, Parliament approved the opening of a 37.4 billion Lebanese pound credit line to fund the disbursement of public sector salaries and allowances for June and beyond. The session was again boycotted by the Lebanese Forces, the Kata'ib party and independent and emerging group parliamentarians, who maintained that Parliament was not constitutionally allowed to legislate during the vacuum. The caretaker Prime Minister convened the caretaker Cabinet on five occasions to address "pressing matters related to citizens' needs". The eight Free Patriotic Movement-affiliated ministers boycotted those sessions. The head of the General Directorate of General Security, Abbas Ibrahim, concluded his tenure on 2 March, with the deputy, Elias Al-Baysari, becoming interim head.

46. More than one year since the signature of the staff-level agreement between IMF and Lebanon (S/2022/556, para. 50), most prerequisite actions for a board-level agreement remain outstanding. In its concluding statement on 23 March, following its article IV mission to Lebanon, IMF observed "limited progress in implementing the comprehensive package of economic reforms", adding, "without rapid reforms [Lebanon] will be mired in a never-ending crisis".

47. In March, the Lebanese pound depreciated to 140,000 pounds to the dollar in the parallel market. Following Central Bank foreign exchange interventions, the unofficial rate stabilized at some 94,000 pounds to the dollar. In its report, "Lebanon economic monitor: The normalization of crisis is no road for stabilization", published on 16 May 2023, the World Bank cited a growing dollarized cash economy estimated at \$9.9 billion, or 45.7 per cent of gross domestic product, in 2022 as a major impediment to Lebanon's economic recovery. The World Bank also reported that

inflation in Lebanon averaged 171.2 per cent in 2022, attributable in large part to its nominal food price inflation rate of 352 per cent, the highest in the world.

48. The livelihood support programme for the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Internal Security Forces commenced on 18 April with the first monthly disbursement for Internal Security Forces personnel. Pursuant to paragraph 10 of resolution [2650 \(2022\)](#) and the United Nations human rights due diligence policy, the programme is funded through a financial transfer and accountability mechanism managed by the United Nations Development Programme under the auspices of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon.

49. On 19 April, the National Anti-Corruption Commission launched its first annual action plan, for 2023–2024. Judicial delegations from France, Germany and Luxembourg travelled to Lebanon, in connection with investigations into corruption allegations against the Central Bank Governor, Riad Salameh, whose term is due to expire on 31 July. On 23 February, a Lebanese prosecutor filed embezzlement, money-laundering and tax evasion charges against Salameh. In May, Lebanon received International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) red notices for his arrest following the issuance of arrest warrants by France and Germany.

50. Eleven emerging groups and independent parliamentarians filed an appeal with the Constitutional Council on 11 May against amendments to the public procurement law, adopted by Parliament on 18 April. Earlier, on 30 March, the caretaker Minister of Public Works and Transport, Ali Hamieh, cancelled a project to construct a new airport terminal following widespread allegations that the contract violated the public procurement law.

51. Demonstrations, roadblocks and strikes to protest against the deteriorating economic conditions continued, mostly in Beirut and north Lebanon. Some 27 bank-related security incidents were recorded during February amid repeated strikes in the banking sector, which further constrained depositors' access to their savings. On 6 March, public schoolteachers suspended in part their two-month strike, allowing schools to reopen.

52. There has been no progress made in the investigation into the Beirut port explosion. In a statement co-sponsored by 38 members of the Human Rights Council on 7 March, it was asserted that the investigation was “hampered by systemic obstruction, interference, intimidation, and a political impasse”.

53. As at 20 June, the prosecution of 68 individuals in the case of the deadly 14 October 2021 Tayyounah clashes ([S/2021/953](#), para. 57) remained pending. No progress has been made in the investigation into the 4 February 2021 killing of Lokman Slim ([S/2021/240](#), para. 46).

54. On 22 February, the caretaker Minister of Interior, Bassam Mawlawi, instructed State Security agencies not to enforce judicial orders from the Mount Lebanon prosecutor, Judge Ghada Aoun, until rulings were issued in recusal lawsuits filed against her. On 4 May, the Judicial Disciplinary Council dismissed Judge Aoun from the judiciary. Aoun has appealed that decision. On 21 March, the Association of Banks in Lebanon suspended its strike to protest against judicial measures affecting the sector.

55. On 19 April, the Military Court issued rulings against 36 individuals in the case of the 1 August 2021 armed clashes in Khaldah. Twenty-five individuals were convicted of murder and sectarian strife, with 9 sentenced to death in absentia and 16 sentenced to prison. Eleven individuals were acquitted. On 5 May, the Military Court postponed until November 2023 the trial session in the case of the death of a Syrian refugee who died in August 2022 in a State security centre in Bint Jubayl, southern Lebanon ([S/2022/858](#), para. 63).

56. The two-track dialogue process between women from traditional political parties and emerging groups continued, alongside 11 local women's mediation networks, to support inclusive dialogue and non-violent conflict resolution. Prior to the postponement of the municipal elections, more than 500 women had benefited from capacity-building to strengthen their participation and representation in elected bodies, including through the adoption of temporary special measures. The United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), together with two national women's rights non-governmental organizations, KAFA and Female, issued an alert concerning the growing number of disappeared women and girls in Lebanon. In 2022, the number of women and girls reported missing increased by more than 30 per cent, to 129 from 81, in 2021.

57. As at 20 June, 814,105 refugees and asylum-seekers were registered with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Lebanon, including 802,626 Syrian refugees and 11,479 refugees and asylum-seekers of other nationalities. With new registrations of Syrian refugees by UNHCR suspended by the Government of Lebanon since 2015, the actual number of refugees remains unknown. As indicated in the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan for 2023, the Government estimates that there are 1.5 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon. UNHCR is aware of eight actual or attempted irregular movements by sea from Lebanon, involving 175 passengers, since 1 January.

58. On 5 April, the Lebanese Armed Forces commenced security operations targeting Syrians in urban residential areas and informal tented settlements across Lebanon. On 26 April, caretaker Prime Minister Mikati convened the interministerial committee overseeing the Syrian refugee file, which reaffirmed the 24 April 2019 decision of the Higher Defence Council ([S/2019/574](#), para. 42). Significant protection concerns have been reported. These operations were conducted in an environment characterized by a pervasive anti-refugee narrative. Following engagement with the Lebanese authorities by the United Nations and partners, no group deportation has occurred since 11 May.

59. Syrian and Palestine refugees remain in dire need of protection and humanitarian assistance. Only 1 per cent of Syrian refugees are food-secure. Palestine refugees also continued to face food insecurity, restrictions on livelihood opportunities, and barriers to gaining access to education and medical care. Quarterly cash assistance from UNRWA helped to lower the poverty rate among Palestine refugees to 80 per cent by March. Incidents of protests, sit-ins, violence and threats against UNRWA staff and facilities continued.

60. The price of the food basket monitored by the World Food Programme reached 2,700,000 Lebanese pounds per person per month in April, up 108 per cent from January. Under the World Bank-financed Emergency Social Safety Net Project, the World Food Programme delivered cash payments to 401,300 Lebanese individuals as at 31 May. The United Nations estimates that, in 2023, approximately 3.9 million people in Lebanon need humanitarian assistance, including 2.1 million Lebanese, 1.5 million Syrian refugees, 211,400 Palestine refugees and 81,500 migrants.

61. On 12 April, to support progress on reforms that would catalyse investment in reconstruction, the Lebanon Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Framework consultative group announced that the Framework would shift focus from supporting post-explosion recovery in Beirut to facilitating inclusive policy dialogue. The Lebanon Financing Facility 2023 annual workplan reflects this shift in focus.

62. As at 31 March, overall international assistance to Lebanon reported by donors stood at \$805.3 million, including \$326.96 million disbursed in 2023 and \$478.3 million carried over from 2022. Donors reported \$504.66 million in outstanding commitments for 2023 and \$220.16 million in commitments for 2024 and beyond.

The appeal for the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan for 2023 is funded at 15 per cent, with \$540 million of \$3.59 billion requested, with United Nations entities and non-governmental organizations reporting \$209.2 million in funds received in 2023 and \$330.8 million carried over from 2022. As at 14 June, the emergency response plan to provide life-saving humanitarian support to the most vulnerable Lebanese citizens, Palestine refugees and migrants affected by Lebanon's socioeconomic crisis was 17.6 per cent funded, with \$35.3 million out of \$200.2 million requested.

III. Security and safety measures

63. In accordance with the Action for Peacekeeping commitment to improve the safety and security of peacekeepers, UNIFIL continued to implement its security plans and risk prevention and mitigation measures in close coordination with the Lebanese authorities. Strict security measures remained in place in the Arqub area (Sector East), including the use of armed escorts for official movements by all United Nations personnel. UNIFIL facilitated 60 missions to the Arqub area, including by members of the United Nations country team.

64. UNIFIL continued to monitor proceedings in Lebanese military courts against individuals suspected of planning or perpetrating serious attacks against UNIFIL peacekeepers. On 1 June, the first military investigation judge issued indictments against seven suspects and search warrants against six more in the case of the fatal attack against a UNIFIL convoy in the vicinity of Aqibiyah on 14 December 2022 (S/2023/184, para. 2). One indicted suspect is in detention, with an arrest warrant issued and implemented. In response to a request for judicial cooperation, UNIFIL has shared the findings of its own investigation with Lebanon's judicial authorities and facilitated access to witnesses within the framework of the UNIFIL status-of-forces agreement. UNIFIL also facilitated interaction between Lebanese and the national authorities of the relevant contingent in connection with their investigations.

65. Hearings related to appeals submitted against the verdict issued on 24 March 2021 in two cases of serious attacks against UNIFIL peacekeepers in Sidon on 26 July 2011 and Burj Shemali on 9 December 2011 were held on 5 June. The next hearing is scheduled for 18 December. The Military Cassation Court held hearings on 7 March regarding an attempted attack against UNIFIL peacekeepers in 2008 in Tyre (Sector West). The next hearing is scheduled for 30 November 2023. The Permanent Military Court held hearings on 26 May regarding the attack perpetrated in Khiyam (Sector East) on 24 June 2007 against UNIFIL and the case of terrorist intent opened in January 2014. The next hearing is scheduled for 7 July. In the two cases of serious attacks against UNIFIL peacekeepers perpetrated in Qasimiyah on 16 July 2007 and Rumaylah on 27 May 2011, a hearing was held on 26 May. The United Nations has not been informed of any criminal proceedings to bring to justice the perpetrators of the incident of 4 August 2018 in the village of Majdal Zun (Sector West). The Military Prosecutor has instructed the Lebanese Armed Forces to expand the investigations into the acts of aggression against UNIFIL peacekeepers in Shaqra (Sector East) on 22 December 2021, in Bint Jubayl on 4 January 2022 and in Ramiyah (Sector West) on 25 January 2022.

66. While the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) situation has not had any impact on mandate implementation, UNIFIL contingency plans remain in place.

IV. Deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

67. As at 20 June, UNIFIL comprised 9,516 military personnel, including 700 women (7.4 per cent), from 49 troop-contributing countries, and 783 civilian staff (231 international and 552 national), including 242 women (30.9 per cent). The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force presence in the area of maritime operations comprised four vessels and 479 of the Force's military personnel, including 22 women (4.5 per cent). In addition, 49 military observers, including 9 women (18.3 per cent), from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization serve with Observer Group Lebanon, under the operational command and control of UNIFIL. The most senior military women serve at the rank of colonel. The most senior civilian woman serves at the D-2 level.

68. As part of Action for Peacekeeping efforts to support effective performance and accountability, UNIFIL completed its regular Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System evaluation, including data collection, analysis and performance assessment, and adopted recommendations that confirmed the effectiveness of mission operations.

69. In accordance with the implementation of the Action for Peacekeeping commitments and Security Council resolution [2436 \(2018\)](#), UNIFIL finalized the assessment of 20 subordinate units for logistics, training and operational preparedness during the reporting period. Minor shortfalls identified in one unit related to the language of its operational order are being resolved.

70. UNIFIL continued the implementation of the assessment of the continued relevance of UNIFIL resources (see [S/2020/473](#)), pursuant to Security Council resolution [2539 \(2020\)](#).

71. Pursuant to paragraph 24 of resolution [2650 \(2022\)](#), UNIFIL continued to address misinformation and disinformation, in line with the mission's strategy adopted in February. As events on 6 and 7 April unfolded, UNIFIL engaged with the media to provide accurate and objective information and explain the mission's liaison and coordination channels.

V. Conduct and discipline

72. From 1 February through 31 May, UNIFIL recorded four allegations of possible unsatisfactory conduct and one allegation of sexual exploitation and abuse. Four of the five cases are still being investigated. Induction and targeted awareness training on United Nations standards of conduct was provided to 361 civilian personnel, including 155 employees of contractors, and to 4,464 military personnel in UNIFIL. Both the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon and UNIFIL remain committed to strict adherence to the United Nations zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and sexual harassment. In this regard, UNIFIL conducted two outreach events, distributing sexual exploitation and abuse "No Excuse" cards to municipal officials to raise awareness of reporting mechanisms. UNIFIL conducted training for 53 staff officers on the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse and sexual harassment.

VI. Observations

73. Lebanon's political status quo is unsustainable. I call again upon all stakeholders to act in a spirit of compromise and consensus to elect a new President for the sake of the Lebanese people and the stability of the country.

74. A continued executive vacuum, while the Government continues to operate in caretaker mode, hinders Lebanon's ability to address the country's challenges. The diminishing capacity of State institutions to provide basic public services further prolongs Lebanon's eventual recovery and ability to return to a sustainable development path. While long-term solutions must be Lebanese, the enduring commitment of the international donor community to respond to the growing humanitarian needs and socioeconomic challenges of the Lebanese people remains critical. More than one year since signing a staff-level agreement, Lebanon is no closer to a fully-fledged IMF programme that would pave the way to the implementation of the necessary fiscal, financial, sectoral and governance reforms and enable the disbursement of the financial support needed to stabilize the economy.

75. The postponement of the municipal elections represents a missed opportunity to meet a key democratic milestone and build confidence and strengthen governance at the local level. I encourage the Lebanese authorities to ensure that preparations, including funding, are in place so that these elections can be held by May 2024 and to bolster the participation and representation of women, including through the adoption of temporary special measures.

76. I firmly condemn the rocket fire from Lebanon towards Israel on 6 April and the breach of the cessation of hostilities. I also condemn Israel's air strike into Lebanon on 7 April. Both parties need to prevent and avoid breaches of the cessation of hostilities and any action that has the potential for rapid escalation. I reiterate my appeal to all parties to fully implement resolution 1701 (2006), to cease these violations and to respect the cessation of hostilities.

77. Continued incidents and posturing near the Blue Line, including firing in the air, the use of smoke and stun grenades, weapons pointing and stone-throwing, are of concern. Direct stand-offs between the Israel Defense Forces and the Lebanese Armed Forces, as well as between individuals and the Israel Defense Forces, have the potential to lead to escalation, with serious consequences. To reduce potential flashpoints, I encourage the parties to utilize the tripartite format of UNIFIL to resume discussions on outstanding contentious points along the Blue Line.

78. I remain seriously concerned about the presence of unauthorized weapons in the area between the Litani River and the Blue Line. The rockets launched from multiple sites in the UNIFIL area of operations on 6 April were a clear violation of resolution 1701 (2006). The presence and active use of weapons at the firing ranges outside State control represents a grave violation of resolution 1701 (2006). I call upon the Lebanese Armed Forces to facilitate access by UNIFIL to locations requested as parts of its investigations and day-to-day implementation of its mandate. The continued lack of support to gain access to the firing ranges is unacceptable.

79. While the installation of infrastructure north of the Blue Line does not violate resolution 1701 (2006), it risks impeding UNIFIL freedom of movement, as demonstrated by recent incidents (see annex I). The presence of individuals with professional cameras and binoculars, as well as CCTV cameras at some of the installations (see para. 20 above), further provokes tensions at the Blue Line, raising questions about their purpose.

80. I note with grave concern the conduct of a Hizbullah military drill involving uniformed and armed combatants with heavy weaponry on 21 May, in violation of

resolution 1701 (2006). I condemn the repeated self-acknowledged maintenance of unauthorized weapons outside of State control by Hizbullah and other non-State armed groups. I once again call upon the Government of Lebanon to take all action necessary to ensure there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than those of the Lebanese State, including through the full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords and of Security Council resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), which require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon. I repeat my call to address the outstanding elements of resolution 1701 (2006) and the issue of the national defence strategy. It remains important that earlier decisions of the National Dialogue are implemented, especially those pertaining to the disarmament of non-Lebanese groups and the dismantling of the bases of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fath al-Intifada.

81. The continued occupation of northern Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line represents a persistent violation of resolution 1701 (2006) and must cease. Ongoing enhancements in the area run contrary to the necessary withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces and create tensions. I again urge the Israeli authorities to fulfil their obligation under resolution 1701 (2006) to withdraw from northern Ghajar and the adjacent area north of the Blue Line.

82. I regret that there has been no progress made on the issue of the Shab'a Farms in accordance with paragraph 10 of resolution 1701 (2006). Recent developments on the ground have shown the destabilizing potential that comes from not addressing that issue and underscore the need for renewed political efforts. I reiterate my call upon Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic to submit their responses to the provisional definition of the Shab'a Farms area as provided in the report of the Secretary-General dated 30 October 2007 (S/2007/641). Meanwhile, and without prejudice to the status of the Shab'a Farms, all parties should fully respect the Blue Line, here as elsewhere, act with maximum restraint and refrain from taking any measures that could lead to misunderstandings or escalation.

83. I urge the parties to coordinate construction activities in the vicinity of the Blue Line through the UNIFIL liaison and coordination mechanisms. Construction work in contentious areas (see paras. 6–8 above) risks increasing tensions. The tents erected south of the Blue Line in the occupied Shab'a Farms, near Bastrah, with individuals crossing from north of the Blue Line to gain access to the structure, constitute a clear violation of resolution 1701 (2006).

84. Perpetrators of attacks against UNIFIL, including those responsible for the killing of a peacekeeper and injuries to three other peacekeepers in the attack on a UNIFIL convoy near Aqibiyah on 14 December 2022, must be brought to justice. In this regard, I note the issuance of an indictment on 1 June by the military investigative judge in the case. The safety and security of peacekeepers needs to be ensured. The role of the Lebanese authorities is crucial for helping to prevent such incidents in future. This includes publicly dispelling misinformation and disinformation regarding the mission's mandate and raising understanding among local communities accordingly. I express serious concern at the continuing acts of intimidation against peacekeepers, notably the incident involving physical violence against peacekeepers on 16 April near Mays al-Jabal. The actions with respect to a UNIFIL Maritime Task Force vessel on 26 April are extremely concerning. All parties must abide by their obligations to respect the safety of UNIFIL and all United Nations personnel.

85. Cooperation and coordination between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces remain crucial for the successful implementation of resolution 1701 (2006). The continued resource constraints faced by the Lebanese Armed Forces affect both operational capabilities and progress in the strategic dialogue with UNIFIL aimed at increasing Lebanese Armed Forces deployments in southern Lebanon and extending

State authority. Reiterating appreciation for continued international support for Lebanon's State Security institutions, I also underscore the need for further demonstrable commitment by the Lebanese authorities to an effective and durable deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces to southern Lebanon, notably the model regiment, with a headquarters that stands equipped and ready. At sea, the gradual assumption of maritime interdiction operation command functions by the Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy with UNIFIL support is encouraging.

86. The continued violations of Lebanese airspace by Israeli aircraft and uncrewed aerial vehicles remain of concern. The overflights constitute violations of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and of Lebanese sovereignty, cause distress to the Lebanese population and undermine the credibility of UNIFIL. I reiterate my condemnation of all violations of Lebanese sovereignty and call again for the Government of Israel to cease all overflights of Lebanese territory.

87. Nearly three years since Beirut was devastated by the deadly port explosion that left more than 218 people dead, 7,000 injured and 300,000 displaced, no one has yet stood trial. I again appeal to the Lebanese authorities to follow through on an impartial, thorough and transparent investigation. Moreover, the lack of progress made in other investigations, including the killing of Mr. Slim and the Tayyunah clashes, underscores the need to strengthen and protect the independence of the judiciary.

88. I call upon the Government of Lebanon to abide by its policy of disassociation, consistent with the Baabda Declaration of 2012, and for all Lebanese actors to cease their involvement in the Syrian conflict and other conflicts in the region. I condemn any movement of fighters and war materiel across Lebanon's border with the Syrian Arab Republic in violation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).

89. Lebanon's efforts to protect refugees are unique in their scope, and I remain appreciative of the remarkable hospitality the Lebanese people have shown. A robust, united and well-funded response to the rising needs of the refugees and of their host communities remains vital. In this regard, defining the status of the post-2015 arrivals, as part of data-sharing arrangements, will be an important step. I am deeply concerned by the escalating anti-refugee narrative, which undermines both refugee protection and social stability in Lebanon. I urge the Lebanese authorities to actively de-escalate such rhetoric to prevent worsening social tensions. I also call upon the Lebanese authorities to ensure the consistent application of legal and procedural safeguards, as well as to uphold the principle of non-refoulement.

90. It is crucial that UNRWA receive consistent and sufficient funding to ensure that it can meet the protection needs of the Palestine refugee community. I urge the international community to provide the Agency with necessary resources.

91. I express my gratitude to all countries contributing military personnel and equipment to UNIFIL and Observer Group Lebanon and encourage them to increase the number of women among military personnel in UNIFIL. I extend my appreciation to the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Joanna Wronecka, and the staff of her office; the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander, Major General Aroldo Lázaro Sáenz, and the civilian and military personnel in UNIFIL under his leadership; and the members of the United Nations country team.

Annex I

Restriction of the freedom of access and movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon from 21 February to 20 June 2023

1. In paragraph 16 of its resolution [2650 \(2022\)](#), the Security Council urged the parties to ensure that the freedom of movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in all its operations, including access to all parts of the Blue Line, were fully respected and unimpeded. It called upon the Government of Lebanon to facilitate prompt and full access to sites requested by the mission for the purpose of swift investigations, including several Green Without Borders sites, the tunnels crossing the Blue Line (as reported in [S/2019/237](#)) and unauthorized firing ranges, in line with resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), while respecting Lebanese sovereignty.

2. During the reporting period, UNIFIL conducted an average of 6,140 monthly patrols during the day and at night, of which 2,509 (40.8 per cent) were foot patrols. The mission conducted an average of 2,458 patrols each month along the Blue Line, both by vehicle and on foot (49 and 51 per cent, respectively). In addition, the mission conducted an average of 53 helicopter patrols and 1,057 inspection activities, which included the conduct of temporary and permanent checkpoints and counter-rocket-launching operations each month. While the freedom of movement of UNIFIL was respected in most cases, the mission continued to experience some restrictions, mostly verbal threats, as detailed below. UNIFIL is following up with the Lebanese Armed Forces on incidents in which the mission's freedom of movement has been restricted.

Access to all locations of interest

3. UNIFIL is yet to gain access to several other sites of interest, including the firing ranges, as well as a number of Green Without Borders sites close to the Blue Line. Repeated formal requests have been made to the Lebanese Armed Forces. Access to those locations is required both in connection with investigations and as part of the mission's daily monitoring of the Blue Line, as mandated under resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and recalled in resolution [2650 \(2022\)](#). Starting on 12 May, large barrels have been placed, anchoring a concertina wire placed across the road leading to the tents (described in para. 7 above). Owing to the barrels, UNIFIL peacekeepers have been unable to gain access to a frequently used observation point on the Blue Line, near the main patrol road in the area of Bastrah. Access to the Blue Line is otherwise not impeded.

4. The Lebanese Armed Forces continued to object to some patrol routes, proposed by UNIFIL to expand its presence outside main routes and municipal centres on the grounds that they were either private roads or areas of strategic importance to the Lebanese Armed Forces. UNIFIL has consistently followed up on reported incidents with the appropriate authorities. It continuously engages with the Lebanese Armed Forces to secure freedom of movement and unrestricted access to its entire area of operations.

Freedom of movement incidents

5. On 21 February, four individuals in civilian clothes approached a UNIFIL patrol in the vicinity of Marji'yun (Sector East), while shouting and picking up stones and signalling the patrol to leave the area. The patrol withdrew to a distance of some 50 m to continue observation. Shortly thereafter, the individuals drove away.

6. On 21 February, an individual in civilian clothes exited a Green Without Borders container in the vicinity of Hula (Sector East) and placed himself in front of a UNIFIL

administrative movement heading towards Shaykh Abbad's tomb, while two other individuals took pictures of the UNIFIL vehicle and United Nations position. Shortly thereafter, the three individuals returned to the container and the administrative movement continued.

7. On 25 February, 12 individuals in civilian clothes blocked the road of a UNIFIL patrol in the vicinity of Bazuriyah (Sector West) by standing across the road. The individuals did not behave aggressively, and the patrol turned around and took an alternate route to continue its planned itinerary.

8. On 4 March, two individuals approached a joint UNIFIL-Lebanese Armed Forces patrol at a public marketplace in the vicinity of Kfar Kila (Sector East), with one of the individuals telling UNIFIL that they were not allowed to perform activities in the area. UNIFIL could see that one of the men had a hunting rifle in his vehicle. The Lebanese Armed Forces personnel spoke with the man and then informed the patrol that it should leave the area. Another individual in civilian clothes then approached the patrol, presenting himself as the head of the village, and told the patrol in a threatening manner not to undertake any activity in Kfar Kila again. The patrol left the area and continued with the planned itinerary. Subsequent patrols have been performed in the same area without difficulties.

9. On 11 March, 12 individuals in civilian clothes, with a vehicle, stopped a UNIFIL patrol in the vicinity of Dibbin (Sector East). The individuals verbally objected to the patrol using the route without the accompaniment of the Lebanese Armed Forces. The patrol reversed and used another road to continue its planned itinerary.

10. On 20 March, a UNIFIL patrol stopped too close to a United Nations position and a container in Hula (Sector East), where some Lebanese Armed Forces personnel were standing talking to a group of individuals in civilian clothes. As the patrol reversed to better position their vehicle, four individuals approached the UNIFIL vehicle and hit it with their hands. The individuals made hand gestures urging the patrol to leave the location. Lebanese Armed Forces personnel present in the area intervened, which stopped the individuals' actions. Following this, the patrol continued its planned itinerary.

11. On 21 March, three individuals approached an Observer Group Lebanon patrol in the vicinity of Blida (Sector East) and asked the patrol whether it had taken pictures and requested the patrol to open its vehicle to see whether it had a camera. After the Observer Group Lebanon personnel refused to comply with the request, the individuals became verbally unfriendly. The incident did not escalate any further and the peacekeepers continued their patrol.

12. On 26 March, 11 individuals in civilian clothes blocked the road of a UNIFIL vehicle patrol, on a secondary road through the village of Juwayya (Sector West) through the placement of eight vehicles across the road. One individual stated that the patrol could not pass without being accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces. Given that the patrol was unable to proceed on the planned route, it returned to the main road, followed by an individual on a scooter. The incident led to the cancellation of the patrol.

13. Also on 26 March, four individuals threw several stones at UNIFIL vehicles returning from a patrol in the vicinity of Yarin (Sector West). The stones shattered a side window and a side mirror of one of the vehicles, without causing any injury to UNIFIL personnel.

14. On 27 March, a vehicle stopped near a UNIFIL patrol in Yarun (Sector West) with two individuals approaching the patrol vehicles. One of the individuals, who carried a stick, indicated to the patrol to leave the area, while another one was

shouting at the patrol. Subsequently, three other individuals arrived in a vehicle and positioned themselves in the middle of the road, while several motorcycles were also observed in the area. One individual took pictures of the patrol with a professional camera. Eventually, the patrol was able to manoeuvre past the group and left the area.

15. On 30 March, six individuals in civilian clothes with four vehicles blocked the road in front of UNIFIL vehicles returning from a patrol, in the vicinity of Marun al-Ra's (Sector West), after the peacekeepers had mistakenly deviated from the main road. The individuals informed the peacekeepers that they would not allow the patrol to leave the area unless it was accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces. After approximately 20 minutes, the patrol managed to leave the area and returned to the main road.

16. On 1 April, 20 individuals in civilian clothes in five vehicles stopped a UNIFIL vehicle with a peacekeeper in the vicinity of Dayr Mimas (Sector East) as the peacekeeper was on route from a location outside the UNIFIL area of operations to Naqurah (Sector West). The UNIFIL vehicle was searched, with the individuals seizing a cell phone and identification documents and taking photos of the vehicle and identification documents. The peacekeeper was able to return to base, but the seized items have not been retrieved.

17. On 4 April, an individual with a dog approached a UNIFIL patrol close to a Green Without Borders container in the vicinity of Alma al-Sha'b (Sector West) and informed the patrol that it was not allowed to be there. The patrol informed the individual that it required access to a blue barrel located in the area, but the individual insisted that the peacekeepers could not proceed further. Given that the area close by was marked as "mined", UNIFIL did not proceed further to explore alternative routes. Two days later, peacekeepers were able to utilize an alternate route to reach the Blue Line.

18. On 7 April, four individuals approached a UNIFIL patrol in Kafr Kila (Sector East) while shouting and with one of the individuals displaying a gun. The gun was not pointed at peacekeepers. Subsequently, the individuals left the area and the patrol continued its activities.

19. On 16 April, a UNIFIL patrol was stopped by individuals in civilian clothing making unfriendly gestures in the vicinity of Ma'arakah (Sector West). The individuals were verbally aggressive and threatened to shoot the peacekeepers if they returned. The individuals left the location shortly thereafter and the patrol continued its planned itinerary.

20. On 16 April, a UNIFIL patrol was stopped by 17 individuals, 2 wearing side arms at the waist, blocking the road in the vicinity of Mays al-Jabal (Sector East). As the patrol leader disembarked its vehicle, one of the individuals, who was wearing a mask, hit him on the head several times. The vehicle's windows and tires were hit with an axe. The patrol was able to leave 10 minutes later and reached a nearby United Nations position. Three peacekeepers were injured slightly by the shattered glass and their vehicle's windows and a wheel were damaged.

21. On 26 April, while operating in the UNIFIL maritime area of operations close to Naqurah, a UNIFIL Maritime Task Force ship detected a "fire control radar" in "lock-on mode" coming from an F-16-type of aircraft for approximately one minute. The only aircraft of this kind detected in the area were six Israel Defense Forces F-16 aircraft flying south of the maritime boundary line. UNIFIL has requested that the Israel Defense Forces provide clarification.

22. On 11 May, a UNIFIL patrol encountered two individuals in civilian clothes, carrying two pistols in holsters, in the vicinity of Dibbin (Sector East). The individuals told the patrol commander not to patrol the area without the Lebanese

Armed Forces. The individuals were not aggressive and eventually left the area. The patrol continued the planned itinerary.

23. On 30 May, a UNIFIL patrol made a navigation error in Yarun (Sector West) and was trying to make a U-turn when three individuals blocked its path. Within minutes, seven more individuals arrived and started to film the patrol. The individuals became aggressive and threw stones, demanding that the peacekeepers leave their vehicles. The Lebanese Armed Forces arrived at the scene after approximately one hour and, after some discussion, accompanied the patrol back to its position. While no peacekeepers were injured, the patrol vehicles were damaged.

Annex II

Implementation of the arms embargo

1. In paragraph 22 of its resolution [2650 \(2022\)](#), the Security Council recalled paragraph 15 of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), according to which all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using flag vessels or aircraft, the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to any entity or individual in Lebanon other than those authorized by the Government of Lebanon or the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The United Nations continued to engage with Member States on allegations of weapons transfers and efforts to address such violations of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).
 2. It is stipulated in paragraph 15 of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, among others, the sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon of arms and related materiel of all types. During the reporting period, no new information was shared with the Secretariat in this regard.
 3. The United Nations remains committed to supporting overall compliance by the parties with resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) in all its provisions and to advancing its implementation. This applies to the implementation of the arms embargo under paragraph 15 of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and any decision that would be adopted by the Security Council in this regard. I look forward to continued dialogue with the Council and its members on furthering our joint goal of the full implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).
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