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Human Rights Situation in the Sudan
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I. Introduction

1. On 15 April 2025, the Sudan marked a sombre anniversary, entering a third year of conflict¹—characterized by blatant disregard for serious human rights violations and abuses and violations of international humanitarian law—which showed no signs of abating. To the contrary, the conflict continued to expand and intensify, taking on increasingly ethnic and divisive dimensions, with a devastating impact on the civilian population.
2. Several trends remained consistent during the first half of 2025: a continued pervasiveness of sexual violence, indiscriminate attacks, and the widespread use of retaliatory violence against civilians, particularly on an ethnic basis, targeting individuals accused of “collaboration” with opposing parties. In addition, new trends began to emerge, with an increasing deployment of drones—particularly in attacks on civilian objects—affecting areas in northern and eastern Sudan that had previously been relatively untouched by the conflict.
3. Between 1 January and 30 June 2025, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) documented the killing of at least 3,384 civilians (including at least 191 children) in the context of the conflict — representing nearly 80 per cent of all civilian casualties (4,238) documented during the whole of 2024. Of these, 2,394 (nearly 70 per cent) occurred during the conduct of hostilities, while the remaining 990 consisted of unlawful killings outside the immediate conduct of hostilities. The most affected locations were the Darfur region (with 1,535 casualties), particularly North Darfur (1,380),² followed by the Kordofan region (724)³ and Khartoum state (691). The remainder were in Al Jazirah (251), White Nile (114), Sennar (38), River Nile (12), Northern (9), Blue Nile (6) and Kassala (4) states.
4. In April, a major offensive by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in North Darfur led to a surge in the number of civilian deaths, accounting for more than 500 of the 877 casualties recorded that month. Following the full recapture of Khartoum state by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in mid-May, casualties dropped significantly in Khartoum as the conflict shifted towards the Kordofan region, where the highest monthly numbers of civilian deaths have been documented since May. An alarming surge in unlawful killings was documented between February and April, largely in Khartoum state as control of territory changed hands between RSF and SAF.

¹ On 11 April, the High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a [press release](#) decrying the “catastrophic cost of inaction” as the conflict entered its third year.

² Within Darfur, the remainder were in South Darfur (124), East Darfur (12), West Darfur (11), and Central Darfur (8).

³ Within the Kordofan region, North Kordofan (346) was the most affected, followed by West Kordofan (224) and South Kordofan (154).

5. While the number of confirmed casualties is substantial, these figures nonetheless represent an under-reporting of the true scale of civilian deaths arising from the conflict. In some cases, ongoing disruptions to internet and telecommunications networks limited OHCHR's ability to confirm reported casualties, while in other cases, those killed included both civilians and combatants, who often could not be precisely distinguished due to the sheer number of the deceased or could not be identified as a result of the impacts of the weapons used. In yet other cases, particularly in relation to allegations of summary executions, sources appear to have refrained from reporting violations and abuses due to credible fears of retaliation.
6. Casualty figures, on their own, provide an incomplete picture of the suffering inflicted upon the Sudanese people, which has taken on many forms amidst a range of violations and abuses, perpetrated with continuing impunity. Therefore, drawing upon the regular monitoring work of OHCHR Sudan, as well as interviews with victims, survivors and eyewitnesses obtained during monitoring missions, this report provides a broader analysis of trends observed in the first six months of 2025.
7. During the reporting period, the High Commissioner continued to raise concerns, privately and publicly⁴, regarding developments in the human rights situation in the Sudan, calling for urgent and concerted actions to ensure the protection of civilians and prevent further harm. Further dialogue was sought with the leadership of SAF and RSF, to follow up on his previous engagement in May 2024. Numerous meetings were held by OHCHR with ministers and officials in Geneva and Port Sudan during the reporting period. The designated Expert of the High Commissioner was scheduled to visit Port Sudan in May 2025; following a postponement for operational reasons, the visit was conducted from 27 to 31 July 2025.⁵
8. Following the granting of pending visas for international staff, OHCHR renewed dialogue with authorities and institutions in Port Sudan pursuant to the Agreement referred to in paragraph 9 exchanging on areas of shared concern and cooperation to strengthen human rights protection. OHCHR continued its cooperation with and capacity building initiatives for a broad range of Sudanese civil society organizations, networks and actors to support their efforts in responding to the crisis, including through engagement with human rights mechanisms and participation in international fora. OHCHR conducted multiple monitoring missions to eastern Chad and to the Abyei Area, which informed the present report and its engagement in-country and with a variety of stakeholders. The Office continued to work within the United Nations Country Team and Humanitarian Country Team, and with other United Nations and international partners, to support a comprehensive response to the crisis.

II. Methodology

9. On 25 September 2019, OHCHR and the Government of the Republic of the Sudan signed an Agreement to establish an OHCHR Country Office in the Sudan. Pursuant to this Agreement, and in accordance with the High Commissioner's global mandate under United Nations General Assembly resolution 48/141, the OHCHR Sudan Country Office monitors and reports on the human rights situation in the Sudan. Due to the prevailing security situation and limited access to conflict-affected areas, this report is predominantly based on remote monitoring and interviews, in addition to three monitoring missions conducted to interview Sudanese witnesses and survivors in eastern Chad (in March and July 2025) and the Abyei Area (in May 2025).

⁴ For a complete list of OHCHR media statements on the Sudan, please visit <https://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/sudan>.

⁵ The end of mission statement is accessible at: [2025-08-05-stm-designated-expert-his-end-mission-port-sudan.pdf](#)

10. In gathering, assessing and analysing information collected, OHCHR’s standard methodology on human rights monitoring, including the principle of “do no harm”, was applied. Information gathered was corroborated using multiple independent sources, to establish facts and analyse violations of international humanitarian law and human rights violations and abuses in the context of the ongoing hostilities. The standard of proof of “reasonable grounds to believe” was applied.

III. Legal framework

11. A non-international armed conflict is ongoing in the Sudan between SAF and RSF, supported by their respective allied armed movements and militias, since 15 April 2023. Consequently, in this situation, international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) apply concurrently.⁶
12. The Sudan is party to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II). Consequently, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 as well as Protocol II, in addition to the rules of customary international humanitarian law, apply to the situation. These obligations are binding on the parties to the armed conflict, including associated non-State actors and armed groups taking part in hostilities.
13. IHRL continues to apply in situations of non-international armed conflict. As a party to a number of international human rights treaties,⁷ the Sudan must respect and ensure the human rights established therein to all individuals in its territory and subject to its jurisdiction. This entails the State’s obligation to exercise due diligence and do everything in its capacity to protect all persons who may be within their territory and all persons subject to their jurisdiction against threats to the enjoyment of human rights posed by non-State actors and armed groups. Where armed groups and other non-State actors exercise government-like functions and control over territory, they must also respect human rights norms when their conduct affects the human rights of individuals under their control.

IV. Security and political developments

14. Over the course of the reporting period, the conflict intensified in central Sudan, before shifting to areas further west. In January, SAF and RSF battled for control of Al Jazirah state, with the SAF regaining control of the key city of Wad Madani on 11 January. In February, clashes intensified in Khartoum—largely controlled by RSF since the outset of the conflict—as the SAF continued to make territorial gains. By the end of March, SAF had captured much of Khartoum, leading many RSF fighters to withdraw to western areas of the sister city of Omdurman—their last stronghold in the state. By mid-May, SAF regained full control of Khartoum state, effectively bringing an end to active hostilities in the nation’s capital—a major strategic and symbolic victory. Throughout this time, the RSF maintained its siege on El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, which it had begun in May 2024, through continuous artillery shelling and drone strikes on the city. Notably, the RSF intensified its attacks on El Fasher in April, with a major offensive capturing the nearby Zamzam internally displaced persons (IDP) camp and ultimately converting it into a military encampment, from which it bolstered its offensives on El Fasher toward the end of the reporting period. As the fighting shifted away from Khartoum, hostilities intensified in the Kordofan region, which became a new frontline, particularly in strategic locations linked to the fight for control of North Darfur. In early May,

⁶ The applicable legal framework is set out in annual reports of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Human Rights Council: see [A/HRC/55/29](#) and [A/HRC/50/22](#).

⁷ See [A/HRC/50/22](#), para. 5.

RSF also launched an intensive series of drone strikes in northern and eastern Sudan, primarily focused on Port Sudan in Red Sea state. However, by the end of June, hostilities were firmly centred around strategic locations in the Kordofan region, and El Fasher in North Darfur.

15. In political developments, on 23 February, the Ministry of Justice issued a revised version of the Constitutional Document containing several significant amendments made by the Sovereign Council and ministerial Cabinet. These included an extension of the transitional period by 39 months; a provision to increase representation of the military on the Transitional Sovereignty Council; removal of all references to RSF; and, in a potential setback for accountability, the abolition of a committee to investigate allegations of grave human rights violations by security forces in connection with a peaceful protest in Khartoum on 3 June 2019. On 19 May, the head of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, Lt.-Gen. Abdel Fattah Al Burhan, appointed Kamal Idris to the position of Prime Minister, who took up his functions on 31 May. In June, the Prime Minister outlined plans for the establishment of a new technocratic “Government of Hope”.
16. On 23 February, RSF, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (Al Hilu faction) (SPLM-N) and allied groups formed a new coalition, known as “Ta’sis”, and signed a political charter to establish a governing authority in areas under the control of RSF. The United Nations Secretary-General expressed concern about the signing of the charter, noting that it risked fragmenting the country and further entrenching the crisis;⁸ other international actors expressed similar concerns.⁹ On 4 March, Ta’sis members signed a “transitional constitution” calling for the elimination of the 2019 Constitutional Document and all preceding laws, and for the establishment of a secular state.¹⁰

V. Impact of hostilities on civilians

a. Killing of civilians during the conduct of hostilities

17. Parties to the conflict continued to launch attacks in densely populated areas, including against protected objects, without prior warning, and frequently using explosive weapons with wide-area effects that had disproportionate impacts on civilians, in violation of the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution under IHL. This included the use in such manner of artillery shelling, air strikes, some of which have reportedly involved the use of barrel bombs, and unmanned aerial vehicles (drones).
18. During the first half of 2025, OHCHR documented the killing of at least 2,394 civilians during hostilities. North Darfur state and the Kordofan region, as well as Khartoum state, were the areas that suffered the highest number of civilian casualties.
19. Several major offensives and mass casualty incidents account for a large share of civilian deaths documented during hostilities, particularly in North Darfur. Beginning on 10 April¹¹, an intensification of fighting for the control of El Fasher and other areas in **North Darfur** state accounted for at least 471 confirmed civilian deaths during hostilities.¹² The largest numbers were recorded in Zamzam IDP camp (200), which was captured by RSF on 13 April, followed by El Fasher city (153), Abu Shouk IDP camp (62), which was subjected to sustained attacks

⁸ <https://press.un.org/en/2025/sgsm22565.doc.htm>.

⁹ This includes statements by the [African Union](#) and the [European Union](#).

¹⁰ The appointment of leadership within this governing authority occurred in July, after the close of the reporting period.

¹¹ See OHCHR, "[Hundreds killed in RSF attacks in Sudan's North Darfur](#)", 14 April 2025; "[Sudan: Türk gravely concerned at rising civilian deaths and widespread sexual violence in North Darfur](#)", 25 April 2025; "[Horror in Sudan know no bounds, warns Türk, urging an end to the conflict](#)", 1 May 2025.

¹² At least 56 summary killings carried out in the context of this violence brought the total number of confirmed casualties arising from these events to at least 527.

until the end of the month, and Umm Kadada locality (56); these offensives by the RSF also reportedly left a high number of civilians injured, and also included multiple incidents of summary executions and sexual violence. Many of these casualties appear to have occurred as a result of indiscriminate shelling and drone attacks by RSF in areas inhabited or frequented by civilians, such as local markets; they also include numerous summary executions that occurred during the fighting, including of humanitarian personnel, and of civilians found hiding in improvised bomb shelters or who were attempting to flee. Constant RSF shelling on the city both before and after the major offensive in April also took a heavy toll: a cumulative total of at least another 139 civilians were killed in smaller-scale incidents (of 20 victims or less) throughout the reporting period.

20. A single mass-casualty incident (also in North Darfur) on 24 March accounted for more than half of all civilian fatalities documented that month, when SAF airstrikes on a market in Tora village killed at least 350 civilians,¹³ and injured many more. Among the dead were 13 members of the same family. According to OHCHR sources, the market was busier than usual due to the approaching Eid holiday, with an estimated 3,000 individuals present during the attack. OHCHR also received reports that some individuals succumbed to their injuries due to an inability to access medical treatment, due in large part to limited options following damage sustained by health facilities in prior attacks.¹⁴
21. In the same month in North Kordofan, as SAF and RSF continued to vie for control of the then-besieged capital of El Obeid and other strategic locations within the state, on 8 March, an airstrike attributed to SAF killed at least 62 civilians, and injured at least 85 others, in Abu Haraz, Sheikan locality. Aerial bombardments have proven to be especially deadly to civilians: these two incidents accounted for nearly half of all civilian deaths documented in the month of March.

b. Attacks against humanitarian and health workers

22. Humanitarian and health workers continued to come under attack with alarming frequency; health workers, in particular, appeared to be deliberately targeted in numerous incidents of killings and abductions. The resulting deprivation of the population's access to essential services, particularly medical services, has been cited as a factor influencing displacement.
23. During the reporting period, at least 30 humanitarian and health workers were killed and eight others injured in five states (North Darfur, Khartoum, Al Jazirah, and West and South Kordofan). In a particularly horrific set of incidents between 10 and 13 April, at least 11 summary executions of medical and humanitarian personnel were documented in the context of RSF attacks in North Darfur: this included 10 staff members of an NGO providing health care services to residents of Zamzam IDP camp, who were summarily executed by RSF fighters while attempting to seek shelter during the attack on the camp, as well as a hospital director who was deliberately targeted by RSF during an attack in Umm Kadada district. Similarly, in early May, during clashes between RSF and SAF over control of the town of El Nuhud in West Kordofan, RSF deliberately targeted three medical professionals—shooting and killing two of them and injuring a third—in a raid on the local hospital. During the same incident, RSF fighters also reportedly looted medical supplies, and damaged or destroyed parts of the facility; as a result of the attack, many of the other medical workers in the hospital fled, severely curtailing the hospital's ability to function.

¹³ This figure represents only those individuals who were identified in the wake of the attacks and confirmed to be civilians.

¹⁴ On 26 March, the High Commissioner issued a [public comment](#) expressing shock at the airstrikes and reports of hundreds of civilian casualties, noting that indiscriminate attacks may amount to a war crime.

24. On 2 June, multiple drones struck a United Nations humanitarian convoy in Al Koma locality, North Darfur, killing at least five members of the convoy and injuring several others. According to sources, the convoy was attacked during the night, while positioned waiting for security clearance to travel onwards to El Fasher. Both SAF and RSF traded accusations of responsibility for the attack. The vehicles had been carrying life-saving food and nutrition assistance provided by WFP and UNICEF, and the loss of this aid worsened the situation of civilians experiencing famine-like conditions in the besieged city of El Fasher.¹⁵ Such incidents violate the prohibition on attacks against humanitarian personnel and objects, and, in addition to broader security concerns and bureaucratic impediments, continued to constrain the work of humanitarian actors, undermining the right to unimpeded access to humanitarian assistance.

c. Attacks on civilian infrastructure, including hospitals and other protected objects

25. The use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas also caused extensive damage to civilian objects and infrastructure. Attacks on civilian objects—including markets, schools, medical facilities, religious sites, IDP camps and shelters—have been a consistent feature of the conflict including throughout the first half of 2025. These incidents, which frequently resulted in significant civilian casualties, also had implications for the economic, social and cultural rights of the population, including the rights to food, health and clean water and sanitation. In some cases, civilian infrastructure appeared to be deliberately targeted in violation of the principles of IHL; even though parties alleged the presence of enemy fighters, this alone does not transform the entire area into a military objective. Markets, in particular, were a frequent target: OHCHR documented at least 38 such attacks during the reporting period, including the aforementioned attack on the Tora market. In many cases, these attacks were carried out on busy market days.

26. Both parties to the conflict also continued to launch attacks against hospitals and health facilities: at least six major attacks against these objects were documented during the reporting period. In North Darfur, for example, on 4 January, RSF reportedly fired several artillery shells at the city of El Fasher, some of which struck the Al-Saudi Maternity Hospital—the only functional hospital in El Fasher capable of providing surgical operations, as well as sexual and reproductive health services—destroying some of its units, and injuring several people, including two medical staff. Less than three weeks later, on 24 January, an attack by RSF on the same hospital resulted in dozens of casualties (both civilians and combatants *hors de combat*) and caused extensive damage to the hospital’s emergency unit, putting it out of service. The hospital has been repeatedly shelled throughout the conflict, with a detrimental impact on access to healthcare for residents of the besieged city, with disproportionate impacts on women and girls seeking sexual and reproductive health services.¹⁶ Hospitals and medical personnel enjoy special protection under IHL.

27. Another major attack on civilian objects, including a health facility, occurred between 21 and 22 June, when SAF launched airstrikes that struck multiple civilian objects in **West Kordofan**, including a local hospital in Al Muglad town, as well as a location where IDPs were living in the Al Gantour area, killing at least 66 civilians, including 22 children, 18 women, and four medical personnel, and injuring at least 18 others. Of the victims, 41 were killed at the hospital, and 25 in Al Gantour. In yet another attack on a protected civilian object on 9 June, a SAF drone strike hit the local girls’ secondary school in Abu Zabad locality, killing eight displaced civilians,

¹⁵ In response to the attack, on 4 June, the OHCHR Spokesperson issued a [comment](#), noting that the incident “clearly violates international humanitarian law” and calling for “all parties to the conflict to take prompt and concrete measures to protect civilians and civilian objects”.

¹⁶ The same hospital was one of several health facilities that were affected by at least 13 other attacks in 2024. See OHCHR, *Under siege: The situation of human rights in El Fasher, North Darfur, since May 2024* (20 December 2024), available at: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/report-ohchr-sudan-country-office-siege-el-fasher-north-darfur-may-2024>.

including a woman and a six-year-old boy, and injuring nine others, including two girls, aged 10 and 17, who had been sheltering there. According to OHCHR sources, the school had been designated as a shelter for displaced people since November 2024.

28. In May, Port Sudan, the capital of Red Sea state and current seat of the Sudanese authorities, saw an unprecedented escalation in long-range drone attacks, attributed to RSF. The city had previously been spared from violence related to the conflict, however beginning on 4 May, it was subjected to daily drone attacks for nearly a week, targeting civilian infrastructure, endangering civilian lives and jeopardizing access to basic services.¹⁷ Locations that were struck included the city's main electricity substation and fuel and gas storage facilities, as well as the civilian seaport and the international airport—a key access point for humanitarian operations and civilian movement. Many of the attacks occurred near densely populated areas, with IDPs once again forced to relocate in search of relative safety. Access to desalinated purified drinking water was impacted by the electricity cuts, as was access to health, as medical facilities were compelled to limit working hours due to the lack of reliable electricity.

d. Recruitment and use of children

29. The parties to the conflict continued to mobilize civilians, including through forced recruitment, and frequently along communal lines. During the reporting period, OHCHR received reports of forced military recruitment by RSF in parts of Darfur, including of children. In West Darfur state, for example, OHCHR sources reported that RSF continued to mobilize fighters, including tribal militias (“Al Fazaa”) and children from the Eringa ethnic community in Ban Jadeed and Saraf Jidad, to support operations in El Fasher. These mobilizations were often carried out by placing extreme pressure on community leaders to provide a certain number of men and boys from their communities for military recruitment, or else face punishment from RSF. In May, credible sources from El Geneina reiterated concerns about the ongoing recruitment of children, and alleged that more than 300—most of them below the age of 16—had been undergoing military training at a recently established RSF camp near El Geneina airport. The recruitment and use of children in hostilities is prohibited under IHL, and may amount to war crimes.

VI. Right to life, liberty and security of the person

a. Summary executions

30. Between 1 January and 30 June 2025, OHCHR documented the unlawful killing of at least 990 civilians in cases of summary executions, attacks on villages or in the context of a general breakdown in law and order. Attacks against civilians and wilful killings are serious violations of IHL and of the right to life under IHRL.
31. During the reporting period, in the context of taking control of geographic areas, OHCHR documented numerous incidents of summary executions of civilians and unarmed individuals alleged to be “collaborators” with the opposing party. In January, at least 210 unlawful killings, including summary executions, and attacks on villages perceived to be supportive of one of the fighting parties, occurred in the context of hostilities between RSF and SAF for control of Al Jazirah state. In the days surrounding 11 January, when SAF gained control of the capital of Wad Madani, OHCHR documented more than 100 summary executions—many of them appearing to target victims on an ethnic basis—largely attributed to SAF and allied fighters, primarily the Sudan Shield Forces.¹⁸ In one example, video footage obtained depicted approximately 60 deceased persons—all in civilian clothing—while an officer wearing a SAF

¹⁷ See OHCHR, [“Sudan: UN expert calls for end to attacks on critical civilian infrastructure amidst intensifying drone attacks”](#), 19 May 2025.

¹⁸ See OHCHR, [“Sudan conflict taking more dangerous turn for civilians”](#), 17 January 2025.

uniform can be seen pointing to them and saying, “*Who told you that RSF tactically withdrew from [Wad] Madani? RSF did not withdraw, but rather their members were killed like sheep in [Wad] Madani*”.

32. Between February and April, the number of documented killings outside the immediate conduct of hostilities tripled, rising from 97 in February, to 150 in March, to a high of 334 in April. This was due in large part to a surge in summary executions that were documented, primarily in Khartoum, after SAF and allied fighters recaptured territory previously controlled by the RSF in late March, and engaged in an apparent campaign of reprisals against alleged RSF “collaborators”.
33. One witness interviewed by OHCHR stated that he had observed SAF’s increasing search operations in civilian neighbourhoods and settlements in East Nile, Khartoum state, between March and April, and that he saw youths as young as 14 or 15 years of age, accused of being RSF members, summarily killed: “*I saw with my own eyes how SAF executed individuals they identified as RSF members. They arrested and executed them on the spot, even when SAF weren’t completely sure that they belonged to RSF.*”
34. In a particularly violent period between 8 and 14 April, at least 64 civilians were reportedly summarily executed by SAF-allied fighters (from the Al Bara’a Brigade and *mustanfreen*¹⁹) in Khartoum city.²⁰ The perpetrators allegedly targeted individuals affiliated with ethnic groups from the Darfur and Kordofan regions, including four men from the native administrations of the Misseriya, Ta’isha, Salamat and Khuzam Arab communities. While most of the victims in these incidents were men and boys, at least four women were also targeted, including two well-known tea sellers, who were killed after being accused of “cooperation” or other perceived or actual association with RSF. In a separate incident, *mustanfreen* fighters reportedly entered a local mosque in the Jebel Awliya neighbourhood shortly after afternoon prayers, selected five young men affiliated with ethnic communities from Western Sudan amongst the worshippers, and executed them on the accusation that they had supported RSF.
35. While many of these summary killings were documented in Khartoum state, OHCHR documented numerous similar incidents in other states. In Sennar state, for example, on 4 April, SAF-affiliated fighters (Al Bara’a Brigade and the Sudan Shield Forces) as well as Military Intelligence personnel allegedly carried out attacks against accused RSF “collaborators” in the village of Al-Shaqiq in the Taiba Al-Lahween area, reportedly killing at least 38 civilians, many of them women and members of the Rizeigat Arab community. Similarly, in North Kordofan state, between 13 and 15 April, SAF and allied fighters (primarily the Al Bara’a Brigade) allegedly executed at least 36 civilians, including numerous women and children, in villages near El Obeid after making territorial advances. The victims were reportedly members of the Hawazma Arab community and other groups perceived to be supportive of RSF, including the Misseriya and Bedairiya Aulad Habeeb Arab tribes, and the Falata community.
36. RSF also reportedly carried out numerous summary executions in Khartoum, as SAF and allied fighters closed in on their positions. On 27 April, video footage obtained by OHCHR depicted the summary execution of at least 30 male individuals in civilian dress by RSF fighters in the Al Salha area of Omdurman. In the footage, the victims are forced to sit on the ground as they are surrounded by the perpetrators, who accuse them of being affiliated with SAF, before opening fire and killing them; a few of the victims appeared to be under the age of 18. RSF reportedly also carried out summary executions of civilians accused of having provided support

¹⁹ Mobilized civilians, defined in the Popular Resistance Regulations 2024 as “those who voluntarily respond to calls for general mobilization by joining the popular resistance”. See A/HRC/58/29, para. 22.

²⁰ See OHCHR, “[Sudan: UN Human Rights Chief appalled by widespread extrajudicial killings in Khartoum](#)”, 3 April 2025.

to SAF and allied fighters in other states. RSF reportedly carried out numerous summary executions as well during their attack on Zamzam IDP camp, particularly between 10 and 14 April. While the exact number of victims remains under investigation, eyewitnesses interviewed by OHCHR reported that these included unarmed individuals, including women, attempting to flee from the camp. In addition, on 11 April in White Nile state, RSF summarily killed at least 17 civilians, including two women, whom they accused of “collaboration” with SAF, in the village of Al-Halba.

37. Other summary killings occurred in the context of attacks on villages in which members of particular ethnic groups appear to have been targeted, carried out primarily by RSF. On 20 April, for instance, RSF launched attacks on the villages of Boroush and Zarafa in Umm Kadada locality, North Darfur, both of which are predominantly inhabited by members of the African Berti community, killing at least 45 civilians.

b. Sexual violence

38. Between January and June, OHCHR documented a total of 164 incidents of conflict-related sexual violence, involving at least 228 victims, including 113 women, 110 girls, one man and four boys. A total of 56 of these incidents occurred in 2025, 87 in 2024, and 21 in 2023. They involved acts of rape, gang rape, sexual exploitation, sexual violence amounting to torture or ill-treatment, including in detention, and sexual slavery; victims were often abducted prior to being assaulted. Incidents documented by OHCHR, including through testimonies from survivors, reflect recurring patterns of conflict-related sexual violence, used as a weapon of war as part of wider attacks involving other violations against civilians. Such violence has frequently been ethnically motivated, or based on the victims’ real or perceived affiliation with the opposing party to the conflict. Men in RSF uniforms were implicated as perpetrators in 82 per cent (153) of all incidents documented during the reporting period; SAF soldiers were implicated in two incidents; while militia elements from Arab communities and unidentified armed men were implicated in the remaining nine incidents.
39. The majority of the incidents from 2023 documented during the reporting period occurred in West Darfur state (18), where sexual violence appeared to be a consistent feature of RSF attacks; much of this violence is still being documented nearly two years after the fact, as more survivors are able to flee, and as OHCHR has reached more of these survivors in eastern Chad. Among incidents from 2024 documented during the reporting period, the highest number were in North Darfur (50), West Darfur (16) and Al Jazirah (10) states, where RSF extended its territorial control throughout 2024. Most confirmed cases that have occurred in 2025 were in North Darfur (45). Sexual violence in 2025 was also reported in Central Darfur, Khartoum, North Kordofan, River Nile, Sennar, South Darfur and West Kordofan states. Overall, sexual violence is vastly under-reported in the Sudan, due to numerous barriers, including insecurity, telecommunications blackouts, stigma, mistrust in justice mechanisms, and fears of retaliation. The actual magnitude of conflict-related sexual violence in the Sudan is likely to be far greater than what has been reported.
40. During a monitoring mission to eastern Chad in March, OHCHR interviewed 20 survivors of sexual violence from West Darfur, who spoke to its systematic use by RSF since the beginning of the conflict, in particular targeting members of the African Masalit and Eringa communities. Survivors recounted that women and girls related to members of SAF and the allied Joint Forces were prevented from fleeing. They were held in conditions amounting to sexual slavery, and were raped repeatedly.
41. In North Darfur, OHCHR documented the rape or gang rape of at least 39 individuals, including 23 women, 13 girls, and 3 boys, as well as reports of abduction, in the context of the RSF attack on Zamzam IDP camp in April 2025. According to sources, most of the victims were from the

Zaghawa community. These violations occurred within the camp during the attack from 11 to 13 April, or as residents subsequently fled towards Tawila and El Fasher. One survivor interviewed in eastern Chad reported that she was held for three days and gang raped as she attempted to flee to Tawila; and that she had met 17 other women from Zamzam who had also been detained in a similar house and repeatedly raped. In another example, eight women and girls were raped in a single incident. One of the victims recounted being asked by a perpetrator if her father was a member of SAF-affiliated forces, suggesting that sexual violence is being used as a retaliatory act in the context of the conflict. OHCHR gathered credible information that RSF fighters specifically asked about wives of senior members of the SAF-affiliated Joint Forces during the offensive on Zamzam camp.

42. Survivors were effectively denied their right to timely and appropriate medical and psychosocial care. The targeted attacks on health service providers further impeded access, leaving survivors without access to emergency contraception, post-exposure prophylaxis and mental health care. Service providers in El Fasher and Tawila reported that clinical care and psychosocial support have nearly collapsed, while humanitarian personnel faced growing challenges to operating safely.
43. On 17 April, the Sudan signed a [Revised Framework of Cooperation](#) with the United Nations on the prevention of and response to sexual violence in conflict, outlining areas of cooperation including comprehensive service provision for survivors, a code of conduct for the security sector, investigation and prosecution to reinforce individual and command responsibility, and protection of victims and witnesses.

c. Detention

44. During the reporting period, OHCHR documented widespread arbitrary detention by parties to the conflict, often targeting individuals accused of—or even simply perceived as—collaborating with the opposing side. Many cases involved ethnic profiling, particularly of civilians from Darfur and Kordofan, as well as civil society figures, including local humanitarian volunteers. These patterns were especially prevalent in contested areas or those retaken by SAF from RSF, and in areas under RSF control.
45. Conditions in both formal and informal detention facilities remained consistently harsh regardless of the detaining party. OHCHR received numerous accounts of torture and other forms of ill-treatment, including severe beatings, electric shocks, burning with hot metal rods, sexual violence, and prolonged suspension. In RSF-controlled areas, homes, schools, and abandoned government buildings were frequently used as makeshift detention sites. SAF-run facilities, including military camps in Rufaa and Wad Madani, were similarly used for coercive interrogations. OHCHR confirmed at least 10 deaths in custody of individuals detained by both RSF and SAF during the reporting period, including a well-known Sudanese footballer, volunteer medics, and local humanitarian volunteers.
46. In March 2025, OHCHR issued a report on detention facilities and practices in Khartoum state,²¹ which documented patterns of arbitrary deprivation of liberty, incommunicado detention, torture and other ill-treatment, and denial of basic needs—including food, water and medical care—in facilities controlled by both RSF and SAF. Former detainees described severe conditions in RSF detention, including prolonged incommunicado detention, systematic beatings, electric shocks, deprivation of food and water, and the withholding of medical treatment. In particular, accounts from Soba prison indicated daily death rates commonly ranging from 4 to 10 detainees, and on some days up to 80, largely due to malnutrition and

²¹ See full report at: [report-ohchr-sudan-country-office-detention-facilities-khartoum.pdf](#)

treatable illnesses. Bodies were reportedly collected daily by trucks for burial at undisclosed locations.

47. Similar patterns of detention practices were documented in other locations. For example, in Al Jazirah state, OHCHR received credible reports of thousands, possibly up to 4,000,²² people detained by SAF, including civil society actors and perceived opponents, following SAF's recapture of Wad Madani. Overcrowding, lack of adequate food and water, and absence of medical care were consistently reported across facilities, alongside accounts of torture. A cholera outbreak was reported in Wad Madani prison, with reports indicating that as many as 300 detainees may have died as a result.
48. In Khartoum state, OHCHR findings were further corroborated by information and material received following the SAF recapture of the majority of Khartoum in late March. Individuals released from RSF detention facilities in Khartoum were found in extremely poor health, with many suffering from acute malnutrition, severe dehydration, untreated injuries, and advanced illnesses as a result of prolonged lack of food and medical care. Several required urgent hospitalization upon release.
49. OHCHR reviewed credible reports of the discovery of mass graves consistent with patterns of enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment, and unlawful killings during the period of RSF control of Khartoum. Large-scale burial sites were reportedly uncovered in Khartoum North (Bahri) and Omdurman, including at a former RSF base in Garri and a school in Al-Salha, where hundreds of detainees are alleged to have died as a result of torture, starvation, or denial of medical care. The aforementioned report of March 2025 further identified at least five burial sites in Khartoum state that may have been linked to detention facilities.

d. Disappearances

50. Reports of disappearances and missing persons, including through detention and abduction by parties to the conflict, persisted throughout the reporting period, raising concerns of enforced disappearances. Between January and June, OHCHR verified the cases of at least 528 individuals who were reported missing since the outset of the conflict, with many believed to be held incommunicado in unofficial detention facilities or military garrisons. Among the disappeared were 27 children, some as young as 12, and several women. Families reported receiving no information about their loved ones, and formal attempts to locate them were often either obstructed or ignored by authorities.
51. After SAF and its allies regained control of Khartoum, numerous missing persons were discovered in former RSF detention sites, some of them in extremely emaciated and weakened states. Reports also began to emerge of missing persons who had died in RSF custody. In one case, a former youth activist was found alive in one of these sites, but died from malnutrition-related complications shortly after being rescued.

²² On 28 May, the Governor of Al Jazirah state announced the arrest of approximately 4,000 individuals accused of collaborating with RSF, stating that some had provided judicial confessions of sabotage and logistical support. The statement, reported by local and international media, has raised concerns among activists about possible ethnic or political targeting of detainees. See: "Sudan announces arrest of 4,000 collaborators with RSF," *Middle East Monitor*, 29 May 2025, <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/sudan-announces-arrest-of-4000-collaborators-with-rsf/>

e. Administration of justice

52. During the reporting period, Sudanese courts, particularly criminal and anti-terrorism courts, handed down at least 108 death sentences (including at least three women) and over 70 long-term custodial sentences, including life imprisonment, predominantly for alleged collaboration with RSF. Charges were largely drawn from the Sudanese Criminal Code (Articles 26, 50, 51, and 186), reflecting accusations of “conspiracy”, “waging war against the state”, and “crimes against humanity”. These cases raised serious concerns about respect for the principle of legality and fair trial and due process guarantees.²³ Imposition of the death penalty following failure to respect these guarantees also amounts to a violation of the right to life.²⁴
53. Courts frequently issued sentences of capital punishment, with monthly totals averaging between 12 and 15 death sentences issued in multiple states by courts in Al Jazirah (Wad Madani, Managil), Blue Nile (Damazine), Gedaref, Kassala, Khartoum (Omdurman, Karari), North Kordofan (El Obeid), Northern (Dongola, Merowe and Karima), Red Sea (Port Sudan), River Nile (Atbara, Shendi, Damer), Sennar (Sennar and Sinjah), and White Nile (Kosti, Kenana) states. There was a growing use of anti-terrorism courts and summary trials; serious concerns exist about the compliance of these courts with fair trial and due process guarantees.²⁵ According to Sudanese criminal law, death sentences can be carried out only after all remedies are exhausted, including final appeal to the Constitutional Court. Currently, death sentences cannot be carried out as the Constitutional Court is yet to be re-established.
54. Reports received by OHCHR raise additional concerns regarding the disproportionate prosecution and sentencing of individuals originating from the Kordofan and Darfur regions, particularly on allegations of affiliation with RSF. This suggests dimensions of both geographic and ethnic profiling, raising serious concerns about discriminatory application of the law within the criminal justice system. Overall, these cases raised deep concerns with regard to fair trial and due process guarantees. Convictions extended to charges covering provision of direct combat support through to “spreading false information”.
55. The National Committee for Investigating Crimes and Violations of National Law and International Humanitarian Law²⁶ reported that, since the outset of the conflict, it had received at least 120,000 complaints against RSF and 300 complaints against SAF and associated forces. Over 4,800 of these have been referred to the courts, many against individuals in absentia.
56. Administrative measures were implemented, including the redeployment of prosecutors, reactivation of prosecution offices, and re-opening of police stations in conflict-affected areas regained by SAF, particularly in Al Jazirah, Khartoum, and North Kordofan. However, these developments were overshadowed by widespread due process concerns, reports of torture and ill-treatment, arbitrary detention, and summary executions by both RSF and SAF, and their allied armed movements. Conditions in SAF-controlled prisons—especially in Wad Madani—remained dire, amidst overcrowding, disease outbreaks and overall neglect contrary to IHRL.
57. On 29 May, the Ministry of Finance imposed new fees on 52 services offered by the public prosecution office, including fees to file a case, request bail, and seek an appeal, prompting condemnation from the Sudanese Bar Association, which warned of impediments to access to

²³ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, articles 9, 14 and 15.

²⁴ The United Nations advocates for the universal abolition of the death penalty, due to the fundamental nature of the right to life, the unacceptable risk of executing innocent people, and the absence of proof that the death penalty deters crime. See <https://www.ohchr.org/en/topic/death-penalty>.

²⁵ See also Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32.

²⁶ Formerly known as the National Commission of Investigations on Human Rights Violations, War Crimes, and Violations Committed by the Rebel Rapid Support Forces, and other crimes.

justice. OHCHR also received credible reports that defence counsel representing (or who may potentially represent) individuals accused of collaborating with RSF have reportedly faced threats and intimidation, restricting the availability of effective legal representation. Notably, a defence counsel representing a civilian political organization was himself prosecuted during the reporting period under Article 53 (“Espionage against the State”), reportedly in connection with his work on behalf of the group.

VII. Civic space

58. The rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association, and participation in public affairs were increasingly constrained by the parties to the conflict. The reporting period was marked by violations and abuses, threats and intimidation against civil society actors, including journalists, human rights defenders, activists, and local humanitarian volunteers.
59. OHCHR monitored a pattern of arbitrary detentions of civic actors by the parties and allied groups. In May, OHCHR received information regarding the detention of at least 14 human rights defenders and resistance committee members by security forces in Kadugli, South Kordofan. In June, a civil society member was allegedly tortured to death in the custody of security forces in Khartoum. Detentions were often based on spurious accusations of “collaboration” with the opposing side. Checkpoints and ‘Starlink’ satellite internet connection locations were frequently used to facilitate such arrests, typically following telephone searches that allegedly uncovered “anti-war” content or other material deemed to indicate “collaboration” with the opposing party to the conflict. Cumulatively, these incidents had a chilling effect on civic space and freedom of expression.
60. Members of local community groups, such as the Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs), were the subject of arbitrary arrest and detentions, threats and smear campaigns. In some cases, particularly in Khartoum, these individuals were initially threatened by RSF when they controlled the city—on suspicion of being SAF “collaborators”—only to be subjected to similar treatment after SAF and its allied groups wrested control of those areas from RSF, and accused in turn of being RSF “collaborators”. In March, an ERR member in **Khartoum** reported receiving death threats via social media and in person from a member of an armed group. Lists purporting to identify alleged RSF “collaborators”, including ERR members, circulated online.
61. Journalists continued to face attacks. According to the Sudanese Journalists Syndicate, at least seven journalists and media workers, all men, were reportedly targeted and killed during the first half of the year. In January, a journalist reportedly died after a month-long detention by SAF during which he was subjected to torture. In February, media reports indicated that a journalist was summarily killed by RSF in Al-Haj Yousif, East Nile, Khartoum state. On 21 March, a group of four media professionals were killed by an RSF-launched drone while covering SAF’s capture of the Republican Palace in Khartoum. Journalists and media workers were also subjected to arbitrary detention. In at least one case, a journalist and their family members faced death threats in connection with the journalist’s reporting.
62. Journalists also continued to face restrictions on their work. In states under the control of SAF, journalists were required to obtain an authorization from the Military Intelligence and the Press and Publications Council on a weekly basis. Journalists indicated to OHCHR that this had a chilling effect on media freedom, as they feared that they would be denied renewal of this authorization if they reported on issues considered to be sensitive or controversial by authorities.
63. During the reporting period, emergency orders and other security-related measures continued to be imposed by both parties to the conflict, constraining the work of NGOs. Within this framework, the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), in areas under SAF control, and the Sudanese Agency for Relief and Humanitarian Operations (SARHO), in RSF-controlled areas,

imposed measures restricting the operations of humanitarian organizations, civil society organizations, human rights defenders, and journalists. In April, for example, HAC suspended the operations of approximately 30 humanitarian organizations in South Kordofan, including three international NGOs. In areas under RSF control, civil society organizations reported that they could not operate without RSF approval, which reportedly required such groups to express support for RSF.

64. Frequent telecommunications blackouts and internet shutdowns, often asserted as justified on security grounds but often imposed arbitrarily, severely limited access to information, restricted free expression, and isolated communities. Both parties to the conflict blamed each other for disrupting internet access. In North Darfur, on 26 January, RSF members reportedly confiscated Starlink devices and banned communication in Dar es Salam locality. In February, in Kerenik locality, West Darfur, the RSF closed all public internet centres, while in El Geneina, RSF continued to control and surveil the use of internet centres, reportedly assigning “intelligence personnel” at each location to monitor users’ communications and other online activities.

VIII. Hate speech and incitement to violence

65. OHCHR documented multiple incidents involving hate speech amounting to incitement to violence, targeting individuals and communities on an ethnic basis. Following SAF’s recapture of Wad Madani in January, for instance, OHCHR received footage in which SAF soldiers can be seen engaging in acts of violence targeting civilians from western Sudan, including unlawful killings, dehumanizing and denigrating victims as “wassekh” (‘dirt’), “afan” (‘mould’), “beheema” (‘animal’) and “abnaa e-dheif” (‘bastards’), and referring to “nadhafa” (‘cleaning operations’) in this context. In other footage that was shared with OHCHR after RSF withdrew from Omdurman in May, an alleged member of SAF-affiliated Al Bara’a Brigade can be seen holding a knife next to the body of a man in civilian clothing, referring to the deceased as “umm ka’ouk”—a notorious parasite that plagues farmers in the Sudan—likening his killing to extermination of a pest, and warning that all RSF supporters will suffer the same fate.
66. In the Kordofan region, following SAF’s recapture of Umm Rawaba locality on 30 January, OHCHR observed an increase in hate speech on social media allegedly posted by SAF supporters, who threatened to attack those who participated in anti-war protests in Umm Ruwaba on 25 December 2024, and suspected RSF “collaborators.”
67. During an OHCHR monitoring mission to eastern Chad, several witnesses reported that in the context of attacks on Zamzam IDP camp and El Fasher in North Darfur, RSF fighters invoked victims’ ethnic affiliation when targeting members of African communities whom they suspected of being supportive of SAF and the Joint Forces, often addressing victims as “falangai”, a derogatory term referring to enslaved persons.

IX. Economic, social and cultural rights

68. The conflict has continued to severely impact the enjoyment of economic and social rights by the civilian population. Attacks by the parties on food production and critical civilian infrastructure—including markets, electrical grids, dams and supply routes—have drastically undermined the availability and accessibility of food, clean water and sanitation, and health care, with the most vulnerable groups and individuals, such as IDPs, being disproportionately affected.
69. In particular, the conflict has led to an unprecedented food crisis, jeopardizing the right to food across the Sudan. At the close of the reporting period, an estimated 24.6 million people faced acute food insecurity, including 637,000 people experiencing catastrophic levels of food

insecurity.²⁷ In December 2024, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) Famine Review Committee found that famine was ongoing in three IDP camps in El Fasher, North Darfur and two locations in the western Nuba mountains in South and West Kordofan, with a risk of famine anticipated in additional areas in the central Nuba mountains (South Kordofan), North and South Darfur, Al Jazirah and Khartoum.²⁸ Sieges and siege-like conditions have resulted in the deprivation of food in El Fasher in North Darfur, Kadugli in South Kordofan and El Obeid in North Kordofan.

70. The hostilities have also had serious impacts on the right to safe drinking water throughout the Sudan, with more than 18.9 million people lacking access to safe water and sanitation services due to widespread service disruptions and damage to water infrastructure. During the reporting period, drone attacks, allegedly conducted by RSF, targeted civilian infrastructure in Khartoum, Northern, River Nile, and Red Sea states, severely disrupting electricity and water supplies. As a result, people were forced to consume unsafe water, contributing to outbreaks of waterborne diseases, including cholera in several locations including Kosti (White Nile) and Omdurman (Khartoum). In North Darfur, water collection points in El Fasher and Umm Kadada locality were deliberately attacked by RSF.
71. As the fighting continues, the health system is on the brink of collapse, further limiting the enjoyment of the right to health. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), in areas affected by the conflict, only 20 to 30 per cent of health facilities are functional.²⁹ Over 800 previously operational health facilities have been damaged or destroyed, and approximately 60 per cent of health workers are no longer present. Remaining facilities face severe shortages of medicines, medical supplies, and personnel, amid continued attacks reportedly committed by RSF, including attacks affecting electricity and water supplies, further hampering the health system's ability to respond effectively.

X. Conclusion and recommendations

72. During the first six months of 2025, as the conflict in the Sudan entered its third year, hostilities continued to expand and intensify, taking new forms, including through the use of advanced drone technologies. The parties to the conflict have repeatedly failed to respect the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law, and international human rights law, with devastating impacts on the civilian population. OHCHR documented serious violations of international humanitarian law which may amount to war crimes, and other crimes under international law.
73. Impunity for violations continues to drive cycles of violence, despite efforts to advance investigations. Accountability, regardless of the affiliation of the perpetrators, is critical to breaking these cycles of violence and preventing further violations and abuses.
74. OHCHR reiterates its concerns about indications of increasing ethnicization of the conflict, building upon longstanding discrimination and inequalities, often along ethnic and tribal lines. This poses a grave risk for stability and social cohesion within the country. Further, there are concerns about increasing restrictions on civil society actors and their space to exercise

²⁷ See IPC Global Initiative, "IPC Alert: Famine-Affected Areas in Sudan", 11 July 2025, available at: https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Alert_Sudan_July2025.pdf.

²⁸ IPC Global Initiative, "Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation – Update Projections and FRC conclusions for October 2024 to May 2025", 24 December 2024, available at: <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1159433/>.

²⁹ See WHO, "Sudan", available at: chrome-extension://efaidnbnmnibpcjpcglclefindmkaj/https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/documents/emergencies/2025-appeals/2025-hea-sudan-and-sudan-refugee-crisis.pdf?sfvrsn=723f6454_5&download=true (last accessed 4 Sept. 2025).

fundamental freedoms, support response and engagement at the local level, and express and pursue aspirations for a peaceful and inclusive future in the Sudan.

75. In this context, it is critical to redouble efforts to bring the conflict to an end, to uphold international humanitarian law and international human rights law, protect civilians, and ensure that sufficient humanitarian assistance reaches all those in need without distinction. To this end, OHCHR urges authorities to continue cooperation with it on the protection and promotion of human rights, including through the granting of visas to OHCHR staff and access for them within the country.

OHCHR calls upon the parties to the conflict to:



- a. Comply fully with their obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and take immediate and concrete steps to implement their stated commitments on the protection of civilians, including through issuing and enforcing strict command orders to end sexual violence in conflict, cease all attacks against civilian infrastructure, ensuring safe passage for civilians wishing to leave high risk areas, and facilitating unimpeded humanitarian assistance to all in need;**
- b. Refrain from using explosive weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas, and immediately stop all forms of indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks;**
- c. Cease all attacks against civilians and other protected persons, including medical personnel, and end practices of unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings.**
- d. Ensure that all persons acting under their instructions, direction or control abide by obligations and commitments under international law;**
- e. Prevent, investigate and punish, including at command levels, perpetrators of serious violations of international humanitarian law and gross violations and abuses of international human rights law;**
- f. Immediately end arbitrary detention, including based on ethnic affiliations, and facilitate access to legal representation and family notification for all detainees;**
- g. Protect the work of civil society representatives, human rights defenders and media workers, and refrain from unduly restricting their work, including on the basis of emergency orders or other security-related measures;**
- h. Engage in mediation efforts in good faith to reach agreement on a cessation of hostilities.**

OHCHR calls upon the international community to:

- a. Intensify engagement with the parties to the conflict to renew dialogue towards a cessation of hostilities, and to address immediate priorities in relation to the protection of civilians and unimpeded humanitarian access;**
- b. Support local civil society actors and advocate for the protection of their role and engagement in responding to the crisis;**
- c. Take necessary action to ensure compliance with the arms embargo measures in Darfur as stipulated in Security Council resolution 1556 (2004), and to refrain from providing any type of military support directly or indirectly to the parties to the conflict where there is risk of its use in breach of international law.**

Annex 1 – Documented civilian deaths in the context of the conflict

Civilian deaths by state (January – June 2025)



Civilian deaths – monthly breakdown (January – June 2025)

