

ANGOLA (3)

29

COUNTRY ASSESSMENT ON
ANGOLA

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CONTENTS

I	SCOPE OF DOCUMENT	1.1 - 1.5
II	GEOGRAPHY	2.1 - 2.2
III	HISTORY	3.1 - 3.25
	Removals	3.26
IV	INSTRUMENTS OF THE STATE	
	Security situation	4.1 - 4.9
	The Judiciary	4.10 - 4.20
	Military Service	4.21 - 4.26
	Social Welfare	4.27 - 4.28
	Prisons	4.29
	Torture	4.30 - 4.31
	Education	4.32
	The Constitution	4.33 - 4.35
V	HUMAN RIGHTS	
	A: INTRODUCTION	5.1 - 5.2
	Human Rights Monitoring	5.3 - 5.11
	B: GENERAL ASSESSMENT	5.12 - 5.17
	C: SPECIFIC GROUPS	
	Ethnic Groups	5.18 - 5.20
	F.L.E.C./Cabindans	5.21 - 5.37
	Bakongo	5.38 - 5.46
	Women	5.47 - 5.50
	Children	5.51
	D: OTHER ISSUES	
	Freedom of Religion	5.52 - 5.55
	Freedom of Speech	5.56 - 5.60
	Media Freedom	5.61 - 5.67
	Freedom of Association	5.68 - 5.73
	Freedom of Movement	5.74 - 5.80
	Internal Flight	5.81 - 5.83
ANNEX A	Political parties	
ANNEX B	Prominent people - past and present	
ANNEX C	Tribes and languages	
ANNEX D	Chronology	
ANNEX E	Election results	
ANNEX F	Glossary	

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. SCOPE OF DOCUMENT

1.1 This assessment has been produced by the Country Information & Policy Unit, Immigration and Nationality Directorate, Home Office, from information obtained from a variety of sources.

1.2 The assessment has been prepared for background purposes for those involved in the asylum determination process. The information it contains is not exhaustive, nor is it intended to catalogue all human rights violations. It concentrates on the issues most commonly raised in asylum claims made in the United Kingdom. It represents the current assessment by the Immigration and Nationality Directorate of the general socio-political and human rights situation in the country.

1.3 The assessment is sourced throughout. It is intended to be used by caseworkers as a signpost to the source material, which has been made available to them. The vast majority of the source material is readily available in the public domain.

1.4 It is intended to revise the assessment on a 6-monthly basis while the country remains within the top 35 asylum producing countries in the United Kingdom.

1.5 The assessment will be placed on the Internet (<http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/ind/cipul.htm>). An electronic copy of the assessment has been made available to the following organisations:

Amnesty International UK
Immigration Advisory Service
Immigration Appellate Authority
Immigration Law Practitioners' Association
Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants
JUSTICE
Medical Foundation for the Victims of Torture
Refugee Council
Refugee Legal Centre
UN High Commissioner for Refugees

II. GEOGRAPHY

2.1 The Republic of Angola is situated in southern Africa on the Atlantic coast. Land borders are shared with the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), Zambia and Namibia. The enclave Cabinda Province, is separated by the estuary of the River Congo and Democratic Republic of Congo territory with the Republic of Congo lying to its north. Angola consists of 18 provinces ranging in area from 2,500 sq km to 223,000 sq km. The capital city is Luanda. The climate is tropical, locally tempered by altitude. There are two distinct seasons, wet and dry, but little seasonal variation in temperature. The coastal lowlands are hot and rainy, but temperatures are lower inland. -[13] & [31]

2.2 The 1970 national population census found there to be 5.6 million Angolans. In 1995 the official estimate was put at 11.5 million. The life expectancy is 47 years and 45% of the total population are under 15 years of age. Angola's infant mortality rate stands at 124 per 1000. A former Portuguese colony, the official language is Portuguese but various Bantu languages are widely spoken, while a small percentage of the population speak separate tongues such as Khosian. (See Annex C) [26] & [31]

III. HISTORY

A. Post - independence Historical background

3.1 Angola gained independence from Portugal on 11 November 1975 following an armed struggle against the Portuguese and internecine conflict between the liberation movements the Movimento Popular de Liberatacao de Angola (MPLA), its rival Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) and the Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (FNLA). With backing from international supporters the MPLA quickly gained control of the capital, Luanda, and established itself as the superior power and governing body of Angola, although UNITA with its own backers (and initially in concert with the FNLA) fought on. Since independence the two main opponents, MPLA and UNITA have continued a bitter conflict for control of the country. [31]

3.2 The first attempt at a peace process began in 1989 and resulted in the signing of the Bicesse peace accords in May 1991 and a ceasefire. [31]

MULTI-PARTY POLITICS AND THE 1992 ELECTIONS

3.3 Representatives of the Government and 26 political parties met in Luanda in the second half of January 1992 to discuss the transition to multi-party democracy. It was agreed that the elections would be organised on the basis of proportional representation, with the President being elected for a five year term, renewable for three years. The legislative assembly would be elected for a four year term. [31]

3.4 Some 800 foreign observers, one half of them provided by the UN monitored the voting at nearly 6,000 polling stations on 29 and 30 September 1992. They subsequently announced that the conduct of the elections had been free and fair. The results were not accepted by UNITA and sparked intense fighting in Luanda on a scale not previously seen. Thousands of people across the country are known to have lost their lives. The UN reacted by imposing sanctions on UNITA in September 1993 which in turn led to UNITA publicly accepting the results of the elections. (See Annex E for results table) [31]

LUSAKA PEACE ACCORD

3.5 Further talks led to the signing of the Lusaka Protocol of 20 November 1994 by representatives of the MPLA and UNITA which built upon the Bicesse Accords of 1991. A formal ceasefire was declared two days later. [1]

3.6 In September 1995 the Joint Commission expressed concern at continued violations of the ceasefire. However in the following month, figures issued by UNAVEM III revealed that recorded ceasefire violations had decreased by approximately 50% between July and September. (The Joint Commission replaced the former

joint political and military commission. It was chaired by the UN Secretary General's Special Representative to Angola, Maitre Beye, who was killed in a plane crash in June 1998 near Abidjan. The investigation into the accident had not been completed at the time of writing. He was replaced, in August 1998, by Issa Diallo. The Joint Commission comprises representatives from the Government, UNITA, and observers from USA, Russia and Portugal. [13] [45]

B. Economic Background

3.7 Angola is a country rich in mineral wealth and natural resources including diamonds, petroleum, and iron but as a direct consequence of the 20 year civil war, the economy has been severely mismanaged. Of its 1,246,700 sq km only 3% is cultivated as arable or permanent crop land. This is insufficient for such a huge population and Angola has been receiving food aid from international agencies since 1975. The largest source of income for the country and one which has been largely unaffected by the hostilities, is that of petroleum mining and production. In 1998, 750,000 barrels of oil per day were produced and this is expected to rise to over one million per day in the next decade. Oil and petroleum products account for about 50% of GDP and 80% of Government revenue. [1] [55] [57]

3.8 Inflation in 1995 was 3,700% rising to a peak of 12,000% in the 12 months leading to 31 August 1996. Following the introduction of new economic policies in June 1996 inflation in July 1997 was 1.35% and 6.5% for August giving a cumulative rate of 20.24% for the year or 107% if the increases in water and electricity charges of January are included. The annual rate of inflation for 1998 was estimated by the UN as 100%. The currency, the new (re-adjusted) kwanza has been devalued many times over recent years because of the hyperinflation. Most recently, the government had been devaluing the currency weekly, which they stopped in 1998 because, as a single policy measure, it proved inadequate to address the deficiencies in the economy. Since the escalation of hostilities with UNITA, it is estimated that the government revenue has dropped by 30%. [2] [3] [55]

3.9 The official rate of exchange at December 1997 was US \$1 = 253,000 Kzr. However, since July 1998, the Kwanza has lost 50% of its value against the dollar and the exchange rate now stands at a staggering US \$1 = 1,000,000 Kzr. The Economist Intelligence Unit predicts that the slide will continue and increase to US \$1 = 1,500,000 Kzr in 1999 and US \$1 = 2,500,000 Kzr in 2000. [2] [3] [62]

3.10 Serious delays in the normalisation of state administration throughout the country restricted the movement of goods and impeded a return of the population to normal life.

As a result, before the resumption of hostilities in 1998, 64% of the population were still living below the poverty line, and 21% were living in extreme poverty. In 1999, with large numbers of the population displaced and c 4 million people crowded into Luanda, the figures are much higher, and difficult to estimate with any degree of accuracy. [14] [55]

C. Recent political situation

UNAVEM III

3.11 In 1995 a UN Security Council resolution authorised the deployment of a 7,000 strong peacekeeping force, UNAVEM III to oversee implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, in particular the demobilisation of troops on both sides. It was originally envisaged that UNAVEM III would complete its tasks by February 1997, but there were substantial delays at each stage of the process and UNAVEM's mandate was extended several times.[31]

3.12 UNAVEM's main task was to supervise the implementation of the military elements of the Lusaka protocol: the withdrawal of Government troops (the FAA) to barracks; the assembly of UNITA troops in quartering areas and the collection of their weapons; the selection of 26,300 UNITA troops to join the FAA and the demobilisation of surplus troops from both sides; the dismantling of check points; the quartering of the Governments Rapid Intervention Police; and the quartering and integration of the UNITA police. [2]

3.13 On 1st July 1997 UNAVEM III was replaced by a UN Civilian Observer Mission (MONUA). UNAVEM III's infantry battalions were all scheduled to withdraw, but in view of the volatile situation, particularly in the north east provinces, the withdrawal was delayed several times. At the beginning of 1998 MONUA had a military component of 1750 men, which was reduced to about 1000 including military observers. In February 1999, when the UN announced plans to withdraw from Angola, following the complete breakdown of the peace process, it comprised 86 Military Observers, 309 Civilian Police Observers, 39 Staff Officers and 550 Troops. [2] [55]

3.14 Progress was also slow on the political aspects of the Lusaka protocol. UNITA's military tasks were officially declared completed on 13 December 1996 by the UN Secretary General's Special representative to Angola, Maitre Beye. UNITA was then able to make the transformation from a military group to a political party and UNITA deputies to the National Assembly could take their seats in Luanda. But delays concerning agreements such as the status of the UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi meant that the Government of Unity and National

Reconciliation (GURN) was not inaugurated until 11 April 1997.
[2]

3.15 The next step in the Lusaka Protocol was for the extension of State administration to those areas which were under UNITA control and for the complete demilitarisation of UNITA. UNITA moved very slowly in handing over these areas and on 30 October 1997, despite considerable eleventh hour activity in handing over arms and ammunition, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1135/97 and imposed a second package of sanctions on UNITA. A third package of UN sanctions was imposed in July 1998 to encourage UNITA to fulfil its obligations under the Lusaka Protocol. [8] & [45]

3.16 Despite UNITA's public commitment to fully implement its obligations under the peace agreement, it did not co-operate over the question of the extension of state administration and retained a well equipped armed force contrary to the demilitarisation declaration which it made on 6 March 1998. This impasse led to a deteriorating security situation which saw government forces bombing the UNITA strongholds of Andulo and Bailundo. [9] & [45]

3.17 Following the imposition of a second round of sanctions on UNITA, dialogue continued and the formal ceasefire held. A crucial step in taking the process forward was the proposed meeting of President dos Santos with the UNITA leader, Savimbi. Both parties publicly stated that they were willing to meet in the interests of the nation but throughout 1997 and 1998 no agreement was reached as to the location or date of the proposed meeting. Jonas Savimbi expressed concerns regarding his personal safety should the meeting be held in Luanda but the President was keen for Savimbi to return to the capital.
[28]

3.18 Progress was slow since sanctions were imposed. By 8th January 1998, 239 localities out of a total of 344 areas had been brought under state control. Numerous dates were agreed for the sensitive areas of Bailundo and Andulo where UNITA are located, but each deadline passed and they remained under UNITA control. [28] & [45]

3.19 At the beginning of 1998, around half the country was still under UNITA control and even though some 78,000 UNITA troops were declared to the UN peace keeping mission (MONUA) the desertion rate was high (around 25,000). Registration of 7,877 residual UNITA military personnel was concluded on 22 December 1997, but it is generally thought that UNITA retained a substantial, well armed experienced force of between 30,000 and 70,000 men. [28] & [45]

3.20 Some 12,000 former UNITA soldiers have been integrated into the FAA out of the original figure of 26,300 demanded by UNITA, although they later amended this to 18,000. UNITA also

demanding that it be allowed to provide 5,500 police officers but, in the end, only supplied 600. [26] & [40]

3.21 Towards the end of January 1998, the UN Security Council voted unanimously for a three month extension, until April 30, of the UN peacekeeping operation in Angola. Members of the Council hoped that this would be the last troop renewal. A recommendation by the UNSG to reduce the numbers of the UN force was also approved. Several more extensions followed, the final one, expiring in February 1999, until the decision was taken, in December 1998, to withdraw MONUA completely as there was no longer a tangible peace process for them to oversee. [35] [55]

D. Current situation

3.22 The UN personnel have all withdrawn to Luanda in preparation for repatriation. Both the government and UNITA-R have made public statements that responsibility for the deterioration in the security situation rests with the UN because they failed to ensure that UNITA disarmed. That, coupled with other anti-UN statements has made it impossible to guarantee the safety of the members of MONUA. [55]

AMNESTY

3.23 An amnesty law was passed in May 1996 in favour of those who had committed military and security crimes. The Government released 279 prisoners arrested in the context of the conflict and UNITA released 170 people, including four South Africans. [22]

GOVERNMENT OF UNITY AND RECONCILIATION

3.24 On 9 April 1997 UNITA representatives (four Ministers and seven Vice Ministers) finally took their places in the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation, (GURN). Seventy UNITA Deputies finally filled the seats in the National Assembly won in 1992. The inauguration was attended by the Portuguese president and leaders of lusophone Africa, but not by Jonas Savimbi. (See Annex E) However, in September 1998, the government suspended the UNITA Deputies as a mark of their displeasure at the delaying tactics employed by UNITA in implementing the terms of the Lusaka Protocol. [25] & [26] & [39] [40]

UNITA

3.24 The last few months have seen a severe, if not fatal, fracture in the peace process. The Lusaka Protocol required UNITA to hand over to state administration the remaining areas under their control but their repeated delays caused the UN to vote for further sanctions against them and, later, the

government to suspend the UNITA members from parliament. UNITA then split between those who remained faithful to Savimbi and a faction, led by Jorge Valentim (previously the Tourism Minister) who wished to negotiate with the government to conclude the Lusaka Protocol. [39] [44] & [45]

3.25 The breakaway faction has called itself UNITA-Renovada (UNITA-R) and is known as the UNITA Renewal Committee. They have been recognised by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and President dos Santos has announced that he will deal only with them. SADC have labelled Savimbi a "war criminal" for his actions in de-railing the peace process. [51]

REMOVALS

3.26 Removals to Angola were halted temporarily on the 20th of August 1998 in response to a letter from UNHCR. CIPU have sought clarification from UNHCR and the decision is currently under review.

IV INSTRUMENTS OF THE STATE

SECURITY SITUATION

4.1 The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for internal security. It exercises this function through the national police and the paramilitary Rapid Intervention Police created in 1992 as an elite military force, known locally as the "Ninjas" and, most recently, reportedly trained by Spain's Civil Guard. The armed forces are responsible for external security. Prior to implementation of the Lusaka protocol-mandated cease-fire, they were primarily engaged in fighting the civil war against UNITA. During 1996 and 1997 civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of the security forces but there were frequent instances in which the security forces acted independently of Government authority. Members of the security forces committed numerous, serious human rights abuses. [17] [26] & [45]

4.2 Tensions between Government forces and UNITA throughout the country generally decreased in the final weeks of 1997 and beginning of 1998. However continuing frictions between local Government authorities and UNITA militants in several provinces led to incidents of ceasefire violations. There were also reports of recently laid mines in Bie and Moxico provinces and widespread acts of banditry in Benguela and Huila province (See below). [28] & [32]

4.3 In June 1998, UNITA opened their new HQ in Luanda. However, Dr Savimbi did not fulfil his promises to move to the capital from his stronghold in Bailundo in the central highlands and to meet the President, Eduardo dos Santos, face to face. The peace process stalled as UNITA failed to hand over the remaining areas under their administration, namely Bailundo, Andulo, Nharea and Mungo, to State control and the UN imposed further sanctions on them. The death of the UN SGSR, Maitre Beye, at the end of June left a vacuum which further destabilised negotiations. [45]

4.4 Hostilities between the government and UNITA increased, with each side blaming the other and by the latter half of 1998 estimates of UNITA's troop numbers ranged between 30,000 and 70,000, many with combat experience dating back to the post-colonial era and rumours abound of the recruitment of foreign mercenaries by both sides. Organisations engaged in de-mining, such as the British Halo Trust, report that previously cleared areas have been re-mined and new mine fields laid. The EU has threatened to withdraw all assistance in de-mining if this continues. [45] & [48]

4.5 The rebellion in neighbouring Democratic Republic of the

Congo (DRC) against President Laurent Kabila, which began earlier this year, has served to widen the gulf between UNITA and the government. Both sides have sent troops across the border. UNITA had traditionally relied on DRC as a secure supply conduit to the outside world and received support from ousted President Mobutu. They therefore supported the rebels. The Angolan government, meanwhile, has a vested interest that no-one sympathetic to UNITA achieves power there, so supported Kabila. Other neighbouring countries such as Uganda and Rwanda have also been drawn in and the conflict is threatening to destabilise the entire region. [45]

Recent developments

4.6 The UN have decided to withdraw MONUA, the monitoring mission, after it became clear that UNITA had abandoned any pretence of adhering to the terms of the peace agreement. Two UN-chartered planes were shot down, allegedly by UNITA, as they overflowed UNITA-held territory in December and January. UNITA initially refused to allow search and rescue parties into the area to hunt for crash sites but the FAA later retook the area containing the site of the first crash and eventually UN Under-Secretary General Sevan managed to negotiate safe-passage with both sides. There were no survivors. [55]

4.7 UNITA have also made several attacks on foreign-owned installations, such as the Canadian-owned Yetwene Diamond mine 600 km east of Luanda. During the attack, 8 employees including two British nationals were killed and eighteen others wounded. [55] [59] [60]

4.8 All UN personnel have been withdrawn to Luanda and arrangements are under way to repatriate members of MONUA. It is hoped that some Human Rights monitors will be allowed to remain. [55]

LUANDA

4.9 The capital of Angola has remained free from fighting, but there are corrupt elements of the police and armed forces who perpetrate violent crime. Originally designed by the Portuguese to accommodate 300,000 people, current estimates of its population range between 3 and 4 million, with more people arriving daily to seek refuge from the fighting in the Central Highlands area. [6] [45] [55]

THE JUDICIARY

4.10 In October 1991, the Code for Penal process was amended to bring Angola's judicial system in line with international norms; it guarantees a public trial, establishes a system of bail and recognises the accused's right to counsel and to

testify. [16]

4.11 The judicial system was largely destroyed during the civil war and does not function in large areas of the country. [26]

4.12 The court system comprises the Supreme Court at the appellate level, and municipal and provincial courts of original jurisdiction under the authority of the Supreme Court. The President has strong appointative powers, including appointment of the Supreme Court judges, with no requirement for confirmation by the National Assembly. [17]

4.13 Municipal courts normally deal rapidly with routine civil and misdemeanour cases on a daily basis. Judges are normally respected laymen, not licensed lawyers. The judge and two laymen selected by the full court act as jury. Routine cases are normally despatched by a court within 3 months. The verdict is pronounced the day following the conclusion of the trial in the presence of the defendant. [17]

4.14 Under the law a person caught in the act of committing a crime may be arrested and detained immediately. Otherwise, the law requires that an arrest warrant be signed by a judge or a provincial magistrate. Arrest warrants may also be signed by members of the judicial police and confirmed within 5 days by a magistrate. The Constitution provides for a prompt judicial determination of the legality of the detention. Under the law the prosecution and defence have 90 days before trial to prepare a case, although this deadline may be extended by attorneys' general under extenuating circumstances. No-one may be held for longer than 135 days without trial. However, in practice, over 90% of the prison population in Luanda are awaiting trial. A warrant is needed to search premises but the police frequently act on their own authority, as happened in July and August 1996 when they conducted a large-scale search for arms amongst the civilian population in urban areas. [17] & [40] [57]

4.15 Although in 1993 the Council of Ministers decided to transfer control of the judicial process and prison systems from the Interior Ministry to the Ministry of Justice, the decision has not yet been implemented. [26]

4.16 The Constitution also provides prisoners with the right to receive visits by family members. However a scarcity of resources and the lack of qualified and motivated personnel in the judicial system limited the exercise of these rights. [17]

4.17 The number of people detained by the Government and UNITA for political and security reasons is unknown. The government denies that it holds political prisoners, however there are credible reports that it does. [17] [57]

AMNESTY

4.18 In May 1996 the National Assembly passed and President dos Santos signed a blanket amnesty covering all crimes under military as well as civilian law against internal state security committed from May 31, 1991 to May 8, 1996. [17] & [36]

DEATH PENALTY

4.19. The death penalty was abolished in Angola in 1992, although there are many allegations of extrajudicial killings by the police and army. UNITA abolished the death penalty in 1996, although there is no independent assessment of their legal system. [40]

UNITA COURT SYSTEMS

4.20 UNITA has established a military and civilian court system in territories under its control and claims that its civil code is equivalent to the Portuguese Civil Code currently used by the Government. UNITA President Jonas Savimbi appoints a judge personally, and UNITA trials are not open to the public. Juries consist of male elders from the community. The accused reportedly has the right to a lawyer. [17]

MILITARY SERVICE

4.21 Laws on conscription have been extant since 26 March 1993. Angola has conscription for all males between 20 and 45 years of age. It is for a period of two years which includes training time. Females can also be conscripted if it is considered necessary by the Council of Ministers. An exemption can be obtained on health grounds. However, with the recent escalation in hostilities between UNITA and the government, UNHCR have voiced fears that both sides may be employing forced conscription, perhaps even including minors, and that young women may be abducted from areas outside Luanda to serve as sex slaves for soldiers. [37]

4.22 The Angolan government have conducted a census of male citizens born between 01.01.1979 and 31.12.1981 in order to keep their records up to date. There is, so far, no evidence of forced conscription outside existing legislation, nor of the abduction of women for sexual or other purposes. [58]

4.23 Service can be postponed if the person is still in full time education. The same applies to teachers, both with formal and without formal qualifications, who are in full time teaching posts. Additionally, the Council of Ministers approves annually a list of technicians and specialists who are exempt from conscription. In practise, compulsory service is

only applied during times of crisis or shortage. [37]

4.24 An alternative is available to military service, called civil service. Individuals are allowed to conscientiously object to military service and are able to perform community service instead. [36]

4.25 Desertion is punishable by a prison sentence of between two and eight years. If carried out during a time of war or on military operations, the penalty increases to between eight and twelve years. Those who fail to report for compulsory service and are subsequently apprehended, their terms of service are increased to four years. The penalties have been extant since 24 November 1993. [36] & [37]

4.26 There are reports of UNITA abducting males of military service age from areas under their control and forcing them to fight, although these are difficult to verify. [57]

SOCIAL WELFARE

4.27 Medical care is provided free of charge but its availability is limited by a shortage of trained personnel and medicines. War veterans receive support from the Ministry of Defence. [13]

4.28 In 1996 the Health Ministry worked with international donors to coordinate a successful child vaccination programme against polio. [17]

PRISONS

4.29 Prison conditions constitute a serious threat to the health and lives of prisoners. Cells are overcrowded and lack the most basic sanitary facilities. The prison system holds up to five times the number of inmates for which it was designed. There are reports that prisoners died of malnutrition, as well as disease and beatings, because the government failed to supply the financial support to buy food or medicines. In the main, prisoners rely on friends and family for basic provisions. Prison officers are poorly paid, sometimes unpaid, by the government and routinely steal from inmates and their families. They frequently beat and abuse inmates. [57]

TORTURE

4.30 The Constitution and Penal Code expressly forbid mistreatment of suspects, detainees or prisoners. However

the UN and other human rights organisations report that there is widespread and generalised abuse of suspects. Security service personnel regularly employ torture and other forms of cruel and degrading treatment, including rape. Confessions obtained this way are regularly accepted as evidence and the perpetrators are rarely if ever punished. There are no cases on record where an army or police officer has been disciplined for use of excessive force on a UNITA suspect. [57]

4.31 Torture is not confined to government forces. Both FLEC and UNITA employ torture routinely, both on suspected traitors within their own ranks and on civilians suspected of supporting the government. [57]

EDUCATION

4.32 Education is officially compulsory for eight years, between seven and fifteen years of age, and is provided free of charge by the Government. Primary education begins at six years of age and lasts for four years. Secondary education beginning at age ten lasts for up to seven years. Enrolment at secondary schools (including students receiving vocational instruction and teacher-training) increased from 57,829 in 1970 to 218,987 in 1991/92. Higher education is being encouraged. In March 1991 the People's Assembly approved legislation permitting the foundation of private educational establishments. [13]

THE CONSTITUTION

4.33 Angola is governed by a Constitution promulgated in November 1975. It was amended several times, most recently in August 1992, when the word "People's" was removed from the official name of the country. The Constitution stipulates that the State shall respect and protect the human person and human dignity with all citizens equal before the law. The Constitution also guarantees freedom of expression, of assembly, of demonstration, of association, of all other forms of expression. At the same time, groupings whose aims and activities are contrary to the Constitutional order and penal laws, or that, even indirectly, pursue political objectives through organisations of a military, paramilitary or militarized nature shall be forbidden. [1]

4.34 Under the Constitution adopted at independence, the sole legal party was the MPLA. In December 1990 however, the MPLA announced that the Constitution would be revised to permit opposition parties. [15]

4.35 The supreme organ of state is the 220 member National Assembly. There is an executive President elected for renewable terms of five years, who appoints a Council of Ministers. Jonas Savimbi (UNITA) has a special status as Leader of the Main Opposition Party, however, after the breakdown of the

peace process, the government deputies presented a proposal to revoke the law specifying his special status. It was revoked by the National Assembly on 27 October 1998. [15] & [47]

V HUMAN RIGHTS

A: INTRODUCTION

5.1 During years of conflict many Angolans have struggled simply to survive. Despite being, in theory, a presidential parliamentary democracy, in fact there is no real tradition of democracy, pluralism or respect for human rights. The combination of war and economic mismanagement has led to much of Angola's infrastructure being destroyed, leaving no effective administration or judicial system in many regions. [6]

5.2 The current increase in hostilities between the government and UNITA has led to a complete breakdown of law and order in many areas and observers fear Angola may be slipping back into civil war. However, there have been no reports of the unrest reaching Luanda. [44]

Human Rights Monitoring

5.3 Human rights monitoring was incorporated into the United Nations's Angolan Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) mandate after campaigning by human rights organisations including Amnesty International. A Human Rights Unit was set up within UNAVEM III and formed part of its successor: MONUA. [12]

5.4 MONUA investigated all alleged cases of cease-fire violations and human rights abuses that were reported to it by the Government, UNITA and private individuals. It divided allegations into confirmed, unconfirmed and pending and assigned responsibility of confirmed reports to the Government, UNITA or bandits. Its mandate was extended several times, most recently until the end of February 1999, after which it began its withdrawal. Under MONUA, the Human Rights Unit with less than 20 staff was upgraded to a Division, with 55 staff. From September 1996 to December 1997, (the most recent figures available), it submitted 50 cases of human rights abuses to the ad hoc group on human rights. This group had been established in 1996 by the Joint Commission which implemented the peace agreement. However, the Division did not publish its assessment of the human rights situation or whether either side complied with its recommendations. [26], [43] & [44] [55]

5.5 United Nations human rights observers were present in seven of Angola's eighteen provinces until they were withdrawn to Luanda in December 1998 in preparation for repatriation. Committees were established in Namibe, Benguela, Huambo, Kwanza Sul, Uige and Cunene. Committees consist of representatives

from the government and civic organisations. In Uige, both government and UNITA representatives participated, but that now no longer functions since the resumption of hostilities. [12] & [26] [55]

5.6 Since May 1995 civilian human rights monitors were assisted by 225 civilian police (CIVPOL) who were also mandated to receive complaints of human rights violations and to investigate them. Until withdrawal by the UN, there were 388 CIVPOL, up from 345. The CIVPOL's mandate also covered monitoring the activities of the Angolan police, visiting detention centres and liaising with local authorities. The total UN presence comprised some 1100 people, down from its original figure of 7000. [28] & [44]

5.7 In 1994 the UNAVEM Human Rights Monitoring Group (HRMG) held a number of national and regional human rights seminars with senior government and UNITA participation. UNAVEM's HRMG and military and civilian police observers were the only effective human rights monitors, but they did not make their conclusions of their investigations public. Additionally, the Government frequently interfered in UNAVEM's attempts to investigate complaints of human rights violations. [12]

5.8 Throughout 1997 HRMG continued to monitor the human rights situation in the country and to organise public awareness campaigns. In collaboration with the civilian police, various human rights activities were carried out in the Provinces as well as in Luanda. [28]

5.9 Amnesty International representatives were invited to participate in a June 1996 human rights seminar for police and prison officials. The Government granted the International Committee of the Red Cross limited access to prisons in 1996. [17]

5.10 Other Human Rights Groups, such as Human Rights Watch, are able to monitor and report their findings. There is one independent Angolan human rights organisation, operating in Luanda, called the Associacao Angolana dos Direitos Humanos (AADH) but it is not yet clear how effective they have been. [40]

5.11 MONUA completed a five day training programme for 62 Angolan human rights counsellors who will staff centres in the municipalities in Benguela. This project is supported by both the provincial and central government authorities will permit citizens to make complaints about human rights abuses and seek legal remedies. [55]

B: GENERAL ASSESSMENT

5.12 The Government cooperates with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and provides first asylum to refugees. An eligibility committee to evaluate asylum claims established on paper in 1990 was first staffed in 1995 and now meets regularly to evaluate asylum requests. There are approximately 9,600 DRC (ex-Zairian) refugees in Angola, at least 1,000 of whom have been officially granted refugee status. An Angolan government minister said, in September 1998, that Angola's refugee problem is worse now than at any other time. He estimated that there were 284,000 refugees relying on government assistance and that 37,000 who had previously been resettled had once again become displaced because of the current crisis in the peace process. UNITA has never cooperated with the investigation of human rights abuses in the areas under its control, except when it claims that the government are responsible. For further examples of UNITA abuses, see US State Department report on Angola 1998, attached as source 57. [17] & [46] [57]

5.13 The UN estimate that there now approximately 500,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Angola, many of whom have had to flee for the second or third time from temporary shelters in recent months. The immediate effects of the fighting have been increasing levels of malnutrition, especially among children, very poor sanitation and health conditions. As a result the risk of epidemics has grown dramatically in the areas affected by the fighting. [55]

5.14 There were no reports of forced expulsion of persons with valid claims to refugee status in 1997. As of October 1997, there were some 2,000 refugees in Luau, Moxico Province, an area that reverted to government control in September. The government agreed not to arbitrarily expel or forcibly repatriate this group of Rwandan and Burundian refugees and allowed UNHCR to provide all appropriate assistance. [26]

5.15 The Angolan Constitution provides all adult citizens with the right to vote. [17]

5.16 Children's rights and welfare receive only marginal attention by the Angolan Government. Vaccination programmes have been carried out in conjunction with international aid organisations and work has begun to demobilise over 8,000 child soldiers in both Government and UNITA armed forces. There are no active private children's rights advocacy groups. [17]

5.17 Current Angolan law authorises forced labour for breaches of worker discipline and participation in strikes. This is a violation of Convention 105 of the International Labour Organisation. This is also prevalent in UNITA-controlled areas, where women are often forced to work as porters, and subjected to concurrent sexual abuse. [17] [57]

C: SPECIFIC GROUPS

ETHNIC GROUPS

5.18 Angola's population includes 1 to 2 percent of Khoisan and other linguistically-distinct hunter, gatherer tribes scattered throughout the southern provinces of Namibe, Cunene and Cuando Cubango. There is no evidence that they suffer from official discrimination or harassment, but they do not participate actively in the political or economic life of the country and have a marginal ability to influence government decisions concerning their interests. [17]

5.19 The long civil conflict has deep ethnic and urban versus rural roots. Many of the small number of white and mixed race Angolans who occupy technical and Governmental positions have strongly backed the MPLA. The Government accuses UNITA of exacerbating ethnic tensions by dwelling on the perceived colonial ties of these people. [17]

5.20 There are seven major ethnic - linguistic groups and within each group are many tribes. (See Annex C)

F.L.E.C./ Cabindans

5.21 FLEC (Frente para a Libertacao do Enclave de Cabinda) was formed in 1963 as a nationalist movement seeking separate independence for Cabinda, a 2,807 sq mile (7,300 sq km) oil-rich enclave on the Atlantic coast sandwiched between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Congo. Cabinda produces about 60% of Angola's total oil output of around 700,000 barrels per day, which in turn represents approximately 90% of the country's total export earnings. [11] & [42]

5.22 Throughout its existence FLEC has been marginalised and its political concerns largely ignored. Banned in 1974 by the Portuguese, FLEC then organised a military wing. Following Angolan independence FLEC, unlike the other main nationalist groups (MPLA, UNITA and FNLA), did not achieve recognition by the Organisation for African Unity, (OAU). FLEC was excluded from the negotiations for the May 1991 Bicesse Accords and did not enter the political process with the introduction of multi-partyism, arguing that the September 1992 elections were for Angolans not Cabindans. [11]

5.23 The Angolan law on political parties dictates that, in order to register, a party must possess support in at least 10 of the 18 provinces which effectively disqualifies FLEC. [31]

5.24 Since its beginning FLEC has been divided into factions. The three principal factions being FLEC/FAC (Forças Armadas de Cabinda), FLEC-Renovada (FLEC-R) and Frente Democrática de Cabinda (FDC).

5.25 In late September 1995 the Government signed a four month cease-fire agreement with FLEC-R. It was anticipated that the agreement, which followed an offensive by FLEC-R on Cabinda City in the previous month would facilitate negotiations of a pact aimed at national reconciliation. Other reports stated that the Government was seeking to offset the perceived possibility of a FLEC-UNITA joint front. (see para 5.32 below) [11] & [31]

5.26 The following January discussions between the Government and FLEC-R resulted in an agreement to extend the cease-fire accord. Further discussions were to continue in pursuit of a definitive agreement. [31]

5.27 In mid-May 1996 the Government and FLEC-R signed an agreement outlining the principles of a ceasefire. However, following renewed fighting later that month between Government troops and the secessionists, the leader of FLEC-FAC declared that a definitive cease-fire would only follow the withdrawal of the FAA from Cabinda. [31]

5.28 In response to the Government's lack of interest in pursuing serious negotiations, FLEC-R carried out numerous sporadic attacks against Government targets in 1997. These included a mortar bomb which fell near the Sonangol terminal (State oil installation) in February and an assault on a police station in June. These actions provoked a firm response from the Government with the FAA targeting villages where FLEC-R personnel were known to be located. [25]

5.29 Heavy clashes between the FAA and the Cabindan separatists led to thousands of people flocking to the provincial capital - Cabinda town. [23]

5.30 During the summer of 1997, the Angolan government at first denied, then admitted it was providing military assistance to Denis Sassou Nguesso in the Congo. This followed reports that, after the fall of President Mobutu, both UNITA and the various FLEC factions had moved substantial amounts of materiel into the Congo with a view to joining forces, with the support of Lissouba, against the FAA in Cabinda. [42]

5.31. Throughout 1997 and into 1998 the number of attacks on Cabindan villages suspected by the FAA of supporting FLEC factions multiplied. Angolan troops in Congo, there to support the pro-Angolan President Nguesso who ousted the pro-UNITA

President Pascal Lissouba in October 1996, are also reported to have raided refugee camps occupied by Cabindans. Separatist fighters are reported to have killed unarmed civilians and taken others hostage. These raids are often followed by government reprisals, in which unarmed civilians have been beaten and killed and soldiers have looted and burned houses. Thus far, there have been no reports of official enquiries into these allegations of extrajudicial execution or torture. [42]

5.32 Attacks by both FLEC-FAC and FLEC-R have increased. They tend to target foreign companies operating in Cabinda, but, as this strikes at the economy, the FAA have retaliated. In 1997 they re-took Miconje and Luali, in the northern part of the enclave, after heavy fighting, which had previously been under FLEC-FAC control, and accused FLEC-FAC of murdering three traditional chiefs who had sought government protection. They also accused FLEC-FAC of harbouring ex-FAZ (Forces Armées de Zaire) and former Hutu-dominated Rwandese troops who had fled to DRC from Rwanda. [42]

5.33 Reports of soldiers and other officials threatening, or actually carrying out, beatings and killings are commonplace and there have been several reports of soldiers, sometimes drunk, firing indiscriminately in public places, on occasion with the intention of terrifying street vendors in order to steal their goods. Amnesty International list many such examples, two of which are reproduced here:

i) On 21.12.1997 an FAA officer stopped an open lorry at Tchiobo village, about 52 kilometres from Cabinda City, on the road to Tando Zinze. The lorry was serving as a bus and carrying dozens of people home from the market in Cabinda City. The officer sought a lift, which the driver refused and, as the lorry pulled away, the officer opened fire at the passengers, killing seven and wounding 11. Amnesty report no arrests have been made.

ii) On 06.01.1998 government soldiers attacked a village called Aldeia da Fortaleza in the south of the enclave, apparently in reprisal for the explosion of an anti-tank mine which killed two high-ranking army officers. They beat civilians, a number of whom required hospital treatment, then looted and burned houses. Amnesty report no knowledge, to date, of any investigation or prosecution. [42]

TORTURE

5.34 Torture, used to intimidate or punish suspected political opponents is not infrequent in Cabinda. One example provided by Amnesty International is detailed below:

Members of the CNC (Comite dos Nacionais de Cabinda, a political organisation committed to non-violence) held a meeting in 1995 to discuss the Treaty of Simulanco. They had, in accordance with the law, informed the authorities 24 hours

in advance. After the meeting started, 30 members of the paramilitary police burst in and arrested 27 of those present. They were handcuffed and taken to police headquarters. There, they were made to lie on the floor and were beaten. One man said that a large officer hit him as if he were a "punchbag" using a baton 60 cm long and 40 cm in diameter, sometimes using both hands. He was hit on his shoulders, ribs, spine, buttocks and head. Other detainees had bayonets held to their throats, or received shocks from electric cattle prods. Police also stamped on heads, backs and fingers. On this occasion there were no fatalities, but the police commander, rather bizarrely using a football metaphor, told them they had been shown the yellow card and next time it would be the red one. This incident was not made public until 1997 as those involved were too frightened. No action against the police involved was taken by the authorities. [42]

FUTURE OF CABINDAN SEPARATISTS

5.35 The rapid turn of events both in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Congo are bound to have serious implications for the Cabindan factions, which have used both countries as safe havens and supply routes. [25]

5.36 The two FLEC factions with a military wing are:

i. FLEC/FAC (sometimes called FLEC/NOIR or FLEC/NEGRA), led by Nzita Henriques Tiago. In the field, its guerilla activities are under the command of General Victor Gomez. This is the most militant and militarily active service group with, it claims, up to 5400 troops, although the real number is estimated at 600. It operates in the north and along the Chilungo river.

ii. FLEC/RENOVADA (sometimes referred to as FLEC/MATANDO BRAZ) led by Colonel Jose Tiburico Zingba Luemba. It is a smaller group, with no more than 300 active guerillas who operate south of the Chilungo river.

5.37 The other factions are much less important and have little or no influence on the Cabindan scene. These include:

i. FLEC/ORIGINAL headed by Luis Ranque Franque who is one of the historic FLEC figures but who has lived in exile for most of his life.

ii. UNCL which is based in Libreville, Gabon and is headed by Luigi Carneiro Gimbi (or Jimbi), is moderate but far less representative of Cabindan opinion than FLEC/FAC or FLEC/R.

iii. UNALEC founded in 1985 by Professor Afonso Massanga.

iv. FLEC/LUBOTA led by Francisco Xavier Lubota.

THE BAKONGO

5.38 The Bakongo are one of the three major ethnic groupings in Angola (the others being the Ovimbundu and the Mbundu), although the tribe itself is spread over three countries: DRC, Congo and Angola. Originally, when Europeans reached this part of Africa in the 15th century, the Bakongo had a centralised kingdom, the Kongo Empire, which lasted until 1665 when they were defeated by the Portuguese. Subsequently, the Bakongo migrated throughout Angola, Congo and DRC during periods of rebellion. Nowadays, the vast majority, approximately 10 million, live in western DRC, 850,000 in southern Congo and only 600,000 in northern Angola. The two subgroups living in Angola are the Sosso and Sorongo. Their main language, Kikongo, is one of DRC's four national languages, although they traditionally also speak French, a relic of DRC's colonial past. [49] & [50]

5.39 In 1954, Holden Roberto established the Union of Angolan Peoples (UPA), the original aim of which was to re-unify all strands of the Bakongo into one state. Eventually, in 1958, the UPA dropped the goal of a separatist state for the Bakongo and concentrated instead on independence for all Angolan peoples. In March 1961, the UPA launched an attack on the Portuguese which was crushed and resulted in up to 400,000 Bakongo fleeing to DRC. Many of these exiles identified themselves as Bakongan rather than Angolan and did not speak Portuguese. The UPA was joined by the MPLA, a Marxist organisation which later drew support from Cuba and the USSR. In 1962 the UPA became the FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola). In 1963, a member of the FNLA called Jonas Savimbi broke away to found his own resistance movement which he named National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). [27] & [50]

5.40 Each of Angola's three main ethno-linguistic groups has been associated with a respective military organisation during the fight for independence and the civil war which followed. The Ovimbundu people of the south with UNITA, the Mbundu with the MPLA (who also attracted the intellectuals in Luanda) and the Bakongo with the FNLA. [50]

5.41 The three resistance groups formed the first post-independence government in 1975 but, after much factional fighting, the MPLA emerged victorious in 1976 to govern alone. However, with the MPLA ascendancy, both the Bakongo and the Ovimbundu were discriminated against but, by the late 1970s, the FNLA was unable to continue its guerilla activities because of a lack of popular support outside the northern regions. By 1979, most of the fighting was concentrated away from the north and many of those Bakongo who had fled to DRC were able to

return.

Their exiled leader, Holden Roberto, was able to return to fight the 1992 Presidential election after political parties were legalised. In September 1992, the FNLA received 2.5% of the National Assembly seats in the first direct elections since independence. [50]

5.42 Several Bakongo separatist groups exist in the UK. Their aim is self determination for the Bakongo but their publications and propaganda are unclear. There is no evidence of links with home-based movements. [52] [53]

i) ABAR (Association of Angolan Bakongo Refugees in the UK)
They appear to be principally a welfare organisation for Angolan Bakongo refugees. They are based at Newham Refugee Centre in London and state their priorities as assistance, support and practical advice for members. Their President is Dr Avelino Makiese and the Secretary Antonio Ndiluawu. [53]

ii) KIMVUKA/MBFA (Bakongo Movement for Federalism in Angola)
Dedicated to 'self-determination' for the Bakongo and the transformation of Angola into a federal state and based in Tottenham, North London. They issue newsletters and statements about events in Angola, in the most part made up of political slogans. Their Permanent Secretary is Avelino Makiese. [52]

iii) MAKO (Movement for Self-determination for the Kongo)
Based in London, they have joined forces with the MBFA and announced, in June 1998, they would be working together on a joint programme. Their President is Joao Mansianganisoma. [52]

5.43 In Angola there is no discrimination in law against those of Bakongo origin and no evidence that, for example, they are prevented from trading or treated as second class citizens in society as a whole. But there have been times when they have come under suspicion and been attacked as a group. One of the most serious instances of persecution was directed against

"Zaireans" (ie Bakongo Angolans) on January 22 1993. Rumours were spread of a plot to kill the Angolan president, which resulted in "Zaireans" being hunted down and chased from the markets. Officially 69 people were killed in the disturbances in several cities although most reports talk of between four and six thousand dead. The killers are reputed to be the military, the national police and civilians. The massacre became known as "Bloody Friday" and was condemned by the government. But this incident is not indicative of the general picture and there has been no repetition. [27] & [50]

5.44 A substantial Bakongo community continues to live in Luanda and they have been able to join the major political parties, including the MPLA. There is no evidence of a systematic persecution or targeting of Bakongo. However the

Bakongo are likely targets if a scapegoat is needed. [27]

5.45 If a Kongo did fall victim to scapegoating, they would not necessarily be able to look to the police for protection (although this would also apply to many other Angolans). The Angolan police are poorly paid and generally acknowledged to be corrupt and lacking in discipline. They tend to be motivated by the opportunity to extort bribes than the pursuit of justice. It could not therefore be ruled out that a Kongo who had come to the attention of the authorities might be pressurised by members of the police with a view to extorting bribes. [27]

5.46 Although a Bakongo returning from abroad would probably be recognised as such, he or she would not automatically be associated with UNITA (traditionally supported by the Ovimbundu, rather than the Bakongo) or with any opposition elements. [27]

WOMEN: CRIME & SOCIAL ISSUES

5.47 Violence against women is widespread. In March 1997 a Ministry of women was created to deal specifically with this problem. Credible evidence indicates that a significant proportion of homicides are perpetrated against women, usually by their spouses. Due to dire economic circumstances, increasing numbers of women are engaging in prostitution and the clergy report that marriages are breaking down at an alarming rate. In much of the country, women swell the ranks of the disabled because they often set off landmines while foraging in the fields for food and firewood. [17] & [26]

WOMEN: DISCRIMINATION

5.48 Despite constitutional protection, women suffer from discrimination. The law provides for equal pay for equal work but in practise women are not compensated equally. Some women hold senior positions within the military (primarily in the medical field) and civil service, but women are mostly relegated to low level positions in state run industries and in the small private sector. Adult women may open a bank account, accept employment, and own property without interference from their spouses. Women also have the right to inherit property. Upon the death of a male head of household, the widow automatically is entitled to 50% of any estate with the remainder divided equally among legitimate male and female children. [17]

5.49 In 1997 a Ministry of Women was set up specifically to deal with violence against women. A series of national conferences on women's rights, partially funded by foreign donors, continued to produce calls for the government to amend the civil code to end women's inequality, create a social

welfare programme and strengthen enforcement mechanisms for existing legislation. The Civil Code dates back, in part, to colonial times and includes discriminatory provisions against women in the areas of inheritance, property sales and participation in commercial activities which conflict with the Constitution, which holds that all citizens are equal before the law. [57]

5.50 The maternal mortality rate in 1996 (most recent available figures) was estimated at 1500 deaths per 100,000 live births. There are no effective mechanisms to enforce child support laws which means that women carry most of the burden in raising children. Due to poor (and further declining) economic circumstances, an increasing number of women engage in prostitution. [57]

CHILDREN

5.51 There has been an increase in the number of street children in Luanda and other cities. This has resulted from the breakdown of family structures due to the civil war and the dire economic circumstances. Orphanages are overcrowded and admission to schools difficult because the children often do not have the necessary identification papers. Girls roaming the streets, although less numerous than boys, are often subjected to rape, sometimes even by the police. With the assistance of aid agencies, the Angolan Ministry of Social Affairs has launched a scheme to trace the relatives of such children and re-unite them, but in practice the children are not always willing to be returned as circumstances there can be even worse. Equally, the relatives are not always prepared to take them back. Child prostitution is an increasing problem. Children often held in prison for petty theft are incarcerated with the adult detainees and often suffer abuse from both prisoners and guards. [17] & [40] [57]

C: OTHER ISSUES

FREEDOM OF RELIGION

5.52 Much of the population follows traditional African beliefs, although a majority profess to be Christians, mainly Roman Catholics, although the Bakongo, who were initially Protestants, mainly adhere to an independent Christian church founded by Simon Kimbangu, whom they revere as a prophet. [1] & [49]

5.53 The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, including the separation of church and state, and the Government respects this right in practice. The authorities apparently did not enforce a 1995 Government order prohibiting

the practise of religion outside of approved locations. [7]

5.54 The Tocoist (Tokoist) church had opposed the Marxist anti-religion nature of the Angolan regime after 1977 more than any other church. There had therefore, been some persecution and many of the Tocoists fled from their homelands in Northern Angola towards the east, that is towards UNITA held territory.

UNITA welcomed these refugees from the MPLA regime and the feeling had thereby grown that the Tocoist church was pro-UNITA. The church achieved official recognition in 1987 but following some violence and internal difficulties it was banned. The ban was lifted in May 1988 and has not since been reimposed. [21]

5.55 Other active denominations include the African Apostolic Church, the Church of Apostolic Faith in Angola, the Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ in the world, the Evangelical Baptist Church in Angola, the Evangelical Church of the Apostles in Jerusalem, the Evangelical reformed Church of Angola, the Kimbanguist Church in Angola and the United Methodist Church. [13]

FREEDOM OF SPEECH

5.56 There is no evidence that repressive measures or arbitrary treatment by the organs of the state are specifically directed against particular groups of people.

5.57 The Angolan Constitution allows for freedom of expression and specifically that the press cannot be subject to political, ideological or artistic censorship. However, the government does not respect these rights in practise. Citizens, including deputies in the National Assembly, expect reprisals for public criticism of the Government or the MPLA and the Government attempts to impede such criticism by monitoring and restricting access to political meetings. [17]

5.58 Freedom of expression or the possibility of voicing dissenting opinions is limited in practise. Due to the war situation, opinions different from the Government's are easily interpreted as sympathising with the cause of the UNITA military faction. [10]

5.59 The Government does not detain UNITA officials indiscriminately as a matter of policy. However at local level the police have no qualms about detaining or harassing UNITA activists on the slightest excuse. Due to prison conditions, the consequences of detainment can be dire. UNITA continues to detain people against their will, although the number of such persons is unknown. [6] & [26]

5.60 UNITA members of the National Assembly have taken their seats and as a result substantive debates on issues ranging from the peace process to the Governments budgeting priorities and accountability have taken place for the first time. [26]

MEDIA FREEDOM

5.61 The Government runs and tightly controls an official daily news bulletin (Diario da Republica), the only television station, and the major radio station (Radio Nacional de Angola). Access to this media by opposition leaders is restricted. There are two commercial radio stations and three private weekly and bi-weekly newspapers which all practise self censorship. There are other newsletters that are published that are openly critical of the Government and its policies. [17]

5.62 In addition to the Government bulletin, the Jornal de Angola is published 6 mornings a week plus a Sunday edition with a circulation of 41,000, but is tightly controlled by the government. [17] & [31]

5.63 Several regional towns also have their own local paper. Amongst the periodicals published are: Angola Norte (publishes in Malanje), A Celula (political journal of the MPLA), Correio de Semana (weekly tabloid owned by O Jornal de Angola), Jornal de Benguela, Lavra & Officina (Journal of the Union of Angolan Writers), Militar, Noticia, Novembro, O Planalto (published in Huambo) and A Voz do Trabalhador (Journal of the National Union of Angolan workers). UNITA also publishes a weekly paper, Kwacha Review, in English. [31] & [40]

5.64 The Angolan Minister of Information, Pedro Henrik Vaal Neto claimed in an Angolan government sponsored section in the International Herald Tribune on June 16, 1995, "there are now 40 newspapers, 24 magazines and 18 bulletins and four private radio stations registered in the country. There are also more than 1000 satellite antennas in the country receiving international broadcasts, including CNN". The Minister said, "Views and opinions on the widest range of issues including of local and national interest receive coverage." "we believe," he added, "that responsible journalism is essential to the health of a democratic society. The Government is aware of the deficiencies in the professional education and training of many Angolan journalists and is actively pursuing measures to rectify the situation". The government has offered recognised political parties radio and TV broadcasting time but this is limited to the state-controlled media. MONUA does have regular broadcasting slots on state television, where, it is stated, they have a free hand. [18] & [40]

5.65 Organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch report that the government intimidates home journalists who are critical of domestic politics. A high profile case being that of the assassination of Ricardo De Mello, a journalist with independent Imparcial Fax newsletter in January 1995. The subsequent investigation failed to identify who was responsible. [18]

5.66 The Government was less restrictive with foreign news agencies such as the Voice of America, the BBC, and CNN. Foreign journalists require authorization from the Minister of Interior in order to obtain access to government officials or travel within Angola. Both the government and UNITA invited journalists to planned press events and to visit areas under their control. [17]

UNITA - RADIO VORGAN (Voz da Resistencia do Galo Negro)

5.67 The Lusaka Protocol required the UNITA radio station, Radio Vorgan, to be transformed into a non-partisan broadcasting facility. This will be known as Radio Despertar and a UNITA delegation arrived in Luanda in January 1998 to make arrangements for the setting up of the station. However, once Vorgan was switched off, the government began to bombard Angolans with what observers have described as "fabricated news reports of UNITA atrocities". Western diplomats and NGO officials in Luanda have speculated that panic is being stirred up intentionally as a prelude to the government launching a full-scale attack on Savimbi's forces. In January 1999 a Portuguese newspaper reported that Radio Vorgan was back on the air. It was thought to be based in Jamba, a former UNITA base very close to Angola's southern border with Namibia. [28] [45] [61]

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

5.68 The Constitution recognises the right of Angolans to form trade unions and to bargain collectively. Organised labour is concentrated in the cities. There is no organised labour in agriculture, traditionally the main source of income for the majority of Angolans. [17]

5.69 The Government dominates the labour movement through the Uniao Nacional de Trabalhadores Angolanos (UNTA), the labour organ of the ruling MPLA. The law requires that labour unions be recognised by the Government. In May 1996 a rival labour federation, the General Centrale of Independent and Free Labour Unions of Angola (CGSILA) was established. Throughout 1997, the CGSILA remained relatively independent [17] & [26]

5.70 At least three independent trade unions which have petitioned for recognition, have never received a response from the Government. [7]

5.71 The Constitution provides for the right to strike. Legislation passed in 1991 provides the legal framework to strike. The law prohibits lockouts and worker occupation of places of employment and provides protection for nonstriking

workers. Strikes by military and police personnel, prison workers and firemen are prohibited. [17]

5.72 SIMPROF (Syndicatos de Professoeres) a nationwide teachers' union, staged strikes in 1997 demanding better pay for teachers and met with some limited success. In 1996 there were wildcat strikes against the Government by teachers, doctors, nurses, airline personnel and Justice Ministry civil servants, among others. The Health and Education Ministries negotiated settlements but repeatedly failed to honour them due to lack of resources. The Justice Ministry declared the strike by its civil servants illegal. In September 1995, UNTA announced a planned one day general strike that was to have been the first labour action in its history. However, the strike was cancelled after the Government announced price controls on essential commodities and agreed to continue discussions with UNTA and other issues. [7], [17] & [26]

5.73 The Constitution provides for the right of assembly; however in practice the government exercises strict controls. Applications to hold pro-government meetings are routinely granted, while those likely to protest against the government are rarely granted. Equally, the government uses legislation to forbid private associations on security grounds. There is no freedom of assembly or association in areas of the country under UNITA control. [57]

FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN ANGOLA

5.74 Controls at the airports of Angola, in particular the main international airport in Luanda, are computerised and very thorough and apply to nationals and expatriates alike. There does not appear to be any discriminatory practises against Angolan citizens with respect to border controls. There is much uncontrolled local border traffic between Angola and all of its neighbouring countries. [10]

LANDMINES

5.75 Despite the hazards to civilians, landmines still continue to be laid. The Angolan government set up 18 resident demining teams (plus one mobile one) with the active support of many international organisations but, because of increased hostilities, only 9 of these were operating at the end of September 1998. [32] & [48]

5.76 By the end of 1997 almost 50% of the country's territory had been surveyed for mines, covering the areas where about 80% of the Angolan population lives. Out of an estimated 2,000 to 2,500 minefields 1,800 minefields have been identified. Progress on mine marking and mine clearance has been limited because of the size of the country, the severity of the mine problem and the shortage of funds and trained human resources.

So far 700 square kilometres have been demined and approximately 10,000 mines out of a total estimated by the UN to be 10 million laid over the 30 years of war have been cleared. [28] & [48]

MOVEMENT IN UNITA CONTROLLED AREAS

5.77 There have been reports of violent actions undertaken by UNITA forces designed to prevent free movement in areas where government control is being reinstated. There are also reports that people cannot travel freely or without surveillance in UNITA controlled areas. The UN monitoring office in Bailundo - a UNITA stronghold - has protested repeatedly that its officers cannot move through UNITA areas without first obtaining authorization from the party leadership. [19] & [33]

DISPLACED PERSONS

5.78 Angola has reportedly between 850,000 and 1.2 million internally displaced persons who rely on emergency food aid supplied by the international donor community. There are reportedly 300,000 refugees in neighbouring countries. Many have begun to return to their homes by way of voluntary repatriation schemes. 120,000 refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia have returned to Angola on their own accord, but, due to the current rise in hostilities, 28,000 Angolans have again sought refuge in the DRC and the number is reported to be rising. The UNHCR campaigned for the start of voluntary repatriation from Namibia in 1997 but volunteers were not repatriated due to the security situation. However several thousand refugees returned independently in 1996 and 1 million had returned by late 1997. At present, an Angolan government minister, Albino Malungo, estimates there are 284,000 internally-displaced refugees who are completely reliant on government assistance. He described the situation as "worse now than at any other time." [20], [22] [26] & [46]

5.79 Because of persistent acts of banditry in Huila and Benguela Provinces towards the end of 1997, more than 10,000 people fled from their villages to towns. In Luanda Norte province, approximately 9,000 persons were displaced in the area of Calonda as a result of military activity in nearby villages. [28]

5.80 In 1997 the Government requested humanitarian assistance for more than 3,000 Angolan refugees who returned to Cabinda Province. A joint visit by the UNHCR and the World Food Programme (WFP) to the province in late 1997 was unable to assess the humanitarian situation there owing to heightened tensions resulting from the military activities in the area. [28]

INTERNAL FLIGHT

5.81 In general terms, the Angolan authorities are well aware

of the economic and social pressures which motivate Angolans of all ethnic origins to seek to emigrate, and that asylum applications are often used as a means of achieving this. The controls at Luanda airport are thorough and any Angolans who have been deported from abroad, or who lived abroad for many years, would be questioned by immigration and police at the airport with a view to establishing their identity and whether they were of interest to the authorities for political or criminal reasons. But the fact of applying for asylum would not, if discovered, be of particular interest. There is no evidence to suggest that returned emigrants are forced to either leave Luanda or return to their area of origin.. [27]

5.82 Flight from agents of persecution is possible but fraught with difficulty. The effects of the civil war including the continued laying of mines, illegal roadblocks and check points as well as a deep rooted hatred between UNITA and government supporters has resulted in a potentially extremely hazardous journey for those fleeing. [24]

5.83 The extension of State administration, (as required under the Lusaka protocol peace agreement) had been concluded only in four provinces, out of a total of eighteen, but within the last few months before the resumption of hostilities, this figure has changed many times. Territory controlled by UNITA is not necessarily administered by them but access is denied to the Government. Those suspected of being UNITA or Government sympathizers are likely to face hostilities if travelling within State administered or UNITA controlled areas respectively. [10] & [24]

ANNEX A

A.1 POLITICAL PARTIES

1/ A law enacted in May 1991 specifies that political parties "must be national in character and scope". Specifically prohibited are parties that "are local and regional in character; foster tribalism, racism, regionalism or other forms of discrimination against citizens or affect national unity and territorial integrity; use or propose the use of violence to pursue their aims; adopt a uniform for their members or adopt clandestine parallel structures; use military, para military or militarized organisation; or are subordinate to the policy of foreign governments, bodies or parties". The 1991 law also makes provision for registered parties to receive state financial assistance on the basis of their support in the most recent general election and the number of candidates presented.

At present the main parties in Angola are:

i. MOVIMENTO POPULAR DE LIBERTACAO DE ANGOLA (MPLA)

Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola

Founded in 1956 and backed by USSR. Between 1961 and 1974 conducted guerilla operations against colonial rule, has been the ruling party since independence achieved from Portugal in 1975. In 1990 replaced Marxist-Leninist ideology with a commitment to democratic socialism. President is Jose Eduardo dos Santos.

ii. UNIAO NACIONAL PARA A INDEPENDENCIA TOTAL DE ANGOLA (UNITA)

National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

Founded in 1966 to secure independence from Portugal and later received support from Portugal to oppose the MPLA. Joined forces with FNLA (see later) and conducted guerilla campaign against the MPLA government with aid from some Western nations. Received intermittent support from South Africa and USA. Signed peace agreement with MPLA - PT in November 1994. Implementation of the terms of the peace agreement remains incomplete. President of the party is Jonas Malheiro Savimbi.

iii. FRENTE NACIONAL DE LIBERTACAO DE ANGOLA (FNLA)

National Front for the Liberation of Angola

Founded in 1962, now mostly subsumed within UNITA. President is Holden Roberto.

iv. FRENTE DE LIBERTACAO DO ENCLAVE DE CABINDA (FLEC)

Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda

Founded in 1961 as a nationalist movement seeking separate independence for Cabinda. Comprises several factions. Leaders are Henrique Tiaho Nzita, Luis de Ganzaga Ranque Franque, Francisco Xavier Lubota.

v. FORUM DEMOCRATICO ANGOLANO (FDA)

Angolan Democratic Forum

Registered in 1992 the FDA was allocated one cabinet post in the "unity" government announced in December 1992. Leader is Jorge Rebelo Pinto Chikoti (currently Vice Foreign Minister).

vi. PARTIDO DEMOCRATICO LIBERAL ANGOLAN (PDLA)

Angolan Democratic Liberal Party

Founded after the move to multi - party democracy in May 1991. Leader is Honorato Lando. Not represented in the National Assembly.

vii. PARTIDO DEMOCRATICO ANGOLANA (PDA)

Angolan Democratic Party

Founded in 1992 - opposes both the government party MPLA and UNITA. The leader, Antonio Alberto Neto was placed third in the first round of Presidential elections in 1992 but the party failed to gain any representation in the National Assembly.

viii. PARTIDO NACIONAL DEMOCRATICO DE ANGOLA (PNDA)

Angolan National Democratic Party

Founded during the transition to multi party democracy in May 1991, (at first called the Angolan National Democratic Convention). The leader is Paulino Pinto Joao and the party is represented with one seat in the National Assembly.

ix. ALIANCA DEMOCRATICA DE ANGOLA (ADA)

Democratic Alliance of Angola

The ADA was created by a number of opposition parties prior to the september 1992 multi - party elections. Taking 0.9% of the popular vote in the Assembly balloting, the party won one seat.

x. PARTIDO DEMOCRATICO PARA PROGRESSO-ALIANCA NACIONAL ANGOLA (PDP - ANA)

Democratic Party for Progress-Angolan National Alliance.

Right-wing party formed in 1991 advocates capitalism and humanism. Led by Mfulumpinga Lando Victor and has one seat in the National Assembly.

xi. PARTIDO RENOVADOR DEMOCRATICO (PRD)

Democratic Renewal Party

Founded by surviving dissidents of the MPLA-PT who staged an abortive coup in 1977. Led by Luis da Silva dos Passos, the party has one seat in the National Assembly.

xii. PARTIDO LIBERAL DEMOCRATICO (PLD)

Liberal Democratic Party

Formed in 1991, the leader Amalia de Vitoria Pereira came tenth out of eleven candidates in the first round of presidential elections but gained three of the two hundred and twenty seats in the National Assembly.

xiii. PARTIDO DA ALIANCA DA JUVENTUDE, OPERARIOS E CAMPONESES DE ANGOLA (PAJOCA)

Party of the Alliance of Youth, Workers and Peasants of Angola
Founded in May 1991 and led by Miguel Joao Sebastiao, the party
has one seat in the National Assembly.

xiv. PARTIDO SOCIAL DEMOCRATICO (PSD)
Social Democratic Party

Formed in May 1991, the Presidential candidate, Bengue Pedro
Joao was placed seventh in elections whilst the party gained
one seat in the National Assembly.

xv. PARTIDO RENOVADOR SOCIAL (PRS)
Social Renewal Party

The centrist PRS was formed in May 1991 and subsequently joined
other opposition parties in calling for a national conference
to agree a new political system. The party took third place in
the Assembly balloting winning six seats. Led by Antonio Joao
Machicungo.

Other parties in Angola are:

PARTIDO DEMOCRATICO LIBERAL ANGOLANO (PDLA) (Angolan Democratic
Liberal Party) - led by Honorato Lando.

PARTIDO ANGOLANO LIBERAL (Angolan Liberal Party)

PARTIDO SOCIAL DEMOCRATICO DE ANGOLA (PSDA) (Angolan Social
Democratic Party) - led by Andre Milton Kilandamoko.

UNIAO NACIONAL DE LIBERTACAO DE CABINDA (UNLC) (National Union
for the Liberation of Cabinda) - led by Lumindo Dimbi. [11]

ANNEX B

B.1 PROMINENT PEOPLE - PAST AND PRESENT

ALBRIGHT Dr Madeleine : US Secretary of State

ANNAN Kofi : UN Secretary General

ALVES Nito : Former MPLA Minister who staged abortive coup in May 1977

BEN-BEN Gen. Arlindo Chenda Isaac Pena : Deputy Chief of Staff, FAA. (Died October 1998)

BEYE Alioune Blondin : UN Secretary general's special representative to Angola (died June 1998)

BOCK General Bango Sapalalo: Chief of Operation , FALA

CARNEIRO Higino (General) : Deputy head of government delegation at joint commission

CHITUNDA Jeremias : Vice President of UNITA

DEMBO Gen. Antonio Sebastiao : Vice President of UNITA

DIALLO Issa : UN Secretary General's Special Representative to Angola (Maitre Beye's replacement). Arrived August 1998.

van DUNEM Fernando Jose Franca - Prime Minister

FERNANDES Gen. Tony da Costa: Angolan Ambassador to UK

GATO Armindo Lucas Paulo: Secretary - General of UNITA

IZATA Sebastiao : Vice Foreign Minister

LAVRADOR Sebastiao Bastos : Governor of Banco Nacional de Angola - appointed 1996

MANUVAKOLA Eugenio Antonino Ngolo : Former Secretary-General of UNITA - signed Lusaka Protocol on behalf of UNITA

de MATOS Gen. Joao Baptista : Chief of Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) General staff

MOCO Marcolino Jose Carlos : Prime Minister 11/92 - 06/96

MOURA Dr Venancio da Silva : Foreign Minister - signed Lusaka Protocol on behalf of MPLA

MUTEKA Faustino : Minister for Territorial Administration

NASCIMENTO Lopo do : MPLA Secretary General

NETO Dr Agostinho : President MPLA pre - independence to 1979

PENA Elias Salupeto : senior UNITA rep on joint military and political commission

PUNA Gen. Miguel N'Zau: Vice Minister for Territorial Administration.

ROBERTO Holden : President of FNLA

SAKALA Alcides: UNITA Secretary for Foreign Affairs

SAMAKUVA Isaias: head of UNITA delegation in Joint Commission, fled abroad in September 1998

dos SANTOS Jose Eduardo : President of the Republic of Angola.

SAVIMBI Dr Jonas : President of UNITA

TIAGO Henrique N'Zita : Leader of FLEC/FAC

TONHA Col - Gen. Pedro Maria : Minister of Defence since 1980 - died in London July 1995

VALENTIM Jorge : Tourism minister, now head of UNITA breakaway faction UNITA-R (UNITA Renovada)

ZABARRA Col. Isaac : secretary to UNITA's military council - surrendered to FAA and alleged Savimbi privately rejected peace accord.

ANNEX C

C.1 TRIBES AND LANGUAGES

1. BAKONGO (SINGULAR KONGO) LANGUAGE - KIKONGO

There are eight main tribes: Xikongo, Susso, Zombo, Sorongo, Iacas, Congo, Pombo and Suco. The Bakongo tribes are not exclusive to Angola - they are also found in neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo and Congo (Brazzaville).

2. MBUNDU (USUALLY KNOWN AS KIMBUNDU) LANGUAGE - KIMBUNDU

There are twenty main tribes: Ambundu, Luanda, Luango, Ntembo, Puna, Dembo, Bangala, Holo, Cari, Chinje, Minuungo, Bambeiro, Quilbala, Haco, Sende, Ngola (or Jinga), Bondo, Songo, Quissama and Libola.

This tribe is exclusive to Angola in the Luanda area fanning outwards to Cuanza Norte and Malange.

3. OVIMBUNDU (SINGULAR OCIMBUNDU) LANGUAGE - UMBUNDU

This is a homogeneous group divided into 22 cheifdoms. The tribe is exclusive to Angola within the Central Plateau region.

4. LUNDA - CHOKWE

There are seven main tribes: Lunda, Lunda-lua-Chindes, Lunda-Ndembo, Mataba, Cacongo, Mai, Chokwe. The Luanda are not exclusive to Angola, found also in neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo (Shaba Province) and Zambia (Western province) but the Chokwe proper are exclusive to Angola, in the Moxico region.

5. AMBO (PLURAL OVAMBO) LANGUAGE OSHIVAMBO

There are four main tribes inside Angola: Cuanhama, Cuamatui, Evale and Cafima. The Cuanhama (or Cuanyama) is also found in neighbouring Namibia.

6. NHANECA-HUMBE

There are ten main tribes: Muilas, Gambos, Humbles, Donguenas, Hingas, Cuancuas, Handas, Quipungos, Quilengues-Humbles and Quilengues-Musos. The tribe is exclusive to Angola in Huila and Cunene provinces of the South.

7. GANGUELA

There are twenty main tribes: Luimbe, Lovale, Lutchazi, Bunda, Ganguila, Ambuela, Ambuila-Mambumbo, Econjeiro, Ngonoielo, Mbande, Cangale, Iahuma, Gengista, Nicolia, Canachi, Ndungo, Nhengo, Nhemba and Avico.

Note: there are variations of spelling of all the above tribes.
[5]

ANNEX D

D.1 CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN ANGOLA

- 1974 MPLA AGREES AN INTERNAL STRUCTURE FOR PARTY AND APPOINTS DR AGOSTINHO NETO AS PRESIDENT
- JANUARY 1975 MEETING BETWEEN MPLA, UNITA AND FNLA IN KENYA: COMMON POLITICAL PROGRAMME REACHED
- JANUARY 1975 AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN THE THREE NATIONALIST PARTIES AND PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHING DATE OF INDEPENDENCE AND TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE
- FIGHTING BREAKS OUT BETWEEN THE MPLA AND FNLA
- JULY 1975 FULLY MPLA EXPELS FNLA FROM CAPITAL, UNITA BECOMES INVOLVED IN FIGHTING
- OCTOBER 1975 UNITA SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS ENTER ANGOLA TO SUPPORT AND FNLA
- NOVEMBER 1975 CUBAN TROOPS ASSIST MPLA
- 11 NOV 1975 OF INDEPENDENCE FROM PORTUGAL - PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC ANGOLA
- FEBRUARY 1976 AS ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY RECOGNISE ANGOLA MEMBER STATE.
- DECEMBER 1977 MPLA FORMULATES RIGOROUS MARXIST/LENINIST PROGRAMME FOR PARTY AND CHANGES NAME TO MPLA - PT: PARTIDO DE TRABALHO.
- SEPTEMBER 1979 AFTER PRESIDENT JOSE EDUARDO DOS SANTOS TAKES OVER DEATH OF DR AGOSTINHO NETO
- NOVEMBER 1980 PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY INAUGURATED
- 1981 - 1983 SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS OCCUPY LARGE AREAS OF TERRITORY IN ANGOLA WHILST FIGHTING WAR WITH NAMIBIAN NATIONALISTS.
- MID 1987 ENGAGES SOVIET SOUTH AFRICA CONFIRMS SUPPORT FOR UNITA & IN DIRECT MILITARY ACTION WITH CUBAN & TROOPS IN ANGOLA.
- 22 DEC 1988 AFRICA. BILATERAL AGREEMENT SIGNED BY ANGOLA & CUBA AND TRIPARTITE ACCORD BY ANGOLA, CUBA & SOUTH

JANUARY 1989 UN SECURITY COUNCIL AUTHORIZE CREATION OF A UN ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION (UNAVEM) TO MONITOR WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN TROOPS.

FEBRUARY 1989 MPLA GOVERNMENT OFFER 12 MONTH AMNESTY TO MEMBERS OF REBEL ORGANISATIONS

JUNE/JULY 1990 MPLA -PT DECIDE THAT ANGOLA WOULD MOVE TOWARDS A MULTI-PARTY POLITICAL SYSTEM.

OCTOBER 1990 MARXIST/LENINIST IDEOLOGY REPLACED WITH A COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM.

MARCH 1991 POLITICAL PARTIES LEGALISED

1 MAY 1991 ESTORIL PEACE AGREEMENT

JUNE 1991 JOINT MILITARY AND POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETS FOR FIRST TIME

15 JULY 1991 AMNESTY LAW INTRODUCED

MAY 1992 SUFFIX 'PT' DELETED FROM MPLA'S NAME

AUGUST 1992 COUNTRY NAME CHANGED TO REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA

27 SEPT 1992 FAPLA AND UNITA FORCES DISBANDED AND NEW NATIONAL ARMY, THE FORCAS ARMADAS DE ANGOLA (FAA) ESTABLISHED

29/30 SEPT 92 PRESIDENTIAL AND LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS TAKE PLACE

5 OCT 1992 UNITA WITHDRAW FROM FAA

11 OCT 1992 HEAVY FIGHTING BREAKS OUT IN LUANDA, MALANJE, HUAMBO AND HUILA PROVINCES

END NOV 1992 UNITA REPORTED TO BE IN CONTROL OF TWO THIRDS OF THE COUNTRY

22 JAN 1993 BLOODY FRIDAY: RIOTS AGAINST FRENCH SPEAKING ANGOLANS AND ZAIRIANS IN LUANDAN MARKET AREAS. 69 BAKONGO KILLED.

19 MAY 1993 US GOVERNMENT OFFICIALLY RECOGNISES ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT

26 SEPT 1993 UN IMPOSES ARMS AND PETROLEUM EMBARGO AGAINST UNITA

20 NOV 1994 LUSAKA PEACE ACCORD SIGNED.

FEBRUARY 1995 UNAVEM III CREATED BY UN SECURITY COUNCIL

MAY 1995 DOS SANTOS & SAVIMBI MEET IN LUSAKA FOR DIRECT TALKS

8 MAY 1996 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY APPROVED A NEW AMNESTY LAW COVERING PERIOD OF 31 MAY 1991 TO 8 MAY 1996

AUGUST 1996 UNITA DECLINE APPOINTMENT OF SAVIMBI TO THE POSITION OF NATIONAL VICE PRESIDENT

NOVEMBER 1996 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ADOPT CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION EXTENDING ITS MANDATE FOR BETWEEN TWO AND FOUR YEARS

11 APRIL 1997 GOVERNMENT OF UNITY AND RECONCILIATION INAUGURATED

1 JULY 1997 ESTABLISHMENT OF MONUA, SUCCESSOR TO UNAVEM III

JULY 1997 INTEGRATED ANGOLAN ARMED FORCES (FAA) OFFICIALLY INAUGURATED

30 OCT 1997 UN IMPOSES ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS AGAINST UNITA

12 NOV 1997 10 DIE IN MALANJE PRISON

28 NOV 1997 GOVERNMENT TAKES CONTROL OF UNITA TOWNS IN NORTH-EAST

22 DEC 1997 REGISTRATION OF 7877 RESIDUAL UNITA MILITARY PERSONNEL CONCLUDED

8 JAN 1998 239 LOCALITIES OUT OF 344 ARE UNDER STATE CONTROL

9 JAN 1998 GOVERNMENT AND UNITA AGREE TIMETABLE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF REMAINING TASKS UNDER LUSAKA PROTOCOL

END JAN 1998 UN SECURITY COUNCIL VOTE FOR THREE-MONTH EXTENSION FOR MONUA

END FEB 1998 TIMETABLE AGREED ON 9 JAN EXPIRES WITH KEY AREAS REMAINING OUTSTANDING

28 JUNE 1998 DEATH OF BEYE, UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO ANGOLA

AUGUST 1998 ARRIVAL OF ISSA DIALLO, BEYE'S REPLACEMENT

24 AUG 1998 ANGOLAN TROOPS CROSS THE BORDER INTO DRC TO
SUPPORT DRC PRESIDENT LAURENT KABILA IN THE
REBELLION AGAINST HIM

1 SEP 1998 UNITA MP'S AND MINISTERS SUSPENDED FROM
PARLIAMENT

15 SEP 1998 ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCE THEY WILL ONLY
NEGOTIATE WITH UNITA-R, SADC RECOGNISE UNITA-R

DECEMBER 1998 UN DECIDE TO WITHDRAW MONUA, BEGIN EVACUATION OF
PERSONNEL TO LUANDA

26 DEC 1998 & TWO UN AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN OVER UNITA-HELD
2 JAN 1999 TERRITORY. NO SURVIVORS

[1], [11], [15], [26], [38], [39], [40] & [51] [55] [59]

ANNEX E

E.1 ELECTION RESULTS

The results of the Presidential and Legislative elections published on 17 October 1992 were as follows:

President			
Candidate	No. of Votes	% of votes	
Jose Eduardo dos Santos (MPLA)	1,953,335	49.57	
Dr Jonas Malheiro Savimbi (UNITA)	1,579,298	40.07	
Antonio Alberto Neto (PDA)	85,249	2.16	
Holden Roberto (FNLA)	83,135	2.11	
Honorato Lando (PDLA)	75,789	1.92	
Luis dos Passos (PRD)	59,121	1.47	
Bengui Pedro Joao (PSD)	38,243	0.97	
Simao Cacete (FPD)	26,385	0.67	
Daniel Julio Chipenda (Independent)	20,646	0.52	
Analla de Victoria Pereira (PLD)	11,475	0.29	
Rui de Victoria Pereira (PRA)	9,208	0.23	
Total	3,940,884	100.00	

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National Assembly

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Party Votes % of votes Seats
 BB
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HMPLA	2,124,126	53.74	129	H
HUNITA	1,347,636	34.10	70	H
MFNLA	94,742	2.40	5	H
MPLD	94,269	2.39	3	H
MPRS	89,875	2.27	6	H
MPRD	35,293	0.89	1	H
HAD COALITION	34,166	0.86	1	H
RPSD	33,088	0.84	1	H
HPAJOCA	13,924	0.35	1	H
MFDA	12,038	0.30	1	H
MPDP-ANA	10,620	0.27	1	H
MPNDA	10,281	0.26	1	H
MCNDA	10,237	0.26	-	H
MPSDA	19,217	0.26	-	H
HPAI	9,007	0.23	-	H
MPDLA	8,025	0.20	-	H
MPDA	8,014	0.20	-	H
MPRA	6,719	0.17	-	H

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HTOTAL 3,952,277 100.00 220 H
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UNITA REPRESENTATIVES IN GURN:

Deputy Minister of Defence

- Ministries of:
- Geology & Mines
 - Trade
 - Health
 - Hotel & Transportation
 - Home Affairs
 - Finance
 - Agriculture
 - Public Works
 - Social Reintegration
 - Mass Communication

Commerce

NB All UNITA representatives suspended 01.09.1998 but dos Santos lifted the suspensions on three UNITA ministers (Valentim - Hotels and Tourism, Hossi - Commerce, Sicato - Health) and six vice-ministers in Defence, Interior, Social Re-integration, Finance, Agriculture and Public Works on 23.09.1998 because he had received "the necessary political clarification in relation to the peace process." [26] [39] & [54]

ANNEX F

F.1 GLOSSARY

CIVPOL	CIVILIAN POLICE
CGSILA	GENERAL CENTRALE OF INDEPENDENT AND FREE LABOUR UNIONS OF ANGOLA
DRC	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
FAA	ANGOLAN ARMED FORCES
FLEC	FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF CABINDA ENCLAVE
FNLA	NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA
GDP	GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
GURN	GOVERNMENT OF UNITY AND RECONCILIATION
HRMG	HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING GROUP
KZR	READJUSTED KWANZA
MONUA	UN OBSERVER MISSION IN ANGOLA
MPLA	POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA
SGSR	(UN) SECRETARY GENERAL'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
TPA	TELEVISION POPULAR ANGOLA
UN	UNITED NATIONS
UNAVEM	UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION
UNHCR	UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES
UNITA	NATIONAL UNION FOR THE TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANGOLA
UNSG	UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL
UNTA	UNION OF ANGOLAN WORKERS
WFP	WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME

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