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
OF THE BACKGROUND PAPER ON

REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS FROM

Somalia September 1999

UNHCR CENTRE FOR DOCUMENTATION AND RESEARCH

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General overview of developments in Somalia since March 1999

Somalia has not experienced any major changes in 1999 in comparison with previous years of the clan-based war which has plagued the country since 1991, the year when the late President Siad Barre was overthrown. Fighting between clan factions have continued in the southern and central parts of Somalia and the recurrent drought and food shortages have again been a reality in 1999, a development which provoked fears of famine.¹

Drought occurred in many parts of Somalia (South, Central, North-East) after rains had failed for the sixth consecutive growing season and it has been estimated that up to a million people could be at risk.² Consequences of the armed conflict such as clan boundaries, checkpoints and land mines have obstructed the delivery of humanitarian aid to the drought victims.³ The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation warned recently in a report, of the potential for "starvation on a large scale due to the cumulative effects of adverse weather, conflict and uncontrolled pests and diseases".⁴ Households' traditional survival strategies cannot be used and economic and commercial activities have been curtailed by the prevailing insecurity.⁵

Cholera is an endemic disease in Somalia. However, outbreaks in the southern regions of Gedo and Bay have been particularly serious this year because of large displacement of people through war and drought.⁶

Repatriation from Ethiopia of the more than 200,000 Somali refugees was resumed in June 1999 after the operation had been suspended by the authorities in Hargeisa in November 1998. 25,000 Somali refugees in Ethiopia are estimated to return back during 1999. The refugees will only be repatriated to the self-declared republic of *Somaliland* in the northwestern part of Somalia to where nearly 60,000 Somali refugees from Ethiopia returned since late 1997.⁷

While repatriation is taking place from Ethiopia to the self-declared republic of Somaliland, the authorities in Kenya closed the border with Somalia in July 1999 to avoid an influx of refugees who were fleeing the fighting in the southern region of lower Jubba. In August, the security situation was assessed to have improved and the border was subsequently reopened.⁸

The civil war in Somalia has become more complex ever since it began almost a decade ago in the sense that eruption of new fighting has - to some extent - been determined by the creation of temporary alliances or animosities between principal factions. It is

¹ EIU 2nd quarter 1999, p. 30

² BBC, 6 July 1999

³ International Committee of the Red Cross, 11 March 1999

⁴ Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), News Briefs, 10 August 1999

⁵ ibid

⁶ BBC, 6 April 1999

⁷ UNHCR, News, Country Updates, Africa Fact Sheet, June 1999; UNHCR, Press Briefings, 18 June 1999

⁸ BBC, 11 August 1999

⁹ EIU, 1st quarter 1999, p. 31

primarily rivalries between the different factions and clan leaders in Mogadishu which have caused repercussions in the southern and central areas of the country.

The war between Ethiopia and Eritrea which commenced in May 1998 eventually spilled over to Somalia as the two warring countries supported adversary Somali factions with arms. Ethiopia and Eritrea fought a proxy war in Somalia which complicated further any prospects of ending the conflict in Somalia. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea have been involved in arms shipments into Somalia thereby worsening the security situation in Somalia. Likewise, other sources identified the support the warring Somali factions "gained" from the extension of the Ethiopia - Eritrea war into Somalia as a possible impetus to "an imminent escalation of violence between Somali rival clan factions". In March 1999 the Ethiopian involvement led its government troops to cross the Somali border into the Balanbale district of the central region of Galguduud. They were pursuing militia from the Somali Islamic group, Al-Ittihad. During the following month of April, Ethiopian forces were reported to have captured two Somali towns, Bula Hawo and Dolo and arrested local leaders. 12

The security situation for aid workers in Somalia remained very precarious throughout 1999. Since the beginning of the year, five aid workers of Somali, Kenyan and American nationality have been killed in Mogadishu and near the border with Kenya. In April 1999 an Italian aid worker was kidnapped in the Lower Jubba region. He was working for an NGO, the only one present in the region, which reportedly had the support of the local community. 13

Two contradictory tendencies have in the last two years begun to emerge in Somalia. On the one hand, attempts to create regional administrations such as Puntland (North-East), Jubbaland (South-West) and the central Bay and Bakool regions have been made. The groups behind these regional administrations do not advocate, as it is the case with Somaliland, independence but rather a federal structure. On the other hand, the principal faction leaders in Mogadishu pursued the objectives of having power concentrated in Mogadishu with no delegation of responsibility out to the different regions. ¹⁴

The most important economic development in 1999 was the lift in May of the ban on livestock exports to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia had a ban on livestock import from Somalia (as well as from Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania) during 17 months due to the presence of Rift Valley Fever. ¹⁵ This will have a positive boost on the economy in the self-declared Republic of Somaliland. ¹⁶

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¹⁰ IRIN, Somalia, 10 August 1999

¹¹ EIU, 2nd quarter 1999, p. 30

¹² EIU 2nd quarter 1999, p. 32

¹³ Associated Press, 6 March 1999; Associated Press, 22 March 1999; Africa News, 22 April 1999; EIU, 2nd quarter 1999, p. 34

¹⁴ AFP, 6 July 1999; EIU, 1st quarter 1999, p. 33; IRIN, 17 July 1999

¹⁵ IRIN News Brief, Somalia, 28 May 1999

¹⁶ EIU, 2nd quarter 1999, p. 36ff

Peace initiatives

The national reconciliation conference originally scheduled for January 1999 in the southern city of Baidoa was postponed several times and no reference is made to it in recent news. While initiatives to broker a peace agreement have been attempted by different African countries such as Libya, Ethiopia, Egypt and Kenya, ministers from the European Union and the Africa-Carribean-Pacific grouping have expressed that "it is up to the Somali themselves to promote national reconciliation". ¹⁷ New peace approaches have particularly been discussed within IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development) and its Standing Committee of which Kenya and Djibouti, among others, are members. The current strategy they have chosen to promote revolves around a concept of "building blocks" i. e. the development of local administrative units as the basis for a decentralised approach to Somali unity. ¹⁸ This strategy has already materialised in part with the establishment of the regional administrations in Somaliland and Puntland. In the southern Lower Jubba region and the central Bay and Bakool regions, attempts by the respective clans have been made to establish similar administrations. ¹⁹

Somali initiatives to organise a peace conference have also taken place recently. The proposal, made by the "President" of the self-declared Republic of Somaliland was, however, turned down by Hussein Mohammed Aideed. He reportedly has indicated that he would only attend if Somaliland gave up its claim to independence.²⁰

The leader of a newly created party, the United Somali Republic Party (USRP), recently visited Ethiopia, Djibouti and other countries to discuss the situation of Somalia. During its inauguration, attended by 500 delegates in Mogadishu, the party pledged itself to overcome the current political impasse and establish a transitional government.²¹

The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan pointed out in a recent report to the Security Council that the international community could do more to help restore a national government in Somalia. In the same report, he proposed that the United Nations could relocate some of its programmes and agencies as well as the UN political office to Somalia. In terms of financial requirements, trust funds should be created to back up the emerging peace process which IGAD was praised for having initiated.²²

Main developments in the southern and central regions

The prospects for national reconciliation in 1999 remained elusive as a result of fierce fighting in the southern region of Lower Jubba and Gedo and in the central regions of Bakool and Bay between armed militias, who in most cases were supported by one of the principal faction leaders in Mogadishu. The rivalries between Mogadishu's faction leaders have influenced the development of the fighting in southern Somalia.²³

²⁰ AFP, 25 July 1999

¹⁷ Africa News Online, 30 July 1999

¹⁸ IRIN, 17 July 1999

¹⁹ ibid.

²¹ IRIN News Brief 10 August 1999

²² United Nations, S/1999/882, 16 August 1999

²³ EIU 1st quarter 1999, p. 30

In the central region of Baidoa incidents of fighting between the Rahawayn Resistance Army (RRA) and forces loyal to Hussein Mohammed Aideed, leader of the United Somali Congress-Somali National Alliance (USC-SNA) and one of Mogadishu's principal faction commanders, were regularly reported in the news. Eventually, by June 1999, the RRA defeated the forces of Aideed after fierce fighting which was described by a "colonel" of the RRA as the hardest since 1995. A Somali newspaper reported that the RRA captured Baidoa with the help of Ethiopian forces. The prospects for an end to the fighting in this part of Somalia look slim as the leaders of the RRA recently vowed that they would continue the fight against Aideed in order to recapture all the land in the Lower Shabelle region and parts of Banadir (Mogadishu) region currently controlled by Aideed's forces. Similarly, Aideed sent more troops to the zone to protect his strongholds. The victory of the RRA in Baidoa forced hundreds of people belonging to the Rahawein clans to flee South Mogadishu after Aideed's supporters began to loot their camps and harassed violently members of the community.

The principal objective of the RRA is to establish a regional government similar to the one in Puntland. Ethiopian government forces apparently assisted the RRA in the fight against Aideed's troops. ²⁹ On the other hand, Aideed, ostensibly supported by Eritrea, has reportedly sponsored members of the Oromo Liberation Front, an Ethiopian rebel group opposed to the Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia. While the Oromo rebels reportedly arrived in July to strongholds of Aideed, Ethiopian forces are reported to have handed over to the RRA weapons they had captured in the fight over Baidoa from Aideed's forces. ³⁰

A major development in the south of Somalia was the change of power in the port of Kismayu. Faction leader Muhammad Said Hirsi, known as General Morgan, a former defence minister under President Siad Barre and subsequently leader of the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), had controlled the city for the past six years. Kismayu was captured in June 1999 by the Somali National Front (SNF), who are allied with Hussein Mohammed Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed, after a fierce artillery battle. The assaults started in January 1999, a month after Muhammad Said Hirsi had announced his intention to establish a regional administration in the south, in an area he refers to as Jubbaland. It was an important victory for Hussein Aideed and his allies who had lost the control of the central town of Baidoa four days earlier. The forces of the SNF continued the fight against the forces of Muhammad Said Hirsi and in late July they captured the southern town of Badhadheh. Muhammad Said Hirsi and his forces subsequently fled to the town of Xagar near the Kenyan border. The authorities in Puntland support the forces of Muhammad Said Hirsi and a local newspaper in

²⁴ AFP, 7 June 1999

²⁵ BBC, 22 July 1999

²⁶ AFP, 9 June 1999

²⁷ AFP, 12 July 1999

²⁸ AFP, 9 June 1999

²⁹ AFP, 6 July 1999

³⁰ Associated Press, 10 July 1999; BBC, 22 July 1999

³¹ BBC, 11 June 1999

³² EIU, 1st quarter, p. 32; EIU, 2nd quarter, p. 35

³³ ibid.

³⁴ EIU 2nd quarter 1999, p. 31; BBC, 25 July 1999

Mogadishu reported that the leaders of the regional administration in Puntland had traveled to the Lower Jubba region to regroup a strong force to retake Kismayu. The leaders of Puntland feared that the attack on Kismayu was an indication of what could happen to their own regional administration. In addition to the troops of Puntland, Ethiopian forces reportedly arrived to assist in the efforts to recapture Kismayu. The fall of Kismayu led to violent demonstrations in several towns in Puntland. The demonstrators demanded immediate action to counter the fall of Kismayu. Tensions were so high that a conflict between supporters of Muhammad Said Hirsi and Hussein Mohammed Aideed's USC-SNA who reside in the north central region of Mudug was feared to break out. The series of Muhammad Said Hirsi and Hussein Mohammed Aideed's USC-SNA who reside in the north central region of Mudug was feared to break out. The series of the region of Mudug was feared to break out. The series of the region of Mudug was feared to break out. The series of the region of Mudug was feared to break out.

Further east in the region of Hiran, violent dispute resulted in at least 11 persons reported to have been killed in April 1999. The opposing parties were Bantu militias and members of the sub-clan Badiaade of the Hawiye group. According to a Mogadishu newspaper, the battle stemmed from the control over a well constructed by an international aid organisation. In her last report of 18 February 1999, the UN Special Rapporteur on Somalia, Mona Rishmawi, expressed concern for the minority groups such as the Bantus and the Rahanweyn whom she perceived as the main victims of measures close to ethnic cleansing. It is based on the strong clan identity in Somalia: "Clan identity in Somalia is stronger than any other identity and beyond the clan there is little sense of community. To the members of a clan the lives of members of other clans simply have less meaning". 40

A new movement, Digil Salvation Army, emerged in July 1999 and after fighting against the forces of Hussein Mohammed Aideed, they captured the southern town of Aw-Deghleh in August 1999. However, their control was only temporally as the same town was recaptured a few days afterwards by forces loyal to Hussein Mohammed Aideed. ⁴²

Outbreaks of violent clashes also were a recurrent phenomenon in the southwestern region of Gedo. The warring parties, both Marehan clan based, were previously the Islamic movement Al-Iitihad and the Somali National Front. They concluded a peace agreement in mid-1998.⁴³ The peace agreement brought to the surface deep divisions within the SNF and skirmishes between rival factions of the SNF followed.⁴⁴ The fighting between the rival factions of the SNF led in April 1999 Kenya to close its border with Somalia and for Ethiopia to send troops to Somali territory. Ethiopia had assisted the SNF in the fight against the Islamic movement Al-Iitihad and in internal SNF squabbles, Ethiopian troops reportedly supported the faction opposing the pro-Aideed wing of the SNF in order to allow their position in the Gedo region to be consolidated.⁴⁵ Reportedly,

³⁵ AFP, 19 July 1999

³⁶ EIU, 1st quarter 1999, p. 30

³⁷ BBC, 25 July 1999

³⁸ BBC, 16 June 1999

³⁹ AFP, 7 April 1999

⁴⁰ United Nations, E/CN.4/1999/103, 18 February 1999

⁴¹ BBC, 2 August 1999

⁴² BBC, 4 August 1999

⁴³ Report on Nordic fact-finding mission to the Gedo region of Somalia, Danish Immigration Service and the Swedish Immigration Board, July 1999

⁴⁴ ibid.; The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 17 April 1999; AFP, 12 May 1999

⁴⁵ The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 17 April 1999

it was Ethiopian forces which were behind the capturing of the two towns, Burdhubo and Luuq in Gedo region. 46

Main developments in Mogadishu

The Banadir administration was set up in August 1998 by the two principal faction leaders Hussein Mohammed Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed, to cover Mogadishu and surroundings. While the joint administration led to a tentative alliance, the two leaders did not manage to obtain full control over the area. Musa Sude Yalahow and Ali Hassan Osman "Ato", the two (former) vice-chairmen to the two co-chairmen Hussein Aideed and Ali Mahdi of the Banadir administration-were not satisfied with the power structure of the administration which they claimed was unrepresentative. ⁴⁷ Consequently, fighting involving various factions resumed in and around the capital. ⁴⁸ The common police force which was set up to support the Banadir administration was dismantled in April 1999 and the police officers returned to their faction militias. ⁴⁹ During the same period, one of the main faction leaders in Mogadishu, Ali Mahdi Mohammed, acknowledged in an interview with the BBC that the joint administration did not work and he blamed this largely on financial constraints. ⁵⁰

In April 1999, Mona Rishmawi, the UN Special Rapporteur on Somalia, condemned the violence against civilians in Somalia through use of mortars, anti-aircraft artillery and armour-piercing weaponry by warring warlords. She made specific reference to the fighting taking place in Mogadishu as well as to the "continuing use of weapons as a means of resolving conflicts in Somalia" and described the violence against civilians as "deplorable". 51

During the same month, a former police officer described the situation in Mogadishu to Agence France Presse thus: "New checkpoints and roadblocks are going up everyday, resulting in more people being killed and properties looted in the streets". 52

The most recent fighting in Mogadishu were apparently clashes between law enforcement officers of Islamic courts and armed militias in August 1999. ⁵³ The Islamic courts, supported by local businessmen, are sponsoring an ad-hoc police force to fight crime and "cleanup operations" around Mogadishu's main Bakara market that are regularly carried out. One source numbered the militiamen enrolled in the Islamic courts' police forces as up to 300. ⁵⁴

⁴⁶ AFP, 6 June 1999

⁴⁷ EIU, 1st quarter 1999, p. 30

⁴⁸ EIU, 2nd quarter 1999, p. 34

⁴⁹ AFP, 4 April 1999

⁵⁰ BBC, 22 April 1999

⁵¹ IRIN, 15 April 1999

⁵² ibid

⁵³ BBC, 15 August 1999

⁵⁴ Associated Press, 10 July 1999

Main developments in the northern regions

Puntland in the northeastern part of Somalia was set up as an autonomous region in July 1998. Unlike Somaliland, the authorities in Puntland have never sought secession from the rest of the country. Instead the leaders of Puntland envisage regional autonomy within Somalia. 55 While violent clashes have not been reported in Puntland, the security situation remains fragile. 56 Puntland officials emphasise that the police force in Puntland was only recently recruited and that it needs more time to improve the security situation in the region. 57 In April 1999, Puntland's "President" Abdullahi Yussuf Ahmed declared a state of emergency estensibly in response to a devastating drought that had reportedly killed 70% of the region's livestock and caused severe famine. 58

While Somaliland is only recognised internationally as a part of Somalia, the previously clear demand for independence has begun to alter. "President" Mohamed Ibrahim Egal of the self-declared Republic of *Somaliland* claimed in an interview in February 1999 that he would be willing to discuss "Somali unity", casting doubts on his commitment to the secession policy of Somaliland. "Somaliland of Criticism followed subsequently from several quarters in Somaliland. However, the Economist Intelligence Unit reckoned that Mohamed Ibrahim Egal was being pragmatic towards Arab countries which had long demanded that Somaliland respected Somali unity as a condition for receiving assistance. Mohamed Ibrahim Egal also stated to the EIU that the warring parties in southern Somalia needed to reconcile and a central government had to be in place before any talks could be initiated. 60

The statement of Mohamed Ibrahim Egal paid dividends quickly afterwards. Donations and trade opportunities have been provided by Egypt and Yemen. The most important, however, was the already mentioned lift of the Saudi Arabian ban on livestock imports. It was estimated to be causing a loss of around 40% of Somaliland's foreign currency revenue. 61

The relations with the neighbouring region of Puntland have been tense over the Sool and Sanaag regions which both administrations claim to be under their authority. Armed confrontations may follow since Puntland declared its authority over Sanaag and Sool in its "government charter" issued in September 1998.⁶² While the influence of the administration in Hargeisa in these two easternmost regions has been minimal, only one attack of a Somaliland police station in Sool region has thus far been reported.⁶³

⁵⁵ United Nations, 18 February 1999, E/CN.4/1999/103, p. 7

⁵⁶ AFP, 3 August 1999

⁵⁷ ibid

⁵⁸ EIU, 2nd quarter 1999, p. 36

⁵⁹ EIU, 2nd quarter 1999, p. 37

⁶⁰ ibid.

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⁶² EIU, 2nd quarter 1999, p. 38

⁶³ ibid.

Future Prospects

Prospects for peace in Somalia as a whole remain remote and conditions on which peace can be built are still very fragile and even non-existent⁶⁴. Violent confrontations are still recurrent phenomena in and around Mogadishu as well as in the central and southern regions of the country. The fighting has even intensified in certain strategic places like the southern port city of Kismayu. While these unstable circumstances in the south and central parts of Somalia prevent any initiation of repatriation of refugees, the relative peace which northern Somalia enjoys has resulted in some returns. However, the weak economic conditions in the north have proven to be an obstacle to a sustainable and large-scale repatriation⁶⁵.


One of the most positive developments for Somalia in 1999 has been that member states of the United Nations have expressed concern about the evident effects of the lack of a functioning central government. According to the recent report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Security Council, member states fear that the absence of law and order attracts criminals and subversives and that Somalia is increasingly used as a transit-point for the trafficking of narcotic drugs and a haven for terrorists⁶⁶. This concern has led to a renewed pronunciation to engage in peace initiatives for Somalia.


⁶⁴ EIU, 2nd quarter 1999, p. 30


⁶⁵ UNHCR, News, Country Updates, Africa Fact Sheet, June 1999

⁶⁶ United Nations, S/1999/882, 16 August 1999

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