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FIDH – International Federation for Human Rights
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The **International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)** is an international human rights NGO that unites 188 member organizations from 116 countries. Since its foundation in 1922, FIDH has been defending all civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).

The **League for the Defence of Human Rights in Iran (LDDHI)** is a human rights organization whose main activities include: to propagate the culture of human rights among Iranians through publication of books, magazines, and articles in Persian and in other languages for civil society and human rights defenders, and by giving interviews to the international media; and to organize talks and conferences in various countries. It is concerned with: the abolition of the death penalty in Iran; women's rights; freedom of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience; rights of religious and ethnic minorities; and freedom of expression, assembly, and association, among others. LDDHI was founded in Paris in March 1983 by some exiled leaders of the "Iranian Association for the Defence of Human Rights and Liberties" (established in 1977), following the forced closure of the latter in Iran in 1981. LDDHI has been a member of FIDH since 1986.

Introduction

1. This submission focuses on the following topics since the country's third Universal Periodic Review (UPR) in November 2019: the judiciary and fair trial rights; the death penalty; civil society and human rights defenders; women's rights; freedom of assembly; the national human rights institution; and elections.
2. Since November 2019, the human rights situation in Iran has worsened. Peaceful protests in 2022 and 2023 were violently and systematically repressed by the authorities. Protesters faced arrests, prosecutions, and death sentences. Compulsory hijab laws were expanded to further punish the women's rights movement that sustained the 2022-2023 protests.
3. Civic space has continued to shrink, and many human rights defenders and lawyers remain detained or face prosecutions that are likely to lead to imprisonment in politically motivated cases.

Unfair trials by a judiciary that is not independent from the executive

4. Iran's judiciary continues to be controlled exclusively by clerics, who have no proper legal and judicial qualifications and training.¹ Constitutional guarantees of an independent judiciary are negated by other constitutional provisions that empower the Supreme Leader to supervise and exert control over the executive, legislative, and judicial branches (Article 57), and to appoint the Head of the Judiciary (Article 157). The current Head of the Judiciary, who was appointed by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei on 1 July 2021, is Hojattolislam Gholamhossein Eje'i, who has occupied many high-ranking positions within the judiciary over the past four decades.
5. Women are excluded from the judiciary. Although the Constitution does not specifically bar women from judgeship, the 1982 Law for Selection of Judges stipulates that judges are selected among jurisprudent "men," a discriminatory requirement that automatically bars women from being appointed as judges having the same powers as their male counterparts. This is why, despite their title, female judges assume only advisory or administrative positions in family courts. They cannot independently issue rulings, which are invalid without a male judge's signature and endorsement.
6. The Islamic Revolution Courts (IRCs) have played a significant role in suppressing all forms of dissent. They have operated outside of the scope of the law, overseeing summary trials and failing to comply with due process, such as by not allowing defendants to have lawyers or preventing the work of lawyers, for example by withholding information and documents. IRCs are notorious for delivering harsh verdicts and have been responsible for imposing death sentences on protesters, members of ethnic communities, and political dissidents.
7. The judiciary has routinely disregarded international standards of fair trial and due process for defendants facing criminal charges. An investigating judge, in close liaison with the Office of the Prosecutor, rather than a court, issues summons and arrest warrants.
8. Human rights defenders, civil society activists, and political dissidents have been frequently arrested without an arrest warrant or by means of pre-signed arrest warrants and remained in detention for months. Articles 190 and 191 of the Criminal Procedure Code authorize the investigating judges not to disclose important information to defendants and their lawyers, thus preventing them from preparing an adequate defense.
9. In the IRCs, cases have usually been prepared by security and intelligence agencies, such as interrogators from the Ministry of Intelligence or the Intelligence Unit of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGCs). Defendants have often had no access to lawyers during pre-trial investigations, and defendants facing national security-related charges have been barred by law

from having lawyers of their choosing. In IRCs, trials against human rights defenders, civil society activists, and political dissidents have stemmed from charges that were vague, trumped-up, and rarely dropped.

10. Independent lawyers who have taken up cases of human rights defenders, members of civil society, and political activists before IRCs have been routinely targeted, detained, charged, tried, and sentenced to lengthy prison terms, severely restricting the ability of defendants to appoint lawyers of their own choosing.

Use of the death penalty inconsistent with Iran's human rights obligations

11. The use of the death penalty in Iran is inconsistent with Iran's obligations under international human rights treaties to which it is a state party, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). Capital punishment is prescribed for numerous offenses that do not meet the threshold of "the most serious crimes," a practice that is therefore inconsistent with Article 6 of the ICCPR. There are at least 84 capital crimes in various laws, including: political offenses; sex-related offenses; religious offenses; cyber-crimes; drug-related offenses; and economic offenses.²
12. Up until 2017, Iran ranked first in per capita executions, and returned to that rank again in 2022, with a spike in the number of executions that reached an eight-year high in 2023. All figures are the minimum known and the real figures are likely higher, because authorities do not publish official statistics on death sentences and executions.
13. During Iran's third UPR cycle, more than 2,300 people have been executed. They included: 267 in 2020 (including 25 for drug-related offenses, one public execution, and four juveniles); 333 in 2021 (including 126 for drug-related offenses, and two juveniles); 582 in 2022 (including 256 for drug-related offenses, two public executions, and six juveniles); 867 in 2023 (including 497 for drug-related offenses, five public executions, and possibly seven juveniles); and 304 as of end of June 2024 (including 184 for drug-related offences, and two juveniles).³
14. Iran has also been ranking as the world's top executioner of children, in breach of the country's obligations under Article 37 of the CRC. Authorities have frequently imposed the death penalty against minors and have executed them when they turned 18 or, occasionally, before. From 2019 to the end of June 2024, at least 23 executions of juvenile offenders were reported. As of February 2023, at least 85 child offenders remained on death row.
15. Iran is considered as one of the leading executioners of women worldwide, with over 172 women executed between 2010 and 2021. Women have been more frequently subjected to execution by stoning than men.
16. During Iran's third UPR cycle, the death penalty was disproportionately used against members of ethnic communities, in a manner that is inconsistent with Iran's obligations under Article 5 of the ICERD. The use of capital punishment in these cases stemmed from charges under *moharebeh*, spreading corruption on earth, insurrection, and other vaguely worded crimes. Members of ethnic communities who were targeted the most by executions included: the Kurds in Western Iran; the Baluchis in Sistan and Baluchistan Province; and the Arabs in Khuzestan Province. Religious minorities whose members were executed included groups of Sunni Muslims in Western Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, and Sistan and Baluchistan Provinces.
17. Over 50 Kurdish individuals were executed between 1 January and 17 November 2021. In 2021, at least 70 Baluchi individuals were executed, accounting for 21% of all executions in the year and

44% of all drug-related executions. In 2022, at least 179 Baluchis were reportedly executed (including more than half on drug-related charges), accounting for one-third of all executions that year,⁴ whereas the Iranian Baluchis represent 3-4% of the total population. In 2023, at least 183 Baluchis and 151 Kurds were executed. The figures for the first six months of 2024, as of end of June, were: 72 Kurds; 42 Azeri Turks; 32 Baluchis; and 23 Afghans. Many drug-related executions claimed the lives of poor and marginalized individuals and members of ethnic communities, in particular the Baluchis and the Kurds, as well as Afghan refugees.

18. During Iran's third UPR cycle, protesters have often faced the death penalty in connection with their participation in large-scale demonstrations. On 14 September 2020, the lawyer of one protester, who had been arrested during the August 2018 protests and was later executed, reported that 30 such protesters were on death row at the time.⁵
19. During the "Women, Life, Freedom" protest movement, which began in September 2022 and lasted until early 2023, hundreds faced charges of capital crimes. As of June 2024, at least 166 of them were still facing such charges and at least 23 had been sentenced to death and were awaiting the outcome of their appeals. At least nine were executed: two in 2022; six in 2023 (one of them in public); and one in 2024.
20. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, and queer (LGBTIQ) individuals can face capital punishment because of the criminalization of certain same-sex conduct punishable by death. Ten such cases were reported in a joint FIDH-LDDHI report published in October 2020.⁶ In September 2022, a court sentenced to death two women defending LGBTIQ rights on charges of promoting homosexuality.⁷

Civil society and human rights defenders under siege

21. Independent civil society in Iran has operated in a hostile environment characterized by severe legal restrictions and criminalization of activists and human rights defenders, including the arbitrary arrest and imprisonment of lawyers and journalists. Independent human rights organizations concerned with civil and political rights, cultural rights of ethnic communities, and women's rights are virtually non-existent in Iran. Many have been long forced to operate from abroad.
22. In the absence of legislation regulating non-governmental organizations (NGOs), in 2016 the Council of Ministers passed the NGOs Rules of Procedures, which provide some degree of government oversight over NGOs.
23. After several unsuccessful attempts to adopt a legislation regarding NGOs since the early 1990s, in September 2023 a draft Social Organizations Law was published by the Parliament Research Center. Government-aligned media reported that Parliament may use Article 85 of the Constitution to bypass normal legislative procedures and have the law adopted by one of its committees or a select committee, and enact it for a specific term, which may be renewed.⁸ If adopted in its current form, the proposed law could further stifle the ability of civil society organizations to operate. The draft law contains many restrictive provisions that mirror those included in the NGOs Rules of Procedures regarding registration, oversight, and dissolution of civil society organizations.
24. The draft law assigns the oversight over civil society organizations to evaluation councils at various local administrative levels. At the national level, a National Evaluation Council is composed of 13 members from various government agencies and institutions, including representatives of the police, Ministry of Intelligence, and the Intelligence Unit of the IRGC.
25. In addition, the draft law contains vague and overly broad restrictive clauses that can be interpreted by the authorities arbitrarily. For example, the draft law prescribes that the granting of

a license to an organization is contingent on the police, the Ministry of Intelligence, and the Intelligence Unit of the IRGC's verification of the "general competence" of the organization's founders. In addition, Article 54 states that organizations have an obligation to avoid activities against "national unity and identity," "Islamic tenets," and "the foundations of the country." Article 81, in conjunction with Article 19 of the Islamic Penal Code (IPC), makes NGO executives punishable with prison terms ranging from 91 days to five years if they are found guilty of "cooperation with international agencies before obtaining a permission" and "other breaches of the [their] duties" determined by the draft law.

26. Iranian authorities have routinely criminalized human rights defenders and civil society activists, who exercised their rights to freedom of opinion and expression and freedom of peaceful assembly, by resorting to draconian provisions of the IPC, such as those relating to "national security," "spreading propaganda against the system," "cooperating with hostile foreign states," "insulting the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Supreme Leader," and "encouraging corruption or prostitution."⁹ Several human rights defenders who were detained before or during the nationwide street protests in 2017-2018 and 2019, remain behind bars. They include: the 2023 Nobel Peace Laureate Narges Mohammadi; Golrokh Ebrahimi Iraee; Sepideh Qolijan; and Mohammad Habibi. Some other imprisoned ones, such as Nasrin Sotoudeh [See *endnote #14*], are on medical leave from prison.
27. During the latest wave of popular street protests in 2022-2023, the already dire situation of human rights defenders and civil society activists further deteriorated and many of them have been detained and prosecuted. LDDHI has recorded the arrest of several hundred human rights defenders, including at least 130 labor rights defenders, 60 women's rights defenders, 12 children's rights defenders, and others in connection with those protests.
28. Independent lawyers who have taken up cases of human rights defenders and civil society activists have been routinely targeted, detained, charged, tried, and sentenced to lengthy prison terms. Harassment and prosecutions of lawyers have worsened since the nationwide demonstrations sparked by the death of Mahsa (Zhin) Amini in September 2022. In many cases, they have faced legal action for standing up to judges and publicizing the cases of their clients arrested in connection with the protests, or representing the families of the protesters killed in the crackdown. Many lawyers were summoned, including 55 in the Kurdish-populated city of Bukan, in Western Azerbaijan Province, and 78 in Tehran. At least 50 were detained. Most of them were released on bail, but a few remain in detention. At least 10 have so far received prison sentences ranging from one to 10 years, including: Arash Kaykhosravi, Mohsen Borhani (both currently in prison); Mohammad Arman; Mohammad Saleh Nikbakht (the lawyer of Ms. Amini's family); Forugh Sheikholeslami Vatani; Marzieh Mohebbi; Nazanin Salari; Farzaneh Zilayee; Khosro Alikordi; Mohammad Seifzadeh; Jalal Fatemi; Sina (Hossein) Yussefi; Massoud Ahmadian; Ghassem Bo'di Bonab; Amir Mehdipour; Amir Hossein Kuhkan; Hadi Sharifzadeh; Nasser Sargaran; and Mahmood Taravat-Ruy. Some others, including Amir-salar Davoodi and Mohammad Najafi, have been in prison for several years.¹ At least three female lawyers (Narges Khorramifard, Mohabbat Mozaffari, and Maryam Arvin) who participated in the 2022-2023 protests or defended the protesters, died under highly dubious circumstances, after being released from detention. The real number of lawyers who died or were murdered under suspicious circumstances in the 2019-2024 period is likely higher.
29. The media has remained heavily censored and subject to significant interference by the authorities. Dozens of journalists were arrested nationwide following the September 2022 protests, because of their reporting on human rights abuses or instances of corruption.¹⁰ Some have fled the country. LDDHI has recorded the names of tens of journalists, who have been summoned, faced arrest, detention, or imprisonment since September 2022. Many were released on bail but are likely to face trials and convictions. A number of others were tried and sentenced to prison terms.

30. According to the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), as of mid-June 2024, there were at least four journalists still in detention (two men and two women).¹¹ They included: Kamyar Fakoor, Vida Rabbani, Roohollah Nakha'i, and Parisa Salehi.
31. Female journalists Elaheh Mohammadi and Niloofar Hamedi were the first reporters to cover the news of the death of Mahsa (Zhina) Amini. They also reported on the security forces' ill-treatment of protesters and the psychological impact of the morality police's actions on the demonstrators in September 2022. Both were arrested on 21 September 2022. They were sentenced to 12 and 13 years in prison, respectively, on bogus charges of cooperation with the United State (US) government, assembly and collusion to commit crimes against Iran's security, and propaganda activity against the Islamic Republic of Iran. On 14 January 2024, they were released on bail pending the outcome of their appeal. Their appearance without the mandatory hijab outside Tehran's Evin Prison led to the opening of a new case against them a day after their release.

Women's rights severely curtailed

32. Women in Iran have been treated as second-class individuals in law and practice. Discriminatory legal provisions deprive women of equal rights in many areas, including with regard to: control over their own body; marriage; divorce; custody of their children; inheritance; nationality; freedom of movement; access to employment; and participation in public affairs. Furthermore, child and forced marriage involving women and girls are widespread and have long been ignored by the authorities. Since Iran's third UPR, the government has made no progress towards the ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).
33. Honor killings have continued to be committed exclusively against women with impunity, because Article 301 of the IPC exempts "fathers and paternal grandfathers" from severe punishment for the killing of their children or grandchildren, and grants full impunity to husbands for killing their wives if caught in the act of adultery. In 2023, at least 122 women were victims of femicide, including at least eight "honor killings."¹² In 2024, as of end of June, 100 cases of femicide were recorded, including 17 cases of honor killings.¹³
34. The issue of women's clothing, and in particular the compulsory wearing of the hijab, continues to be central to the oppressive attitude of the Iranian authorities towards women. Punishments for not wearing the hijab in public, which were first envisaged in the IPC in 1983 and then in 1996, were endorsed in the 2013 IPC and remain in force to date. Women who appear in public without a sharia-sanctioned hijab could face imprisonment ranging from 10 days to two months (Article 638). In addition, Article 639, which prescribes punishments ranging from one to 10 years in prison, has frequently been used to prosecute women who failed to wear the hijab in public, on charges of establishing or managing "centers of immorality and prostitution" or encouraging people to "commit immorality and/or prostitution."¹⁴
35. In an attempt to enforce more stringent hijab laws, the government drafted a Bill of Hijab and Chastity that was introduced in Parliament in May 2023. The bill, later renamed Bill for the Protection of Family through Promotion of the Culture of Hijab and Chastity, would punish "nudity," "lack of hijab," "improper clothing," and "the promotion of such affairs that undermine man and woman's peace of mind within the family, increase divorce and societal harms, and reduce the value of family." It prescribes prison terms ranging from six months to 10 years and heavy fines for offenders, who could include car owners with offending drivers or passengers, and owners of businesses where the offending persons are seen. Children from the age of nine upwards are liable under the bill. Although the draft law has not yet been adopted, many punishments stipulated in it have already been enforced.

36. Women have been deprived of the right to take part in public affairs. The number of women in decision-making positions in different branches of government has been traditionally very low. Women account from between three to five percent of the 290 parliamentarians in the current legislature (2020-2024). Women have also been barred from seeking political office [See below, *para. #46*]. In addition, a number of public positions are totally closed to women [See above, *para. #5*].

Freedom of assembly violently repressed

37. The right to freedom of peaceful assembly has been repressed in law and practice. While Article 27 of the 1979 Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of “unarmed” assembly, provided that its exercise does not “violate the foundations of Islam,”¹ Iran has failed to enact a comprehensive law that codifies the rights and duties of all those involved in public assemblies. The only existing legislation containing provisions related to public assemblies is the Law on Procedures of Operation of Political Parties and Groups, enacted in 2016. This law is limited to events organized/held by political parties and groups, and imposes draconian restrictions on their exercise of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly. Under Articles 11 and 13 of the law, the Parties Commission has the power to “deliberate and decide on requests to hold assemblies and demonstrations.”
38. In May 2023, the government introduced in Parliament the Bill of Law on Holding of Assemblies and Demonstrations. The bill places restrictions on the right to freedom of assembly that are incompatible with international law, including a ban on public assemblies that “disrespect Islam, its principles and its sanctities and/or contravene Islam’s rulings.” The proposed legislation also requires assembly organizers to apply for permission to city governors, who have the authority to approve or reject the applications, and grants police extensive powers to disperse any assembly. In addition, the bill stipulates that assemblies may be held only in certain designated locations, and are prohibited in the vicinity of health, military, security, and police facilities. Parliamentary consideration of this proposed law remains pending. If approved, the bill would replace the relevant provisions of the above-referenced law of 2016.
39. During Iran’s third UPR cycle, the government systematically cracked down on vastly peaceful demonstrations and assemblies, in a manner that is inconsistent with Article 27 of the Constitution, which allows for the “organizing of unarmed assemblies and marches.” This systematic repression involved the widespread use of unnecessary and/or disproportionate force, arrests, long prison terms, extra-judicial killings, and executions of protesters on trumped-up charges, in addition to related limitations on the right to freedom of expression.
40. The most recent wave of large-scale and largely peaceful nationwide street protests began in September 2022, when a young Kurdish woman, Mahsa (Zhina) Amini, died in custody of the morality police in Tehran. Police and plainclothes agents used live ammunition, pellets, tear gas, water cannons, and batons to suppress the demonstrations. The crackdown on protesters resulted in the killing of at least 805 people, including 107 children, the injury of many others, and the arrest and detention of thousands of protesters and civil society activists. At least nine protesters faced fast-tracked trials and were sentenced to death and executed in connection with their participation in the demonstrations [See above, *para. #19*].

Proposed National Human Rights Institution fails to comply with Paris Principles

41. Attempts to establish a national human rights institution (NHRI) have remained unsuccessful. The government’s proposed bill on the establishment of an NHRI envisages the creation of a body that is inconsistent with the Paris Principles, which require NHRIs to be fully independent from the state. The bill was submitted to the Cabinet on 6 May 2017 and there have been no reports on subsequent developments since then.
42. The bill envisions the creation of a 15-member Supreme Council and an unstated number of specialized committees. Tasks of the Supreme Council include: approving the NHRI’s policies, plans, and priorities; approving various rules of procedures as required; approving the NHRI’s annual budget; and examining reports of executive bodies and giving recommendations to them. According to Article 5 of the bill, members of the Supreme Council include three members from legally instituted NGOs; two members to be chosen from university professors and religious

specialists, nominated by Iran's President and confirmed by Parliament; two jurists specialized in human rights, nominated by the Head of the Judiciary and confirmed by Parliament; and one representative of the Judiciary's Islamic Human Rights Commission.

43. Under Article 14 of the bill, various government agencies should have representatives with observing status on the Supreme Council. Such agencies include: the offices of the deputy presidents for legal affairs and women; the ministries of interior, justice, foreign affairs, education, sports and youth, labor and social affairs, culture and Islamic guidance; the Prosecutor General; and the police.
44. According to Article 56 of the bill, the proposed NHRI may only receive international funds with the approval of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Election processes neither inclusive nor participatory

45. Recent elections in Iran have consistently failed to be genuine, inclusive, and participatory. Members of religious faiths other than Shia branch of Islam have been prevented from standing in presidential election.
46. Women have consistently registered as candidates in all 13 presidential elections since 1979, but the Guardian Council of the Constitution (GCC)¹⁵ has always disqualified them, without providing justifications. In 2021, the GCC rejected 585 (or 98%) of the 592 candidates who had registered to contest the June presidential elections. All 40 female candidates who had registered were rejected as well. In June 2024, 287 people applied to register as candidates and 80 of them were approved after it was found they had fulfilled the registration requirements. The GCC rejected 74 of the 80, including all four women who had successfully registered.

Recommendations

47. Take all necessary measures to ensure that all defendants in criminal proceedings have prompt access to a legal counsel of their choosing.
48. Stop imposing a select group of lawyers on defendants in the investigation stage and allow defendants in criminal proceedings to have access to a legal counsel of their choosing in all stages of pre-trial detention, including during the investigation stage.
49. Take steps towards the abolition of the death penalty for all crimes, including by immediately establishing an official moratorium on executions.
50. Stop the practice of executing individuals who are below the age of 18 at the time of the commission of the alleged crime.
51. Prohibit public executions.
52. Repeal all legislation that results in discrimination against, and persecution of, individuals because of their sexual orientation or gender identity.
53. Ensure that all individuals fully enjoy the right to freedom of opinion and expression without discrimination.
54. Fully guarantee the right to freedom of expression of independent media, and the right of media workers to freely exercise their profession without fearing prosecution.
55. Ratify the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
56. Repeal mandatory hijab laws and all other legal provisions that are discriminatory against women.
57. Immediately and unconditionally release all those who are detained for the peaceful exercise of the right to freedom of expression, including all human rights defenders, lawyers, and trade unionists.
58. Fully respect the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and lift undue restrictions on this right, in line with Article 21 of the ICCPR.
59. Enact legislation stipulating the right and duties of all those involved in public assemblies, in line with Iran's obligations under Article 21 of the ICCPR.

60. Refrain from the use of unnecessary and disproportionate force against peaceful protesters.
61. Conduct thorough, impartial, and transparent investigations into all deaths of protesters during the large-scale nationwide protests in 2022-2023, and hold those responsible accountable.
62. Expedite steps to establish a national human rights institution that is fully independent from the state, in line with the Paris Principles.
63. Guarantee genuine, inclusive, and participatory election processes at all levels.
64. Ensure all individuals can exercise their right to take part in public affairs without any discrimination based on gender, ethnicity, or religion.

¹ For more details, see FIDH-LDDHI, *The Iran Notes - Iran's judiciary as a tool of repression and fear*, 29 September 2023; <https://www.fidh.org/en/region/asia/iran/the-iran-notes-iran-s-judiciary-as-a-tool-of-repression-and-fear>

² FIDH-LDDHI, *No one is spared - The widespread use of the death penalty in Iran*, p. 52; 8 October 2020; <https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/iranpdm758ang-2.pdf>

³ LDDHI has recorded seven names, who were reported to be minors at the time of the commission of the alleged crime. As the judiciary does not report many executions and ages of the executed victims, this report relies on unofficial reports.

⁴ Balochcampaign, *Annual Report on Human Rights in Baluchistan and Baluch-populated Regions 2022*, <https://t.me/balochcampaign/17194>

⁵ Radio Farda, *Navid Afkari's lawyer: 30 people are on death-row*, 14 September 2020; <https://www.radiofarda.com/a/navid-afkari-more-executions/30837657.html>

⁶ FIDH-LDDHI, *No one is spared - The widespread use of the death penalty in Iran*, p. 27; <https://www.fidh.org/en/region/asia/iran/iran-death-penalty-violates-fundamental-rights-and-international-law>

⁷ FIDH, *Iran: Death sentence against two women for speaking out in support of LGBTQI+ rights*, 22 September 2022; <https://www.fidh.org/en/region/asia/iran/iran-death-sentence-lgbt-rights>

⁸ Daily Javan, *Likelihood of using Article 85 of the Constitution to consider the draft Social Organisations Law*, 14 August 2023; <https://www.javanonline.ir/fa/news/1178580>

⁹ For more details, see FIDH-LDDHI, *The Iran Notes – Civil society under attack*, February 2024, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/iran_notes_-_3_-_civil_society_-_february_2024.pdf

¹⁰ IFJ has reported 100 journalists arrested from September 2022 (<https://ifj-farsi.org/?p=11196>), and the Committee for the Protection of Journalists at least 95 in September 2022 (<https://cpj.org/2022/09/names-of-journalists-arrested-in-irans-anti-state-protests/>).

¹¹ IFJ, *List of four journalists imprisoned in Iran*, 17 June 2024; <https://ifj-farsi.org/?p=13248>

¹² Hengaw, *International Women's Day, Report on widespread violation of women's rights in Iran in 2023*, 8 March 2024, <https://hengaw.net/fa/report-statistics/2024/03/article-3>

¹³ Hengaw, 13 June 2024, https://t.me/Hengaw_Org/22995

¹⁴ A prominent example is human rights lawyer Nasrin Sotoudeh, who was sentenced under Articles 638 and 639 in 2018. See: <https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/human-rights-defenders/iran-nasrin-sotoudeh-sentenced-to-33-more-years-in-jail>. For other cases, see: <https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/human-rights-defenders/iran-arbitrary-detention-and-judicial-harassment-of-ms-vida-movahedi>; and <https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/human-rights-defenders/iran-sentencing-of-mses-saba-kord-afshari-yassman-aryani-monireh>

¹⁵ The 12-member GCC is responsible, inter alia, for ensuring the compatibility of the legislation passed by Parliament with the principles of Islam and the Constitution, and vetting candidates in elections.