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India: Databases, including the tenant registration (or tenant verification) system, the Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems (CCTNS), and POLNET; police access to these databases and their ability to track individuals; cases of individuals being tracked by the police using these databases; surveillance by state authorities; socio-economic profiles of Bengaluru, Chennai, Delhi, Hyderabad, Kolkata, Ludhiana, and Mumbai (2020–May 2022) [IND201036.E]

Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

This Response to Information Request replaces the following Responses to Information Requests: IND105494 of May 2016, IND106101 of May 2018, IND106120 of June 2018, IND106289 of May 2019, and IND200626 of May 2021.

1. Communication and Information Sharing Between Police Offices Across States and Union Territories (UTs)

In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a lawyer with the Delhi High Court stated that police departments typically communicate with one another through the use of wireless messaging, such as text messaging and email, and in "urgent cases, phone or fax is used" (Lawyer 10 Apr. 2016). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, an assistant professor with the Centre for Criminology and Sociolegal Studies at the University of Toronto, who has conducted research on policing in India, stated that communication methods such as fax, phone, email and databases "may be used to varying degrees by various departments," however, to her knowledge, "there is little inter-state police communication except for cases of major crimes like smuggling, terrorism, and some high profile organised crime" (Assistant Professor 14 Apr. 2016). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, an associate professor in the Department of Criminal Justice at Indiana University, whose research areas include criminal justice policy issues and the Indian police, and who has worked with India's National Crime Record Bureau (NCRB), stated that "[i]nformation about persons of interest is not recorded into the CCTNS but in classified databases" (Associate Professor 16 May 2018). According to the same source, "[p]olice surveillance databases are classified and not shared across states; concerned officers can seek information through normal official channels" (Associate Professor 16 May 2018).

In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a US-based professor of sociology, who specializes in criminology and criminal justice and program evaluation and who has written on crime and justice in India, indicated that

[s]ome tech-savvy officers and the local agencies they lead [use the CCTNS to record information on persons of interest], while others may not be familiar with the system or too set in their ways. Rather than using online resources, the latter are likely to contact police in cities and villages where the persons of interest may be suspected of having gone to by phone or by deputing an officer to travel there. (Professor of sociology 15 June 2018)

According to the Associate Professor, the "[t]racking of persons of interest is difficult and police have a mixed record of success" (Associate Professor 16 May 2018).

In a telephone interview with the Research Directorate, a US-based professor of political science, who specializes in the contemporary politics of South Asia and has published on India's national security, stated that

[i]f they put their minds to it, police authorities in India are able to track and locate persons of interest, depending on the heinousness of the crime and the pressure received from political authorities. For example, it is possible [for them] to locate a person of interest in cases of rape, murder or armed robbery. Social class also plays a vital role: the likelihood of prosecution is much greater if a case involves the murder of a politician's daughter versus the murder of a slum dweller. (Professor of political science 15 May 2018)

A December 2020 country information report on India by Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) states that "India does not have a centralised registration system in place to enable the police to check the whereabouts of inhabitants in their own state, let alone in any of the other states or [UTs]" (Australia 10 Dec. 2020, para. 5.39). The same source indicates that "state police do not have sophisticated online databases to track offenders; such work would be done manually" and that "[i]n general, there is a good degree of cooperation between state police services" (Australia 10 Dec. 2020, para. 5.11). Hanif Qureshi, the Inspector-General of Police in the state of Haryana, states that India does "not have any national data[b]ase of criminals or gangs against which suspects can be identified" (Qureshi 9 Jan. 2020). The same source further indicates that police systems between districts and states are not integrated, creating "[i]slands of technology" which can only communicate within a state or district (Qureshi 9 Jan. 2020). Qureshi notes, for example, that a police officer issuing a traffic ticket would not be aware of the individuals' traffic violation history in other states, and "mostly [not] even within the state" (Qureshi 9 Jan. 2020).

In contrast, in March 2022 India's Union Home and Cooperation Minister stated that 16,390 police stations nationwide "have been connected on CCTNS" (India 11 Mar. 2022). According to the 2019–2020 annual report by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), the initiative behind CCTNS is being implemented by the MHA's NCRB (India [2020], para. 14.4). An article by the *Indian Express*, an Indian English-language newspaper, reports that CCTNS was launched in 2009 "with the aim of establishing seamless connectivity among 15,000 police stations across the country" (*The Indian Express* 20 Nov. 2015). The Union Home and Cooperation Minister added that agencies including the "Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) and the National Investigation Agency (NIA) "are still not connected with it" (India 11 Mar. 2022). According to the CCTNS Pro-Active Governance and Timely Implementation (Pragati) Dashboard [1] of 1 January 2022, as of December 2021, "[n]etwork [c]onnectivity" is available at 15,919 police stations out of 16,380 police stations in India (97 percent) (India 1 Jan. 2022, 10, 15, 46). The same source states that CCTNS software has been "deployed" at all 16,380 police stations in India (100 percent) (India 1 Jan. 2022, 14). A December 2020 report on CCTNS by the NCRB indicates that a digital police portal was launched on 21 August 2017 and that this portal enables searches for a "criminal/suspect" in a national-level CCTNS database (India Dec. 2020, 15). According to the Pragati Dashboard of 1 January 2022, 94 percent of police stations are able to conduct searches in the national database (India 1 Jan. 2022, 3). Information published by the MHA in its Women Safety Division Newsletter reports that 99 percent of police stations are registering 100 percent of First Information Reports (FIRs) in CCTNS (India [June 2021], 5). For information on FIRs, including whether FIRs are entered in CCTNS, see Response to Information Request IND200628 of June 2021.

According to the Pragati Dashboard of 1 January 2022, in 2021 a total of 6,334,562 FIRs were registered using CCTNS software (India 1 Jan. 2022, 14). The same source adds, however, that the total number of logins for the Cri-MAC (Crime Multi-Agency Centre) application on CCTNS, which includes information on "[r]ecently occurred important crimes" such as "[m]ajor [h]einous [c]rimes" and on "[n]otorious [c]riminals ([a]rrest/[w]anted)" (India Dec. 2020, 51), was 54,900 since the

launch of the service (India 1 Jan. 2022, 60). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, the Executive Director of the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) and the Institute for Conflict Management (ICM) [2] observed that the number of Cri-MAC logins is low when compared to the number of FIRs registered (Executive Director 6 May 2022).

The SATP Executive Director stated that according to available data the current status of Indian police authorities' ability to track individual citizens across different cities or states using police databases is "mixed" (Executive Director 6 May 2022). The same source added that "the emphasis of publicly available data ... is on connectivity and compliance, not utilization," and noted that there is no available data indicating "the frequency" with which investigators access the CCTNS database, the regional distribution of police station searches on the database, or the "utility" of authorities' CCTNS access to their investigations in practice (Executive Director 6 May 2022).

The SATP Executive Director stated that available data indicates that CCTNS software is being used increasingly in the filing of FIRs (Executive Director 6 May 2022). The same source added that a "backlog" of "complaints" registered under the CCTNS citizen portal is emerging (Executive Director 6 May 2022).

The MHA Women Safety Division Newsletter states that 1,421,000 searches have been conducted on the CCTNS National Police Database on Crime and Criminals (India [June 2021], 1). The SATP Executive Director indicated that this is a figure "suggesting a very low level of actual utilization" (Executive Director 6 May 2022).

2. Communication Mechanisms and Initiatives

2.1 CCTNS

The December 2020 NCRB report indicates that CCTNS was launched by the MHA in 2009 (India Dec. 2020, 3). A November 2015 article by the *Indian Express* reports that CCTNS was launched in 2009 and that its implementation "entailed digitisation of data related to FIRs registered, cases investigated, and chargesheets filed in all police stations, in order to develop a national database of crime and criminals" (*The Indian Express* 20 Nov. 2015). According to the MHA's annual report for 2019–2020, CCTNS was an expansion of the Common Integrated Police Application (CIPA), which aimed to "computeriz[e]" data at police stations in India; CCTNS "sought to interconnect all police stations and higher police offices for collecting and sharing information on crime and criminals on a common platform" (India [2020], para. 14.2). The same source notes that, since 2015, the scope of the CCTNS project was extended beyond establishing a national database of crime and criminal records to [the] establishment of [an] Inter- Operable Criminal Justice System (ICJS) by integrating data from prisons, courts, prosecution, forensics, police and fingerprints. (India [2020], para. 14.5)

In a 2015 article, *India Today*, a news magazine, reported that "CCTNS had its origins" in POLNET [3] (*India Today* 25 Nov. 2015). According to the source, POLNET "never took off" (*India Today* 25 Nov. 2015). According to sources, the initial deadline for completing the CCTNS project was 2012, which was then extended to 2015 (*The Indian Express* 20 Nov. 2015; *India Today* 25 Nov. 2015; *Governance Now* 18 Jan. 2016).

2.1.1 Capacity to Track Persons Through CCTNS

The December 2020 NCRB report notes that while CCTNS is a "centrally developed software" and has been introduced across India, there is "considerable" difference in versions and structure across states, particularly in "advanced" states [4], such as Gujarat, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, and Tamil Nadu (India Dec. 2020, 36). The SATP Executive Director stated that "[s]ome states," including Bihar, are "lagging" in terms of their police stations registering FIRs on CCTNS (Executive

Director 6 May 2022). In a follow-up correspondence with the Research Directorate, the professor of political science provided the following information regarding the recording of FIRs in the CCTNS. FIRs are supposed to be recorded in the CCTNS. Whether and how they are actually recorded depends on the professionalism of the police station and its capacity, which can vary from state to state. There is great disparity between the efficiency of police stations from state to state, for example, between Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh – the latter state includes parts that are poorly governed. While all police stations in India are supposed to be equipped with computers, this is not always the case. There are days when the electricity is gone, which prevents the recording of complaints in the electronic database. As such, across India, FIRs are not entered systematically or uniformly into the CCTNS. (Professor of political science 16 May 2018)

Likewise, the professor of sociology stated that

the overall goal of the CCTNS [is for all FIRs across India to be recorded in the CCTNS]. However, it is highly idiosyncratic as to what actually gets done. ... Thus, there is no systematic way to figure out which crimes are likely to be transferred to the CCTNS and which are not. (Professor of sociology 15 June 2018)

The Pragati Dashboard of 1 January 2022 indicates that 69 percent of "the [t]echnical [s]etup for handling CCTNS" is in place, 85 percent of data from police stations across India is synchronized with CCTNS data "on [the] same day/immediately" and 88 percent is synchronized within seven days (India 1 Jan. 2022, 2, 29). The same source notes that 93 percent of "[l]egacy [d]ata [m]igration" has been completed (India 1 Jan. 2022, 2). The same source also states that photographs of 62 percent of arrested/missing persons have been entered into CCTNS (India 1 Jan. 2022, 3). According to the same source, CCTNS is now "live" in 32 states/UTs and "partially live" in 2 states/UTs, while Bihar and West Bengal have not yet declared a "[g]o-live date" (India 1 Jan. 2022, 3).

According to Qureshi, CCTNS is available only through desktop computers, not through mobile platforms, except for "a few exceptions in some states" (Qureshi 9 Jan. 2020). A 2019 joint report on policing in India by Common Cause [5] and the Lokniti Programme for Comparative Democracy (Lokniti) at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) [6] indicates that, according to a survey conducted among "close to" 12,000 police "personnel of all ranks," across 21 Indian states and various social groups, 68 percent of police reported that they "[a]lways" have access to a working computer at their workplace and 55 percent reported that they "[a]lways" have access to functioning CCTNS software (Common Cause and Lokniti 2019, 12, 44, 70–71). The same source further notes that the states which report the most access to functioning CCTNS are Chhattisgarh, Telangana and Punjab, while Bihar, West Bengal, and Assam report the lowest access to functioning CCTNS at the workplace (Common Cause and Lokniti 2019, 71). A September 2020 article by the *Indian Express* reports that CCTNS was not "effective" in linking all police stations in Maharashtra state and that, according to an official from the MHA, police stations were not able to view pending cases from other police stations "due to some technical issues" (*The Indian Express* 22 Sept. 2020).

The MHA annual report indicates the ICJS system can be used to search for an "accused" individual in police, prison, and court databases (India [2020], para. 14.5). The same source notes that ICJS "is being actively implemented in all the States/UTs" (India [2020], para. 14.5).

The MHA Women Safety Division Newsletter states that "a unique WebApp UNIFY" uses a "[m]achine learning model" to allow police to search photographs of missing persons, criminals, and unidentified bodies of the deceased against CCTNS's national photograph repository (India [June 2021], 5).

2.1.2 CCTNS State-Level Function and Deployment

Sources indicate that CCTNS is separated into central and state components (*Governance Now* 23 June 2018; *Express Computer* Feb. 2016). The central component is responsible for hosting data from

across the country in a National Data Centre (NDC) and providing a Core Application Software (CAS) for capturing data (*Governance Now* 23 June 2018; *Express Computer* Feb. 2016), which allows for a searchable national database (*Governance Now* 23 June 2018). According to a February 2016 article in *Express Computer* magazine [7], each state or UT has its own data centre, called the State Data Centre (SDC), to which its police stations are connected; in turn, data from the SDCs is uploaded to the NDC (*Express Computer* Feb. 2016). In May 2021 correspondence with the Research Directorate, the Executive Director similarly stated that each state or UT has its own CAS, known as "CAS (State)" and further noted that "CAS (Centre) is maintained by the NCRB as the national database" and is used to facilitate information exchange among states/UTs and between states/UTs and the central government (Executive Director 11 May 2021). An MHA memorandum dated 30 November 2015 and issued to all states and UTs indicates that, per "guidelines," all states/UTs "need to share data" with the NDC and that "[o]nly" those that do so will be able to access the national database and "related reports"; this enables "real time" searches and queries of national crime data (India 30 Nov. 2015).

The December 2020 NCRB report notes that the purpose of CAS (Centre) is to maintain "a national database of crimes, criminals and other information collated from the [s]tates across the country and provide reporting and analysis on the data to various stakeholders" (India Dec. 2020, 28). The same source indicates that CAS search is "now available" at the police station level in India and that different search parameters are available for persons of interest, including age, height, and physical features (India Dec. 2020, 6). The December 2020 NCRB report notes that police stations and law enforcement agencies can search "[d]etails of any case registered across India," starting with the FIR (India Dec. 2020, 62).

2.1.3 Information Captured on CCTNS

The SATP Executive Director stated that the CCTNS portal allows "authorized investigators" to view the "complete record history of any criminal from anywhere across the country" (Executive Director 6 May 2022). A 2016 *Times of India* article indicates that all police stations in Maharashtra state were ordered to transition from manual station diaries to digital station diaries by 1 January 2016 and adds that station diaries are a record of all FIRs registered at a particular police station (*The Times of India* 2 Jan. 2016). The article notes that the online system for recording digital station diaries will include "the details of the crimes, accused arrested [*sic*], court proceedings and other details," and will "develop real-time updates" for officers to "keep a watch on the developments related to a crime" (*The Times of India* 2 Jan. 2016). According to a report presented to India's Parliament by the Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, the MHA informed the committee that FIRs are being registered "100% electronically" in 16,074 police stations nationwide (India 10 Feb. 2022, para. 3.19.2).

According to the SATP Executive Director, the CCTNS portal provides authorities with a "Google-type advance search engine" which they can use to "generate analytical reports" (Executive Director 6 May 2022). The same source added that state police organizations as well as investigative agencies including the CBI, the Intelligence Bureau [IB], the Directorate of Enforcement, and the National Investigation Agency can use the Digital Police portal to access a national database of crime and criminals, which contains 11 search categories and 44 different reports for users to search (Executive Director 6 May 2022).

A paper on "smart policing" by Shivangi Narayan, a researcher who studies digital policing in India (Narayan n.d.), states that the CCTNS records data from FIRs and the "'daily diary' or the 'general diary' (an account of the daily functioning of the police station)" (Narayan 4 Sept. 2017, 2). The same source indicates that "most" crime data in police stations comes from complaints, which are not

recorded in CAS, and that "only a portion of complaints become FIRs," which are recorded in CAS (Narayan 4 Sept. 2017, 2).

An article on information sharing in the criminal justice system by Sushil Kannan, a joint assistant director of India's NCRB, published in the *NCRB Journal*, indicates that there are a total of twenty-four forms, including seven major Integrated Investigation Forms (IIF), which are used to capture information on suspects or accused persons in CCTNS (Kannan Oct. 2019, 3). The Pragati Dashboard of 1 January 2022 lists the following IIF entered into CCTNS:

- FIR, IIF 1;
- Crime Details Form, IIF 2;
- Arrest/Court Surrender Form, IIF 3;
- Property Search and Seizure Form, IIF 4;
- Final Form/Report, IIF 5;
- Court Disposal Form, IIF 6;
- Result of Appeal Form, IIF 7;
- Missing Person Registration, IIF 8;
- Unidentified Person Registration, IIF 9;
- Registration of Unidentified Dead Body, IIF 10;
- Registration of Unnatural Death, IIF 11 (India 1 Jan. 2022, 58).

The same source states that across India, 88 percent IIF 1 to IIF 6 forms and 66 percent IIF 8 to IIF 11 forms are entered into CAS (India 1 Jan. 2022, 2). Narayan states that there are inconsistencies in the statistics on the Pragati Dashboard; Narayan notes, for example, that on a 2017 Pragati Dashboard, one page indicates that 80 percent of Delhi police stations were entering information on IIF 1 to 5 on CAS and 30 percent were entering information on IIF 6 to 7, but subsequent pages on the same dashboard indicate that Delhi was entering 100 percent of information from IIF 1 to 7 (Narayan 4 Sept. 2017, 2). Blank template forms of IIF 1 to IIF 7 are available online (India n.d.a).

The website of the Punjab Police lists the following CAS forms:

- Gang Profile Form, Organized Crime Information System (OCIS) 1;
- Gang/Organization Criminal Activity Details, OCIS 2;
- Member Details Form, OCIS 3;
- General Dairy;
- Non-Cognizable Offence Information Report;
- Lost Property Registration;
- Unclaimed/Abandoned Property;
- Medico Legal Case Request Form (MLC);
- Stranger Roll Registration;
- Preventive Action Registration;
- Foreigner Registration Form;

- C-Form;
- Missing Cattle Registration (Punjab n.d.).

Blank templates of these CAS forms are available online (Punjab n.d.). Information on whether these CAS forms are entered into CCTNS could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

Regarding whether information on extrajudicial arrests would be captured in criminal databases, the Executive Director indicated that "[n]o official record of such arrests is maintained" in official criminal databases, including CCTNS (Executive Director 11 May 2021). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

The December 2020 NCRB report indicates that the following nine services are provided for users in the CCTNS citizen portal:

- Filing complaints to the concerned police station
- Obtaining the status of the complaints
- Obtaining copies of FIRs
- Accessing details of arrested persons/wanted criminals
- Accessing "[d]etails of missing/kidnapped persons and their matching with arrested"
- Accessing details of stolen/recovered vehicles, arms and other property
- Submitting requests for issue/renewal of various No Objection Certificates (NOC)
- Verifying requests for "servants," employment, passport, senior citizen registrations, etc.
- Accessing portal for sharing information and enabling citizens to download required forms (India Dec. 2020, 26–27).

2.2 Zonal Integrated Police Network (ZIPNET)

According to the lawyer, ZIPNET is being used to "share information amongst neighboring states" (10 Apr. 2016). According to the ZIPNET website, the project was introduced in 2004 in order to "share crime and criminal information in real-time" and provide "search engines to match information from [the] central repository in [an] online environment" (India n.d.b). The same source states that the project began with the Delhi, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan police, followed by Punjab, Chandigarh and Utrakhnad police in 2008, and then the Himachal Pradesh police in 2012 (India n.d.b). According to the website, ZIPNET contains the following information for the public and the police:

1. FIR (Heinous Cases: Murder, Dacoity [gang robbery], Robbery & Snatching)
2. Arrested Persons (Heinous Cases: Murder, Dacoity, Robbery & Snatching)
3. Most Wanted Criminals
4. Missing Children
5. Children Found
6. Missing Person (including action taken module for authenticated Users Only)
7. Un-identified Dead Bodies

8. Un-identified Person Found (Unconscious, Minor, Abandoned, Mentally Disturbed)
9. Stolen Vehicles
10. Unclaimed/Seized Vehicles
11. Missing/Stolen Mobiles
12. Police Alerts
13. Daily Police Bulletin (Authenticated Users Only)
14. Jail Releases (Authenticated Users Only)
15. Bail Out (Authenticated Users Only)
16. Press Releases (Authenticated Users Only)
17. Messaging (Authenticated Users Only). (India n.d.b)

Information on the use and effectiveness of ZIPNET could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

2.3 National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID)

According to a 2016 article by *Governance Now*, a "fortnightly print magazine" that provides analysis of governance and institutions in India (*Governance Now* n.d.), under the NATGRID program, the "home ministry [Ministry of Home Affairs] wanted to link 81 databases," including those of "10 law enforcement agencies ... user agencies, and that of 22 provider agencies, including banks, telecoms and internet service providers, railways, airlines and future databases" (*Governance Now* 18 Jan. 2016). The *Indian Express* similarly reports that the project entails combining 21 sensitive databases relating to domains such as banks, credit cards, cellphone usage, immigration records, motor vehicle registrations, Income-Tax records and NCRB into a single database for access by authorised officers from 10 central agencies. (*The Indian Express* 20 Nov. 2015)

According to an article by Asian News International (ANI), a news agency in India, a report tabled in Parliament in March 2022 by the Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs indicates that "procedural delays are hampering the progress of NATGRID," and that the "operationalisation of NATGRID" has not yet occurred (ANI 19 Mar. 2022). An article by Press Trust of India (PTI), a New Delhi-based Indian news agency, indicates that the Indian government is "expected to launch" NATGRID "soon" (PTI 12 Sept. 2021). According to sources, the implementation of the NATGRID program has been stalled for several years (*The Indian Express* 20 Nov. 2015; *India Today* 25 Nov. 2015). The 2016 article by *Governance Now* similarly states that the NATGRID project has "not been rolled out" and cites a government official who is associated with the project as stating that the "project exists only on paper" (*Governance Now* 18 Jan. 2016). Further information on the implementation of the NATGRID program could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

Information on the ability of police to locate an individual specifically through the use of registration and security checks could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

3. Use of Surveillance Technology

In a 2021 report on India, Freedom House states that "in certain situations" the state's surveillance of online content and activity "infringes" on user privacy rights, and adds that the government's surveillance apparatus is "becoming more sophisticated" (Freedom House 21 Sept. 2021, Sec. C5). According to a September 2013 article in the *Hindu*, a daily newspaper, "the Internet activities of India's roughly 160 million users are ... subjected to wide-ranging surveillance and monitoring" (*The Hindu* 8 Sept. 2013). According to a 2014 report co-produced by the Software Freedom Law Centre (SFLC) [8] and the World Wide Web Foundation (Web Foundation) [9], "Indian citizens are routinely and discreetly subjected to Government surveillance on a ... staggering scale" (SFLC and Web Foundation Sept. 2014, 2). According to the same source, an application filed by SFLC "under the Right to Information Act, revealed that on an average, around 7500 – 9000 telephone interception orders are issued by the Central government alone each month" (SFLC and Web Foundation Sept. 2014, 2).

In an article published in the *Wire*, an online Indian news publication, Prashant Reddy T., "an assistant professor at the National Academy for Legal Studies and Research (NALSAR), Hyderabad," indicates that "metadata[,] such as location data or IP [Internet Protocol] addresses[,] have been used as a form of surveillance by police in India (The Wire 2 Jan. 2018). The same source provides the example that "the police can determine the location of a person by asking the telecom service provider [TSP] to triangulate the location of the mobile phone using cell phone towers or by securing details of the [IP] of an email account" (The Wire 2 Jan. 2018). According to Scroll.in, an Indian online news source, "[c]all data or phone records compris[ing] information held by mobile phone companies with details of the numbers called, the duration of the calls and their frequency" are accessible to police authorities with the sanction of [Deputy Commissioner Police (DCP)]-level officers for the "purposes of criminal investigation" (Scroll.in 11 Apr. 2018).

In 2013, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that "[i]n recent years, authorities have repeatedly used the Information Technology Act to arrest people for posting comments on social media that are critical of the government" (HRW 7 June 2013). In March 2014, Reporters Without Borders (Reporters sans frontières, RSF) stated that "[w]ith the CMS [Central Monitoring System] fairly recently established, only a handful of cases have come to light in which web users have been prosecuted based on ... surveillance" (RSF 10 Mar. 2014). According to sources, in November 2012 two women were arrested for posts on Facebook critiquing a citywide shutdown due to the death of a prominent politician (RSF 10 Mar. 2014; HRW 7 June 2013; BBC 20 Nov. 2012).

3.1 Lawful Interception and Monitoring (LIM) Systems

According to the SFLC and Web Foundation report, LIM systems are "a generic term" used to describe "any surveillance system sanctioned by law" (SFLC and Web Foundation Sept. 2014, 2). The same source states that "a number" of LIM systems have been "installed into India's telephone and Internet networks," which exposes "phone calls, texts, emails and general Internet activity" to government surveillance, in real-time (SFLC and Web Foundation Sept. 2014, 2). The September 2013 article by the *Hindu* similarly states that LIMs monitor "internet traffic, emails, web-browsing, Skype and any other Internet activity of Indian users" (*The Hindu* 8 Sept. 2013). In June 2013, the same source reported that at the state level, there are approximately 200 LIM systems (*The Hindu* 21 June 2013).

In its June 2013 article, the *Hindu* reports that the following agencies "are authorized to intercept and monitor citizens' calls and emails":

the [IB]... the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) ... the [CBI], the [NCB], DRI [Directorate of Revenue Intelligence], National Intelligence Agency, CBDT [Central Board of District Taxes], Military Intelligence of Assam and JK [Jammu and Kashmir] and Home Ministry. (*The Hindu* 21 June 2013)

3.2 Central Monitoring System (CMS)

According to sources, the CMS program will give centralized access to telecommunications networks and monitor phone calls, text messages and Internet use (HRW 7 June 2013; US 13 Apr. 2016; *The Hindu* 21 June 2013) as well as provide capability to identify a user's physical location (*The Hindu* 21 June 2013; US 13 Apr. 2016). According to *S.O. 6227(E)*, an order issued by the Cyber and Information Security Division of the MHA on 20 December 2018, the following security and intelligence agencies are authorized "for the purposes of interception, monitoring and decryption of any information generated, transmitted, received or stored in any computer resource":

- IB;
- NCB;
- Directorate of Enforcement;
- CBDT;
- DRI;
- CBI;
- National Investigation Agency;
- Cabinet Secretariat (RAW);
- Directorate of Signal Intelligence ("[f]or service areas of Jammu & Kashmir, North-East and Assam only");
- Commissioner of Police, Delhi (India 2018).

In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a representative of the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), a non-profit organization based in Bengaluru and Delhi that conducts research on "internet and digital technologies from policy and academic perspectives" (CIS n.d.), stated that the CMS is a

Central Government project to intercept communications, both voice and data, that is transmitted via telephones and the Internet to, from and within India. ... It must be clearly understood that no public documentation exists to explain the scope, functions and technical architecture of the CMS.

...

From what we understand from publicly available information, prior to the CMS, all service providers in India were required to have Lawful Interception Systems installed at their premises in order to carry out targeted surveillance of individuals by monitoring communications running through their networks. However, in the CMS era, all TSPs in India are required to integrate Interception Store and Forward (ISF) servers with their pre-existing Lawful Interception Systems. Once ISF servers are installed on the premises of TSPs in India and integrated with Lawful Interception Systems, they are then connected to the RMCs [regional monitoring centres] of the CMS. Each RMC in India is connected to the CMS. In short, the CMS involves the collection and storage of data intercepted by TSPs in central and regional databases.

In other words, all data intercepted by TSPs is automatically transmitted to RMCs, and subsequently automatically transmitted to the CMS. This means that not only [does] the CMS authority have centralized access to all data intercepted by TSPs all over India, but the authority can also bypass service providers in gaining such access. This is due to the fact that, unlike in the case of so-called "lawful interception" where the nodal officers of TSPs are notified about interception requests, the

CMS allows for data to be automatically transmitted to its data centre, without the involvement of TSPs. (CIS 14 June 2018)

According to the SFLC and Web Foundation report, the CMS is not "a surveillance system *per se*, since the ... interception and monitoring of communications will be carried about by the pre-existing framework of LIM systems" (SFLC and Web Foundation Sept. 2014, 25). The same source states that the CMS will automatically access the information that has "already been intercepted by the LIM system" and will have "central and regional databases that will store intercepted data," and provide access to authorized users of the CMS (SFLC and Web Foundation Sept. 2014, 25). According to the report, users will "no longer need to approach telecom/internet service providers on a case-by-case basis to retrieve intercepted information" (SFLC and Web Foundation Sept. 2014, 25).

3.2.1 CMS Implementation

In 2013, HRW reported that in April of that year, the Indian government began implementing the CMS (HRW 7 June 2013). According to the 2013 article in the *Hindu*, "only Delhi and Haryana have tested 'proof of concept' (POC) [10] successfully" and "Kerala, Karnataka and Kolkata are the next three destinations for CMS's implementation" (*The Hindu* 21 June 2013). According to a 2019 article by PTI, CMS's "hub" is situated in Delhi, and 21 RMCs are "operational" in India's 22 "telecom circles" (PTI 4 July 2019). Freedom House, in their 2015 *Freedom on the Net* report for India, states that "[n]ews reports indicate that the government is continuing to develop the [CMS], its ambitious nationwide mass surveillance program directed at monitoring individuals' digital communications" (Freedom House 2015, 2). The same source further states that in early 2014, a "minister told parliament ... that [CMS] is being phased in over the next three years," and in 2015, "parliament was informed that New Delhi and Karnataka have been chosen for the initial phase" (Freedom House 2015, 25). According to the US Department of State's *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021* for India, the CMS program "continued to allow governmental agencies to monitor electronic communications in real time without informing the subject or a judge" (US 12 Apr. 2022, 31). Further information on the implementation of the CMS program could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

4. Relationship Between Aadhaar and Police Databases

According to the SATP Executive Director, the *Aadhaar Act* "disallow[s]" the "linking" of CCTNS with the Aadhaar [national ID number] database, thereby "limiting" the authorities' ability to "track offenders," especially in cases of first offences (Executive Director 6 May 2022).

For information on the Aadhaar number, its uses, the relationship between Aadhaar and police databases, and whether authorities use Aadhaar registration to track individuals, see Response to Information Request IND200627 of May 2021.

5. Tenant Verification

According to a 2018 investigative report by *India Today*, an English-language news magazine, on tenant registration in Delhi, tenant verification aims to "detect criminal background, if any, and maintain a database on people living" in a particular area (*India Today* 8 Aug. 2018). Quoting a Delhi police officer, a 2019 article by the New Delhi-based *Millennium Post* similarly reports that "[t]hrough [p]olice [v]erification, the history of any tenant can be verified whether the person had any criminal involvement or absconding from other states[]" police" (*Millennium Post* 28 Mar. 2019). Sources describe tenant registration [or verification] as "mandatory" (*India Today* 8 Aug. 2018; *Millennium Post* 28 Mar. 2019). The SATP Executive Director stated that the tenant registration system is not applied uniformly nationwide and noted that Uttarakhand includes its tenant registration system as part of its CCTNS system, whereas Haryana has its own citizens' portal called

Har Samay which offers "33 citizen-centric services" (Executive Director 6 May 2022). The same source added that variations of this sort exist in other states as well (Executive Director 6 May 2022). Sections 5.3 to 5.7 of this Response provide information on tenant verification in some of India's major cities.

5.1 Police Verification of Tenant Information

According to the *Indian Express*,

[a] police verification is done whenever a property, commercial or otherwise, is rented out. A form is filled by both the owner and tenant, and has details like name, photograph and residential address of both. It also has copies of proof of identity and residence of both.

The police goes through the documents and checks the background of the tenant. They then sign and declare the property verified. (*The Indian Express* 11 Dec. 2017)

Sources report on the ability of police verification of tenants across various states of India as follows:

- According to *The Hans India*, an English-language newspaper published across Telangana and Andhra Pradesh, the tenant verification programme exists in Karimnagar, New Delhi, Gurgaon, Kolkata, Mumbai, Pune, Bengaluru, Chennai, Thane, Jammu and Kashmir, and Punjab (*The Hans India* 7 June 2017).
- According to *The Tribune*, a daily Indian newspaper, the "Patiala police have started a special tenant verification drive" (*The Tribune* 23 Aug. 2017). According to the same source, the district police [of Patiala] have conducted surveys of over 200 ... houses" and warned the owners of consequences if they did not register their tenants (*The Tribune* 23 Aug. 2017). The same source explained that

the Patiala Deputy Commissioner-cum-District Magistrate had passed written orders for verification of tenants from outside the district at the nearest police station within 15 days. However, implementation of the order has remained ineffective. Following this, the police ... decided to check all such houses housing tenants without informing the authorities. (*The Tribune* 23 Aug. 2017)

- According to *The Hindu*, the Cyberabad police have put in place a tenant verification system (*The Hindu* 21 July 2015).
- According to *The Hindu*, police in Hyderabad have asked "house owners to register their tenants through the Hawk Eye App" (*The Hindu* 21 July 2015). According to sources, the Hawk Eye App is a mobile app launched by the Hyderabad police (*The Hindu* 11 Jan. 2017; Hyderabad n.d.) that has approximately 3.5 million users (*The Hindu* 11 Jan. 2017). According to the website of the Hyderabad police, one of the features of the Hawk Eye App is the registration of tenants with the police (Hyderabad n.d.). According to *The Hindu*, "[t]he App has [the] facility to upload the photographs and other details of the tenant. Once the details are uploaded[,] they form part of a database of the city police and can be checked at any point of time" (*The Hindu* 21 July 2015).

The *Indian Express* cites a Navi Mumbai Police Commissioner as stating that "it is impossible for the police to actually verify the identity of all those who rent property" in Navi Mumbai and that "the police force is not equipped to personally go and check all new tenants" (*The Indian Express* 11 Dec. 2017). The *Indian Express* cites the same Navi Mumbai Police Commissioner as stating that the police does not "have enough men to do thorough checks on each verification form that comes to [them]. [They] can ensure checks against fake documents by asking for multiple documents proof,

but that's about it" (*The Indian Express* 11 Dec. 2017). The *Indian Express* cites a lawyer as stating that the entire process of tenant verification "has several loopholes" and cites him as stating that "police verification, in theory, is meant to ensure that if a criminal or terrorist is seeking tenancy, the police know and keep an eye. It also ensures the safety of the property owner, who can escape ... allegations of complicity in a crime, in case a crime is committed, by saying that he had informed the police. However, the cops are often unfamiliar with the rules of the tenancy act. While a stamp duty of ... 750 [Indian rupees (INR)] [approximately C\$12.50] is minimum for tenancy, sometimes the police accept a stamp paper of ... 100 [INR] [approximately C\$1.66]. They don't even do spot checks, taking the written document as the final word, which generally leads to discrepancies." (*The Indian Express* 11 Dec. 2017)

The *Indian Express* cites the same lawyer as explaining that the "police force is just ill-equipped and short-staffed to actually carry out such verifications when they get over 50 forms daily" (*The Indian Express* 11 Dec. 2017). In another correspondence, the Associate Professor stated that "[i]nformation about tenants is very limited and Delhi/Mumbai and a few other metropolises have intermittently tried to develop a database and verify the information. To the best of [his] knowledge, this is very inadequate and not updated regularly" (Associate Professor 18 Apr. 2018).

Section 3.9.1 of a "Citizen User Manual" for the CCTNS, produced by Wipro, a Bengaluru-based IT company (Wipro n.d.a), and submitted to the NCRB of the MHA, provides instructions and screenshots of the tenant verification process within the CCTNS program; Section 3.9.1 of this manual is available online (Wipro n.d.b).

5.2 Relationship Between Police Databases and Tenant Verification

The Executive Director noted that one of the stated uses of CCTNS is the verification of tenants and that CCTNS is used for this purpose "but utilization varies widely between states" (Executive Director 11 May 2021). *India Today*, an India-based weekly magazine (The India Today Group n.d.), quotes LN Rao, a former deputy commissioner of police in Delhi, as stating that tenant verification is "done only for the psychological satisfaction, not for actual background check ... the cops don't make any effort to follow up with the concerned police station of other states" (*India Today* 8 Aug. 2018). A July 2019 *Indian Express* article explains that in Chandigarh, after the police receive tenant verification forms, the forms are sent to the district police superintendents for "the authentication of names, addresses, criminal background[,] etc." (*The Indian Express* 23 July 2019). An anonymous Station House Officer (SHO) [11] cited in the same source indicated that the "Information Sheets" are sent directly to "area SHOs" in cases where a police station's name and "jurisdiction" are mentioned, adding that "[i]t is a lengthy process" (*The Indian Express* 23 July 2019). The SHO notes that neighbouring states, such as Haryana, Punjab, Himachal and "even" New Delhi, often reply "shortly" on the back of the Information Sheet but that there is a "long" wait for a response from "faraway states," such as UP [Uttar Pradesh], Bihar and West Bengal (*The Indian Express* 23 July 2019). Further and corroborating information on the use of police databases during tenant verification could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

5.3 Tenant Registration Requirements in Bengaluru

Sources report that there are landlords in Bengaluru who require potential tenants to show their Aadhaar card (*Bangalore Mirror* 11 May 2017; Asianet News Online 10 May 2017) in order to "process rental agreements" (*Bangalore Mirror* 11 May 2017). In March 2019, Citizen Matters, an independent news site funded by the Oorvani foundation, "a non-profit trust that works on open knowledge platforms for civic engagement and community revitalisation" (Citizen Matters n.d.), reported that the police launched a drive to

"document" residents living in apartment complexes across the city. ... [A]partment owners' associations have been asked to provide full details of their residents and safety and surveillance assets, as part of the police's "[p]reventive [s]ecurity [m]easures." (Citizen Matters 21 Mar. 2019)

The same source further reports that the General Secretary of Bangalore Apartments' Federation (BAF) stated that apartment associations have neither the "obligation nor the authority to share tenant or owner information with anybody else" and, if such information is required, police must ask the individuals involved to provide it, rather than the apartment association (Citizen Matters 21 Mar. 2019). Further information on the requirements and procedures for tenant verification in Bengaluru could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

5.4 Tenant Registration Requirements in Delhi

Sources describe tenant registration in Delhi as mandatory (*India Today* 8 Aug. 2018; *Millennium Post* 28 Mar. 2019). Further information on the requirements and procedures for tenant verification in Delhi could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

According to the *India Today* article,

Delhi Police spokesperson Madhur Verma said, "[a]ll verification forms of the applicant are sent to his/her concerned police station (from where he/she belongs) to check for any criminal background or get a character certificate. In almost all cases, the police of other states fail to even give any revert on the case." (*India Today* 8 Aug. 2018)

The same article further reports that

Mail Today [a Delhi-based newspaper] visited about 25 police stations in Delhi and Noida to check on the verification process.

In most police stations, the verification forms were found dumped, gathering dust with no action being taken to complete the procedure. (*India Today* 8 Aug. 2018)

Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

The 2019 *Millennium Post* article reports that

[f]or the safety of any city, tenant verification is very important but there are landlords who ignore the rule ...

In Delhi itself, there are 1,137 cases of violation found during verification of tenants. Sources told *Millennium Post* that till February 24 [2019], as many as 65,163 tenants were checked and more than 26,000 tenants were verified and 20,198 forms filled [out] for verification. In many cases, the landlords violated the rules. (*Millennium Post* 28 Mar. 2019, italics added)

According to sources, police in Delhi have charged (Citizen Matters 21 Mar. 2019) or convicted landlords that have not completed tenant verification (PTI 18 Sept. 2018; *The Hindu* 3 July 2014).

In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a PhD research scholar at the Centre for Study of Social Systems, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi stated that

[t]enant registration is currently compulsory in Delhi and every tenant needs to be verified [by] the police. ... [T]he tenant needs to sign an agreement on a notarized certificate with the landlord in the presence of two witnesses. After police verification, they are allowed to lease and move into the premises. (Research scholar 2 May 2018)

The same source explained that "[w]hile it is compulsory that tenants be verified by the police before they move in the premises, this is not always the case" (Research scholar 2 May 2018). PTI cites a police officer as stating that "Delhi's south-west district police have registered 46 FIRs against landlords, who failed to comply with tenant verification rules" in January 2018 (PTI 23 Jan. 2018).

The same source cites the police officer as further stating that tenant verification is "'a must, especially in the capital'" (PTI 23 Jan. 2018).

5.5 Tenant Registration Requirements in Kolkata

A 2016 article by the *Times of India* reports that, according to top police officials, "all landlords will have to submit forms filled with details of their tenants to the nearest police station" and non-compliance may result in jail time (*The Times of India* 25 June 2016). According to the same article, a similar directive had been given in the past, however, the Kolkata police lacked the resources to enforce it (*The Times of India* 25 June 2016). The website of the Kolkata Police provides a "Residential Tenants Profile Form"; a copy of the form is attached to this Response. Further and corroborating information on the requirements and procedures for tenant verification in Kolkata could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

5.6 Tenant Registration Requirements in Mumbai

According to an article on the website of the Mumbai-based Shreeyansh Legal, a law firm whose areas of practice include property law (Shreeyansh Legal n.d.), the tenant verification form is available both online and at police stations; the form is filled out with "information of [the] owner and tenant," attached to a copy of the "registered leave and license agreement," and submitted to the police station (Shreeyansh Legal 23 May 2018). Further information on the requirements and procedures for tenant verification in Mumbai could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

5.7 Tenant Registration Requirements in Chennai, Hyderabad, and Ludhiana

Information on tenant registration requirements in Chennai, Hyderabad, or Ludhiana could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

6. Socio-Economic Profiles, Including Population, Demographics and Economy

6.1 Bengaluru

The city of Bengaluru is located in the state of Karnataka (India [2011]a), of which it is the capital (WorldAtlas 25 Apr. 2017; *India Today* 2011, 75). According to sources, Bengaluru was formerly known as Bangalore (BBC 31 Oct. 2014; *The Times of India* 1 Nov. 2014). According to provisional reports from India's census, the population of Bengaluru was 8,443,675 as of 2011 [12] (India [2011]a). Other sources report that Bengaluru has a population of 10.5 million people (World Economic Forum 5 Oct. 2016) or 10.6 million people (WorldAtlas 25 Apr. 2017) or 11.5 million people (PRI 6 May 2016).

According to the book *India Today. An Encyclopedia of Life in the Republic*, Bengaluru is a "demographically diverse city" (*India Today* 2011, 75). Information on the ethnic composition of Bengaluru could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

According to provisional reports from India's 2011 census, 78.87 percent of Bengaluru's population is Hindu, while 13.9 percent is Muslim, 5.61 percent is Christian, 0.97 percent follows Jainism, 0.15 percent is Sikh, 0.15 percent is Buddhist, 0.01 percent follows another unspecified religion, and 0.44 percent follows no particular religion (India [2011]a). Sources indicate that the languages spoken in Bengaluru include the following: Kannada (WorldAtlas 25 Apr. 2017; BBC 31 Oct. 2014; *India Today* 2011, 75), Hindi, English, Telugu (WorldAtlas 25 Apr. 2017; *India Today* 2011, 75), Urdu, Tamil (*India Today* 2011, 75), Konkani and Malayalam (WorldAtlas 25 Apr. 2017).

India Today states that Bengaluru is "the fastest growing major metropolis in India" and that it is a "major economic and cultural hub" (*India Today* 2011, 75). Other sources indicate that Bengaluru is referred to as "India's Silicon Valley" (BBC 21 Oct. 2014; PRI 6 May 2016; World Economic Forum 5 Oct. 2016). Information on employment rates in Bengaluru could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

6.2 Chennai

The city of Chennai is the capital of the Tamil Nadu state (India [2011]b; *India Today* 2011, 679). According to the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs, Chennai is "India's fourth largest city, by economy and population" (India n.d.c). According to provisional reports from India's census, the population of Chennai was 4,646,732 as of 2011 (India [2011]b). Other sources indicate that Chennai has a population of 7 million people (WorldAtlas 25 Apr. 2017) or 10.2 million people (World Economic Forum 5 Oct. 2016).

According to provisional reports of India's 2011 census, 80.73 percent of Chennai's population is Hindu, while 9.45 percent is Muslim, 7.72 percent is Christian, 1.11 percent follows Jainism, 0.06 percent is Sikh, 0.06 percent is Buddhist and 0.04 percent follows another unspecified religion (India [2011]b).

According to *India Today*, Chennai is the "center of a vibrant cultural life based around Tamil culture and language" (*India Today* 2011, 680). Sources indicate that Chennai is a demographically diverse city (Yatra n.d.a; *The Hindu* 19 Dec. 2011), that is "home to over 30 different communities" (*The Hindu* 19 Dec. 2011). Information on the ethnic composition of Chennai could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response. Sources indicate that while the official language of Chennai is Tamil (Yatra n.d.b; *India Today* 2011, 679), the following languages are also spoken in Chennai: English (Yatra n.d.b; *India Today* 2011, 679); Telugu and Malayalam (Yatra n.d.b).

According to the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs, Chennai has a "diverse array of economic sectors and is known for its automobile industry" and information technology sector (India n.d.c). Information on employment rates in Chennai could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

6.3 Delhi

Sources indicate that New Delhi is one of several districts that are part of the city of Delhi (*The Diplomat* 29 Sept. 2016; *India Today* 2011, 502). According to *The Diplomat*, an international affairs magazine for the Asia-Pacific region,

[t]he entire city of Delhi ... is a Union Territory under the Indian constitution, officially known as the National Capital Territory of Delhi. This region is jointly administered by a local government and the central government of India. Central government buildings are concentrated in New Delhi and the central government ... of India has paramount jurisdiction over these buildings – thus over most of New Delhi. (*The Diplomat* 29 Sept. 2016)

According to provisional reports from India's census, the population of Delhi was 11,034,555 as of 2011 (India [2011]c). According to other sources, the population of New Delhi is more than 18 million people (*India Today* 2011, 502; CNN 10 Nov. 2017). Information on the ethnic composition of Delhi could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

According to provisional reports of India's 2011 census, 80.21 percent of Delhi's population is Hindu, while 12.78 percent is Muslim, 0.96 percent is Christian, 1.39 percent follows Jainism, 4.43 percent is Sikh, 0.12 percent is Buddhist, 0.02 percent follows another unspecified religion, and 0.08 percent follows no particular religion (India [2011]c).

According to *India Today*, "[n]umerous languages are spoken in Delhi, although the predominant languages are Hindi, Punjabi, Urdu, and English" (*India Today* 2011, 502).

Information on employment rates in Delhi could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

6.4 Hyderabad

The city of Hyderabad is located in Telangana state (*Encyclopaedia Britannica* 27 Apr. 2018; Telangana n.d.). The *Encyclopaedia Britannica* explains that Hyderabad serves as the capital of both Telangana and Andhra Pradesh states and that it is "Telangana's largest and most-populous city" (*Encyclopaedia Britannica* 27 Apr. 2018).

According to provisional reports from India's census, the population of Hyderabad was 6,731,790 as of 2011 (India [2011]d). Other sources state that Hyderabad has a population of 8.4 million people (*The New Indian Express* 23 July 2017) or 9.7 million people (WorldAtlas 25 Apr. 2017). Information on the ethnic composition of Hyderabad could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

According to provisional reports of India's 2011 census, 64.93 percent of Hyderabad's population is Hindu, while 30.13 percent is Muslim, 2.75 percent is Christian, 0.29 percent follows Jainism, 0.25 percent is Sikh, 0.25 percent is Buddhist, 0.04 percent follows another unspecified religion, and 1.56 percent follows no particular religion (India [2011]d). According to *India Today*, "[s]ome 40 percent of the population [in Hyderabad] is Muslim, and the city has traditionally been the heartland of Muslim culture in the south [of India]" (*India Today* 2011, 336). According to the same source, "[t]he large number of Muslim residents in the 'Old City' of Hyderabad gives rise to communal tensions, and violence between Hindus and Muslims breaks out from time to time" (*India Today* 2011, 338). Further and corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

The same source states that "Telugu and Urdu are the principal languages spoken, although English is widely used in the city's administration and among the educated class" (*India Today* 2011, 338). According to the same source, Hyderabad is "an industrial center with notable [information technology], media and pharmaceutical companies" (*India Today* 2011, 338). Other sources indicate that Hyderabad is an information technology hub and a tourism centre (World Economic Forum 5 Oct. 2016; *Encyclopaedia Britannica* 27 Apr. 2018). Information on employment rates in Hyderabad could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

6.5 Kolkata

The city of Kolkata is the capital of West Bengal (India [2011]e; *Encyclopaedia Britannica* n.d.). Sources indicate that Kolkata was formerly known as Calcutta (Yatra n.d.c; NPR 2 Sept. 2016; *Encyclopaedia Britannica* n.d.). According to India's 2011 census, the population of the Kolkata metropolitan area is 14,035,959 people (India [2011]e). Other sources report that Kolkata has a population of 14.7 million people (WorldAtlas 25 Apr. 2017) or 15 million people (World Economic Forum 5 Oct. 2016). Information on the ethnic composition of Kolkata could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response. Sources indicate that the languages spoken in Kolkata include Bengali, English and Hindi (Yatra n.d.d; Ghosh Jan. 2005, 52).

According to sources, Kolkata is a "commerce hub" (World Economic Forum 5 Oct. 2016; *Encyclopaedia Britannica* n.d) and a city of transport and manufacturing (*Encyclopaedia Britannica* n.d.). Information on employment rates in Kolkata could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

6.6 Ludhiana

The city of Ludhiana is located in the state of Punjab (*Encyclopaedia Britannica* 5 Mar. 2018; India n.d.d) and "is the largest city in [Punjab] in terms of area and population" (India n.d.d). According to provisional reports from India's census, the population of Ludhiana was 1,618,879 as of 2011 (India [2011]f). Information on the ethnic composition of Ludhiana could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response. According to India's Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs, Ludhiana is an "important pilgrimage center for Sikhs" (India n.d.d). According to provisional reports from India's 2011 census, 65.96 percent of Ludhiana's population is Hindu, while 28.75 percent is Sikh, 2.81 percent is Muslim, 1.05 percent follows Jainism, 0.68 percent is Christian, 0.62 percent follows no particular religion, 0.11 percent is Buddhist and 0.03 percent follows another unspecified religion (India [2011]f).

Media sources report instances of targeted killings in Ludhiana (*Hindustan Times* 9 Oct. 2017; PTI 17 Oct. 2017; *The Tribune* 14 Feb. 2018), including "a series of high-profile murderous attacks on activists belonging to religious or right wing organisations" (PTI 17 Oct. 2017). For further information on targeted killings in Ludhiana, see Response to Information Request IND106097 of June 2018.

Sources indicate that Ludhiana is an industrial centre (*Encyclopaedia Britannica* 5 Mar. 2018; India n.d.d). Other sources indicate that Ludhiana is the industrial hub of Punjab state (PTI 25 Aug. 2014; *The Indian Express* 13 July 2017). Information on employment rates in Ludhiana could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

6.7 Mumbai

The city of Mumbai is located in the state of Maharashtra (India [2011]g; Yatra n.d.e). Sources indicate that Mumbai was formerly known as Bombay (Yatra n.d.e; PTI 11 Feb. 2016). According to provisional reports from India's census the population of Mumbai was 12,442,373 as of 2011, while its "urban/metropolitan" population was 18,394,912 (India [2011]g). Other sources report that Mumbai has a population of 20.8 million people (WorldAtlas 25 Apr. 2017) or 21.4 million people (World Economic Forum 5 Oct. 2016). Information on the ethnic composition of Mumbai could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response. According to provisional reports of India's 2011 census, 65.99 percent of Mumbai's population is Hindu, while 20.65 percent is Muslim, 3.27 percent is Christian, 4.10 percent follows Jainism, 0.49 percent is Sikh, 0.49 percent is Buddhist, 0.40 percent follows another unspecified religion, and 0.26 percent follows no particular religion (India [2011]g). Sources indicate that the languages spoken in Mumbai include English, Hindi (Yatra n.d.f; Forbes Travel Guide 11 Aug. 2017), Marathi, Gujarati, Tamil, Telugu, Konkani, Dangii and Varhadii (Yatra n.d.f). According to the *New York Times*, "most of the people in [Mumbai] can read English but not Marathi" (*The New York Times* 16 Feb. 2011). According to sources, Mumbai is India's financial centre (NDTV 6 May 2018; World Economic Forum 5 Oct. 2016; Yatra n.d.e). Information on employment rates in Mumbai could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

Notes

- [1] The Pro-Active Governance and Timely Implementation (Pragati) Dashboard is a monthly report on the status of Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and System (CCTNS) published by the National Crime Record Bureau (NCRB) (Common Cause and Lokniti 2019, 28).
- [2] The South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) is an online database focusing on "terrorism and low intensity warfare in South Asia" (SATP n.d.a). The SATP is a project of the New Delhi-based Institute for Conflict Management (ICM), which is a "non-profit [s]ociety" "committed to the continuous evaluation and resolution of problems of internal security in South Asia," including in India (SATP n.d.b).
- [3] Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), a company in defence electronics (BEL n.d.a) that has partnered with the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) to establish the Police Communication Network (POLNET), states on its website that POLNET is "a satellite based network that provides voice, video, data and message communication" (BEL n.d.b).
- [4] The December 2020 report by the NCRB of the MHA notes that six "[a]dvanced [s]tates," including Andhra Pradesh, Goa, Gujarat, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Telangana, opted to "adopt their own software because these [s]tates ha[d] been using their own [p]olice applications before [the] introduction of [the] CCTNS" (India Dec. 2020, 4).
- [5] Common Cause is a "registered society" seeking to "promote democracy, good governance and public policy reforms [through] advocacy [as well as] interventions by formal and informal policy engagements" (Common Cause and Lokniti 2019, 186).
- [6] The Centre for the Study of the Developing Societies (CSDS) is an India-based research institute of social sciences and humanities; the Lokniti Programme for Comparative Democracy is a CSDS research program that seeks "to engage with national and global debates on democratic politics" (Common Cause and Lokniti 2019, 186).
- [7] *Express Computer* is an Indian publication covering technology and "eGovernance" (*Express Computer* n.d.).
- [8] The Software Freedom Law Centre (SFLC) is a New Delhi-based "donor supported legal services organisation that brings together lawyers, policy analysts, technologists, and students to protect freedom in the digital world" (SFLC n.d.).
- [9] The World Wide Web Foundation (Web Foundation) is an advocacy group that works in "partnership with over 160 organisations" in order to "advance the open Web as a public good and basic right" (Web Foundation n.d.).
- [10] According to PC Magazine, a website that provides "independent reviews" of technology products (PC Magazine n.d.a), Proof of Concept (POC) is the "evidence that a product, technology or an information system is viable and capable of solving an organization's particular problem" (PC Magazine n.d.b).
- [11] Station House Officers (SHO) are authorized to register complaints and criminal cases (*The Times of India* 1 Jan. 2018).
- [12] The most recent census conducted in India occurred in 2011; the census originally planned for 2021 was postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic (India [2021]).

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