

Flygtningenævnets baggrundsmateriale

Bilagsnr.:	950
Land:	Sudan
Kilde:	United Nations independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan
Titel:	Sudan: a war of Atrocities
Udgivet:	22. september 2025
Optaget på baggrundsmaterialet:	30. oktober 2025



General Assembly

Distr.: General
22 September 2025

Original: English

Human Rights Council

Sixtieth session

8 September–3 October 2025

Agenda item 2

**Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the
High Commissioner and the Secretary-General**

Sudan: a war of atrocities

Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan*

Summary

In the present report, the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan documents attacks on civilians and objects essential for survival in the Sudan. The mission concludes that both parties to the conflict have violated international human rights and humanitarian law, with most violations amounting to war crimes. The conduct of the Rapid Support Forces may also constitute crimes against humanity, including persecution and extermination. The mission calls for accountability and sets out a road map for justice.

* The present document was submitted to the conference services for processing after the deadline so as to include the most recent information.



I. Mandate

1. The independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan submits the present report pursuant to Human Rights Council resolutions 54/2 and 57/2. It focuses on the impact of the conflict on the civilian population and critical infrastructure and describes atrocities documented during the reporting period. It should be read in conjunction with the mission's previous report¹ and conference room paper.² It will be followed by a conference room paper.³
2. The mission is composed of three independent experts: Mohamed Chande Othman (United Republic of Tanzania) (Chair), Joy Ngozi Ezeilo (Nigeria) and Mona Rishmawi (Jordan, Switzerland and the State of Palestine). It is supported by a secretariat whose capacity is at approximately 40 per cent, due to the liquidity crisis affecting the United Nations.

II. Methodology and cooperation

A. Methodology

3. The standard of proof applied by the mission is that of "reasonable grounds to believe". The phrase "the mission finds" is used when this standard is met.
4. All information gathered by the mission is subjected to rigorous verification and corroboration, and open-source materials undergo authentication processes. Requests for cooperation by judicial and other entities are processed in line with applicable policies and procedures, and subject to informed consent from victims or witnesses.
5. The mission travelled to Ethiopia (10–14 December 2024), Uganda (1–18 December 2024), Chad (1–18 April 2025) and Kenya (20–22 February and 26–31 May 2025).
6. The mission conducted a total of 257 interviews (120 men, 137 women) between October 2024 and July 2025. Of those, 199 were conducted in person and 58 remotely. It held over 50 meetings and consultations with victims and survivors, affected communities, civil society, other stakeholders and experts.
7. The mission verified 43 videos and geolocated eight attacks. It reviewed information received from 147 individuals and 32 civil society organizations following the issuance of a call for submissions. It also reviewed reports from public sources, including United Nations, regional and international bodies and non-governmental organizations.
8. In February 2025, the mission observed the ongoing trial before the District Court of Stockholm against two former executives of the company Lundin Oil, accused of complicity in serious human rights violations and war crimes in the Sudan.
9. From 28 to 30 May 2025, the mission held a consultation on accountability in Nairobi with the support of the Kenya Section of the International Commission of Jurists.

B. Cooperation

10. The mission sent five notes verbales to the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations Office and other international organizations in Geneva. On 27 November

¹ [A/HRC/57/23](https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/ffm-sudan/index).

² See "Findings of the investigations conducted by the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023". Available at <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/ffm-sudan/index>.

³ The conference room paper will be available at <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/ffm-sudan/index>. For supplementary information on the conflict dynamics and on the sources used in the present report, see <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/ffm-sudan/a-hrc-60-22-additional-info.pdf>.

2024, with reference to correspondence sent previously, the mission renewed its request to visit the Sudan and to meet with officials. On 19 February 2025, it reiterated the request. On 2 July, it wrote to the civilian Prime Minister, requesting a meeting and a visit to the Sudan. On 28 July, it sent questions on allegations of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, also requesting a meeting. On 22 August, it shared a draft of the present report with the Permanent Mission, for comments. All communications went unanswered.

11. The mission wrote to the Rapid Support Forces on 14 July 2025, requesting a meeting. On 29 July, it reiterated the request and shared questions on allegations of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. No response was received.

12. The mission also sent notes verbales to neighbouring States, requesting access to Sudanese communities based there. It is grateful to Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, which provided visas to facilitate such access.

13. In December 2024, the mission met with African Union officials in Ethiopia, including members of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. It also met with representatives of the diplomatic corps, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the United Nations based in Ethiopia.

14. The mission deepened its collaboration with the African Union Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and Other Mass Atrocities and the joint fact-finding mission on the Sudan, established by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and the African Union.

15. The mission engaged with representatives of the European Union, the European Parliament and diplomats in Brussels, and participated in events related to its mandate in Germany, Kenya, Switzerland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

16. The mission established cooperation with judicial and other entities, including the International Criminal Court.

III. Legal developments

17. The legal framework applicable to the Sudan was outlined in the mission's previous report and conference room paper. The mission has classified the conflict that started in mid-April 2023 as a non-international armed conflict, with the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces as the main parties. Together with their allies, the parties are bound by international human rights law; article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and by the Protocol Additional thereto, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, to which the Sudan is a Party; and customary international law. The parties have signed the Jeddah Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan, which, despite repeated calls for its full implementation, remains unimplemented.

18. International humanitarian law imposes obligations on third States. Article 1 common to the Geneva Conventions requires all High Contracting Parties to respect and ensure respect for the respective Convention. States must not only ensure respect by their own armed forces, but also by other groups or persons acting on their behalf and the population as a whole. All States must refrain from providing aid or assistance that facilitates the commission of violations, and must work actively to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law.

19. Resolutions adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations are binding. The arms embargo and sanctions regime related to Darfur, in effect pursuant to Security Council resolution 1556 (2004) and subsequent resolutions, were extended for one year by Security Council resolution 2750 (2024). Targeted sanctions were imposed on several Sudanese individuals and companies affiliated to the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, including by Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the European Union and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan.

20. The Sudan instituted proceedings at the International Court of Justice, regarding alleged violations by the United Arab Emirates of obligations under the Convention on the

Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. It requested the Court to issue provisional measures ordering the United Arab Emirates to, inter alia, refrain from any conduct amounting to complicity in the commission of acts of genocide, specifically in relation to the Rapid Support Forces. The Court upheld the reservation to the Convention made by the United Arab Emirates, concluding that the Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the case.

21. In January and July 2025, the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court reiterated that it had reasonable grounds to believe that international crimes continued to be committed in Darfur. It announced that steps were being taken to request arrest warrants. In December 2024, closing arguments were delivered in the trial of Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman. All other suspects remain at large, including former President Omar Al-Bashir.

22. Accountability efforts are ongoing within several domestic jurisdictions. In the United Kingdom, a war crimes dossier concerning the Rapid Support Forces and international complicity was submitted to the relevant authorities. In the United States, legal proceedings were initiated against BNP Paribas, accused of violating sanctions and assisting the Government of the Sudan in committing international crimes between 1997 and 2011. In Sweden, the landmark trial against two former Lundin Oil executives for complicity in war crimes between 1999 and 2003 is ongoing, highlighting control over resources as a root cause of the recurring conflicts in the Sudan.

IV. Main findings

23. As the conflict in the Sudan intensifies, parties have not only failed to protect civilians and critical infrastructure, but rendered civilians primary targets. The mission documented widespread violence against individuals and communities, including killings, mass displacement, detention, enforced disappearance and sexual violence. Civilian infrastructure suffered extensive damage, with medical centres, schools, markets, food production systems, electricity stations and displacement camps being attacked.

A. Violations against life and integrity of the person

24. The mission finds that both warring parties and their allies targeted civilians and individuals taking no active part in hostilities were killed and injured through shelling and attacks on displacement camps, checkpoints, roads and convoys, and as a result of retaliatory assaults based on perceived allegiances. They also faced torture, arbitrary detention and sexual violence.

1. Attacks on civilians

25. From the beginning of the siege by the Rapid Support Forces of El Fasher in May 2024, El Fasher and surrounding areas have been repeatedly shelled by both warring parties. Over 470,000 persons have been displaced from El Fasher city and its surroundings, including from the Shagra, Zamzam and Abu Shawk displacement camps.

26. The Abu Shawk camp, north of El Fasher, has been a target of shelling by the Rapid Support Forces since mid-July 2024; the shelling intensified in 2025. Between 20 January and 31 March, multiple artillery strikes killed over 80 persons, injured others and caused severe damage to property, triggering displacement. On 10 April 2025, the Rapid Support Forces intensified its shelling on Abu Shawk; since then, shelling has occurred almost daily, killing dozens of civilians and causing massive damage. More than 300 people have reportedly been killed in Abu Shawk from all the shelling. Most civilians in the camp were from non-Arab communities.

27. Since May 2024, the Zamzam displacement camp, south of El Fasher, has also been shelled regularly by the Rapid Support Forces. The Rapid Support Forces associate certain communities, particularly the Zaghawa, with the joint forces allied to the Sudanese Armed Forces, which are present in the area. One witness noted, in Arabic: “They burned everything. They claimed they only wanted to fight soldiers, but they punished the whole community. It

felt like they wanted to remove us because of who we are.” This shelling intensified by late 2024 and was particularly heavy on 11 and 12 February 2025, when the Rapid Support Forces stormed the camp. At least 30 persons were killed and 21 injured. Looting occurred.

28. From 11 to 13 April 2025, the Rapid Support Forces and allies conducted a large-scale ground offensive on the Zamzam camp. A large military convoy entered the camp, firing randomly, killing and injuring many people. Members or perceived associates of the Sudanese Armed Forces and joint forces were summarily executed. Estimates of the number of persons killed range from 300 to 1,500, with over 157 wounded, the majority women and children. By the time the Rapid Support Forces took control, parts of the camp were burned, and all facilities were destroyed. Over 400,000 inhabitants – about 81 per cent of the camp’s population – were again displaced, with many fleeing towards Tawilah or back to El Fasher.

29. The Rapid Support Forces also attacked civilian convoys. In mid-January 2025, the Rapid Support Forces attacked a convoy of between 40 and 60 vehicles close to the border with Chad. They were largely carrying persons from non-Arab communities, fleeing from Tawilah to Tine, in Chad. The convoy had been assured safe passage through areas under the control of the Rapid Support Forces and was escorted by neutral forces. At a checkpoint at the entrance of Kabkabiyah, it was ordered to stop. Members of the Rapid Support Forces and affiliates surrounded the vehicles and opened fire on the convoy. The sudden attack caused panic. Civilians attempted to escape, but at least 30 were killed. Others were captured, detained and subjected to physical assaults until their families paid ransoms.

30. On the road or at checkpoints as they were fleeing, many civilians, including children, were killed, beaten, robbed and subjected to racial slurs by the Rapid Support Forces. The main victim groups of these attacks were non-Arab communities, specifically, members of the Zaghawa, Fur, Masalit and Tunjur communities.

Findings

31. The mission finds that the Rapid Support Forces and their allies continued to carry out coordinated, large-scale attacks on civilians as part of a deliberate policy targeting non-Arab communities. These operations, some involving large-scale killings and forced displacement, constitute serious violations of international humanitarian law, intersecting with the prohibition of adverse distinction based on race or ethnicity, including violence to life and person, intentionally directing attacks against civilians, terrorizing populations and forcing civilian displacement. They also violate international human rights law, particularly the rights to life and to non-discrimination.

32. The mission finds that acts carried out by the Rapid Support Forces, occurring in the context of and directly linked to the non-international armed conflict, amount to war crimes, including violence to life and person, in particular murder, intentionally directing attacks against civilians, and forcing the displacement of civilians. Given the widespread and systematic character of the acts and the existence of an underlying policy, the mission finds that the Rapid Support Forces also committed crimes against humanity, notably murder, torture, forced displacement, persecution on ethnic grounds and other inhumane acts.

2. Reprisals

33. The mission finds that civilians were targeted – by both parties and their respective allies – because of their real or perceived affiliation with the opposite side.

Rapid Support Forces and allies

34. In early October 2024, after the joint forces allied with the Sudanese Armed Forces attacked and captured a base of the Rapid Support Forces in Bir Maza, North Darfur, the Rapid Support Forces and their allies attacked Kutum locality, targeting several villages between the towns of Kutum and Anka, perceived as sympathetic to the Sudanese Armed Forces. Towns and villages, including Breidik, Bir Maza and Anka, were looted and burned. By late November 2024, an estimated 4,630 households had been displaced from Kutum locality. Over 50 individuals were killed, primarily from Zaghawa and Tunjur communities.

35. Following the defection of Commander Abu Aqla Keikel and his Sudan Shield Forces from the Rapid Support Forces to the Sudanese Armed Forces on 20 October 2024, the Rapid Support Forces launched attacks in Commander Keikel's stronghold in east Gezira. Over 30 towns and villages, including Tambul, Rufa'a, Sireha and Hilaliyya, were targeted. Witnesses reported extrajudicial killings, beatings, widespread looting and rape. The Rapid Support Forces entered Tambul in vehicles and on motorcycles, shooting at residents with heavy machine guns, entering houses, and beating and insulting residents for the perceived celebration of Commander Keikel's defection. By November 2024, the Rapid Support Forces had reportedly killed hundreds of people, including 80 in Sireha alone. Over 130,000 people fled their homes.

Sudanese Armed Forces and allies

36. After the Sudanese Armed Forces and their allies recaptured Gezira in January 2025, reprisals targeted, in particular, the Kanabi community, which was accused of siding with the Rapid Support Forces. Between 9 and 12 January 2025, the Sudan Shield Forces attacked several Kanabi villages, including Tayba and Dar al-Salam al-Hideba. They arrived in armed vehicles, shooting and killing unarmed civilians, burning homes and looting property and livestock. In Tayba alone, at least 26 individuals, including a child, were killed. Perpetrators used racial slurs, such as *abeed* (slaves) and *gharaba* (foreigners), against victims. In Dar al-Salam al-Hideba, at least 16 individuals were killed and many houses looted and burned. Some remain missing. Most residents were forced to flee and were prevented from returning to their village.

37. During the retaking of Wad Madani, between 12 and 25 January 2025, videos verified by the mission show individuals in army fatigues beating a civilian on crutches. Another man was beaten, thrown from a bridge and then shot. Other videos show individuals beaten while being accused of supporting the Rapid Support Forces. Some perpetrators appeared in Al-Baraa bin Malik Brigade uniforms. One perpetrator can be heard saying, in Arabic: "This is in revenge for all our martyrs."

38. Verified videos also document violent reprisals by the Sudanese Armed Forces and their allies carried out during the advance towards and recapture of Khartoum, Omdurman and Khartoum North. They show men in uniforms of the Sudanese Armed Forces or allied forces beating and killing individuals in civilian clothes who are accused of being members of the Rapid Support Forces. One video, dated 8 January 2025, shows individuals in army uniforms in Umm Badda, south Omdurman, beating a man in civilian clothes while saying, in Arabic: "This guy is Rapid Support Forces and [a] Kafir-infidel." They then shoot and kill him. Another video, dated 19 February 2025, shows several detained men blindfolded and tied together while soldiers beat them with sticks and chant slurs at them for supporting the Rapid Support Forces. On 25 March 2025, also in Umm Badda, six individuals in army uniforms are seen dragging an injured young man in civilian clothes and then shooting him. A man in civilian clothes decapitated the body with a knife and held the victim's head, while others chanted "*Allahu akbar*". On 27 March 2025, in Jereif West, Khartoum, two individuals in army uniforms publicly executed an individual in civilian clothes for suspected collaboration with the Rapid Support Forces.

39. The mission received credible reports, which it continues to investigate, of similar targeting by the Sudanese Armed Forces and allies of the Arab Rizeigat community in Sennar on the basis of their perceived allegiance with the Rapid Support Forces.

Findings

40. The mission finds that the parties, and their allies, carried out large-scale attacks against civilians in North Darfur, Gezira and/or Khartoum. Civilians were deliberately targeted on the basis of their ethnicity and/or perceived affiliation with the opposing side. The mission documented killings, some at a large scale, executions and injuring of civilians. These acts constitute serious international humanitarian law violations intersecting with the prohibition of adverse distinction based on race or ethnicity, including violence to life and person, outrages upon personal dignity, intentionally directing attacks against civilians, and measures designed to terrorize populations.

41. The mission recorded collective punishment, reprisals and conflict-related displacement. The Sudanese Armed Forces, in some cases with civilian involvement, were responsible for desecration of the dead and exposing victims to public curiosity. Executions of civilians or persons hors de combat without judicial guarantees violate international humanitarian law. The mission finds that these practices also violate international human rights law, including the rights to life, liberty, security of person, freedom from torture, non-discrimination and guarantees of fair trial and due process.

42. Accordingly, the mission finds that both parties committed war crimes, including violence to life and person, intentionally directing attacks against civilians or persons hors de combat, collective punishment or reprisals against civilians, and forced displacement of civilians.

43. It also finds that the Sudanese Armed Forces perpetrated the war crimes of carrying out executions without previous judgment or judicial guarantees and outrages on personal dignity by desecration of the dead. The Rapid Support Forces also committed crimes against humanity, in particular murder, persecution on ethnic grounds, forced displacement and other inhumane acts.

3. Arbitrary detention, torture and inhuman treatment

44. The mission finds that both parties detained individuals arbitrarily without charge or legal process, and subjected them to torture, inhuman and degrading treatment and inhuman conditions.

Rapid Support Forces

45. In Darfur, Khartoum and other parts of the Sudan under its control, the Rapid Support Forces detained civilians in military bases, police stations, prisons and civilian infrastructure that had been converted into detention facilities.

46. Most detainees were arrested at their homes or checkpoints. They were held incommunicado without access to legal representation or communication with, or visits by, their families. None were charged, and none appeared before a court.

47. Guards of the Rapid Support Forces subjected detainees to severe beatings with whips. One interviewee stated that he had been beaten, whipped and drenched with cold water for several hours until he lost consciousness. The beatings continued for three days.

48. Detainees were held in crowded facilities without access to adequate food and sanitation or medical care, including in Soba prison in Khartoum and the central prison in Zalingei. Those detained in Soba prison described it as a “slaughterhouse”, stating that between June and October 2024, at least 50 detainees had died due to torture, malnutrition and lack of medical care. Some detainees were forced to work in construction or prepare meals for the guards.

49. Families of some detainees had to pay ransom to secure their release. One witness, held near Nyala between February and August 2024, stated that a guard had told him he could “buy his freedom”. The detainee managed to relay a message to his wife, who paid around 500,000 Sudanese pounds (\$833) for his release. He was threatened with consequences if he disclosed that he had been held by the Rapid Support Forces.

50. Guards of the Rapid Support Forces executed detainees, including seven detainees at a military base of the Rapid Support Forces in North Darfur in May 2024. Verified videos depict armed men wearing Rapid Support Forces uniforms beating a large group of approximately 15 to 25 male detainees with sticks and whips and then shooting them in Salha, Omdurman, on or around 27 April 2025.

Sudanese Armed Forces

51. Arrests carried out by the Sudanese Armed Forces were based mainly on suspicion of collaboration with the Rapid Support Forces. In areas retaken by the Sudanese Armed Forces or at army checkpoints, many who lived under the control of the Rapid Support Forces were stopped, beaten and detained for alleged association with the Rapid Support Forces. Former

detainees reported that they had been subjected to incommunicado detention and highlighted the lack of due process and judicial oversight. Only one of those detainees had appeared before a judge, which had led to his release following more than two months of detention.

52. Individuals recounted horrific details of their treatment in detention facilities of the Sudanese Armed Forces. In military intelligence facilities in Singa, Sennar, in May 2024, detainees were beaten with water pipes while tied. At the White Nile military base, daily beatings with sticks and whips also took place, and detainees were punched and kicked.

53. In Serkab prison in Karari, Omdurman, a victim was hit with a hammer upon arrival. He was interrogated about his connections with the Rapid Support Forces; during the interrogation, he was forced to sit naked on a metal chair, with weights attached to his genitals, while two masked men administered electric shocks. Another victim, arrested in El Fasher in April 2025, was beaten by six soldiers after denying having collaborated with the Rapid Support Forces. He was later held in solitary confinement for 20 days before being released.

54. Witnesses also reported the lack of adequate food, sanitation and medical care in army detention facilities. For instance, in Serkab prison, some prisoners slept standing up, due to the overcrowding of cells.

Findings

55. The mission finds that both parties arbitrarily arrested and detained civilians, subjecting them to inhuman conditions and severe physical and mental suffering for purposes of intimidation, coercion, punishment or discrimination. The Rapid Support Forces carried out executions and caused deaths in detention. These acts constitute serious international humanitarian law violations, including violence to life and person and outrages upon dignity, as well as violations of international human rights law, notably the prohibitions of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and the rights to life, liberty, security, health and adequate food.

56. The mission finds that the Rapid Support Forces forced detainees into labour, or demanded ransoms for their release, amounting to hostage-taking and forced labour practices in violation of both international humanitarian law and international human rights law.

57. Accordingly, the mission finds that both parties perpetrated war crimes, including violence to life and person, in particular murder, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture, and outrages upon personal dignity. The Rapid Support Forces also perpetrated the war crimes of murder and hostage-taking. Given its widespread and systematic character, the acts of the Rapid Support Forces may also amount to crimes against humanity, including imprisonment or severe deprivation of liberty, requiring further investigation.

4. Sexual and gender-based violence

58. The mission received an overwhelming volume of information on and evidence of sexual violence, including rape, gang rape, forced nudity, abduction, sexual slavery and forced marriage. Members of the Rapid Support Forces were identified as the primary perpetrators, but members of the Sudanese Armed Forces were also implicated. While predominantly directed at women and girls, some victims were men and boys.

Rapid Support Forces

59. The Rapid Support Forces used sexual violence as a deliberate tactic to humiliate and subjugate women, girls and entire communities. Such violence is rooted in racism, prejudice and extreme cruelty, and violence has become a defining feature of the conflict. It is enabled by widespread impunity.

60. Sexual violence occurred throughout the conflict zones, including Khartoum North, El Fasher, Gezira, Khartoum, Kordofan, Kurni, Nyala, Omdurman and Zamzam. It took place in streets, public squares, homes, abandoned buildings and forested areas. In some incidents, multiple perpetrators in Rapid Support Forces uniforms raped women and girls. In June 2025, one survivor fleeing El Fasher was stopped at a checkpoint of the Rapid Support Forces between Shagra and Tawilah. She was taken to an abandoned building, along with several

other women and girls aged 15 to 17, where they were all raped. Some raped women were visibly pregnant, while others became pregnant as a result of the rape.

61. Forced nudity was also documented, particularly in Khartoum and Gezira. Girls were reportedly stripped at checkpoints manned by the Rapid Support Forces, under the pretext of searches. A male victim reported being forced to remain naked for three consecutive days while detained by the Rapid Support Forces in Khartoum.

62. In areas under their control, the Rapid Support Forces systematically carried out abductions for sexual exploitation purposes. This violence was especially prevalent between May 2023 and February 2025 in North and South Darfur and Khartoum. In El Fasher, in April 2024, one woman and her sister, along with three girls, were abducted from their house, blindfolded and taken to a Rapid Support Forces camp, where they were repeatedly raped over three days. Witnesses reported women and girls being forced into Rapid Support Forces vehicles. Many have been reported missing. There are allegations, requiring further investigation, of the Rapid Support Forces trafficking and selling women and girls. One interviewee saw 28 young women with their hands tied being brought by the Rapid Support Forces to the Al-Daman Hotel in Nyala in May 2023, allegedly to be sold.

63. Forced marriage is another form of gender-based violence. It was documented primarily in Khartoum and Gezira, between May 2023 and December 2024. Members of the Rapid Support Forces appear to have coerced families, often during home raids, into “marrying” off girls as young as 12. The coercion included killing or injuring family members, or threats of such violence.

64. Sexual violence often has an ethnic dimension. The Rapid Support Forces mostly targeted women and girls belonging to non-Arab communities in North Darfur, including the Zaghawa and Fur, often associating them with the joint forces allied with the Sudanese Armed Forces. Racial slurs were used to dehumanize victims. In some cases, perpetrators apparently stated that rape was intended to “improve” the victims’ race. Information was also received about children born out of rape and that many such children have been abandoned or remain undocumented. More investigation is needed in this area.

65. The persistence and recurrence of violent sexual acts across multiple regions and time frames indicate a systemic pattern. Access to medical and psychological services for survivors of sexual violence remains limited, mainly due to the collapse of the healthcare system within the Sudan and decreased support in displacement. Many women and girls only sought help after fleeing to neighbouring countries.

Sudanese Armed Forces

66. The mission received evidence that members of the Sudanese Armed Forces had committed sexual violence in the White Nile, Blue Nile, Khartoum and Northern States. Documented incidents include rape, sexual harassment and sexualized torture of women and men, particularly during detention or while they were fleeing. One example is the above-mentioned case of a man detained for months by the Sudanese Armed Forces in Khartoum in 2024 and subjected to sexualized torture, including electrocution to his genitals.

67. The mission continues to investigate rape and other forms of sexual violence by the Sudanese Armed Forces. These violations appear to be underreported, as victims fear retaliation and fear being perceived as sympathetic towards the Sudanese Armed Forces in some areas.

Findings

68. The mission finds that the Rapid Support Forces continued large-scale rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence against women and girls, often targeting victims on the basis of both their gender and ethnic identity. These acts, including forced nudity of men in detention, constitute serious violations of international humanitarian law, intersecting with the prohibition of adverse distinction, including violence to life and person (in particular cruel treatment and torture), and outrages upon personal dignity, in particular rape and indecent assault, as well as collective punishment on intersecting gender and ethnic grounds.

69. Under international human rights law, this conduct violates the rights of victims, including children and family members who witnessed the violence, to be free from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; to physical and mental health, including reproductive rights; and to non-discrimination. The mission confirmed a pattern of deprivation of liberty, including forced marriage of women and children for sexual purposes, where perpetrators appear to exercise ownership over the victims, amounting to sexual slavery.

70. Accordingly, the mission finds that the Rapid Support Forces committed war crimes, including violence to life and person, outrages upon personal dignity, rape and sexual slavery. The mission finds that this conduct formed part of a widespread and systematic attack against civilians and constitutes crimes against humanity, including torture, enslavement, rape, sexual slavery and comparable sexual violence, persecution on intersecting ethnic and gender grounds, and other inhumane acts.

B. Attacks on civilian infrastructure

71. The mission has documented a consistent pattern of attacks on civilian infrastructure and objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. Hospitals, markets, water sources and electricity systems were damaged. These attacks have had a devastating impact on civilians, preventing access to healthcare, food, clean water and shelter. Food insecurity increased due to the inability of farmers to reach their fields, and because seeds were not distributed owing to the conflict.

1. Attacks on food systems and other critical infrastructure

Rapid Support Forces

72. The Rapid Support Forces and their allies systematically targeted civilians and civilian objects, including dwellings, markets, shops and food sources, as well as critical infrastructure, including water and electricity systems, across the Sudan. Ground operations were accompanied by widespread looting, including of personal items, livestock, stock in warehouses, generators, solar panels and water pumps.

73. The Rapid Support Forces repeatedly shelled civilian neighbourhoods in areas under the control of the Sudanese Armed Forces in the southern and western parts of El Fasher city, mostly inhabited by non-Arab communities, destroying homes and infrastructure, and killing many civilians in houses, hospitals, markets and streets. In particular, the Al-Wahda and Al-Thawra neighbourhoods were targeted and destroyed. Shelling intensified late in 2024, and intensified shelling was still occurring at the time of writing, damaging residential areas and houses. The Rapid Support Forces also launched ground attacks on several El Fasher neighbourhoods, as well as nearby villages and towns, including Burush on 25 January 2025, and Shagra on 27 February, killing civilians, and destroying and looting property. Shagra was burned to the ground.

74. The Rapid Support Forces also struck markets. On 23 September 2024, shelling by the Rapid Support Forces struck Sabreen Market in Karari, Omdurman, killing at least 15 civilians. A second attack on the same market, on 1 February 2025, killed 54 to 60 civilians and wounded about 158. In North Darfur, particularly in and around El Fasher, repeated shelling of local markets, including the Al-Mawashi livestock market on 3 and 4 July 2024 and 26 September, killed over 40 civilians and damaged the livestock market and livelihoods. The Rapid Support Forces repeatedly shelled the market in the Abu Shawk displacement camp, including in August, November and December 2024, in January 2025 and on 5 March, 18 May and 4 June 2025, killing and injuring civilians, damaging food stalls and supplies.

75. In North Darfur, ground attacks launched by the Rapid Support Forces were documented in 2024 and 2025, including on Zamzam, Abu Zurayqah, Um Hajalij, Tabit and Dar al-Salam. In October and November 2024, attacks by the Rapid Support Forces on Kutum, Breidik, Bir Maza and Anka set markets surrounding homes ablaze and led to widespread looting and the villages being burned down. On 11 and 12 February 2025, during assaults on the Zamzam displacement camp, the Rapid Support Forces and their allies burned

large parts of the market and looted food, livestock and vehicles. Individuals bringing food into the camp were also targeted: some were killed, while others were robbed of their goods. These recurring operations destroyed essential trading infrastructure and hampered access to vital goods.

76. The Rapid Support Forces attacked the electricity infrastructure of the Sudan. Early in April 2025, drone strikes launched by the Rapid Support Forces hit the Merowe Dam power station, disrupting supply across northern parts of the Sudan. On 14 May, drone strikes destroyed several power stations in Omdurman, causing widespread blackouts. The El Fasher grid has been a frequent target, with repeated strikes causing prolonged interruptions to electricity and Internet services.

77. The Rapid Support Forces targeted water infrastructure, particularly around El Fasher. Late in May 2024, it briefly seized the Golo water reservoir – the primary water source for El Fasher – and shut down pumps. In February 2025, the Rapid Support Forces damaged water facilities and supply lines in Shagra, exacerbating water shortages in El Fasher. Attacks by the Rapid Support Forces on the Abu Shawk and Zamzam displacement camps further disrupted access to safe water; by mid-2025, many local water towers and pumps had been destroyed or were non-functional.

78. Farmland and crops were also destroyed, including by destructive grazing, or burned by the Rapid Support Forces and their allies. Between 31 March and 15 April 2024, Berka and eight other villages and surrounding agricultural land west of El Fasher were subjected to arson and destruction. Crops were also forcibly grazed in Muhajiriyah, East Darfur in late 2024.

Sudanese Armed Forces

79. The Sudanese Armed Forces destroyed civilian property and infrastructure, particularly through shelling and air strikes on areas held by the Rapid Support Forces.

80. The Sudanese Armed Forces frequently conducted attacks on civilian neighbourhoods, particularly in east El Fasher, killing and injuring civilians, and damaging their houses and property. As civilians began to flee, the Rapid Support Forces occupied houses and schools, resulting in the Sudanese Armed Forces shelling entire residential areas, causing extensive casualties and widespread damage to civilian property and infrastructure. One witness described how, in October 2024, his house was hit by an air strike, killing his siblings.

81. Markets across North Darfur have suffered deadly air strikes by the Sudanese Armed Forces. On 4 October 2024, air strikes launched by the Sudanese Armed Forces on Koma market near El Fasher reportedly killed at least 45 civilians, including 13 children, and injured hundreds. The entire market was engulfed in flames and destroyed. Multiple surrounding structures, including health facilities and water sources, were also damaged. Koma market was struck again on 1 June 2025, killing dozens of civilians.

82. The Sudanese Armed Forces also struck the market and wells in nearby Mellit multiple times after the Rapid Support Forces took control of it, including on 26 April 2024, when strikes on water wells killed hundreds of camels, and 2 September, when a strike on Al-Aish market killed 14 persons and severely disrupted trade activities and food access. On 9 December 2024, a strike on the Kabkabiyah market killed over 100 civilians. Verified videos show the market destroyed, with damaged buildings, burned shops, smoke, and wounded civilians being pulled from under the rubble by other civilians.

83. On 24 March 2025, the Sudanese Armed Forces bombed the Tora market, north of El Fasher, during peak hours, setting fire to the market, burning cattle and other livestock and people, and killing and injuring hundreds of civilians, largely women and children, and many animals, including livestock. The Sudanese Armed Forces reportedly used imprecise barrel bombs. The consequences were catastrophic, as Tora was among the last accessible food sources in the area.

84. The Sudanese Armed Forces also hit markets in other parts of the Sudan, including the Fur market in Hasahisa, Gezira, on 7 October 2024, killing over 100 civilians.

Findings

85. The mission finds that the Rapid Support Forces and their allies engaged in large-scale looting and pillage and the destruction of objects essential to civilian survival, including through the burning of camps and towns. These acts deprived civilians of food, water and housing, violating international humanitarian law and economic, social and cultural rights.

86. It finds that both parties failed to take sufficient measures to minimize the impact of air strikes and artillery on civilians and civilian infrastructure, including markets. Indiscriminate attacks risking civilian lives violate international humanitarian law and human rights law as well as international criminal law.

87. The mission finds that the Rapid Support Forces and their allies perpetrated war crimes, including pillage and intentionally directing attacks against civilians. Combined with the denial of humanitarian relief supplies, they also committed the war crime of intentionally using starvation as a method of warfare by depriving the civilian population of objects indispensable to their survival. These acts may also constitute crimes against humanity, including persecution on ethnic and political grounds, forced displacement and other inhumane acts, and contributing to extermination.

2. Attacks on medical facilities

88. The mission finds that attacks on, or in the vicinity of, medical infrastructure by both parties have caused the near-total collapse of the healthcare system across the Sudan.

89. The World Health Organization and other organizations have documented several hundred attacks on healthcare infrastructure since the beginning of the conflict. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that as at 30 June 2025, less than 25 per cent of the health facilities remained operational in the worst-affected areas. Over half of the reported attacks occurred during the siege of El Fasher. The same Office reported that, by March 2025, over 200 health facilities in El Fasher were no longer operational. The destruction of these essential services has left civilians without access to urgent care. More than 20 million people are in need of healthcare, amid escalating medical needs due to injury, malnutrition and disease.

Rapid Support Forces

90. The Rapid Support Forces carried out large-scale and systematic attacks on medical facilities across the Sudan, including Gezira, Khartoum and North Darfur, attacking hospitals, looting medical supplies and killing medical care professionals, leading to widespread closures, further deaths and the collapse of healthcare provision.

91. Around El Fasher, in particular, attacks on health infrastructure has escalated since May 2024. The Al-Janoubi hospital in southern El Fasher, which was one of the last two remaining surgical-capacity facilities, was repeatedly attacked between 25 May and 8 June; several individuals were killed.

92. On 8 June 2024, fighters of the Rapid Support Forces entered the hospital, opening fire on staff and patients, looting medical supplies and taking an ambulance. Family members attempting to evacuate patients were shot at. This attack led to the closure of the hospital.

93. The Saudi maternity teaching hospital, in western El Fasher, was also repeatedly shelled. From March 2024 onwards, artillery shelling damaged the facility and injured civilians. On 19 May, the maternity ward was struck; on 21 June, the shelling killed a pharmacist and four others; on 27 June, an attack damaged the pharmacy and water tanks. Additional attacks on 29 July killed three persons and injured 25. On 11 August, another attack killed one person, injured five and damaged the surgical ward. Between October and December 2024, continued strikes caused severe structural damage to the hospital and more casualties. On 24 January 2025, a drone strike launched by the Rapid Support Forces killed over 70 people and destroyed its emergency and surgical wards, rendering the hospital non-operational.

94. Smaller clinics in and around El Fasher were forced to close due to destruction, insecurity or looting. Patients often required transfer amid dangerous conditions, as the Rapid Support Forces increased control of roads.

95. In northern El Fasher, the police hospital was shelled in August 2024, injuring civilians and destroying the facility, which was subsequently abandoned. In Birdik, the local clinic was burned down by the Rapid Support Forces in November 2024.

96. Medical infrastructure in displacement camps was similarly decimated. In Abu Shawk, all medical facilities, including a private clinic, an emergency volunteer unit and a malnutrition treatment centre, were destroyed by attacks in April and June 2024.

97. In February 2025, the Rapid Support Forces shelled and raided multiple hospitals in Khartoum, including the Al-Nau hospital in Omdurman, killing at least six civilians. In late November 2024, the Rapid Support Forces attacked Hilaliyya in Gezira, looting health facilities and threatening to kill health workers.

98. Medical personnel were directly targeted. Since the start of the conflict, at least 159 health workers were reportedly attacked, while others were arrested. Most of these cases were attributed to the Rapid Support Forces. For example, one doctor was killed in his home in Thawra in El Fasher, and another was abducted to treat wounded fighters. In Kutum, the Rapid Support Forces occupied the hospital and threatened staff, demanding preferential treatment for their wounded fighters. On 24 December 2024 and 10 January 2025, during patient transfers to El Fasher, Médecins sans frontières (international) ambulance staff were shot at, forcing that organization to suspend operations. On 11 April 2025, fighters of the Rapid Support Forces shot and killed 11 Relief International clinic staff and injured several more persons in Zamzam.

Sudanese Armed Forces

99. The Sudanese Armed Forces also launched attacks on hospitals or in their vicinity, including in Khartoum and North Darfur, with serious consequences. For example, on 11 May 2024, an air strike landed roughly 50 metres from the Babiker Nahar paediatric hospital in El Fasher, killing two children and one caregiver and injuring other persons. Médecins sans frontières (international) had to suspend operations in what was one of the few children's hospitals in the country. The facility was eventually closed.

100. On 28 May 2024, air strikes launched by the Sudanese Armed Forces caused a fire in Kutum hospital in North Darfur, destroying the maternity ward and major infrastructure. Several patients and staff were killed or injured, and the hospital was rendered inoperable.

101. On 21 June 2025, the Sudanese Armed Forces bombed the Mijlad referral hospital in West Kordofan, killing at least 41 persons and wounding dozens more. The hospital remains only partially operational.

Findings

102. The mission finds that the parties violated the protections afforded to medical facilities and personnel. It finds that the Rapid Support Forces made medical units, transports, and the wounded and sick the objects of attack and compelled medical staff to perform tasks or prioritize patients on non-medical grounds. These acts constitute prohibited acts under international humanitarian law and human rights law, including violations of the rights to life and to physical and mental health.

103. The mission finds that the Sudanese Armed Forces failed to take sufficient measures to minimize the impact of air strikes and artillery on civilians and civilian infrastructure, including hospitals and medical facilities. Indiscriminate attacks that put civilian lives at risk violate international humanitarian law and human rights law as well as international criminal law.

104. Accordingly, the mission finds that the Rapid Support Forces perpetrated war crimes, including violence to life and person and intentionally directing attacks against hospitals and locations where the wounded and sick are collected. Taken together with other findings, these acts may also constitute the war crimes of intentionally directing attacks against civilians,

forcing civilian displacement and the use of starvation as a method of warfare, as well as crimes against humanity, including persecution on ethnic grounds, forced displacement and contributing to extermination.

3. Attacks on humanitarian workers and facilities

105. Humanitarian workers and facilities were targeted or caught in the crossfire. Between April 2023 and April 2025, more than 84 Sudanese humanitarian workers were reportedly killed.

106. On 15 April 2023, several World Food Programme (WFP) staff members were killed as a result of clashes between the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces in Kabkabiyah; the Rapid Support Forces also looted WFP vehicles and cash intended for aid. On 19 December 2024, three WFP workers were killed as a result of an aerial bombardment that hit the WFP field office compound in Yabus, Blue Nile State.

107. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that a team from an international non-governmental organization was abducted by armed men in June 2025 while visiting Nertiti, in Central Darfur. The members of the team were released after a few days.

108. An alarming incident that the mission continues to investigate concerns a drone attack on a joint WFP and UNICEF humanitarian convoy during the night of 2 June 2025, in Koma in North Darfur. The convoy was carrying food supplies for El Fasher. The attack killed five humanitarian workers, injured several others and damaged life-saving humanitarian supplies. According to WFP, the parties were aware of the whereabouts and route of the convoy. The trucks were marked with WFP and UNICEF banners. The convoy had been stopped in El Koma by the Rapid Support Forces, which controlled the area, and was waiting for permission to proceed to El Fasher.

109. United Nations entities and international non-governmental organizations continue to face administrative challenges, including delays in issuing visas and travel authorizations, which hamper their operations. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that in May 2025, only 110 of the 355 pending visa requests were approved, and the backlog is increasing.

Findings

110. The mission finds that attacks on humanitarian facilities, convoys and workers, along with imposed bureaucratic restrictions, significantly impeded humanitarian operations, and resulted in the denial of humanitarian access; in particular, such denial was part of the prohibited siege tactics used against El Fasher and surrounding areas. Despite the Security Council's call, in resolution 2724 (2024), and request, in resolution 2736 (2024), for the parties to allow rapid, safe and unhindered passage of humanitarian relief, both parties continued to carry out actions contrary to their international humanitarian law obligations.

111. The mission finds that these violations, together with acts of intentionally directing attacks on civilians and destruction of objects indispensable to their survival, have contributed to famine and starvation in and around El Fasher. It finds that the Rapid Support Forces, through its siege of El Fasher and its surroundings, committed the war crime of intentionally using starvation as a method of warfare by depriving civilians of objects indispensable to their survival, including by wilfully impeding relief supplies. The combined effect of deprivation of access to food and medicine and attacks on and obstruction of humanitarian assistance by the Rapid Support Forces may also amount to the crime against humanity of extermination.

4. Attacks on places of worship and culture

112. The mission received credible allegations of attacks on places of worship by both warring parties and is planning additional investigations on this topic.

113. The Sudanese Armed Forces reportedly bombed the Sheikh El Jeili Mosque in Wad Madani in October 2024, and the Sheikh Elsidq Mosque in Khartoum North in December 2024. Later that same month, an air strike launched by the Sudanese Armed Forces damaged the Al Ezba Baptist Church, its nursery and residential buildings in Khartoum North.

114. In June 2025, the Rapid Support Forces reportedly shelled three Christian churches in El Fasher. The Rapid Support Forces reportedly also looted churches and pressured Christians from the Nubian community to convert to Islam.

C. Socioeconomic toll

115. The conflict has triggered one of the country's worst humanitarian crises, marked by relentless violence, destruction of infrastructure, collapse of food systems and deliberate obstruction of aid, leaving civilians in acute peril.

116. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the conflict has caused the world's fastest-growing displacement crisis. As of early July 2025, nearly 12.1 million persons have been forcibly displaced, of whom 7.6 million are within the Sudan and 4.2 million in other countries.

117. Disruptions to food supply chains and agricultural production, as well as delays and administrative challenges in delivering aid, have resulted in widespread hunger and malnutrition, with some areas facing famine conditions. According to WFP, the Sudan is on the brink of becoming the world's most severe hunger emergency in recent history. Approximately 24.6 million persons – half of the country's population – are experiencing acute food insecurity. In the Zamzam and Abu Shawk camps, the situation is particularly dire. The Rapid Support Forces cut all critical food and water supplies in the camps. Witnesses reported that in Zamzam, access to food and water deteriorated sharply by March 2025 and that basic items, such as oil, lentils, sugar and water, were scarce and unaffordable, leading to malnourishment, dehydration and death, in particular among children. Furthermore, in the context of people moving from one shelter to another, witnesses recounted seeing civilians dying in the streets from hunger.

118. The mission documented the devastating impact of the siege of the Rapid Support Forces on El Fasher. The Rapid Support Forces severely restricted supply entry and targeted key infrastructure, resulting in widespread food and water shortages. Lack of food and water has become a leading cause of death. One witness reported that hunger was so severe she lost 20 kilograms, and her daughter was hospitalized for malnutrition; a 2-year-old child in the hospital died from starvation.

119. The conflict also left families and communities without economic means. The destruction of infrastructure, including roads and factories, and agricultural land has compounded the challenges facing the country's labour force. Businesses have shut down, supply chains are broken and millions of people have lost access to essential goods and services.

120. Poverty levels have thus worsened significantly, with the proportion of the population living on less than \$2.15 per day more than doubling – from 33 per cent in 2022 to 71 per cent in 2024.

121. The conflict has also had a devastating impact on children. According to UNICEF, more than 6 million children (27 per cent of them under the age of 5) are internally displaced or seeking refuge and protection in neighbouring countries. Over 770,000 children are expected to suffer from severe acute malnutrition in 2025, and over one in three children are already suffering from acute malnutrition, according to WFP.

V. Accountability

122. The mission reported on accountability measures in detail in its previous reports and will expand on its reporting further in the forthcoming conference room paper.

A. Domestic developments

123. By June 2025, 120,594 individual cases had reportedly been registered with the national committee established by the Sudanese authorities for the investigation of crimes

and violations of national and international humanitarian law. Of those, 3,997 had been referred to regular courts and 1,093 verdicts had been issued. While announcing further investigations and emergency courts to deal with the Rapid Support Forces and its perceived collaborators, various officials continued to stress that the small number of cases against the Sudanese Armed Forces, constituting 257 of the total cases registered, reflected the isolated nature of violations by the Sudanese Armed Forces, and that they did not constitute international crimes. Information and evidence of violations were denied without the initiation of credible investigations. Broad immunities from prosecution provided to State forces were upheld and blanket amnesties were offered to members of the Rapid Support Forces willing to report to the Sudanese Armed Forces, without excluding international crimes as required by international law.

124. While promising to end impunity, the Rapid Support Forces denies responsibility for reported violations, without an indication of any credible investigations having been instituted. It continued to set up investigative mechanisms and courts in areas under its control in the Darfur states. Little is known, however, about the legal basis, the composition or the current functioning of these courts.

125. The mission finds that the Sudan remains unwilling and unable to genuinely conduct thorough, prompt and impartial investigations and prosecutions for international crimes committed in the current conflict. It reiterates its previous finding of selective justice, lack of trust by victims and survivors in the domestic legal institutions, given the historical pattern of the use of domestic laws and mechanisms to evade accountability, and the need for thorough legal institutional reforms in the context of a democratic civilian rule.

B. Options for victim-centred accountability measures

126. To effectively break the cycle of impunity, a range of options for delivering justice and ensuring accountability should be considered. Towards this end, the mission organized a three-day consultation in Nairobi, which offered a safe space for developing recommendations on accountability measures, which the mission will examine.

127. Discussions considered lessons from past accountability and transitional justice experiences in the Sudan, the sequencing of justice and peace, and options for future measures. It was agreed that preparations for justice and accountability must begin immediately. The overarching principle of an all-inclusive Sudanese dialogue with a gender-sensitive approach should guide the design and implementation of any process.

128. Different justice models were explored, including the modalities of expanding the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court to all of the Sudan and the establishment of an independent judicial mechanism working in tandem with the Court. It was noted that the 2020 Juba Agreement for Peace in the Sudan included an approach for transitional justice, including the idea of a hybrid special court. The use of universal jurisdiction was stressed.

129. It was also stressed that professional documentation of violations and related crimes should continue as a tool for justice, including registers for specific violations, missing persons and damages, as well as training and capacity-building. The mission's mandate of evidence collection and preservation remains crucial.

130. Participants in the consultation emphasized the transformative role of reparations and distributive justice. Interim reparatory measures should be provided to victims, survivors and communities as a priority.

VI. Conclusions and recommendations

131. The mission finds that both parties to the conflict violated international law, amounting to international crimes. The Rapid Support Forces carried out large-scale and systematic attacks on civilians, constituting violations of international humanitarian law and human rights, including large-scale killings, sexual and gender-based violence, looting and destruction of essential survival objects. These acts constitute war crimes, including violence to life and person, outrages on personal

dignity, intentionally directing attacks on civilians, hostage-taking, forced displacement, pillage and the use of starvation as a method of warfare. They also constitute crimes against humanity, including murder, torture, rape, sexual slavery and sexual violence of comparable gravity, and persecution based on intersecting gender, political and ethnic grounds. The deprivation of food, medicine and humanitarian assistance may also amount to extermination.

132. The mission finds that the Sudanese Armed Forces committed violations of international humanitarian law and human rights, including direct attacks on civilians, indiscriminate air strikes, and the use of artillery affecting populated areas and civilian infrastructure, and failed to protect hospitals, medical personnel and humanitarian operations. These acts amount to war crimes, including violence to life and person, outrages on personal dignity, carrying out executions without previous judgment or judicial guarantee, and attacks on specially protected objects.

133. In the light of the continuing war of atrocities in the Sudan and the need for accountability, the mission recommends following the road map set out below.

134. Conflict parties must stop violence and protect civilians. To that end, the mission recommends that the parties:

(a) Stop the fighting immediately and commit to a lasting peace, abide by international law obligations, Security Council and Human Rights Council resolutions and the Jeddah Declaration;

(b) Protect civilians, including by putting an end to the shelling of civilians and infrastructure, reprisals, hate speech and ethnic targeting;

(c) Lift sieges, particularly those on El Fasher and in Kordofan, and ensure unhindered humanitarian access; establish secure corridors for aid delivery; and allow safe civilian evacuation;

(d) Protect displaced communities by halting attacks on camps, preventing killings, ensuring safe shelter, and ensuring safe routes for civilians out of active conflict zones;

(e) Safeguard cultural heritage by preventing the looting and destruction of historical, religious, public and community sites;

(f) Stop sexual violence, sexual slavery and forced marriage and end child use in conflict;

(g) End impunity and ensure accountability, including by cooperating with the mission and the International Criminal Court and surrendering all wanted persons.

135. Other States and the international community should support the people of the Sudan without fuelling conflict. To that end, the mission recommends that they:

(a) Respect, enforce and expand the Security Council arms embargo and halt all material support to the parties, including through private actors and transit routes;

(b) Back durable peace efforts and stop interference that fuels instability and deepens the illicit war economy;

(c) Support humanitarian needs, including by restoring medical assistance, responding to disease outbreaks and providing large-scale food support;

(d) Promote compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law through diplomatic, legal and economic influence and enable independent and impartial investigations by cooperating with the mission and the International Criminal Court;

(e) Explore avenues for bringing the perpetrators to justice by expanding the International Criminal Court jurisdiction and supporting the establishment of an independent and impartial judicial mechanism for the Sudan;

(f) Suspend cooperation with those suspected of international crimes and bring them to justice in national courts through the exercise of universal jurisdiction;

issue targeted sanctions against individuals and entities suspected of international crimes;

- (g) Fund victim support structures and interim reparatory measures.**

136. Mediators should drive inclusive, sustainable peace. To that end, the mission recommends that mediators:

- (a) Increase engagement to bring the parties to the table and secure a sustainable ceasefire;**

- (b) Address humanitarian priorities, including famine prevention, health system recovery and safe humanitarian access;**

- (c) Facilitate inclusive civilian participation in negotiations, and ensure women's representation, in line with Security Council resolution 1325 (2000);**

- (d) Align with the Sudanese people's aspirations for justice, stability and prosperity in the design of any peace process and embed justice in peace processes through a comprehensive approach to transitional justice and no amnesty for international crimes.**

137. Civil society and local communities should preserve evidence and build the future. To that end, the mission recommends that they:

- (a) Document violations and preserve evidence for accountability processes;**

- (b) Maintain community resilience and solidarity by supporting victims and survivors;**

- (c) Continue their commendable efforts towards building an inclusive, democratic and human rights-oriented Sudan that works for all its people.**
