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803 Individuals Extrajudicially Killed
Between March 6-10, 2025

**Preliminary Report on the Violations
that Took Place in the Wake of the
Attacks Carried Out by Non-State
Armed Groups Linked to the Assad
Regime, Mostly in the Governorates
of Latakia, Tartus, and Hama**

Tuesday 11 March 2025





The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), founded in June 2011, is a non-governmental, independent group that is considered a primary source for the OHCHR on all death toll-related analyses in Syria.

Contents:

I. Brief on the Attacks and Violations Taking Place in Syria in March 6-10, 2025.....	1
II. Report Methodology.....	3
III. Detailed Account of the Violations Committed and Recorded in March 6-10, 2025.....	5
A. Extrajudicial and Unlawful Killing	5
B. Targeting Media Workers.....	5
C. Targeting hospitals and vital facilities	6
IV. Details of Attacks and Violations Committed in March 6-10, 2025	7
V. Findings of the Preliminary Analysis of the Visual Evidence Found on the Violations Committed in March 6-10, 2025.....	14
VI. Conclusions and Recommendations	17
Acknowledgment and Solidarity	19

I. BRIEF ON THE ATTACKS AND VIOLATIONS TAKING PLACE IN SYRIA IN MARCH 6-10, 2025

Syria witnessed an unprecedented security crisis between March 6 and 10, 2025, in one of the worst waves of violence to hit the country since the fall of Bashar Assad's regime on December 8, 2024. Non-state armed groups linked to the Assad regime carried out coordinated attacks targeting security and military sites affiliated with the transitional government's ministries of defense and interior. These attacks, which were primarily concentrated in the governorates of Latakia, Tartus, and Hama, prompted formal government forces to launch extensive security operations to pursue the attackers.

In addition to official forces, local military factions and foreign Islamist groups nominally affiliated with the Ministry of Defense—though without any actual organizational integration—participated in these operations. Armed civilian groups also supported government forces without being officially affiliated with any specific military formation. However, these security operations, which began as attempts to capture the direct perpetrators, quickly escalated into violent confrontations accompanied by large-scale, grave violations, most of which had a retaliatory and sectarian nature. Local factions and foreign Islamist groups under the nominal authority of the Ministry of Defense played the most significant role in committing these violations.

These events resulted in extrajudicial killings, including summary executions and mass killings driven by vengeful and sectarian motives, as well as attacks targeting civilians, including medical, media, and humanitarian personnel. Violations also extended to public facilities and dozens of public and private properties. These violations led to waves of forced displacement affecting hundreds of residents, along with the disappearance of dozens of civilians and members of the internal security forces, exacerbating the poor humanitarian and security conditions in the affected areas.

Legal responsibility and the complexity of the security landscape

Since the non-state armed groups linked to the deposed Assad regime no longer have any actual control over specific areas and possess no clear organizational structure, they are not legally classified as parties to the armed conflict under international humanitarian law but are instead categorized as criminal armed groups. However, this classification does not exempt them from criminal accountability under international law.

The security landscape is further complicated by the multiple and overlapping parties involved in the conflict, particularly the intertwining of official forces with affiliated armed factions, especially foreign groups nominally under the Ministry of Defense. This complexity makes legal accountability more challenging and places significant burdens on the transitional government in its efforts to stabilize the security situation and prevent further violations.

Although the transitional government has announced measures to control groups affiliated with it, the lack of actual oversight and weak control over these factions have led to continued grave violations. This situation necessitates a comprehensive and urgent investigation to ensure legal accountability and prevent impunity. In this context, on March 9, 2025, President Ahmed Al-Sharaa, the transitional head of state, issued a decision to establish an independent national committee to investigate and ascertain the facts surrounding the recent events in the coastal region events, which is to submit its report to the presidency within 30 days.

The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) welcomes the decision to form an independent national committee to investigate the events in the Syrian coastal region and considers this a positive step reflecting the transitional government's commitment to achieving justice and uncovering the truth about the grave violations that have taken place since March 6, 2025. While SNHR appreciates this decision, it calls for enhancing the committee's effectiveness and transparency by:

1. Including representatives from independent human rights organizations among the committee's members to ensure greater transparency and incorporate a non-governmental, human rights-focused perspective into the investigation process.
2. Engaging members of the Alawite community and representatives from the affected areas, given the clear sectarian nature of many of the violations documented, to foster trust in the investigation's findings and ensure the committee's impartiality.

SNHR also recommends expanding the geographic scope of the investigation to include all areas where grave violations have occurred, rather than limiting the committee's work to the coastal region alone. Our documentation indicates that other areas, such as the governorates of Hama and Homs, also witnessed widespread violations targeting civilians and their properties. We at SNHR believe that a comprehensive and fair investigation must ensure that no area or victim is excluded from access to justice.

Furthermore, SNHR urges extending the timeframe of the committee's investigation beyond 30 days, as the events under investigation are complex and involve grave, multi-party violations. A thorough and accurate collection of evidence requires adequate time to ascertain the truth comprehensively and objectively.

SNHR reaffirms its full readiness to cooperate with the independent national committee in its efforts to investigate and establish the facts. This includes providing verified data and information, as well as offering the technical and forensic expertise of SNHR's specialist documentation and verification teams, in support of the pursuit of justice and accountability.

II. REPORT METHODOLOGY

This preliminary report is based on data and information collected and documented directly by SNHR's teams, in addition to first-hand accounts obtained from eyewitnesses, victims' families, local dignitaries, and other reliable sources. SNHR's experts also analyzed a number of videos and images, subjecting them to painstaking scrutiny to verify their authenticity by examining environmental elements such as building patterns, types of vegetation, clothing styles, spoken dialects, and any identifiable landmarks confirming that the events occurred within the relevant Syrian setting.

Due to the sensitive and distressing nature of some of the visual content examined, it is not shown in this report. However, these materials are available for analysis by human rights organizations and investigative bodies upon request.

SNHR also relied on information provided by victims' families regarding the killings, with our teams communicating directly with numerous families to verify incidents, as well as cross-checking their accounts with other available evidence to confirm the victims' civilian status and ensure they were not involved in combat.

Additionally, SNHR received reports and accounts about the violations through [an online platform designated for reporting violations](#) during Syria's transitional phase. These reports were analyzed and verified according to SNHR's rigorous documentation and investigation standards.

This report documents the incidents SNHR has managed to verify up to the date of its publication, noting that documentation and verification efforts are ongoing, and updates will be added as new information or evidence is confirmed.

Verification standards used in this report

- Direct interviews with eyewitnesses and survivors.
- Technical analysis and thorough verification of visual materials, including videos and images.
- Cross-referencing information from multiple independent sources to ensure the highest level of accuracy and reliability.

The concept of extrajudicial killings covered in this report includes unlawful killings that individuals are subjected to outside the context of combat operations. This includes summary executions and indiscriminate killings targeting civilians or unarmed individuals, as well as the killing of persons who have been arrested, have become incapable of combat, or have been disarmed. All of these cases constitute grave violations of international humanitarian law and amount to unlawful killings.

Identification of perpetrators

- **Non-state armed groups linked to the Assad regime (referred to as ‘Fulol’/remnants of the former Assad regime).**

These are military or paramilitary formations that remained loyal to the former Assad regime after its downfall. They include Assad loyalists who previously served in the Assad regime’s regular army, security agencies, or pro-Assad auxiliary militias. After the Assad regime’s collapse, these groups continued their armed activities, driven by vengeful motives or as part of attempts to seize control of specific areas, or to destabilize the new Syrian government. They are locally referred to as Fulol (remnants of the former Assad regime).

- **Armed forces participating in military operations**

These include military formations involved in security and military operations during the period covered by the report. They primarily consist of factions and armed organizations nominally under the Ministry of Defense but without actual organizational integration, giving them relative operational independence. Additionally, this category includes personnel from the Ministry of Interior’s internal security forces and local armed civilian groups that participated in the operations without a formal organizational structure.

Challenges

- The large number of victims attacked within a short period created significant difficulties in documentation and verification processes, especially as some areas continued to report further killings and injuries even after the documentation process had begun. This affected the ability of SNHR’s field teams to quickly access and comprehensively and accurately document cases.
- The geographic expansion of the attacks and the simultaneous spread of violence across multiple areas posed an additional challenge to evidence collection and to conducting interviews with witnesses and victims. This led to delays in reaching some areas and documenting the violations which people there had been subjected to in a timely manner.
- The events were also marked by significant overlap between official forces and allied armed factions, particularly foreign organizations nominally affiliated with the Ministry of Defense, as well as between the civilian armed groups that fought alongside non-state armed groups linked to the former Assad regime. Further complicating the matter is the difficulty in distinguishing between civilians and armed combatants in many cases, especially as many fighters wore civilian clothing, making it extremely difficult to accurately determine the responsible parties for each documented violation.
- The deteriorating security conditions and armed ambushes carried out on public roads connecting cities and villages, by non-state armed groups linked to the deposed Assad regime, posed major challenges for fieldwork, limiting the ability of our documentation teams to reach affected locations safely and in a timely manner to collect reliable and immediate evidence.

SNHR emphasizes that this report represents only an initial outcome of an ongoing documentation process aimed at providing the most accurate and reliable picture possible of the violations committed. SNHR must also stress that the current report does not necessarily cover all potential violations but is strictly based on what its teams have been able to verify so far. SNHR can confirm that the figures included in the report do not include the deaths among the non-state armed groups linked to the Assad regime during armed confrontations. The deaths of combatants in the context of military clashes are not classified as violations under international humanitarian law.

For more details on the criteria SNHR adopts in distinguishing between civilians and combatants in its statistics and documentation reports, [please refer to our monthly reports on civilian deaths.](#)

III. DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE VIOLATIONS COMMITTED AND RECORDED IN MARCH 6-10, 2025

A. Extrajudicial and Unlawful Killing

SNHR documented the killing of at least **803 individuals**, including 39 children and 49 women (adult females), between March 6 and 10, 2025. These are distributed according to the responsible parties as follows:


1. Non-state armed groups linked to the Assad regime

- These groups killed at least 172 members of security, police, and military forces (Internal Security Forces and Ministry of Defense) in direct attacks and ambushes. Additional casualties occurred during armed confrontations and clashes as part of the state forces' military operations to regain control of areas occupied by these groups.
- These groups also killed at least 211 civilians, including one humanitarian worker, as a result of direct gunfire.

2. Armed forces involved in military operations (irregular factions and organizations nominally affiliated with the Ministry of Defense):

SNHR recorded the killing of at least 420 people, including civilians and disarmed combatants. Among them were 39 children, 49 women, and 27 medical workers. These deaths occurred as a result of a large-scale security and military crackdown launched by the armed groups in the areas where non-state armed groups linked to the Assad regime were stationed. These deaths are distributed by governorate as follows:

- **Latakia governorate:** 185 killed, including 15 children, 11 women, and two medical personnel.
- **Hama governorate:** 49 killed, including 15 children, 10 women, and one medical worker.
- **Tartus governorate:** 183 killed, including nine children, 28 women, and 24 medical personnel.
- **Homs governorate:** Three killed.



Note: SNHR does not document the deaths of non-state armed group members during clashes, as the killing of these forces is not considered illegal.

B. Targeting Media Workers

SNHR documented at least nine instances of activists and media workers being directly targeted while covering clashes between the armed forces involved in military operations and non-state armed groups linked to the Assad regime in the governorates of Latakia and Tartus.

C. Targeting hospitals and vital facilities

SNHR documented six direct attacks on civilian objects during the reporting period, all of which were by non-state armed groups linked to the Assad regime. The attacks were as follows:

- At least four hospitals were damaged.
- One mosque was damaged.
- An ambulance belonging to the Syrian Civil Defense (White Helmets) was damaged while carrying out medical and humanitarian work at the attack site.

IV. DETAILS OF ATTACKS AND VIOLATIONS COMMITTED IN MARCH 6-10, 2025

These attacks and violations were carried out amid chaotic security conditions and a significant escalation of violence in various areas. As a result, attacks and violations continued steadily throughout the four days covered in the report. Below is a daily breakdown of recorded and verified events and violations:

● March 6, 2025

Attacks and clashes

On Thursday, March 6, 2025, non-state armed groups linked to the Assad regime launched a series of coordinated attacks targeting multiple security and military sites belonging to the transitional government's Ministries of Defense and Interior. These attacks took place in the governorates of Latakia and Tartus, particularly in the cities of Jabla, Banyas, and their surrounding villages and towns.

Key targeted sites included:

Latakia governorate:

- **In Latakia city:** the Criminal Security Branch building, al-Da'tour neighborhood, al-Azahari roundabout, Naval Command Headquarters, the al-Thawra Highway, and the Basatin Al-Rihan district.
- **In rural Latakia:** Hmeimim Bridge, the Salanfa-Jabla-Drekish triangle, Jaba city (al-Noor Hospital - the vicinity of the Abu Bakr Al-Siddiq Mosque), Ishtamo village and airport, al-Qardaha city, Beit Aana village, and al-Dalia village.

Tartus governorate:

- **Harison village,** Banyas police station, Banyas bridge, and security and military points in the Qadmous district and its surroundings.

These attacks and clashes then spread to wider areas in both governorates, leading to a significant escalation in violence.

Clashes and the tactics used

The initial clashes erupted in the villages of Beit Aana and al-Dalia in rural Latakia when non-state armed groups attacked an Internal Security Forces patrol using small and medium-sized weapons, as well as RPGs, resulting in the deaths of around 10 security personnel. The clashes quickly spread to rural Jabla and areas inside the city, where armed groups targeted security and military checkpoints belonging to the Ministries of Defense and Interior. Ambushes were also set up to attack security vehicles coming to reinforce the targeted positions in order to isolate these points and hinder reinforcements.

Fierce clashes broke out on the outskirts of villages in rural Jabla, prompting the Ministry of Defense to intervene with military helicopters, particularly in the Beit Aana and al-Dalia districts. Rocket launchers were also used to bomb areas in the outskirts of the villages of Harf al-Sari, Ba'bada, Dweir Ba'bada, and Wadi Al-Qalaa in rural Latakia.

Indications of planning and execution

Initial field analysis indicates that these attacks were systematically planned and executed under the supervision of trained military commanders, including former military personnel who served with Assad regime forces before the regime's downfall. The attacking groups demonstrated a high level of military training and expertise, which was evident in their use of advanced tactics such as road blockades, targeting supply lines, and isolating battlefronts.

Role of armed civilians in the attacks

In addition to the participation of trained non-state armed groups linked to the Assad regime, armed civilians also took part in these attacks in Jabla. These civilians emerged with personal weapons as soon as the attacks began, with snipers affiliated with these groups positioning themselves on residential rooftops to target security patrols and reinforcements sent by the Ministry of Defense.

In parallel, [a statement](#) circulated on social media announcing the establishment of an armed entity named 'The Military Council for the Liberation of Syria', led by Brigadier General Ghiath Dalla, a former officer in Bashar al-Assad's army, who is listed on SNHR's database as a perpetrator of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The 'Alawite Islamic Council in Latakia' also [released a statement](#) calling on the international community to intervene and protect the Alawite sect in Syria.

Weak security forces capabilities

Meanwhile, it quickly became clear that the security and military personnel deployed by the transitional authorities had only recently been incorporated into the state security apparatus and had undergone only brief military training, leaving them ill-equipped and wholly unprepared to confront such complex attacks.

It is believed that this inadequate training and lack of combat readiness contributed to the high number of casualties among the security and military forces.

Wide alert in Syrian governorates

As news of the attacks spread and reports of casualties among the Internal Security forces and the Ministry of Defense emerged, several Syrian governorates, including Idlib, Hama, Aleppo, Deir ez-Zour, Homs, Quneitra, and Daraa, saw widespread announcements of public and military alerts.

Crowds gathered in main squares, with calls for general mobilization, with numerous former opposition fighters once again taking up arms, and heading to the Syrian coast to support government forces in countering the attacks.

Violations against civilians, media, medical, and humanitarian personnel by non-state armed groups linked to the Assad regime on March 6, 2025

In addition to targeting security and military sites, non-state armed groups committed grave violations against civilians and media and medical personnel, including:

1. Extrajudicial and unlawful killings

On this day, the death toll from attacks by non-state armed groups linked to the Assad regime reached its peak. Over four days, these groups killed at least 383 individuals, distributed as follows:

- At least 172 members of state security, police, and military forces were killed in confrontations and ambushes set up by the non-state armed groups linked to the Assad regime.
- At least 211 civilians, including women and children, were killed in mass executions and systematic attacks targeting residential neighborhoods and public roads.

2. Targeting civilians and public and private properties

- Civilian cars and motorcycles were targeted in attacks believed to be motivated by retaliatory and sectarian motives. Many vehicles with [Idlib license plates](#) were deliberately attacked, and several victims' bodies were burned inside them. It is estimated that at least 32 civilian vehicles were targeted.
- Homes near conflict areas were bombed.
- Gunfire was used in populated residential areas, intimidating residents and preventing them from leaving.
- Security and administrative headquarters were besieged, complicating evacuation and medical aid efforts.

3. Targeting journalists and activists

We recorded nine cases of assaults and attacks on journalists and activists, including:

- A media team from Al Jazeera, along with several media activists, was directly targeted in rural Latakia. [Media worker Ryad al-Hussein](#), from Aleppo city, was shot in the thigh in this attack and transported to Tishreen Hospital for treatment.

- Media worker Fares al-Saleh, born in 1990, a reporter for Dalal Kurdish Radio, from al-Sfira city in eastern rural Aleppo governorate, was ambushed on the outskirts of Jabla. [His vehicle](#) was severely damaged by heavy gunfire, and he was besieged for several hours before Ministry of Defense personnel could reach him.
- Media worker Hadi al-Taha, from Me'rata village in southern rural Idlib, was injured while covering clashes between security forces and armed groups in rural Latakia.

4. Targeting medical personnel and hospitals

- [A Syrian Civil Defense ambulance was targeted](#) at the southern entrance to Latakia city while transporting injured people for treatment.
- Non-state armed groups stormed al-Noor Hospital and the National Hospital in Jabla in search of injured security and military personnel, targeting security guards and attacking medical staff and patients.
- Banyas National Hospital was besieged, and the building was subjected to gunfire, injuring members of the medical staff.

● Escalation of attacks and violations starting March 7, 2025, and the role of undisciplined armed groups

Increased clashes and loss of control

Starting on the morning of March 7, 2025, military confrontations between the Ministry of Defense and Interior forces, supported by allied armed groups, and non-state armed groups linked to the Assad regime, saw an unprecedented escalation and a significant expansion of operations. In this context, the negative role of undisciplined armed groups supporting the authorities became apparent, as these forces were clearly not formally under the command of the Ministries of Defense and Interior. This resulted in a lack of control over these groups' actions, leading to their perpetrating violations against civilians and causing widespread damage to public and private property.

Large-scale security campaign and violent raids

Amid escalating military actions, the forces affiliated with the Ministries of Defense and Interior, backed by supporting armed factions, launched a wide-ranging security campaign covering dozens of villages and towns that had witnessed ambushes and clashes over the previous two days.

This crackdown saw participants shooting randomly and directly at homes, and carrying out mass arrests targeting males over 18, as well as perpetrating a number of summary executions of civilians without any effort to clearly distinguish between civilians and combatants. In western rural Hama and rural Homs, notably in villages including al-Bayyada, al-Bustan, Jeb Ramla, and al-Rasafa, security forces conducted sweeping raids in which homes were burnt down, particularly in the villages of al-Bustan and al-Bayyada.

Casualties and losses from security operations

In the absence of a clear central command or an effective mechanism to control the movements of the pro-Assad armed groups, the events saw a surge in indiscriminate killings, looting, and repeated assaults on civilians and their property. Some factions exploited the security chaos to commit grave violations, including:

- Burning homes and looting private property.
- Carrying out summary executions against residents of areas that were previously considered strongholds of non-state armed groups linked to the Assad regime.

The escalation of events since March 7, 2025, clearly indicate that the lack of central control and effective oversight by the Ministries of Defense and Interior over their supporting affiliated groups, as well as their failure to adhere to military and legal regulations, were major factors in the increasing scale of violations against civilians. While the official operations aimed to pursue non-state armed groups linked to the Assad regime, some of these operations quickly turned into large-scale acts of retaliation, accompanied by mass killings and looting carried out by undisciplined armed groups.

Due to the complex nature of these events, SNHR documented incidents of mass killings that targeted civilians, including entire families, and investigations are still ongoing to accurately identify those responsible. Initial information, as well as accounts by witnesses and victims collected by SNHR teams, indicate the involvement of undisciplined armed groups, including foreign groups, in committing many of these violations. In this context, SNHR documented the killing of at least **420 people** (both civilians and disarmed fighters), including 39 children, 49 women, and 27 medical personnel, during the continuous security and military operations over the three days following March 6, 2025.

Key areas that witnessed mass killings by governorate

Governorate	Areas
Latakia	Al-Mukhtariya village, al-Sanawbar village, Ein al-Arous village, al-Shalfatiya village, Bostan al-Basha village, al-Heffa town, al-Bassa village, Jabla city, Latakia city, Bsisin village, Ghniri village
Hama	Al-Shir village, al-Rasafa village, al-Thwym village, Arza village, al-Alamin village, al-Bustan village, Bostan al-Fandara village (in rural Misyaf), al-Shamsiya village, Birin village, Salhab city.
Tartus	Banyas city, Quneitra alley (Kartou subdisrtict), Barmiya village
Homs	Btisa village.

The documented information indicates that Latakia governorate witnessed the highest number of mass killings (12 different areas), followed by Hama governorate (10 areas), highlighting the widespread nature of retaliatory and sectarian violence in the western and southern rural parts of both governorates. In Tartus governorate, mass killings were recorded in three main areas, with Banyas city standing out as a clear example of the loss of control and the sharp deterioration in security conditions.

Banyas city: A stark example of loss of control after the targeting of security forces

Between March 6 and 9, 2025, Banyas city in rural Tartus governorate witnessed a series of bloody events that began with an armed attack by non-state armed groups linked to the Assad regime targeting Internal Security forces' positions. The situation quickly escalated into violent confrontations that resulted in the Internal Security forces' losing control over the city.

1. The first phase: Coordinated attack on security forces (March 6, 2025)

- Non-state armed groups linked to the Assad regime launched simultaneous and organized attacks targeting sites belonging to the Internal Security forces, particularly the Banyas police station in the al-Qusour neighborhood.
- These attacks resulted in the killing and injury of many Internal Security personnel, leading to a rapid collapse of security control within the city.

Control over large parts of the city

- The non-state armed groups linked to the Assad regime managed to seize control of approximately 75 percent of Banyas city's neighborhoods following clashes with local residents who attempted to defend their areas, supported by personnel affiliated with the Ministries of Defense and Interior.
- By evening, al-Qusour neighborhood (an area with a predominantly Alawite population), where the non-state armed groups linked to the Assad regime had taken up position, was subjected to artillery and rocket bombardment by government forces from the outskirts of the city, resulting in civilian casualties. This was accompanied by intense and indiscriminate exchanges of gunfire, leading to further civilian deaths inside the city's neighborhoods.

2. The second phase: Raids and executions (March 7 - 9, 2025)

Entry of government forces and pro-Assad armed groups

- The forces of the Ministries of Defense and Interior, supported by foreign and local factions, as well as armed civilian groups from surrounding areas, launched a counteroffensive to regain control of the city and break the siege imposed by the non-state armed groups linked to the Assad regime. These non-state armed groups withdrew towards nearby Alawite-majority villages in the surrounding mountainous area.
- The military confrontations and raids were concentrated in al-Qusour neighborhood, which witnessed intense and widespread clashes.

Executions and field killings

- During these operations, summary executions and killings took place inside homes, targeting entire families. The victims of these killings were not limited to men, but included women and children.
- SNHR was able to document the killing of at least **179 people**, including nine children, 28 women, and 24 medical personnel.
- Instances of direct clashes were also recorded between armed groups supporting the government's security forces on one side and elements of the Internal Security forces who attempted to prevent indiscriminate killings on the other. In some cases, these clashes escalated into armed confrontations between the two sides.
- These operations were accompanied by widespread looting and destruction, including the burning of shops, vehicles, and both public and private properties, further worsening the humanitarian and security situation in the city.

V. FINDINGS OF THE PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE VISUAL EVIDENCE FOUND ON THE VIOLATIONS COMMITTED IN MARCH 6-10, 2025

As part of SNHR's efforts to document and verify the grave human rights violations that occurred between March 6 and 10, 2025, SNHR conducted an in-depth analysis of several widely circulated video clips collected from open sources. Given the sensitive and distressing content of these videos, and out of respect for the dignity of the victims and the feelings of their families, as well as in accordance with international human rights standards, this report does not include direct publication of these videos. Instead, we provide a detailed analysis of their content and the possible human rights violations they reflect. It should be noted that some of the links included here contain distressing or shocking images, and they have been incorporated into the report solely for documentation and human rights analysis purposes.

At least **38 video** clips related to the documented violations were reviewed and analyzed, and these videos were categorized into several primary types:

1. Videos documenting victims on public roads


- **Content:** These clips show multiple bodies scattered on public roads, with clear evidence of the targeted vehicles being shot at or blown up. The victims' visible injuries suggest that they were either killed in armed ambushes or in indiscriminate attacks while traveling.
- **Analysis:** Through analysis of these videos, the dialects spoken by individuals appearing in some recordings, as well as the vehicle license plates seen in them, suggest that these incidents indeed took place inside Syrian territory. However, due to poor video quality and the absence of distinct geographical landmarks, it was not possible to determine the exact location, date, or time of the recordings at the time of compiling this preliminary report.

2. Videos documenting victims gathered in specific locations

- **Content:** These clips depict numerous victims' bodies densely stacked on top of each other in designated locations. The manner in which the bodies are piled on top of one another and their positioning strongly indicate that these were victims of summary executions or systematic mass killings, rather than casualties of direct armed clashes.
- **Analysis:** These videos were subjected to thorough examination based on the review and analysis of visible environmental elements in the footage, specifically:
 - The nature of the victims' clothing.
 - The architectural style of buildings and streets seen in the background.
 - The type of trees and vegetation present at the locations.


Initial analysis suggests that these videos were recorded inside Syria and that the environmental details surrounding the victims align with the current geographical and environmental conditions of the areas where the violations are believed to have occurred. Additionally, no weapons were visible near the victims' bodies, which included a number of elderly individuals, reinforcing the likelihood that many of these victims were not combatants and were not engaged in direct clashes at the time of the killings.

Illustrative image taken from one of the analyzed video clips



- The positions of these bodies are very similar, with most lying in the same direction, suggesting the likelihood that they were victims of summary execution rather than combatants killed during direct armed clashes.

Illustrative image taken from one of the analyzed video clips



3. Videos documenting humiliating treatment of detainees and prisoners

- **Content:** In this type of videos, fighters are seen wearing [non-uniform clothing](#), some of which differ [from official Syrian security uniforms](#), suggesting that they could be undisciplined military personnel or individuals not officially under the command of the Ministry of Defense or Interior.
- Some videos also show individuals wearing [official uniforms](#) or [vehicles displaying the new Syrian police insignia](#), increasing the likelihood that these videos were filmed inside Syria.
- While the inability to determine the precise time that these videos were filmed leaves scope for multiple possibilities, the similarity of their context to the field events reported during that period supports the assumption that they are linked to the violations that took place between March 6 and 10, 2025.

4. Analysis of the victims' status and the legality of their killings

- If victims appear in civilian clothing but with weapons next to them, this could indicate that they were armed during the clashes.
- In most of the videos, however, the victims do not have weapons near them, leaving two main possibilities:
 - They were prisoners captured during battle (whose weapons had been confiscated), meaning they were subjected to summary execution without trial, which constitutes a war crime under international law.
 - They were civilians killed without any verification of whether they were armed, raising serious concerns about human rights violations.

Conclusion

The footage examined by SNHR strongly suggests the likelihood of summary executions, as victims' bodies were found in similar positions, without any weapons nearby, indicating that they were not engaged in active combat when they were killed. Some footage also revealed clear evidence that the killings occurred in designated locations, with a recurring pattern in body placement, further supporting the possibility of extrajudicial executions.

The presence of individuals in civilian clothing suggests the involvement of unofficial or undisciplined paramilitary groups in these operations. Since some videos include footage of vehicles bearing government insignia, this requires deeper investigation to determine the identity of those responsible and the extent of their involvement.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

1. Serious violations

The facts documented in this report confirm that serious violations of international human rights law occurred between March 6 and 10, 2025. These violations include mass killings, summary executions, and the targeting of civilians, including children, women, medical personnel, and journalists.

2. Shared responsibility for violations and complexities in identifying perpetrators

These events involved multiple actors, making it extremely difficult to precisely determine individual responsibility. SNHR holds all parties responsible for these violations, particularly non-state armed groups linked to the Assad regime and unregulated armed groups that operated without a clear central command.

3. Weak capacity of security forces and the transitional army to maintain security

The armed confrontations revealed a significant weakness in the ability of Syria's state security agencies and government military forces to handle large-scale security challenges. These challenges include a lack of legal training and poor operational planning. It was also evident from these events that the transitional government has failed to exert central control over the armed groups loyal to it, contributing to a significant escalation in field violations.

4. Increasing sectarian nature

These events showed a significant rise in sectarian rhetoric and behavior, exacerbating the impact of violations on civilians who suffered from mass killings, acts of revenge, and systematic targeting of their properties. This led to large waves of displacement and worsening humanitarian crises.

5. The need for justice and accountability

The nature and scale of the violations highlight the urgent need for independent and comprehensive investigations and for holding those responsible accountable. The absence of accountability poses a serious risk of continued violence and entrenches impunity.

Recommendations

To the transitional government

1. Control the armed forces and affiliated groups and prevent further violations

- Establish clear and effective mechanisms to ensure oversight and accountability for the actions of armed groups affiliated with the transitional government.
- Require these groups to fully comply with international human rights law during security and military operations.

2. Conduct an independent and transparent investigation and ensure accountability

- Form a broad, independent national committee to investigate the committed crimes, with participation from independent local human rights organizations.
- Prosecute those involved in violations and conduct fair trials to prevent impunity.

3. Protect civilians and secure their humanitarian needs

- Ensure immediate and effective protection for civilians in areas experiencing clashes or security tensions.

4. Restructure and rehabilitate security and military agencies

- Restructure the security and military forces to enhance their efficiency and ensure compliance with international law.
- Provide specialist training programs focused on respecting human rights standards during field operations.

To security forces and the military

- Take the necessary measures to protect hospitals and medical facilities from any targeting during military operations.
- Ensure the protection of journalists and media personnel and allow them to cover events safely and freely.
- Prevent any sectarian or politically motivated acts of revenge and prosecute those involved in military courts.

To judicial authorities and government institutions

- Strengthen the independence of the Syrian judiciary to ensure immediate and fair accountability for those suspected of or involved in perpetrating violations.
- Establish a national fund to compensate victims and those affected, in addition to launching urgent rehabilitation and reconstruction programs in areas impacted by violations.

To Syrian society and civil society organizations

- Support professional documentation efforts for violations to secure necessary evidence for future accountability.
- Strengthen local and community efforts to ease sectarian tensions and support civil initiatives that promote peaceful coexistence and social dialogue while avoiding acts of revenge under all circumstances.

To local actors (religious and social institutions)

- Launch local campaigns to combat sectarian incitement and hate speech, promoting social cohesion and peaceful coexistence through dialogue and social and cultural awareness.
- Advocate for the establishment of local reconciliation committees involving trusted community figures to help reduce sectarian and social tensions and create suitable conditions for the success of transitional justice efforts.
- Emphasize the role of community leaders in spreading clear messages that call for coexistence and in rejecting violence while contributing to calming inflammatory rhetoric within society.

To the UN and the international community

- The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (COI) must urgently follow up on recent events and conduct an independent investigation to document crimes and violations and clearly identify the responsible parties.
- Support national organizations working on documenting violations, as well as relief organizations, and those promoting civil peace.
- Call on the international community and humanitarian organizations to provide urgent emergency assistance to those affected by military operations, especially in Latakia, Tartus, and Hama, and ensure immediate humanitarian and medical aid reaches the affected populations.

Acknowledgment and Solidarity

SNHR wishes to express our deep solidarity with all victims and their families, as well as with all civilians and Internal Security personnel affected by these painful events. Our deepest condolences go to their families. We also extend our appreciation and gratitude to all those who contributed information to this report, including witnesses, activists, survivors, and victims' family members.



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No justice without accountability

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