

Flygtningenævnets baggrundsmateriale

Bilagsnr.:	821
Land:	Myanmar
Kilde:	Freedom House
Titel:	Freedom on the Net 2024-Myanmar
Udgivet:	16. oktober 2024
Optaget på baggrundsmaterialet:	19. november 2024

Document #2116570

Freedom House (Author)

Freedom on the Net 2024 - Myanmar

Not Free

9

/ 100

A [Obstacles to Access](#) 2 / 25

B [Limits on Content](#) 5 / 35

C [Violations of User Rights](#) 2 / 40

Last Year's Score & Status

10 / 100 Not Free

Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free). See the [research methodology](#) and [report acknowledgements](#).

Key Developments, June 1, 2023 – May 31, 2024

Internet freedom in Myanmar marked a historic low during the coverage period, making Myanmar's information environment one of the worst in the world. The military, which seized control of the state in a February 2021 coup, continued to impose localized internet-access blocks, data price hikes,

ecoi.net description:

Report on digital media and internet freedom (reporting period June 2023 - May 2024)

Country:

Myanmar

Source:

[Freedom House](#) (Author)

Published:

16 October 2024

Original link:

online trolling, and arbitrary prosecutions resulting in long prison sentences. The military's direct and indirect control over all major service providers has also enabled the enforcement of strict rules on user identity registration, as well as mass censorship and surveillance.

- Authorities frequently enforced short-term, localized restrictions on internet access to prevent the opposition from organizing or sharing information about atrocities, effectively impacting millions of users (see A3).
- In May 2024, WhatsApp, X, and Instagram were restricted by the government. Alongside the social media platforms, many popular VPNs, including Psiphon and NordVPN, became inaccessible (see B1 and B7).
- In an effort to bypass platform moderation policies, in 2023, the Ministry of Information launched a local YouTube imitator, MTube, to host videos produced by the state and state-controlled channels (see B5).
- Scores of internet users were imprisoned for their online activities during the coverage period; military courts issued multiyear prison sentences and carried out executions (see C3 and C7).
- In May 2024, the military ramped up its offline crackdown on VPNs, arresting and fining those found to have VPN apps on their mobile devices (see C4).

Political overview

Military commanders seized control of Myanmar's government in February 2021, ending a period of power sharing between military and civilian leaders under a 2008 constitution that had been drafted by a previous junta. Since the coup, the military has violently suppressed dissent and battled a sizable armed resistance movement that has widespread popular support and includes militias associated with ethnic minority groups. The National League for Democracy (NLD), which led the civilian government before the coup and won a sweeping victory in the November 2020 elections, serves as the political backbone of a self-declared National Unity Government (NUG). Protected by the armed resistance groups, the NUG exercises partial or effective control over a growing swathe of territory outside major population centers. Millions of people remain displaced or have been newly displaced by the ongoing civil war, with many seeking refuge abroad.

<https://freedomhouse.org/country/myanmar/freedom-net/2024>

Document type:
Periodical Report

Language:
English

Available on ecoi.net since:
23 October 2024

Document ID:
2116570

A Obstacles to Access

A1 0-6 pts

Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of 2 / internet connections? 6

Though internet penetration in Myanmar has generally expanded in recent years, during the coverage period, people's access to internet was limited by power shortages, access restrictions (see A3), and high costs imposed by the military (see A2).

As of January 2024, internet penetration was 44 percent.¹ Most internet users in Myanmar rely on mobile services, and the mobile penetration rate was 117.4 percent.² There were 64.3 million mobile connections in the country as of February 2024, down from 73 million in January 2022.³ The mobile penetration rate was higher during the first two years following the coup because many users had multiple SIM cards,⁴ discarding and replacing them to avoid surveillance and boycott military-controlled service providers (see A4).⁵

The fixed-line and wireless broadband penetration rate remained low at 6.7 percent, representing just 0.5 percent of all subscriptions in 2020.⁶ Average mobile download speeds declined to 24.42 Mbps during the coverage period, while average fixed-line broadband download speeds remained the same at 18.85 Mbps.⁷

Telecommunications infrastructure has been damaged as a consequence of the armed conflict between the military and resistance groups; expansion has similarly been curtailed by physical insecurity.⁸ More than 400 cell towers were destroyed in 2021 and an unknown number are not regularly serviced or refueled due to physical risk.⁹

The NUG stated in February 2023 that it had started providing publicly accessible internet connections in at least 15 townships outside military control, expanding to 60 by the end of 2023.¹⁰ However, efforts to establish small-scale infrastructure have faced obstacles (see A2). For instance, during the previous coverage period, an improvised tower erected by one group was

reportedly destroyed by the military.¹¹ The military has also threatened satellite internet users and improvised-tower users with imprisonment.¹²

Infrastructure development has also been hampered by flooding, unreliable electricity, an inefficient bureaucracy, fuel hoarding, and corruption in the private and public sectors. The amount of electricity produced in the country has also significantly declined since the coup.¹³ Daily power outages throughout the coverage period ranged from 5 to 16 hours in length.¹⁴ In 2022, the Ministry of Power and Energy announced that 24-hour outages could occur in parts of Myanmar due to infrastructure repairs, though other sources claimed that daylong outages were already taking place in Yangon.¹⁵

A2 0-3 pts

Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of 0 / the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? 3

The average cost of internet access dropped from a peak in 2022 but remains more expensive than before the 2021 coup.¹⁶ Price increases imposed by the military—combined with inflationary pressures and increased unemployment¹⁷—have forced poorer people in Myanmar to reduce their usage or stop it altogether.¹⁸ Some have sold their devices to pay for basic needs.¹⁹

In 2023, 1 gigabyte (GB) of mobile data cost 2081.25 kyat (\$0.98).²⁰ In 2023, telecommunications companies began loaning data to users for later payment. The state-owned operator, Myanmar Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), for instance, offers a hiked rate of 859 kyat (\$0.40) for 350 megabytes (MB) of loaned data and 4,949 kyat (\$2.33) for 2 GB of loaned data, prices which are prohibitively expensive in Myanmar.²¹

Previously, in December 2021, the military-controlled Ministry of Transport and Communications (MoTC) ordered all mobile service providers to double their data prices,²² with 1 GB of nonpackaged mobile data costing 10,000 kyat (\$4.70) at the time.²³ The MoTC also imposed a purchase tax on SIM-card sales in January 2022, ²⁴ tripled telecommunications firms' corporate tax,²⁵ and created a tax for mandatory registration of international mobile equipment identity (IMEI) numbers.²⁶ Mobile service providers that were not at the time affiliated with the military reported that they did not request the increases.²⁷

Users in some urban areas can access fixed-line and wireless broadband.²⁸ As of March 2024, major service providers offer fixed-line connections at rates ranging between 28,000 kyat (\$13.19) to 35,000 kyat (\$16.50) per month.²⁹ Satellite internet connections are significantly more expensive, costing several hundred dollars per month, and only payable abroad.³⁰

Poorer and rural internet users, already lacking devices and struggling with the country's rapid postcoup financial downturn,³¹ experienced far greater relative increases in internet-access costs since the 2021 coup than richer urban users. Online media outlets report that rural audiences no longer look at data-heavy audio-visual content, migrating to low data text-based content on Telegram for instance.³²

Gender disparity in internet access has declined in recent years but still remains.³³ For women, barriers to owning and using a mobile phone to access the internet include perceived lack of relevance, high costs, and insufficient literacy skills.³⁴

In 2018, the MoTC established a Universal Service Fund (USF), meant to address regional infrastructural gaps and connect 99 percent of the population to telecommunications services by 2022.³⁵ However, in October 2022, the military redirected the fund, which supported by a 2 percent tax on telecommunications providers, toward building a comprehensive SIM Registration Management System (see C4).³⁶

A3 0-6 pts

Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the 0 / purposes of restricting connectivity? 6

The military has repeatedly shut down telecommunications services since seizing power. In the early hours of February 1, 2021, armed soldiers forcefully entered telecommunications providers' offices and demanded a nationwide cut to internet access.³⁷ The military also instructed service providers to implement extensive restrictions on specific targets, blocking access to websites, applications, and social media platforms (see B1).

The military has since eased the nationwide restrictions, instead replacing it with localized internet restrictions in areas where resistance groups are particularly active;³⁸ these localized cuts frequently

coincide with offline crackdowns by the military.

The MoTC has significant powers to disrupt connectivity without oversight or safeguards, as it controls much of the telecommunications infrastructure via the state-owned MPT. During the coverage period, cuts were reported in Ayeyarwady Region, Bago Region, Chin State, Kachin State, Kayah State, Kayin State, the Kokang Self-Administered Zone within Shan State, Magway Region, Mon State, Rakhine State, Sagaing Region, Shan State, and the cities of Yangon, Mandalay, and Naypyidaw, affecting millions of users.³⁹ Sagaing Region, a hub of resistance, has faced especially long disruptions.⁴⁰ The military has reportedly used portable signal jammers to restrict local communications when raiding villages.⁴¹ Since 2022, fixed-line connections in Yangon and other cities have been throttled and disrupted.⁴²

Myanmar has three underwater and four overland internet gateways. Private-sector providers were gradually diversifying ownership of mobile infrastructure and the internet backbone prior to the coup; since the coup, however, such efforts have yet to materialize, as the military seeks to strengthen its grip on Myanmar's internet infrastructure (see A4). For instance, in 2023, the military announced that any unlicensed satellite equipment being used to access the internet was illegal and users would be prosecuted.⁴³

A4 0-6 pts

Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? 0 / 6

Before the coup, the administration of telecommunications licenses was generally regarded as fair and transparent, and external efforts to influence decisions were largely rebuffed.⁴⁴ Now, the military directly controls two of Myanmar's four mobile service providers.

The military-owned Mytel, part of which is indirectly owned by the Vietnamese military, was licensed in 2017.⁴⁵ Despite facing an anticoup consumer boycott in 2021, Mytel had approximately 13 million subscribers in 2023.⁴⁶ Following the coup, the military also seized control of state-operated MPT,⁴⁷ which is partly owned by Japanese telecommunications companies KDDI and Sumitomo,⁴⁸ and, as of early 2024, has 29.6 million subscribers.⁴⁹ Mytel and MPT are also the

country's leading broadband providers, giving the military significant control over broadband connectivity as well.⁵⁰

The other two mobile service providers, Atom (formerly Telenor), with 18 million subscribers in 2023, and Ooredoo, with 9 million subscribers in 2022,⁵¹ were operated by foreign companies prior to the coup, but are now under the ownership of opaque firms with close links to the military. For instance, in May 2024, Ooredoo completed the sale of its Myanmar operations to Nine Communications, a Singapore-based subsidiary that is reportedly owned by military-linked individuals but continues to operate under the Ooredoo brand.⁵² Similarly, Telenor sold its Myanmar operations in March 2022 to Investcom, a joint venture between M1 Group, a Lebanon-based investing company, and Shwe Byain Phyu, a military-linked local firm. In June 2022, they renamed the provider "Atom."⁵³

In February 2024, after Shwe Byain Phyu was sanctioned by the Canadian and US governments (in September 2023⁵⁴ and January 2024⁵⁵ respectively), the firm sold their majority stake in Atom to Myancom Holding. Since the sale, news site Myanmar Now reported on allegations that the newly incorporated Myancom Holding is a shell company with the same beneficiaries as Shwe Byain Phyu.⁵⁶

Foreign companies are also divesting from other parts of the telecommunications infrastructure. In April 2024, Malaysian company Axiata said it was seeking regulatory approval to sell at least 3,000 towers to an unknown local buyer, citing difficulties operating in Myanmar.⁵⁷

A5 0-4 pts

Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to 0 / operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? 4

Myanmar's regulatory bodies have been under the authority of the military since the 2021 coup. The MoTC's Posts and Telecommunications Department (PTD) is responsible for regulating the telecommunications sector. As a ministerial department run by former military officers, the PTD has no legal or practical safeguards for its regulatory and operational independence, leaving it completely open to political interference.⁵⁸

The military has controlled the PTD's regulation of telecommunications companies and licensing since seizing power.⁵⁹ PTD decisions lack any transparency and demonstrate a bias in favor of the

military's interests. For instance, when Telenor submitted a request for permission to sell its Myanmar operations in 2022, the PTD required the provider to sell to the military's preferred buyer (see A4).⁶⁰ The PTD has also publicly threatened its own staff for participating in prodemocracy protests and strikes.⁶¹

Article 86 of the 2013 Telecommunications Law outlines the responsibilities of a Myanmar Communications Regulatory Commission (MCRC), which has not been established.⁶² Even though the mandate for the MCRC's composition does not sufficiently safeguard its independence, the Telecommunications Law calls for the MCRC to take over regulatory functions from the PTD. The MCRC would also operate a mechanism to adjudicate any administrative disputes in the telecommunications sector.⁶³ Many analysts suggested that the NLD government failed to establish the MCRC because it was unwilling to relinquish the more direct control it had over the telecommunications sector through the PTD.⁶⁴

B Limits on Content

B1 0-6 pts

Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet 0 / content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 6

Since the coup, the military has consolidated two distinct blocking regimes. Mobile service providers must block all websites except those on a list preapproved by the military. All fixed-line and wireless broadband service providers, which serve only a small portion of the public, allow access by default but block many specific addresses.

In May 2024, the MoTC issued orders to mobile and broadband telecommunications providers to block WhatsApp, X, Instagram, and VPNs; alongside the platforms, many popular VPNs, including Psiphon and NordVPN, became inaccessible soon after.⁶⁵ In June 2024, the Associated Press reported that only one VPN it tested still worked, and noted slow connection speeds. However, many experts have stated that it will be difficult to determine the full scope of the new blocks, as accessibility in the country varies daily. Signal, an encrypted messaging service, was restricted in July 2024, after the coverage period.⁶⁶

In June 2024, activist group Justice for Myanmar published a report about the military's use of a new web surveillance and censorship system at the end of May, with potential capabilities "to intercept and decrypt web traffic and block applications and websites, including the widespread use of [VPNs]."⁶⁷ Activists believe the technology may be being used to implement the blocks.⁶⁸

The military's attempts to block censorship circumvention tools like VPNs, including via an earlier ban in 2021,⁶⁹ have been indiscriminate and led to significant collateral damage.⁷⁰ For instance, immediately after VPNs became inaccessible in May 2024, media outlets saw a massive decline in online audience numbers.⁷¹ Blocks have also disrupted content delivery networks like Google and Amazon services,⁷² banking, transportation, and—during the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic—education and health care. Some businesses and banks have raised concerns about their ability to operate.⁷³ In addition, the blocks have reportedly undermined networks outside the country.⁷⁴

Previously, in the first year following the coup, the military-controlled MoTC regularly issued secretive blocking orders to service providers—several per week during the most violent periods—with each containing hundreds of thousands of addresses to block.⁷⁵ The first such order was issued on February 3, 2021, and targeted Facebook and WhatsApp.⁷⁶ Orders to block Instagram and what was then known as Twitter arrived on February 5,⁷⁷ followed later by blocks on most independent media outlets and international sources of information such as Wikipedia (see B6).⁷⁸ Some blocking orders were reversed in May 2021.⁷⁹

The default blocking on mobile services began on May 25, 2021, when the military ordered providers to obstruct access to all websites and internet protocol (IP) addresses except for 1,200 approved addresses that included a large contingent of banking and financial sites, a small number of entertainment sites like YouTube and Netflix, news sites such as the *New York Times* and US-based Cable News Network (CNN), and gaming platforms.⁸⁰ The list of approved addresses was updated in 2022 to add business sites, including those of local businesses; it is unclear how many further updates have occurred since then.⁸¹

Telenor disclosed that MoTC orders issued immediately after the coup in 2021 required telecommunications companies to block access to URLs and IP addresses under Section 77 of the Telecommunications Law, which allows authorities to issue blocking orders to license holders in

“emergency situations.”⁸² The military cited goals like “preserving stability” and preventing “fake news” from “spreading misunderstanding.”⁸³

In the immediate aftermath of the coup, service providers did not implement blocking orders consistently,⁸⁴ with addresses blocked by some providers but not by others.⁸⁵ For example, Facebook was accessible via at least one broadband provider, despite being subject to a blocking order,⁸⁶ and for some Mytel subscribers, despite not being on the list of approved sites.⁸⁷ It was unclear whether this was due to confusion, technical difficulties, or discretion; some staff at service providers reportedly tried to limit the effects of military orders by interpreting them narrowly or subverting their application.⁸⁸

B2 0-4 pts

Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards?

1 / 4

State and nonstate actors continued to exert pressure to remove content during the coverage period.

Most independent media outlets have closed or gone into exile in response to the coup and the military's pressure, including its demands to cease critical coverage.⁸⁹ No independent publishers operate freely within military-controlled areas of Myanmar, and those that opted to stay after the coup, such as the previously independent Eleven Media outlet, self-censor (see B4).⁹⁰

Immediately after the coup in February 2021, the military began pressuring publishers to delete content. Officials graduated from issuing warnings to journalists to later demanding that media outlets cease critical coverage of the military's actions, as well as delete any words translating to “regime” and “junta,” and refrain from “biased” reporting (see B5).⁹¹ By March 2021, Myanmar's five daily newspapers had closed down.⁹² One of the largest outlets, 7DayDaily, deleted its entire website in response to the deteriorating situation.⁹³

Due to weak legal safeguards in the country and a pattern of military intimidation, global digital platforms like Facebook have refrained from establishing local entities in Myanmar (see C2). As a result, the military is unable to apply similar pressure to platforms as it does to publishers. In the

month following the February 2021 coup, the military attempted to detain the few platform employees in-country, but the employees were quickly evacuated. Two consultants were detained while trying to leave the country after the military reportedly suspected that they were Facebook employees.⁹⁴

Messaging and social media platforms such as Facebook, TikTok, and Telegram have faced ongoing calls from international actors to improve their content moderation in ways that address military propaganda, disinformation, and threats.⁹⁵ Facebook had already come under mounting pressure from civil society, the media, and foreign governments to invest in and improve content moderation beginning in 2018, when it was criticized for failing to contain inflammatory online content that encouraged violence against the Rohingya people.⁹⁶

Digital rights defenders have raised concerns that Facebook's content moderation has led to the removal of valid content, including commentary and documentation of human rights violations. Some in Myanmar's civil society sector suspect that these problems stem from weak training among staff and deficient algorithms; others have pointed to discriminatory decision-making among content reviewers.⁹⁷ Myanmar's media outlets have faced particular difficulties in navigating Facebook's community standards while trying to cover the conflict and have reported that they have seen posts removed subject to the platform's policies on coordinating harm and graphic violence.⁹⁸

Other platforms have also been criticized for their content moderation efforts. For example, while Telegram deleted channels such as Han Nyein Oo and Thazin Oo, which had been promoting the military's propaganda, doxing people, and sexually harassing women activists who opposed the coup, those behind the channels simply started new versions and regained thousands of followers.⁹⁹

B3 0-4 pts

Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? 0 / 4

There were no legal challenges to content restrictions either before or after the coup. The NLD government occasionally articulated vague aims, and the military, when it did offer a rationale, included only broad references to "fake news" and the need to protect national stability and ensure public security.¹⁰⁰ Since the coup, broad restrictions on digital content have been enforced without

transparency and with gross disproportionality. The military-controlled PTD has administered the military's orders without publishing information on what, why, when, how, or by whom restriction decisions were made.¹⁰¹

The only available sources of information about restrictions have been ministers' comments to the media, service providers' statements, and civil society. The only service provider that documented the receipt of PTD orders, Telenor, stopped soon after the coup,¹⁰² providing irregular updates until mid-April 2021, and then stopping reporting on the issue entirely, citing concerns for the safety of its staff.¹⁰³ No further public information on military blocking orders emerged during the coverage period.

Under the Telecommunications Law, the PTD can direct telecommunications providers to temporarily block and filter content "for the benefit of the people," and there is no mechanism for appeals.¹⁰⁴

In March 2024, the Ministry of Information issued three new orders to regulate the production and distribution of movies which undermine the state's policies on cultural and social issues—effectively penalizing the online publication of films that have not been preapproved by the ministry's film censorship board.¹⁰⁵ Additionally, the ministry is currently drafting a new law to address the distribution of movies on online platforms and further equip the military to take action against online movies which evade censorship.

A draft Cyber Security Law, introduced in January 2022, would require digital platforms to remove a wide range of content, and offers no transparency or appeal mechanisms (see C2). Sanctions under the bill include blocking orders and criminal liability for company representatives, who could face up to three years in prison for violations.¹⁰⁶ The law has not yet been enacted and as of the end of the coverage period, no new details have emerged regarding its current status.

The increase in social media companies' content moderation in recent years has not been matched by an increase in transparency about moderation policies, including appeal processes. Facebook publishes very little information about its approach to moderation and the appeal process in Myanmar, aside from routine transparency disclosures about global content removals.¹⁰⁷ Telegram

has also previously displayed pronounced deficiencies in transparency surrounding its content moderation.¹⁰⁸

B4 0-4 pts

Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? 1 / 4

Since the coup, self-censorship online has grown significantly. Many journalists, commentators, and ordinary people initially condemned the coup and the military online. However, those living under military rule increasingly self-censor for their own security (see B8, C3, and C7).¹⁰⁹ Some have stopped publishing online entirely, while others avoid posting content that risks attracting attention from the military and its online proxies (see B2).¹¹⁰ Increased platform moderation has also led to self-censorship, with users hesitant to post words and phrases that automatically trigger platform warnings and removals.¹¹¹

Many social media users have removed photos of protests and other material that could attract military attention from their profiles, changed their profiles to hide their identities, and opened new proxy accounts under new identities.¹¹² Before the coup, journalists, commentators, and ordinary people still faced a range of pressures to agree with government narratives and majority beliefs on matters related to the military, powerful businesses, armed conflict, the Rohingya, religion, sex and gender, and other politically sensitive topics.¹¹³ For example, most independent media outlets actively self-censored when reporting on the Rohingya to avoid backlash,¹¹⁴ and when they did address the issue, they generally opted to refer to Rohingya people as “Muslims” or “Bengalis,” effectively denying their self-identification.¹¹⁵ Women and girls self-censored on a range of topics, particularly those related to sex and gender, due to the risk of abuse and sexual harassment.¹¹⁶

B5 0-4 pts

Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? 1 / 4

The military junta has engaged in concerted efforts to control and manipulate information online. On the first day of the coup, the military seized control of all state-owned media and government communications services,¹¹⁷ as well as related social media accounts and broadcasting channels.¹¹⁸ The military then began limiting access to independent sources of information by

banning independent media outlets (see B6) and blocking all but a list of approved websites and social media platforms (see B1).

After the coup, the military ordered soldiers to create social media accounts, spread military messages online, and troll sources of information that challenged military narratives. It established and continues to train units specialized in “electronic warfare,”¹¹⁹ running clandestine disinformation campaigns in online groups and fan channels of celebrities and sports teams.¹²⁰

Some social media platforms have tried to prevent the military from promoting false and misleading narratives online. Following the coup, Facebook, X, YouTube, VKontakte, and TikTok all to some extent banned the military or its representatives from using their services.¹²¹

In an effort to bypass platform moderation policies, the military-controlled Ministry of Information launches and promotes replacement or imitation apps of social media platforms. In 2023, the ministry launched a local YouTube imitator, MTube to host videos produced by the state and state-controlled channels.¹²² The military also promotes OKPar, a local competitor to Facebook, whose content moderation rules ban anything that will “stimulate small or big issues” relating to politics or society.¹²³ Despite claims that the platform is end-to-end encrypted, a 2021 report by the Qurium Media Foundation found that the platform leaks sensitive information.¹²⁴ Additionally, in April 2024, another Facebook competitor, Myanmar Myspace, was removed from Google’s app store soon after launch following public complaints that it was a front for the military.¹²⁵

In 2022, military proxies began launching “imposter” or sham promilitary media outlets online. By 2023, dozens of propaganda channels had cropped up, posing as media outlets that service specific regions and minority languages.¹²⁶ Proxies also launched social media accounts, mimicking independent fact-checking sites, to brand independent media content with “fake news” stamps.¹²⁷ Military supporters, including military members’ relatives and members of nationalist groups, have been encouraged to amplify such content.¹²⁸

Promilitary disinformation networks have migrated to Telegram, which offers fewer restrictions, and promilitary channels like Kyaw Swar and Han Nyein Oo attract large followings on Telegram.¹²⁹ A 2023 report by Myanmar Witness found that disinformation on Telegram is often sexualized to target

women from or supporting resistance groups (see C7).¹³⁰ While the platform had removed some promilitary accounts for incitement to violence as of March 2022, many more remained.¹³¹

Facebook's moderation of promilitary networks have also sometimes failed to limit the spread of their content. A June 2021 investigation by Global Witness found that Facebook's page-recommendation algorithm had been amplifying promilitary content that violated many of its own violence and misinformation policies.¹³² Internal Facebook documents leaked in October 2021 also identified the platform's failure to limit the spread of content shared by promilitary accounts.¹³³

B6 0-3 pts

Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users' ability to publish 0 / content online? 3

The military has revoked the licenses of many independent media outlets and ordered telecommunications companies to block their websites, most recently banning Mekong News in December 2023 (see B1).¹³⁴ In March 2021, shortly after the coup, the military declared that anyone caught operating without a license in any area governed by martial law, including parts of the commercial capital, Yangon, would be tried in closed military tribunals rather than in civilian courts.¹³⁵

Also in March 2021, the military stripped the licenses of five independent media outlets—Myanmar Now, Khit Thit Media, Democratic Voice of Burma, Mizzima, and 7Day News—writing that they were “no longer allowed to broadcast or write or give information by using any kind of media platform or using any media technology.”¹³⁶ The military subsequently raided the offices of outlets with revoked licenses and sought to detain their journalists (see C3).¹³⁷ License revocations continued during the coverage period (see B2).¹³⁸

In November 2021, the military amended the Broadcasting Law to criminalize broadcasting, including publishing videos online, without a license, effectively threatening all independent media outlets (see C2).¹³⁹

While independent media outlets can partially avoid the military's licensing regime by operating in exile (see B2), they then face serious economic constraints due to a reduction in business revenue streams. While some outlets have managed to earn income from advertising-based monetization of

their content, others are inhibited by platform policies, such as those which prevent outlets from participating in monetization programs if they operate directly in Myanmar or have a bank account there.¹⁴⁰

B7 0-4 pts

Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? 1 / 4

Independent media outlets largely operate in exile and face legal, economic, and social pressures that affect the quality and diversity of their content (see B6). Since the coup, the online information landscape has grown increasingly distorted, rife with promilitary disinformation (see B5).

The coup has also led to a significant decline in the diversity of topics of reliable information available to the public. In late May 2024, the government instructed service providers to block VPNs and many major social media platforms (see B1), effectively preventing people from being able to access websites and platforms blocked and limiting their ability to access necessary and reliable information.

Facebook's dominance over Myanmar's online space is also a threat to information diversity and reliability. In 2020, 78 percent of mobile users had never used an internet browser or app store, with most accessing the internet via Facebook applications on their mobile phones.¹⁴¹ Due to military blocks, some people have turned to alternate ways of accessing the internet (see B1), but Facebook's policies and practices still have an outsized effect on information. For instance, most media outlets do not have individual websites and instead operate exclusively through Facebook. As a result, their editorial decisions are heavily influenced by Facebook's algorithms and community standards.¹⁴²

Additionally, because many people turn to Facebook for most online information, the blocks against Facebook and the lack of affordable or stable circumvention tools available have severely limited access to crucial news, and even life-saving information like where to safely avoid the military.¹⁴³

Before access to social media platforms and VPNs was restricted in May 2024, circumvention and secure communications tools were widespread. One secure communications app, Bridgify, was downloaded over a million times in Myanmar within two days of the coup.¹⁴⁴ Psiphon, which is now blocked, was downloaded by nearly two million users during the same period.¹⁴⁵

Independent media outlets are also overstretched and often deprioritize topics unrelated to the coup, due to public demand and a need for political news coverage.¹⁴⁶ Additionally, sources, including the authorities, are fearful of the repercussions for sharing information (see C3 and C7),¹⁴⁷ and it is increasingly difficult to fact-check information in the face of both promilitary disinformation and sham outlets (see B5). In 2023, a human rights defender was forced to flee when she saw her name on a warrant list circulating online and had no way to check the image's authenticity. Exiled outlets frequently rely on freelancers inside Myanmar, known locally as "citizen journalists," who oftentimes lack the training and support needed to safely report on the "fast-moving conflict."¹⁴⁸

B8 0-6 pts

Do conditions impede users' ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, 1 / 6 particularly on political and social issues?

The military continued to impede the public's ability to associate or assemble online throughout the coverage period.¹⁴⁹ The military's blunt restrictions on internet access (see A3), blocking of tools like Facebook, WhatsApp, and VPNs (see B1), as well as Signal after the coverage period, use of interception systems and social media surveillance to identify and locate political and community leaders (see C4 and C5), and extrajudicial violence (see C3 and C7) are all designed to prevent popular mobilization.¹⁵⁰

The military has forced much of civil society to go into hiding, operate from exile, shift focus to less politically sensitive topics, shut down, or publicly accept the legitimacy of the coup.¹⁵¹ The four organizations that led the precoup Myanmar Digital Rights Forum—an annual discussion venue for stakeholders in the civil society, business, and technology sectors—have shut down, gone into exile, or both.¹⁵² Activists based in Myanmar who organize campaigns and civil society events, or speak to the media, do so anonymously out of fear of retribution. Popular online campaigns are run from those in exile.¹⁵³

Rules adopted in October 2022 require civil society organizations to register with local authorities and then regulate the purposes and activities that registered organizations are permitted to pursue. Organizations that fail to comply face fines and criminal penalties of up to five years in prison for their representatives.¹⁵⁴ Despite these restrictions, people continued to use online tools to organize

and share information whenever possible. Online calls to join nationwide offline “silent protests” persisted during the coverage period, as did the sharing of thousands of images of empty streets.¹⁵⁵

The Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) was launched on Facebook the day after the coup started,¹⁵⁶ and participants continued to mobilize during the coverage period.¹⁵⁷ Political opposition to the military takeover, which was organized within days of the February 2021 coup,¹⁵⁸ has since coalesced into the NUG, a broad-based prodemocracy resistance movement that appears to rely heavily on its online presence.¹⁵⁹

C Violations of User Rights

C1 0-6 pts

Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? 0 / 6

The military-drafted 2008 constitution guarantees limited rights for citizens to “express and publish their convictions and opinions,” to form associations and organizations, and to “freely develop literature, culture, arts” provided their actions do not contradict laws aimed to protect “security, prevalence of law and order, community peace and tranquility, or public order and morality” in Myanmar.¹⁶⁰ The constitution includes no provisions directly related to the internet or access to information, although Article 96 and Schedule 1 (8.m) empower the parliament to establish laws regulating the internet. Myanmar has two special laws that form the basic regulatory framework for the internet. The 2004 Electronic Transactions Law established rules for data management and electronic finance. The 2013 Telecommunications Law added a licensing system for service providers. Both contain harsh criminal penalties for a range of vague offenses (see C2).

The military disregarded these minimal constitutional rights and numerous other constitutional principles when they initiated the coup and declared an effectively continuous state of emergency in February 2021, extended again by six months in July 2024, after the coverage period.¹⁶¹ The military claimed their actions were within the bounds of their constitutional authority, because they were imperative to addressing unsubstantiated allegations of fraud in the November 2020 elections.¹⁶²

The rule of law has essentially collapsed since the coup, as the military took control of the judicial system.¹⁶³ The military has suspended habeas corpus and other due process rights, arbitrarily detained thousands of people (see C3), tried civilians in military courts, heard cases inside prisons to prevent observers from attending, harassed lawyers, ignored evidentiary rules, and used torture to extract confessions.¹⁶⁴ Members of the Constitutional Tribunal, the one state body that on paper could have held the military accountable to the constitution, were all replaced by the military within days of the coup.¹⁶⁵

In April 2021, elected parliamentarians who had escaped the military's growing crackdown declared that they had revoked the 2008 constitution and replaced it with an interim charter under the aegis of the NUG,¹⁶⁶ which does not guarantee freedoms of expression or association, the right to access the internet, and many other civil and political rights.¹⁶⁷

In March 2021, the military began imposing martial law in areas where they face the greatest opposition and has since continued to increase the number of areas ruled by martial law.¹⁶⁸ People who commit any of the following offenses in areas ruled by martial law are tried in closed extrajudicial military tribunals rather than supposedly civilian courts, including:¹⁶⁹ inciting disaffection toward the government or military; disrupting the government or military; committing a crime of treason under the penal code; or committing an offense under the News Media Law, Printing and Publishing Law, and Electronic Transactions Law.

C2 0-4 pts

Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 0 / 4

Since the coup, the military has expanded and increased criminal penalties for many offences that encompass online activities, leading to hundreds of individuals being imprisoned (see C3).

In December 2023, the military established a new interdepartmental committee tasked with identifying and prosecuting individuals who post pornography, "fake news," or political criticism on social media under existing laws.¹⁷⁰

In January 2022, the military reintroduced, but did not enact, a slightly revised draft of the Cyber Security Law which, if adopted, would introduce further criminal penalties for online activities, such as the use of VPNs, and undermine due process.¹⁷¹ It would also give the military significant control over the internet in Myanmar and extend military jurisdiction to foreign companies abroad.¹⁷² The military first proposed the law in 2021.¹⁷³

In 2021, the military amended the 2004 Electronic Transactions Law to include provisions lifted from a draft of the Cyber Security Law and that criminalize the publication of “false information” or information that could damage Myanmar’s foreign relations.¹⁷⁴ The law already criminalized an ill-defined range of online activity and was routinely used to criminalize internet activism during the previous period of military rule until 2011.¹⁷⁵ For instance, it prohibits “any act detrimental to” state security, law and order, community peace and tranquility, national solidarity, the national economy, or the national culture.

The 2013 Telecommunications Law is intended principally to deregulate the market, but it also includes criminal penalties for legitimate online activities; Article 66(d) addresses defamation, while Article 68 penalizes disinformation.¹⁷⁶

In February 2021, the military ordered an amendment to the penal code to increase the already draconian punishments for treason and sedition, and to add a vague offense under a new provision, Article 505A, which criminalizes causing fear, spreading purportedly false news, or disrupting officials, with a penalty of up to three years’ imprisonment, a fine, or both.¹⁷⁷ The amended penal code contained other provisions that have been used to a lesser extent, including a revised version of the existing Article 505(a), which criminalizes encouraging officials to mutiny, and Article 505(b), which bans causing fear or alarm in public.

In March 2023, the military amended the 2014 Counter Terrorism Law to list opposition groups as “terrorists” and increase the penalty for violating Article 3(b)(xv), which criminalizes “exhortation, persuasion, [and] propaganda” related to terrorist groups or “activities of terrorism” (see C5).

In November 2021, the military amended the Broadcasting Law to extend criminal penalties to media outlets that publish online without a license, prescribing up to five years in prison for the responsible

individuals (see B6).

The Trademark Law, adopted in 2019, penalizes trademark infringement, counterfeiting, and commercial copying with up to three years' imprisonment and a fine of approximately 5 million kyat (\$2,400).¹⁷⁸ It was adopted alongside the Patent Law and the Industrial Design Law, which also include criminal sanctions for violations.¹⁷⁹ Each law applies to online content and could be enforced against internet users.

The NLD government in 2020 issued a Directive on the Prevention of Incitement to Hatred and Violence, ordering officials to address the issue of hate speech.¹⁸⁰ After the coup, the military began working on a revised hate-speech law that could include punishment for "political" hate speech, which would contradict international human rights standards on the topic.¹⁸¹ As of the end of the coverage period, there have been no updates regarding the status of the draft law.

C3 0-6 pts

Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under 0 / international human rights standards? 6

Thousands of people have likely been penalized for their online activities in Myanmar's restrictive legal environment. Military-controlled authorities and courts continued to engage in arbitrary and disproportionate arrests, including of internet users, and imposed extreme sentences during the coverage period.

It is difficult to verify how many individuals were prosecuted specifically for their online activities because courts operate in secret. Printouts of individuals' social media posts and other online activities are often used as evidence in political cases, regardless of whether the individual was charged for their online activities.¹⁸²

As of the end of the coverage period, the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) reported that 26,799 individuals had been detained for political crimes since start of the coup in February 2021¹⁸³ —indicating 3,905 new political arrests during the coverage period. 20,543 people remain in prison.¹⁸⁴ According to the AAPP's database, at least one individual was sentenced to death, at least five individuals were sentenced to life in prison, six individuals were sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment with hard labor, and at least nine received sentences longer than 20 years

under the Counter Terrorism Law during the coverage period. Similarly, under Article 505A of the penal code (see C2), at least two individuals were sentenced to life in prison during the coverage period.¹⁸⁵

Hundreds more individuals have been prosecuted for their online activities under other laws of general application. Data for Myanmar, a research group, reported that between February 2022 and January 2024, 1,480 individuals were arrested for “criticizing the junta and supporting the opposition forces online,” but they were unable to confirm how many of the individuals were later charged or convicted.¹⁸⁶ Free Expression Myanmar (FEM), a civil society organization, reported that many of the individuals were likely charged and convicted under Article 505A,¹⁸⁷ but it was difficult to verify the exact number of charges and convictions.¹⁸⁸ According to FEM, nearly 4,000 people were charged or convicted under Article 505A in the year after the coup, and an additional 7,200 people were held on unknown charges that may have been under Article 505A.¹⁸⁹

Many of the individuals targeted by the military for their online activities had no clear association to journalism, activism, or political parties, and did not have substantial followers. For instance, a woman was arrested in February 2024 for posting on social media that she wished those who were killed in the military crackdown would be reborn in a peaceful country.¹⁹⁰ A 25-year-old woman and a 45-year-old man were arrested in August 2023 for allegedly harassing coup leader Min Aung Hlaing online.¹⁹¹

The military also often detains family members if they cannot capture an individual, or if they want to further threaten those caught. A 70-year-old woman and her daughters were arrested in August 2023 because the woman wrote on social media urging opposition groups to look after themselves.¹⁹² When the journalist Htet Htet Aung, who reported for the online outlet Thingangyun Post, was detained in 2021, her seven-year-old daughter was also held and questioned for two days before being released.¹⁹³

A report from the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law found that of the 206 journalists detained since the start of the coup, 59 were still in prison by the end of February 2024.¹⁹⁴ Almost all of the detained journalists had worked for online media outlets, and most were charged under Article 505A. ¹⁹⁵ In September 2023, Sai Zaw Thaike, a photojournalist for the news site Myanmar

Now, was sentenced to a total of 20 years in prison under various penal code provisions including sedition and Article 505A after covering the aftermath of Cyclone Mocha earlier that year.¹⁹⁶

Celebrities and online influencers are also targeted by the military.¹⁹⁷ In August 2023, a musician who went by Min Oat Myanmar was sentenced to 20 years in prison for criticizing coup leader Min Aung Hlaing for failing to maintain electricity supplies.¹⁹⁸

Hundreds of people who have avoided being brought into custody have faced other penalties.¹⁹⁹ For example, the military has confiscated the property of absent dissidents, such as the home of Thalun Zaung Htet, editor of online outlet Khit Thit Media, which was seized in February 2022.²⁰⁰ Individuals who do not receive a custodial sentence after arrest are still forced to delete content.²⁰¹

C4 0-4 pts

Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? 0 / 4

Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 because Myanmar authorities deployed a new censorship system to block most VPNs in May 2024, severely restricting people's ability to communicate anonymously and securely.

The military has tried to restrict individuals' ability to communicate online anonymously or using encryption.

In May 2024, many popular VPNs became largely inaccessible in Myanmar, after the MoTC ordered a nationwide ban on VPNs, as well as Instagram, X, and WhatsApp (see B1).²⁰² Access to Signal, an encrypted messaging service, was blocked in July 2024, after the coverage period. Prior to the blocks, a significant portion of the population used VPNs to evade the military's censorship and safely access websites without revealing their location, service provider, or IP address.²⁰³ Additionally, most businesses in Myanmar use applications and systems that use encryption and VPNs for security purposes.

In 2021, the military started using its large network of checkpoints to search people's devices for VPNs, and detained, beat, and extorted bribes from individuals caught with the technology.²⁰⁴ In May 2024, alongside the new blocking regime, the military simultaneously ramped up its offline

crackdown on VPNs.²⁰⁵ In June 2024, the Associated Press cited Radio Free Asia when it reported that 25 people were arrested and fined in Ayeyarwady Region after authorities found VPN apps on their devices.²⁰⁶

Additionally, the military's draft Cyber Security Law would, if adopted, criminalize the possession of VPN software and the use of pseudonyms on Facebook, with a sentence of up to three years' imprisonment in both cases (see C2).²⁰⁷

Anonymity is limited by mandatory SIM-card registration requirements. After the coup, the military required all subscribers to reregister their SIM cards with their official identity documents. In September 2022, authorities warned that SIM cards would be permanently blocked if they had not been reregistered with correct data by January 2023.²⁰⁸ The military has also called for mandatory registration of the IMEI numbers of all devices, with those that are not registered risking exclusion from telecommunications services; the demand was ostensibly linked to the collection of registration fees (see A2), though it was not yet enforced during the coverage period.²⁰⁹

It is unclear whether the military has continued to advance plans for biometric registration of SIM cards that were initiated prior to the coup.²¹⁰ In 2019, the NLD government had issued a tender for a biometric SIM-card registration system,²¹¹ which would include fingerprints and facial-recognition information.²¹² The military's biometric system for citizenship identity cards has separately continued, albeit very slowly.²¹³

C5 0-6 pts

Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users' right to privacy? 1 / 6

The military's online surveillance and interception efforts have grown since the coup, dovetailing with its comprehensive offline capacity to intrude on citizens' privacy.

In June 2024, Justice for Myanmar reported that the military was using a new system that may allow it to decrypt and inspect web traffic, including individual users' online traffic, and may also allow it to monitor individual use of applications including VPNs.²¹⁴

Soldiers and police also conduct physical surveillance of devices through random spot-checks and at fixed checkpoints throughout Myanmar, looking for censorship circumvention tools or politically

sensitive content in photo albums, messages, and social media posts (see C4).²¹⁵ Checkpoints are unpredictable but usually involve handing over identity documents and mobile phones which are first manually searched and sometimes plugged into forensic technology, such as Israeli software Cellebrite,²¹⁶ which can restore deleted content.²¹⁷ Those caught with compromising material may be detained, beaten, or face demands for bribes up to 100,000 kyat (\$47).²¹⁸ Women have reported being sexually assaulted at checkpoints and then harassed by phone afterwards.²¹⁹

The military's Public Relations and Information Production Unit, known as the Ka Ka Com, reportedly had a network of teams comprising hundreds of soldiers nationwide that were responsible for identifying suspected "watermelons" online (seemingly promilitary supporters who secretly support Aung San Suu Kyi, the deposed state councillor) and infiltrating their networks;²²⁰ military surveillance networks also utilized information from the devices of detainees,²²¹ and from security cameras equipped with facial-recognition technology.²²² The communications of soldiers themselves are also under surveillance by the military leadership to identify possible defectors.²²³

According to a May 2021 Reuters report, former military officials pressured service providers in late 2020 to install interception technology that would enable the military to view texts and emails, listen to phone calls, and locate users without assistance or approval.²²⁴ A January 2023 report by the Israeli newspaper *Haaretz* indicated that the technology, sold by Israeli company Cognyte, had been due to go live in June 2021, though the technology's operational status has remained unclear since the report was published.²²⁵

Civil society activities believe that the military has access to interception technology. ²²⁶ Before the coup, the Social Media Monitoring Team (SMMT),²²⁷ a body established under the MoTC,²²⁸ spent its \$4.8 million budget on tools from vendors based in Canada, the United States, Sweden, and Israel, among others.²²⁹ Purchases included MacQuisition forensic software, which can extract data from Apple computers; tools that can extract deleted content from mobile devices; and additional technology for determining the home addresses of online critics.

Soon after the coup began, the military suspended most of the limited privacy protections stipulated in the Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens.²³⁰ In March 2023, the military introduced new bylaws to the Counter Terrorism Law, including a new chapter that grants the authorities

sweeping powers to intercept, block, or restrict mobile and electronic communications without court oversight or any other form of due process.²³¹

The 2004 Telecommunications Law allows for military interception of communications on the grounds of national security and rule of law, which are defined vaguely; the law does contain a clause that states all interception should be done “without affecting the fundamental rights of the citizens.” However, the law also grants the government power to request and examine data without a warrant, as well as inspect equipment and intercept communications in an undefined “emergency situation,” relating to any citizen, in Myanmar or abroad, and without probable cause.

The draft Cyber Security Law, if passed, will strip away almost all remaining privacy protections and require all data to be stored on devices and servers designated by and accessible to the military, without any form of oversight (see C2).²³² Additionally, the military unilaterally amended the Electronic Transactions Law in February 2021 to grant authorities broad powers to inspect any device on vague bases such as “misuse.”²³³

C6 0-6 pts

Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology 0 / companies infringe on users’ right to privacy? 6

Service providers are obliged to hand data over to the state without sufficient oversight or safeguards. Myanmar lacks a robust data protection law, despite years of calls from a range of stakeholders in the private sector and civil society.²³⁴

The Electronic Transactions Law, which was amended by the military soon after the coup, obliges data controllers to submit information to state authorities without adequate protections for user privacy. The law does assign some duties for data controllers, but those duties are ill-defined, and the amended bylaws were not published.²³⁵

The Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens, passed in 2017 and partially suspended since the coup,²³⁶ prohibits the interception of personal communications without a warrant, but it contains a vague exception allowing surveillance if permission is granted by the president or a

government body. The law does not outline clear procedures governing how data can be collected, stored, or destroyed, nor does it provide for judicial review.²³⁷

The Telecommunications Law grants the government the power to direct unspecified persons “to secure any information or communication which may harm security, rule of law, or peace of the state.”²³⁸ The law also authorizes the government to inspect the premises of telecommunications firms and to require them to hand over documents—for the ill-defined purposes of defending the “security of the state” or “the benefit of the people”—without safeguards for individuals’ privacy and other human rights.²³⁹ A 2018 amendment to the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Law included a new provision requiring telecommunications firms to disclose user information without due process.²⁴⁰

The draft Cyber Security Law would require platforms and service providers with over 100,000 users in Myanmar to store data on servers designated by and fully accessible to the military, functionally amounting to data localization. The bill would also impose broad retention requirements for user data (see C2).²⁴¹

There is little room for service providers to push back against the military’s instructions, and the military’s direct or indirect control of the country’s providers facilitates even more seamless access to user data. Between February 2021 and February 2022, the military-controlled MoTC handed Telenor more than 200 data-request orders under the Telecommunications Law,²⁴² requiring call records and call locations spanning months, covering thousands of users.²⁴³ Telenor reportedly complied with all of them.

In at least one instance, providers did successfully resist a military order for information. In March 2022, a regional military official ordered service providers to disclose subscriber lists in order to identify who still had internet access; the companies reportedly appealed successfully to the military on the grounds that the move would violate their license requirements.²⁴⁴

The military has increased regulatory requirements for digital payment operators in an effort to track down donors to the prodemocracy opposition movement.²⁴⁵ Operators are required to verify their customers’ identities and transaction records, and to submit such records to the authorities.²⁴⁶ Penalties for opposition supporters are extremely punitive, and several young

women have received 10-year prison terms, in each case for transferring the local equivalent of less than \$10 to an opposition group.[247](#)

C7 0-5 pts

Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or 0 / any other actor in relation to their online activities? 5

The military and its proxies continued to threaten, extort, physically assault, forcibly disappear, torture, and kill online and offline opponents with complete impunity during the coverage period. Many people in Myanmar face extralegal intimidation and violence on a daily basis amid ubiquitous military propaganda, constant surveillance, and physical searches, including of devices.[248](#)

The military has used threats and violence against people who supported online resistance or participated in protests, the CDM, and political opposition groups, especially the NUG itself (see B8).[249](#) The imposition of martial law (see C1) and the threat of capital punishment has an intimidating effect among protesters, strikers, political activists, journalists, and human rights defenders.[250](#)

By May 2024, at least 124 people, including two children,[251](#) had received death sentences from military courts since February 2021. At least four people were executed in July 2022, including[252](#) Kyaw Min Yu, a writer and political activist who was initially arrested for threatening “public tranquility” with social media posts criticizing the military coup.[253](#) Phyo Zeya Thaw, another civil society activist executed that year, was a prodemocracy rapper and NLD parliamentarian with a large following online. Their executions marked the first uses of the death penalty in Myanmar in decades.

At least 5,173 people have been killed in military crackdowns since February 2021, including at least five journalists who worked for or were previously employed by online media outlets.[254](#) In February 2024, the military shot, killed, and hid the body of Myat Thu Tan, an detained online journalist.[255](#)

As of the end of the coverage period, at least 20 civil society workers and activists and over 120 students have been killed since the coup.[256](#) In January 2024, social media influencer Kyaw Zan Wai and former journalist Myat Thu Tun were killed by the military while being held in detention.[257](#) In

March 2023, Thit Sann Oo similarly died in detention; he was arrested in September 2022 for social media posts criticizing the military.²⁵⁸

“Watermelons,” or individuals who outwardly support the military but actually prefer the prodemocracy movement, came under attack during the coverage period. Promilitary users with large followings called for information on “watermelons” and doxed those they accused; such users have also offered bounties for their targets’ deaths.²⁵⁹ The military also collected the social media profiles of all individual soldiers and leveled threats against them for any banned online activity,²⁶⁰ including their VPN-enabled use of Facebook.²⁶¹

Soldiers, nationalists, and other military proxies, such as members of the “Blood Comrades” group, also tracked down social media users who were opposed to the military,²⁶² and issued threats,²⁶³ particularly on Telegram.²⁶⁴ The military has awarded influential promilitary social media users with national commendations for services to combat what it says is disinformation.²⁶⁵

Activists, journalists, human rights defenders, and other dissidents have been regularly doxed since the coup, usually over Telegram, TikTok, and Facebook.²⁶⁶ While men were typically smeared by military proxies as “terrorists,” women faced various forms of sexual intimidation, such as nonconsensual sharing of sexually explicit images—including fabricated images—and calls for offline punishment.²⁶⁷

C8 0-3 pts

Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users 1 / subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? 3

Websites, Facebook accounts, and email services have been subjected to technical attacks in Myanmar, and the military has reportedly attempted to recruit hackers.²⁶⁸

Human rights defenders, journalists, and political activists continued to report regular, often weekly, attempts to hack their devices, email, and social media accounts during the coverage period.²⁶⁹ Several media outlets also claim to have had their Facebook and YouTube accounts hacked since the coup, before later restoring them.²⁷⁰ Prior to the coup, pro-Rohingya and Muslim

activists reported frequent hacking attempts, and online activists noted that Google regularly warned them of “government-backed attackers” attempting to hack their Google accounts.²⁷¹

Advanced spyware has been identified in Myanmar,²⁷² and human rights defenders, journalists, and political activists have reported the presence of spyware on their mobile phones (see C5).²⁷³ Advanced espionage malware, thought to originate in China and be state sponsored,²⁷⁴ has repeatedly been found hidden in widespread Burmese-language fonts that are commonly shared via USB sticks or available for download online, including on the national presidential website as of June 2021.²⁷⁵

Footnotes

- ¹Simon Kemp, “Digital 2024: Myanmar” DataReportal, February 23, 2024, accessed June 2024, <https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2024-myanmar>.
- ²“Digital 2024: Myanmar,” Datareportal, February 27, 2024, <https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2024-myanmar>.
- ³“Establishing Internet Exchange in Myanmar,” Ministry of Transport and Communications, September 7, 2020, <https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/6%20Myanmar%20CLMV-%20Inter...>; Myanmar; “Digital Development Dashboard,” International Telecommunications Union, accessed April 24, 2022, <https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Dashboards/Pages/Digital-Develo...>
- ⁴“Digital 2021: Myanmar,” Datareportal, February 21, 2021, <https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2021-myanmar>.
- ⁵“Sanction Mytel for complicity in the Myanmar military’s crimes!,” Justice for Myanmar, June 14, 2022, <https://www.justiceformyanmar.org/press-releases/sanction-mytel-for-com...>
- ⁶“Myanmar Telecom Operators Country Intelligence Report,” Global Data, October 9, 2023, <https://www.globaldata.com/store/report/myanmar-telecom-operators-marke...>; “Myanmar Telecoms Industry Report - 2023-2030,” Research and Markets, October 2023, <https://www.researchandmarkets.com/reports/5240413/myanmar-telecoms-ind...>; “MPT takes FTTH footprint to half of Myanmar,” Mobile World Live, February 5, 2024, <https://www.mobileworldlive.com/operators/mpt-takes-ftth-footprint-to-h...>

- 7“Myanmar median country speeds 2024,” Ookla, January 1, 2024, [https://www.speedtest.net/global-index/myanmar-\(burma\)](https://www.speedtest.net/global-index/myanmar-(burma)).
- 8“ကချင်ပြည်နယ်မှာ အင်တာနက်လိုင်း ပြတ်တောက်နေ,” Radio Free Asia, November 16, 2023, <https://www.rfa.org/burmese/news/internet-down-kachin-11162023043241.ht...>; “Myanmar Telecoms Industry Report - 2023-2030,” Research and Markets, October 2023, <https://www.researchandmarkets.com/reports/5240413/myanmar-telecoms-ind...>; “Nearly 100 Border Guard Police flee into Bangladesh; US provides non-lethal aid to democratic forces,” DVB, February 6, 2024, <https://english.dvb.no/nearly-100-border-guard-police-flee-into-banglad....>
- 9“Hundreds of telecoms towers downed in Myanmar coup resistance,” Reuters, December 3, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/hundreds-telecoms-towers-dow...>
- 10“Myanmar’s Civilian Government Provides Internet in Rebel-Held Territory,” The Irrawaddy Times English, February 7, 2023, <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmars-civilian-government-provi...>; “Anti-junta forces set up satellite-based internet service in 60 areas,” Radio Free Asia, December 19, 2023, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/myanmar-satellite-internet-121....>
- 11Discussions with digital rights defenders, May 29, 2023.
- 12“Myanmar Junta to Prosecute Satellite Internet Users,” Irrawaddy, November 23, 2024, <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-junta-to-prosecute-satelli...>
- 13“For Myanmar’s generals, energy crisis threatens shaky grip on power,” Al Jazeera, December 11, 2023, <https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2023/12/11/myanmars-generals-face-new....>
- 14“Myanmar Power Shortage Leaves Millions at Mercy of Searing Summer,” Irrawaddy, accessed September 2023, <https://www.irrawaddy.com/features/myanmar-power-shortage-leaves-millio....>
- 15“Public anger grows in Myanmar over junta’s power cuts,” RFA, March 8, 2022, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/power-03082022162906.html>.
- 16Data prices in 2022 were on average 43% more expensive than before the coup in 2021. Prices in 2023 reduced to 27% more expensive than before the coup: “Worldwide mobile data

pricing 2023,” Cable, accessed on March 5, 2024, <https://www.cable.co.uk/mobiles/worldwide-data-pricing/>.

- 17World Bank, “Myanmar’s economic recovery slowed by high prices and shortages”, June 27, 2023, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/06/25/myanmar-s-ec...>
- 18Andrew Heffner, “Myanmar’s internet gets pricier for dissenters, apolitical alike,” Al Jazeera, February 11, 2022, <https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2022/2/11/myanmars-internet-gets-pric...>; “Decline in internet user rates in rural areas after increasing internet data prices”, Burma News International, January 14, 2022, <https://www.bnionline.net/mm/news-87800>
- 19Andrew Heffner, “Myanmar’s internet gets pricier for dissenters, apolitical alike,” Al Jazeera, February 11, 2022, <https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2022/2/11/myanmars-internet-gets-pric....>
- 20The exchange rate used in this report, 2,121.38 kyat to the dollar, is based on the OANDA currency-conversion rate quoted on December 1, 2023. However, since coming into power in February 2021, the military has imposed forced currency-exchange rates, often well below the street rate. In May 2024, at the end of the coverage period, Nikkei reported that the street value of the kyat neared 4,000 to the dollar.
- 21“MPT launches monthly data loans,” Mobile World Live, September 23, 2024, <https://www.mobileworldlive.com/operators/mpt-launches-monthly-data-loa...>
- 22Andrew Heffner, “Myanmar’s internet gets pricier for dissenters, apolitical alike,” Al Jazeera, February 11, 2022, <https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2022/2/11/myanmars-internet-gets-pric....>
- 23Prepaid nonpackaged rates were still at least 10 Kyat per MB in March 2024: <https://ooredoo.com.mm/portal/en/newtarrif>; <https://www.atom.com.mm/en/personal/packages-and-plans/plans#prepaid>
- 24Aung Naing, “Junta says hefty new telecoms taxes will curb ‘extreme use of internet services,’” Myanmar Now, January 8, 2022, <https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/junta-says-hefty-new-telecoms-taxes...>
- 25“Myanmar Junta Raises SIM and Internet Taxes to Silence Opposition,” The Irrawaddy, January 12, 2022, <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-junta-raises-sim-and-inter...>

- 26Khit Thit Media, Facebook post, June 7, 2022, <https://www.facebook.com/khitthitnews/photos/a.386800725090613/15154089...>
- 27Personal discussions with digital rights defenders, March 16, 2022.
- 28The average broadband cost dropped in Yangon from \$72.31 per month in 2017 to \$27 in 2021, see “Compare our best broadband deals,” Cable, [n.d.], <https://www.cable.co.uk/broadband/pricing/worldwide-comparison/>
- 29Atom unlimited fiber 15mbps at 28,000 kyat per month; MPT unlimited fiber 22mbps at 32,000 kyat per month; 5BB unlimited fiber 25mbps at 35,000 kyat per month; Unifi unlimited fiber 15mbps at 32,500 kyat per month; Mytel unlimited fiber 18mbps at 28,000 kyat per month.
- 30Satellite links are used by some opposition forces to coordinate their response to the military. The receivers are both extremely expensive, technically difficult to run, and a serious security risk. The first single satellite receiver was established in June 2023: <https://mizzima.com/article/free-burma-rangers-boss-thanks-elon-musk-br...>
- 31“ICT Development Index 2017 – Myanmar,” International Telecommunications Union (ITU), accessed May 31, 2024, <http://www.itu.int/net4/ITU-D/idi/2017/index.html> - idi2017economytab&MMR.
- 32Discussions with media managers, June 18, 2024.
- 33“Digital 2024: Myanmar,” Datareportal, February 27, 2024, <https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2024-myanmar>; In 2017 only 19 percent of women had internet access, compared with 29 percent of men: “Myanmar, Digital Development Dashboard,” International Telecommunications Union, accessed April 24, 2022, <https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Dashboards/Pages/Digital-Develo....>
- 34“Digital 2022: Myanmar,” Datareportal, March 18, 2022, <https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2022-myanmar>.
- 35Aung Kyaw Nyunt, “Government to collect tax to fund telecoms in rural areas,” Myanmar Times, April 24, 2018, <https://web.archive.org/web/20220121020506/https://www.mmtimes.com/news....>

- 36“A tender acceptance and opening ceremony was held for 9 Phase I townships / cities to be operated by USF program,” Ministry of Transport and Communications, December 6, 2020, <https://perma.cc/H34X-XM54>; “Temporary suspension of Phase II and Phase III tenders submitted by Universal Service Fund,” Ministry of Transport and Communications, March 23, 2021, <https://perma.cc/P34S-5WQW>; “Myanmar diverts special telecoms fund to biometrics database,” Myanmar Times, June 11, 2020, <https://web.archive.org/web/20200629193959/https://www.mmtimes.com/news...>; “Tender announcement to establish SIM Registration Management System,” Post and Telecommunications Department, Ministry of Transport and Communications, October 28, 2022, <https://www.ptd.gov.mm/AnnouncementDetail.aspx?id=3YubGy/sj1HUWe8XbffiF....>
- 37Richard Weir, “Myanmar Military Blocks Internet During Coup,” Human Rights Watch, February 2, 2021, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/02/myanmar-military-blocks-internet-du....>
- 38“Myanmar Junta Cuts Internet Access in Anti-Regime Resistance Strongholds,” The Irrawaddy, September 15, 2021, <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-junta-cuts-internet-access...>
- 39“Internet disruptions in Sagaing region, including Monywa,” DVB Burmese, May 24, 2022, <http://burmese.dvb.no/archives/535099>; “Myanmar Junta Shells Civilians, Cuts Internet as AA Advances in Rakhine,” The Irrawaddy, January 24, 2024, <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-junta-shells-civilians-cut...>; “Arakan Army claims military is losing war; CPJ calls for investigation into death of journalist in Arakan State,” DVB, February 19, 2024, <https://english.dvb.no/arakan-army-claims-military-is-losing-war-cpj-ca...>; “လောက်ကိုင်တွင် ဖုန်းလိုင်းများ ဖြတ်တောက်ထားပြီး တရုတ်နိုင်ငံသားများ ပြန်လာရန် တရုတ်ဘက်က ပြန်လည်ခေါ်ယူ၊ ရွှေ့ပြောင်းအလုပ်သမားများအားလုံး နေရပ်ပြန်မရဘဲ ပိတ်မိနေ,” Khit Thit Media, November 4, 2023, <https://www.facebook.com/khitthitnews/posts/pfbid035NWJ1V5zuVKKdWKp6uSg...>; “ကျောက်ရိတ်၊ ကြာအင်းဆိပ်ကြီးမြို့နယ်ရှိ စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်စခန်းများကို KNU ဦးဆောင်သော မဟာမိတ်တပ်များက တစ်ပြိုင်တည်း ဝင်တိုက်နေ,” Khit Thit Media, November 2, 2023, <https://www.facebook.com/khitthitnews/posts/pfbid02vG9QG37x6TijKxFdNhe7...>; “ကောလင်းမြို့မှာ လေကြောင်း ပစ်ကူနေတဲ့ကြားက စစ်အုပ်စု လက်နက်ချ၊ တချို့ ထွက်ပြေး၊” Mandalay Free Press, November 5, 2023, https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=pfbid02ifdagx2CYz3gSrAcnG...; “ကချင်ပြည်နယ်မှာ အင်တာနက်လိုင်း ပြတ်တောက်နေ,” Radio

Free Asia, November 16, 2023, <https://www.rfa.org/burmese/news/internet-down-kachin-11162023043241.ht...>; “တိုက်ပွဲဖြစ်နေသည့် ကျိုက်မရောမြို့နယ်၌ အင်တာနက်လိုင်း ပြတ်တောက်နေ,” DVB, November 23, 2023, <https://burmese.dvb.no/post/626313>; “ပလက်ဝမြို့နယ်ကို စစ်ကောင်စီက ကုန်းလမ်း၊ ရေလမ်းအပါအဝင် အင်တာနက် နှင့် ဖုန်းလိုင်းများကို ပိတ်ထား,” Ayeyarwady Times, December 1, 2023, <https://www.facebook.com/ayeyarwaddytimes/posts/pfbid0TQifptcPJypDd7CZJ...>; “ဖုန်းလိုင်း ပြတ်တောက်နေတဲ့ မူဆယ် ၁၀၅ မိုင်မှာ သေဆုံးနေတဲ့အလောင်း ၄ လောင်းထက်မနည်း တွေ့ရှိထား၊ အလောင်း ကောက်ယူလို့ မရသေး,” Shwe Phee Myay News Agency, December 2, 2023, <https://www.facebook.com/shwepheemyaynews/posts/pfbid02EzoegVt4hKH6L8W...>; “မုန်းမြို့ စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်ရင်းနှင့် ရဲစခန်း အချို့ကို ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ် သိမ်းပိုက်၊ စစ်ကောင်စီက လျှပ်စစ်မီးနှင့် အင်တာနက် ပြတ်တောက်ထား,” Mizzima, December 3, 2023, <https://www.facebook.com/100067928020493/posts/683619947245600>; “ချင်းပြည်သူ့အချို့ ဆက်သွယ်ရေးအခက်အခဲကြောင့် မိုခါမုန်တိုင်းသတင်းအား မသိရဖြစ်နေ,” May 13, 2023, <https://mpapress.com/သတင်း/20956/>; “Disconnections and vanishing rights,” Athan Myanmar, May, 2023, <https://athanmyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Eng2.1.pdf>

- 40“Myanmar junta cuts off internet access ‘indefinitely’ to resistance stronghold of Sagaing,” Myanmar Now, March 4, 2022, <https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/myanmar-junta-cuts-off-internet-acc...>; “Myanmar Communication Blackout,” Athan Myanmar, January 14, 2024, <https://athanmyanmar.org/myanmar-communication-blackout-2021-to-present/>
- 41“Internet disruptions in Sagaing region, including Monywa,” DVB Burmese, May 24, 2022, <http://burmese.dvb.no/archives/535099>
- 42“O file, Fiber internet lines and MPT Internet lines are slow and intermittent,” News Eleven, August 11, 2022, <https://news-eleven.com/article/235497>
- 43“Myanmar to act against unlicensed use of satellite, radar, and radio equipment,” The Nation Thailand, November 23, 2023, <https://www.nationthailand.com/world/asean/40033165>.
- 44“Myanmar telco auction: the good and the bad,” Financial Times, June 27, 2013, <https://www.ft.com/content/befae5a-22cc-33e3-a8d3-84ce27742dc3>.
- 45“Fourth telco MyTel to start selling SIM cards in March,” Myanmar Times, February 14, 2018, <https://www.mmtimes.com/news/fourth-telco-mytel-start-selling-sim-cards...>; Aung Kyaw Nyunt and Pyae Thet Phyo, “Myanmar’s fourth telco gets licence at last,” Myanmar Times,

January 13, 2017, <https://www.mmtimes.com/business/technology/24533-myanmar-s-fourth-telc....>

- 46“Mytel becomes leading telecom operator in Myanmar after 5 years,” Vietnam Plus, June 13, 2023, <https://en.vietnamplus.vn/mytel-becomes-leading-telecom-operator-in-mya...>; “Mytel loses millions of dollars and subscribers since coup,” Mizzima, November 7, 2021, <https://mizzima.com/article/mytel-loses-millions-dollars-and-subscriber....> Mytel reported revenues of \$2 billion in its first five years of operating: “Mytel becomes leading telecom operator in Myanmar after 5 years,” Vietnam Plus, June 13, 2023, <https://en.vietnamplus.vn/mytel-becomes-leading-telecom-operator-in-mya....>
- 47Fanny Potkin and Poppy Mcpherson, “How Myanmar’s military moved in on the telecoms sector to spy on citizens,” Reuters, May 18, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/how-myanmars-military-moved-....>
- 48“Notice Concerning Provision for Doubtful Receivables in Telecommunications Business in Myanmar,” Sumitomo, April 10, 2024, <https://www.sumitomocorp.com/en/jp/news/release/2024/group/17550>. The Norwegian central bank placed the two Japanese telecommunications companies on its investment "observation list" due to concerns that they may be complicit in military wrongdoing.
- 49“MPT takes FTTH footprint to half of Myanmar,” Mobile World Live, February 5, 2024, <https://www.mobileworldlive.com/operators/mpt-takes-ftth-footprint-to-h....>
- 50“In post-coup Myanmar, telco operators act as the military’s eyes and ears,” Engage Media, July 23, 2023, <https://engagemedia.org/2023/myanmar-telecommunications/>.
- 51Sebastian Strangio, “Qatari Telecoms Firm Ooredoo Negotiating Exit From Myanmar: Report,” The Diplomat, July 21, 2022, <https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/qatari-telecoms-firm-ooredoo-negotiatin....>
- 52Hein Htoo Zan, “Military Crony Linked to New Ownership of Ooredoo’s Myanmar Unit”, Irrawaddy, September 12, 2022, <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/military-crony-linked-to-new-owner...>; “Robust Revenue increase of 2% for 9M 2023 - Strong normalized Free Cash Flow growth of 8% to QAR 5.7 billion,” Ooredoo, October 30, 2023, https://www.ooredoo.com/en/media/news_view/robust-revenue-increase-of-2...; Fanny Potkin, “EXCLUSIVE Qatar telecoms firm Ooredoo in talks to sell its Myanmar unit – sources,”

Reuters, July 20, 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/markets/deals/exclusive-qatar-telecoms-firm-oor...>; "Ooredoo Myanmar reports 8% growth in revenue in 2021," Myanmar Business Today, March, 4, 2022, <https://mmbiztoday.com/ooredoo-myanmar-reports-8-growth-in-revenue-in-2....>

- 53The minority partner was Lebanese company, M1 Global: Victoria Klesty, "Telenor quits Myanmar with \$105 mln sale to Lebanon's M1 Group," Reuters, July 8, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/telenor-sells-myanmar-op...> ; Aung Naing, "The crony who will control Telenor Myanmar's customer data," Myanmar Now, March 4, 2022, <https://web.archive.org/web/20221125063825/https://www.myanmar-now.org/....> Morgan Meaker, "Myanmar's Fight for Democracy Is Now a Scrap Over Phone Records," February 8, 2022, <https://www.wired.com/story/telenor-myanmar-phone-records/>; "It's not over until it's over: sanctions must stop Telenor's sale to the Myanmar military," Access Now, March 18, 2022, <https://www.accessnow.org/sanctions-telenor-sale-to-myanmar-military/>. Number of subscribers: "Setting the Pace, Conquering the Race: First Year Triumph! Interview with CEO of ATOM," Myanmar Insider, July 18, 2023, <https://www.myanmarinsider.com/setting-the-pace-conquering-the-race-fir...>
- 54"Additional sanctions for Myanmar," Government of Canada, October 31, 2023, <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2023/10/backgrounder-addit....>
- 55"Treasury Sanctions Military Cronies and Companies in Burma Three Years after Military Coup," U.S. Department of the Treasury, January 31, 2024, <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2067>.
- 56"ရွှေမျိုင်းဖြူပိတ်ဆို့အရေးယူခံရပြီးနောက် ATOM Myanmar ပိုင်ဆိုင်မှု ပဟောပြုဖြစ်နေ," Myanmar Now, February 28, 2024, <https://myanmar-now.org/mm/news/49684/>
- 57"အခက်တွေ့နေသည့် မလေးရှား ဆက်သွယ်ရေးကုမ္ပဏီ မြန်မာမှ ထွက်မည်," Myanmar Now, April 4, 2024, <https://myanmar-now.org/mm/news/50820/>
- 58Discussions with participants at the Myanmar Digital Rights Forum in Yangon on January 18, 2019.
- 59Chester Toh and Jainil Bhandari, "Myanmar: The Legal Landscape," Getting the Deal Through, November 2018, <https://gettingthedealthrough.com/country-focus/article/6460/myanmar-le...>; "History of the Ministry of Transport and Communications," Ministry of Transport and

Communications, March 20, 2023, <https://www.motc.gov.mm/my/ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်-ပို့ဆောင်ရ...>

- ⁶⁰Telenor's request was for permission to sell. However, the regulator's response was to require Telenor to sell to the military's preferred buyer.
- ⁶¹"ပို့ဆောင်ရေးနှင့်ဆက်သွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၏ လုပ်ငန်းညှိနှိုင်းအစည်းအဝေး အမှတ်စဉ် (၂/၂၀၂၁) ကျင်းပ, [Coordination Meeting No. (2/2021) of the Ministry of Transport and Communications was held]," Ministry of Transport and Communications, June 3, 2021, <https://perma.cc/QK54-37Q4>
- ⁶²Namali Premawardhana, "Myanmar forges ahead in ICT," Myanmar Times, December 18, 2017, <https://www.mmtimes.com/news/myanmar-forges-ahead-ict.html>.
- ⁶³Namali Premawardhana, "Myanmar forges ahead in ICT," Myanmar Times, December 18, 2017, <https://www.mmtimes.com/news/myanmar-forges-ahead-ict.html>.
- ⁶⁴Discussions with experts at the Myanmar Digital Rights Forum on January 18, 2019.
- ⁶⁵"Myanmar's embattled military government cracks down on free flow of news by blocking VPNs," AP, June 15, 2024, <https://apnews.com/article/myanmar-censorship-virtual-private-network-f...>
- ⁶⁶"Myanmar Junta Restricts More Mobile Apps, Residents Say," Radio Free Asia, July 23, 2024, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/google-signal-blocked-myanmar-....>
- ⁶⁷"The Myanmar Junta's Partners in Digital Surveillance and Censorship," Justice for Myanmar, June 19, 2024, <https://www.justiceformyanmar.org/stories/the-myanmar-juntas-partners-i....>
- ⁶⁸"Activists accuse 2 Chinese companies of helping junta control the internet," Radio Free Asia, June 24, 2024, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/china-helping-junta-to-control....>
- ⁶⁹"Junta issues daily directives to further block internet access, telecoms providers say," Myanmar Now, March 20, 2021, <https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/junta-issues-daily-directives-to-fu...>; "Myanmar Junta Blocks Facebook, VPNs as The UN Security Council Voices 'Deep Concern'," Radio Free Asia, February 2, 2021, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/facebook-blocked-0204202114010....>
- ⁷⁰Ramakrishna Padmanabhan et al, "A multi-perspective view of Internet censorship in Myanmar," Association for Computing Machinery, August 23,

2021, <https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3473604.3474562>.

- 71 Discussions with media managers on June 19, 2024.
- 72 Discussions with digital rights defenders, March 16, 2022.
- 73 "Whitelisted internet takes Myanmar back to a 'dark age'," Frontier Myanmar, June 30, 2021, <https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/whitelisted-internet-takes-myanmar-b...>
- 74 "A multi-perspective view of Internet censorship in Myanmar," Association for Computing Machinery, August 23, 2021, <https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3473604.3474562>.
- 75 "Whitelisted internet takes Myanmar back to a 'dark age'," Frontier Myanmar, June 30, 2021, <https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/whitelisted-internet-takes-myanmar-b...>
- 76 "Myanmar's Military Blocks Access To Facebook After Overthrowing Government," Forbes, February 4, 2021, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/roberthart/2021/02/04/myanmars-military-bl...>; "Directive to block social media service," Telenor Group, February 3, 2021, <https://www.telenor.com/directive-to-block-social-media-service/>; "Myanmar junta blocks Facebook, clamping down on opposition to coup," Reuters, February 3, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/article/myanmar-politics-int/myanmar-junta-bloc...>
- 77 "Directive to block social media services Twitter and Instagram in Myanmar," Telenor Group, February 5, 2021, <https://www.telenor.com/directive-to-block-social-media-services-twitte...>
- 78 "Myanmar's digital regime foreshadows SE Asia," Bangkok Post, March 15, 2021, <https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/2083615/myanmars-digital-re...>
- 79 "Myanmar allows Tinder but axes dissent havens Twitter, Facebook," NIKKEI Asia, May 25, 2021, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Myanmar-Coup/Myanmar-allows-Tinder-bu...>; Free Expression Myanmar @FreeExpressMm, "Whitelisting update for #Myanmar. Rolling out today (25 May): @Instagram =  @Viber =  @WhatsApp =  BUT @Facebook =  #WhatsHappeningInMyanmar #KeepItOn #LetTheNetWork," May 24, 2021, <https://twitter.com/FreeExpressMm/status/1396881429586354178>.
- 80 "Myanmar allows Tinder but axes dissent havens Twitter, Facebook," NIKKEI Asia, May 25, 2021, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Myanmar-Crisis/Myanmar-allows-Tinder-....>
- 81 Discussions with digital rights defenders, March 16, 2022.

- ⁸²Directives from authorities in Myanmar – February-August 2021,” Telenor Group, last updated July 28, 2021, <https://web.archive.org/web/20211221011637/https://www.telenor.com/sust...> ; “Myanmar: Immediately lift ban on ethnic news websites,” ecoinet, accessed on September 18, 2021, <https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2027659.html>.
- ⁸³“Myanmar’s Military Blocks Access To Facebook After Overthrowing Government,” Forbes, February 4, 2021, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/roberthart/2021/02/04/myanmars-military-bl...>; “Directive to block social media service,” Telenor Group, February 3, 2021, <https://www.telenor.com/directive-to-block-social-media-service/>; “Myanmar junta blocks Facebook, clamping down on opposition to coup,” Reuters, February 3, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/article/myanmar-politics-int/myanmar-junta-bloc...>
- ⁸⁴See “Myanmar,” Open Observatory of Network Interference, accessed May 31, 2024, <https://explorer.ooni.org/country/MM>.
- ⁸⁵Ramakrishna Padmanabhan et al, “A multi-perspective view of Internet censorship in Myanmar,” Association for Computing Machinery, August 23, 2021, <https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3473604.3474562>.
- ⁸⁶Tests carried out on March 16, 2022.
- ⁸⁷Ramon Solabarrieta, Facebook post, <https://www.facebook.com/ramon.solabarrieta/videos/1024744474784118/>.
- ⁸⁸Discussions with digital rights defenders, March 16, 2022.
- ⁸⁹Thompson Chau, “After a year of reporting on Myanmar’s military coup, I knew my luck would eventually run out,” The Guardian, March 9, 2022, <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/commentisfree/2022/mar/0...>
- ⁹⁰“Home,” Eleven Media Group, accessed May 31, 2024, <https://elevenmyanmar.com/>.
- ⁹¹“Amended law throws Myanmar back into the media dark age,” Myanmar Now, <https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/amended-law-throws-myanmar-back-into-me...>; “Myanmar: Military tightens media restrictions, targets journalists,” The International Federation of Journalists, February 17, 2021, <https://www.ifj.org/media-centre/news/detail/category/health-and-safety...> See also <https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/myanmar-junta-accuses-fo...>

- 92“Myanmar becomes a nation without newspapers,” Myanmar Now, March 18, 2021, <https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/myanmar-becomes-a-nation-without-ne....>
- 93See <http://7daydaily.com>
- 94“Two Australians detained by Myanmar junta while trying to leave country,” The Guardian, March 21, 2021, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/22/two-australians-detained-....>
- 95“Myanmar: Social media companies must stand up to junta’s online terror campaign, say UN experts”, OHCHR, March 13, 2023, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/03/myanmar-social-media-co....>
- 96Kevin Roose and Paul Mozur, “Zuckerberg Was Called Out Over Myanmar Violence. Here’s His Apology.,” April 9, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/09/business/facebook-myanmar-zuckerberg....>
- 97Many media outlets report that Meta frequently removes their posts under its Community Standards. Discussions with media freedom defenders, June 1, 2023.
- 98Laure Siegel, “In Myanmar, journalists raise media voices against the bloody coup,” IPI, February 15, 2023, <https://ipi.media/myanmar-journalists-raise-voices/>
- 99“Watermelon suppression: doxing campaign targets pro-democracy soldiers and police,” March 14, 2022, Frontier Myanmar, <https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/watermelon-suppression-doxing-campai....>
- 100“The MoTC cites legal basis in Myanmar’s Telecommunications Law, and references circulation of fake news, stability of the nation and interest of the public as basis for the order,” from: “Data network restored in Myanmar,” Telenor Group, February 6, 2021, <https://www.telenor.com/media/press-release/myanmar-authorities-orders-...>; see also “Myanmar citizens oppose military takeover on social media,” Nikkei Asia, February 4, 2022, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Myanmar-Crisis/Myanmar-citizens-oppos...>; Kin Yi Yi Zaw, “Myanmar junta cuts off internet access ‘indefinitely’ to resistance stronghold of Sagaing,” Myanmar Now, March 4, 2022, <https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/myanmar-junta-cuts-off-internet-acc....>
- 101Free Expression Myanmar, “Official Secrets Act”, February 27, 2017, <https://freeexpressionmyanmar.org/official-secrets-act/>.

- 102“Directives from authorities in Myanmar – February-August 2021,” Telenor Group, September 15, 2021, <https://web.archive.org/web/20220614072628/https://www.telenor.com/sust...>
- 103“Directives from authorities in Myanmar – February-August 2021,” Telenor Group, last updated July 28, 2021, <https://web.archive.org/web/20220614072628/https://www.telenor.com/sust...>
- 104“Telecommunications Law – Law. No. 31/2013,” Free Expression Myanmar, October 8, 2013, <http://freeexpressionmyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/telecommuni...>
- 105“Moi implements measures to regulate televised movie broadcasting,” Global New Light of Myanmar, March 29, 2024, <https://www.gnlm.com.mm/moi-implements-measures-to-regulate-televised-m...>; “Information Ministry issues warning on broadcasting movies contrary to Myanmar culture,” Global New Light of Myanmar, April 1, 2024, <https://www.gnlm.com.mm/information-ministry-issues-warning-on-broadcas...>
- 106“Military’s cyber security bill worse than their previous draft,” Free Expression Myanmar, January 27, 2022, <https://freeexpressionmyanmar.org/militarys-cyber-security-bill-worse-t...>; “GNI Calls for Withdrawal of Draft Cybersecurity Law in Myanmar,” Global Network Initiative, January 31, 2022, <https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/cybersecurity-law-mm-2022/>.
- 107“Community Standards Enforcement Report,” Facebook Transparency Center, accessed May 31, 2024, <https://transparency.fb.com/data/community-standards-enforcement/>; Rafael Frankel, “An Update on the Situation in Myanmar,” Meta, February 11, 2021, <https://about.fb.com/news/2021/02/an-update-on-myanmar/>.
- 108Andrew Nachemson, “Channelling hate and disinformation: Myanmar’s bad actors move to Telegram,” Frontier Myanmar, September 15, 2021, <https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/channelling-hate-and-disinformation-....>
- 109Discussions with digital rights defenders, March 16, 2022.
- 110Personal monitoring of Facebook accounts since the coup, 23 March 2021.
- 111Removals are due to platform over-moderation. “Facebook Bans Racist Word ‘Kalar’ in Myanmar, Triggers Collateral Censorship,” Global Voices, June 2, 2017, <https://advox.globalvoices.org/2017/06/02/facebook-bans-racist-word-kal...>

- 112“Checkpoints // Myanmar Map of Lawlessness,” Visual Rebellion, December 20, 2023, <https://visualrebellion.org/timeline/myanmar-map-checkpoints/>; “Myanmar Junta Steps Up Efforts to Monitor, Silence Perceived Online Critics,” The Irrawaddy, June 14, 2023, <https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/analysis/myanmar-junta-steps-up-effor....>
- 113“Myanmar journalists 'harassed' for reporting on Rohingya crisis,” Al Jazeera, October 16, 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/myanmar-journalists-harassed-rep....>
- 114Julia Carrie Wong, Michael Safi, and Shaikh Azizur Rahman, “Facebook bans Rohingya group's posts as minority faces 'ethnic cleansing',” The Guardian, September 20, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/sep/20/facebook-rohingya-mu....>
- 115“Myanmar bans Radio Free Asia for using the term “Rohingyas”,” Reporters Without Borders, June 12, 2018, <https://rsf.org/en/news/myanmar-bans-radio-free-asia-using-term-rohingy....> The term “Bengalis” was used in a discriminatory attempt to link the Rohingya to Bangladesh and deny their basic rights in Myanmar. Since the coup, more Myanmar users have actively spoken out about the Rohingya, in some cases apologizing for not believing past atrocity allegations in the light of the military's recent violence against civilians protesting its seizure of power: Verena Hölzl, “Myanmar Coup Protesters Regret Silence Over Rohingya Genocide,” Vice, February 25, 2021, <https://www.vice.com/en/article/v7m898/myanmar-coup-protesters-regret-s...>
- 116“Daring to defy Myanmar's Patriarchy,” Free Expression Myanmar, 2018, <http://freeexpressionmyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/daring-to-d....>
- 117Naw Betty Han @NawBettyHan, "Military media, MWD broadcasted this photo last night that the protestors was burning and destroying on March 30. But the photo's Watermark showed that it was taken on February 4. Does it mean that Coup Council is lying in their owed Media? #WhatsHappeningInMyanmar," Twitter, March 31, 2021, <https://twitter.com/nawbettyhan/status/1377120708409520133>; @MyanmarIPC, “Our first act as the #Myanmar Independent Press Council was to takedown the Ministry of Information @Myanmar_MOI Twitter account which had been publishing this disinformation and threats of violence by the State media.,” Twitter, March 21, 2021, <https://twitter.com/MyanmarIPC/status/1373492061576527872>.
- 118Peter Guest, “How misinformation fueled a coup in Myanmar,” Rest of World, February 2, 2021, <https://restofworld.org/2021/how-misinformation-fueled-a-coup-in-myanma....>

- 119 "Signals Corps helps resume communications whenever the country faces state of emergency," Ministry of Information, February 6, 2024, <https://www.moi.gov.mm/moi:eng/news/12988>.
- 120 Fanny Potkin and Wa Lone, "'Information combat': Inside the fight for Myanmar's soul," Reuters, November 2, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/information-combat-inside-fi....>
- 121 "Ministry of Information, Myanmar," Facebook, accessed on September 19, 2021, <https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=189150611199427>; @myanmar_moi, Twitter, accessed September 19, 2021, https://twitter.com/myanmar_moi; both were suspended on March 21, 2021. "Myanmar coup: YouTube removes channels run by army amid violence," BBC News, March 5, 2021, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-56282401>. "An Update on the Situation in Myanmar," Facebook Newsroom, February 11, 2021, <https://about.fb.com/news/2021/02/an-update-on-myanmar/>.
- 122 "Myanmar Junta Adds Russia's 'Firehose of Propaganda' to its Arsenal," Irrawaddy, September 7, 2023, <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/myanmars-crisis-the-world/myanmar-junta-...>
- 123 "Ministries and experts cooperate to create a new social media platform to replace Facebook: SAC", Eleven Media Co., August 18, 2022 <https://elevenmyanmar.com/news/ministries-and-experts-cooperate-to-crea....> Article 4.4.g of OKPar terms and conditions: <https://www.okpar.com/agreement.html>.
- 124 "MYANMAR'S OFFICIAL SOCIAL APPLICATION OKPAR – FLAWED PRIVACY BY DESIGN?," Qurium, May 4, 2021, <https://www.qurium.org/alerts/myanmars-official-social-application-okpa....>
- 125 "MySpace Myanmar taken down from Google App store," DVB, June 7, 2024, <https://english.dvb.no/national-unity-government-visits-australia-forei...>; Allegra Mendelson, "Cat and mouse: Myanmar netizens find cracks in draconian VPN ban," Frontier Myanmar, August 6, 2024, <https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/cat-and-mouse-myanmar-netizens-find-....>
- 126 "Online Terrorization: An Examination of the Myanmar Junta's Propaganda Tactics," The Red Flag in collaboration with Beautifiers of Diversity Network, December

2023, <https://theredflagmedia.com/online-terrorization/>

- 127 State media newspapers can be found at <https://www.burmalibrary.org/en/category/myanmar-alin-2024> and individual stories at <https://www.moi.gov.mm>; "Online Terrorization: An Examination of the Myanmar Junta's Propaganda Tactics," The Red Flag in collaboration with Beautifiers of Diversity Network, December 2023, <https://theredflagmedia.com/online-terrorization/>
- 128 "Military Propaganda Facebook Pages; Join Telegram groups; Internal order to share," Khit Thit Media, November 5, 2022, <https://www.facebook.com/385165108587508/posts/1644254976011842>.
- 129 "Online Terrorization: An Examination of the Myanmar Junta's Propaganda Tactics," The Red Flag in collaboration with Beautifiers of Diversity Network, December 2023, <https://theredflagmedia.com/online-terrorization/>; Other channels with followings between 40,000 to 100,000 include Ko Thet, Banyunt, Thazin Oo, And Sergeant Phoe Si: "Online Terrorization: An Examination of the Myanmar Junta's Propaganda Tactics," The Red Flag in collaboration with Beautifiers of Diversity Network, December 2023, <https://theredflagmedia.com/online-terrorization/>
- 130 "Digital Battlegrounds: Politically motivated abuse of Myanmar women online," Myanmar Witness, January 25, 2023, <https://www.myanmarwitness.org/reports/digital-battlegrounds>.
- 131 Andrew Nachemson and Frontier Myanmar staff, "'Watermelon suppression': doxing campaign targets pro-democracy soldiers and police," Frontier Myanmar, March 14, 2022, <https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/watermelon-suppression-doxing-campai...>
- 132 "Algorithm of harm: Facebook amplified Myanmar military propaganda following coup," Global Witness, June 23, 2021, <https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/digital-threats/algorithm-ha...>
- 133 "Hate speech in Myanmar continues to thrive on Facebook," Associated Press, November 18, 2021, <https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/hate-speech-myanmar-continues-th...> See also "Algorithm of harm: Facebook amplified Myanmar military propaganda following coup," Global Witness, June 23, 2021, <https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/digital-threats/algorithm-ha...>

- ¹³⁴Eleven Media is the only large independent media outlet still operating as of March 2022. Some large outlets, such as the Myanmar Times, closed themselves before being shut down. "Myanmar Military Strips Five Media Companies of Licenses," Voice of America, March 8, 2021, <https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/myanmar-military-strips-five-...>; "IN NUMBERS: Arrests of Journalists and Media Staff in Myanmar," Reporting Asean, accessed on September 18, 2021, <https://www.reportingasean.net/in-numbers-arrests-of-myanmar-journalist-...>; List of media outlets whose licenses have been revoked," Myanmar Election Watch, December 2023, <https://myanmarelectionwatch.org/en/news/list-media-outlets-myanmar-lic....>
- ¹³⁵"Myanmar: Junta Tribunals Impose 65 Death Sentences," Human Rights Watch, July 21, 2021, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/07/21/myanmar-junta-tribunals-impose-65-d...>
- ¹³⁶Rebecca Ratcliffe, "Myanmar: second NLD official dies in custody as junta cracks down on media," The Guardian, March 9, 2021, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/08/myanmar-un-chief-urges-re....>
- ¹³⁷AFP, "US journalist held in Myanmar charged with terrorism and sedition," The Guardian, November 10, 2021, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/10/danny-fenster-us-journali...>; Lorcan Lovett, "'The darkest days are coming': Myanmar's journalists suffer at hands of junta," The Guardian, June 7, 2021, <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/jun/07/the-darkest-....>
- ¹³⁸"List of media outlets whose licenses have been revoked," Myanmar Election Watch, December 2023, <https://myanmarelectionwatch.org/en/news/list-media-outlets-myanmar-lic....>
- ¹³⁹"Criminal media laws return, internet threatened," Free Expression Myanmar, November 3, 2021, . <https://freeexpressionmyanmar.org/criminal-media-laws-return-internet-t....>
- ¹⁴⁰Independent Media Rebuilds Inside and Outside Myanmar After Violent Coup," Global Investigative Journalism Network, March 14, 2023, <https://gijn.org/stories/independent-media-press-freedom-myanmar-coup-a...>
- ¹⁴¹Asian Development Bank, "Ooredoo Myanmar Limited Nationwide Telecommunications Project (Myanmar)," December 2020, <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-documents/49116/49116-0....>

- ¹⁴²Personal communications with media editors, February 18, 2024. See also: “Independent Media Rebuilds Inside and Outside Myanmar After Violent Coup,” Global Investigative Journalism Network, March 14, 2023, <https://gijn.org/stories/independent-media-press-freedom-myanmar-coup-a....>
- ¹⁴³Liam Scott, “Myanmar junta's VPN block poses 'major threat,' say analysts,” Voice of America, July 5, 2024, <https://www.voanews.com/a/myanmar-junta-s-vpn-block-poses-major-threat-....>
- ¹⁴⁴Fanny Potkin and Jesse Pang, “Offline message app downloaded over million times after Myanmar coup,” Reuters, February 2, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-politics-bridgefy-idUSKBN2A2....>
- ¹⁴⁵Ole Tangen Jr, “The battle for Myanmar plays out on Twitter, TikTok and Telegram,” DW, April 20, 2021, <https://www.dw.com/en/the-battle-for-myanmar-plays-out-on-twitter-tikto....>
- ¹⁴⁶“News is life and death to us,” International Media Support, December 2022, <https://www.mediasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Myanmar-News-is...>; One large media development program supporting Myanmar’s exiled media outlets has commissioned unpublished studies assessing the extent to which health and other issues have been covered by media since the coup.
- ¹⁴⁷“2021.03.11 Myanmar’s media, after the coup: Reporting under fire,” YouTube, March 11, 2021, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8xVdya8Qdn0>.
- ¹⁴⁸“Bearing witness: The volunteers bringing news from the front line,” Frontier Myanmar, September 29, 2022, <https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/bearing-witness-the-volunteers-bring....>
- ¹⁴⁹“Recommendations to protect mass movements submitted to UN,” Free Expression Myanmar, June 13, 2022, <https://freeexpressionmyanmar.org/recommendations-to-protect-mass-movem....>
- ¹⁵⁰For more information including a daily tally and specific cases see: What’s happening in Myanmar,” Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, <https://coup.aappb.org>.
- ¹⁵¹John Liu, “CSOs after the coup: Operations squeezed, funding crunched,” Frontier Myanmar, September 28, 2021, <https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/csos-after-the-coup-operations-squee....>

- 152Discussions with digital rights defenders, March 16, 2022; Rebecca Ratcliffe, “Ex-UK ambassador and her husband jailed for a year in Myanmar, reports say,” The Guardian, September 2, 2022, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/02/ex-uk-ambassador-husband-...>; “Statement by the Board of Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business,” Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business, December 10, 2022, <https://www.myanmar-responsiblebusiness.org/news/closure-yangon-branch...>
- 153“Blood Money,” Facebook Page, accessed May 31, 2024, <https://www.facebook.com/BloodMoneyCampaignMM/>.
- 154Oliver Spencer, “Assessing potential impact of the new association law and FATF blacklisting on Myanmar media,” The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, <https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/ICNL-ARL-FATF-Media-Impact-Anal...>
- 155“Myanmar at standstill as silent strike marks third anniversary of coup ,” The Guardian, February 1, 2024, <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/feb/01/streets-of-m....>
- 156“After coup, medical workers spearhead civil disobedience campaign,” Frontier Myanmar, February 2, 2021, <https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/after-coup-medical-workers-spearhead...>
- 157“How has Myanmar’s military stalled collapse from CDM-inflicted damage?” Teacircle, January 17, 2023: <https://teacircleoxford.com/politics/how-has-myanmars-military-stalled-...>; “Anti-junta teachers still 130,000-strong,” Radio Free Asia, October 5, 2023, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/cdm-10052023163027.html>.
- 158“Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw,” CRPH Myanmar, accessed May 31, 2024, <https://www.crphmyanmar.org>.
- 159See “Government of the Public of the Union of Myanmar,” NUG Myanmar, accessed May 31, 2024, <https://www.nugmyanmar.org>.
- 160Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008) Article 354. Article 365 includes a similar broad and vague limitation.
- 161“Myanmar junta extends state of emergency by six months,” Dhaka Tribune, July 31, 2024, <https://www.dhakatribune.com/world/asia/353219/myanmar-junta-extends-st...>

- 162“Statement by Myanmar civil society organisations on the unconstitutionality of new ‘laws’,” Free Expression Myanmar, February 19, 2021, <https://freeexpressionmyanmar.org/statement-by-myanmar-civil-society-or....> "Myanmar junta extends state of emergency, forcing delay to elections", The Guardian, July 31, 2023, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/31/myanmar-junta-extends-sta....>
- 163Melissa Crouch, "Did the Myanmar Coup Install an Illegitimate President?," The Diplomat March 11, 2021, <https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/did-the-myanmar-coup-install-an-illegit....>
- 164“Myanmar: A year after military takeover, no rule of law or judicial independence,” ICJ, February 10, 2022, <https://www.icj.org/myanmar-a-year-after-military-takeover-no-rule-of-l....>
- 165Melissa Crouch, “Open letter to Association of Asian Constitutional Courts on Myanmar,” Personal blog, June 4, 2021, <https://melissacrouch.com/2021/06/04/open-letter-to-association-of-asia....>
- 166Sebastian Strangio, “Myanmar Coup Opponents Announce ‘Unity Government’, Interim Constitution,” The Diplomat, April 1, 2021, <https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/myanmar-coup-opponents-announce-unity-g....>
- 167The author has conducted an analysis of the Charter with a closed circulation, identifying the missing rights.
- 168“Number of Townships Placed Under Martial Law by Myanmar Junta Rises to 61,” The Irrawaddy, March 5, 2024, <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/number-of-townships-placed-under-m....>
- 169“Myanmar: Junta Tribunals Impose 65 Death Sentences,” Human Rights Watch, July 21, 2021, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/07/21/myanmar-junta-tribunals-impose-65-d....>
- 170“Order Number 246/2023,” State Administrative Council, December 15, 2023; “Committee formed to take action against posting pornographic materials and fake news to social network,” CNI, January 22, 2024, <https://cnimyanmar.com/index.php/english-edition/19897-committee-formed....>
- 171Six risks from Myanmar’s draft Cyber Security Law,” Free Expression Myanmar, February 14, 2021, <https://freeexpressionmyanmar.org/six-risks-from-myanmars-draft-cyber-s....>

- 172“Six risks from Myanmar’s draft Cyber Security Law,” Free Expression Myanmar, February 14, 2021, <https://freeexpressionmyanmar.org/six-risks-from-myanmars-draft-cyber-s...>; “GNI Calls for Withdrawal of Draft Cybersecurity Law in Myanmar,” Global Network Initiative, January 31, 2022, <https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/cybersecurity-law-mm-2022/>.
- 173“GNI Calls for Withdrawal of Draft Cybersecurity Law in Myanmar,” Global Network Initiative, January 31, 2022, <https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/cybersecurity-law-mm-2022/>.
- 174“Myanmar’s new Electronic Transactions Law Amendment,” Free Expression Myanmar, February 18, 2021, <https://freeexpressionmyanmar.org/myanmars-new-electronic-transactions-....>
- 175“Myanmar’s new Electronic Transactions Law Amendment,” Free Expression Myanmar, February 18, 2021, <https://freeexpressionmyanmar.org/myanmars-new-electronic-transactions-....>
- 176Other problematic provisions in the Telecommunications Law (2013) include Articles 4, 5-8, 18, 40, 68, and 75-77, see “Telecommunications Law,” Free Expression Myanmar, October 8, 2013, <http://freeexpressionmyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/telecommuni....>
- 177“Myanmar: Penal Code amendments portend long-term repression,” Article 19, February 15, 2021, <https://www.article19.org/resources/myanmar-penal-code-amendments-porte...>; “Myanmar Ruling Council Amends Treason, Sedition Laws to Protect Coup Makers”, The Irrawaddy, February 16, 2021, <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-ruling-council-amends-trea....>
- 178“Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Law No. 3/2019 - Trademark Law,” Myanmar Law Library, 2019, <https://perma.cc/58F4-3NWU>; “Myanmar Passes Long-Awaited Trademark Law,” Tilleke & Gibbins, February 1, 2019, <https://www.tilleke.com/resources/myanmar-passes-long-awaited-trademark...>; Sher Hann Chua and Khin Myo Myo Aye, “Myanmar Enacts Copyright Law,” Lexology, May 24, 2019, <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=89cfb0ea-acf2-4c3a-aea0-....>
- 179Yuwadee Thean-ngarm, Sher Hann Chua and Nwe Oo, “Myanmar Passes Patent Law,” Lexology, March 14, 2019, <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=37278f03-6667-47c9-a531-....>

- 180“Hate speech Directive threatens free expression in election countdown,” Free Expression Myanmar, April 22, 2020, <http://freeexpressionmyanmar.org/hate-speech-directive-threatens-free-e....>
- 181“Hate speech” committee threatens more censorship,” Free Expression Myanmar, July 16, 2021, <https://freeexpressionmyanmar.org/hate-speech-committee-threatens-more-....>
- 182“505A Act of Revenge: Review of Myanmar Coup Speech ‘Crimes,’” Free Expression Myanmar, January 31, 2022, <https://freeexpressionmyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/505a-act-o....>
- 183“What’s Happening in Myanmar,” Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, Accessed May 31, 2024, <https://coup.aappb.org/>.
- 184“What’s Happening in Myanmar,” Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, Accessed May 31, 2024, <https://coup.aappb.org/>.
- 185“Sentences,” Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, Accessed May 31, 2024, bit.ly/3WP0sla.
- 186“Report: 1,500 arrested in Myanmar since 2022 in social media crackdown,” Radio Free Asia, February 22, 2024, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/social-media-arrests-022220241....>
- 187“505A Act of Revenge: Review of Myanmar Coup Speech ‘Crimes,’” Free Expression Myanmar, January 31, 2022, <https://freeexpressionmyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/505a-act-o....>
- 188“Myanmar military’s justice system,” Free Expression Myanmar, July 13, 2023, <https://freeexpressionmyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/myanmar-mi....>
- 189“505A Act of Revenge: Review of Myanmar Coup Speech ‘Crimes,’” Free Expression Myanmar, January 31, 2022, <https://freeexpressionmyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/505a-act-o....>
- 190“Military declares mandatory conscription law; India ends Free Movement Regime,” DVB, February 12, 2024, <https://english.dvb.no/military-declares-mandatory-conscription-law-ind....>

- 191“Myanmar regime arrests 70-year-old woman, daughters over online comment,” Myanmar Now, August 15, 2023, <https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/myanmar-regime-arrests-70-year-old-woma....>
- 192“Myanmar regime arrests 70-year-old woman, daughters over online comment,” Myanmar Now, August 15, 2023, <https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/myanmar-regime-arrests-70-year-old-woma....>
- 193Nway Nway Eain, “ Junta forces in Yangon detain and interrogate journalist’s 7-year-old daughter,” Myanmar Now, November 24, 2021, <https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/junta-forces-in-yangon-detain-and-inter....>
- 194“Journalist detentions in Myanmar, 2021-24,” International Center for Not-for-profit Law, March, 2024, <https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/Myanmar-journalists-report.pdf>.
- 195“Myanmar reporter gets additional ten-year sentence for covering protest,” RSF, May 20, 2023: <https://rsf.org/en/myanmar-reporter-gets-additional-ten-year-sentence-c....>
- 196“Myanmar court jails photojournalist for 20 years,” Reuters, September 6, 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmar-court-jails-photojou....>
- 197“Former Myanmar Doctor sentenced to six years for posting photos to Only Fans website,” Mishima, September 30, 2022, <https://www.mizzima.com/article/former-myanmar-doctor-sentenced-six-yea....>
- 198“A Burmese hip-hop artist is jailed for 20 years for criticizing Myanmar’s military leaders,” AP, August 24, 2023, <https://apnews.com/article/myanmar-hiphop-jailed-byu-har-min-oat-ac3e48....>
- 199“Nearly 1,000 NLD-affiliated properties seized by Myanmar’s junta since coup,” RFA, May 23, 2023: <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/seizures-05232023163954.html>.
- 200“Myanmar Junta Seizes Anti-Regime Celebrity and Journalist Homes,” the Irrawaddy, February 16, 2022, <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-junta-seizes-anti-regime-c....>
- 201Discussions with digital rights defenders, March 16, 2022.
- 202“မြန်မာပြည်တွင်းတွင် VPN များ ချိတ်ဆက်မရတော့ဘဲ လူမှုကွန်ရက် Facebook စာမျက်နှာနှင့် မက်ဆင်ဂျာများ သုံးစွဲမရ ဖြစ်နေ,” Khit Thit Media, May 31, 2024, <https://yktnews.com/2024/05/165124/>; Grant

Peck, "Myanmar's embattled military government cracks down on free flow of news by blocking VPNs," AP News, June 14, 2024, <https://apnews.com/article/myanmar-censorship-virtual-private-network-f...>; Liam Scott, "Myanmar junta's VPN block poses 'major threat,' say analysts," Voice of America, July 5, 2024, <https://www.voanews.com/a/myanmar-junta-s-vpn-block-poses-major-threat-....>

- 203 Golda Benjamin, "Worse than China or Iran? Myanmar's dangerous VPN ban," Access Now, June 26, 2024, <https://www.accessnow.org/myanmar-vpn-ban/>; Liam Scott, "Myanmar junta's VPN block poses 'major threat,' say analysts," Voice of America, July 5, 2024, <https://www.voanews.com/a/myanmar-junta-s-vpn-block-poses-major-threat-....>
- 204 Discussions with digital rights defenders, March 16, 2022. "Checkpoints // Myanmar Map of Lawlessness," Visual Rebellion, December 20, 2023, <https://visualrebellion.org/timeline/myanmar-map-checkpoints/>
- 205 "Research group monitors regime's online crackdown since 2021," DVB, June 14, 2024, <https://english.dvb.no/international-organizations-decry-childrens-righ...>
- 206 Associated Press, "Myanmar's Embattled Military Government Cracks Down on Free Flow of News by Blocking VPNs," June 24, 2024, <https://apnews.com/article/myanmar-censorship-virtual-private-network-f...>; "Myanmar junta imposes random searches for VPNs," Radio Free Asia, June 13, 2024, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/myanmar-internet-restrictions-....>
- 207 "Myanmar junta using draft law to conduct searches for VPNs," RFA, January 16, 2022, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/bill-01262022183617.html>; "Military's cyber security bill worse than their previous draft," Free Expression Myanmar, January 27, 2022, <https://freeexpressionmyanmar.org/militarys-cyber-security-bill-worse-t...>
- 208 <https://elevenmyanmar.com/news/dept-of-telecommunications-issue-a-state...>; "Non re-registered SIM cards will be closed in 30 days," Narinjara, March 14, 2023, <https://burmese.narinjara.com/local-news/detail/640fe5f8be9d1e25d3afa9f1>
- 209 Khit Thit Media, "ပြည်သူများ၏ မိုဘိုင်းလ်ဖုန်းဟန်းဆက်များ၏ IMEI မှတ်ပုံတင်ရန်နှင့် အခွန်တောင်းခံရန်၊ လုံခြုံရေးအရ ထိန်းချုပ်ရန် စစ်ကောင်စီက ဖုန်းအော်ပရေတာများအားလုံးကို အစည်းအဝေးခေါ်ယူ," June 7, 2022, <https://www.facebook.com/khitthitnews/photos/a.386800725090613/15154089...>; Golda Benjamin, Wai Phyo Myint, and Dhevy Sivaprakasam, "Myanmar IMEI FAQ: How the Junta Could

Disconnect the Resistance,” Access Now, August 2, 2023, <https://www.accessnow.org/myanmar-imei/>.

- ²¹⁰The military is slowly starting to collect biometric data for a national identify system: “Myanmar Digital Coup Quarterly: May-July 2023,” Engage Media, December 14, 2023, <https://engagemedia.org/2023/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-may-july-20....>
- ²¹¹Thompson Chau, “Myanmar wants mobile user biometrics,” Myanmar Times, December 5, 2019, <https://www.mmtimes.com/news/myanmar-wants-mobile-user-biometrics.html>; “Myanmar: Dangerous Plans for Biometric SIM Card Registration Must be Scrapped,” Privacy International, December 9, 2019, <https://privacyinternational.org/news-analysis/3303/myanmar-dangerous-p....>
- ²¹²Chris Burt, “Myanmar closes delayed biometrics tender amid funding confusion, data protection laws still absent,” Biometric Update, June 11, 2020, <https://www.biometricupdate.com/202006/myanmar-closes-delayed-biometric....>
- ²¹³“Myanmar’s biometric data collection sparks rights violation fears,” Biometric Update, August 3, 2023, <https://www.biometricupdate.com/202308/myanmars-biometric-data-collecti....>
- ²¹⁴The Myanmar Junta’s Partners in Digital Surveillance and Censorship,” Justice for Myanmar, June 19, 2024, <https://www.justiceformyanmar.org/stories/the-myanmar-juntas-partners-i....>
- ²¹⁵“Myanmar junta using draft law to conduct searches for VPNs,” RFA, January 26, 2022, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/bill-01262022183617.html>
- ²¹⁶Analyst interviews between July 2017 and March 2018 with people arrested for protesting or other forms of activism online.
- ²¹⁷“The Dangers of Checkpoints: Stories of arrest and censorship from Myanmar civilians,” Engage Media, January 15, 2024, <https://engagemedia.org/2024/youth-myanmar-checkpoints/>.
- ²¹⁸“Checkpoints // Myanmar Map of Lawlessness,” Visual Rebellion, December 20, 2023, <https://visualrebellion.org/timeline/myanmar-map-checkpoints/>.
- ²¹⁹Ibid.
- ²²⁰Fanny Potkin and Wa Lone, “‘Information combat’: Inside the fight for Myanmar’s soul,” Reuters, November 2, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/information-combat->

inside-fi....

- 221“Authorities in Yangon posing as activists online arrest dozens,” RFA, March 2, 2022, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/arrests-03022022185117.html>.
- 222Hannah Beech, “Myanmar’s Military Deploys Digital Arsenal of Repression in Crackdown,” The New York Times, March 1, 2021, [https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/01/world/asia/myanmar-coup-military-sur...;](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/01/world/asia/myanmar-coup-military-sur...) “Myanmar Security Forces Using Western Surveillance Tech Against Civilians, OCCRP, June 14, 2021, <https://www.occrp.org/en/blog/14621-myanmar-security-forces-using-weste...>
- 223Nora Aung, “Myanmar Regime Using Mytel SIM Cards to Track its own Soldiers,” Irrawaddy, June 16, 2022, [https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-regime-using-mytel-sim-car....](https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-regime-using-mytel-sim-car...)
- 224Fanny Potkin and Poppy Mcpherson, “How Myanmar’s military moved in on the telecoms sector to spy on citizens,” Reuters, May 18, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/how-myanmars-military-moved-....>
- 225Oded Yaron, “Myanmar Acquired Spyware From Israeli Cyber-intelligence Firm Cognyte, New Docs Reveal,” Haaretz, January 15, 2023, <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/security-aviation/2023-01-15/ty-art....>
- 226Analyst communications with digital rights defenders, May 22, 2021.
- 227Nay Phyto Win, “Government allots over 6 billion kyats to form social media watchdog,” Democratic Voice of Burman (DVB), March 19, 2018, <http://images.dvb.no/news/government-allots-6-billion-kyats-form-social....>
- 228Moe Moe, “New Body to Track Online Instigators Who Harm Govt, Sovereignty,” The Irrawaddy, May 23, 2018, <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/new-body-track-online-instigators-....>
- 229“Justice For Myanmar publishes details of Myanmar’s tools of digital surveillance and repression,” Justice for Myanmar, March 2, 2021, [https://www.justiceformyanmar.org/press-releases/justice-for-myanmar-pu...;](https://www.justiceformyanmar.org/press-releases/justice-for-myanmar-pu...) Hannah Beech, “Myanmar’s Military Deploys Digital Arsenal of Repression in Crackdown,” The New York Times, March 1, 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/01/world/asia/myanmar-coup-military-sur...>

- 230 Safeguards in the law were undermined by providing an alternative option of securing permission directly from the national government. “Myanmar Military Junta Suspends Laws Protecting Citizens’ Privacy to Crack Down on Opposition,” The Irrawaddy, February 14, 2021, <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-military-junta-suspends-la...>; “The legal and policy framework for information communication technology in Myanmar: Implications for human rights,” Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business, January 2019, <https://www.myanmar-responsiblebusiness.org/pdf/2019-Policy-Brief-Myanm....>
- 231 “Counter Terrorism Law Regulations”, March 1 2023, <https://www.mlis.gov.mm/IsScPop.do?lawordSn=18976> ; “Amendment grants Myanmar junta sweeping new powers under Anti-Terrorism Law,” RFA, March 15, 2023: <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/amendment-03152023170207.html>.
- 232 “Six risks from Myanmar’s draft Cyber Security Law,” Free Expression Myanmar, February 14, 2021, <https://freeexpressionmyanmar.org/six-risks-from-myanmars-draft-cyber-s....>
- 233 “Myanmar’s new Electronic Transactions Law Amendment,” Free Expression Myanmar, February 18, 2021, <https://freeexpressionmyanmar.org/myanmars-new-electronic-transactions-....>
- 234 “Realising Digital Myanmar,” Telenor, February 2018, <https://www.telenor.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Telenor-Realising-Di...>; “Chapter 4.3 Privacy,” SWIA, Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business, accessed May 31, 2024, <http://www.myanmar-responsiblebusiness.org/pdf/SWIA/ICT/Chapter-04.03-P....>
- 235 “Myanmar’s new Electronic Transactions Law Amendment,” Free Expression Myanmar, February 18, 2021, <https://freeexpressionmyanmar.org/myanmars-new-electronic-transactions-....>
- 236 “Myanmar Military Junta Suspends Laws Protecting Citizens’ Privacy to Crack Down on Opposition,” The Irrawaddy, February 14, 2021, <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-military-junta-suspends-la...>
- 237 “Lack of Consultation on the Citizens Privacy and Security Law is a Missed Opportunity,” Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business, March 13, 2017, <http://www.myanmar-responsiblebusiness.org/news/lack-of-consultation-ci...>; Tin Htet Paing, “Critics Skeptical of New

Privacy Legislation," The Irrawaddy, March 15, 2017, <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/critics-skeptical-of-new-privacy-l....>

- 238"Telecommunications Law," Law. No. 31/2013, Article 75, Free Expression Myanmar, October 8, 2013, <http://freeexpressionmyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/telecommuni....>
- 239"Telecommunications Law – Law. No. 31/2013," Free Expression Myanmar, October 8, 2013, <http://freeexpressionmyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/telecommuni....>
- 240Drug Policy Advocacy Group, "Guiding Drug Law Reform in Myanmar," Transnational Institute (TNI), November 29, 2017, <https://www.tni.org/en/publication/guiding-drug-law-reform-in-myanmar>.
- 241"Military's cyber security bill worse than their previous draft," Free Expression Myanmar, January 27, 2022, <https://freeexpressionmyanmar.org/militarys-cyber-security-bill-worse-t...>; "GNI Calls for Withdrawal of Draft Cybersecurity Law in Myanmar," Global Network Initiative, January 31, 2022, <https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/cybersecurity-law-mm-2022/>.
- 242Aung Naing, "Telenor has shared sensitive customer data with military since the coup: industry sources," Myanmar Now, February 7, 2022, <https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/telenor-has-shared-sensitive-custom....>
- 243Ibid.
- 244The order has circulated among digital rights activists on March 30, 2022, but has not yet been published. Telecommunications companies reportedly did not implement the order.
- 245"Myanmar embraces mobile payments under military rule," Nikkei Asia, January 19, 2023, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Myanmar-Crisis/Myanmar-embraces-mobil...>; "KBZ users struggle under junta surveillance," Frontier, April 28, 2023, <https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/kbz-users-struggle-under-junta-surve...>; "Myanmar Junta Restricts Mobile Money Payments to cut Resistance Funding," The Irrawaddy, August 18, 2022, <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-junta-restricts-mobile-mon....>
- 246"Myanmar embraces mobile payments under military rule," Nikkei Asia, January 19, 2023, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Myanmar-Crisis/Myanmar-embraces-mobil....>
- 247Ibid.

- 248“Myanmar junta using draft law to conduct searches for VPNs,” RFA, January 26, 2022, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/bill-01262022183617.html>.
- 249“Myanmar: Over 100 killed in deadliest day since military coup,” DW, March 27, 2021, <https://www.dw.com/en/myanmar-over-100-killed-in-deadliest-day-since-mi...>
- 250“Myanmar: Junta Tribunals Impose 65 Death Sentences,” Human Rights Watch, July 21, 2021, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/07/21/myanmar-junta-tribunals-impose-65-d....>
- 251“Myanmar: Bachelet condemns executions, calls for release of all political prisoners,” OHCHR, July 25, 2022, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/07/myanmar-bachelet-condem....>
- 252“Home,” Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, accessed May 31, 2024, <https://aappb.org/>.
- 253Kyaw Min Yu, Myanmar activist known as Ko Jimmy, executed at 53, The Washington Post, July 26, 2022, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/obituaries/2022/07/26/ko-jimmy-myanmar-e...>
- 254“Home,” Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, accessed May 31, 2024, <https://aappb.org/>; “Journalists Killed,” Committee to Protect Journalists, accessed May 31, 2024, https://cpj.org/data/?status=Killed&start_year=2021&end_year=2024&group....
- 255“Myanmar Journalist Shot, Killed While in Military Custody,” Voice of America, February 16, 2024, <https://www.voanews.com/a/myanmar-journalist-shot-killed-while-in-milit....>
- 256What’s happening in Myanmar,” Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, <https://coup.aappb.org>; Luke Harding “Outrage in Myanmar after activist allegedly tortured to death,” The Guardian, March 15, 2021, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/15/the-death-of-zaw-myat-lyn....>
- 257“Body of Myanmar Journalist Among Those Dumped in Bomb Shelter by Fleeing Troops,” The Irrawaddy, February 12, 2024, <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/body-of-myanmar-journalist-among-t...>
- 258<https://aappb.org/?p=24461>.
- 259Andrew Nachemson, “‘Watermelon suppression’: doxing campaign targets pro-democracy soldiers and police,” Frontier Myanmar, March 14,

2022, <https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/watermelon-suppression-doxing-campai....>

- 260Ibid.
- 261Analyst communications with digital activists with relatives inside military barracks, March, 31 2021.
- 262Soe San Aung, "Myanmar junta using social media to track its opponents," RFA, March 3, 2022, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/social-media-03032022175020.ht...>; "'Blood Comrades' Issue Threats to Myanmar Media," VOA, June 9, 2022: <https://www.voanews.com/a/blood-comrades-issue-threats-to-myanmar-media....>
- 263Alyson Chadwick and Simon Billenness, "Myanmar's military is using TikTok against protesters. The app must take a stand.," The Washington Post, March 16, 2021, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/03/16/myanmars-military-is...>
- 264Ibid.
- 265"Online Terrorization: An Examination of the Myanmar Junta's Propaganda Tactics," The Red Flag in collaboration with Beautifiers of Diversity Network, December 2023, <https://theredflagmedia.com/online-terrorization/>.
- 266"Myanmar Media on the Verge of Collapse," NHK World, March 2, 2022, <https://web.archive.org/web/20220310081516/https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkwo....>
- 267"Digital Battlegrounds: Politically motivated abuse of Myanmar women online," Myanmar Witness, January 25, 2023, <https://www.myanmarwitness.org/reports/digital-battlegrounds>.
- 268"As early as December 2022, the coup leader Min Aung Hlaing was warned by his security chiefs that the military-sponsored elections will trigger waves of violence across Myanmar", FORSEA, March 29, 2023: <https://forsea.co/a-translation-of-myanmar-militarys-secret-document/>; "Signals Corps helps resume communications whenever the country faces state of emergency," Ministry of Information, February 6, 2024, <https://www.moi.gov.mm/moi:eng/news/12988>.
- 269Analyst discussions with digital rights defenders, 2023.
- 270The author has supported multiple media outlets to restore access to their hacked social media accounts during the period under review.

- [271](#)Discussions with Myanmar digital rights activists, July 15, 2019; personal communications with a pro-Rohingya activist, Yangon, April 2018.
- [272](#)Patrick Howell O'Neill, "The spyware used by Arab dictators has now shown up in Myanmar," MIT Technology Review, July 10, 2019, <https://www.technologyreview.com/f/613939/spyware-dealers-spotted-in-my...>; "New FinSpy iOS and Android implants revealed ITW," Securelist, Kapersky, July 10, 2019, <https://securelist.com/new-finspy-ios-and-android-implants-revealed-itw....>
- [273](#)Mobile phone spy software includes mSpy, FlexiSpy, Highster, SpyEra, TheOneSpy, and Mobile Spy. Personal communications with women human rights defenders, Yangon, February 2018.
- [274](#)Tim Starks, "An espionage campaign spread its wings from Myanmar to the Philippines, raising new questions," Cyberscoop, July 14, 2021, <https://www.cyberscoop.com/espionage-myanmar-philippines-china-hacking/>.
- [275](#)Catalin Cimpanu, "Backdoor malware found on the Myanmar president's website, again," The Record, June 2, 2021, <https://therecord.media/backdoor-malware-found-on-the-myanmar-president....>

Austrian Red Cross
Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and
Asylum Research and Documentation
(ACCORD)

Wiedner Hauptstraße 32, 1041 Wien
T +43 1 589 00 583
F +43 1 589 00 589
info@ecoi.net

Contact
Imprint & Disclaimer
F.A.Q.
Data Protection Notice

ecoi.net is run by the Austrian Red Cross (department ACCORD) in cooperation with Informationsverbund Asyl & Migration. ecoi.net is funded by the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Austrian Ministry of the Interior and Caritas Austria. ecoi.net is supported by ECRE & UNHCR.

