#### Flygtningenævnets baggrundsmateriale

Bilagsnr.:	615
Land:	Irak
Kilde:	International Organization for Migration
Titel:	Displacement Monitoring and Needs Assesments Final Report 2012
Udgivet:	9. januar 2013
Optaget på baggrundsmaterialet:	5. august 2013



#### **Table of Contents**



IOM International Organization for Migration

IOM IRAQ المنظمة الدولية للهجرة ـ العراق

Displacement Monitoring and Needs Assessments
Final Report 2012

Monitoring Program Overview	3
Map of Assessment Coverage	4
Displacement Trends	5-7
Returnees	8
The Changing Narrative of Migration	9
Circular Migration and Integration	10-11
Recommendations	12
Priority Needs	13-14
Livelihoods	15-18
Shelter	19-20
Water	21-22
Medical Facilities	23
Electricity	24
Sanitation	25-26
Education	27-30
Women	31-32
Religious Minorities	33-34
IOM Activities	35



#### **IOM Iraq**

#### **Displacement Monitoring and Needs Assessment Program**

Iraq maintains a sizeable body of field staff operating throughout the country. These staff members continuously monitor the needs and conditions of internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnee families, and vulnerable host communities by consulting local councils, mayors, mosques, churches, mukhtars, community leaders, and the families themselves. Our field monitors conduct beneficiary and location assessments to gather extensive information, at the family, community, and governorate levels, regarding demographics, socioeconomic circumstances, migration activity, living conditions, and reported

needs. Monitors play an important role in information collection and dispersal, as well as in the coordination and delivery of timely assistance. They also communicate with government officials and staff of international agencies and local NGOs in order to identify overall trends and locations of greatest need. The monitoring program has experienced several phases of operation, the two most recent occurring between January 2009 and November 2010 (Phase IV) and November 2010 and June 2012 (Phase V). Phase IV resulted in a nationwide update of all IDP locations using a group approach and repeated visits for verification of locations, needs,

intentions, and numbers of IDP families. Over 188,000 IDPs were assessed during this phase. During Phase V, IOM broadened the scope of the assessment to include returnees and vulnerable host communities. Field teams reported on the needs of vulnerable communities as a whole, including their socio-economic and demographic characteristics, access to services, infrastructural needs, and additional contextual information. During Phase V the teams visited more than 2,800 locations, interviewed over 29,000 families, and completed more than 2,000 service mapping reports. It is on these two surveys that this report is based.

It is important to keep in mind that the information contained in this report cannot be generalized to the entire Iraqi population. The numbers are based upon a survey of specific, vulnerable populations who are disproportionately affected by displacement and poverty when compared to the country at large. Consequently, the results of the survey do not present a depiction of conditions for average families across the country, but instead bring to light the migration trends and major challenges facing Iraq's poorest communities.

#### Communities Assessed by IOM November 2010—June 2012 Ninewa **Assessed Vulnerable Communities** Governorate Sulaymaniyah Anbar 125 Babylon 112 Baghdad 215 Basrah 101 Dahuk 69 Salah al-Din Diyala 193 Erbil 47 Kerbala 120 Kirkuk 215 Missan 161 Muthanna 125 Najaf 123 Anbar Ninewa 389 Qadissiya 130 Salah al-Din 242 Sulaymaniyah 186 130 Thi-Qar Qadissiya 152 Wassit **Grand Total** 2835 Assessed Vulnerable Communities Najaf Basrah ( Muthanna


# PROTRACTED DISPLACEMENT AT A GLANCE


OF ASSESSED IDP FAMILIES HAVE BEEN DISPLACED FOR MORE THAN

**5** YEARS

41% OF

ASSESSED IDP FAMILIES WERE DISPLACED WITHIN THEIR ORIGINAL GOVER-NORATES





#### **Reasons for Prevention of Return**

Poor Relations Lack of Job
With Community Opportunities
of Origin In Place Of Origin

71% 52% 37% 32% 28%

Security Lack of Access to Lack of Property or Destroyed Money Property in Place of Origin

#### Displacement Trends

11 - 20%

21 - 35% 36 - 50%

> 50%

Percentage of assessed IDP families originating from each governorate that displaced within the same governorate.

Dahuk Erbil Ninewa Sulaymaniyah Kirkuk Salah al-Din Diyala Baghdad **Anbar** Wassit Kerbala Babylon Qadissiya Missan Najaf Thi-Qar < 10%

The February 22, 2006 bombing of the Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra precipitated an eruption of sectarian violence that caused lraq's largest wave of displacement since the beginning of the 2003 war. An estimated 1.6 million families have been internally displaced since that time.

The majority of families have now been displaced for over 5 years and few intend to return home. As the period of displacement increases, families become dramatically less inclined to return,

choosing instead to integrate into their locations of displacement. As the years pass, families may begin to feel settled in their new locations by establishing themselves within the community, enrolling their children in school, and perhaps obtaining employment. Additionally, conditions in their communities of origin may make return impossible or undesirable. Most of Irag's IDP families see local integration as their most realistic option.

Top Governorates of Origin of Assessed IDPs

Baghdad (53%)

Diyala (23%)

Ninewa (10%)

Salah al-Din (5%)

Kirkuk (5%)

Top Current Governorates of Assessed IDPs

Baghdad (27%)

Diyala (12%)

Kirkuk (9%)

Salah al-Din (8%)

Ninewa (7%)

Muthanna

Basrah

#### **Displacement Trends Continued**

In addition to IDP intentions shifting as the years pass, the needs of displaced families also evolve as the length of displacement increases. During the initial period of displacement, IDP needs reflect concerns of immediate survival, such as shelter and food. As displacement becomes protracted, needs shift to issues of long-term stability, such as sustainable income and household items. The needs and living conditions of Iraq's IDPs have come to closely mirror those of their host communities, as is characteristic of protracted displacement. For more information on priority needs, see pages 12-13.


Throughout Iraq, reasons for prevention of return mirror many of the reasons for displacement. Factors preventing return reflect poor economic conditions countrywide as well as lingering security concerns that have contributed to a breakdown in trust and community cohesion. These reasons, however, vary considerably between governorates. Assessed families citing the poor security situation as a reason for prevention of return range from just 3% of families from Qa-

dissiya to 90% of those originating from Babylon. Similarly, drought as a prevention reason is cited by less than 1% of assessed families from Baghdad, but by as many as 92% of families displaced from Muthanna.

The ethnic and religious character of the last decade's violence in Iraq has changed the demographic landscape of the country. Shia families largely moved to Baghdad (38%) with smaller numbers displaced throughout the other governorates (<10% each). Sunni IDPs are located primarily in Diyala (18%), Salah al-Din (18%), Kirkuk (17%), and Baghdad (15%), and in smaller numbers across the other governorates.

Christian IDPs are clustered in Ninewa (45%), Dahuk (26%), and Erbil (17%), and Yazidis can be found displaced in Ninewa (34%), Dahuk (27%), and Sulaymaniyah (16%).

Top Reasons for Displacement Cited By Assessed IDP Families



1/2 of IOM's assessed IDP families were displaced in 2006



92% of assessed IDP families from Muthanna cite drought as a reason for displacement



85%
of assessed IDP families intend to integrate into their current locations.

# 97%

Of assessed returnees report improved security in the place of origin as a reason for return,

while **74%** cite difficult conditions in displacement.

of assessed IDP families in Kirkuk plan to return.



than **1 in 10** assessed displaced families intends to return.

# Returnees

The number of returning refugees and IDPs has typically been low. Recent unrest in the region has caused a slight upswing in the number of refugees returning to Iraq, particularly from Syria and Yemen.

Among 2,713 assessed returnee families, the top reasons for return were improved security in origin (97%), difficult conditions in displacement (74%), benefits of returnee payments (53%), assistance from the local community (31%), and improved relations with the local community (25%).

The percentage of families intending to return remains at or well below 10% in all governorates except Kirkuk, in which 28% plan to return. The assessed IDPs in Kirkuk originated mainly from 6 surrounding governorates. Those who intend to return are predominately Sunni Muslim Arabs, although the governorate's population of IDPs includes Shia Muslims and Christians. as well as Kurds and Turkmen. Half of Kirkuk's families who intend to return are currently living in Al-Hawiga district where infrastructure and services are limited. The rest are distributed amongst the governorate's other three districts. Kirkuk is one of the four governorates considered to

have a disputed internal boundary (DIB). The region is ethnically and religiously diverse and is known for being less secure than most other regions in the country. The lack of political stability and the presence of inter-group tensions may explain the higher rate of intentions to return. It may also be explained by the fact that many displaced families find it difficult to integrate in Kirkuk. Most of the displaced are Arabs and local law prohibits them from owning private property or working in government offices unless their parents were born in Kirkuk (For a detailed explanation of displacement and living conditions in the DIBs, see IOM Special Focus— Disputed Internal Boundaries, November 2010.)

Finally, field staff have noted a trend amongst returnee families who have returned in name only. A number of displaced families have been observed returning to their communities of origin, registering as returnees with MoDM, and collecting returnee payments, only to then return to their locations of displacement. Consequently, actual returnee numbers are difficult to derive.

#### The Changing Narrative of Migration in Iraq

Outside of the country's postwar context, other push and pull factors influence migration.

#### Water Scarcity

Displacement due to security threats has largely dissipated in recent years, only to be replaced by a rise in water-related migration. With issues of salinity, pollution, a low water table, and drought, Iraq's agricultural sector has suffered considerably. The resulting loss of related jobs has pushed families many (particularly those from rural areas) to migrate in search of work and better water sources. IOM has observed that 11% of assessed displaced families countrywide and 94% of assessed families in Muthanna were displaced due to water scarcity.

For more information on water related migration in Iraq, see pages 21-22 and the IOM Special Report on water scarcity.

(http://www.iomirag.net/Documents/ Water%20Scarcity%20Report%20-% 20Updated%20June%202012.pdf).



#### **Rural to Urban**

cities.

For more information on rural to ur-

ban migration, see page 3 of the IOM

Special Report on shelter.

(http://www.iomirag.net/Documents/ IOM%20IRAQ%20SPECIAL% 20REPORT%20-%20SHELTER.pdf).



#### **Marshlands**

Field monitors note an increas- Prior to displacement due to vioing rate of rural to urban migra- lence, the South of Iraq experition throughout Iraq and partic- enced a rise in population moveularly in Qadissiyah. Water scar- ment following a targeted camcity, a lack of schools, and poor paign to drain 90% of the marshaccess to electricity and other lands in the southern goverbasic services in rural communi- norates in the 1990s. Many of ties are responsible for this ris- those families remain displaced ing trend. The mayor of Al Di- due to the lack of agricultural wanniyah reported in 2011 that jobs which has resulted from the approximately 5,000 families region's ongoing drought condihad migrated from the country-tions. A decade prior to the side to his city. The resulting in- drainage, families were displaced crease in urban populations has from the marshlands area due to led to the creation of dense and conflict. IDPs displaced during unsanitary collective housing the recent war as well as earlier settlements on the outskirts of marshlands IDPs similarly list drought and a lack of jobs as reasons preventing their return.

#### **Syrian Migrants**

Migrants from Syria have been arriving in Northern Iraq in recent months. In coordination with UNHCR, IOM has assisted in establishing two tented camps for these families, distributed NFIs to 1,773 families, installed a water storage tank, and conducted an emergency assessment. 99% of those families assessed are Sunni Muslim Kurds. All families reported their reasons for displacement as armed conflict, ethnic, religious, and political discrimination, and other forms of violence and threats. The families are largely in need of shelter, employment, food, and NFIs.

For more information on Irag's marshlands, see page 7 of the IOM Special Report on water scarcity.


(http://www.iomirag.net/Documents/ Water%20Scarcity%20Report%20-%



For more information on Syrians in Iraq,

(http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/ SyriaReport.pdf)





Many displaced families have adopted a pattern of 'circular migration.' Individuals, or whole families, return periodically to their places of origin to conduct personal business (check on property, visit with relatives, receive medical care, attend funerals, etc.), and then return to their locations of displacement.

Families displaced both internally in Iraq as well as those residing as refugees in other countries engage in this phenomenon. There is not yet an established method for tracking the number of individuals, nor is it known for how long they visit their governorates of origin or what effect this practice has on long-term IDP intentions. IOM plans to address these and other issues in a forth-coming study.



Currently 85% of assessed IDP families intend to integrate into their current communities. The figure remains above 85% in most governorates, but dips to 52% in Basrah and 54% in Wassit where many IDP families are waiting on one or several factors to decide. In Anbar, just 25% of assessed families plan to integrate while 74% are waiting to decide, ostensibly due to the increasingly unstable security and political conditions of that governorate.

Families wanting to integrate report that they are in need of legal help regarding document transfers, property attainment, and school enrollment. Displaced families do not possess residential documents for the administrative locations in which they intend to integrate and are therefore unable to obtain typical benefits enjoyed by legal residents,

including employment, PDS (food ration) access, school enrollment, and property ownership.

IOM field staff have interviewed family members in Erbil who are unable to obtain regular employment due to a lack of residency status and whose children have been unable to transfer their educational documents and enroll in university. Nevertheless, these families plan to remain in their locations of displacement and hope to fully integrate in the future.

Further obstacles to integration include overcrowding and difficult conditions in the country's poorest communities. A lack of adequate resources and basic services in many locations is increasing tensions between IDP and host community families that prevent successful integration.

#### **Integration Continued**

In Baghdad, IDP children residing in Al Shabla and Al Hindiya are prohibited from attending the local schools due to overcrowding and must travel to other areas to pursue their education. In Abu Dashir, the main sanitation network cannot support the demand from the area's residents, many of whom are squatting illegally, causing frustration and resentment of IDPs within the host community.

Without a confirmed legal status including residency documents for their current locations, displaced families will remain in a state of limbo and cannot realize integration, self-determination, or stability.

Residential areas of high density not only experience overstressed services, but also see highly inflated rental prices for housing, another factor that causes tension within the host community and prevents acceptance of IDPs. Furthermore, issues of mistrust between groups are still prevalent in areas that are home to both displaced and host community families, particularly where crime and unrest are present.

Due to the overall difficulties in obtaining regular employment that exist in Iraq, some IDPs experience repeated displacements as they continue to move between locations within a governorate in search of adequate income. The continual residence changes prohibit such individuals from developing trusting relationships within any one community.

# Some families have integrated successfully as a result of marriage or tribal ties within their current locations

Displaced families also discussed with IOM staff the challenges presented by cultural differences that exist in some locations between IDPs and their host communities, particularly in rural areas. Field monitors report that improved economic conditions and psychosocial support would help in the promotion of community cohesion. IOM is planning a more comprehensive study on opportunities for the facilitation of integration.



#### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

communities, and returnees alike. Such projects should include:




In light of Iraq's displacement and return trends, IDP intentions, current socioeconomic conditions, and contributing factors to migration examined by IOM field staff over several years of assessments, IOM recommends that the Government of Iraq and participating organizations work to:




communities that include legal mechanisms for integration and societal cohesion.

Promote relief and development projects that support the whole community, including IDPs, host

Involve municipal authorities and community leaders in the creation of integration plans tailored to their







- \*Irrigation retraining and equipping of farmers in communities experiencing water scarcity and high levels of salinity. Increased usage of irrigation methods that promote water conservation will help farmers maintain their livelihoods and will consequently maintain jobs and slow water related migration.
- Increase the availability of legal help for families, including referrals to legal services and document obtainment assistance.




- Conduct housing upgrades for residents of substandard housing and facilitate the creation of resettlement plans when residents of squatter settlements must be evicted. Investigate methods to reduce housing rental prices.
- Devise strategies that will enable Iraq's vulnerable female heads of household to achieve food security for their families and to realize a sustainable income. Small business enterprises must be made available to women who want to take control of their financial futures and contribute, not only to the health and wellbeing of their families, but also to the revitalization of their communities.

# **Priority Needs**

79%

IOM field teams asked all assessed families to list their top three needs.



# **Priority Needs**

The priority needs of Iraq's IDPs mirror those of their host communities. It is for this reason that IOM began a new form of assessment in 2010; one that examines the conditions of vulnerable populations at the community level. Field visits are conducted in locations that are known to be home to populations of IDPs, but other vulnerable communities are visited as well in order to provide context and comparison.


The similar needs of IDP families and host communities underscore the recommendation that relief and development projects be implemented for both populations jointly to promote integration and to improve the stability of the entire community. It is important to make note of the areas in which there exists an imbalance between the two groups' needs in order to target assistance where appropriate.

Livelihood projects, for example, are in high demand by all groups and should be offered accordingly, yet IDPs have a higher need for shelter assistance than returnees and host community families.

Needs such as education and legal help rank lower in priority during assessments. This ranking does not indicate that families do not struggle with obtaining adequate legal help and educational opportunities. In fact, the availability of both is quite poor, and many IDP families are in urgent need of legal and document assistance. In the survey, however, families are requested to choose just three priority needs, and most are living in such difficult conditions that their immediate concerns are related to basic survival, such as obtaining income and food.

Returnee needs do not differ significantly from those of IDPs and host communities with the exception of water ranking higher at 35%, shelter lower, at 27%, and legal help higher, at 23% of assessed families.

Subsequent sections of this report cover priority needs in further detail as they relate to the various demographics assessed by IOM and to the country's overall displacement picture.



# Livelihoods

Non-Food Items Aid Food Poverty Level
Employment Wages


Rations Coping Government Distributions

dered access to food and non-food items, and continually poor living conditions create an ongoing struggle for Irag's vulnerable communities to sustain hold some form of employment, only their families. Livelihood challenges affect both host communities and IDP families alike, although IDPs often experience additional challenges in securing employment, legal assistance, schooling, or property due to a lack of necessary documents or an inability to transfer existing documents, transcripts, and residency permits.

Across Iraq, 23% of the population lives below the poverty line, however almost 90% of all IOM-assessed vulnerable families have a per capita income lower than the poverty level (\$66/month or \$2.20/ day as defined by the Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology).

A lack of employment opportunities, hin- More than half of assessed vulnerable families throughout Iraq rely on daily wages as their source of income.<sup>2</sup> Of the 30% of IOM-assessed individuals who 13% are salaried workers who may have access to benefits and a retirement pension. Fewer than 1% of assessed families indicate retirement pensions as a primary source of income. A further 73% of assessed workers are employed by the construction or agriculture industries or in other unskilled labor.

> While the government and public sector employ 40% of employees in Iraq,<sup>3</sup> only 9% of IOM-assessed vulnerable employees work within this category. These figures are often the result of a general lack of employment opportunities, but are also due to low levels of education among the assessed workforce. 79% of assessed daily wage workers either received no education or only attended primary school. By comparison, the same is true of half of salaried staff.



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>The World Bank, see http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/irg\_aag.pdf

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> In IOM assessments and analyses, 'Daily Wages' denotes irregular, ad hoc jobs whereas

<sup>&#</sup>x27;Employed' indicates full time employment and a predictable salary.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Iraq Knowledge Network Labor Force Factsheet, December 2011


#### Livelihoods Continued

Furthermore, 31% of salaried staff received secondary education or higher compared to only 5% of daily wage workers.


Within the IDP community, low levels of salaried employment are also fuelled by a lack of governorate specific legal paperwork and documentation required by many establishments and authorities. IOM field staff have followed the cases of individuals in the Kurdish governorates where, without the assistance of a Kurdish representative, employment in addition to shelter, schooling, and food rations are often unavailable.

Assessed IDP and Host Community families report similar rates of primary sources of income, with daily wages and aid from others as the top two sources Student for both groups. Agriculture is a source of income for just 8% of assessed families, and the livestock and fisheries industries falls even lower at 4%. The low representation of these industries among the workforce is likely due to the effects of water scarcity and the subsequent lowered river levels and restricted groundwater supplies. In addition, the number of active farmers has decreased dramatically—as has the productivity of agricultural land.


# Employment status of assessed individuals (aged 18 and older)



# Education levels of assessed individuals who are employed (aged 15 and older)



# Primary sources of income for assessed families (Families may select more than one answer)



#### Livelihoods Continued

#### Public Distribution System

In response to the imposition of sanctions in the early 1990s, the Government of Iraq launched the Public Distribution System (PDS), designed to ensure that every citizen received a monthly ration of detergent, infant formula, milk, pulses, rice, salt, soap, sugar, tea, vegetable oil, weaning cereal and wheat flour. The PDS system still exists, but it currently fails to reach many of the most vulnerable communities. 48% of IOM-assessed families that cited food as a priority need also reported that the PDS system is not functioning in their communities.

#### Many IDPs are unable to transfer their PDS card from their governorate of origin. Without it, they cannot receive government food aid.

37% of IDP families citing food as a priority need report that they are unable to transfer their original PDS ration cards to their current locations. A further 15% of IDP families in need of food indicate that they are receiving PDS rations but that they are incomplete.

In addition to being unable to depend on the PDS system, families often report to IOM field staff that food supplies are either unavailable or unaffordable in local markets. Many families rely on food received from mosques, charitable organizations and other donors. When this supply is insufficient, they survive on small portions of cheaper foods. IOM field staff have also reported that families often send their children out to work or to gather discarded cans and bottles that they can then sell.

#### Non-food items (NFIs)

A lack of NFIs such as basic furniture, kitchen equipment, adequate clothing and fuel for cooking and heating continues to cause difficulties for low-income vulnerable families. Many IDP families, forced from their governorates of origin, have been unable to transport possessions with them. IOM field staff indicate that IDPs often rely on basic commodities provided by members of their host communities, who themselves are struggling financially.

IOM staff have reported that the most often cited NFI requirements are cooking and heating fuel (particularly during winter months), water storage tanks and filtration units (particularly in agricultural, water scarce environments), generators to compensate for power-cuts and restricted municipal electricity supplies, clothes, household items, and building materials for the reconstruction of homes.



An IOM distribution of NFIs in Babylon.



of assessed families cite access to work as a priority need



of assessed families cite non-food items as a priority need



of assessed families cite food as a priority need

#### Livelihoods Continued

# Confronting livelihood challenges: Family-to-family assistance

IOM field staff across Iraq have reported that IDP families rarely receive livelihood assistance from other IDPs, likely because IDP families are themselves struggling and not in a position to support others. When assistance is given, it usually occurs in rural rather than urban areas, typically passes between families that were displaced together, and is often restricted to the sharing of food, NFIs, and transportation.

Host communities, on the other hand, are generally forthcoming with assistance to IDPs. This neighborly aid occurs more frequently in rural communities, as IDPs that displaced to

rural locations typically did so to join extended family members or as a result of tribal affiliations. Some rural host community families have, reportedly, given up portions of their land so that IDP families may cultivate it. Assistance with food, NFIs, small loans, and medical supplies have all been reported by IDP recipients.

There are no official arrangements between host community shopkeepers and IDP families but IOM field staff have reported that some owners do allow for payment by installment. Others have discounted certain products or allow particularly vulnerable families to work off their accrued debts. In rural communities, agricultural products are sometimes bartered for items such as clothing, household goods and healthcare products.

IOM field staff indicate that there is very little difference in the living conditions of IDPs who are displaced for different reasons (drought, violence, conflict etc.) other than the fact that those displaced due to conflict may have moved suddenly and had less opportunity to transfer possessions. Field staff in some governorates have, however, reported a difference in living conditions between IDPs displaced pre and post 2006. Those displaced pre-2006 are often more integrated as they have had a greater length of time to transfer PDS cards, register their children with schools, and process legal documentation. In Baghdad, recently displaced IDPs are struggling more than those who have been displaced for a longer period of time as shelter is becoming scarcer and rental prices have risen dramatically.



# SHELTER 1/4 Of all assessed families live in substandard housing

For the purposes of this report,

# is comprised of the following forms of shelter Collective Settlements 8% Public Buildings Former Military Camps

Obtaining adequate shelter remains a high priority for IDP families, with 45% of those assessed ranking it as a top three priority need, compared with 28% of assessed Host Community families.

A lack of adequate housing solutions both hinders integration efforts by IDPs and creates an obstacle to return. Families attempting to integrate are often financially unable to sustain rental payments and the country's housing shortages and high costs of building materials make home construction prohibitively expensive. IDP families may also have lost the value of their original property to abandonment or conflict-related destruction.

Assessed displaced families also identify the lack of housing options that exist in their places of origin. Housing challenges are particularly prohibitive in Babylon, as 67% of assessed IDP families from that governorate list barriers to property as a reason for prevention of return. Baghdad ranks second, with 50% of assessed IDPs from that governorate citing the same reason.

Families in Host Communities are also affected by the country's housing and displacement conditions when population influxes to their locations cause inflated rental prices.

37% of assessed IDP families cite a lack of access to property or destroyed property in the place of origin as a reason for prevention of return.



#### **Evictions**


A majority of families living in substandard housing are living illegally on public lands making them vulnerable to eviction. For many families, an eviction may become a second or third displacement.

IOM advocates for the creation of permanent resettlement plans for the residents of squatter settlements. Local government officials in Wassit Governorate have demonstrated the efficacy of such plans in several cases, offering land and other resettlement assistance to families occupying public lands. Resettlement plans are highly preferable and lead to more durable housing solutions than outright eviction, however families often still require significant assistance in securing appropriate sanitation, water access, and other services. Organizations should work in collaboration with local officials to contribute building supplies, NFIs, generators, and water tanks as complements to the government's resettlement plan.

For more information on evictions, resettlement plans, and other shelter information, see the IOM Iraq Special Report on Shelter (<a href="http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20IRAQ%20SPECIAL%20REPORT%20-%20SHELTER.pdf">http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20IRAQ%20SPECIAL%20REPORT%20-%20SHELTER.pdf</a>)

**51%** of assessed Host Community families live in homes that they own, compared with **23%** of assessed IDP families. Meanwhile, **35%** of assessed IDP families live in substandard shelters, compared to **22%** of assessed Host Community residents.

# **Water Scarcity**



of assessed vulnerable families report that the water available to them is not sufficient for their personal daily needs.

12% of assessed vulnerable families use rivers, streams, and lakes, or the illegal siphoning of water from open pipes as their main source of water. This carries a significant risk of exposure to pollutants.

of IOM-assessed vulnerable families use public or private wells as their main source of water. Often, however, they lack the means to filter that water and are thus exposed to pollutants.

of assessed vulnerable families throughout Iraq cite access to water as a priority need.

of IDPs displaced from the marshland governorates of Basrah, Missan and Thi-Qar cite drought as a reason preventing their return.

of assessed farmers in agricultural areas identified as water scarce have indicated the need to sell livestock as a result of drought, while 16% have reported animal death and 14% reported water scarcity-related sickness within their herds.

#### Water Scarcity Continued

Water Scarcity is an urgent and critical issue within Iraq, particularly among vulnerable IDP, returnee and host communities. This is largely due to a combination of recent drought conditions, upstream damming and tributary diversion by Turkey, Iran and Syria. It not only has negative implications for the general health of vulnerable populations, but also impacts both agricultural productivity and the natural environment, leading to the worsening of conditions that already present a substantial challenge to those struggling with other issues such as sectarian violence, restricted supplies of food and non-food items and a widespread lack of employment opportunities.

50% of assessed vulnerable farmers use traditional flood irrigation methods which require large quantities of water, degrade the quality of the soil and increase levels of salinity.

In some governorates, water scarcity represents the predominant reason for both the displacement and prevention of return of IOM-assessed IDPs from and to their place of origin. In other governorates, heightened security conditions have a greater influence on these population movements, however, in most cases, water scarcity is still a factor, contributing to the difficult conditions faced by the most vulnerable members of Iraqi society. Iraq's water scarcity issues are complicated by other factors affecting available water supplies. High levels of water pollution and salinity, particularly in the southern governorates, contribute to increasing levels of water-related illness, both in the human population and within livestock essential to farmer livelihoods. In agricultural areas, farmers are struggling to efficiently irrigate their crops. High levels of salt can reduce crop yields, limit the choice of crops that can be grown and, at higher concentrations over long periods, can kill trees and make the land unsuitable for agricultural purposes.



### **Medical Facilities**

Access to medical facilities is listed as a priority need for 26% of assessed members of vulnerable IDP, returnee and host communities throughout Iraq. In many vulnerable communities, security concerns affect residents' ability to travel to receive necessary medical assistance. In Ninewa, IOM field staff have reported that Christian, Shabak and Yazidi minority community members have been prevented from reaching hospitals in Mosul and have been forced to travel to Kurdistan for medical care. This lengthier travel is particularly concerning in emergency cases where response time is critical.

In many vulnerable communities, and especially in remote, rural areas, women face a lack of female doctors specializing in gynecology and obstetrics. Many are financially una-

ble to travel to the nearest city to receive treatment, leaving them exposed to reproductive health issues and unable to benefit from Irag's national breast cancer screening program. In addition, mental healthcare professionals and psychiatric units are often unavailable to those living in vulnerable communities. In a recent IOM report investigating a rise in suicides within the Yazidi minority community in the Sinjar district of Ninewa, monitors discovered that, although a significant number of psychosocial problems had been reported, members of the community still had no access to psychologists or social workers, and there were no mental health units in the main district hospitals (For more information, see the Religious Minorities section of this report).

#### **Local Clinics: Access and Facility Quality**

In the village of Anab in Sulaymaniyah, the 169 host community members have to deal with a lack of services exacerbated by unpaved roads that make communication difficult. In the village of Al-Jubairiyah Al-Thalitha in Salah Al-Din, over 4000 HC, IDP and returnee residents rely on a clinic located 4 km away. Many residents are poor and suffer from health issues, rendering the community in need of its own medical unit.

Even in communities that do have clinics, however, essential equipment such as refrigerators for the storage of heat-sensitive medicines and equipment for the sanitary disposal of dangerous materials are often lacking. In some areas, rudimentary healthcare facilities have been set up within premises that are not fit for the purpose and therefore cannot provide the comprehensive care required by vulnerable communities.



48% of families assessed in a


recent small-scale IOM survey of female and youth-headed households in vulnerable communities in Baghdad reported having no access to healthcare facilities.

**89%** of those who did have access expressed dissatisfaction with the facilities and standards of service provided.

# Electricity

**19%** of assessed vulnerable families cite electricity as a priority need.

Source of electricity used by assessed families with access to an electrical supply:



The average number of hours of electricity available to assessed families varies significantly between governorates. With an Iraq average of 8.6 hours, assessed families in governorates such as Anbar, Najaf and Babylon see only about 5.5 hours per day while the governorates of the KRG receive considerably more.

The discrepancy between IDP and Host Community families in hours of electricity access may be explained by the higher proportion of IDP families living in informal housing on collective settlements that are unlikely to benefit from public services such as the electricity grid.

For 7% of assessed vulnerable families, there is no available supply of electricity. IOM service mapping assessments indicate that, in many areas, the electrical system is in a dilapidated and unsafe condition. Homes in some villages and informal settlements are often not supplied with their own network, so residents tap into public electricity with makeshift extension cables and are exposed to all the associated safety risks that this involves.

Assessed families reporting access to fewer than 9 hours of electricity per day:

69% 81%

Host IDP

Community Families

Assessed families often indicate a need for generators to supplement the electricity supplied by the power grid as power-cuts occur frequently, particularly at night. Power cuts as well as the generally low availability of electricity affect the lives of vulnerable families in varied ways.

Generators are prohibitively expensive for many vulnerable families. Because of restricted electricity supplies, families struggle to remain cool in the intense heat of summer and children are prevented from studying in the evenings, particularly during the winter months. A lack of street lighting has reportedly resulted in a significant rise in levels of crime. IOM field staff have also noted detrimental effects on the industrial and agricultural sectors, which require reliable power supplies in order to maintain efficient and productive outputs.



<sup>1</sup>FAO Corporate Document Repository, Chapter 7-Health issues related to drainage water management

#### Sanitation and Waste Disposal

While more immediate or lifesustaining issues such as access to drinking water, food supplies and employment are often the focus of needs assessments of vulnerable communities, sanitation infrastructure and waste disposal services are often overlooked. Non-functioning ties throughout Iraq, IOM monitors recorded concerning circumstances with regards to sanitation infrastructure. In many of the 18 governorates, the overwhelming majority of assessed locations have no access to either a functioning sewage system or a municipal waste dispos-

99% of vulnerable communities assessed in Muthanna and Babylon had no access to a functioning sewage system. 100% of assessed vulnerable communities in Muthanna and 99% in Babylon had no access to a municipal waste disposal service.

sewage systems, in conjunction with the accumulation of discarded waste material, poses significant health risks. If left unresolved, these unsanitary conditions can contribute to rising levels of disease and are of particular concern within vulnerable communities that also lack adequate healthcare facilities.

During an assessment of living conditions within vulnerable communi-

al service. In some cases, even when a sewage system is present, community members are not able to use it due to its poor state of repair.

In tropical and subtropical regions there is a close link between the presence of excess water (due to a lack of adequate drainage) and the transmission of water related vector-borne diseases.<sup>1</sup>

#### Sanitation and Waste Disposal Continued

Vectors, such as rats and mosquitoes, are more prevalent in these areas and are attracted to either waste material or the damp conditions, increasing the potential of infection for villagers using water sources for drinking, cooking and washing purposes.

Villages often have no containers in which to deposit waste materials and, without municipal waste removal services, they must either dump their rubbish on unsanitary, hazardous waste ground or burn it a procedure that carries its own health risks. Solid waste collection services are more rare in rural areas than in urban centers. 85% of rural households across Iraq burn or bury their rubbish or dump it in open areas. This figure rises to above 93% in rural Ninewa, Muthan-

na, Qadissiya, Thi-Qar, Babylon and Wassit.

Burning waste materials using unprotected and unfiltered apparatus can have serious health consequences, particularly when plastics are present. These plastics release dioxins when burned which are carcinogenic and hormone interrupting and can lead to serious medical conditions such as cancer, birth defects, reproductive failure, immune diseases and subtle neurobehavioral effects.<sup>2</sup>

Some families have been forced to drill manholes inside their houses which are then drained into tanker trucks. Other families have resorted to digging open channels which flow, unprotected, through residential areas.



#### Effects of Poor Sanitation and Waste Disposal

#### Abu Jarbo'a: Well water contamination

In the village of Abu Jarbo'a in Ninewa, residents have expressed concern to IOM field staff over leaking sewage that forms stagnant pools in populated areas. Residents are concerned that the sewage could contaminate well water, creating a significant public health risk.

#### **Kut Al-Fadagh: Restricted water flow**

In the village of Kut Al-Fadagh in Basrah, due to the absence of a functioning sewage system, residents often dispose of their sewage directly into the river. Canals and streams are experiencing restricted flow or, in some cases, becoming blocked such that whatever available water there is does not reach residential areas.

#### Shimer collective: Water-born disease

In the Shimer collective residence in Bagdad, uncollected waste has built up in an area that suffers from poor drainage due to its lack of a functioning sewage network. The presence of vermin and water-borne diseases have dramatically increased and pose a significant threat to the local population, particularly in areas where children are allowed to play. IOM field staff have noted significant levels of skin diseases and diarrhea in those children who regularly spend time in these areas. A local complex representative has requested a waste disposal campaign, distribution of sufficient quantities of rugged waste disposal bags and a health-awareness campaign to educate locals as to the risks and consequences associated with poor sanitation and waste management.



# Education

62%

of IOM-assessed individuals are illiterate (aged 15 and older).

43%

of all assessed families have illiterate children. In 87% of those families, the head of household is also illiterate.

65%

of all assessed female-headed households have illiterate children. 99% of these families are headed by an illiterate woman.

87%

of assessed men over the age of 20 have not received education higher than the intermediate level. The same is true for 93% of assessed women.

49%

of assessed women over the age of 20 have either no education or no formal education. The figure is 31% for assessed men.

#### **Education Continued**

#### ☐ Drop-out Rates


The significant failure of assessed individuals to progress past the primary level of education can be attributed to the breakdown in the educational infrastructure available to vulnerable communities as well as the prevalence of other factors such as financial restraints or cultural influence.

Evidence of the country-wide violence beginning in 2003 and its impact on education infrastructure and financial feasibility of school attendance can be seen in comparisons of education level by age.


The chart below indicates the number of IOM-assessed individuals who entered the formal educational system but did not progress past the primary level. In red are the percentages within each governorate for those who, based on age, should have progressed beyond primary level pre-2003. In blue are percentages for those who should have

completed primary education between 2003 and now. Countrywide, 41% of men and 35% of women over the age of 20 (the pre-2003 group) did not progress beyond primary education. These figures rise to 54% and 53% respectively among individuals within the 11 to 20 age bracket (the post-2003 group).

It is clear that primary level drop-out rates have increased among assessed individuals in all governorates since the start of the conflict in 2003. Other factors contributing to significant post-primary drop-out rates include a lack of secondary schools accessible to students in rural areas, the inability of families to pay school fees or transportation, the need for children to work and contribute to the household income, and cultural prohibitions against female school attendance in later years.



# Level of education reached by assessed vulnerable individuals aged 21 and older



#### **Education Continued**

**Illiteracy** within Iraq's vulnerable communities is a widespread and urgent issue that both contributes to, and is fuelled by, low school attendance figures and high levels of unemployment. These circumstances effectively curtail upward social and economic mobility.

Across Iraq, within IOM-assessed vulnerable communities, 62% of assessed individuals 15 years of age or older are illiterate. Any investigation into the root causes of this high rate needs to look at several factors including family education levels, conditions of employment, school drop-out rates, and issues preventing school attendance.

Evidence gathered suggests that illiterate parents are much less likely to send their children to school than literate ones. Of all assessed vulnerable families, 43% have illiterate children. 87% of these families with illiterate children are headed by adults who are themselves illiterate. This figure indicates that illiteracy in one generation is a significant causative factor in illiteracy in following generations.

It must also be noted that there is a significant disparity in rates of school-aged illiteracy between those households headed by men and those headed by women. Of all assessed female-headed households, 65% have illiterate children and, of these families, 99% are headed by an illiterate woman. This is true of 81% of male-headed households that have children who cannot read or write.

These high rates of illiteracy may, in part, be sustained by low levels of household income. Across Iraq, almost 90% of all assessed vulnerable families have a per capita income less than the poverty level (\$66/month or \$2.20/day). These high levels of poverty contribute to rising school drop-out rates and, subsequently, higher levels of illiteracy, as low-income families are more likely to keep

children at home in order to contribute to household income than to spend scarce financial resources on education.


Within households headed by both literate and illiterate parents, the predominant reason for assessed 6-18 year old children not attending school are the financial constraints of low-income, vulnerable families. This is particularly true of female-headed households where monthly income is often less than half that of households headed by men. This accounts for the fact that 99% of female heads of household with illiterate schoolaged children are illiterate themselves.



#### **Education Continued**

Adult illiteracy contributes both directly and indirectly to the illiteracy of children. A parent's experience with an educational system that failed to provide the level of education necessary to obtain a secure, sufficiently-paid job instills a negative attitude towards the benefits of investing in the education of children. It is significant that while 12% of literate female heads of household consider education inappropriate on cultural and gender grounds (presumably referring to girls), this is true of 22% of those who are illiterate. Illiterate parents are not sending their children to school because they are either unable, unwilling or both.


Any program designed to tackle adult illiteracy would contribute not only to the development of a vulnerable family's ability to financially support the education of their children, but would also change attitudes towards the benefits and acceptability of the educational process for all sections of Iraqi society.



#### **Educational Infrastructure**

IOM field staff assessing vulnerable communities throughout Iraq have reported significant shortfalls in educational infrastructure. Schools are often severely overcrowded with teacher/student ratios falling well short of that recommended for effective learning. Multi-rotational schools with separate morning and evening sessions for boys and girls or for different educational levels are common within IOM-assessed vulnerable communities.

Teaching establishments often lack basic sanitation facilities and provide insufficient access to clean drinking water. Field staff have also reported a lack of teaching equipment and materials such as text books, notepads and writing material essential for efficient educational progression in line with current curricula. A lack of single-sex schools is also a factor affecting school enrollment, particularly with regards to the number of girls attending and progressing through the educational system.



# Unique Challenges Facing Iraq's Vulnerable Women

Iraqi women not only tackle post-conflict issues faced by the whole nation such as a lack of infrastructure, security concerns and economic and political instability, but must also deal with a set of unique challenges associated with a resurgence in strict cultural norms that prevent women from studying or working. This restrictive environment particularly affects women who haven been left to fend for themselves and support their households due to the loss of male household members after decades of war, a rise in sectarian violence, and increasing divorce rates.

A lawyer, interviewed by IOM field staff, suggested that divorced women often find it difficult to claim what is rightfully due to them. The payment that a woman receives on divorce (al Mo'akhar) is usually paid over a long period of time and in small amounts, not taking into consideration increasing living costs. If a woman files for divorce, she waves all of her rights to alimony, even if the circumstances leading to divorce are not of her making. Former husbands have been known to change their address and, unless the new address can be located, the divorced woman will not receive alimony, as the government is not currently obliged to offer compensation. When the former husband is located, charges can be filed in court, but this procedure relies upon witness testimony from members of the same community who are often unwilling to get involved.

Women are often ostracized from their communities after divorce. This lack of local support is also often the case when charges of violence against women are brought to court. A wife can prove abuse by means of a medical report, however this relies upon an immediate medical examination which is often not possible. Within conservative rural communities, relatives of women who are forced to take on the role of head of household prefer to take financial responsibility rather than allowing them to leave the household environment in search of employment.

Women who do manage to develop income generating initiatives are usually restricted to work that can be done in the home such as sewing, hairdressing, and clothes making. It is generally acceptable for women to engage in agricultural work, however, this is often not an option due to the security conditions. A further factor is water scarcity which reduces levels of paid employment within the agricultural sector employment which is prioritized for unskilled male workers, leaving women to look elsewhere.



77% of assessed women are either unable or unwilling to work.

1 in 5 assessed female heads of household rely on aid from friends or relatives living in Iraq or abroad.


65% of assessed women are illiterate, compared to 50% of men.

of assessed girls over 13 years of age have only reached the primary education level. Just 5% of assessed girls over 13 years of age have reached the secondary education level — approximately half that recorded for assessed boys.

#### **Employment and Education**

One of the principle findings of an IOM survey of female-headed households in Ninewa, Baghdad and Kirkuk suggested early marriage as a significant factor influencing female drop-out rates. Parents of large families, particularly within vulnerable communities where income is especially low, tend to educate boys in the knowledge that they are more likely to become future wage earners. Other factors include a shortage of secondary schools and a reluctance on the part of parents to send their daughters to mixed-sex schools.

91% of assessed women are either unemployed, unwilling or unable to work. Of the 3% of women who are employed, 55% work in the unskilled agriculture or construction industry sectors.



#### Female-Headed Households

Female heads of household (FHoHs) have become more numerous in recent years as a result of war, sectarian violence and a climbing divorce rate. These women find it particularly difficult to work outside the household due to social constraints and parental and household responsibilities. For these reasons, many of Iraq's FHoHs must rely on alternative sources of income such as government grants or the financial support of friends and family.

Average monthly family income for femaleheaded households and male-headed households



IOM figures indicate that 86% of assessed FHoHs are widows and are likely to move to a new location after losing the financial support of male family members, thereby making them IDPs. Favorable relations with the community are therefore of paramount importance to assessed FHoHs with 53% citing poor relations with their community of origin as a significant reason for prevention of return. Just 8% of assessed FHoHs are employed, 68% being unwilling or unable to work. This has lead to the average monthly income among assessed female headed households being more than 50% lower than among assessed maleheaded households.

#### **Religious Minorities**

The October 31, 2010 attack on the Saidat al-Najat church in Baghdad stimulated an increase in the displacement of Christian families - adding to those displaced from Mosul in February and March of the same year. Nevertheless, IOM monitors have, since January 2011, reported a steady reduction in the number of Christian IDPs in the northern governorates.

Christian families have found it particularly difficult to integrate into their host communities in Dahuk, Sulaymaniyah, Erbil and Ninewa. Many have emigrated to Turkey, Jordan and, to a lesser extent, Syria. Others have returned to their governorates and communities of origin. Those displaced with family ties in their new communities have found it easier to settle and integrate. Many, however, have expressed concern with regards to difficulties in the areas of security, housing, employment, and food.

Christians living in Northern Iraq experience a more stable security situation than in other parts of the country. Even so, many do not feel safe and choose to immigrate to other countries.

Property concerns are a crucial factor in a family's decision to integrate. Many have been unable to sell their properties in Baghdad and, as a result, struggle to find affordable rental accommodation. Between November 2010 and January 2011, rental prices are reported to have doubled, and in some cases tripled, in areas such as Ainkawa in Erbil, where displaced Christian families are present in large numbers.

Many families are also struggling to obtain sufficient food, as Public Distribution System (PDS) cards are only valid within the governorate of issue. These cards allow for the distribution of food rations and are transferable between governorates. The transfer process, however, is complex and time consuming.

Education is also an issue for the large number of children displaced since 2010. Varying curricula is often cited as a reason preventing educational integration, as is the Arabic/Kurdish language barrier. Monitors have also reported that a number of university students from Baghdad and Mosul have found it impossible to continue their studies in their location of displacement and have therefore been forced back to their governorates of origin to undertake examinations.


For these reasons, movements both to and from the north of Iraq continue as families are displaced but find their locations of displacement non-conducive to permanent settlement and return to face the challenging conditions that once forced them out of their homes.

#### Only

of IOM-assessed Christian displaced to the northern governorates wish to integrate into their host communities.

#### The remaining

**77%** have either indicated a description or to resettle in a third location.



#### **Religious Minorities Continued**

In July 2011, IOM field staff conducted a psychosocial evaluation in the Sinjar district of the governorate of Ninewa. The evaluation was carried out in the wake of 66 suicides reported by district authorities since the beginning of 2010. All of the suicide victims were within the 18 to 23 age bracket and the vast majority were from the Yazidi community.

Health professionals interviewed by IOM staff have suggested social and cultural forces have played prominent roles in the recent spate of suicides, adding that economic and livelihood concerns have played a secondary role. Members of the Yazidi community are often confronted with family censure and disapproval on entering a relationship with or expressing a desire to marry a member of the local Muslim population. This, combined with comparatively high levels of illiteracy, unemployment and poverty are thought to be contributory factors in the feelings of unease, isolation, alienation and difficulties in social interaction experienced by many young Yazidi community members.

Whereas 58% of assessed Sunni Muslims aged 18 to 23 were found to be illiterate, the same was true of 69% of assessed Yazidis.

Yazidis were found to be less well educated than their Muslim neighbors and Yazidi women demonstrated higher rates of illiteracy than either their Muslim counterparts or Yazidi men. This was also found to be the case with levels of employment. The overwhelming majority of Yazidi women, for example, are either unable or unwilling to work due to family responsibilities or cultural issues preventing women engaging in activities outside of the home.



A member of the Yazidi community being interviewed by an IOM staff member.

Sinjar has few resources to deal with these psychological, social and livelihood challenges. There are no psychologists or social workers, and no mental health units in the main district hospitals. In the absence of professional mental healthcare practices, doctors reportedly prescribe sedatives. In order to deal with a cultural divide which has negative implications for the lives of Sinjar district's youth, support must be provided, not just in terms of psychosocial medical facilities to deal with the aftermath, but also educational and livelihood assistance to redress the imbalance between the Yazidi and Muslim communities.

For more information on assessments of religious minorities, see the IOM special reports on Christian displacement (www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Christian% 20Displacement%20Update,%2031%20January%202012/pdf) and Yazidi psychosocial health (www.iomiraq.net/Documents/Yazidis%20Report.pdf).

#### **IOM Activities**

#### **Assisted Migration**

IOM Iraq assists both migrants returning home and those resettling to third countries. Before and after departure, IOM provides counseling and support services. Eligible returnees receive reintegration assistance which can include services such as vocational training, in kind grants, and business development support.

**43,000** beneficiaries since 2003

#### Community Stabilization and Reintegration

IOM's community-based initiatives address infrastructure needs in Iraq's most vulnerable communities. By restoring or improving sanitation, health, and education facilities, IOM's community initiatives stabilize vulnerable IDP, returnee, and host communities, and have a positive impact on local economies.

**500** projects implemented since 2003

#### **Emergency Relief**

IOM delivers essential emergency relief items to crisis-affected individuals and communities throughout Iraq. When emergencies occur, IOM's Rapid Assessment and Response Teams (RARTs) perform distributions tailored to the needs of the affected population. With relief items prepositioned in its warehouse in Erbil, IOM can deliver supplies anywhere in Iraq within 24 hours.

95,000 Beneficiaries since 2009

#### **Livelihood Support**

IOM's livelihood support programs have assisted internally displaced persons, returnees, and host community members since 2007. By providing job placement, vocational training, small business development services, and in-kind grants, IOM's livelihood assistance helps Iraq's most vulnerable populations gain access to employment and a regular income.

**145,000** Beneficiaries since 2007

## Rapid Displacement and Migration Assessment and Response

IOM's Rapid Assessment and Response Teams (RARTs) conduct regular assessments of IDPs, returnees, and host community members across Iraq. RARTs identify vulnerable communities, gather valuable data about residents' movements, living conditions, and intentions, and respond to the needs they express. IOM and its partner organizations utilize this data to develop relevant assistance programs.

250,000 interviews conducted since 2006

## **Socio-Economic Reintegration of Former Combatants**

In partnership with Iraqi authorities, IOM has conducted a number of projects aimed at mitigating conflict risks and rising unemployment among former combatants. In the most recent project, IOM and the "DDR Unit" began a pilot program under the direction of the Iraqi Prime Minister's Office to provide income generation opportunities to 500 former Iraqi soldiers. The project aims to pave the way for the socioeconomic reintegration of various armed groups in Iraq and to promote long-term stabilization and peace in the country.

11,379 Demobilized soldiers surveyed

## **Integrated Border and Migration Management**

In an effort to strengthen the Iraqi Government's capacity to respond to migration challenges, IOM conducts institutional assessments, offers migration management trainings, performs infrastructural upgrades at border crossing points and along the 'green borders,' and provides policy recommendations.

2,500 Authorities Trained to date

#### **Return of Qualified Nationals**

Through the 'Iraqis Rebuilding Iraq (IRI) program,' IOM recruited and placed qualified nationals on short-term reconstruction assignments throughout the country from 2005-2007. During the program, 62 Iraqi expatriate professionals contributed to the rehabilitation of Iraq.

**62** Expatriates Recruited

#### **Private Sector Mobilization**

IOM's private sector mobilization initiatives aim to assist Iraq in its transition toward economic decentralization. On the macro-level, programs include mapping businesses and building a referral network of micro-finance organizations. On the micro-level, IOM offers business start-up assistance, vocational support, and a job matching program for returnees. IOM also provides management consulting, capacity-building grants, and vocational instructors' trainings.