

Kopieret til BO7
AFGHANISTAN (1)18/998
18/9-98 gh**DANMARKS FASTE MISSION**

Genève

m
mTELEFON: (+41 22) 918 00 40
TELEFAX: (+41 22) 918 00 46
TELEX: 414166 DAN CH**133**

TELEFAX TIL	UDENRIGSMINISTERIET	ORIGINAL
-------------	---------------------	-----------------

UDFYLDES AF UM.
AFD.: <u>53</u>
ANTAL EX.: _____
L-FORDELT: _____

Kopieret:

U.M.
<u>StF.4</u>
15 SEP. 1998

Prioritet

MISFAX nr. 1468

Antal sider **43** inkl. denne side
 Repr. j.nr. 17.C.1/11
 Fra Anne Marie Sloth Carlsen
 Til S.3
 Kopi: StF.4 og S.6

Dato 14. september 1998
 Kl. 17:29

Afghanistan

Vedlagt indsendes diverse materiale om Afghanistan modtaget fra UNHCR.

P.M.V./Anne Marie Sloth Carlsen 1468

Modtaget 16/9 98
 på møde i U.S.



Im Fin.skr. 19 J.nr 97/71511-1

16 SEP. 1998 LSC

Antal. bilag Aktnr. 61

NATIONS UNIES
HAUT COMMISSARIAT
POUR LES REFUGIES



UNITED NATIONS
HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR REFUGEES

Télégrammes : HICOMREF

Télex : 416740 UNHCR CH

Email : brown@unhcr.ch

Notre/Our code:

Votre/Your code: EXT.4.1.DEN
98/FDRS6/279

FN-MISSION		
BILAG		
09 SEP. 1998		
17	C	1/1

Case Postale 2500

CH-1211 Genève 2 Dépôt

7 September 1998

Subject: Afghanistan

Dear Ms. Sloth Carlsen,

With reference to our meeting on 1 September during which we discussed UNHCR's funding priorities for the remainder of the year, the attached documents on Afghanistan may be of interest to you.

Warm regards.

Dag Andreassen
Senior Funding and Donor Relations Officer

Ms. Anne Marie Sloth Carlsen
Counsellor
Permanent Mission of Denmark
to the United Nations Office at Geneva

Chronology of a quarter-century of Afghan War 17 April 1998 (Reuters)

Following is a chronology of the main events in Afghanistan since the end of the monarchy in 1973 and the bloody wars won and lost by different factions.

1973 - After almost 200 years of monarchy, King Zahir Shah ousted in a military takeover led by his cousin, Mohammed Daoud. —

1978 - President Daoud killed in Marxist coup. Nur Mohammad Taraki elected president of revolutionary council. Islamic groups start armed protests against communist policies.

1979 - Hafizullah Amin appointed prime minister, becomes president after shootout in which Taraki killed.

December - Soviet transport planes land in Kabul with troops who seize key buildings and radio station. Babrak Karmal becomes president, requests Soviet military aid. Amin executed.

1980 - U.N. General Assembly calls for immediate withdrawal of foreign troops. Afghan Mujahideen rebels in Pakistan form alliance and start receiving arms from Pakistan, the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, China and others for guerrilla war.

1986 May - Karmal replaced as general secretary of the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan by Najibullah.

1987 September - Najibullah elected president at a special session of the Revolutionary Council.

1988 April - Pakistan, Afghanistan, Soviet Union and United States sign agreement in Geneva for withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan by February 15, 1989.

1989 February - Last Soviet soldier leaves. Mujahideen elect moderate Sibghatullah Mojadidi executive president and hardliner Abdurrah Rasul Sayyaf prime minister of a Pakistan-based "provisional government". Guerrilla war goes on.

1992 April - A key commander defects from Najibullah's government, prevents the president from leaving Kabul. Najibullah takes refuge in United Nations compound. Rival mujahideen groups fight for control of Kabul. Mojadidi enters Kabul, takes over as head of state. Under a rotating presidency agreement, he is replaced within months by Burhanuddin Rabbani.

1993 - Inconclusive fighting between Rabbani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar factions leave more than 10,000 civilians dead.

1994 - Factional battles continue between forces of the president and Prime Minister Hekmatyar and his allies, reducing much of Kabul to rubble and forcing many to flee.

August - A senior mullah from Kandahar, Mohammed Omar Akhund, sets up the Taleban movement, a group of Islamic religious students, who quickly become a powerful guerrilla force, capturing the southern city.

1995 - The Taleban offensive continues; in February they drive Gulbuddin Hekmatyar from his base south of Kabul and reach the city's outskirts. They are thrown back in March by Rabbani's troops in the militia's first major defeat.

October - Taleban forces advance to the gates of Kabul for a second time, capturing Charasyab base and a band of hills.

1996 April 3 - About 1,000 Moslem clergymen elect Taleban leader Omar as Amir-ul-Momineen (commander of the faithful), denouncing Rabbani as unfit to lead Islamic nation.

June 26: After a peace deal between Rabbani and Hekmatyar, Hekmatyar becomes prime minister. Taleban attack Kabul with rockets, killing at least 54 people.

Sept 5: Taleban launch offensive in eastern Afghanistan and later move towards Kabul.

Sept 26: Afghan government troops begin abandoning Kabul.

Sept 27: Taleban take control of Kabul, hang Najibullah and his brother Shahpur Ahmadzai, declare Afghanistan a "completely Islamic state".

1997 May 13: Afghan opposition forms new government under Rabbani in Mazar-i-Sharif, the northern stronghold of warlord General Abdul Rashid Dostum.

May 19: Dostum faces mutiny by General Abdul Malik, who allies with Taleban. Dostum loses control, flees to Turkey.

May 24: Taleban enter Mazar-i-Sharif with help of General Malik.

May 25: Pakistan recognises Taleban government, followed by Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. Other countries wait.

May 28: Malik turns against Taleban and, in alliance with Shi'ite Moslem Hezb-i-Wahdat opposition faction, drives Taleban from Mazar-i-Sharif after heavy fighting. Hundreds of Taleban are killed and thousands captured.

July 24: Opposition forces come within 20 km (12 miles) of Kabul, within rocket range. Aid workers leave.

July 30: Taleban tighten regulations in Kabul, punish over 700 people for breaking Islamic laws forbidding women from working outside their homes and men from trimming beards.

Aug 7: Aid workers return to Kabul, are hampered by Taleban rules limiting access to women.

Aug 13: Opposition names Abdur Rahim Ghafourzai prime minister and Ahmed Shah Masood defence minister. Ghafourzai dies in an air crash at a remote airfield on August 21.

Aug 30: Taleban convey proposal for peace talks to United Nations in Pakistan.

Sept 9: Fighting rages outside Mazar-i-Sharif after Taleban try again to take city.

Sept 20: Over 70 aid workers and dependants evacuate Mazar-i-Sharif after their premises are ransacked and looted.

Sept 29: Taleban arrest European Union Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs Emma Bonino, E.U. delegates and journalists for taking pictures in a women's hospital in Kabul, release them same day.

Oct 14: Opposition General Dostum returns Mazar-i-Sharif from exile in Turkey.

Nov 18: U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright calls Taleban treatment of women "despicable".

Nov 2: General Malik routed by former ally Dostum and forced to flee country.

Dec 28: Taleban propose setting up commission of Islamic scholars to set peace terms.

1998 Jan 10: Opposition alliance agrees to Taleban proposal for commission of clerics but stress "other people" have to be consulted too.

Feb 6: Massive earthquake kills over 4,000, destroys over 20 villages in northern Takhar province. Aftershock kills 250 people two days later.

March 24: United Nations pulls 14 international staff from southern Afghanistan, charges Taleban harassment of staff, interference.

March 26: Three opposition alliance leaders agree to demilitarise Mazar-i-Sharif.

April 5: Opposition alliance agrees to talk with Taleban on developing joint commission of Islamic clerics to mediate peace.

April 6: U.N. Security Council urges ceasefire and political dialogue.


April 17: American U.N. ambassador Bill Richardson visits Afghanistan.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO AFGHAN PROGRAMME 1988 TO 1998

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	TOTAL
Australia												603,337.00
Austria		603,337										46,296.00
Belgium		296,556			46,296							596,556.00
Canada	698,099								300,000			10,176,996.00
Denmark					2,395,833	3,877,357	1,214,286		735,294	735,294	520,833	9,566,600.00
Finland	1,540,611			423,729	1,974,672	1,610,306	1,622,146	2,226,345	1,709,402			3,505,192.00
France	906,513	2,090,032	878,735	200,000	431,602		414,353			548,516	370,110	5,039,481.00
Germany	2,325,581	452,381			210,748		350,263	220,682	300,000		82,508	3,011,880.00
Indonesia						233,918						30,000.00
Ireland	95,004					56,338	30,000					151,342.00
Japan	3,200,000	14,683,296		2,058,546	11,283,186	2,000,000		6,000,000			497,300	39,722,328.00
Luxembourg								212,014				212,014.00
Netherlands		721,154	292,398		2,646,061	2,604,167		1,818,182	818,713	523,560		9,424,235.00
Norway	692,844			500,000	614,439	1,156,055	471,471	484,653	459,418	573,729		4,952,609.00
Korea								200,000				200,000.00
Spain		773,281										773,281.00
Sweden					3,894,824		1,909,091	2,255,607	1,197,168	651,042	901,515	10,809,247.00
Switzerland	978,708				1,270,871	349,650		431,034		4,444	1,013,514	4,048,221.00
UK	12,546,468				7,561,437	4,477,612	4,261,215	1,428,571		1,290,322		31,565,525.00
USA				3,600,000	10,780,039	6,500,000	3,000,000	5,010,000	4,000,000	1,500,000	3,190,000	37,580,039.00
Yugoslavia		14,345										14,345.00
E.C.	3,928,697	403,614			4,359,678	6,400,095	3,716,772	11,613,307	4,066,498	794,826		35,223,487.00
UNO			120,000		445,070	24,000	200,000	500,000				1,289,070.00
Private		327,446	2,794	4,871	1,588	81			16,351	143,153	150	496,434.00
TOTAL	26,912,525	20,365,442	1,293,927	6,787,146	47,914,756	29,289,579	17,189,597	32,400,395	13,542,844	6,764,886	6,575,930.00	209,037,027.00



Areas of return




The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir and agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The line status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.

© UNHCR ENVIRONMENTAL DATABASE © ADC WORLD MAP 20 JAN 89

Afghan Repatriation Operation



1. The Board of Directors shall have the authority to declare dividends on the common stock of the Corporation, subject to the approval of the stockholders.

U.S. AIR FORCE INFORMATION DATA SERVICE, 3 DECEMBER 1967

AFGHAN CHRONOLOGY

- 1973 After more than two centuries of monarchy, king Zahir Shah is ousted in a military takeover by Mohammed Daoud.
- 1978 President Daoud killed in coup. Nur Mohammed Taraki declared president of revolutionary council.
- 1979 Islamic opposition (mujahedeen) protest government's communist policies. Refugee exodus begins. President Taraki killed in palace coup in September and succeeded by Hafizullah Amin. Soviet troops enter Afghanistan in December. Amin is executed and Babrak Karmal proclaimed president. 600,000 refugees by end of year.
- 1980 U.N. calls for immediate withdraw of foreign forces. Mujahedeen armed resistance increases. 600,000 refugees.
- 1983 War spreads and intensifies as arms flow to rebels increases. 3.9 million refugees.
- 1987 Babrak Karmal replaced by chief of secret police Najibullah. 5.1 million refugees.
- 1988 Geneva Accords call for withdraw of Soviet troops. While some refugees continue to flee others begin returning. 5.9 million refugees.
- 1989 Last Soviet soldier departs on 25 February. 6.1 million refugees.
- 1990 A peak of 6.2 million is reached, but 350,000 have returned since 1988. 6.2 million refugees.
- 1992 Najibullah government falls to mujahedeen in April. Sibghatullah Mojadidi named president and later replaced by Burhanuddin Rabbani. 1.6 million refugees go home. 6.0 million refugees.
- 1993-94 Kabul reduced to rubble in factional fighting. Up to one million displaced inside Afghanistan. Another 1.3 million refugees return home to peaceful areas. 4.4 million refugees.
- 1994 Taliban guerrilla forces capture southern city of Kandahar. 3.4 million refugees.
- 1995 Taliban capture Herat and advance to outskirts of Kabul. Repatriation from Iran stops after fall of Herat. 2.7 million refugees.
- 1996 Taliban capture Jalalabad and Kabul in September. Najibullah hanged after sheltering in U.N. compound since 1992. Fighting in western and central Afghanistan. 2.7 million refugees.
- 1997 Fighting continues in western, central and northern Afghanistan. Taliban briefly capture northern city Mazar-i-Sharif, but are driven out after 4 days. Repatriation continues to eastern and southern areas. 2.7 million refugees.

1998

February - earthquake in northern Afghanistan (2,000 killed); serious flooding in southern Afghanistan

March - UN agencies pull out of Kandahar (southern Afghanistan) following physical attack on UN personnel by Taliban official

May - London meeting of Afghanistan Support Group of donor governments concerning UN activities in Afghanistan. Memorandum of Understanding between Taliban and United Nations signed in Kabul permitting the return of UN personnel to Kandahar.

June - 2nd earthquake rocks northern Afghanistan (4,000 killed)

July - 4 millionth refugee returns to Afghanistan; all NGOs withdraw from Kabul in opposition of requirement by Taliban that they relocate to the Polytechnic. UN suspends flights to Kabul following rocket attack while UN aircraft on the ground. Taliban begin military campaign in northern Afghanistan capturing districts in Faryab province

August - Fighting continues in northern Afghanistan as Taliban capture districts and provinces throughout the area, including the city of Mazar-i-Sharif on 8 August. UN and Taliban sign agreement which permits NGOs to return to Kabul. Bombing of suspected "terrorist camps" in Afghanistan by US military on 20 August results in complete evacuation of all UN and NGO personnel throughout Afghanistan by 23 August. UN programmes continue under the national staff in Afghanistan.



UNHCR

Afghan Refugee Statistics

13 April 1998



Main Populations of Afghan Refugees & Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)*

Location of Refugees	Number	Location of IDPs	From	Number
Iran	1,400,000	* Herat	Badghis	39,000
Pakistan	+ 1,200,000	* Kabul	Areas north of Kabul	210,000
Russia	— 20,000	Hazarajat region	Hazarajat	35,000
India	17,000	Kandahar	Northern provinces	11,000
Central Asian Republics	9,000			
TOTAL	2,646,000	* TOTAL		300,000+

* Only includes IDPs displaced from 1 Oct. 1996 to 31 Dec. 1997. "TOTAL" takes account of areas of northern Afghanistan known to have produced IDPs at various times as a result of fluid frontlines and for which no reliable estimates exist. Many IDPs from Kabul and most of those in the north are believed to have returned to their homes.
 † Includes all refugees residing in refugee villages (registered & unregistered) & c. 50,000 new arrivals since Oct. 1996.
 ‡ Only includes refugees registered by UNHCR and/or the Central Asian Governments. Asylum-seekers not included.
 § Registered by UNHCR and ICRC. Excludes 3,100 IDPs displaced in 1993-4 who are still living in camps in Herat.
 † Counted by UNHCR monitors between 2 Jan. and 31 Oct. 1997. Excludes IDPs who entered Kabul before 2 Jan 1997.
 Many of these IDPs are believed to have quietly returned to their homes in the Shomali Valley region in recent months.

Afghan Repatriation Statistics

From:	Pakistan (assisted)	Pakistan (spontaneous)	Pakistan Subtotal	Iran (assisted)	Iran (spontaneous)	Iran Subtotal	Grand Total
1988/89	—	200,000	200,000	—	—	—	200,000
1990	63,000	87,000	150,000	—	—	—	150,000
1991	174,000	26,000	200,000	—	—	—	200,000
1992	1,274,000	—	1,274,000	7,000	287,000	294,000	1,568,000
1993	133,000	225,000	358,000	337,000	269,000	606,000	964,000
1994	32,000	71,000	103,000	121,000	106,000	227,000	330,000
1995	77,000	76,000	153,000	92,000	103,000	195,000	348,000
1996	101,000	20,000	121,000	8,000	6,000	14,000	135,000
1997	71,000	13,000	84,000	2,000	—	2,000	87,000
1998 *	8,710	168	8,878	224	—	224	* 9,000
Total †	1,934,000	718,000	2,652,000	568,000	771,000	1,338,000	3,991,000

* From 1 January to 31 March 1998

† Some totals may not add up due to rounding

Assisted Repatriation of Tajik Refugees from Afghanistan *

From:	Sakhi Camp	Kunduz	Herat	Total
1993	8,993	9,538	—	18,531
1994	6,098	4,717	—	10,815
1995	330	998	97	1,425
1996	505	849	—	1,354
1997	3,211	6,986	54	10,251
1998	—	—	24	24
Total	19,137	23,088	175	*42,400

* Another 12,000 refugees are thought to have returned spontaneously

** Repatriation of Tajik refugees in Afghanistan is virtually complete apart from a few small scattered pockets of refugees who may remain in unknown locations

... / More so so

Afghan Refugee Populations, 1980-1998 (as of 1 January)

Year	Pakistan	Iran	India	Russian F.	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	Tajikistan	Turkmenistan	Uzbekistan	Total
1980	400,000	200,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	600,000
1981	1,400,000	500,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,900,000
1982	2,375,000	800,000	3,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,178,000
1983	2,700,000	1,200,000	4,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,904,000
1984	2,800,000	1,500,000	5,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,305,000
1985	2,900,000	1,800,000	6,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,706,000
1986	2,700,000	2,000,000	6,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,706,000
1987	2,878,000	2,221,000	6,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,105,000
1988	3,156,000	2,700,000	5,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,861,000
1989	3,255,000	2,900,000	5,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	6,160,000
1990	3,272,000	2,940,000	8,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	6,220,000
1991	3,185,000	3,000,000	12,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	6,197,000
1992	3,077,000	2,900,000	10,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,987,000
1993	1,627,000	2,700,000	11,000	12,000	-	-	-	-	-	4,350,000
1994	1,477,000	1,850,000	24,000	16,000	-	-	-	-	-	3,367,000
1995	1,053,000	1,623,000	22,000	17,000	-	-	-	-	-	2,715,000
1996	*1,200,000	1,420,000	20,000	19,000	2,000	1,000	1,000	2,000	30,000	2,695,000
1997	*1,200,000	1,400,000	19,000	20,000	2,000	1,000	1,000	2,000	30,000	2,675,000
1998	*1,200,000	1,400,000	20,000	17,000	*2,000	*1,000	*2,000	*1,000	*3,000	2,646,000

* From 1996 onwards, estimates of the Afghan refugee population in Pakistan include all those residing in refugee villages -- whether registered or unregistered. Prior to 1996, Pakistan statistics only include registered refugees. Unregistered Afghans living outside refugee villages are excluded from all Pakistan statistics. The 1997 figure also includes new arrivals. The number of registered refugees in Pakistan as of 1 Jan. 1997 was 815,000.

* 1998 figures for the Central Asian Republics include only recognized Afghan refugees registered by UNHCR or by the relevant Government. Asylum-seekers are not included.

All figures for the Islamic Republic of Iran are based on government estimates. A very small proportion of Afghan refugees in Iran live in camps.

Tens, or even hundreds, of thousands of Afghan refugees live in countries other than those listed. However, no accurate estimate of their total number exists.

**UNHCR's 1998 budget for the repatriation and reintegration
of Afghan refugees stands at US\$ 20,923,585**

**UNHCR's 1997-8 budget for the repatriation and
reintegration of Tajik refugees stands at US\$ 9,676,000**



THIS ISSUE PAPER WAS PREPARED BY WRITENET ON THE BASIS OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION, ANALYSIS AND COMMENT. ALL SOURCES ARE CITED. THIS PAPER IS NOT, AND DOES NOT PURPORT TO BE, EITHER EXHAUSTIVE WITH REGARD TO CONDITIONS IN THE COUNTRY SURVEYED, OR CONCLUSIVE AS TO THE MERITS OF ANY PARTICULAR CLAIM TO REFUGEE STATUS OR ASYLUM. THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS PAPER ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHOR AND ARE NOT NECESSARILY THOSE OF UNHCR.

AFGHANISTAN: PERSISTENT CRISIS CHALLENGES THE UN SYSTEM

By Barnett R. Rubin - WRITENET

August 1998

WRITENET IS A NETWORK OF RESEARCHERS AND WRITERS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, FORCED MIGRATION, ETHNIC AND POLITICAL CONFLICT.

WRITENET IS A SUBSIDIARY OF PRACTICAL MANAGEMENT (UK)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- 1. INTRODUCTION: SUMMARY OVERVIEW**
- 2. AFGHAN ACTORS**
 - 2.1 The Taliban**
 - 2.2 Northern Groups**
- 3. INTERNATIONAL ACTORS**
 - 3.1 States**
 - 3.2 International Organizations**
- 4. BIBLIOGRAPHY**

1. INTRODUCTION: SUMMARY OVERVIEW¹

On 8 August 1998 the Taliban (Islamic student) movement of Afghanistan seized Mazar-i Sharif, the last city remaining outside its control. In the course of their campaign in north Afghanistan the Taliban had taken control of nearly all of the parts of the country's territory that had remained outside its power since it marched into Kabul on 26 September 1996. Just as the Taliban prepared to campaign for international diplomatic recognition, however, on 20 August 1998, the United States launched a cruise missile attack against camps in Afghanistan that it charged contained the terrorist infrastructure of a movement led by Osama bin Laden, the wealthy Saudi exile. The U.S. claimed to have strong evidence implicating bin Laden and his network of exiled Islamists in the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on 7 August. The U.S. also raided a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, Sudan, said to be manufacturing precursors of chemical weapons substances. The Taliban's continued defence of bin Laden and their denunciation of the U.S. raid ruled out any dialogue with the U.S. which might perhaps have led to diplomatic recognition and construction of oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia through Afghanistan.

During the more than twenty years since the "Saur Revolution" of 27 April 1978 brought a Communist party to power, Afghanistan had moved from one stage to another of civil war and political disintegration, without seeming to get any closer toward peace, political order, or sustainable development. The combination of an inimical regional environment, characterized by unstable strategic and economic competition, with the destruction of much of the country's elites, institutions, and infrastructure, has assured the continuation of war among forces based in different regions of the divided country. The victory of the Taliban may put an end to open warfare, but is likely to lead to continued guerrilla or commando activities. The emergence of an assertive Islamic traditionalism in the form of the Taliban has also placed new obstacles in the way of international humanitarian and peacemaking programmes.²

The division of control over the country had remained relatively stable since the summer of 1997. The Taliban movement, originally based in the southern city of Qandahar, the heartland of Pashtun traditionalism and the homeland of Afghanistan's old royal clan, had conquered the Persian-speaking city of Herat, near the Iranian border, in September 1995. A year later, in September 1996, they swept into the eastern Pashtun city of Jalalabad and the capital city, Kabul, driving out the Tajik-

¹ For background information see Barnett R. Rubin, *Afghanistan: The Forgotten Crisis* (WRITENET for UNHCR/CDR, February 1996) (UNHCR/CDR REF WORLD Databases) and Barnett R. Rubin, *Afghanistan: The Forgotten Crisis - Update* (WRITENET for UNHCR/CDR, December 1996) (UNHCR/CDR REF WORLD Databases)

² On the Taliban see William Maley (ed.), *Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban* (London: Hurst and Company, 1998). Maley's "Introduction: Interpreting the Taliban", *ibid.*, pp. 1-28, weighs different characterizations of the Taliban. *Taliban* is the Persian and Pashto plural of the Arabic word *talib*, which means a religious student (the Arabic plural is *talaba*). Despite the tendency of Western media to treat *taliban* as a singular noun referring to the movement, I shall treat it as a plural. For a collection of apparently authentic Taliban material in English see the website at <http://taliban.com/>.

dominated government of the "Islamic State of Afghanistan", led by President Burhanuddin Rabbani and Defence Minister Ahmad Shah Massoud.

At the end of May 1997 the Taliban took advantage of divisions within the mainly Uzbek National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (NIMA) to take temporary control of Mazar-i Sharif. This northern city on the border of Uzbekistan was the only major urban centre still out of their control. The Shi'a in the city, however, mostly from the Hazara ethnic group, resisted the Taliban attempt to disarm them and drove the conquerors out in bloody battles that killed thousands and may also have led to the subsequent massacre of prisoners. A Taliban attempt to capture Mazar-i Sharif again in September 1997 also failed, largely because of a major resupply effort mounted by Iran.

While the Taliban failed in their first two attempts to control the entire north from this urban centre, they managed to establish a long-term presence in the area. They gained the support of many of the ethnic Pashtuns who had been settled in the north by the Afghan monarchy and established a political and military base in Kunduz, which was supplied by air from Kabul, and, according to some reports, Pakistan.

Despite intermittent activity on several front lines (north of Kabul, around Kunduz, north-east of Herat, on the borders of Hazarajat), the lines of control remained relatively stable until the Taliban's new offensive in July 1998.³ The Taliban have constituted a governmental structure which they call the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (*Da Afghanistano Islami Amarar*). Before the summer 1998 offensive they controlled the entire Pashtun belt, from Jalalabad in the East, through Qandahar in the South, and on through the Southwest. They also controlled the ethnically mixed, primarily Persian-speaking cities of Herat and Kabul, which border on the Pashtun areas. Finally, they controlled a pocket of territory in the north centred on Kunduz. They thus controlled the highways connecting Afghanistan to Pakistan, Iran, and Turkmenistan, nearly all of the Pakistani border, all of the Iranian border, and about half of the border with Turkmenistan. They also appeared to control part of the border with Tajikistan, including the port of Sher Khan Bandar. These areas included all of the country's major customs posts except for Hairatan, north of Mazar-i Sharif, which the Taliban briefly held in May 1997. They also controlled the areas estimated to produce 90 per cent of Afghanistan's opium poppies, the country's most profitable crop. Taxes on this crop are an important source of revenue for the Taliban, though they strictly prohibit its consumption. The UN estimates that Afghanistan and the surrounding region produce slightly more than half the world's supply of this drug.⁴

The opposition to the Taliban, known generically as the "United Front", consisted of several groups controlling different portions of the remaining parts of the country, which are largely inhabited by Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras. After the main Taliban offensive, elements of these groups controlled only a few mountainous areas, home to

³ Agence France Presse [Kabul], "Heavy Fighting Rages in Northern Afghanistan", 15 July 1998

⁴ United Nations Drug Control Program, *World Drug Report* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 18

ethnic minorities: Badakhshan and the Panjsher Valley, inhabited by Tajiks, and the Hazarajat, home to the Shia Muslim Hazara ethnic group. Before the Taliban's July-August offensive, the opposition groups had controlled most of the northern tier of provinces from Faryab to Badakhshan (except for Kunduz) as well as the Hazarajat. They controlled the main highway leading to Uzbekistan and the railhead at Hairatan that connects to the former Soviet rail system, with links to Asia and Europe. Hairatan is the only major customs post in their territory. These territories included about half of Afghanistan's border with Turkmenistan, the short but logistically and economically important border with Uzbekistan, nearly all of the border with Tajikistan, and a remote, mountainous, and largely inaccessible part of the border with Pakistan (including Pakistan-controlled Kashmir).

Even before the offensive, The Taliban appeared to control at least two thirds of Afghanistan's territory; their own estimates ranged as high as 85 per cent. Much of that territory, however, was uninhabited desert, especially in the Southwest. Probably the areas under Taliban control at that time included slightly more than half of the country's population, which is currently estimated at nearly 24 million.⁵ The two largest population centres then under Taliban rule, Herat and Kabul, were largely hostile to them, and the requirements of controlling these areas probably make them more of a drain on their personnel than a source of recruits. These market centres provided significant income, however.

The Taliban's main advantage was that they controlled the territory and population in the regions they ruled through a unitary structure, while the opposition remained split and riven by feuds. The opposition was divided into several groups, and each group was divided into feuding factions. Furthermore, both sides depended to a great extent (though precise data are lacking) on foreign military, technical, and financial assistance. The Taliban are supported and were to some extent organized by Pakistan, with financial support from both official and unofficial sources in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab states, while the northern groups have received aid from Iran, Russia, and, to a lesser extent, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The Taliban thus controlled the borders and highways leading not only to their own main supporter, Pakistan, but also the opposition's main supporter, Iran. Supplying the Taliban was thus easier and less expensive than supplying the northern groups. By late August, the Taliban had control of virtually all the country's airfields except for two in Hazarajat, virtually stopping aid to any other region.

The regional competition results from the reconfiguration of the region after the break-up of the Soviet Union. Iran, Pakistan, and Russia are competing for control over the routes by which Central Asia's oil and gas resources will reach outside markets, which in turn will largely determine what power becomes predominant in the area.⁶ The decision by India, followed by Pakistan, to test nuclear weapons has raised the stakes

⁵ United States of America, Central Intelligence Agency, *World Factbook* - 1997 (electronic format)

⁶ Ahmed Rashid, "The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan Pipeline: Company Government Relations and Regional Politics", *Focus on Current Issues* [Washington DC], October 1997

in the region and complicated peacemaking efforts. The independence of ethno-national states in Central Asia has given new prominence to ethnic identities, affecting co-ethnics across borders. And the increasing politicization of Islamic identity has increased the salience of Sunni/Shi'a sectarian differences.

Perhaps the best known fact about the Taliban is the restrictions they have imposed on women, requiring that they be fully veiled, forbidding most education and employment, and imposing strict limitations on their access to public services, including health care. The Taliban have also required men to grow full, untrimmed beards, cut their hair short, and attend mosque. They forbid any social mingling or communication among men and women outside of the family. These rules (and others) have led to a series of confrontations with the representatives of the international community, largely the UN agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) present in Afghanistan.⁷

Despite these rules, until the summer of 1998 these organizations continued to work in Taliban areas, as they did not in most areas controlled by the northern groups. All agencies withdrew from Mazar-i Sharif after their offices, property, and storehouses (including food intended for destitute or famine-stricken areas) were completely looted for the second time in September 1997 (they had also been looted in May). The UN continued to work in Hazarajat, however. Western NGOs left Kabul in July 1998 when the Taliban refused to withdraw a requirement that they all move to the Polytechnic, a ruined Soviet-built campus in northern Kabul. More Westerners left in response to U.S. warnings about dangers to non-Muslim foreigners during the preparation for the raids on 20 August. The Taliban resent the fact that, although they have provided security for UN and NGO staff and property, the opposition, which has failed to do so, continues to be recognized as the Government of Afghanistan by most countries and to occupy Afghanistan's UN seat. Only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates recognize the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Opposition to the Taliban's gender policies accounted for much of the resistance to either recognizing them or vacating Afghanistan's UN seat. Indeed, a significant movement has developed in Europe and North America in opposition to the Taliban's gender policies, and this movement, as much as the interest in gas and oil pipelines, has placed Afghanistan back on the international radar screen. The Taliban's harbouring of bin Laden and his network provide yet another even more prominent reason.

2. AFGHAN ACTORS

Through the past twenty years the identity of Afghan political organizations has changed several times.⁸ During the period of the Soviet occupation, Afghan actors were divided between the Communist or pro-Soviet group based in Kabul and the various *mujahedin* forces based in Pakistan, Iran, or different regions of Afghanistan.

⁷ United Nations, *Report of the UN Gender Mission to Afghanistan, 12-24 November 1997* (electronic format)

⁸ On Afghan political actors during the Soviet period and the immediate period following the fall of Najibullah in 1992, see Rubin, *Afghanistan: The Forgotten Crisis*. Some of the same figures are still active today, but they are organized somewhat differently.

After the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and particularly after the termination of aid from the USSR (which dissolved) and the U.S. (which disengaged), only groups that managed to consolidate a territorial base inside Afghanistan were significant. Such groups invariably took on ethnic or regional characteristics, despite the absence of ethnic ideology in most cases, as this was the only means available to consolidate power in the country. They also developed links with foreign powers, which provided them with military and financial assistance. (See 3. INTERNATIONAL ACTORS for further details.)

The units of political and military action in Afghanistan today are ethno-regional coalitions organized around elites that cohere around territorial units and access to external resources for patronage.⁹ Human settlement in these largely mountainous and arid zones has clustered around river systems that form the basis of irrigation, and towns that are both local marketing centres and stops along long-distance trade routes. Regions, formed around these features of the natural environment and separated by mountains and deserts, constituted the political and social units that were amalgamated through conquest and alliance into the state of Afghanistan. That state originally included a few large provinces coinciding with those regions: Kabul, Jalalabad, Qataghan-Badakhshan, Turkestan, Herat, Hazarajat, and Qandahar. A century of state building had divided these large units into 30 smaller provinces, helping to fragment the broad coalitions that could challenge state power across such socially coherent areas.¹⁰ The collapse of the Afghan state as a result of the war, however, destroyed among other things most of this administrative structure. Once the Soviet troops withdrew, control weakened over the roads that linked these regions internally. Regional coalitions then began to coalesce once more within these historical units, though at different rates and with different types of leadership and economic bases.

These regionally based coalitions form the basis for the new ethno-regional politics of Afghanistan. Each such coalition has at its core a group of men linked by some network. In each case the leadership is largely uniform ethnically and socially, reflecting the nature of social solidarity in a fragmented society. It is precisely because of this phenomenon that the Taliban and other groups aiming at taking central state power are so intent on recentralizing the government and fragmenting such coalitions.

Throughout most of this period, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras each had political-military organizations in which they predominated and that exercised considerable power in the regions where these ethnic groups predominated. Few areas were homogeneous, however, and despite some localized conflicts, there was no massive ethnic cleansing. Pashrun nomads did lose access to pasture lands in non-Pashtun areas, including the northern steppes and the mountain pastures of Hazarajat. The

⁹ On these forms of solidarity, see Olivier Roy, *Groupes de solidarité au Moyen-Orient et en Asie centrale: États, territoires et réseaux*, Cahiers du Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, no. 16 (Paris: Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1996)

¹⁰ Afghanistan under the royal regime and republic had 29 provinces. Najibullah separated a new province, Sar-i Pul, from Jawzjan, making 30. According to some reports, subsequent regimes have separated Khost from Paktia and Nuristan from Kumar and Laghman, making 32 provinces, but this is not confirmed by any law or constitution.

central government was controlled by a largely Tajik group, and military control of Kabul was largely in the hands of non-Pashtun militias, some of which victimized some Pashtuns. Hence while non-Pashtuns groups were determined not to return to the status of dependent minorities, many Pashtuns felt marginalized and threatened.

While all the non-Pashtun groups were allied in the campaign for control of Kabul in 1992, they gradually defected from the Tajik-dominated *Jamiat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan* (Islamic Society of Afghanistan) which controlled the presidency and official security establishment. In the civil war that tore the capital apart from 1992 to 1996, virtually every group was at one time both the ally and the opponent of every other group, regardless of ethnicity.

The main militia fighting for Kabul that was composed primarily of Pashtuns was the *Hizb-i Islami* (Islamic Party) led by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, based south and east of the city. Despite the support this group received from Pakistan, it failed to consolidate a base among Pashtuns, who had no effective vehicle to compete for power. The *shuras* (councils) of Jalalabad and Qandahar, traditional Pashtun centres, had degenerated into ineffectual groupings preoccupied with smuggling and the drug trade. Much of the Pashtun area was dominated by small warlords. Qandahar, in particular, was the scene of frequent factional fighting in and around the city.

The Taliban provided a vehicle around which Pashtuns could unite, despite the misgivings many have about aspects of this group's ideology and close links to Pakistan. Thus while there are two mainly Pashtun groups in the United Front (both formerly powerful but now insignificant), the Taliban have consolidated a political monopoly in the Pashtun areas. Until the Taliban conquest of the North, then, the country was divided between those areas controlled by the Taliban and those controlled by the others, and the actors in these two regions are considered separately below. It is worth bearing in mind, however, that the identity and alignment of actors has continually changed under the impact of regional realignments and shifts in control over resources. More such changes are undoubtedly in the offing, though we cannot predict what form they will take. The consolidation of Taliban control is likely to give rise to new alignments, perhaps including ethnic and tribal factionalism within the Taliban regime itself.

2.1 The Taliban

The Taliban do not represent a totally new phenomenon in Afghanistan. The network of teachers and students from private, rural-based *madrasas* in Afghanistan and the neighbouring Pashtun-populated areas of Pakistan (previously British India) has played an important part in the history of the country for centuries. During the anti-Soviet *jihad* they constituted one of the important sources of recruitment for *mujahedin* in the tribal areas. They were particularly prominent in the *Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami* (Movement of the Islamic Uprising) of Mawlawi Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi and the breakaway faction of *Hizb-i Islami* (Islamic Party) led by Mawlawi Yunus Khalis.¹¹

¹¹ Olivier Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985)

This group had become marginalized as a result of years of state building by the royal regime, which created a new elite (including Islamic scholars and judicial officials) trained in modern schools and universities. The royal regime, the Communists, and the Islamists recruited primarily from different sectors of this new elite.¹² The internecine battles of the past twenty years, in which one faction after another of that intelligentsia succeeded to power, each decimating its rivals, eventually led to the eclipse of this modernizing group. At the same time, as millions of Afghans became refugees, and the country's educational system collapsed, rural *madrassas* provided almost the only education available to a generation of Pashtun boys reaching school age since 1978. The rise of the Taliban occurred a generation after the start of this new educational process, just as the Communist *coup d'état* (and Islamist resistance) occurred a generation after the massive expansion of the state educational system.¹³

Today's Taliban movement (*Da Afghanistan da Talibano Islami Tahrik*, or Islamic Movement of Taliban of Afghanistan) formed in response to the failure of the *mujahedin* to establish a stable government after the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the collapse of the government they left behind. While various militias fought over and destroyed large swathes of the national capital, *mujahedin* commanders in parts of the countryside became virtual warlords. In Qandahar, in particular, internecine fighting had led to chronic insecurity, including rape and abduction of women, and omnipresent checkpoints where armed men extorted tribute from traders and travellers.

A group of *madrassa* teachers and students led by Mullah Muhammad Umar formed the Taliban movement to end the power of these warlords and establish a pure Islamic regime. They succeeded largely because of the military aid they received from Pakistan (see below, 3. INTERNATIONAL ACTORS). This aid enabled them initially to seize control of Qandahar city and province in October-November 1994 and to expand until they took control of virtually the entire country in August 1998.¹⁴

Despite their expansion beyond their original home base, the Taliban leaders remain a group of mainly Qandahari *mullahs* trained in *madrassas* affiliated with the Deobandi movement (see below) in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. This leadership thus has both a regional and ideological component. The two are related, but not because, as is sometimes said, the Taliban represent in any simple way the traditional code of the conservative Pashtun tribes of southern Afghanistan. On the contrary, the Taliban represent an Islamic ideological radicalization of elements of that code under the impact of war and mass displacement. While their restrictions on women may bear some resemblance to the tribal code, other regulations, such as forbidding celebration of Nawruz, the spring New Year derived from pre-Islamic Persian traditions, are

¹² Roy, *Islam and Resistance*. For a statistical analysis, see Barnett R. Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), Chapter 4.

¹³ Rubin, *Fragmentation of Afghanistan*

¹⁴ Anthony Davis, "How the Taliban Became a Military Force", in Maley (ed.), *Fundamentalism Reborn?*, pp. 43-71; Ahmed Rashid, "Pakistan and the Taliban", *ibid.*, pp. 72-89

opposed to traditionalism. Especially in the non-Pashtun cities that they rule, the Taliban enforce this ideology through a new disciplinary apparatus alien to tribal traditions.

The Taliban ruling structure is based on their understanding of Islamic precepts of government. It is headed by an *amir* (Mullah Muhammad Umar) who is assisted by *shuras*, or consultative bodies. Since their concept of Islamic authority is that of the *amir* leading a community (*millat*) of Moslems, Mullah Umar renamed the Islamic State of Afghanistan the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in October 1997.

In making the transition from a militant movement to a would-be government, the Taliban have changed their institutional structure. They do not seem to be maintaining the Taliban Islamic Movement as a formal structure parallel to the state. Instead, the movement is becoming an informal network connecting the leading figures in the new state structure, where power now resides. Mullah Umar, as *Amir al-Mu'minin*, is head of state. Originally Mullah Umar headed a ten-member Supreme *shura* and a military *shura*, both based in Qandahar. After the Taliban capture of Kabul, they established the Kabul *shura*, consisting of the ministers and acting ministers of the Taliban government. Several analysts reported that the Supreme *shura* and Military *shura* coexisted with the Kabul *shura* for some time, constituting a parallel power structure similar to that of a Communist Party in a Leninist regime.¹⁵ These structures may have persisted, but today Taliban leaders claim that they have been abolished in favour of a more conventional government structure.¹⁶

Mullah Muhammad Umar, the head of state, was "elected" as *amir al-mu'minin* (commander of the believers, a title of the caliph) by an assembly of about 1,200 invited *ulama* in Qandahar during 20 March to 4 April 1996. He apparently has the final say on all matters.¹⁷ Subordinate to him is the Kabul *shura*, effectively a cabinet of ministers, chaired by Mullah Muhammad Rabbani, whose position is analogous to that of a prime minister or head of government.

While this government has few resources, and many parts of it are hardly functioning, the Taliban have increasingly adopted a discourse of Afghan nationalism as well as their Islamic traditionalism and are trying to re-create a centralized Afghan state. In areas under their control they have appointed provincial governors and administrators of districts, cities, towns, and precincts from the centre. The administrators are invariably natives of areas other than the ones they govern. The location of the head of

¹⁵ Ahmed Rashid, "The Taliban Movement" (unpublished document). The analogy with Leninism is the present author's.

¹⁶ Personal interviews with Mawlawi Abdul Hakim Mujahid, ambassador of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan to Pakistan, Islamabad, 9 June 1998; Mawlawi Abdul Wakil Mutawakkil, spokesman of Amir al-Mu'minin, Qandahar, 3 June 1998; Said Muhammad Haqqani, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kabul, 11 June 1998.

¹⁷ Interviews with UN officials, Kabul, 9-11 June 1998.

state in Qandahar and the government in Kabul, however, encumbers decision making. It also continues to communicate the message that the Taliban's power is based in one section of the country, rather than in the national capital, which was moved from Qandahar to Kabul in 1775.

Most of the Taliban's resources and efforts go to the war effort and to maintaining security in the areas under their control. They have reduced checkpoints on the roads to a minimum, and petty crime has diminished. They have also established a new security service, the Ministry of Enforcement of Virtue and Suppression of Vice (*al-Amr bi al-Ma'ruf wa al-Nahi 'an al-Munkir*), which bears the same name, based on a Quranic verse, as its homologue in Saudi Arabia. Originally a department of the office of the chairman of the Kabul *shura*, it was promoted to the status of a ministry in May 1998, thus recapitulating the history of its communist predecessor, *Khad*.¹⁸ This ministry is responsible for the enforcement of all Taliban decrees regarding moral behaviour (Mullah Umar charged it with all responsibilities for "guidance," or *irshad*, the Islamist term for political and moral control), including the decrees restricting activities of UN agencies and NGOs.¹⁹ It appears to have an independent source of funding (probably from Saudi Arabia) and has become the most powerful agency within the Islamic Emirate.

Mullah Umar and all but one member of the Supreme Shura were Qandahari Pashtuns.²⁰ All the members of the military *shura* whose ethnic and regional origins are known to the author are Qandahari Pashtuns. The Kabul *shura* is also predominantly Qandahari Pashtun but includes more Eastern Pashtuns, a couple of Persian speakers, and one Uzbek.

Some observers have therefore described the Taliban as dominated by the Durranis, the confederation of Qandahar-based tribes that founded the Afghan empire in 1747 and from which all of the country's kings were descended. Such an analysis has reinforced the belief of some that the Taliban might prove a bridge to the restoration of a "traditional" Afghanistan, that they might collaborate with the exiled former king, Zahir Shah, or that they might be subject to moderating influences from tribal leaders or the Western-educated dignitaries of the old regime. A closer look at the Taliban leadership's tribal origins, however, shows that this analysis is inaccurate and such hopes misplaced.

¹⁸ *The Kabul Times*, "H.E. Amirul Mominin's Decree," 1 June 1998

¹⁹ For the text of Taliban decrees, see United Nations, Commission on Human Rights, *Final Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan Submitted by Mr. Choong-Hyun Paik, Special Rapporteur, in Accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1996/75*, E/CN.4/1997/59, 20 February 1997, pp. 32-6.

²⁰ "Qandahari" here denotes the broad region with Qandahar at its centre, including several provinces in addition to the modern province of Qandahar.

Though Qandahar has been dominated by Durrani for centuries, the area also includes some Ghilzais and other Pashtuns, and the Taliban leadership reflects this fact. Furthermore, there was a traditional hierarchy among the tribes of the area, with the Durrani senior tribes on top, Durrani junior tribes next, and then other Pashtuns and ethnic groups. The Taliban leadership structure shows no trace of this traditional hierarchy. Mullah Muhammad Umar himself is descended from the Ghilzai Hotaki tribe, whose leader Mir Wais conquered Isfahan in 1721, after the Safavid Persian governor of Qandahar tried to force Shiism on the Afghans. (Hence the antipathy between Iran and the Taliban has some historical roots.) His deputy, and chair of the Kabul *shura*, Mullah Muhammad Rabbani, is a member of the Kakar tribe, also not Durrani. Of all the Taliban leaders whose tribal affiliations are identified by author Ahmed Rashid, only one is a member of the formerly powerful Barakzai tribe, the tribe of the Afghan royal family.²¹

Indeed the once powerful tribal structure of Qandahar, dominated by large landholding clans allied with the royal family, has been shattered by the war. As in the other regions of the country, a new elite has emerged. The Qandahari character of the movement is not tribal but a version of the ethno-regionalism described above. In the Taliban case the social network of the elite at the core of the coalition is formed from Qandahari *mullahs* who studied in the same set of *madrasas* in Pakistan and participated in the *jihād*. Hence the movement has a strong ethnic and regional characteristic, without its leaders having any intention to form such a movement, and it has therefore attracted support from many who do indeed seek a Pashtun ethnic movement capable of ruling Afghanistan.

The Taliban leaders participated in the *jihād* as minor commanders or fighters. Few of them were born before 1960, and they thus belong to a younger generation than the leaders of the Islamist groups (who were born in the 1940s or 1950s) or the traditionalist parties (born even earlier). Their troops and even some of the leadership are too young to have participated in the *jihād*, and their formative political experience was not the Soviet invasion and the resistance but the subsequent civil war among the supposedly Islamic parties.

Their core leaders are not just *mullahs*, but *mullahs* who belong to a common political network, the Deobandi *madrasas* in the Pashtun tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Deobandi movement, which owes its name to the Indian town where a famous *madrasa* was established in the nineteenth century, developed from conservative reform movements among Indian Moslems. During the nineteenth century Indian Moslems were split between the followers of Aligarh, home of the Aligarh Moslem University, which provided a Western-style higher education to Indian Moslems, and Deoband, where the *madrasa* provided a conservative education focused on Islamic law (*sharia*) and jurisprudence (*fiqh*). Deobandis looked back for

²¹ Tribal affiliations from Rashid, "Taliban Movement." Rameen Moshref, *The Taliban*, Afghanistan Forum Occasional Paper, No. 35 (New York: Afghanistan Forum, May 1997), p. 6, claims that Mullah Umar is Nurzai. The Nurzai are one of the junior Durrani tribes. Moshref does not provide a tribal affiliation for Mullah Rabbani. During a visit to Qandahar in June 1998 I was told that some Durrani resented the Ghilzai top leadership of the Taliban.

inspiration to Shah Waliullah, an eighteenth century Indian thinker influenced by his contemporary, Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab of Arabia (whose followers are called Wahhabis by their opponents), who provided the ideological legitimacy of the dynasty of ibn Sa'ud. Hence the Taliban's Saudi connection, like their antipathy to Iran, has roots several centuries old.

Deobandis reject all forms of *ijtihad*, the use of reason to create innovations in *sharia* in response to new conditions, the revival of which is a key plank in the platform of the Islamic modernists. They oppose all forms of hierarchy within the Moslem community, including tribalism or royalty, favour excluding Shia from participation in the polity, and take a very restrictive view of the social role of women. All of these characteristics of the Indian and Pakistani Deobandis are found in exaggerated forms among the Afghan Taliban.²²

2.2 Northern Groups

The groups arrayed against the Taliban formed a nominal alliance called the National Islamic United Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (*Jabha-yi Muttahid-i Islami-yi Milli bara-yi Nijat-i Afghanistan*).²³ The fate of several of the elements of this group after the Taliban capture of the North remains unclear. While this group's membership varies from time to time, at least the following belong to it:

Islamic State of Afghanistan (*Jamiat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan*)/Supervisory Council of the North (SCN, *Shura-yi Nazar-i Shamali*).²⁴

This group, primarily composed of Tajiks, is led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, leader of Jamiat and President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan (ISA), the government deposed from Kabul by the Taliban. *Jamiat* was one of the original Islamist parties in Afghanistan, and Rabbani was a lecturer at the Islamic Law Faculty of Kabul University. Rabbani became President pursuant to an agreement among exiled *mujahedin* party leaders in Peshawar in 1992. The most powerful leader of this group is Ahmad Shah Massoud, the *Jamiat* commander of the Panjsher Valley, who was officially Rabbani's deputy and Minister of Defence. Both are Sunni Persian-speakers (hence "Tajiks") but from different subregions and with different power bases. There are recurrent rumours that Massoud is about to break with Rabbani, but this has not happened. Though the ISA holds Afghanistan's UN seat and claimed to rule the entire area outside of Taliban control, even before the Taliban victory in the North, it did not control a coherent state structure. Massoud controlled an area including much of

²² Rashid, "Taliban Movement"; Barbara Daly Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982)

²³ Details on the composition of the alliance from "Framework for Peace for the People of Afghanistan (*Tarah-i Sulh bara-yi Mardum-i Afghanistan*)" signed by nine leaders of the alliance. I thank Roger L. Plunk for providing me with this document. More information on these groups, including historical background, can be found in Rubin, *Afghanistan: The Forgotten Crisis*, and the references therein.

²⁴ This group's former embassy in Washington maintains a website at www.afghan-government.com/.

Parwan and Takhar provinces through the regional administrative structure he established in the late 1980s, the Supervisory Council of the North. In late August 1998 he still controlled his home base in the Panjsher Valley, but had told the population to feel free to move elsewhere to flee an anticipated Taliban attack. Some commanders in control of parts of Badakhshan support Rabbani, though a number defected to the Taliban in August 1998. Massoud's front line has been 25 km north of Kabul, and until the Taliban victories he controlled the Bagram air base, from which he could shell Kabul. He has since retreated into the Panjsher Valley.

National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (*Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami-yi - Afghanistan - NIMA*).

This group brought together Northern, mostly Uzbek, former militias of the Communist regime who mutinied against President Najibullah in early 1992. It also included former leaders and administrators of the old regime from various ethnic groups, mainly Persian-speaking, and some Uzbek *mujahedin* commanders. It has lost all territory under its control and many of its commanders have defected to the Taliban. It is not clear if it has any future. Its founder and principal leader was Abdul Rashid Dostum, who rose from security guard to leader of Najibullah's most powerful militia. This group took control of Mazar-i Sharif in alliance with other groups in early 1992 and controlled much of Samangan, Balkh, Jawzjan, Faryab, and Baghlan provinces. A coalition of militias, it was subject to internal disputes. Dostum is thought to have assassinated a principal rival, Ghulam Rasul Pahlawan, whose brother, Abdul Malik Pahlawan, sought revenge by revolting against Dostum and allying with the Taliban in May 1997. Malik then turned on the Taliban and is accused of killing several thousand Taliban prisoners taken in Mazar at that time.²⁵ Dostum fled to Turkey but with the assistance of Uzbekistan returned to Afghanistan in September to oust Malik and lead the successful relief of Mazar against another Taliban assault. NIMA was the strongest force in the north during 1992-1997, ruling several provinces partly through the remaining state structures of the former regime, but its internal disputes weakened it considerably.

Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan (*Hizb-i Wahdat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan*).

The principal Shia party in Afghanistan with support mainly among the Hazara ethnic group, this group was originally formed under Iranian sponsorship in order to unite eight Shia parties. Its leader, Muhammad Karim Khalili, has to some extent asserted his independence from Iran and is based in Hazarajat. The leader of its executive council of the North, Haji Ayatollah Muhammad Muhaqqiq, commanded the party's forces in Mazar-i Sharif and was favoured by Iran. Wahdat became the major military force in north Afghanistan and provided the backbone of resistance to the Taliban's attempts to capture Mazar-i Sharif. In March 1995 the party's founding leader, Abdul Ali Mazari, was killed in Taliban custody in an incident, details of which are disputed. It continues to control the Hazarajat, which in late August 1998 is under Taliban blockade from both north and south.

²⁵ Amnesty International, *Afghanistan: Reports of Mass Graves of Taliban Militia* (London, November 1997)

Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan (*Hizb-i Wahdat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan*) - Akbari faction. A breakaway faction of Wahdat led by Hujjat-al-Islam Sayyid Muhammad Akbari. Akbari is a non-Hazara Shia (from the Qizilbash group), with religious training in Iran. This faction allied with Massoud and Rabbani at times when the main Wahdat allied with Dostum against the leaders of the "Islamic State".²⁶

Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (*Harakat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan*). A Shia party that never joined Wahdat, led by Ayatollah Muhammad Asif Muhsini, long allied with *Jamiat*. Its relations with Iran are strained. Its leadership is mostly non-Hazara Shia.

Islamic Party of Afghanistan (*Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan*) - Hikmatyar. This formerly radical Islamist party, led by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, was favoured by Pakistan throughout the *jihad* and subsequently became Pakistan's main vehicle for attempts to oust the Rabbani regime. In the face of the Taliban, who captured most of his heavy weapons and became Pakistan's newly favoured clients, Hikmatyar joined Rabbani's government as Prime Minister in June 1996, thereby claiming a role he had formally exercised under an agreement reached in Islamabad in March 1993. After a sojourn in Iran, he returned to north Afghanistan to join the United Front. He now controls few military or political resources.

Council of the East (*Shura-yi Mashriqi*). This faction regroups some former leaders of the *shura* of Jalalabad, notably Haji Abdul Qadir. Former Governor Abdul Qadir reportedly made millions of dollars through smuggling consumer goods from Dubai to Pakistan and involvement in the drug trade, of which his province was one of the centres. Some small groups in the East are still said to be loyal to this group. Like Hikmatyar, he is Pashnun, and his presence serves to show that the northerners aspire to a genuinely national identity.

The "United Front" functioned, and rather poorly, mainly as a framework for negotiating with the Taliban. It did not have joint political or administrative functions in the areas under these groups' control. Until August 1998, the northern areas had four main administrative and political centres: Mazar-i Sharif, which some groups aspired to turn into a temporary capital for a government in exile of the ISA; Taluqan, the headquarters of Massoud's SCN; Shiberghan, Dostum's headquarters; and Bamiyan, headquarters of the *Hizb-i Wahdat* administration of Hazarajat. By late August, only the last was still out of the Taliban's control. Some elements of the former state administration survived in each region, but political power resided in the various armed groups rather than in a unitary structure. The coalition among *Junbish*, *Jamiat*, and *Wahdat* (primarily) that had ruled Mazar broke down as the city's population became even more Hazara (due to migration from Kabul and Hazarajat), and *Junbish* was weakened by factional struggle. Through the middle of 1998, the city remained in a tense stand-off, with the city centre controlled by Wahdat troops led by Muhaqqiq, and Dostum's forces surrounding them.

²⁶ Some information on Akbari was supplied by William Maley, Qadir Amiryar, and David Isby in private communications, for which I thank them. On the Shi'a parties see Kristian Berg Harpviken, *Political Mobilization among the Hazara of Afghanistan: 1978-1992* (Oslo: Department of Sociology, University of Oslo, 1996).

These groups had somewhat different aims. *Wahdat* and *Junbish* articulated the need for regional autonomy and power-sharing among various groups in Afghanistan. Hazara groups in particular insisted on control over their own areas and recognition of Shia law (*fiqh-i Ja'afari*) in their own affairs. *Jamiat*'s articulated plans for the future Afghan state seemed as centralized as the Taliban's, though Massoud was said to have developed a plan for a federal system based on nine regions.²⁷ These groups' attempts to establish a temporary government in Mazar-i Sharif suffered a major setback when a plane carrying 40 of their leaders, including Abdul Rahim Ghaffurzai, the Prime Minister designate, crashed, killing all passengers, in August 1997.²⁸ Ghaffurzai, a Pashtun from Afghanistan's royal clan (the Muhammadzai) with extensive foreign affairs experience, would have given this alliance a more national image and a better international presence. Since then, the United Front was unable to agree on a Prime Minister. On paper, several of these groups acknowledged the ISA and held positions within it: Dostum was deputy to the President and military commander of the northern regions, Muhaqqiq was Minister of Internal Affairs, and an official of the Akbari faction was a deputy Prime Minister. All groups, however, maintained their own military and command structure, and they did not carry out a unified strategy to mobilize resources in their struggle with the Taliban. This disunity was accentuated by the divisions among the northerners' several patrons.

3. INTERNATIONAL ACTORS

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Afghanistan lost the strategic position it had previously enjoyed as a buffer state, first between the Russian and British empires, and then between the Soviet and U.S. led blocs. A buffer state, of course, is consistent with closed frontiers, and for the past century several of Afghanistan's frontiers, especially the northern one, were effectively closed. The isolation imposed on the country by Amir Abdul Rahman (1880-1901) gradually eased, but much of the country's population remained isolated and relatively immobile. This constituted a break with much of the region's history. For millennia before the development of blue-water navigation technologies, today's Afghanistan was at the cross-roads of overland trade routes linking South, East, and West Asia and beyond to the Mediterranean and Europe. These routes brought Greek armies and art, Indian Buddhism, Mongol conquest, and Arab Islam, together with its Turkic military formations and Persian administration, all of which, and more, marked the country's heritage.

The combined effects of the war and the dissolution of the Soviet Union have restored Afghanistan's previous status as a country with open borders crossed by trade routes and subject to the conflicting ambitions of regional powers. The relevant international

²⁷ On the debate on how centralized the government should be, see M. Nazif Shahrani, "The Future of the State and the Structure of Community Governance in Afghanistan" in Maley (ed.), *Fundamentalism Reborn?*, pp. 212-42. Massoud's ideas were transmitted to me verbally by Roger E. Plunk, Islamabad, 31 May 1998.

²⁸ Agence France-Presse [Jabul Seraj], Emmanuel Dunand, "Anti-Taliban Figure's Death in Plane Crash a Massive Loss: Official", 22 August 1997

actors now include not only states in Afghanistan's neighbourhood and beyond, but international oil companies, Islamic movements based in the Middle East, the United Nations, including both its political department and humanitarian agencies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), both Western and Islamic. The U.S. strike against alleged terrorist camps in Jaji district of Paktia province has now fixed Afghanistan at least in U.S. public discourse as a base for terrorists.

3.1 States

The state with the closest ties to and strongest links to Afghanistan is Pakistan, and it is generally supported in its policy, as it has been for decades, by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arabs. Afghan nationalism across the border and Pashtun nationalism within Pakistan posed one of the threats to the integrity of this relatively new country. Pakistan's extreme insecurity results from its confrontation with its much larger neighbour, India; the loss of over half its population and its eastern province (which became Bangladesh) in the 1971-1972 civil war, which ended with Indian intervention; and Afghanistan's historic challenge to the incorporation of the Pashtun areas into Pakistan. Indeed, Afghanistan was the only country to vote against Pakistan's admission to the United Nations.

Pakistan saw the war in Afghanistan as a way to reverse its relations with Afghanistan, providing it with a secure border to the west and north, thereby giving it "strategic depth" in its confrontation with India. Hence successive governments, regardless of ideology, supported only Islamic rather than nationalist groups in Afghanistan, as the former opposed nationalist claims against a fellow Moslem state, or at least did not raise them so loudly. The deep involvement of Pakistan in the war also helped incorporate many Pashtuns more firmly into key military and civilian elites there. As a result the Pashtun question changed for Pakistan. Pashtun elites in the Pakistani state could now exercise clientelistic control or influence over religiously oriented Pashtun groups in Afghanistan. Pashtun rule of the right kind in Afghanistan thus became an instrument of Pakistani influence, rather than a security threat.

The opening of Central Asia added a new dimension to the concept of "strategic depth." Drawing on historical memories of political, cultural, and economic links among Central Asia, Afghanistan, and the Moslems of the Indian subcontinent, some in Pakistan saw trade and pipeline routes through Afghanistan to Central Asia as a key to the country's future security and well-being.²⁹ These would add yet greater "strategic depth".

Until over two years after the fall of Najibullah, support for Hikmatyar's *Hizb-i Islami* remained the main means through which Pakistan pursued the goal of installing a Pashtun-dominated client regime in Kabul.³⁰ In mid-1994, however, the government of

²⁹ Rashid, "The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan Pipeline"

³⁰ For more background and references, see Rubin, *Afghanistan: The Forgotten Crisis*, and *Afghanistan: The Forgotten Crisis - Update*.

Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto shifted support to the Taliban.³¹ Originally the goal seems to have been limited to clearing the road from Quetta to Qandahar and the Qandahar-Herat highway. The Taliban developed their own ambitions, however, and Pakistan eventually threw the full weight of its support behind them as a future government of Afghanistan. Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan signalled a new level of public support in May 1997, when he flew to Mazar-i Sharif with a large delegation immediately after the Taliban's capture of that city, recognized the Taliban government, and announced that all others should follow suit, as the civil war was now over. Pakistan was supported in this policy by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

In the following year, some different perspectives emerged in the Pakistani Government. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Army Chief of Staff General Jehangir Karamat (both Punjabis) supported a more neutral policy and a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan. The foreign minister (a Pashtun) and the intelligence services (Pashtun dominated) held to a more strictly pro-Taliban line. This line clearly won out after the nuclear tests by India and then Pakistan in May 1998, leading to the Pakistani-supported Taliban offensive of July and August.

But the Taliban's links to Pakistan do not end (and did not begin) with the Government. As mentioned above, the Taliban derive much of their religious inspiration from the Deobandi movement in Pakistan. Virtually all of the Taliban leaders were refugees in Pakistan for several years and studied in *madrasas* there affiliated with one branch or another of the Deobandi political party *Jamiat ul-Ulema-i Islam* (JUI). The main branch of this party is run by Maulvi Fazlur Rahman, an important figure in Benazir Bhutto's government, where he was chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the parliament. An important offshoot is the one led by Maulana Samiul Haq, which runs two important large *madrasas*, the *Dar ul-Uloom Haqqania* in the Northwest Frontier Province and the *Jamia Uloom-ul-Islamiya* in Karachi. The various Taliban leaders using the name "Haqqani" are not related to each other; they are graduates of *Dar ul-Uloom Haqqania*. These links remain important and provide new recruits (both Afghans and Pakistanis) to the Taliban. Samiul Haq boasted that most of his Pakistani and Afghan students had joined the Taliban after the latter's defeat in Mazar-i Sharif in May 1997, claiming that "Mullah Omar personally rang me to request that I let these students go to Afghanistan on leave since they are needed there".³² These same *madrasas* provided the Taliban with thousands of new recruits, both Afghan and Pakistani, after the take-over of Mazar-i Sharif in August 1998.³³

These *madrasas* and the political parties to which they are affiliated are also a political force in Pakistan. Through them the Taliban are also linked to more extreme Sunni groups, such as the *Sipah-i Sahiba* and *Lashkar-i Jhangvi*, both of which are thought

³¹ Rashid, "Pakistan and the Taliban"; Rubin, *Afghanistan: The Forgotten Crisis - Update*

³² *The Nation* [Lahore], Ahmed Rashid, "350 Pak Students Captured by Afghan Opposition", 14 July 1997. See also Rashid, "Pakistan and the Taliban".

³³ *The Frontier Post* [Peshawar], "Pak Students Reinforcing Taliban's Ranks", 12 August 1998

to be involved in acts of terrorism against Shia in Pakistan. Many of their members are reported to have gained military experience fighting with the Taliban.

The Taliban also receive support from traders based in Quetta, Peshawar, and Karachi who are engaged in the transit and drug trade. These trading groups are composed of both Afghan and Pakistani Pashtuns. The removal of checkpoints and the establishment of public order in southern and western Afghanistan was of great benefit to them, and they have contributed to the Taliban's treasury and are also regularly assessed, as needs arise. Afghan, Pakistani, and Arab traders based in the UAE have also contributed to the Taliban.³⁴ These traders also affirm their new-found social status through contributions to the *madrasas* where Taliban are trained. They are linked to the local administrations of NWFP and Baluchistan, who are remunerated for permitting smugglers' markets to continue. Officials of these provinces also benefit from the system of permits in force for the export of food and fuel to the Taliban controlled areas of Afghanistan. The Taliban thus have a broad set of links to Pakistan's society and polity.³⁵

Saudi Arabia appears to have continued to fund much of Pakistan's policy in Afghanistan through both official and unofficial channels. Until mid-1998 Saudi Arabia supplied heavily subsidized fuel to the Taliban through Pakistan, in addition to providing general funding. Saudi Arabia feels some affinity to the Taliban interpretation of Islam; support for the Taliban also fits in with their rivalry with Iran and long-term strategic co-operation with Pakistan. Some Saudi companies and individuals also have interests in the various pipeline proposals under consideration.³⁶

A specific Saudi concern has been the activities of Saudi dissident Osama bin Laden, a wealthy businessman who has funded militant Islamic groups in Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere. The United States considers him a major supporter of terrorism and charged him with responsibility for the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on 7 August 1998. Bin Laden was one of the first Arabs to join the *mujahedin's* struggle against the Soviet Union and stayed throughout the war. He funded much of the participation of Arab and other international volunteers. Throughout that time he worked in collaboration with the Saudi intelligence agency and its Pakistani and U.S. counterparts. He turned against his erstwhile sponsors at the time of the Gulf War, when he opposed the invitation of U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia. After being deprived of his Saudi citizenship in 1994, he lived for a time in Sudan, which expelled him under U.S. pressure. He then returned to Afghanistan. Bin Laden, together with a group of his followers, was living under the protection of the Jalalabad *shura* until Taliban captured the area in September 1996. He shifted to Qandahar in 1997. According to diplomatic sources, the Taliban have promised Riyadh that bin Laden would not use his refuge to support any acts of violence abroad, but in mid-1998 the Saudis seem to have become sceptical whether this agreement was being observed. Together with a warming of Saudi-Iran relations after the election of

³⁴ Interview with Afghan based in UAE.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Rashid, "The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan Pipeline", p. 11

President Muhammad Khatami, this seems to have led Riyadh to reduce its aid to the Taliban in the summer of 1998.³⁷

Iran's links to Afghan groups have changed and deepened over time. Iran's policy is dictated by a combination of solidarity with the Shia in Afghanistan (and in Pakistan) and strategic concerns over the U.S. embargo, access to Central Asia, and rivalry with Saudi Arabia. It has reacted forcefully to the Taliban take-over of north Afghanistan, especially to the capture of 35 Iranian drivers by the Taliban in Mazar-i Sharif, and the disappearance of 11 Iranians from its consulate, including diplomats, consular employees, and a journalist.

Iran originally became involved through its links to revolutionary Shia groups that took control of Hazarajat from the more traditionalist formations established in 1979.³⁸ As it emerged from the war with Iraq in 1988 and adjusted to the changes in the USSR, which coincided with the death of Imam Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989, Iran's policy became more assertive. It united most of the Shia parties into the *Hizb-i Wahdat* in 1988 and pressed for *Wahdat*'s inclusion in international negotiations, which had been dominated by the Sunni parties supported by the U.S., Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. From the Soviet troop withdrawal in February 1989 until the fall of Najibullah in April 1992, Iran saw the Soviet-backed Kabul government as the main force blocking the take-over of Afghanistan by Sunni, Wahhabi parties backed by these countries. While it continued to support Shia parties politically, it did not support their making war on the Najibullah government.

The break-up of the Soviet Union and the rise of the Taliban led Iran to undertake a more active policy, in which it provided economic and military assistance to groups beyond its traditional Shia beneficiaries. As the Najibullah regime collapsed, Iran helped form and arm the "Northern Alliance", including *Jamiat*/SCN, the newly formed *Jumbish*, and *Wahdat*.³⁹ It was partly motivated to do so by the desire to block the parties supported by the U.S., Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia from coming to power.

Initially, an attempt to use Iranian/Persian cultural identity as an instrument of foreign policy also affected Iran's decisions. This was the period when Iran was deeply involved in supporting the nationalists and Islamists of Persian-speaking (though predominantly Sunni) Tajikistan. Iran had initiated a cultural agreement among Persian-speaking political entities, of which the signatories were Iran, Tajikistan, *Jamiat*, and *Wahdat*. After a brief moment of enthusiasm, this consideration waned.

Strategically, though, the opening of Central Asia and the Caucasus - the Caspian basin - was if anything more important for Iran than for Pakistan. Bordering on the Caspian itself as well as the newly independent littoral states of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, Iran represented the shortest route to the sea for that region's oil and attractive routes to customers such as Turkey for its natural gas. Its location as the only state on both

³⁷ Interviews with diplomats in New York who prefer not to be identified

³⁸ Roy, *Islam and Resistance*; Harpviken, *Political Mobilization*

³⁹ Harpviken, *Political Mobilization*

the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea increased Iran's strategic and international importance and increased Iran's leverage against U.S. sanctions.

Gas and oil pipelines from Central Asia through Afghanistan and Pakistan were the only other direct southern route. Construction of such pipelines would enable the U.S. to promote its goal of linking Central Asia to the international energy markets by routes other than Russia while still bypassing Iran. Iran therefore suspected that support for the Taliban by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia was not merely an attempt to impose an extremist Sunni, anti-Shia regime on Afghanistan, but part of the U.S. plan to encircle and isolate Iran. By guaranteeing security for the pipeline route, the Taliban would weaken the leverage that Iran had gained.⁴⁰ Hence Iran's efforts to stop the spread and consolidation of Taliban power were dictated by both ideological and strategic considerations.

Since the Taliban's first approach to Kabul in early 1995, when Massoud also crushed the remnants of *Hizb-i Wahdat* within Kabul city, the strategic considerations have dominated. Iran has become the principal supplier of fuel, weapons, and other equipment to all groups fighting the Taliban, including those, such as Massoud, who have also opposed *Hizb-i Wahdat*. Iran supplies these groups by air, as it has no border with the areas they control.

The rivalry between Iran and Pakistan has thus become the principal external factor fuelling the war. It has been worsened by one of the war's by-products: increasing Sunni-Shia violence in Pakistan. This has taken the form of assassinations by small extremist groups, not mass violence. Among the victims were five Iranian officers receiving training from the Pakistan Air Force. The Sunni groups engaging in this violence, *Sipah-i Sahiba* and the yet more extremist *Lashkar-i Jhangvi*, derive from splits in the JUI, and some of their cadres are fighting with the Taliban in Afghanistan, the main source of their military experience.

Nonetheless, Iran and Pakistan have since 1997 intensified their dialogue on Afghanistan in an attempt to prevent this conflict from contaminating the entire bilateral relationship. Iran was very supportive of Pakistan's position over the nuclear tests it conducted in May 1998. Thereafter the two states began a joint diplomatic demarche to the Taliban and northern groups. This entente was greatly strained by the Taliban offensive and capture of Iranian diplomats and drivers, for which Iran is holding Pakistan responsible. Iran spoke out strongly against the U.S. attack on bin Ladin's base, but this event does not appear to have mended its relations with the Taliban.

Russia has also played an important role in supplying the northern groups, especially Massoud. In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the break-up of the USSR, Russia, which no longer had a border with Afghanistan, withdrew from the region. The war in Tajikistan drew Russia back in; it provided about 25,000 troops and border forces to stabilize control of that country by the victors in the 1992-1993 civil war.

⁴⁰ Rashid, "The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan Pipeline", pp. 14-16

Russia saw Pakistan's ambitions in Afghanistan and Central Asia as a threat to its security sphere, which it came to define as the entire former USSR. It found common interest with Iran here as in the Caucasus, where Turkey and the U.S. are the main external powers. Russia had provided some support to the Rabbani/Massoud government, as well as to Dostum, in the interest of resisting Hikmatyar. Moscow and Kabul, however, had a conflict over the Islamic guerrillas from Tajikistan, who found shelter and received aid and training in the predominantly Tajik areas of north-east Afghanistan. The rise of the Taliban led Russia, Iran (where some exiled Tajik Islamic opposition leaders lived), and the Rabbani/Massoud forces to seek to liquidate this problem, in the interest of consolidating the rear bases of resistance to the Taliban. Joint pressures by them on the parties to the Tajikistan conflict led to the signing of a peace accord in June 1997 and the subsequent repatriation of most of the refugees and fighters. At the same time Massoud was granted access to an air base in Kulab, home of Tajikistan's Russian-supported ruling clan. There he received both Russian and Iranian assistance and was able to keep his small air force in repair. While Tajikistan had few resources of its own to give, it did facilitate use of its territory in this way, in conjunction with Russia and Iran. Massoud's loss of all airbases in Afghan territory after the Taliban offensive rendered this access useless.

Uzbekistan also supported the resistance to the Taliban but was more strongly attached to one leader, Abdul Rashid Dostum. It refused to provide assistance to Abdul Malik Pahlawan after the latter had ousted Dostum in May 1997. Iran, on the other hand, had given some aid to Dostum and continued to aid Malik. Uzbekistan supported the return to Afghanistan of General Dostum in September 1997 after his four-month exile in Ankara. Facing what appear to be the beginnings of an Islamic insurgency in the Ferghana Valley, which it blames on foreign supported "Wahhabis", Uzbekistan continues to sound the alarm about the Taliban. It is also alarmed by the Tajikistan peace agreement, which brings Islamists into the Government and excludes the Uzbekistan-sponsored party in northern Tajikistan, and by the use of the Kulab base by Massoud. All of this increases Uzbekistan's desire to have its own relations with an important force in Afghanistan.

Despite persistent rumours and charges that the U.S. supported the Taliban in order to build pipelines and isolate Iran, there is no evidence that Washington ever gave any material support. The U.S. attack on Taliban-controlled Afghanistan should finally lay these rumours to rest. Under the first Clinton administration, the U.S. Government expressed some supportive views about the Taliban. It suggested it might consider reopening the U.S. Embassy if security improved in Kabul following a Taliban victory and advocated engagement rather than isolation of the Taliban in UN forums. Since Madeleine Albright became Secretary of State, however, U.S. condemnation of Taliban policies on gender has been forthright.⁴¹ While the Secretary's own views may have influenced this direction, so has the organization of an influential lobbying network of feminist, human rights, and humanitarian groups, supported by some Afghan women exiles in the U.S., who have made Taliban gender policies into a political issue. These networks include key constituencies of President Clinton and the

⁴¹ Reuters [Peshawar], "Albright Focuses on Afghan Women", 18 November 1998

Democratic Party. The link now drawn between the Taliban regime and international (non-Afghan) terrorists who have targeted U.S. installations and citizens assures that no reconciliation or even dialogue is possible for some time.

The region as a whole, including Afghanistan, has regained a certain level of importance to the United States. In the spring of 1997, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott announced a new policy giving a higher priority to Central Asia.⁴² South Asia also received more attention, because of economic interest in India, as an offshoot of the interest in Central Asia and pipelines, and because of the security dangers posed by nuclearization and the Kashmir conflict. Hopes for improved relations with Iran after the election of President Muhammad Khatami in May 1997 also sparked interest in Afghanistan as a place where the U.S. and Iran have some common interests and can collaborate. As a result the U.S. became somewhat more engaged in Afghanistan in 1998, including a one-day trip there in April by UN Permanent Representative Bill Richardson in March. Richardson was the highest level U.S. official to visit the country in over 20 years.⁴³ The U.S. has so far defined its policy mainly as supporting UN efforts at peacemaking, in the hopes that the country can be reconstructed and pipelines built to Central Asia. The U.S. attack, however, renders all these efforts impossible.

3.2 International Organizations

The United Nations operates in Afghanistan without either major collaboration or competition of other inter-governmental organizations. Unlike Europe, Africa, or Latin America, regional organization has tended to be weak throughout Asia. On occasion the UN has worked together with the Organization of the Islamic Conference, but the OIC's role has been largely symbolic. Alongside the UN are various non-governmental organizations (NGOs), both Western and Islamic. The Western-based NGOs largely work under the umbrella of the UN system. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) also carries out the full range of its activities throughout the country.

The role of the UN system, like the strategies of states, has changed with the transformation of the international system and the war in Afghanistan. Its humanitarian role began with aid by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to the first flows of refugees, mainly to Pakistan, in 1978, and its political role began in 1981, with the first mission of a personal representative of the UN Secretary General.

During the Soviet occupation, the UN's humanitarian and development activities were politically polarized. UNHCR led an effort to help the over three million Afghan refugees in Pakistan in ways that effectively funded a rear base for the U.S.-Pakistan-Saudi effort to support the *mujahedin*. This was eventually complemented by cross-border "humanitarian" efforts funded by USAID that aimed at building the capacity of

⁴² Strobe Talbott, *A Farewell to Flashman: American Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia* (Washington DC: Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Center for the Study of Central Asia, 21 July 1997) (electronic format)

⁴³ Agence France-Presse [Kabul], Stefan Smith, "Afghans Place High Hopes for Peace in Richardson Visit", 16 April 1998

mujahedin political organizations inside Afghanistan. The NGOs that participated in this effort largely saw themselves as supporters of the struggle against the Soviet occupation.⁴⁴ Islamic NGOs provided support for Arab and other Moslem fighters who joined the *mujahedin*, Islamic education for refugees, and other humanitarian activities, also as part of a solidarity effort.⁴⁵ In 1984 the UN Human Rights Commission also appointed a special rapporteur on Afghanistan, the first such appointment for a pro-Soviet country. His relatively frank reports were passed with large majorities in the Commission and approved by the General Assembly. On the other side, UNDP led a much smaller effort in Kabul which supported development programmes of the Soviet-aided Afghan government. Until Gorbachev changed the Soviet attitude to international norms and organizations, the ICRC was excluded from Afghanistan; it gained access in 1986.

The political efforts of the UN during this period led to the signature of the 14 April 1988, Geneva Accords, which provided for Soviet troop withdrawal by 15 February 1989. Virtually none of the other elements of the Accords were ever implemented. The UN essentially provided diplomatic cover for the Soviet decision to withdraw, which was largely negotiated through direct bilateral channels with the U.S.⁴⁶

Until the collapse of the Soviet Union and its client government in Afghanistan, the UN played a complementary role to a U.S.-Soviet dialogue that tried to reach agreement over an interim regime in Afghanistan. This process was typical of that period, between the end of the Cold War, symbolized by the November 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall, and the break-up of the USSR in December 1991; the U.S. and USSR attempted to liquidate their remaining disputes and jointly manage the international system. The humanitarian effort similarly tried to bridge gaps. Following the signing of the Geneva Accords a single co-ordinator was appointed for all humanitarian efforts for Afghans in and outside Afghanistan. The co-ordination operation, called Operation Salaam by the first co-ordinator, Sadruddin Aga Khan, was known first as the UN Office of the Co-ordinator for Afghanistan (UNOCA) and then as the UN Office of the Co-ordinator for Humanitarian Affairs in Afghanistan (UNOCHA). It negotiated agreements making it possible for humanitarian actors to cross political and military lines to provide assistance as needed anywhere in Afghanistan.

While the humanitarian operations continued, the political effort of the UN lapsed after 1992. As was typical of the immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse, political and

⁴⁴ Helga Battenmann, "NGOs and the Afghan War: The Politicisation of Humanitarian Aid", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 12 (1990), pp. 1-23

⁴⁵ Olivier Roy, *L'Echec de l'Islam Politique* (Paris: Seuil, 1992); Barnett R. Rubin, "Arab Islamists in Afghanistan" in John L. Esposito (ed.), *Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform?* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997), pp. 179-206

⁴⁶ Barnett R. Rubin, *The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); William Maley, "The UN in Afghanistan: 'Doing its Best' or 'Failure of a Mission?'" in Maley (ed.), *Fundamentalism Reborn?*, pp. 182-97. For differing points of view see Riaz Mohammad Khan, *Untying the Afghan Knot: Negotiating Soviet Withdrawal* (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 1991); Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

strategic stakes were unclear, and humanitarianism emerged as an all-around response to state collapse, ethnic conflict, and other problems. Such an approach failed in Afghanistan as it did in Bosnia, Somalia, and elsewhere.⁴⁷

In December 1993, pursuant to a resolution of the General Assembly, the UN re-established a political office, now named the United Nations Special Mission for Afghanistan (UNSMIA). It was initially headed by Mahmoud Mestiri, former minister of foreign affairs of Tunisia, until his resignation in May 1996. He was succeeded by a German diplomat, Dr. Norbert Holl, who resigned in October 1997. James Ngobi of Zimbabwe took over as head of UNSMIA, but UN Secretary General Kofi Annan raised the priority of Afghanistan in July 1997 by appointing a high-level special envoy, Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Algeria and a long-standing UN diplomat, to oversee the effort.

While neither Mestiri nor Holl had any successes to show for their efforts, Brahimi took over at a time when the situation was particularly difficult and complex. Since the capture of Kabul by the Taliban in September 1996, the Rabbani government had continued to hold Afghanistan's UN seat, as no member state except for Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE recognized the Taliban. Hence the UN did not recognize the single group that controlled the largest amount of territory and population (especially taking into account that the anti-Taliban groups did not jointly control the remainder of the country), including the national capital.

The UN's humanitarian and development programmes had their own dilemmas. The UN was attempting to implement a demanding form of UN reform in Afghanistan, including new measures designed to deal with the problem of working in stateless environments, at the same time that its very presence remained in constant question.⁴⁸ UN agencies all had separate mandates and funding sources, and, without a government counterpart with which to develop a national plan, each agency and NGO pursued its own mandate independently. In order to bring some order into this chaotic situation, the UN system began a process of developing a "Strategic Framework" to set goals for its programmes in Afghanistan and established a new organizational structure to assure that all agencies engaged in "Common Programming".⁴⁹ These structures aimed to bring representatives of all agencies together with donors and NGOs to make joint decisions about priorities and programmes.

⁴⁷ The literature on the "crisis of humanitarianism" is vast. Two seminal pieces are (on Somalia) Alexander de Waal, *Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998) and (on Bosnia), David Rieff, *Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993).

⁴⁸ On the coordination problem, see Antonio Donini, Eric Dudley, and Ron Ockwell, *Afghanistan: Coordination in a Fragmented State*, (New York: United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1996) (electronic format).

⁴⁹ United Nations, "A Draft Strategic Framework for International Assistance to Afghanistan: Inter-Agency Mission to Islamabad and Afghanistan, 19th September - 15th October 1997" (unpublished document); United Nations, "Making a Reality of Principled Common Programming" (Islamabad, 24 April 1998 (unpublished document)

As if this were not difficult enough, the UN also had to face some of the harshest dilemmas of humanitarian access. After its offices were sacked and goods looted during fighting in Mazar-i Sharif in May and again in September 1997, the UN withdrew from all northern areas but Hazarajat. Hence it did not undertake any programmes in most areas controlled by forces nominally loyal to the government it recognized. In Taliban areas, however, while the authorities provided full security for UN personnel and property (except when they arrested or harassed staff for alleged espionage or violations of their various edicts), the UN and NGOs found it difficult to operate for other reasons: Taliban edicts, especially those regarding women, contradicted international principles and made it nearly impossible for many programmes to reach their intended beneficiaries.¹⁰

The conflict over these issues between the Taliban and the UN was punctuated by various incidents. The UN withdrew from Qandahar and southern Afghanistan from mid-April to mid-June 1998, after the governor of Qandahar threw a teapot at the UN Regional Co-ordinator for Qandahar. This dispute largely erupted over a Taliban decree banning the UN from employing foreign Moslem women staff in Afghanistan unless they were accompanied by a *mahram*, an adult male member of their immediate family. The Taliban also stated that they would henceforth refuse to deal with Alfredo Witschi-Cestari, the UNDP resident representative and head of UNOCHA. They apparently regarded his forceful advocacy of international principles as hostile to them.

In response to these conflicts, the UN sought to reach a written understanding with the Taliban over the principles governing humanitarian and development programmes. After two weeks of negotiations in Kabul the two sides agreed on a "Memorandum of Understanding" (MoU).¹¹ The Taliban agreed to respect the privileges and immunities of UN international staff. They conceded that women could work in the health sector. They also agreed to the construction of 11 schools each for boys and girls and to the improvement of some health and higher education facilities for both sexes. There was no agreement on the *mahram* issue, which was to be referred to international Islamic scholars. The UN agreed to language stating that women's access to education and health care would be "gradual," a phrase which provided a target for critics of the MoU.¹²

Even these conditions seemed difficult for the Taliban, who asked the UN not to publicize the MoU.¹³ Soon after its signing, some elements within the Taliban appeared to try to undermine it by ordering the closure of non-health programmes for women and ordering NGOs to move to new common quarters. The new quarters were to be in the Polytechnic, a ravaged former dormitory without water or electricity in a northern

¹⁰ Claude Bruderlein and Adeel Ahmed, *Report of the DHA Mission to Afghanistan (30 March - 3 May 1997)* (New York: United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Policy and Analysis Division, 15 June 1997) (electronic format); United Nations, "Report of the UN Gender Mission"

¹¹ Afghanistan, "Memorandum of Understanding Between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and the United Nations", Kabul, 13 May 1998

¹² *New York Times*, "Bad Bargain in Afghanistan," 13 July 1998

¹³ Interview with UN staff, Islamabad, June 1998

neighbourhood of Kabul distant from most international offices but close to the front lines. By mid-July, Special Envoy Brahimi openly speculated that the UN might have to withdraw from Afghanistan entirely.⁵⁴ The NGOs in fact left Kabul (though not all of Afghanistan) soon after. Most foreign personnel left Afghanistan in the days before the U.S. attack in response to U.S. warnings.

On human rights, the UN Human Rights Commission continually renewed the appointment of the special rapporteur. After the death of the first appointee, Professor Felix Ermacora, of Austria, in 1995, he was succeeded by Professor Choong-Hyung Paik of South Korea.⁵⁵

In 1997, however, the UN Human Rights Centre, upgraded under its new High Commissioner, Mary Robinson, began to explore a new role in Afghanistan: forensic investigation of war crime accusations. After his return to Afghanistan in September 1997, Dostum announced the discovery of mass graves holding thousands of Taliban dead. He charged that these had been prisoners captured in Mazar-i Sharif and executed by his rival, Abdul Malik Pahlawan.⁵⁶ *Wahdat* also charged that during the advance on Mazar-i Sharif in September, Taliban (or, more precisely, Pashtun settlers who had sided with the Taliban) had massacred nearly one hundred Hazara civilians in Qizilabad village south of Mazar.

The Taliban and other Afghan parties demanded a UN investigation, and some Afghans began to ask for international war crimes trials for those responsible. The UN Human Rights Centre in Geneva sent some investigators to the region for a preliminary inquiry in November 1997. A further mission examined the sites again in May 1998, but by July the investigation had not yet started. After the Taliban capture of Mazar and the North, Amnesty International and others called for the deployment of human rights monitors to prevent possible ethnic reprisal killings.

The political mission was also on hold. In April, under pressure from Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the Taliban agreed to negotiate in Islamabad with a delegation from the United Front. At the insistence of the Taliban, the negotiations dealt with the naming of a commission of *ulama* (Islamic scholars) from all sides who would be responsible for resolving the conflict.⁵⁷ These negotiations led to a tentative agreement on a nomination procedure and a cease-fire, and Bill Richardson, U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN, visited Afghanistan in order to affirm international support for the accord. Nonetheless, soon after Richardson's departure, all the agreements broke down amid recriminations. The Taliban stated that negotiations with the

⁵⁴ *New York Times*, Barbara Crossette, "U.N.'s Impatience Grows over Afghan Restrictions on Aid Workers," 14 July 1998

⁵⁵ See for instance United Nations, Commission on Human Rights, *Final Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan*

⁵⁶ Amnesty International

⁵⁷ *Reuter* [Islamabad], Raja Asghar, "Afghans Say No Progress on Ulama Commission", 28 April 1998

fragmented opposition were a waste of time, while the Northerners argued that the Taliban were still intent on a military victory.⁵⁸ Time seems to have proven both sides right.

The UN continued to call attention to foreign intervention as an important factor intensifying the conflict. The reports of the Secretary General published in November 1997 and June 1998 spoke in unusually frank terms, describing supplies of arms and military training by foreign countries and explicitly questioning their sincerity in supporting the UN mission.⁵⁹ Following a Presidential Statement of the Security Council of 13 July 1998, Special Envoy Brahimi told the press: "The fact is that this war can not go on unless it receives support from outside. The legend that the Russians have left enough arms for fighting to continue for 50 years is just that ... a legend, it is not possible."⁶⁰ Pakistan and Iran, the two major external powers involved in this struggle, were attempting to undertake a joint diplomatic action to resolve the conflict, sending a common mission to Qandahar and Mazar-i Sharif. But it would be difficult to disagree with Ambassador Brahimi's prognosis. According to the press, he expected "the fighting to worsen in the near future. He [said] UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has been warning the international community about the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan and it appears his worst fears are now coming true."⁶¹ While the Taliban victory might seem to bring the country together, it is likely to provoke a strong regional reaction and spark guerrilla warfare. The U.S. attack, which was followed by attacks on UN personnel in Kabul and the sacking of the UN office in Jalalabad, will further reduce the possibility of international involvement in bringing peace to Afghanistan.

⁵⁸ Interviews in Afghanistan and Pakistan, June 1998

⁵⁹ United Nations Security Council, *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security: Report of the Secretary General*, S/1997/894, 14 November 1997 and S/1998/532, 19 June 1998

⁶⁰ *Voices of America*, Max Ruston, "UN Security Council on Afghanistan", 14 July 1998

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

4. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Afghanistan. "Memorandum of Understanding Between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and the United Nations". Kabul. 13 May 1998.

Agence France Presse [Kabul]. "Heavy Fighting Rages in Northern Afghanistan". 15 July 1998.

_____. [Kabul]. Stefan Smith. "Afghans Place High Hopes for Peace in Richardson Visit". 16 April 1998.

_____. [Kabul Seraj]. Emmanuel Dumand. "Anti-Taliban Figure's Death in Plane Crash a Massive Loss: Official". 22 August 1997.

Amnesty International. *Afghanistan: Reports of Mass Graves of Taliban Militia*. London, November 1997.

Baitenmann, Helga. "NGOs and the Afghan War: The Politicisation of Humanitarian Aid". *Third World Quarterly*. Vol. 12 (1990). Pp. 1-23.

Bruderlein, Claude and Adeel Ahmed. *Report of the DFLA Mission to Afghanistan (30 March - 3 May 1997)*. New York: United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Policy and Analysis Division, May 1997.

Cordovez, Diego and Selig S. Harrison. *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Davis, Anthony. "How the Taliban Became a Military Force" in Maley (ed.). *Fundamentalism Reborn?* Pp. 43-71.

De Waal, Alexander. *Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998.

Domini, Antonio, Eric Dudley, and Ron Ockwell. *Afghanistan: Coordination in a Fragmented State*. New York: United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1996.

"Framework for Peace for the People of Afghanistan (Tarah-i Sulh bara-yi Mardum-i Afghanistan)" (unpublished document in Dari and English)

The Frontier Post [Peshawar]. "Pak Students Reinforcing Taliban's Ranks". 12 August 1998.

Harpviken, Kristian Berg. *Political Mobilisation among the Hazara of Afghanistan: 1978-1992*. Oslo: Department of Sociology, University of Oslo, 1996.

The Kabul Times. "H.E. Amirul Mominin's Decree". 1 June 1998.

Khan, Riaz Mohammad. *Unraveling the Afghan Knot: Negotiating Soviet Withdrawal*. Durham NC: Duke University Press, 1991.

Maley, William (ed.). *Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban*. London: Hurst and Company, 1998.

_____. "Introduction: Interpreting the Taliban" in Maley (ed.) *Fundamentalism Reborn?* Pp. 1-28.

_____. "Afghanistan: 'Doing Its Best' or 'Failure of a Mission?'" in Maley (ed.). *Fundamentalism Reborn?* Pp. 182-97.

- Metcalf, Barbara Daly. *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982.
- Moshref, Rameen. *The Taliban*. Afghanistan Forum Occasional Paper, No. 35. New York: Afghanistan Forum, May 1997.
- The Nation* [Lahore]. Ahmed Rashid. "550 Pak Students Captured by Afghan Opposition". 14 July 1997.
- New York Times*. Barbara Crossette. "U.N.'s Impatience Grows over Afghan Restrictions on Aid Workers". 14 July 1998.
- _____. "Bad Bargain in Afghanistan". 13 July 1998.
- Rashid, Ahmed. "Pakistan and the Taliban" in Maley (ed.). *Fundamentalism Reborn*. Pp. 72-89.
- _____. "The Taliban Movement" (unpublished document).
- _____. "The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan Pipeline: Company Government Relations and Regional Politics". *Focus on Current Issues* (Washington DC), October 1997.
- Reuter [Islamabad]. Raja Asghar. "Afghans Say No Progress on Ulama Commission". 28 April 1998.
- _____. [Peshawar]. "Albright Focuses on Afghan Women". 18 November 1997.
- Rieff, David. *Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995.
- Roy, Olivier. *Groupes de solidarité au Moyen-Orient et en Asie centrale: Etats, territoires et réseaux*. Cahiers du Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales. No. 16. Paris: Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1996.
- _____. *L'Echec de l'Islam politique*. Paris: Seuil, 1992.
- _____. *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- Rubin, Barnett R. "Arab Islamists in Afghanistan" in John L. Esposito (ed.). *Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform?*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997. Pp. 179-206.
- _____. *Afghanistan: The Forgotten Crisis - Update*. WRITENET for UNHCR/CDR, December 1996 (UNHCR/CDR REF WORLD Databases).
- _____. *Afghanistan: The Forgotten Crisis*. WRITENET for UNHCR/CDR, February 1996 (UNHCR/CDR REF WORLD Databases).
- _____. *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995.
- _____. *The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995.
- Shahrani, M. Nazif. "The Future of the State and the Structure of Community Governance in Afghanistan" in Maley (ed.). *Fundamentalism Reborn?*. Pp. 212-42.
- Talbott, Strobe. *A Farewell to Flashman: American Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia*. Washington DC: Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Center for the Study of Central Asia, 21 July 1997 (electronic format).

United Nations. "Making a Reality of Principled Common Programming". Islamabad, 24 April 1998 (unpublished document).

_____. *Report of the UN Gender Mission to Afghanistan, 12-24 November 1997* (electronic format).

_____. "A Draft Strategic Framework for International Assistance to Afghanistan: Inter-Agency Mission to Islamabad and Afghanistan, 19th September - 15th October 1997" (unpublished document).

_____. Commission on Human Rights. *Final Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan Submitted by Mr. Chaong-Hyun Paik, Special Rapporteur, in Accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1996/75*. E/CN.4/1997/59. 20 February 1997.

_____. Security Council. *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security: Report of the Secretary General*. S/1997/894. 14 November 1997. S/1998/532. 19 June 1998.

United Nations Drug Control Program. *World Drug Report*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

United States of America. Central Intelligence Agency. *World Factbook - 1997* (electronic format).

Voice of America. Max Roston. "UN Security Council on Afghanistan". 14 July 1998.

