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Antisemitism in Europe

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY



UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

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Cover Photo: The Star of David seen on an iron door in Kazimierz, a historic Jewish quarter of Krakow, Poland on Wednesday, April 8, 2020. (Photo by Artur Widak/NurPhoto via Getty Images)

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Are Jews able to live openly and freely as Jews, in whatever manner they wish? The answer to this question is fundamental for judging antisemitism in any country.

The factors that go into that assessment include:

(1) Prevalence of antisemitic attitudes among the general population; (2) Number and nature (or severity) of antisemitic incidents; (3) Tolerance for antisemitic rhetoric in public, whether in politics or media; and (4) Actions (or inaction) by governments to counter and prevent antisemitism. This latter category may include physical security for Jewish institutions, public denunciations of antisemitism by political leaders, prosecution of antisemitic hate crimes, and education against antisemitism.

For the purpose of this study, researchers asked questions on those topics of Jewish community leaders and government officials in 11 countries. These inquiries were informed and complemented by desk research to develop profiles of how antisemitism manifests in each country and how governments are addressing antisemitism. Those 11 country profiles constitute Part I of this report.

Political commitments to combat antisemitism were made by every state covered in this report in the 2004 “Berlin Declaration” of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and repeated several times in the OSCE context. Member states of the European Union have also made multiple declarations in the context of the European Union.

The performance of those commitments has been mixed. The major themes of these commitments can be distilled into the categories of (1) political commitment, (2) physical security measures, (3) education about antisemitism, (4) incident reporting, and (5) law enforcement. The states covered in this report have mixed records across these major categories, which are assessed collectively as the focus for Part II of this report, using the following criteria:

POLITICAL COMMITMENT

Political commitment to tackle antisemitism is evident where political leaders regularly publicly condemn antisemitic incidents, where they confer with Jewish leaders on plans of action, and where governments have put in place national plans against antisemitism and assigned national coordinators for those plans. Such steps ensure efforts are

made across government, putting emphasis on the most pressing issues and assuring that gaps are filled. Among the exemplary governments in this respect are France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and the UK.

PHYSICAL SECURITY

With the exception of France, all Jewish community leaders responded that physical security measures at Jewish institutions were adequate to the threats assessed. The most common complaint was that Jewish communities bore excessive financial burdens for necessary security measures such as private security guards. Several governments covered all or a vast majority of security costs, including Hungary, Norway, and the UK.

EDUCATION

The common and lamentable problem in this category is the absence of formal education about antisemitism outside the context of the Holocaust. A repeated complaint from Jewish community leaders was that history textbooks included references to Jews only in the contexts of Biblical Israel, the Holocaust, and the modern State of Israel.

Also largely absent are positive representations of Jewish contributions to national and world society. Jewish leaders have long called for more positive examples to be taught as a means of dispelling antisemitic stereotypes of Jews as separate from — and parasitic on — the rest of society and concerned only with themselves.

INCIDENT REPORTING

Antisemitic incident reporting should be systematic, public, informative, and actionable for policymakers. Unfortunately, in too many cases, it is not. Among the 11 states in this study, there were wide differences in the methods of data collection for antisemitic incidents, even in the more restrictive case of antisemitic hate crime, and differences in categorization. For example, Germany records, “Politically motivated crimes with an antisemitic motive,” which in practice it treats as essentially only right-wing extremist hate crimes, while the Netherlands records “discriminatory antisemitic incidents,” capturing a much broader array of data.

Categorization also differs widely, which affects the utility of the information collected. In the UK and France, for example, incident categories are clear and comprehensive, while in Poland 89% of reported antisemitic incidents were categorized as “unspecified.” Proper categorization is imperative, because different types of incidents will require different policy responses. Vandalism may require more visible security measures, such as noticeable cameras or security personnel. High numbers of assaults may dictate mobile police patrols within a certain perimeter of Jewish institutions. Illegal online hate speech may dictate more police resources for investigations or to liaise with social media platforms or in other areas.

Massive under-reporting by victims of incidents is common across the states surveyed by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) in 2019. Members of Jewish communities were asked whether they had reported, either to the police or to some other organization, the most serious antisemitic incident that had occurred over the past five years. In every country, the vast majority of victims had not reported the incident, ranging from 88% in Hungary to 74% in the Netherlands, with most of the eight countries surveyed at about 80%.¹

LAW ENFORCEMENT

Jewish leaders were asked whether antisemitic crimes were adequately prosecuted as hate crimes. The responses varied and included those who were generally satisfied (Sweden and the UK), those who were generally unsatisfied (France, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine), those who noted that some progress was being made but more is needed (Belgium and the Netherlands), and those who noted that too few cases existed to make an assessment (Hungary and Norway). Two factors were often cited for the less than satisfactory state of prosecutions: insufficient or inconsistent applications of penalty enhancements and difficulties establishing motive based on the information collected.

OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

Measured against their own long-standing and common political commitments, governments of the 11 states covered in this report have responded differently to the challenges of antisemitism in their countries. In some countries, antisemitic attitudes are a greater challenge than antisemitic incidents. In others the reverse holds true.

In 10 of the 11 countries, though, efforts seem insufficient to meet the antisemitism challenges that present themselves.

In some cases, the insufficiency is due to more immediate challenges. For example, in Russia and Ukraine, Jewish leaders did not assess antisemitism as a serious concern among the issues facing the Jewish communities, and more generally facing their countries, and they did not fault their governments for lack of effort against antisemitism.

In some cases, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, Jewish leaders worried that political commitment was not commensurate with their assessments of the situation of antisemitism, with the result that government actions were judged inadequate.

In some cases, such as France, Germany, and the UK, the governments have exhibited clear political will to tackle antisemitism, but the scale of the problem may be exceeding their efforts.

Only one government, however, seems to be making efforts that meet — and even exceed — the antisemitism challenges in the country: Norway. Norway’s positive example includes a comprehensive national plan, coordination with its Jewish community’s leadership, fully financed security measures, detailed programs for educators, mandatory training on antisemitism for police, disaggregated hate crime reporting, multifaceted monitoring of antisemitism in Norwegian society, and promotion of positive aspects of Jewish life through its Jewish Pathfinders program that sends Jewish students around the country to speak in classrooms about being Jewish in Norway.

U.S. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

For Part III of this study, researchers interviewed current and former participants in the making of U.S. policy to solicit ideas about how the U.S. government can do more to combat antisemitism in Europe in ways that advance American national interests as well as values.

There is widespread, bipartisan awareness that antisemitism is rising in key places around the world including Europe, that combating this challenge is an important American interest, and that more can and should be done to effectively advance this objective. Generally, respondents held the view that antisemitism in Europe and other parts of the world poses a threat to American interests because it threatens democracy, pluralism, and stability in U.S.-allied countries — and, to a lesser extent, that it contributes to violent extremism, anti-Americanism, and violence against the State of Israel, another American strategic partner.

¹ European Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Experiences and Perceptions of Antisemitism Second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU,” 2018. (https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2018-experiences-and-perceptions-of-antisemitism-survey_en.pdf)

The interviews yielded many suggestions:

Voice: There is broad agreement on the importance of the U.S. Government publicly using its voice. The U.S. government should note and commend those European governments that acknowledge the severity of the challenge posed by antisemitism and are devoting very substantial efforts to combat it, even if more can and should be done. U.S. officials should also press foreign leaders to change their conduct if they use language that demonizes Jewish people or the State of Israel, or language that resonates with and perpetuates antisemitic tropes.

SEAS: The State Department's Office of the U.S. Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism (SEAS) is more impactful than ever before, having benefited significantly from active leadership and increased staff capacity. Its effectiveness is poised to further increase due to a doubling of appropriations for the office's budget for Fiscal Year 2021, as well as a new law granting the envoy greater seniority and broader authorities. The additional funding could be used to hire a career official to serve as a policy advisor in the Office in order to help the Special Envoy's team with translating new policy positions and public messaging into internal memoranda for purposes of instructing human rights officers at U.S. Embassies in Europe and other parts of the world, desk officers, and other U.S. officials at the working level better understand how to implement such specialized and nuanced pronouncements in an operational setting. The Office should also be encouraged to generate a manual for new foreign service officers in-country on the nuts and bolts of engaging with local government officials, law enforcement, civil society, and Jewish communities to combat antisemitism, as well as existing U.S. government resources and policy guidelines that may be helpful to this end.

National Security Council: The National Security Council should help monitor, elevate, coordinate, and express such messages of its own accord, and should have clear lines of responsibility for combating antisemitism abroad. Regardless of whether the issue of antisemitism in Europe in particular is handled primarily by NSC officials responsible for European affairs or by NSC officials focused on global functional issues, responsibility for tackling it should be clearly assigned to one or more individuals who are sufficiently authorized and incentivized to focus adequately on the problem.

Secretary of State: The Secretary of State is another crucially important official for determining whether the messages of the antisemitism envoy resonate sufficiently in foreign capitals. That includes whether the Special Envoy is seen as having the clear support of the Secretary as well as whether the Special Envoy's messages are reinforced by the Secretary

in public and private settings. At times in the past, the Special Envoy has reported directly to the Secretary of State, and recently Congress overwhelmingly passed legislation signed by the President into law that mandates for this direct reporting relationship between the Special Envoy and the Secretary to be restored. As such, the Secretary should take this step without delay and assist the White House in nominating a suitable nominee.

Congress: Members of Congress have an important role to play in the fight against antisemitism, including as part of U.S. policy. They should conduct themselves in a judicious and collaborative manner to sustain bipartisan support for the importance of identifying and combating antisemitism abroad without politicizing the issue or using it for partisan gain. The House and Senate Bipartisan Task Forces for Combating Anti-Semitism are particularly important institutions in this regard. Congressional leadership, committees of jurisdiction, and rank and file Members all can use their voice to highlight antisemitism in Europe and other regions of the world through statements, letters, hearings, interparliamentary engagements, and in meetings with foreign government officials. In addition to passing legislation that addresses the issue, they can authorize and appropriate funds for tackling various aspects of antisemitism in Europe.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES FOR U.S. ADVOCACY WITH EUROPE:

The U.S. government can take steps on several critical topics in the fight against antisemitism. Particularly promising objectives for U.S. diplomacy toward Europe that were identified by current and former U.S. officials who were interviewed for this report include the following:

Encouraging the Physical Security of European Jewish Communities

The U.S. government cannot be responsible for funding the protection of European Jewish communities but can certainly encourage it as a core responsibility for national and local governments in Europe. The need is enormous, and authorities are still failing in many places, imposing an untenable financial burden on Jewish communities and contributing to widespread fear in the community and even consideration of emigration by some. The United States can also offer to train, advise, and facilitate the exchange of best practices among civil society, police, or prosecutors.

Another way in which the U.S. government can help support the physical security of European Jewish communities is in the counterterrorism and countering violent extremism arena. U.S. officials in these fields should work with European

counterparts to track and combat antisemitic messaging and plots by terrorist organizations in Europe. This must include efforts to combat threats against Jewish communities from both Islamist extremist terrorists as well as from xenophobic, white supremacist terrorists, both of which have engaged in such plots within Europe, in the United States, and at times may have a transatlantic nexus as well.

Encouraging the Appointment of Antisemitism Coordinators

A major priority of U.S. government efforts to combat antisemitism in Europe that must be continued is the push to encourage European governments to appoint and empower effective national coordinators for combating antisemitism. Given the absolute crisis levels of antisemitic violence in many European countries, all European governments should be encouraged to appoint an internal-facing antisemitism coordinator so that local Jewish communities, national government officials, and foreign governments have a single authority to call when incidents of antisemitism occur and who can be responsible for taking stock and devising sustainable solutions.

Recommending the Adoption of The IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism

The Special Envoy's office has been extensively engaged in encouraging European governments to adopt the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance's Working Definition of Antisemitism along with its specific associated examples, and this is an effort that the Biden Administration appears prepared to continue. The Working Definition is the single most accepted, useful tool for capturing a broad array of anti-Jewish expressions as antisemitic, and as such it can help a broad array of governmental and non-governmental officials identify when particular actions or statements constitute intolerant, offensive, or hateful abuse against Jewish communities, without inappropriately criminalizing new categories of offensive speech.

Promoting Education and Public Awareness-Raising

The U.S. government should sustain and broaden efforts to encourage the adoption of several types of education programs that benefit the wellbeing of European Jewish communities. Holocaust education is essential, but so is education — and broader public awareness-raising for adults as well — on anti-bias topics, on antisemitism in particular, and on positive contributions of Jewish communities to the fabric of society in European nations.

Each of these types of programs can help bolster European pluralism and democracy and is something the U.S. government can encourage, facilitate, or celebrate. U.S. Embassies, educators, civil society, and the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum all play an important role in each of these areas in partnership with European societies, but there is more that can be done — for instance if U.S. diplomats in Europe received additional programming materials and funding to convene trainings or teaching sessions on these subjects.

Combating Antisemitic Cyberhate

There was widespread agreement among interview respondents that antisemitic incitement to hatred or violence through social media and other online platforms is a burgeoning new frontier that is increasingly important, impactful, and dangerous. The U.S. government needs antisemitism monitors who are capable of tracking and responding to antisemitic cyberhate, and it needs cyberhate experts to be trained in identifying and responding to antisemitism.

Collaborating with Multilateral Organizations

The U.S. government can and should do more in partnership with multilateral organizations as part of its efforts to combat antisemitism in European countries. For example, this should include the OSCE, IHRA, European Union, and United Nations, as well as the new U.S.-chartered multilateral International Alliance for Freedom of Religion or Belief, previously known as the International Religious Freedom Alliance.

For instance, the U.S. government should continue to encourage OSCE Participating States, including European states, all to report detailed enough data on hate crimes to the OSCE in order to guide meaningful policy responses. Most OSCE states still fail to report national hate crime data to the organization in enough detail to, for example, even provide a total number of antisemitic hate crimes in the country per year, let alone more detailed information on the topic.

The U.S. government should also support the OSCE's Words Into Action program, which focuses on security, education, and coalitions in the fight against antisemitism, as well as the UN's newly designated focal point to monitor antisemitism, situated within the UN's Alliance of Civilizations. In light of the United Nation's long history of demonizing the Jewish state, Washington should pay close attention to whether the UN's Alliance of Civilizations has both the will and the capability to meaningfully combat all forms of antisemitism, including those framed as criticisms of Israel or Zionism that cross into antisemitic tropes or demonization.

INTRODUCTION

Are Jews able to live openly and freely as Jews, in whatever manner they wish? The answer to this question is fundamental for judging antisemitism in any country.

The factors that go into that assessment include: (1) Prevalence of antisemitic attitudes among the general population; (2) Number and nature (or severity) of antisemitic incidents; (3) Tolerance for antisemitic rhetoric in public, whether in politics or media; and (4) Actions (or inaction) by governments to counter and prevent antisemitism. This latter category may include physical security for Jewish institutions, public denunciations of antisemitism by political leaders, prosecution of antisemitic hate crimes, and education against antisemitism.

The following country profiles briefly describe these main factors for each of the countries included in the report. Additional commentary is added where relevant. The profiles are not exhaustive of the topic of antisemitism in each country — entire books have been written about antisemitism in many of them — but aim to convey an accurate summary of the situation of antisemitism and government efforts to address it.

Each profile includes the following sections:

Top concerns of Jewish community leaders: Leaders were asked open-ended questions about their top concerns. Follow-up questions were also asked about specific sources of antisemitism and how it is expressed, for example in the form of violence, rhetoric, or discrimination. The information for this section of the profiles was compiled from interviews with Jewish community leaders, government officials, and other relevant actors, as well as from desk research to inform and complement the interview process. Interviews were conducted “on background” to allow for free expression of concerns and criticisms. For almost all of the countries covered by this report, more than one Jewish leader was interviewed to ensure descriptions that are representative of the community. Some interviewees were representatives elected by their communities, while others were Jewish community professionals. Sentiments attributed to “Jewish leaders” are assessments of the sum of these conversations and should not be attributed to any specific individuals. Jewish population figures in the country profiles are taken from *Jews in Europe at the Turn of the Millennium: Population Trends and Estimates*

by the European Jewish Demography Unit of the Institute for Jewish Policy Research.²

Jewish community surveys: The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) conducted surveys in 2012 and 2018 of Jewish communities in twelve EU countries, including eight covered in this report (Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, The Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and United Kingdom). The surveys asked about Jewish adults’ experiences and perceptions of antisemitism and related topics. Topline findings from the 2018 survey are presented, including significant differences between the 2012 and 2018 surveys on certain questions.

Antisemitic incident reports: Where available, antisemitic incident data is presented to demonstrate recent levels and/or relative trends over the past few years. Data may come from antisemitism monitoring organizations, Jewish community organizations, government, and/or law enforcement agencies and is indicated as such in each instance.

Antisemitic attitude surveys: ADL’s Global 100 survey of antisemitic attitudes provides data on the general population’s beliefs in antisemitic conspiracy theories and other antisemitic stereotypes. In addition, a 2018 Eurobarometer survey provides data on the general population’s beliefs about the overall issue of antisemitism in their country; that is, to what extent antisemitism is a serious problem in their country.

Physical security: Jewish leaders and government officials were asked whether security measures at Jewish institutions were adequate to their threat assessments.

Government actions: Jewish leaders and government officials were asked (and desk research conducted on) the following questions:

1. Do officials systematically and publicly condemn antisemitic incidents?
2. Does the government have a comprehensive plan for combating antisemitism, including online antisemitism?
3. Do officials adequately confer and coordinate with Jewish community leaders on actions against antisemitism?
4. Do parliamentary committees effectively review government action against antisemitism?

2 Sergio Della Pergola, L. Daniel Staetsky, “Jews in Europe at the turn of the Millennium,” October 2020. (https://www.jpr.org.uk/documents/JPR_2020.Jews_in_Europe_at_the_turn_of_the_Millennium.pdf)

Education: Jewish leaders and government officials were asked (and desk research conducted on) the following questions:

1. Is there adequate formal education in schools about antisemitism?
2. Are there informal education programs, such as public awareness campaigns?
3. Do schools have adequate plans and personnel to respond to antisemitic incidents?
4. Are public sector employees (e.g., educators, law enforcement, judiciary) trained to understand antisemitism, including, for example, the use of the IHRA definition?

Law enforcement: Jewish leaders and government officials were asked (and desk research conducted on) the following questions:

1. Are adequate systems in place to report antisemitic hate crime, including illegal hate speech?
2. Does law enforcement report publicly on antisemitic hate crime statistics? Do those reports reflect the experiences of the Jewish community?
3. Are antisemitic crimes adequately prosecuted as hate crimes?

Following the country profiles, key aspects of common challenges are reviewed to indicate gaps in current European government efforts to address antisemitism.

The final section examines past and present U.S. foreign policy interventions to support the fight against antisemitism in European countries and suggests a range of additional measures that could make U.S. policy more effective in this regard.

PART I: COUNTRY PROFILES

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28	Poland
31	Russia
33	Sweden
36	Ukraine
38	United Kingdom

BELGIUM

Jewish population: 29,000



ANTISEMITISM ASSESSMENT

Top concerns of Jewish community leaders

Jewish leaders cited varied concerns. The 2014 terror attack on the Jewish Museum of Belgium by an Islamic State adherent keeps the issue of terrorism at the front of mind, even though community leaders are satisfied with physical security arrangements at Jewish institutions.

Indifference to antisemitic hate speech is a major concern, with examples given in different contexts. Public response was minimal to shouted slogans about war against Jews during a pro-Palestinian protest. Similarly, public response to antisemitic displays at the Aalst carnival was minimal. While political leaders issued condemnations, society in general displayed worrying indifference.

Jewish leaders also cited a tense social environment, exacerbated by COVID-19, conducive to antisemitism, including online antisemitism conspiracy theories.

Antisemitism in radical left movements is an increasing concern with the far-left growing in popularity.

FRA report major findings³

Among Belgian Jews, 86% said antisemitism is a “fairly big” or “very big” problem, up from 78% in the 2012 FRA survey.

Specifically, 39% of Belgian Jews said they had experienced antisemitic harassment over the prior 12 months. Of these respondents, 25% had offensive or threatening statements directed at them in person.

The most common antisemitic statements heard by Belgian Jews were:

- Israelis behave “like Nazis” towards the Palestinians (64%).
- Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes (45%).
- The world would be a better place without Israel (43%).

Further, 28% witnessed other Jews being verbally insulted or harassed and/or physically attacked in the prior 12 months.

Only 15% reported to either the police or a Jewish organization the most serious incident of antisemitic harassment in the past five years.

More than half (65%) worried that their family members or friends would be verbally insulted or harassed in the next 12 months because they are Jewish, while 54% worried about physical attacks.

Although 21% frequently avoided wearing, carrying, or displaying in public things that could identify a person as Jewish, another 6% always did.

Moreover, 88% said the Arab-Israeli conflict impacts how safe they feel as a Jewish person in Belgium.

Among Belgian Jews, 44% had considered emigrating over the prior five years because of not feeling safe as a Jew.

Incident reports

The national equal opportunity body, UNIA, reports antisemitic incidents, as does a dedicated website by the Jewish community, antisemitisme.be. The Belgian Federal Police includes “Holocaust denial” and “Holocaust distortion” as categories in its crime reporting as well as “racism and xenophobia,” but does not have a separate category for antisemitic hate crime.

UNIA’s 2019 report notes 79 incidents of antisemitism, of which 46 (58%) were online. Other incidents included: 1 assault, 5 threats, and 6 graffiti incidents.⁴

Antisemitisme.be reported 1 assault, 1 threat, and 11 acts of vandalism, and 33 online incidents in 2019, and noted that total incidents were similar to the 10-year average.⁵

The Federal Police reported 2 cases of Holocaust denial and 11 cases of Holocaust distortion in 2019.⁶

3 European Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism Second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU,” 2018. (https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2018-experiences-and-perceptions-of-antisemitism-survey_en.pdf)

4 UNIA (Interfederaal Gelijkekansencentrum), “Rapport chiffres,” 2019. (https://www.unia.be/files/Documenten/Jaarrapport/2020_Rapport_chiffres_2019_DEF.pdf)

5 Antisemitisme.be, “Antisemitisme en Belgique Rapport Annuel,” 2019. (<http://www.antisemitisme.be/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Rapport-Antisemitismebe-2019-1.pdf>)

6 Federal Police, Crime Statistics, 2019. (http://www.stat.policefederale.be/assets/pdf/crimestat/nationaal/rapport_2019_trim4_nat_belgique_fr.pdf)

ADL Global 100 major findings⁷

ADL Global 100 surveys included Belgium in 2014, 2015, and 2019. Its average Global 100 Index Score was 24%, equal to the average for Western Europe. Significant findings from the 2019 survey include:

- 50% agreed “Jews are more loyal to Israel than to Belgium.”
- 40% agreed “Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust.”
- 29% agreed “Jews don’t care what happens to anyone but their own kind.”
- 8% agreed “Jews are responsible for most of the world’s wars.”
- 0% agreed that the Holocaust was a myth, and 11% thought the Holocaust had been greatly exaggerated by history.

Eurobarometer

The December 2018 Eurobarometer survey⁸ asked questions about antisemitism of the general public. Among those surveyed, 50% of Belgians responded that antisemitism was a “very” or “fairly” important problem in Belgium, compared to 86% of Belgian Jews in the FRA survey. Other significant findings include:

- 59% believe “expressions of hostility and threats towards Jewish people in the street or other public places” is a problem.
- 57% believe “people denying the genocide of the Jewish people, the Holocaust” is a problem.
- 52% believe “antisemitism in schools and universities” is a problem.

RESPONSE TO ANTISEMITISM

Physical security:

Jewish leaders and government officials were asked whether security measures at Jewish institutions were adequate to their threat assessments. All interviewees were satisfied with physical security measures in place, but funding burdens remained a major issue for the Jewish community. Police or military are present at Jewish institutions whenever requested by the Jewish community, but Jewish institutions require additional private security. The cost of private security is partially subsidized by the government, but the Jewish community still bears a significant financial burden for security.

Political actions:

Do officials systematically and publicly condemn antisemitic incidents? Yes. Public officials regularly make statements in response to major incidents and about the need to combat antisemitism.

Does the government have a comprehensive plan for combating antisemitism, including online antisemitism? A federal plan to combat racism is under development and it should address antisemitism, but no stand-alone antisemitism plan is envisaged. There is an informal stakeholder working group on antisemitism, but no official government focal point for antisemitism. The working group includes government officials, law enforcement, UNIA (equal opportunities agency), and Jewish community leaders.

Do officials adequately confer and coordinate with Jewish community leaders on actions against antisemitism? Yes.

Do parliamentary committees review government action against antisemitism? There is no specific parliamentary committee on antisemitism, but both the Belgian Senate and the parliament of the Brussels region have passed resolutions that call on the federal government to take certain actions which have been lacking. The Senate resolution from December 2018 called on the government to appoint a coordinator on the fight against antisemitism, to implement the working definition of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), and to foster education against antisemitism.

Education:

Is there adequate formal education in schools about antisemitism? Education about antisemitism is inconsistent. Antisemitism is addressed in the context of Holocaust education, but contemporary antisemitism is not always addressed.

Are there informal education programs, like public awareness campaigns? No.

Do schools have adequate plans and personnel to respond to antisemitic incidents? No, and incident response has been disappointing.

Are public sector employees (e.g., educators, law enforcement, judiciary) trained to understand antisemitism, including the adoption and use of the IHRA definition? Police trainees can opt to take a one-day seminar on antisemitism at the Kazerne Dossin Holocaust memorial and documentation center, but the seminars are not mandatory. Teachers generally receive

⁷ Anti-Defamation League, “ADL Global 100 Belgium,” 2019. (<https://global100.adl.org/country/belgium/2019>)

⁸ Special Eurobarometer 484, “Perceptions of Antisemitism,” January 2019. (<https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/ResultDoc/download/DocumentKy/85035>)

education on dealing with discrimination which touches on antisemitism.

Law enforcement:

Are adequate systems in place to report antisemitic hate crime, including illegal hate speech? Mostly. Antisemitic motive is noted in police reports when police assess that to be the case. However, the lack of a box to check to note antisemitic motive makes the availability of disaggregated data subject to additional research. Doubts remain about police judgments regarding antisemitic motive, but progress is being made on that issue.

Does law enforcement report publicly on antisemitic hate crime statistics? No, though Holocaust denial and Holocaust distortion are reported separately.

Are antisemitic crimes adequately prosecuted as hate crimes?

Generally, yes. Two recent exceptions include the decision not to prosecute a café owner who posted a sign, “Dogs are allowed in this establishment, but Jews are not under any circumstances,” and the decision not to prosecute soccer fans who chanted, “My father was in the commandos, my mother was in the SS, together they burned Jews ’cause Jews burn the best.” Public prosecutors have received a circular to impress upon them the importance of prosecuting antisemitic hate crime.

FRANCE

Jewish population: 448,000



ANTISEMITISM ASSESSMENT

Top concerns of Jewish community leaders

Jewish leaders expressed concern about two main issues, both focusing on antisemitic violence.

Their permanent and overriding worry is about radical Islamic terror attacks on Jewish institutions. The 2012 attack on the Ozar HaTorah school in Toulouse and the 2015 attack on the Hyper Cacher market cast a long shadow of insecurity over the community, even with heightened security measures by both law enforcement and the community itself.

The other major concern is about violence against Jewish individuals, mostly by French Muslims who are incited by anti-Israel rhetoric online. While not all antisemitic assaults can be traced to anti-Israel incitement, Jewish leaders ascribe a majority of the blame for antisemitic violence on this phenomenon.

FRA report major findings⁹

Among French Jews, 95% said antisemitism is a “fairly big” or “very big” problem, the highest in the EU countries surveyed.

Specifically, 27% of French Jews said they had experienced antisemitic harassment over the prior 12 months, the lowest score among Jewish communities surveyed. Of these respondents, 15% had offensive or threatening statements directed at them in person.

The most common antisemitic statements heard by French Jews were:

- Israelis behave “like Nazis” towards the Palestinians (53%).
- Jews have too much power in France (50%).
- Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes (36%).

Further, 22% witnessed other Jews being verbally insulted or harassed and/or physically attacked in the prior 12 months.

Only 18% reported to either the police or a Jewish organization the most serious incident of antisemitic harassment in the past five years.

Notably, 72% worried that their family members or friends would be verbally insulted or harassed in the next 12 months because they are Jewish. In particular, 70% worried about physical attacks. Both scores were the highest in the FRA survey.

Although 29% frequently avoided wearing, carrying or displaying in public things that could identify a person as Jewish, another 7% always did.

Moreover, 85% said the Arab-Israeli conflict impacts how safe they feel as a Jewish person in France.

Among French Jews, 46% had considered emigrating over the prior five years because of not feeling safe as a Jew.

Incident reports

SPCJ, the Jewish community security organization, issues annual antisemitic incident reports, and the statistics are corroborated with the Ministry of Interior. Its 2019 report¹⁰ noted 687 antisemitic incidents, a 121% increase since 2017. Among those incidents were: 45 assaults, 5 acts of arson, 101 acts of vandalism, 196 threats or instances of public hate speech, 276 graffiti incidents, and 64 cases of hate mail or antisemitic flyers.

SPCJ emphasized that the reported numbers are significantly lower than the numbers of actual incidents, because (1) French Jews now see antisemitism as a normal part of life and no longer make an effort to report incidents; (2) the victims fear retribution from the perpetrators if they report incidents to the police; (3) many victims do not believe a report to the police will lead to any consequences for the perpetrator; and (4) most of the threats and insults are online and are not captured.

⁹ European Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism Second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU,” 2018. (https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2018-experiences-and-perceptions-of-antisemitism-survey_en.pdf)

¹⁰ Jewish Community Security Service, “Report on Antisemitism in France,” 2019. (<https://www.antisemitisme.fr/dl/2019-EN>)

ADL Global 100 major findings¹¹

ADL Global 100 surveys included France in 2014, 2015, and 2019. Its average Global 100 Index Score was 24%. Significant findings from the 2019 survey include:

- 32% agreed “Jews are more loyal to Israel than to France.”
- 31% agreed “Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust.”
- 29% agreed “Jews have too much power in the business world.”
- 17% agreed “Jews think they are better than other people.”
- 0% agreed that the Holocaust was a myth, and 6% thought the Holocaust had been greatly exaggerated by history.

Eurobarometer

The December 2018 Eurobarometer survey¹² asked questions about antisemitism of the general public. Among those surveyed, 72% of French respondents said antisemitism was a “very” or “fairly” important problem France, significantly less than the 95% of French Jews in the FRA survey. Other significant findings include:

- 51% believe antisemitism had increased over the past five years, above the 38% EU average.
- 80% believe “expressions of hostility and threats towards Jewish people in the street or other public places” is a problem.
- 80% believe “antisemitic graffiti or vandalism of Jewish buildings or institutions” is a problem.
- 78% believe “people denying the genocide of the Jewish people, the Holocaust” is a problem.

RESPONSE TO ANTISEMITISM

Physical security:

Jewish leaders regretted that police and military personnel were no longer permanently stationed at Jewish institutions, as was the case from 2015 to 2017. As noted previously, antisemitic incidents have increased by 121% since 2017 and SPCJ made the connection explicit in its report. One leader summarized the situation as, “A lot has been done, but more

could be done.” Government sources assert that security is adequate from their perspective.

Political actions:

Do officials systematically and publicly condemn antisemitic incidents? Yes, all sources agree that French leaders — from the President to local mayors — regularly condemn antisemitic incidents. Jewish leaders said that French political elite from all of the mainstream parties are fully committed to the fight against antisemitism, but they have doubts about the leaders of the far-right and far-left populist parties.

Does the government have a comprehensive plan for combating antisemitism, including online antisemitism? Yes, in 2014, the Prime Minister’s office adopted and raised the profile of the Inter-Ministerial Delegation for the Fight Against Racism, Antisemitism, and anti-LGBT Hate (DILCRAH)¹³, and since 2015 it has produced two national plans to address antisemitism, the first for 2015-17 and the second for 2018-2020. A third plan is under development by DILCRAH, which coordinates government action across ministries and other government agencies, and should be published in April 2021. DILCRAH uses the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism.

Do officials adequately confer and coordinate with Jewish community leaders on actions against antisemitism? Yes, all sources agreed.

Do parliamentary committees review government action against antisemitism? Parliamentarians are active participants in the fight against antisemitism, and more than 20 of them have formed a formal “study group” on antisemitism.¹⁴ The group proposed a resolution to adopt the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism, and it passed on December 3, 2019.¹⁵

Education:

Is there adequate formal education in schools about antisemitism? Antisemitism is addressed in the context of Holocaust education, but contemporary antisemitism is not always adequately addressed. Officials understand that Holocaust education and education against antisemitism are not the same and are considering how to improve the latter. Currently, Jewish history is mostly portrayed in three phases: Biblical, Holocaust, and the State of Israel, which ignores many historical instances of antisemitism.

11 Anti-Defamation League, “ADL Global 100 France” 2019. (<https://global100.adl.org/country/france/2019>)

12 Special Eurobarometer 484, “Perceptions of Antisemitism,” January 2019. (<https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/ResultDoc/download/DocumentKy/85035>)

13 DILCRAH (Délégation Interministérielle à la Lutte Contre le Racisme, l’Antisémisme et la Haine anti-LGBT), (<https://www.gouvernement.fr/dilcrah>)

14 Assemblée nationale, “Composition du groupe d’études: antisémisme,” April 2021. (https://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/instances/fiche/OMC_PO746629)

15 Assemblée nationale, “Résolution n° 361, adoptée par l’Assemblée nationale, visant à lutter contre l’antisémisme,” December 3, 2019. (http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/15/textes/l15t0361_texte-adoptee-seance)

Are there informal education programs, like public awareness campaigns? DILCRAH and several organizations provide informal education, including on contemporary antisemitism.

Do schools have adequate plans and personnel to respond to antisemitic incidents? A handbook exists, but implementation varies by school and by subject. Holocaust denial is usually handled well, while anti-Israel antisemitism is more difficult for school personnel.

Are public sector employees (e.g., educators, law enforcement, judiciary) trained to understand antisemitism, including the adoption and use of the IHRA definition? DILCRAH has a variety of education programs for public sector employees, but challenges remain in implementation. Teachers have online professional development programs about antisemitism and racism as well as a written handbook on how to deal with classroom incidents. A new DILCRAH program on antisemitism, racism, and anti-LGBTQ hate will soon be mandatory in police academies and will use the IHRA definition. The police training explains the specificities of antisemitism versus racism.

Law enforcement:

Are adequate systems in place to report antisemitic hate crime, including illegal hate speech? Yes, French police have systems in place for reporting antisemitic hate crime, including a separate system¹⁶ for online crime, including illegal hate speech. DILCRAH is training police to take better into account the victim's perspective on the incident.

Does law enforcement report publicly on antisemitic hate crime statistics? Yes, the Ministry of Interior publishes data, which are corroborated with SPCJ, the French Jewish security organization.

Are antisemitic crimes adequately prosecuted as hate crimes? Jewish leaders are not satisfied, based on anecdotal evidence, and have not received responses to their requests to the government for data on this topic. The Ministry of Justice does not disaggregate hate crime data for antisemitism. Prosecutors reportedly do not see much value in pursuing charges with aggravating circumstances that are based on inferred intent (without explicit evidence of antisemitic intent), because they are difficult to prove and do not necessarily lead to penalty enhancement. The murder case of Sarah Halimi created great distress in the Jewish community when the prosecutors initially did not include antisemitism as an aggravating circumstance of the murder charge, despite reports that the assailant cried "Allahu akbar" during the murder.

¹⁶ Minister de Le Interieur, "internet signalement," (<https://www.internet-signalement.gouv.fr/PortailWeb/planets/AccueilInput.action>)

GERMANY

Jewish population: 118,000



ANTISEMITISM ASSESSMENT

Top concerns of Jewish community leaders

Jewish community leaders in Germany are especially concerned with the rise of antisemitic incidents¹⁷ and hate speech. The hate speech concerns relate mostly to online antisemitism, including Israel-related antisemitism.¹⁸

Leaders view several actions as important steps to addressing antisemitism, including (1) implementing the IHRA working definition of antisemitism in public sectors, such as law enforcement, judiciary, and education,¹⁹ (2) strengthening Holocaust education, antisemitism education, and education about Jewish life, and (3) normalization of diverse Jewish identities in German society. Young Jewish leaders are particularly concerned about the last point.

Right-wing extremism²⁰ and the far-right political party Alternative for Germany (AfD) are also of major concern.

FRA report major findings²¹

Among German Jews, 85% said antisemitism is a “fairly big” or “very big” problem.

Specifically, 41% of German Jews said they had experienced antisemitic harassment over the prior 12 months, the highest percentage of all surveyed countries. Of these respondents, 29% had offensive or threatening statements directed at them in person, the highest percentage of all surveyed countries.

The most common antisemitic statements heard by German Jews were:

- Israelis behave “like Nazis” towards the Palestinians (63%).
- Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes (45%).

- Jews have too much power in Germany (42%).
- The world would be a better place without Israel (38%).
- Jews bring antisemitism on themselves (38%).

Further, 29% witnessed other Jews being verbally insulted or harassed and/or physically attacked in the prior 12 months.

Only 20% reported to either the police or a Jewish organization the most serious incident of antisemitic harassment in the past five years.

Of those surveyed, 62% worried that their family members or friends would be verbally insulted or harassed in the next 12 months because they are Jewish. In particular, 54% worried about physical attacks.

Although 32% frequently avoided wearing, carrying, or displaying in public things that could identify a person as Jewish, another 4% always did.

Notably, 73% said the Arab-Israeli conflict impacts how safe they feel as a Jewish person in Germany.

Among German Jews, 46% had considered emigrating over the prior five years because of not feeling safe as a Jew, tied for highest with France.

Incident reports

The Research and Information Center for Antisemitism (RIAS) monitors antisemitism in the states of Berlin, Bavaria, Brandenburg, and Schleswig-Holstein, and issues incident reports. Its Berlin report²² for the first half of 2020 noted 410 incidents, including 6 assaults, 20 threats of violence, 25 incidents of vandalism, and 301 incidents of abusive behavior. The incident total for the first six months of 2020 was just 10% lower than the 458 incidents during the same period in 2019, despite the COVID-19 lockdown.

17 Bundesverband RIAS, “Antisemitismus während der Covid-19-Pandemie Antisemitismus im Kontext der Covid19-Pandemie,” 2020. (https://www.report-antisemitism.de/documents/2020-09-08_Rias-bund_Antisemitismus_im_Kontext_von_covid-19.pdf)

18 Zentralrat der Juden, “Neue PMK-Statistik: Antisemitismus ist Alltag Geworden,” May 27, 2020. (<https://www.zentralratderjuden.de/aktuelle-meldung/artikel/news/neue-pmk-statistik-antisemitismus-ist-alltag-geworden/>)

19 Zentralrat der Juden, “Presseerklärung zum Deutschen IHRA-Vorsitz” February 3, 2020. (<https://www.zentralratderjuden.de/aktuelle-meldung/artikel/news/presseerklaerung-zum-deutschen-ihra-vorsitz/>)

20 Zentralrat der Juden, “Rechtsextremismus und Antisemitismus Konsument Bekämpfen,” June 19, 2020. (<https://www.zentralratderjuden.de/aktuelle-meldung/artikel/news/rechtsextremismus-und-antisemitismus-konsequenz-bekaempfen/>)

21 European Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism Second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU,” 2018. (https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2018-experiences-and-perceptions-of-antisemitism-survey_en.pdf)

22 Recherche und Informationsstelle Antisemitismus Berlin (RIAS Berlin), “Antisemitische Vorfälle in Berlin,” September 22, 2020. (https://report-antisemitism.de/documents/2020-09-22_rias-be_Annual_Antisemitische-Vorfaele-Halbjahr-2020.pdf)

ADL Global 100 major findings²³

ADL Global 100 surveys included Germany in 2014, 2015, and 2019. Its average Global 100 Index Score was 19%, somewhat lower than the 24% average for Western Europe. Significant findings from the 2019 survey include:

- 49% agreed “Jews are more loyal to Israel than to Germany.”
- 42% agreed “Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust.”
- 27% agreed “Jews have too much power in the business world.”
- 31% agreed “People hate Jews because of the way Jews behave.”
- 22% agreed “Jews have too much control over the United States government.”
- 6% agreed “Jews are responsible for most of the world’s wars.”
- 1% agreed that the Holocaust was a myth, and 7% thought the Holocaust had been greatly exaggerated by history.

Eurobarometer

The December 2018 Eurobarometer survey²⁴ asked questions about antisemitism of the general public. Among those surveyed, 66% of German respondents said antisemitism was a “very” or “fairly” important problem in Germany, less than the 85% of German Jews in the FRA survey. Other significant findings include:

- 61% believe antisemitism had increased over the past five years.
- 64% believe “expressions of hostility and threats towards Jewish people in the street or other public places” is a problem.
- 71% believe “people denying the genocide of the Jewish people, the Holocaust” is a problem.
- 48% believe “antisemitism in schools and universities” is a problem.

RESPONSE TO ANTISEMITISM

Physical security:

Jewish leaders and government officials were asked whether security measures at Jewish institutions were adequate to their threat assessments. The common response was that generally they are adequate, but exceptions have arisen like the security failure at the Halle synagogue during the terror attack on Yom Kippur. The German government and federal state governments subsidize security measures for Jewish institutions. In September 2020, the federal government agreed to provide the Central Council of Jews in Germany with an additional 22 million euros for structural security measures at Jewish institutions.²⁵

Political actions:

Do officials systematically and publicly condemn antisemitic incidents? Yes. Public officials regularly make statements in response to major incidents and about the need to combat antisemitism.

Does the government have a comprehensive plan for combating antisemitism, including online antisemitism? Yes, the Federal Government submitted an extensive report on the “status of implementation and evaluation of the recommendations for action of the independent expert circle on antisemitism” in September 2020²⁶. The Federal Government Commissioner for Jewish Life in Germany and the Fight against Antisemitism, Dr. Felix Klein, is in charge of coordinating and executing the 5 central demands:

1. Appointment of a national antisemitism commissioner and establishment of an independent panel of experts.
2. Consistent recording, publication and punishment of antisemitic crimes.
3. Permanent support for antisemitism prevention organizations.
4. Creation of a permanent federal-state commission for national and federal state antisemitism commissioners.
5. Long-term funding of research on antisemitism.

There are currently 28 model projects with an explicit focus on hate online, including antisemitism.

Do officials adequately confer and coordinate with Jewish community leaders on actions against antisemitism? Yes.

23 Anti-Defamation League, “ADL Global 100” 2019. (<https://global100.adl.org/country/germany/2019>)

24 Special Eurobarometer 484, “Perceptions of Antisemitism,” January 2019. (<https://ec.europa.eu/comfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/ResultDoc/download/DocumentKy/85035>)

25 Bundesministerium des Innern, “Bundesregierung stellt zusätzlich 22 Millionen Euro zum Schutz Jüdischer Einrichtungen bereit,” September 17, 2020. (<https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/pressemitteilungen/DE/2020/09/bmi-zdj.html>)

26 Deutscher Bundestag, “Bericht der Bundesregierung über den Umsetzungsstand und die Bewertung der Handlungsempfehlungen des Unabhängigen Expertenkreises Antisemitismus,” September 11, 2020. (<http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/223/1922389.pdf>)

The political umbrella organization for Jews in Germany, the Central Council for Jews in Germany, holds close relationships with public officials and convenes regularly with government officials, according to its own statements.

Do parliamentary committees review government action against antisemitism? The German Parliament Bundestag established an independent expert circle on antisemitism, which provided reports in 2009, 2013, and 2017.²⁷ In 2018, the Bundestag called on the German government to submit a regular report on the status of the fight against antisemitism in Germany.²⁸

Education:

Is there adequate formal education in schools about antisemitism? Antisemitism education is addressed within Holocaust education. However, current antisemitic trends or incidents are not part of the school curriculum. In February 2021, Josef Schuster, President of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, said, “Not only must more knowledge about Judaism be taught in schools, but there must also be more education about antisemitism.”

Are there informal education programs, like public awareness campaigns? There is a wide range of informal education programs funded by government, public and private foundations, as well as civil society. An example for a national informal education program is the “Meet A Jew”²⁹ program, in which Jewish high school students meet with non-Jewish high school students to provide individual insights into the diversity of Jewish life in Germany in personal encounters. In another example, the Berlin State Office for Equal Treatment — Against Discrimination included antisemitism in their “Discrimination has many faces — equal treatment is your right!”³⁰ public awareness campaign.

Do schools have adequate plans and personnel to respond to antisemitic incidents? A 2020 report, “Antisemitism in the context of school — Interpretations and ways of dealing with it by teachers in Berlin schools”³¹ found that teachers can recognize antisemitic incidents as such, but are often

unsure how to intervene, especially in cases of contemporary antisemitism, related to Israel. Similar studies for two additional states, Baden-Württemberg and Thuringia, are being undertaken, but no similar studies have been published for states other than the state of Berlin.

Are public sector employees (e.g. educators, law enforcement, judiciary) trained to understand antisemitism, including the adoption and use of the IHRA definition? Teachers are not systematically trained to understand and deal with antisemitism, though Jewish institutions offer such training. The independent expert group on antisemitism recommends that such training be developed and promoted for teachers and social workers.³²

In the Federal Criminal Police Office’s (BKA) general training measures, the topic of antisemitism is included in the basic courses on politically motivated crime and hate crime. Similar courses are offered for the military. The national antisemitism report calls for prevention of antisemitism and racism curricular training courses to be offered” to an even greater extent to multipliers, especially in the police sector”³³. The pilot project “Regishut” (Hebrew for sensitization), launched in 2020, provides senior ranking Berlin police officers with specialized knowledge regarding various forms of contemporary antisemitism.³⁴

Law enforcement:

Are adequate systems in place to report antisemitic hate crime, including illegal hate speech? Antisemitic crimes are recorded by police, but questions remain about appropriate classification. All antisemitic crimes are currently categorized as “politically motivated crime,” regardless of actual motive. At the same time, some crimes, such as graffiti with hate speech against Israel, are often not included in antisemitic hate crime reports. A committee of federal and state police experts is evaluating ways to rectify categorization issues. Additionally, the Berlin Police has a specific position of “antisemitism commissioner” to ensure adequate attention is paid to antisemitic crimes.³⁵

27 Deutscher Bundestag, “Bericht des Unabhängigen Expertenkreises Antisemitismus,” April 7, 2017. (<https://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/119/1811970.pdf>)

28 Bundes Regierung, “Wichtige Maßnahmen gegen Antisemitismus,” September 2, 2020. (<https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/antisemitismusbericht-1781500>)

29 Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland, “Meet a Jew,” (<https://www.meetajew.de>)

30 Senatsverwaltung für Justiz, Verbraucherschutz, und antidiskriminierung, “Diskriminierung hat viele Gesichter – Gleichbehandlung ist Ihr gutes Recht!” (<https://www.berlin.de/sen/lads/sensibilisierung/kampagnen/diskriminierung-hat-viele-gesichter/>)

31 Marina Chernivsky, Friederike Lorenz, “Antisemitismus im Kontext Schule – Deutungen und Umgangsweisen von Lehrerinnen an Berliner Schulen,” November, 2020. (https://kompetenznetzwerk-antisemitismus.de/wp-content/uploads/Forschungsbericht_2020-Berlin.pdf)

32 Deutscher Bundestag, “Bericht der Bundesregierung über den Umsetzungsstand und die Bewertung der Handlungsempfehlungen des Unabhängigen Expertenkreises Antisemitismus,” September 11, 2020. (<https://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/19/223/1922389.pdf>)

33 Deutscher Bundestag, “Bericht der Bundesregierung über den Umsetzungsstand und die Bewertung der Handlungsempfehlungen des Unabhängigen Expertenkreises Antisemitismus,” September 11, 2020. (<https://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/19/223/1922389.pdf>)

34 Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin, “Zwischenbericht des Ansprechpartners des Landes Berlin zu Antisemitismus,” August 14, 2020. (<https://www.parlament-berlin.de/adoss/18/IIIPlen/vorgang/d18-2930.pdf>)

35 Polizei Berlin, “Antisemitismusbeauftragter der Polizei Berlin,” (<https://www.berlin.de/polizei/aufgaben/antisemitismusbeauftragte-r/>)

Does law enforcement report publicly on antisemitic hate crime statistics? Yes. Law enforcement publishes reports on antisemitic crimes on an annual basis,³⁶ both on a federal and state basis.

Are antisemitic crimes adequately prosecuted as hate crimes? Yes, the majority of antisemitic crimes are prosecuted adequately. However, there are instances of outrage by Jewish communities for not treating antisemitic crimes as such. For example, the Jewish community heavily criticized the final ruling of an arson attack on a synagogue in the city of Wuppertal during the 2014 Gaza war, when the judge ruled it to be a politically motivated attack and considered as criticism of Israel.³⁷

³⁶ Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Berlin, “Bericht der Antisemitismusbeauftragten der Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Berlin,” January 27, 2021. (<https://www.berlin.de/generalstaatsanwaltschaft/presse/pressemitteilungen/2021/pressemitteilung.1045130.php>)

³⁷ Der Tagesspiegel, “Wie kann ein Anschlag auf eine Synagoge nicht judenfeindlich sein?” March 27, 2017. (<https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/antisemitismus-in-deutschland-wie-kann-ein-anschlag-auf-eine-synagoge-nicht-judenfeindlich-sein/19572812.html>)

HUNGARY

Jewish population: 47,000



ANTISEMITISM ASSESSMENT

Top concerns of Jewish community leaders

Jewish leaders expressed concern about the introduction of nationalist historical figures, who also engaged in antisemitism, into school textbooks and other areas of public cultural and political prominence.

Politicians' use of language that can be understood as antisemitic codes, such as "rootless cosmopolitans" and "globalists," also give pause to community leaders.

Although antisemitic violence is extremely rare and even absent in most years, Jewish leaders worry about far-right extremist groups, such as the neo-Nazi Legio Hungaria group.

FRA report major findings³⁸

Among Hungarian Jews, 77% said antisemitism is a "fairly big" or "very big" problem.

Specifically, 23% of Hungarian Jews said they had experienced antisemitic harassment over the prior 12 months, the lowest score among Jewish communities surveyed. Of these respondents, 17% had offensive or threatening statements directed at them in person.

The most common antisemitic statements heard by Hungarian Jews were:

- Jews have too much power in Hungary (53%).
- Israelis behave "like Nazis" towards the Palestinians (44%).
- Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes (41%).

Further, 27% witnessed other Jews being verbally insulted or harassed and/or physically attacked in the prior 12 months.

Only 8% reported to either the police or a Jewish organization the most serious incident of antisemitic harassment in the past five years, the lowest rate among the Jewish communities surveyed.

Of those surveyed, 28% worried that their family members or friends would be verbally insulted or harassed in the next 12 months because they are Jewish. In particular, 18% worried about physical attacks.

Although 13% frequently avoided wearing, carrying, or displaying in public things that could identify a person as Jewish, another 3% always did.

Just 17% said the Arab-Israeli conflict impacts how safe they feel as a Jewish person in Hungary.

Among Hungarian Jews, 43% had considered emigrating over the prior five years because of not feeling safe as a Jew.

Incident reports

Action and Protection Foundation (TEV), a Jewish community nongovernmental organization (NGO), issues annual antisemitic incident reports. Its report for the first half of 2020³⁹ noted 4 vandalism incidents and 11 instances of public hate speech, such as antisemitic posters or chants at demonstrations. No assaults or threats were reported. In 2019,⁴⁰ TEV reported 1 assault, 6 vandalism incidents, and 27 instances of public hate speech.

ADL Global 100 major findings⁴¹

ADL Global 100 surveys included Hungary in 2014, 2015, and 2019. Its average Global 100 Index Score was 41%, higher than the 34% average for Eastern Europe. Significant findings from the 2019 survey include:

- 43% agreed "Jews have too much power in the business world."
- 59% agreed "Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust."
- 55% agreed "Jews are more loyal to Israel than to Hungary."
- 51% agreed "Jews have too much control over global affairs."
- 43% agreed "Jews think they are better than other people."

38 European Agency for Fundamental Rights, "Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism Second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU," 2018. (https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2018-experiences-and-perceptions-of-antisemitism-survey_en.pdf)

39 Action and Protection League, "Antisemitic Crimes and Hate Incidents in Hungary," June 2020. (https://tev.hu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/APL-annual-short_2020JAN-JUN_72dpiKESZ.pdf)

40 Action and Protection Foundation, "Antisemitic Hate Crimes And Incidents In Hungary," 2019. (https://tev.hu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/APF-annual-short_2019_72dpi-1.pdf)

41 ADL, "Global 100 Survey Hungary," 2019. (<https://global100.adl.org/country/hungary/2019>)

- 0% agreed that the Holocaust was a myth, and 17% thought the Holocaust had been greatly exaggerated by history.

Eurobarometer

The December 2018 Eurobarometer survey⁴² asked questions about antisemitism of the general public. Among those surveyed, 45% of Hungarian respondents said antisemitism was a “very” or “fairly” important problem Hungary, significantly less than the 77% of Hungarian Jews in the FRA survey. Other significant findings include:

- Just 26% believe antisemitism had increased over the past five years, significantly lower than the 38% EU average, and 22% believe antisemitism had decreased, the largest percentage in the EU after Romania.
- 46% believe “expressions of hostility and threats towards Jewish people in the street or other public places” is a problem.
- 46% believe “people denying the genocide of the Jewish people, the Holocaust” is a problem.
- 40% believe “antisemitism in schools and universities” is a problem.

RESPONSE TO ANTISEMITISM

Physical security:

Jewish leaders were satisfied with physical security measures in place, and cited excellent coordination with law enforcement. The Hungarian government provides funding for security-related costs.

Political actions:

Do officials systematically and publicly condemn antisemitic incidents? The Hungarian government has declared a “zero tolerance” policy on antisemitism. The small number of incidents, most of which are minor, do not allow for a strict assessment of this parameter.

Does the government have a comprehensive plan for combating antisemitism, including online antisemitism? The Hungarian government informed⁴³ the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights that it is developing a national plan to address antisemitism, which will use the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism.

Do officials adequately confer and coordinate with Jewish community leaders on actions against antisemitism? Yes, though officials may confer more with one part of a divided Jewish community leadership than another.

Do parliamentary committees review government action against antisemitism? No.

Education:

Is there adequate formal education in schools about antisemitism? Antisemitism is addressed in the context of Holocaust education, but contemporary antisemitism is not always addressed and is at the discretion of the teachers. Jewish history has been given more attention in recent textbooks, including historical instances of antisemitism.

Are there informal education programs, like public awareness campaigns? Several Jewish organizations provide informal education at schools, including on contemporary antisemitism, but not all schools are covered.

Do schools have adequate plans and personnel to respond to antisemitic incidents? No specific guidance for antisemitic incidents is provided to schools.

Are public sector employees (e.g., educators, law enforcement, judiciary) trained to understand antisemitism, including the adoption and use of the IHRA definition? The Action and Protection Foundation gives seminars on antisemitism and hate crime for law enforcement students at the National University of Public Service.

Law enforcement:

Are adequate systems in place to report antisemitic hate crime, including illegal hate speech? Hungarian police have a system in place for reporting hate crime. In 2019 police received updated instructions on procedures for receiving hate crime complaints.⁴⁴

Does law enforcement report publicly on antisemitic hate crime statistics? No. Hate crime data is published, but not disaggregated by motive.

Are antisemitic crimes adequately prosecuted as hate crimes? This parameter is not ascertainable because of the lack of serious antisemitic hate crimes.

⁴² European Commission, “Perceptions of Antisemitism,” January 2019. (<https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/ResultDoc/download/DocumentKy/85035>)

⁴³ European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Overview of Antisemitic Incidents Recorded In The European Union,” 2019. (https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2020-antisemitism-overview-2009-2019_en.pdf)

⁴⁴ OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), “Hate Crime Reporting Hungary,” 2019. (<https://hatecrime.osce.org/hungary>)

THE NETHERLANDS

Jewish population: 30,000



ANTISEMITISM ASSESSMENT

Top concerns of Jewish community leaders

Jewish leaders expressed concern about increasing antisemitism and continuing public indifference, which together cause a sense of insecurity. They see this trajectory as continuous and worry about where it will lead.

According to Jewish leaders, much of the Jewish community is particularly worried about Muslim antisemitism, even if the incident reports do not reflect a disproportionate number of incidents by Muslims (or those perceived to be Muslims.) This situation may result from radical Islamists having high public profiles in the Netherlands.

While far-right parties are pro-Israel, they have members and supporters who engage in antisemitic speech. Most of the reported incidents occurred in private chat groups that were later exposed.

Jewish leaders are also concerned about the Denk party, whose base of support is the Turkish-descent population, which in 2018 refused to sign a cross-party declaration about combating antisemitism.

Exclusion of Jews from progressive causes by far-left leaders is a new, but increasing, concern.

FRA report major findings⁴⁵

Among Dutch Jews, 73% said antisemitism is a “fairly big” or “very big” problem.

Specifically, 35% of Dutch Jews said they had experienced antisemitic harassment over the prior 12 months, and 26% had offensive or threatening statements directed at them in person.

The most common antisemitic statements heard by Dutch Jews were:

- Israelis behave “like Nazis” towards the Palestinians (51%).
- Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes (32%).
- The world would be a better place without Israel (32%).

Further, 22% witnessed other Jews being verbally insulted or harassed and/or physically attacked in the prior 12 months.

Only 25% reported to either the police or a Jewish organization the most serious incident of antisemitic harassment in the past five years.

More than half (52%) worried that their family members or friends would be verbally insulted or harassed in the next 12 months because they are Jewish, and 37% worried about physical attacks.

Although 22% frequently avoided wearing, carrying or displaying in public things that could identify a person as Jewish, another 11% always did.

Notably, 64% said the Arab-Israeli conflict impacts how safe they feel as a Jewish person in the Netherlands.

Among Dutch Jews, 32% had considered emigrating over the prior five years because of not feeling safe as a Jew.

Incident reports

CIDI, an NGO which monitors antisemitism, issues annual incident reports. Its 2019 report⁴⁶ noted 182 incidents (not counting online incidents), the highest number since CIDI began recording incidents in 1982, and a 35% increase over 2018. Among the incidents were 10 threats of violence, 43 cases of verbal abuse, 14 incidents of vandalism, and 50 “public square” incidents, such as antisemitic chants at soccer matches or demonstrations. Such incidents doubled in 2019 compared to the prior year.

⁴⁵ European Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism Second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU,” 2018. (https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2018-experiences-and-perceptions-of-antisemitism-survey_en.pdf)

⁴⁶ CIDI Antisemitism Monitor, “Monitor of Antisemitic Incidents in the Netherlands Summary Report,” 2019. (<https://www.cidi.nl/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/English-Summary-CIDI-Monitor-Antisemitic-Incidents-2019.pdf>)

ADL Global 100 major findings⁴⁷

ADL Global 100 surveys included the Netherlands in 2014, 2015, and 2019. Its average Global 100 Index Score was 9%, much lower than the 24% average for Western Europe. Significant findings from the 2019 survey include:

- 43% agreed “Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the Netherlands.”
- 31% agreed “Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust.”
- 19% agreed “Jews don’t care what happens to anyone but their own kind.”
- 5% agreed “Jews are responsible for most of the world’s wars.”
- 0% agreed that the Holocaust was a myth, and 3% thought the Holocaust had been greatly exaggerated by history.

Eurobarometer

The December 2018 Eurobarometer survey⁴⁸ asked questions about antisemitism of the general public. Among those surveyed, 65% of Dutch respondents said antisemitism was a “very” or “fairly” important problem in the Netherlands, similar to the 73% of Dutch Jews in the FRA survey. Other significant findings include:

- 88% believe antisemitism had increased over the past five years.
- 61% believe “expressions of hostility and threats towards Jewish people in the street or other public places” is a problem.
- 56% believe “people denying the genocide of the Jewish people, the Holocaust” is a problem.
- 37% believe “antisemitism in schools and universities” is a problem.

RESPONSE TO ANTISEMITISM

Physical security:

Jewish leaders were asked whether security measures at Jewish institutions were adequate to their threat assessments. All interviewees were satisfied with physical security measures in place, but funding burdens remained a major issue for the Jewish community. The cost of private security is partially subsidized by the government, but the Jewish community still bears a significant financial burden for security. A parliamentary resolution to provide additional security funding, proposed in July 2020, was voted down.

Political actions:

Do officials systematically and publicly condemn antisemitic incidents? Yes. Public officials regularly make statements in response to major incidents and about the need to combat antisemitism.

Does the government have a comprehensive plan for combating antisemitism, including online antisemitism? In May 2019, the Dutch parliament adopted a resolution, which called upon the government to develop a national plan to address antisemitism, including the appointment of a national focal point, but no stand-alone plan is under development and no focal point has been appointed. The government finances some projects for NGOs to work with teachers, local officials, and police on antisemitism issues, but funding is minimal (reportedly less than \$4 million in total) and ad hoc. The government’s National Action Plan Against Discrimination includes measures against antisemitism but does not sufficiently account for the specificities of antisemitism.

Do officials adequately confer and coordinate with Jewish community leaders on actions against antisemitism? Yes.

Do parliamentary committees review government action against antisemitism? Parliamentarians are active on the issue of antisemitism, but no separate, standing committee exists.

Education:

Is there adequate formal education in schools about antisemitism? Antisemitism is addressed in the context of Holocaust education, but contemporary antisemitism is not always addressed and is at the discretion of the teachers. Proposals to include antisemitism as a topic in “citizenship” education have not yet been accepted.

⁴⁷ ADL, “Global 100 Survey Netherlands,” 2019. (<https://global100.adl.org/country/netherlands/2019>)

⁴⁸ European Commission, “Perceptions of Antisemitism,” January 2019. (<https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/ResultDoc/download/DocumentKy/85035>)

Are there informal education programs, like public awareness campaigns? The government has provided some funding to Holocaust education organizations to include new programs on contemporary antisemitism in their offerings.

Do schools have adequate plans and personnel to respond to antisemitic incidents? Responses vary across schools, according to anecdotal information, but no comprehensive survey has been done.

Are public sector employees (e.g., educators, law enforcement, judiciary) trained to understand antisemitism, including the adoption and use of the IHRA definition? The Ministry of Justice and Security has circulated the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism to police departments and prosecutors. Plans to hold trainings on antisemitism for public sector employees of local governments are under development but have not yet been implemented.

Law enforcement:

Are adequate systems in place to report antisemitic hate crime, including illegal hate speech? Mostly. Formally, there is a system, but in practice it is rarely used.⁴⁹ Doubts remain in the Jewish community about police judgments regarding antisemitic motive, but progress is being made on that issue.

Does law enforcement report publicly on antisemitic hate crime statistics? Yes, but confidence in the data is low.

Are antisemitic crimes adequately prosecuted as hate crimes? Not consistently, but progress is being made. Some reluctance is ascribed to the difficulty to prove antisemitic intent under Dutch legislation.

⁴⁹ NL Times, “MPs want harsher action against discrimination in proposed hate crime law,” June 29, 2020. (<https://nltimes.nl/2020/06/29/mps-want-harsher-action-discrimination-proposed-hate-crime-law>)

NORWAY

Jewish population: 1,500



ANTISEMITISM ASSESSMENT

Top concerns of Jewish community leaders

In broad terms, Jewish leaders are concerned that antisemitism is poorly understood in Norwegian society and antisemitic hate speech is often minimized.

Far-right antisemitic incitement and potential threats of violence are also concerns, though not considered a major societal issue.

FRA report major findings

Norway was not surveyed in the EU FRA report, but a 2017 report by the Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies included a survey⁵⁰ of Jewish experiences of antisemitism. Among its major findings were:

- In response to the question “Do you ever avoid showing your religious affiliation out of fear of negative attitudes?” 64% of Jewish respondents answered “Yes.”
- In response to the question “Have you experienced harassment in Norway in the past 12 months because of your religious affiliation?” 73% answered “Never,” 16% “Rarely,” 10% “Sometimes,” and 1% “Often.”

Incident reports

The Jewish community collects reports of incidents, and the police collect reports of antisemitic hate crimes. In 2019, the police reported 4 physical assaults, 2 incidents of damage to property, and 1 threat.

According to Norway’s 2021-23 action plan against antisemitism, a dedicated position at the Norwegian Centre against Racism to monitor online antisemitic incidents should be funded.

ADL Global 100 major findings⁵¹

ADL Global 100 surveys included Norway in 2014. Its Global 100 Index Score was 15%. Significant findings from the survey include:

- 40% agreed “Jews are more loyal to Israel than to Norway.”
- 31% agreed “Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust.”
- 27% agreed “Jews have too much control over the United States government.”
- 21% agreed “Jews think they are better than other people.”
- 23% agreed “People hate Jews because of the way Jews behave.”
- 1% agreed that the Holocaust was a myth, and 5% thought the Holocaust had been greatly exaggerated by history.

Eurobarometer

Norway is not covered by the Eurobarometer survey, but the survey by the Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies found that 77% of Norwegians agreed with the statement: “Harassment and violence against Jews concern everyone and constitute attacks on our society.”

RESPONSE TO ANTISEMITISM

Physical security:

Jewish leaders believe security measures at Jewish institutions are adequate to their threat assessments. The state provides both round-the-clock police protection and funding for all security needs.

⁵⁰ Center for Studies of The Holocaust and Religious Minorities, “Attitudes Towards Jews and Muslims in Norway,” 2017. (https://www.hlsenteret.no/english/research/jewish-history-and-antisemitism/Population%20survey:%20Attitudes%20towards%20Jews%20and%20Other%20Minorities/hl-report_digital_8mai_full.pdf)

⁵¹ ADL, “Global 100 Survey Norway,” 2014. (<https://global100.adl.org/country/norway/2014>)

Political actions:

Do officials systematically and publicly condemn antisemitic incidents? Jewish leaders noted that officials condemn antisemitism in general, e.g., at Holocaust remembrance events, but rarely condemn antisemitic incidents (which rarely occur). A specific example given was the lack of official condemnations when the neo-Nazi Nordic Resistance Movement posted antisemitic flyers on Yom Kippur in October 2020.

Does the government have a comprehensive plan for combating antisemitism, including online antisemitism? Yes. Norway published its first comprehensive plan in 2015, entitled “*Action plan against antisemitism 2016–2020*.”⁵² It put forward 11 measures to be carried out by 6 government ministries.

1. Develop teaching resources aimed at teacher training programs and teachers in schools (Ministry of Education and Research)
2. Strengthen the schools project “Democratic preparedness against racism, antisemitism and undemocratic attitudes” (Dembra) (Ministry of Education and Research)
3. Continue funding for Jewish Pathfinders (Jewish youth leadership training) (Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation)
4. Maintain the increased level of funding for the Jewish museums (Ministry of Culture)
5. Secure funding for the Jewish Cultural Festival in Trondheim (Ministry of Culture)
6. Register antisemitism as a motive for hate crime in all police districts (Ministry of Justice and Public Security)
7. Conduct surveys on attitudes every five years (Ministry of Children and Equality)
8. Monitor antisemitism on the internet and in the media (pilot project) (Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation)
9. Establish a research program on antisemitism and Jewish life in Norway today
10. (Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation)
11. Establish doctoral/post-doctoral positions for research on the prevention of group-focused enmity in schools (Ministry of Education and Research and Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation)

12. Continue Norway’s international commitments to combating antisemitism and preserving Jewish heritage in Europe (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

A follow up action plan⁵³ for 2021-23 was published in January 2021.

1. Further develop the schools project “Democratic preparedness against racism, antisemitism and undemocratic attitudes” (Dembra) (Ministry of Education and Research)
2. Funding for school visits to concentration camps (Ministry of Education and Research)
3. Funding for teacher training (Ministry of Education and Research)
4. Continuing support for the Jewish community’s outreach efforts, including the Jewish Pathfinders program (Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation)
5. Continuing support for the Jewish museums in Oslo and Trondheim and for the Jewish Culture Festival in Trondheim (Ministry of Culture)
6. Establish a National Competence Center on Hate Crime to support the police (Ministry of Justice and Public Security)
7. Conduct surveys on attitudes every 5 years (Ministry of Children and Equality)
8. Monitor online antisemitism (Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation)
9. Complete the research program on antisemitism and Jewish life in Norway today (Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation)
10. Complete doctoral/postdoctoral positions research on the prevention of group-based enmity in schools (Ministry of Education and Research and Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation)
11. Continue Norway’s international commitments to combating antisemitism and preserving Jewish heritage in Europe (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
12. Evaluate the overall effort against antisemitism (Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation)

Do officials adequately confer and coordinate with Jewish community leaders on actions against antisemitism? Yes, including access to the Prime Minister.

⁵² Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation, “Action Plan Against Antisemitism,” 2020. (<https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/dd258c081e6048e2ad0cac9617abf778/action-plan-against-antisemitism.pdf>)

⁵³ Norwegian Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development, “Handlingsplan mot Antisemittisme,” 2023. (<https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/9c3f6754f04844da971a26331b732b3f/209394-antisemittisme-web.pdf>)

Do parliamentary committees review government action against antisemitism? No formal committees exist for this purpose, but individual parliamentarians often pose formal written questions to the government that require government responses.

Education:

Is there adequate formal education in schools about antisemitism? Antisemitism is addressed in the context of Holocaust education, but contemporary antisemitism is not always addressed in the standard curriculum.

Are there informal education programs, like public awareness campaigns? Yes. The government funds the program, Democratic Preparedness Against Racism and Antisemitism (DEMBRA), run by the Holocaust Center, which has developed online educational resources for teachers to address racism and antisemitism.⁵⁴ Topics include: “Antisemitism in Norway Today”, “What Is Antisemitism?”, “Antisemitism in Norwegian Schools”, “Antisemitism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, and “Holocaust Denial.”

Students participate in organized visits to the Holocaust Center in Oslo. Students visit Nazi concentration camps in Poland on government-funded programs. The government funds the “Jewish Pathfinders” program, which sends Norwegian Jewish students to schools across Norway to discuss being Jewish, including aspects of antisemitism.

Do schools have adequate plans and personnel to respond to antisemitic incidents? The DEMBRA materials include advice on responding to bias incidents in schools.

Are public sector employees (e.g., educators, law enforcement, judiciary) trained to understand antisemitism, including the adoption and use of the IHRA definition? One lesson on antisemitism is mandatory in the Norwegian police academy, and a national competence center for hate crime will support requests for optional police training. Training is available to teachers through the DEMBRA program, but is not mandatory. DEMBRA program officials visit schools on a voluntary basis and assess needs, then offer trainings.

Law enforcement:

Are adequate systems in place to report antisemitic hate crime, including illegal hate speech? Yes, police reporting systems can record antisemitic hate crimes.

Does law enforcement report publicly on antisemitic hate crime statistics? Yes, the National Police Directorate reports these statistics.

Are antisemitic crimes adequately prosecuted as hate crimes? The number of incidents is too small to make a determination.

⁵⁴ Democratic Readiness against Anti-Semitism and Racism (DEMBRA), “Rasisme og andre uttrykk for gruppefiendtlighet,” 2017. (<https://dembra.no/no/utema/rasisme-antisemittisme-og-annen-gruppefiendtlighet/?fane=om-temaet&trekk=2>)

POLAND

Jewish population: 5,000



ANTISEMITISM ASSESSMENT

Top concerns of Jewish community leaders

With regard to antisemitism, Jewish leaders expressed concern about antisemitic rhetoric in public, including by far-right political and media figures. Recent debates over Holocaust history and restitution touched sensitive political issues and unleashed unprecedented antisemitic commentary. In February 2018, the Jewish community issued an open letter⁵⁵ about antisemitism, and the same issues persist at present:

We, representatives of Polish Jewish organizations, express our outrage over the growing wave of intolerance, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism in Poland. Increasingly, hate speech has escaped the confines of the Internet to infiltrate the public sphere. It has found its way into newspapers and television broadcasts, including those belonging to public media outlets.

We are no longer surprised when members of local councils, parliament, and other state officials contribute anti-Semitic speech to public discourse. The number of threats and insults directed toward Poland's Jewish community is rising. While we appreciate verbal condemnations of anti-Semitism on the part of President Andrzej Duda, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, and Law and Justice party leader Jarosław Kaczyński, these politicians' words ring empty and do nothing to stop the spread of evil without strong supporting actions.

On the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the anti-Semitic events of March 1968 and 75 years after the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Polish Jews do not feel safe in Poland. In significant ways, present threats to Poland's Jewish community are different from those we experienced in the past. Unlike many of Europe's Jews today, we do not now face direct physical threats. Despite a lack of physical violence, however, our situation is far from normal.

It is unacceptable for Poland's leaders to merely state that anti-Semitism is wrong without recognizing publicly that it is a dangerous, growing problem in our country today.

We receive authorities' inaction as tacit consent for hatred directed toward the Jewish community and call upon Polish leadership to punish those whose actions threaten our wellbeing.

FRA report major findings⁵⁶

Among Polish Jews, 85% said antisemitism is a "fairly big" or "very big" problem.

Specifically, 32% of Polish Jews said they had experienced antisemitic harassment over the prior 12 months, and 21% had offensive or threatening statements directed at them in person.

The most common antisemitic statements heard by Polish Jews were:

- Jews have too much power in Poland (70%).
- Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes (67%).
- Israelis behave "like Nazis" towards the Palestinians (63%).

Further, 32% witnessed other Jews being verbally insulted or harassed and/or physically attacked in the prior 12 months.

Only 19% reported to either the police or a Jewish organization the most serious incident of antisemitic harassment in the past five years.

Half of those surveyed (50%), worried that their family members or friends would be verbally insulted or harassed in the next 12 months because they are Jewish, and 35% worried about physical attacks.

Although 25% frequently avoided wearing, carrying, or displaying in public things that could identify a person as Jewish, another 5% always did.

Just 21% said the Arab-Israeli conflict impacts how safe they feel as a Jewish person in Poland.

Among Polish Jews, 42% had considered emigrating over the prior five years because of not feeling safe as a Jew.

⁵⁵ Jewish Community of Warsaw, "Open statement of Polish Jewish organizations to the public opinion," February 2018. (<https://warszawa.jewish.org.pl/2018/02/open-statement-of-polish-jewish-organizations-to-the-public-opinion/>)

⁵⁶ European Agency for Fundamental Rights, "Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism Second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU," 2018. (https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2018-experiences-and-perceptions-of-antisemitism-survey_en.pdf)

Incident reports

As reported to the OSCE, “Special co-ordinators at both the central (the National Hate Crime Co-ordinator in the Criminal Bureau of the General Police Headquarters) and local levels (police headquarters in every Voivodeship and the Metropolitan Police Headquarters) are responsible for preventing and investigating hate crimes, as well as for compiling data from their district and reporting them monthly to the National Police Information System (KSIP). Monthly reports are forwarded to the Ministry of the Interior and Administration.”⁵⁷

The “NEVER AGAIN Association” publishes an annual “Brown Book” detailing hate incidents in Poland, including antisemitic incidents. Its 2019 report⁵⁸ noted antisemitic incidents, including no assaults, 1 threat of violence, 24 incidents of vandalism, and 16 incidents of abusive behavior.

ADL Global 100 major findings⁵⁹

ADL Global 100 surveys included Poland in 2014, 2015, and 2019. Its average Global 100 Index Score was 43%, significantly higher than the 34% average for Eastern Europe and the 24% average for Western Europe. Significant findings from the 2019 survey include:

- 74% agreed “Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust.”
- 64% agreed “Jews are more loyal to Israel than to Poland.”
- 56% agreed “Jews have too much power in the business world.”
- 48% agreed “Jews think they are better than other people.”
- 48% agreed “Jews don’t care what happens to anyone but their own kind.”
- 45% agreed “People hate Jews because of the way Jews behave.”
- 21% agreed “Jews are responsible for most of the world’s wars.”
- 1% agreed that the Holocaust was a myth, and 21% thought the Holocaust had been greatly exaggerated by history.

Eurobarometer

The December 2018 Eurobarometer survey⁶⁰ asked questions about antisemitism of the general public. Among those surveyed, 41% of Polish respondents said antisemitism was a “very” or “fairly” important problem in Poland, about half the rate of the 85% of Polish Jews in the FRA survey who said antisemitism was a problem. Other significant findings include:

- Just 18% believe antisemitism had increased over the past five years.
- 41% believe “expressions of hostility and threats towards Jewish people in the street or other public places” is a problem.
- 33% believe “people denying the genocide of the Jewish people, the Holocaust” is a problem.
- 31% believe “antisemitism in schools and universities” is a problem.

RESPONSE TO ANTISEMITISM

Physical security:

Jewish leaders were asked whether security measures at Jewish institutions were adequate to their threat assessments. All interviewees were satisfied with physical security measures in place. The cost of security is partially subsidized by the government, but the Jewish community still makes a significant financial commitment for security.

Political actions:

Do officials systematically and publicly condemn antisemitic incidents? No.

Does the government have a comprehensive plan for combating antisemitism, including online antisemitism? No, but the police have developed an “Action Plan” intended “to counteract the promotion of fascism and other totalitarian regimes as well as crimes of inciting to hatred based on national, ethnic, racial, religious differences, or due to lack of denominations or for any other reason.”

Do officials adequately confer and coordinate with Jewish community leaders on actions against antisemitism? No.

⁵⁷ OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), “Hate Crime Reporting Poland,” 2019. (<https://hatecrime.osce.org/poland>)

⁵⁸ Never Again Association, “A selection of racist, xenophobic and homophobic events which occurred in Poland in 2019 are monitored by the ‘NEVER AGAIN’ Association and documented in the Brown Book,” January 2019. (https://www.nigdywiecej.org/docstation/com_docstation/172/brown_book_2019.pdf)

⁵⁹ ADL, “Global 100 Survey Poland,” 2019. (<https://global100.adl.org/country/poland/2019>)

⁶⁰ European Commission, “Perceptions of Antisemitism,” January 2019. (<https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/ResultDoc/download/DocumentKy/85035>)

Do parliamentary committees review government action against antisemitism? No, but issues related to antisemitism can be reviewed in parliamentary committees responsible for the issues of internal security and committees responsible for the issues of national and ethnic minorities.

Education:

Is there adequate formal education in schools about antisemitism? Antisemitism is addressed in the context of Holocaust education, but contemporary antisemitism is not always addressed and is at the discretion of the teachers.

Are there informal education programs, like public awareness campaigns? Many informal education opportunities are available and partially funded by the government. Among them are programs about antisemitism for teachers and students at the Museum of the History of Polish Jews, at the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum, and through cooperation with Yad Vashem.

Do schools have adequate plans and personnel to respond to antisemitic incidents? With very few Jewish students in public schools, no basis for judgment was available.

Are public sector employees (e.g., educators, law enforcement, judiciary) trained to understand antisemitism, including the adoption and use of the IHRA definition? OSCE/ODHIR has conducted training programs for Polish police and prosecutors, though such trainings are not part of the standard curriculum.

Law enforcement:

Are adequate systems in place to report antisemitic hate crime, including illegal hate speech? Yes, but the outsized number of antisemitic crimes in the “unspecified” category raises questions. In 2019, police reported 4 physical assaults, 3 cases of incitement to violence, 2 cases of damage to property, 4 incidents of attacks against places of worship, 2 incidents of threats, and 121 “unspecified” incidents.⁶¹

Does law enforcement report publicly on antisemitic hate crime statistics? Yes

Are antisemitic crimes adequately prosecuted as hate crimes? No. Jewish community leaders reported disappointment that the vast number of antisemitic criminal complaints were not prosecuted as antisemitic hate crimes.

61 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), “Hate Crime Reporting Poland,” 2019. (<https://hatecrime.osce.org/poland>)

RUSSIA

Jewish population: 155,000



ANTISEMITISM ASSESSMENT

Top concerns of Jewish community leaders

No aspects of antisemitism were considered of serious concern to Jewish leaders, as incidents are rare, no political force espouses antisemitism, right-wing extremists focus their hate on people from Central Asia and the Caucasus, and radical Islam is closely monitored. Occasional antisemitism on social media and in remarks by public figures were the two manifestations that were indicated, but not as issues of great concern.

FRA report major findings

No equivalent survey of Russian Jewish experiences of antisemitism has been undertaken.

Incident reports

Antisemitic incident reports are produced by the Russian Jewish Congress in cooperation with the SOVA Center, the latter of which also monitors hate crime in general. Their 2019 report⁶² noted 1 assault, 1 case of arson against a synagogue, and 3 acts of vandalism against Jewish targets, such as synagogues, Holocaust memorials, and cemeteries, and an additional incident of antisemitic graffiti unrelated to Jewish institutions. The report also cited numerous antisemitic comments in Russian media, directed at Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.

ADL Global 100 major findings⁶³

ADL Global 100 surveys included Russia in 2014, 2015, and 2019. Its average Global 100 Index Score was 28%, lower than the Eastern European average of 34%. Significant findings from the 2019 survey include:

- 50% agreed “Jews have too much power in the business world.”
- 50% agreed “Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust.”
- 46% agreed “Jews don’t care what happens to anyone but their own kind.”

- 32% agreed “People hate Jews because of the way Jews behave.”
- 14% agreed “Jews are responsible for most of the world’s wars.”
- 1% agreed that the Holocaust was a myth and 18% thought the Holocaust had been greatly exaggerated by history.

Eurobarometer

Russia is not covered by this survey.

RESPONSE TO ANTISEMITISM

Physical security:

Jewish leaders believe security measures at Jewish institutions are adequate to their threat assessments. However, the financial burden for security falls entirely on the Jewish community, which hires private security guards for daily tasks at Jewish institutions. Police are provided for major community events. The Jewish community and security officials have close cooperation on threat analysis.

Political actions:

Do officials systematically and publicly condemn antisemitic incidents? No, though there are relatively few incidents to comment on.

Does the government have a comprehensive plan for combating antisemitism, including online antisemitism? No.

Do officials adequately confer and coordinate with Jewish community leaders on actions against antisemitism? Yes, though antisemitism is not a high government priority. Jewish community leaders interact with the Federal Agency for Ethnic Affairs, the Presidential Administration, and the Moscow municipal administration.

Do parliamentary committees review government action against antisemitism? No.

62 Russian Jewish Congress, “Report on Anti-Semitism In Russia,” 2019. (https://rjc.ru/uploads/default/files/SOVA_Report_2019_A4_ENG_print.pdf)

63 ADL, “Global 100 Survey Russia,” 2s019. (<https://global100.adl.org/country/russia/2019>)

Education:

Is there adequate formal education in schools about antisemitism? Antisemitism is addressed in the context of Holocaust education, but contemporary antisemitism is not addressed.

Are there informal education programs, like public awareness campaigns? No.

Do schools have adequate plans and personnel to respond to antisemitic incidents? Responses vary across schools, according to anecdotal information. No specific plans have been elaborated.

Are public sector employees (e.g., educators, law enforcement, judiciary) trained to understand antisemitism, including the adoption and use of the IHRA definition? The Russian Jewish Congress has trained a small number of teachers, 100-200, on Holocaust education, but no trainings on antisemitism have been done for any public sector employees.

Law enforcement:

Are adequate systems in place to report antisemitic hate crime, including illegal hate speech? Police reporting systems can record hate crime, but do not further disaggregate among bias motivations.

Does law enforcement report publicly on antisemitic hate crime statistics? No.

Are antisemitic crimes adequately prosecuted as hate crimes? According to Jewish community leaders, these crimes are usually prosecuted as “hooliganism” or vandalism.

SWEDEN

Jewish population: 15,000



ANTISEMITISM ASSESSMENT

Top concerns of Jewish community leaders

Jewish leaders cited concerns in three areas, all of which were considered of serious concern: intimidation by far-right extremists, terrorism by radical Islamists and white supremacists, and anti-Israel extremism by both Muslim and left-wing activists.

The neo-Nazi Nordic Resistance Movement, in particular, has become more active over the past five years with more propaganda, including extensive flyer campaigns and more marches and other public events. The actions of the Nordic Resistance Movement have an intimidating effect on the Jewish community and led to the permanent closure of a Jewish community center in Umea. Certain members within the Sweden Democrats party evoke concern by the Jewish community, which boycotts contact with the party. The tolerance of openly anti-Jewish members in a major political party unsettles community leaders.

Terrorism is a constant concern of Jewish community leaders, who fear potential attacks from radical Islamists, similar to terror attacks against Jewish institutions in France, and potential attacks from white supremacists, as happened in Norway with Anders Behring Breivik.

Community leaders also worry about violence by anti-Israel extremists, such as the Molotov cocktail attacks on the Gothenburg synagogue and Malmo cemetery chapel, which followed U.S. recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital.

Jewish community leaders were not worried about antisemitism among the general population or discrimination, e.g., in housing. No concerns were expressed about tolerance of antisemitism in major media, though incidents occur occasionally.

FRA report major findings⁶⁴

Among those surveyed, 82% of Swedish Jews said antisemitism is a “fairly big” or “very big” problem, up from 60% in the 2012 FRA survey.

Specifically, 30% of Swedish Jews said they had experienced antisemitic harassment over the prior 12 months, and 18% had offensive or threatening statements directed at them in person.

The most common antisemitic statements heard by Swedish Jews were:

- Israelis behave “like Nazis” towards the Palestinians (43%).
- Jews have too much power in Sweden (27%).
- The world would be a better place without Israel (26%).

Further, 28% witnessed other Jews being verbally insulted or harassed and/or physically attacked in the prior 12 months.

Only 18% reported to either the police or a Jewish organization the most serious incident of antisemitic harassment in the past five years.

Nearly half (45%) worried that their family members or friends would be verbally insulted or harassed in the next 12 months because they are Jewish, and 35% worried about physical attacks.

Although 26% frequently avoided wearing, carrying, or displaying in public things that could identify a person as Jewish, another 9% always did.

Notably, 67% said the Arab-Israeli conflict impacts how safe they feel as a Jewish person in Sweden.

Among Swedish Jews, 38% had considered emigrating over the prior five years because of not feeling safe as a Jew.

National Council for Crime Prevention 2019 study

In 2019, the National Council for Crime Prevention (BRA) published a study of antisemitic experiences of Swedish Jews, based on 92 interviews.⁶⁵ Their main findings concur with the positions expressed by Swedish Jewish leaders:

Police reports, court judgements, and interviews show that expressions of anti-Semitism occur in a range of different environments and contexts — in public places, in schools, in workplaces, in the home, at Jewish institutions, and

⁶⁴ European Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism Second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU,” 2018. (https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2018-experiences-and-perceptions-of-antisemitism-survey_en.pdf)

⁶⁵ Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brå), “Anti-Semitic Hate Crime Summary of Report,” 2019. (https://www.bra.se/download/18.62c6cfa2166eca5d70e2a9c6/1561382557622/2019_4_Anti-Semitic_hate_crime.pdf)

on the Internet. As a result, there are few places where members of the Jewish community can be free of feelings of fear or concern about exposure to anti-Semitism.

The National Council's study shows that radical nationalism constitutes a threat to both individuals and to Jewish institutions. A number of the Council's interview subjects have noted increased activity in the radical nationalist milieu in recent years, for example in the form of public political activities. In addition to organising large-scale events such as demonstrations, these groups commit offences in the form of harassment and threats, the purpose of which, according to the interview subjects, is to force Jewish people to leave their positions or close down their associations.

While radical nationalism constituted the most clearly distinguishable ideological milieu in the National Council's data, a number of interview subjects who work to ensure the security of Jewish institutions described the violent jihadist milieu as posing the most severe threat to these institutions. This threat is considered serious, since violent jihadist groups view Jewish institutions as legitimate targets for terrorist attacks, and according to the National Council's interview subjects, an increasing number of anti-Semitic attacks around the world are being committed by persons with ties to this type of milieu. The fact that Jewish institutions have been the targets of terrorism in other countries has thus contributed to an increased sense of insecurity in the Jewish community in Sweden.

Incident reports

The National Council for Crime Prevention publishes a hate crime report based on police statistics and analyzes antisemitic hate crime every other year. The last available antisemitism data is from 2018, when BRA reported the following data⁶⁶:

	2018	2012-2016 annual average
Assaults	6	10
Threats	95	89
Vandalism	22	25
Incitement	125	83

The Official Council of Swedish Jewish Communities (JFST) and the Swedish Committee Against Antisemitism (SKMA) react to major incidents of antisemitism, but do not produce regular reports of antisemitic incident data. Similarly, antisemitism in social media is responded to in an ad hoc fashion and is not systematically monitored.

ADL Global 100 major findings

ADL Global 100 surveys included Sweden in 2014 and 2019. In both surveys, Sweden's Global 100 Index Score was just 4%, almost the lowest in the world. Other significant findings from the 2019 survey include:

- 25% agreed "Jews are more loyal to Israel than to Sweden."
- 15% agreed "Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust."
- 13% agreed "Jews have too much control over the United States government."
- 0% agreed that the Holocaust was a myth, and just 2% thought the Holocaust had been greatly exaggerated by history.

Eurobarometer

The December 2018 Eurobarometer survey⁶⁷ asked questions about antisemitism of the general public. Among those surveyed, 81% of Swedes responded that antisemitism was a "very" or "fairly" important problem in Sweden. A similar percentage (82%) of Swedish Jews answered similarly in the FRA survey. Such consistency is a positive sign, as large divergences could hinder government approaches to combating antisemitism. Other significant findings include:

- 63% believe "antisemitism in political life" is a problem.
- 52% believe "antisemitism in the media" is a problem.
- 85% believe conflicts in the Middle East "definitely" have an influence on how Swedish Jews are seen by people in Sweden.

RESPONSE TO ANTISEMITISM

Physical security:

Jewish leaders and government officials were asked whether security measures at Jewish institutions were adequate to their threat assessments. All interviewees were satisfied with physical security measures in place, but there were differences of opinion about policies regarding security personnel. Police are present at Jewish institutions on holidays and for special events, but not at synagogues on Shabbat. The cost of private security guards is partially subsidized by the government, but the Jewish community still bears a significant financial burden for security.

⁶⁶ European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, "Overview of Antisemitic Incidents Recorded in the European Union," 2019. (https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2020-antisemitism-overview-2009-2019_en.pdf)

⁶⁷ European Commission, "Perceptions of Antisemitism," January 2019. (<https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/ResultDoc/download/DocumentKy/85035>)

Political actions:

Do officials systematically and publicly condemn antisemitic incidents? Yes. Prime Minister Stefan Lofven has made statements in response to major incidents and about the need to combat antisemitism.

Does the government have a comprehensive plan for combating antisemitism, including online antisemitism? A “National Plan to Combat Racism, Similar Forms of Hostility, and Hate Crimes”⁶⁸ has existed since 2016. The plan includes antisemitism as a topic and notes that antisemitism is distinct from racism, but no separate plan for combating antisemitism exists. The government did publish in June 2020, “Measures to combat antisemitism and increase security,”⁶⁹ a document which describes measures the government has taken. Additionally, the government plans to hold an international high-level conference in October 2021, “the Malmö International Forum on Holocaust Remembrance and Combating Antisemitism.”

Do officials adequately confer and coordinate with Jewish community leaders on actions against antisemitism? Yes.

Do parliamentary committees review government action against antisemitism? Issues of antisemitism are discussed within standing parliamentary committees, e.g., on education.

Education:

Is there adequate formal education in schools about antisemitism? No. Antisemitism is addressed in the context of Holocaust education, but education about contemporary antisemitism is lacking.

Are there informal education programs, like public awareness campaigns? There are many informal Holocaust education programs, but not specific to antisemitism.

Do schools have adequate plans and personnel to respond to antisemitic incidents? Schools are obligated to have such plans, but the results are mixed and depend on individual schools. Most problems occur in schools with many students of immigrant background from the Middle East, who resist discussions about the Holocaust.

Are public sector employees (e.g., educators, law enforcement, judiciary) trained to understand antisemitism, including the adoption and use of the IHRA definition? Forum for Living History, a public agency, receives government funding to train police, prosecutors, and teachers about antisemitism. With the government’s adoption of the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism in January 2020, that standard should be included in trainings going forward. However, according to Jewish community officials, police have little understanding of antisemitism and government officials acknowledged that better police training is required. One example given was police inaction in the face of clearly antisemitic speech at marches by the Nordic Resistance Movement.

Law enforcement:

Are adequate systems in place to report antisemitic hate crime, including illegal hate speech? Mostly. Antisemitic motive is noted in police reports when police assess that to be the case. However, the lack of a box to check to note antisemitic motive makes the availability of disaggregated data subject to additional research, and doubts remain about police judgments regarding antisemitic motive. There is a special police unit for online crimes, including illegal hate speech. In October 2020, the Swedish Defense Research Agency, a government agency, published a report about antisemitism in social media (in English, not Swedish) and found that 30% of almost 2.5 million posts about Jews or Judaism were antisemitic.

Does law enforcement report publicly on antisemitic hate crime statistics? Yes, though on a bi-annual basis and on the basis of additional research, not automatic disaggregation.

Are antisemitic crimes adequately prosecuted as hate crimes? Generally, yes.

⁶⁸ Government Offices of Sweden, “A comprehensive approach to combat racism and hate crime,” 2017. (<https://www.government.se/492382/contentassets/e6047ff54c00452895005f07e2e2ba39/a-comprehensive-approach-to-combat-racism-and-hate-crime>)

⁶⁹ Government Offices of Sweden, “Measures to combat antisemitism and increase security,” June 2020. (<https://www.government.se/government-policy/democracy-and-human-rights/measures-to-combat-antisemitism-and-increase-security/>)

UKRAINE

Jewish population: 45,000



ANTISEMITISM ASSESSMENT

Top concerns of Jewish community leaders

Glorification of World War II era Ukrainian nationalist fighters is the top concern of Jewish leaders. These historical figures of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) fought against the Red Army, but also allied with Nazi Germany and were responsible for the murders of thousands of Jews. Torchlit marches, organized by far-right groups, are held each year in Kyiv and other cities on January 1 to mark the birthday of OUN leader Stepan Bandera.

Vandalism of Holocaust memorials remains a concern, but antisemitic violence is rare or rarely reported.

FRA REPORT MAJOR FINDINGS

No equivalent survey of Ukrainian Jewish experiences of antisemitism has been undertaken.

INCIDENT REPORTS

Antisemitic incident reports for 2019 were produced by the Jewish Confederation of Ukraine (JCU) and by the National Minority Rights Monitoring Group of the Congress of National Communities of Ukraine, in association with the Association of Jewish Organizations and Communities (Vaad) of Ukraine.

The two reports were largely consistent, noting no assaults, 3 threats, 11-14 acts of vandalism against Jewish targets, such as synagogues, Holocaust memorials, and cemeteries, 10-12 incidents of antisemitic graffiti unrelated to Jewish institutions, and dozens of incidents of hate speech.

ADL GLOBAL 100 MAJOR FINDINGS⁷⁰

ADL Global 100 surveys included Ukraine in 2014, 2015, and 2019. Its average Global 100 Index Score was 39%. Significant findings from the 2019 survey include:

- 72% agreed “Jews have too much power in the business world.”
- 46% agreed “Jews think they are better than other people.”
- 44% agreed “Jews don’t care what happens to anyone but their own kind.”
- 19% agreed “Jews are responsible for most of the world’s wars.”
- 0% agreed that the Holocaust was a myth, and 16% thought the Holocaust had been greatly exaggerated by history.

Eurobarometer

Ukraine is not covered by this survey.

RESPONSE TO ANTISEMITISM

Physical security:

Jewish leaders believe security measures at Jewish institutions are adequate to their threat assessments. However, the financial burden for security falls entirely on the Jewish community, which hires private security guards for daily tasks at Jewish institutions. Police are provided for major community events. The Jewish community and security officials have close cooperation on threat analysis.

Political actions:

Do officials systematically and publicly condemn antisemitic incidents? Public officials usually make statements in response to any major incidents, but not for minor ones.

Does the government have a comprehensive plan for combating antisemitism, including online antisemitism? No, but the Ministry of Interior works closely with the Jewish community on monitoring of incidents.

70 ADL, “Global 100 Survey Ukraine,” 2019. (<https://global100.adl.org/country/ukraine/2019>)

Do officials adequately confer and coordinate with Jewish community leaders on actions against antisemitism? Yes, though antisemitism is not a high government priority.

Do parliamentary committees review government action against antisemitism? Yes, under the rubric of parliamentary review of racism and xenophobia.

Education:

Is there adequate formal education in schools about antisemitism? Antisemitism is addressed in the context of Holocaust education, but contemporary antisemitism is not addressed.

Are there informal education programs, like public awareness campaigns? No.

Do schools have adequate plans and personnel to respond to antisemitic incidents? Responses vary across schools, according to anecdotal information. No specific plans have been elaborated.

Are public sector employees (e.g., educators, law enforcement, judiciary) trained to understand antisemitism, including the adoption and use of the IHRA definition? A small-scale seminar for police was held by the OSCE in 2019. Ukraine has not yet adopted the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism.

Law enforcement:

Are adequate systems in place to report antisemitic hate crime, including illegal hate speech? Police reporting systems are in place to record antisemitic hate crime, but Jewish community representatives note that its use is rare and irregular without their intervention.

Does law enforcement report publicly on antisemitic hate crime statistics? Yes, the National Police report statistics.

Are antisemitic crimes adequately prosecuted as hate crimes? According to Jewish community leaders, these crimes are usually prosecuted as “hooliganism.”

UNITED KINGDOM

Jewish population: 300,000



ANTISEMITISM ASSESSMENT

Top concerns of Jewish community leaders

Jewish leaders expressed continuing concern about antisemitism in the Labour party, despite the welcome change in leadership from Jeremy Corbyn, widely regarded as an anti-Semite, to Keir Starmer, who has committed to ridding the party of antisemitism. Jewish leaders believe Starmer's task will not be easy.

While noting that terrorism against the Jewish community and hate crime are both perennial and serious concerns, much of the community's attention focuses on antisemitism online. Both the organized Jewish community and grassroots campaigns are increasing their efforts against online antisemitism.

FRA report major findings⁷¹

Among British Jews, 75% said antisemitism is a "fairly big" or "very big" problem.

Specifically, 25% of British Jews said they had experienced antisemitic harassment over the prior 12 months, and 16% had offensive or threatening statements directed at them in person.

The most common antisemitic statements heard by British Jews were:

- Israelis behave "like Nazis" towards the Palestinians (42%).
- Jews have too much power in the UK (35%).
- The world would be a better place without Israel (32%).

Further, 24% witnessed other Jews being verbally insulted or harassed and/or physically attacked in the prior 12 months.

Only 21% reported to either the police or a Jewish organization the most serious incident of antisemitic harassment in the past five years.

Among those surveyed, 39% worried that their family members or friends would be verbally insulted or harassed in the next 12 months because they are Jewish, and 30% worried about physical attacks.

Although 14% frequently avoided wearing, carrying, or displaying in public things that could identify a person as Jewish, another 3% always did.

More than half (55%) said the Arab-Israeli conflict impacts how safe they feel as a Jewish person in the United Kingdom.

Among British Jews, 30% had considered emigrating over the prior five years because of not feeling safe as a Jew.

Incident reports

The Community Security Trust (CST), the Jewish community security organization, monitors antisemitism and issues incident reports. Its report⁷² for the first half of 2020 noted 789 incidents, the third highest January-June total ever, despite the impact of COVID-19 which significantly reduced social interactions. Among the incidents were 47 assaults, 36 threats of violence, 28 incidents of vandalism, and 673 incidents of abusive behavior.

ADL Global 100 major findings⁷³

ADL Global 100 surveys included the United Kingdom in 2014, 2015, and 2019. Its average Global 100 Index Score was 10%, much lower than the 24% average for Western Europe. Significant findings from the 2019 survey include:

- 33% agreed "Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the United Kingdom."
- 20% agreed "Jews have too much power in the business world."
- 16% agreed "Jews think they are better than other people."
- 14% agreed "Jews don't care what happens to anyone but their own kind."
- 5% agreed "Jews are responsible for most of the world's wars."
- 0% agreed that the Holocaust was a myth, and 8% thought the Holocaust had been greatly exaggerated by history.

71 European Agency for Fundamental Rights, "Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism Second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU," 2018. (https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2018-experiences-and-perceptions-of-antisemitism-survey_en.pdf)

72 Community Security Trust (CST), "Antisemitic Incidents Report," June 2020. (<https://cst.org.uk/data/file/c/5/Incidents%20Report%20Jan-Jun%202020-1.1596720071.pdf>)

73 ADL, "Global 100 Survey United Kingdom," 2019. (<https://global100.adl.org/country/united-kingdom/2019>)

Eurobarometer

The December 2018 Eurobarometer survey⁷⁴ asked questions about antisemitism of the general public. Among those surveyed, 62% of British respondents said antisemitism was a “very” or “fairly” important problem in the United Kingdom, similar to the 75% of British Jews in the FRA survey. Other significant findings include:

- 44% believe antisemitism had increased over the past five years.
- 51% believe “expressions of hostility and threats towards Jewish people in the street or other public places” is a problem.
- 53% believe “people denying the genocide of the Jewish people, the Holocaust” is a problem.
- 40% believe “antisemitism in schools and universities” is a problem.

RESPONSE TO ANTISEMITISM

Physical security:

Jewish leaders and government officials were asked whether security measures at Jewish institutions were adequate to their threat assessments. All interviewees were satisfied with physical security measures in place. The cost of security is generously subsidized by the government, but the Jewish community still makes a significant financial commitment for security.

Political actions:

Do officials systematically and publicly condemn antisemitic incidents? Yes. Public officials regularly make statements in response to major incidents and about the need to combat antisemitism.

Does the government have a comprehensive plan for combating antisemitism, including online antisemitism? A cross-government working group on antisemitism exists, which includes officials as well as Jewish community representatives, and it provides a forum to propose and assess government measures against antisemitism. This arrangement has been described as a “living comprehensive plan.” The UK Government Advisor of Antisemitism is also charged with identifying gaps in efforts of state agencies and proposing remedies. Antisemitism is also addressed in broader plans, such as the government’s plan against hate crime.

Do officials adequately confer and coordinate with Jewish community leaders on actions against antisemitism? Yes.

Do parliamentary committees review government action against antisemitism? Parliamentarians are active on the issue of antisemitism, and an All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) Against Antisemitism exists. The APPG Against Antisemitism is an informal group of Members of Parliament with a particular interest in combatting antisemitism. Formal parliamentary committees make occasional inquiries about antisemitism.

Education:

Is there adequate formal education in schools about antisemitism? Antisemitism is addressed in the context of Holocaust education, but contemporary antisemitism is not always addressed and is at the discretion of the teachers.

Are there informal education programs, like public awareness campaigns? Civil society efforts have begun recently, but are neither widespread nor systematic. The football club programs have the potential to reach hundreds of millions of fans. The government has provided some funding to Holocaust education organizations to include new programs on contemporary antisemitism in their offerings. Antisemitism is a topic within government campaigns against hate crime.

Do schools have adequate plans and personnel to respond to antisemitic incidents? Responses vary across schools, according to anecdotal information. Problems are much more likely to occur at universities than at high schools or earlier.

Are public sector employees (e.g., educators, law enforcement, judiciary) trained to understand antisemitism, including the adoption and use of the IHRA definition? Police are decentralized in the UK, but the College of Police hate crime guidance on antisemitism uses the IHRA definition. The Crown Prosecution Service includes antisemitism training for its hate crime prosecutors, including the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism. No trainings on antisemitism for judges has been established. Teacher training is decentralized and varies regarding antisemitism.

74 European Commission, “Perceptions of Antisemitism,” January 2019. (<https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/ResultDoc/download/DocumentKy/85035>)

Law enforcement:

Are adequate systems in place to report antisemitic hate crime, including illegal hate speech? Yes.

Does law enforcement report publicly on antisemitic hate crime statistics? Yes and the data are usually similar to what is reported by CST, though the data are not formally corroborated with CST.

Are antisemitic crimes adequately prosecuted as hate crimes?

Usually, though not always. In those exceptions, plea bargains are often the explanation. Defendants often plead guilty to the underlying charge, but not to the aggravating circumstance of antisemitism, and prosecutors often settle for that. Online hate crimes are rarely prosecuted at present because of legislative deficiencies. The proposed Online Harms Bill should resolve those deficiencies.

PART II: ASSESSMENTS OF EUROPEAN POLICIES

Antisemitism can be roughly divided into two phenomena: attitudes and incidents. Antisemitic attitudes engender discrimination, whether implicit or explicit, and can find expression in bigoted remarks. Incidents encompass physical or verbal assaults, threats, vandalism, hate mail, etc. Hate speech crosses the divide between attitudes and incidents. All forms of antisemitism impact Jewish communities.

Political commitments have been made by all states to address all forms of antisemitism. Education is a tool to try to preclude antisemitic attitudes. Preventative security measures try to preclude incidents, as do dissuasive measures such as prosecutions, which should also provide justice for the victims.

In 2004, every state covered in this report made a political commitment to combat antisemitism in the “Berlin Declaration” of the OSCE. Among the commitments were to:

- Strive to ensure that their legal systems foster a safe environment free from antisemitic harassment, violence or discrimination in all fields of life;
- Promote, as appropriate, educational programs for combating antisemitism;
- Combat hate crimes, which can be fueled by racist, xenophobic, and antisemitic propaganda in the media and on the Internet;
- Collect and maintain reliable information and statistics about antisemitic crimes, and other hate crimes, committed within their territory, report such information periodically to the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), and make this information available to the public.

Ten years later, the OSCE Ministerial Council adopted the 2014 “Declaration on Enhancing Efforts to Combat Anti-Semitism,” which recalled the commitments made a decade earlier and called upon OSCE participating states to:

- Encourage political leaders and public figures to speak out strongly and promptly when antisemitic incidents occur;
- Promote educational programs for combating antisemitism and provide young people with opportunities for human rights education including on the subject of antisemitism;

- Increase efforts to implement existing OSCE commitments related to monitoring hate crimes and collecting data related to such crimes, including those motivated by antisemitism;
- Investigate effectively, promptly, and impartially acts of violence motivated by antisemitism and prosecute those responsible;
- Encourage the inclusion of religious and belief communities in public discussions of pertinent legislative initiatives.

Eight of the 11 states covered in this report (including the United Kingdom at the time) approved the 2018 Council of the European Union declaration, “Council Declaration on the fight against antisemitism and the development of a common security approach to better protect Jewish communities and institutions in Europe.” In that document the European leaders called on member states:

- to adopt and implement a holistic strategy to prevent and fight all forms of antisemitism as part of their strategies on preventing racism, xenophobia, radicalization and violent extremism;
- to endorse the non-legally binding working definition of antisemitism employed by the IHRA as a useful guidance tool in education and training, including for law enforcement authorities in their efforts to identify and investigate antisemitic attacks more efficiently and effectively;
- to increase their efforts to ensure security for Jewish communities, institutions, and citizens;
- to provide for the financing of and implement the necessary security measures for Jewish communities, institutions, and citizens;
- to improve the recording of hate crime by law enforcement authorities;
- to participate in the ongoing training of national law enforcement and criminal justice authorities provided by the FRA and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in order to improve their ability to record and collect hate crime data, including on antisemitism, and support civil society organizations to complement the collection in order to better measure the extent of antisemitism affecting Jewish citizens; and

- to introduce training about all forms of intolerance, racism, and hate crime, in particular antisemitic prejudices and hate crime into their school curricula, into vocational training such as for people working in the field of security and justice, as well as into the curricula of integration courses.

The major themes of these commitments can be distilled into the categories of (1) political commitment, (2) physical security measures, (3) education about antisemitism, (4) incident reporting, and (5) law enforcement. The states covered in this report have mixed records across these major categories, which are assessed collectively.

POLITICAL COMMITMENT

Political commitment to tackle antisemitism is evident where political leaders regularly publicly condemn antisemitic incidents, where they confer with Jewish leaders on plans of action, and where governments have put in place national plans against antisemitism and assigned national coordinators for those plans. Such steps ensure efforts are made across government, putting emphasis on the most pressing issues and assuring that gaps are filled. Among the exemplary governments in this respect are those of France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and the UK.

PHYSICAL SECURITY

With the exception of France, all Jewish community leaders responded that physical security measures at Jewish institutions were adequate to the threats assessed. The most common complaint was that Jewish communities bore excessive financial burdens for necessary security measures such as private security guards. Several governments covered all or a vast majority of security costs, including Hungary, Norway, and the UK.

EDUCATION

The common and lamentable problem in this category is the absence of formal education about antisemitism outside the context of the Holocaust. A repeated complaint from Jewish community leaders was that history textbooks included references to Jews only in the contexts of Biblical Israel, the Holocaust, and the modern State of Israel.

While textbooks were not reviewed for this report, Jewish leaders noted that adequate descriptions of major historical episodes of antisemitism, such as religious antisemitism of both the Catholic Church and Protestant denominations, as well as dhimmitude in Muslim-majority societies, were largely absent. Medieval antisemitism of blood libels, which led to the murders of untold numbers of Jews, are rarely mentioned, nor are more modern major episodes, such as the Tsarist pogroms, which led to waves of Jewish emigration. Certainly there are exceptions, such as the treatment of the Dreyfus Affair in France.

Also largely absent are positive representations of Jewish contributions to national and world society. Jewish leaders have long called for more positive examples to be taught as a means of dispelling antisemitic stereotypes of Jews as separate from — and parasitic on — the rest of society and concerned only with themselves.

INCIDENT REPORTING

Antisemitic incident reporting should be systematic, public, and value-adding for policymakers. Unfortunately, in too many cases, it is not. Among the 11 states in this study, there were wide differences in the methods of data collection for antisemitic incidents, even in the more restrictive case of antisemitic hate crime, and differences in categorization. For example, Germany records, “Politically motivated crimes with an antisemitic motive,” which are essentially only right-wing extremist hate crimes, while the Netherlands records “discriminatory antisemitic incidents.”

These differences have persisted despite the commitments undertaken by each of the 11 states at OSCE meetings and the availability of technical assistance from OSCE, for example the 2014 publication, *Hate Crime Data-Collection and Monitoring Mechanisms: A Practical Guide*,⁷⁵ which proposes steps to develop robust collection and reporting processes for hate crimes. In 2018, OSCE proposed “The Information Against Hate Crimes Toolkit (INFAHCT),” a program “aimed at improving systems for monitoring and collecting data on hate crimes. INFAHCT achieves this by helping to build and strengthen the policies and capacities of national institutions and other structures to collect data on hate crimes.”⁷⁶

75 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), “Hate Crime Data-Collection and Monitoring Mechanisms,” 2014. (<https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/3/a/124533.pdf>)

76 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), “Information Against Hate Crimes Toolkit (INFAHCT): Programme Description,” August 2018. (<https://www.osce.org/odihr/INFAHCT>)

Categorization also differs widely, which affects the utility of the information collected. In the UK and France, for example, incident categories are clear and comprehensive, while in Poland 89% of reported antisemitic incidents were categorized as “unspecified.”

Proper categorization is imperative, because different types of incidents will require different policy responses. Vandalism may require more visible security measures, such as noticeable cameras or security personnel. High numbers of assaults may dictate mobile police patrols within a certain perimeter of Jewish institutions. Illegal online hate speech may dictate more police resources for investigations or liaison with social media platforms or in other areas.

Massive under-reporting by victims of incidents is common across the states surveyed by the FRA in 2019. Members of Jewish communities were asked whether they had reported, either to the police or to some other organization, the most serious antisemitic incident that had occurred over the past five years. In every country, the vast majority of victims had not reported the incident, ranging from 88% in Hungary to 74% in the Netherlands, with most of the eight countries surveyed at about 80%.⁷⁷

Only five of the 11 countries — Belgium, France, Hungary, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom — had cooperation mechanisms between the government or law enforcement and civil society organizations that monitored antisemitism.

The 2020 FRA report, *Overview of Antisemitic Incidents Recorded in the European Union: 2009-2019* is worth quoting at length for its damning assessment:

As already indicated in FRA’s 2019 overview of data on antisemitism, evidence collected by FRA consistently shows that few EU Member States record antisemitic incidents in a way that allows them to collect adequate official data. This is true despite the serious negative consequences of antisemitism for Jewish populations in particular, as FRA’s second survey on antisemitism showed, and for society at large.

The inadequate recording of hate crime incidents, including those of an antisemitic nature, coupled with victims’ hesitance to report incidents to the authorities, contributes to the gross under-reporting of the extent, nature and characteristics of the antisemitic incidents that occur in the EU. It also limits the ability of policymakers and other relevant stakeholders at

national and international levels to take measures and implement courses of action to combat antisemitism effectively and decisively, and to assess the effectiveness of existing policies. Incidents that are not reported are not investigated or prosecuted, allowing offenders to think that they can carry out such attacks with impunity. Victims who do not report their experiences to authorities may also not receive relevant information about available assistance.

The data that do exist are generally not comparable, not least because they are collected using different methodologies and from different sources across EU Member States. Furthermore, although official data collection systems are generally based on police records and/or criminal justice data as well as on data collected by the national equality bodies, authorities do not always categorise incidents motivated by antisemitism under that heading.

LAW ENFORCEMENT

Jewish leaders were asked whether antisemitic crimes were adequately prosecuted as hate crimes. The responses varied and included those who were generally satisfied (Sweden and the UK), those who were generally unsatisfied (France, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine), those who noted that some progress was being made but more is needed (Belgium and the Netherlands), and those who noted that too few cases existed to make an assessment (Hungary and Norway.)

Two factors were often cited for the less than satisfactory state of prosecutions: penalty enhancement issues and difficulties establishing motive.

Several interviewees noted that police and prosecutors have little incentive to pursue aggravating charges of hate crime, additional to the crime without the hate aspect, because penalty enhancement is either minimal or entirely within the provenance of the judge. When penalty enhancement is minimal, police and prosecutors do not see the value of spending significant additional time and resources to investigate the aggravating hate factors to support prosecution on those aspects.

The second complicating factor was difficulty of establishing the antisemitic hate motive. This reason was given foremost by Russian and Ukrainian leaders, who said most antisemitic vandalism is prosecuted simply as “hooliganism” without any hate crime aspects.

⁷⁷ European Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU,” 2018. (https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2018-experiences-and-perceptions-of-antisemitism-survey_en.pdf)

OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

Measured against their own longstanding and common political commitments, governments of the 11 states covered in this report have responded differently to the challenges of antisemitism in their countries. In some countries, antisemitic attitudes are a greater challenge than antisemitic incidents. In others the reverse holds true.

In ten of the 11 countries, though, efforts seem insufficient to meet the antisemitism challenges that present themselves. In some cases, the insufficiency is due to lack of attention. For example, in Russia and Ukraine, Jewish leaders did not assess antisemitism as a serious concern among the issues facing the Jewish communities, and more generally facing their countries, and they did not fault their governments for lack of effort against antisemitism.

In some cases, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, Jewish leaders worried that political commitment was not commensurate with their assessments of the situation of antisemitism, with the result that government actions were judged inadequate.

In some cases, such as France, Germany, and the UK, the governments have exhibited clear political will to tackle antisemitism, but the scale of the problem may be exceeding their efforts.

Only one government, however, seems to be making efforts that exceed the antisemitism challenges in the country: Norway.

Norway was included in this report despite its small Jewish community, few antisemitic incidents, and low antisemitic attitudes, because it provides an example of going above and beyond its duty. Norway's positive example includes a comprehensive national plan, coordination with its Jewish community's leadership, fully financed security measures, detailed programs for educators, mandatory training on antisemitism for police, disaggregated hate crime reporting, multifaceted monitoring of antisemitism in Norwegian society, and promotion of positive aspects of Jewish life through its Jewish Pathfinders program that sends Jewish students around the country to speak in classrooms about being Jewish in Norway.

PART III. U.S. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

U.S. policy toward Europe is by no means driven by the imperative to combat antisemitism, nor should it be. But it is certainly among the various considerations that enter into U.S. policy related to the continent as well as one of the factors that guide policy formation and implementation efforts. There was widespread consensus among interview subjects that there is more the U.S. government can do to combat antisemitism in Europe in ways that advance American national interests as well as values. The remaining section of this report is organized into three parts, framed in terms of the following: (1) principles, (2) institutions, and (3) additional recommended measures.

PRINCIPLES

There is widespread, bipartisan awareness that antisemitism is rising in key places around the world including Europe, that combating this challenge is an important American interest, and that more can and should be done to more effectively achieve this objective. Interview subjects were frequently asked whether the United States spends too much attention, effort, or tax dollars on combating antisemitism in Europe and around the world, yet not a single respondent interviewed for this project responded in a manner suggesting they agreed with this perspective. Generally speaking, respondents held the view that antisemitism in Europe and other parts of the world poses a threat to American interests because it threatens democracy, pluralism, and stability in U.S.-allied countries — and, to a lesser extent, that it contributes to violent extremism, anti-Americanism, and violence against the State of Israel, another American strategic partner.

Support for doing more to combat antisemitism around the world, including in Europe, constitutes a bipartisan consensus with widespread support on both sides of the aisle. However, a substantial portion of respondents raised concern that bipartisan action on this foreign policy issue is increasingly more difficult to muster, and that support for combating antisemitism, at home or abroad, may encounter less widespread consensus on each side of the aisle for particular reasons. Additionally, many respondents expressed concern that broad support for combating antisemitism does not necessarily equate to similarly widespread awareness of what actually constitutes antisemitism and how to identify it in practice.

There is broad agreement on the importance of the U.S. government publicly using its voice in order to call out problematic actions that contribute to antisemitism in Europe, as well as to commend or encourage more positive conduct by other actors in the region. While only being critical across the board would be counterproductive, it seems clear that the United States can and should be as consistent as possible in condemning antisemitism conduct, even when it is perpetrated, enabled, or insufficiently being tackled by U.S.-allied European governments. In Western Europe and Scandinavia, the primary challenge in this regard seems to be mustering sufficient U.S. will to consistently call out antisemitism on the left, which may be framed in terms of criticism of Israeli policies but at times goes far beyond mere policy debate. In Eastern Europe, the primary challenge in this regard seems to be mustering sufficient U.S. will to consistently call out antisemitism on the right, which may overlap with xenophobic movements that claim their support for the Government of Israel makes their conduct immune from antisemitism. Ideally, both of these priorities should be consistently and sufficiently addressed by the U.S. government, regardless of which political party holds the White House and both chambers of Congress.

The U.S. government should note and commend those European governments that acknowledge the severity of the challenge posed by antisemitism and are devoting very substantial efforts to combat it, even if more can and should be done. The United States should also press foreign leaders to change their conduct if they use language that demonizes Jewish people and/or the State of Israel, or uses language that resonates with and perpetuates antisemitic tropes.

U.S. Executive Branch officials up to the level of President should be encouraged to call out antisemitism in Europe and beyond, and when possible to take some personal actions to show interest and concern, such as visiting communities, museums, or memorial sites. Members of Congress can also play an important role by using their voice in this regard, and bipartisan unity of message can be particularly impactful in certain cases of antisemitism in Europe.

There is also significant value placed on the credibility of America's voice with regard to combating antisemitism in Europe, as well as a sense that more can be done to bolster that credibility. For instance, while there is often no doubt a value in private U.S. conversations with foreign officials about antisemitism in European countries, there was a sense

that certain governments were clearly not being “called out” enough, even if they may be getting “called in” for relevant discussions in private.

Further, a number of respondents reported being told that American calls for European national governments to do more to fight antisemitism are more often dismissed as not being credible when the United States is perceived as systematically scapegoating any vulnerable group domestically, regardless of how Jewish Americans in particular are being treated. U.S. officials were also encouraged to engage European Jewish communities to inform policy deliberations as well as the American Jewish community as a possible force-multiplier for reinforcing timely U.S. messages.

In addition, there was also significant value placed on the utility of encouraging cross-communal coalition-building within Europe. Some respondents noted that it was easier to persuade European civil society actors to support their Jewish compatriots when the matter was framed not just narrowly in terms of antisemitism alone but rather in terms of all groups standing up for pluralism and civil liberties. Likewise, in many instances some of the same conspiracy theories targeting Jewish communities in Europe also target other communities as well. However, such coalition-building efforts in Europe were seen as secondary to the priority of urging European governments to ensure their Jewish communities are physically secure.

INSTITUTIONS

Many of the policy recommendations offered by respondents for this project were primarily salient toward one of three main institutional actors within the U.S. government. The following section is therefore divided based on recommendations particular to the roles of three institutional actors: (1) the Office of the U.S. Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism, (2) other actors across the Executive Branch, and (3) Members of Congress.

SEAS

The State Department’s Office of the U.S. Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism is more impactful than ever before. After having remained vacant for over two years, since then the office has benefited significantly from active leadership and increased staff capacity. Provided it does not remain empty again, its effectiveness is poised to further increase due to a doubling of appropriations for the office’s budget for Fiscal Year 2021. As the most important full-time point person and team for U.S. efforts to combat antisemitism abroad, the Special Envoy and the envoy’s office are absolutely critical for combating and keeping pace with rising antisemitism abroad.

Congress passed the bipartisan Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism Act at the very end of its 116th session, and then-President Trump signed the bill into law shortly before leaving office. The overwhelming margins by which the bill was passed in various forms by individual chambers of Congress emphasize the broad support that the bill’s common-sense institutional recommendations enjoy, which should now be implemented by the Secretary of State and broader Executive Branch. Key institutional reforms that are now mandated because of this law include: upgrading the Special Envoy to the rank of Ambassador, requiring the Envoy to report directly to the Secretary, and authorizing the Envoy to serve as the primary advisor to, and coordinate efforts across, the U.S. government relating to monitoring and combating antisemitism and antisemitic incitement that occur in foreign countries. The envoy must also now be confirmed by the Senate, upping the importance of quickly naming a nominee.

One particularly intriguing recommendation that some respondents embraced but others felt would be duplicative or overly burdensome was to revive the practice of the Office of the Special Envoy generating annual reports regarding the status of antisemitism abroad, focused less on highlighting activities of the office and more on providing brief country reports. This would help address an identified need for informing the public and especially other U.S. officials traveling to foreign countries that seek helpful, reliable, and apolitical briefing materials so they can raise the issue effectively with foreign officials. Although some of this material is already included in State Department reports pertaining to Human Rights or International Religious Freedom, having the information in a centralized, trusted, and publicly available depository in a manner that is also more focused and comprehensive could provide cutting-edge information to a broader array of interested stakeholders, acting as a force multiplier for the Office’s existing diplomacy.

Indeed, Section 4 of the Global Anti-Semitism Review Act [Public Law 108-332] that created the Envoy’s position also outlines key topics for a one-time required report on antisemitism abroad that could be useful to reinstitute as a regular product, including a description of:

1. acts of physical violence against, or harassment of, Jewish people, and acts of violence against, or vandalism of, Jewish community institutions, such as schools, synagogues, or cemeteries, that occurred in each country;
2. the responses of the governments of those countries to such actions;

3. the actions taken by such governments to enact and enforce laws relating to the protection of the right to religious freedom of Jewish people;
4. the efforts by such governments to promote anti-bias and tolerance education; and
5. instances of propaganda in government and nongovernment media that attempt to justify or promote racial hatred or incite acts of violence against Jewish people.⁷⁸

Substantially increased budgets for FY2021 should also be more than sufficient to account for the added writing and reporting burden that such a requirement would impose on the office.

Further, such funding could be used to hire an additional career official to serve as a policy advisor in the Office to focus on internal State Department process, coordination, and messaging, since in 2019 and 2020 the Office's team was relatively short on career staff relative to political appointees. This sort of bureaucratic coordination was identified as an area for growth, where the Office can have greater impact in future administrations. For example, such an additional career official could help the Special Envoy's team with translating new policy positions and public messaging into internal memoranda for purposes of instructing human rights officers at U.S. Embassies in Europe and other parts of the world, desk officers, and other U.S. officials at the working level better understand how to implement such specialized and nuanced pronouncements in an operational setting. Such an official could also be responsible for conceptualizing, measuring, and documenting efficacy of the Office's work combating antisemitism, in order to prove results and justify continued increased funding from appropriators. Furthermore, the Office of the Special Envoy should be encouraged to generate a manual for new foreign service officers in-country on the nuts and bolts of engaging with local government officials, law enforcement, civil society, and Jewish communities to combat antisemitism, and on existing U.S. government resources and policy guidelines that may be helpful to this end.

More broadly, sustaining support for the Special Envoy from appropriators as well as civil society would benefit from reinforcing the relatively nonpartisan nature of the Office's work. Building broad support from Members of Congress on both sides of the aisle, as well as from a broad array of Jewish communal groups and human rights organizations provides an important asset for bolstering the effectiveness of the Office's message abroad. While the Envoy may

reasonably be expected to advocate for relevant aspects of an Administration's record and agenda, the Envoy and her or his team should also steer clear of contentious partisan debates.

The Executive Branch

The Office of the Special Envoy cannot and should not be the only Executive Branch entity actively engaged in combating antisemitism in Europe and other parts of the world. The White House has a responsibility to engage in such efforts as well, and to do so in a manner that reinforces concerns expressed by the State Department and relevant Jewish communities. When possible, the President and Vice President should use their voice and their actions to send these sorts of messages, particularly during travel abroad or in response to notable incidents. Additionally, the National Security Council should help monitor, elevate, coordinate, and express such messages of its own accord, and should have clear lines of responsibility for combating antisemitism abroad. Regardless of whether the issue of antisemitism in Europe in particular is handled primarily by NSC officials responsible for European affairs or by NSC officials focused on global functional issues, responsibility for tackling it should be clearly assigned to one or more individuals who are sufficiently authorized and incentivized to focus adequately on the problem. This effort should, of course, also incorporate the activities of the NSC's Special Advisor to the President on International Religious Freedom to the extent to which such work pertains.

The Secretary of State is another crucially important official for determining whether the messages of the antisemitism envoy resonate sufficiently in foreign capitals. That includes whether or not the Envoy is seen as having the clear support of the Secretary as well as whether or not the Envoy's messages are reinforced by the Secretary in public and private settings. At times in the past, the Envoy has reported directly to the Secretary of State, and overwhelmingly passed bipartisan legislation recently signed into law now requires for this direct reporting relationship between the Envoy and the Secretary to be restored. As such, the Secretary should take this step without delay.

Nonetheless, there are clear synergies between the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and the Office of the Special Envoy that also should continue to be leveraged. The Assistant Secretary can be an important voice for combating antisemitism in Europe and around the world, and the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom (IRF) and the IRF Office both can be crucial allies for the Special Envoy. This is especially the case with regard to issues

78 U.S. Department of State, "Global Anti-Semitism Review Act," October 8, 2014. (<https://2001-2009.state.gov/g/drl/rls/79640.htm>)

of religious practice that are under legislative threat in certain European countries, such as matters pertaining to ritual slaughter and male circumcision that observant Jewish and Muslim communities both practice. The IRF Ambassador also has an important voice when faith communities such as Jewish communities in Europe face physical dangers as well, since the freedom to safely worship, attend religious communal institutions, and to wear traditional attire in public without fear of assault are each fundamental religious liberties as well. So, both the Envoy and the Ambassador-at-Large should speak openly about these challenges and collaborate whenever it would be beneficial.

To be effective in Europe, the Special Envoy also needs support from the State Department's Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR), including relevant leaders in the bureau as well as our diplomats in-country. EUR can play a crucial role gathering information and sustaining relationships with local Jewish communities, as well as reinforcing the Special Envoy's advocacy with national governments and facilitating impactful visits. The Special Envoy can bolster the capacity of EUR to do so by offering insights, trainings, and recommended programmatic materials in advance of key milestones on the calendar, such as Kristallnacht. When the relationship is not working well, however, EUR may undermine the Special Envoy's messaging and reporting if it is seen as conflicting with keeping bilateral relations on an even keel.

The more that the Office of the Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism is translating policy pronouncements into operational guidance for country officers, the more EUR and U.S. Embassies will be able to implement such directives in a broad array of places at once. The Envoy's office should also provide templates and facilitate the customized generation of biannual strategies for combating antisemitism by the pertinent regional bureaus, including not only EUR but also the Bureaus of Near Eastern Affairs, South and Central Asian Affairs, and Western Hemisphere Affairs — and potentially by several functional bureaus as well, such as the Bureaus of International Organizations, Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, and Population, Refugees, and Migration.

The Office of the Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues (SEHI) within EUR is also an invaluable partner for efforts to combat antisemitism in Europe. Although the two Special Envoys, SEHI and SEAS, have distinctive lanes, there is often productive overlap between the two, such as when greater education about the historical facts and present-day lessons of the Holocaust can reinforce efforts to combat antisemitism within European societies. For example, the SEHI's recent JUST Act Report, while focused primarily

on the issue of Holocaust-era restitution, also documents European governments' varying levels of Holocaust education mandates. In those cases where European governments' national mandates for Holocaust education are too low, the U.S. government can play a productive role in encouraging change. Likewise, the two Special Envoys should collaborate to encourage Middle Eastern governments to start the long-overdue work of acknowledging and raising public awareness about the Holocaust, as one of numerous important avenues for combating widespread antisemitic animus in the region. Increased funds for the Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues could also expand efforts by the State Department to work with partners in Europe to combat the rising challenge of Holocaust distortion; this U.S. policy objective would likely also have benefits for addressing antisemitism.

One State Department envoy that has been eliminated but should be restored is the Special Representative to Muslim Communities. In addition to that representative's crucial public outreach role, it has also served as an invaluable ally for the antisemitism envoy, bringing together Jewish and Muslim communities in key parts of Europe and beyond to bridge communal tensions, better combat antisemitic violence by extremists from certain European Muslim communities, and to jointly advocate for national governments in Europe to take action against both antisemitism and anti-Muslim bigotry. For example, these two officials have engaged in productive joint travel in past years bringing imams on delegations to concentration camps to learn more about the Holocaust and convening top leaders of the Jewish and Muslim communities in Malmo, Sweden, for novel forms of interfaith dialogue and building trust.

In addition to recent funding increases for the Office of the Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism, several other areas were mentioned that could benefit from increased funding in the fight against antisemitism in Europe and beyond. Increased staffing capacity at the National Security Council may be appropriate, as well as increased funding for the Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues. Increased funding for public diplomacy activities by U.S. Embassies in Europe and beyond may also play an important role in facilitating programs by Embassy staff, contractors, or grantees to raise public awareness about antisemitism in-country and bring together community leaders or youth for coalition-building programs. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research may also benefit from funding to conduct polling or other information-gathering in European countries on antisemitism and other forms of hate. Lastly, while the Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act mandated increased training for certain U.S. diplomats on issues pertaining to freedom of worship — and the department has indeed vastly increased

trainings, including with regard to antisemitism — it may be worth the State Department studying to what degree certain specific officials may benefit from more detailed training options or requirements.

Members of Congress

Congress often plays the role of the “bad cop” when it comes to issues of antisemitism in Europe and other parts of the world, but that is not necessarily a bad thing. In fact, it is often quite productive. For instance, this past year the bipartisan co-chairs of the Senate Task Force for Combating Anti-Semitism sent a letter expressing concern to the Polish government about the spike in state-enabled incitement against Jews and LGBTI individuals during the most recent presidential election there. That letter sent a U.S. message that was important in its own right, even though — and perhaps specifically because — the Executive Branch chose not to do so in a similar manner due to other bilateral considerations.

The emergence of the Senate’s Bipartisan Task Force for Combating Anti-Semitism is an important, welcome development that follows the model of the House’s Bipartisan Task Force of the same name in place for significantly over a decade. Not all issues of antisemitism in Europe or beyond are amenable to action by the task forces, but they provide an important framework for coordinating support from Members on the issue and for sustaining a fair degree of consensus on the issue across the aisle.

Congressional leadership and leaders on key committees play an even more important role on combating antisemitism abroad, to the extent to which they are able to devote bandwidth to the issue, as do a handful of other Members who are themselves Jewish, who represent a district with a large Jewish community, or who simply care especially deeply about combating antisemitism.

The Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission in the House also raises issues of antisemitism around the globe in a substantive and productive manner as part of its work, which the bipartisan Senate Human Rights Caucus could do as well if similarly upgraded to a Commission with funding and staff. Indeed, the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the U.S. Helsinki Commission, has already been playing this role as part of its advocacy for security cooperation and human rights throughout the OSCE region.

In addition to their participation in these bodies and through their own public and private statements, Members of Congress also have other tools for combating antisemitism in Europe. These comprise bills and resolutions, funding, oversight, and participation in interparliamentary fora

including the OSCE, European Union, United Nations, NATO, the International Council of Jewish Parliamentarians, and an Inter-Parliamentary Task Force on Online Antisemitism, created in the past year, that brings together parliamentarians from the United States, U.K., Israel, Canada, and Australia.

One challenging trend in Congress, however, has been the increasing polarization and political weaponization of the governmental fight against antisemitism in the United States, Europe, and beyond. To the extent that maximalist legislation or parliamentary maneuvers on combating antisemitism are designed with an eye toward painting the other side of the aisle in an unfavorable light, such dynamics detract from its legitimacy, weaken the bipartisan consensus for fighting antisemitism, and undermine U.S. support for vulnerable Jewish communities.

Federal Commissions

With regard to federal Commissions, there was widespread recognition among interview subjects that the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom has been increasingly involved in monitoring and combating antisemitism in recent years. Furthermore, interviewees also expressed general enthusiasm for this trend, describing it as a worthwhile and effective response to a genuine, complex, and escalating international challenge. Additionally, the U.S. Commission for the Preservation of America’s Heritage Abroad could play a more consistent role, with a sharper focus on certain types of antisemitism in Europe. In particular, it should be encouraged and supported to boost its institutional capacity for routinely monitoring, documenting, and calling out hateful incidents at heritage sites such as synagogues and cemeteries in its area of operations, which covers Central and Eastern Europe as well as Eurasia.

ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDED MEASURES

In addition to the general principles and institution-specific recommendations for U.S. policy just outlined, the following section outlines six other areas where specific U.S. government attention could be beneficial for combating antisemitism in Europe. However, this list is by no means exclusive and should not be treated as a comprehensive roadmap for action; rather, it constitutes those topics that seem most notable as being worthwhile, beneficial, and top-of-mind for the action agenda going forward. Those six topics are as follows: (1) encouraging the physical security of European Jewish communities, (2) encouraging the appointment and empowerment of national coordinators for combating antisemitism, (3) recommending suitable adoption of the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism,

(4) promoting education and awareness-raising, (5) combating antisemitic cyberhate, and (6) collaborating with intergovernmental organizations.

Encouraging the Physical Security of European Jewish Communities

There is widespread agreement that the U.S. government cannot be responsible for funding the protection of European Jewish communities, but it can certainly encourage it as a core responsibility for national and local governments in Europe. The need is enormous, authorities are still failing in many places, and it is leading to widespread fear in the community and even consideration of emigration by some. The United States can also offer to train, advise, and facilitate the exchange of best practices among civil society, police, and prosecutors. The Special Envoy can also commend positive developments in this regard when they are taken by European governments — for example when the Special Envoy has visited with or commended law enforcement officials in Germany or Poland engaged in important trainings of this sort.

Another way in which the U.S. government can help support the physical security of European Jewish communities is in the counterterrorism and countering violent extremism arena. U.S. counterterrorism and CVE officials should work with European counterparts to track and combat antisemitic messaging and plots by terrorist organizations in Europe. This must include efforts to combat threats against Jewish communities from Islamist extremist terrorists as well as from xenophobic, white supremacist terrorists. Such groups have already engaged in plotting violent acts within Europe and in the United States, and at times may have a transatlantic nexus as well.

Encouraging the Appointment of Antisemitism Coordinators

A major priority of U.S. government efforts to combat antisemitism in Europe that must be continued is the push to encourage European governments to appoint and empower effective national coordinators for combating antisemitism. However, these governments should be encouraged to do as we say, not as we do, since what is needed in Europe is not the appointment of more antisemitism envoys in foreign ministries but rather in an internal security capacity, such as in a ministry of the interior or prime minister's office. Given the absolute crisis levels of antisemitic violence in many European countries — and the continent's horrific history of failing to protect Jewish citizens from expulsion and genocide — it is reasonable for the U.S. government to call upon European governments to appoint envoys whose primary responsibility is to get their own houses in order.

Moreover, it is also reasonable to have those officials be solely focused on combating antisemitism, not all forms of hate — although appointing other officials to address other forms of hate should be encouraged as well. All European governments should be encouraged to appoint an internal-facing antisemitism coordinator so that local Jewish communities, national government officials, and foreign governments, including the U.S. government, have a single authority to call when incidents of antisemitism occur and who can be responsible for taking stock and devising sustainable solutions. The U.S. government can and should also continue efforts to convene such national government coordinators to share best practices.

Opinions were split among interview respondents as to whether developing comprehensive national government strategies for combating antisemitism, as some European governments have done, is the sort of action that the U.S. government should be encouraging every European government to take. What respondents were more united around was the principle that, whether any given European government chooses to combat the problem through national action plans or through more piecemeal programs, commitments, or frameworks, the U.S. government should try to track their policy pledges — and to grade or at least provide feedback when those countries achieve their pledges or fail to follow through on key commitments. National action plans and national coordinators are both great, but neither is an end in and of itself; what matters is whether European states are taking steps that can resolve the problem.

Recommending the Adoption of the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism

The Special Envoy's office has been extensively engaged in encouraging European governments to adopt the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance's Working Definition of Antisemitism along with its specific associated examples, and this is an effort that the Biden Administration should be encouraged to continue. The Working Definition is the single most accepted, useful tool for capturing a broad array of anti-Jewish expressions as antisemitic, and as such it can help a broad array of governmental and non-governmental officials identify when particular actions or statements constitute intolerant, offensive, or hateful abuse against Jewish communities.

Although some of the definition's critics — and even a few of its supporters — may see it as a recommended template for broadly prohibiting and even criminalizing speech, such an interpretation of the definition or how it should be applied is erroneous. The Working Definition explicitly makes clear that only a narrow range of criticisms of the State of the

Israel and its policies cross the line into antisemitism. And its characterization as a “working definition” is specifically to emphasize that its utility is primarily as a generalized guidepost for education and training. It also may be helpful in instances when law enforcement or prosecutors need help identifying when anti-Zionist or anti-Israel speech may also be antisemitic, such as when attempting to assess intent for the purposes of determining whether a hate crime has occurred, such as if a synagogue is firebombed and the perpetrator rails against “Zionists” in particular. But any broader application of the Working Definition by legal authorities against acts of speech should not be advocated by the U.S. government and typically does not appear to be under consideration by European governments anyway. Collaboratively resolving current political debates within the United States about what the Working Definition is and is not, and how it should or should not be applied, will also help bolster U.S. officials encouraging the definition’s adoption abroad.

Promoting Education and Public Awareness-Raising

The U.S. government should sustain and expand efforts to encourage the adoption of several types of education programs that benefit the wellbeing of European Jewish communities. Holocaust education in the curriculum is essential, but so is education on antisemitism, anti-bias topics, and on positive contributions of Jewish communities to the historical and contemporary fabric of society in European nations. Of equal importance is the need for raising the awareness of the adult population on these topics.

Each of these types of programs can help bolster European pluralism and democracy and is something the U.S. government can encourage, facilitate, or celebrate. U.S. Embassies, educators, civil society, and the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum all play an important role in each of these areas in partnership with European societies. Nevertheless, there is more that can be done, such as providing U.S. diplomats in Europe with additional programming materials and funding to convene trainings or teaching sessions on these subjects.

Additionally, public polling, such as ADL’s Global 100 poll, shows the European public’s continued belief in an array of antisemitic myths, at much higher rates than among the U.S. public in most cases. This fact suggests another way such programs could help address an existing challenge. And in the aftermath of disease, distancing, economic devastation, and scapegoating related to the global pandemic, this challenge will likely be especially acute.

Regarding Holocaust education and awareness in particular, the U.S. government can encourage such programming and play an important role in pushing back when governments in Europe — particularly in Eastern Europe — engage in Holocaust distortion. When certain national governments attempt to rehabilitate historical figures with Jewish blood on their hands to bolster national identity or for political advantage, it undermines pluralistic democracy and civic education on the continent while making Jewish communities feel endangered or like second-class or conditional citizens. Furthermore, the U.S. and European governments can help combat antisemitism within and beyond their borders by welcoming more countries beyond the continent — most notably from the broader Middle East — as observers or members of IHRA. Indeed, the IHRA Guidelines for Teaching and Learning about the Holocaust have been translated into several European languages but would also be useful for the U.S. government to promote its use in Arabic, Turkish, Persian, Chinese, Spanish, and other world languages.

Combating Antisemitic Cyberhate

There was widespread agreement among interview respondents that antisemitic incitement to hatred or violence through social media and other online platforms is a burgeoning new frontier that is increasingly important, impactful, and dangerous. The U.S. government needs antisemitism monitors who are capable of tracking and responding to antisemitic cyberhate, and it needs cyberhate experts to be trained in identifying and responding to antisemitism. The U.S. government can also play a major role sensitizing social media platforms and other pertinent technology companies on how to identify, discourage, and, when appropriate, take down antisemitic cyberhate, and there is substantial need for transatlantic cooperation on this issue. The Inter-Parliamentary Task Force on Online Antisemitism is an important development in this regard, but it is not sufficient. More research is needed, as is staff capacity and greater action.

Collaborating with Multilateral Organizations

The U.S. government can and should do more in partnership with multilateral organizations as part of its efforts to combat antisemitism in European countries. For example, this should include the OSCE, IHRA, European Union, and United Nations, as well as the new U.S.-chartered multilateral International Alliance for Freedom of Religion or Belief, previously known as the International Religious Freedom Alliance.

For instance, the U.S. government should continue to encourage OSCE Participating States, including European states, all to report detailed enough data on hate crimes to the OSCE in order to guide meaningful policy responses. Most OSCE states still fail to report national hate crime data to the organization in sufficient detail to, for example, even provide a total number of antisemitic hate crimes in their respective countries per year, let alone more detailed information on the topic.

The OSCE's Words Into Action program, which focuses on security, education, and coalitions in the fight against antisemitism, is also particularly important and should be restarted with substantial U.S. support. Words Into Action included the creation of several excellent national action assessments for European governments, assessing the extent to which national policies were combating antisemitism and providing detailed recommendations for future action. U.S. funding could be very well-spent supporting OSCE Words Into Action in generating national action assessments with tailored national policy recommendations for combating antisemitism for every single one of the OSCE's Participating States in the coming years.

Another area for concerted U.S. government engagement in the years ahead is the UN's newly designated focal point to monitor antisemitism, situated within the UN's Alliance of Civilizations. In light of the United Nation's long history of demonizing the Jewish state, Washington should pay close

attention to whether the UN's Alliance of Civilizations has both the will and the capability to meaningfully combat all forms of antisemitism, including those framed as criticisms of Israel or Zionism that cross into antisemitic tropes or demonization. The United States should assess how best to facilitate the long-term effectiveness against antisemitism of this focal point, as well as several other U.N. bodies, including UNESCO. Further, the United States should also assess how best to mitigate the extremely disproportionate focus on Israel at the U.N. Human Rights Council.

Finally, more attention should be given to the role of the International Alliance for the Freedom of Religion and Belief that the U.S. government helped charter in recent years. This body has already begun to provide a useful forum for American and Israeli diplomats both to raise concern with European officials about restrictions on Jewish religious ritual practice in specific cases. More consideration should be given to how the Alliance, as part of its various activities, can provide a forum and coordinating body for advocating support for vulnerable Jewish communities in Europe and beyond. This should include not just advocacy regarding ritual slaughter and male circumcision but also religious freedom in the broader sense: namely, the responsibility of governments including in Europe to ensure the basic safety, acceptance, and viability of vulnerable faith communities in their country, including their Jewish communities.

CONCLUSION

The answer to the question posed at the beginning of this report — Are Jews able to live openly and freely as Jews, in whatever manner they wish? — is unfortunately negative, though to different extents in the 11 countries studied. Whether that standard is realistic, it must be the goal that governments aspire to.

As the country profiles show, the factors that generate anxiety in Jewish communities differ in their severity and their composition. Some communities suffer more from antisemitic violence and the consequent sense of insecurity for the entire community. Other communities are disquieted by the frequency and seeming acceptability of antisemitic discourse in public.

Governments should be able to close many of the gaps in their efforts to ensure the wellbeing of their Jewish communities. Some actions can be implemented quickly, such as fully funding security requirements and having leaders commit to publicly denouncing antisemitism. Other actions will take more time, such as reforms in education and improvements in law enforcement, but commencing work in those areas should not be delayed.

The U.S. government has many opportunities to support efforts against antisemitism in Europe. The executive and legislative branches both have roles to play, as do federal commissions, like the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. With this report, USCIRF hopes to have made a significant contribution to those efforts.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

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