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BRIEF

SOMALIA | Luuq District

Protection Analysis Update | June 2025

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The conflict landscape in Somalia during 2024-2025 is characterized by fighting between the government forces and non-state armed actors (e.g. Al-Shabaab, ISIS) and persistent inter and intra-clan conflicts.ⁱ In Luuq District of Gedo Region, the conflict involving the allied Reer Hassan and Gabaawayn clans on one side, and the Macalin Wayne on the other, has escalated since July 2024ⁱⁱ. Primarily originating from land disputes and control of the Luuq local administration, the conflict has resulted in approximately 88,452 individuals (14,742 households) being displaced and seeking refuge in safer areas, such as Dogob, Dhuycaley, Shadiley, Kulmiye, Yurkud, Bashiir, and Xaanowayn and neighboring districts. Despite multiple peace negotiation attempts by clan elders, Jubaland regional and national government officials, the situation remains unstable, with no fruitful peace agreement reached.ⁱⁱⁱ The most prevalent protection risks^{iv} faced by the populations in Luuq district are as follows:

- **Unlawful impediments or restrictions to freedom of movement, siege and forced displacements.**
- **Attacks on civilians and unlawful killings, and attacks on civilian objects.**
- **Forced recruitment and association of children in armed forces and groups.**
- **Forced family separation which affects children.**

URGENT ACTIONS NEEDED

- Stronger involvement from both local and federal governments is needed to address existing grievances, negotiate and enforce peace agreements, and prevent further escalation of violence.
- Strengthen community-based protection/community self-protection mechanisms and support inclusive community protection structures.
- Support disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs for children formerly associated with armed forces and groups, including those involved in armed conflict.
- Promote the piloting of a Civilian Self-Protection Strategy to equip communities with the tools to prevent, reduce and mitigate protection risks through strengthening their own civilian self-protection approaches.

CONTEXT

POPULATION	NO OF VERIFIED SITES	INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE (EST.)	MAIN TRIGGER OF DISPLACEMENT	LEVEL OF HUMANITARIAN ACCESS
145,645	36	65,179 ^v	CONFLICT & INSECURITY	MODERATE ACCESS CONSTRAINTS


The protection environment in Somalia has deteriorated significantly due to a complex interplay of several factors that include chronic conflicts, recurrent climatic shocks and fragmented governance^{vi}. Clan-based dynamics remain central to many conflicts, with competition over resources driving different clans to attempt to dominate or displace others.

The absence of effective law enforcement and weak implementation of local clan agreements has allowed tensions to continue even after persistent resolution attempts^{vii}. This is further complicated by political instability, where weak governance structures at local and state levels contribute to prolonged conflicts.^{viii}

The militarization of communities, with clan-based militias receiving support from their community members often exacerbates hostilities. Additionally, the presence of Non-State Armed Actors, particularly Al-Shabaab in areas like Luuq, complicates peace negotiations and humanitarian responses, as they control certain parts of the region and influence local communities.^{ix}

A 20-day ceasefire, negotiated by traditional leaders, took effect on 15 November 2024; however, fighting resumed in February 2025, highlighting the limited progress made toward a sustainable resolution.

The presence of a multitude of armed actors within Luuq district, comprising State forces (e.g. Somali National Army (SNA), National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), Federal Police, Ethiopian National Defense Forces) alongside non-state armed actors such as clan-affiliated militias, District Commissioner aligned armed personnel, and the presence of Al-Shabaab has rendered the Luuq district a complex environment which heightens protection risks for civilians, including restricted movement, increased vulnerability to violence, limited service access, and elevated risks of forced recruitment—particularly affecting children and requiring specialized protection interventions and careful humanitarian programming.



PROTECTION RISKS

RISK 1

Unlawful impediments or restrictions to freedom of movement, siege and forced displacements

The triggers and contributing factors include:

- Clan-based dynamics in Luuq often trigger conflicts as different clans compete over resources and seek to dominate or displace others.^x
- Resource competition is the primary driver of conflict in Luuq, with disputes over access to water, grazing land, fertile farmland, and commercial land at the center of inter-clan tensions. Control over revenue streams, such as local businesses, markets, and the airport, further exacerbates grievances and fuels violence. These dynamics are compounded by climatic shocks, particularly prolonged droughts, which intensify competition over scarce resources.
- Absence of enforcement (the law and local clan agreements) even when agreements are reached (primarily through tribal elders) as there is a lack of government capacity and enforcement, allowing tensions and violence to persist.^{xi}
- Political instability and weak governance structures, especially at local and state levels, contribute to prolonged conflicts and prevent solutions from being implemented.
- Militarization of both local militias and non-state armed actors (Al-Shabaab) with support from external forces sometimes exacerbate the situation. Clan-based militias are often seen as supporting their own community's interests, leading to retaliatory killings linked to clan-based grievances.
- The presence and involvement of non-state armed actors (Al-Shabaab), particularly in the outskirts of Luuq, complicates peace negotiations and the humanitarian response, as they control certain parts of the region and influence local communities.

Between July-October 2024, Luuq district recorded three waves of conflicts that displaced over 80,000^{xii} people into the neighboring districts because of fighting between government and Al-Shabaab and inter-clan violence fueled by clan militias. By January 2025, displacement figures had risen to an estimated 165,000, marking the highest projected conflict-induced displacement in Somalia for the first quarter of 2025.^{xiii} The separation of communities along conflict frontlines has significantly restricted freedom of movement, with minority groups often facing barriers to accessing assistance in certain clan-controlled areas. Further, this fragmentation impedes equitable delivery of assistance.

The most affected groups include 1) Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) as many of the displaced persons are unable to return to their original locations due to ongoing violence and the fear of revenge killings. IDP camps are often settled along clan affiliations; 2) Persons affiliated with minority and marginalized groups, whose vulnerability is heightened by social and economic marginalization, lack of legal protections, and the absence of equal political representation in comparison to the majority clans, render them susceptible to exploitation and further displacement.^{xiv}; 3) Vulnerable women and children in IDP settings who face increased risks of violence and exploitation. Women and girls are particularly vulnerable to sexual violence, exploitation, and abuse. In Luuq, 92.2 percent of community members interviewed by protection partners, identified women as the most at-risk group, highlighting the severe impact of GBV on this population.^{xv}

Impact on affected communities

- Prolonged and tertiary displacement as most individuals remain displaced for long periods due to the absence of safe return options, with fear of violence hindering their ability to go back home. The cyclical nature of displacement is particularly pronounced in Luuq, where 94.8 percent of respondents interviewed by protection partners reported multiple displacements.^{xvi}
- Prevalence of aid diversion due to corruption or clan-based interests. This undermines the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance and increases tensions between communities.
- Increased violence due to ongoing tensions and a lack of peace enforcement and potentially leading to more displacement and loss of life.
- Distrust in humanitarian aid. There is growing distrust in humanitarian efforts, with accusations of bias in aid distribution. This leads to severe challenges in providing assistance in a neutral and effective manner.^{xvii}

RISK 2

Attacks on civilians and other unlawful killings, and attacks on civilian objects

In the latter half of 2024, Luuq district witnessed a severe escalation in inter-clan violence, with an estimated 35 fatalities occurring over just two days in early July. Sporadic flare-ups later in October 2024 claimed at least 9 more lives. In the first half of 2025, at least 23 people were killed, including over 10 during intense fighting on 11–12 February 2025 and further casualties during renewed clashes on 26 February 2025.^{xviii} Between April 2023 and March 2025, ACLED recorded a total of 180 conflict-related fatalities across the Gedo region. Of these, approximately 60 deaths occurred in Luuq district between July 2024 and February 2025, a period of about eight months. This means that roughly one-third (33.3 percent) of all fatalities in Gedo were concentrated in Luuq during a significantly shorter timeframe, highlighting the district as a major hotspot of violence within the region.^{xix}

Naf Iyo Maal IDP site which hosted 5,000 people was burnt to the ground in July 2024.^{xx} Further, the fighting led to the complete destruction of a key market hub and critical infrastructure, such as shelters, WASH and health care facilities, affecting over 100,000 people, including previously displaced flood-affected families and members of the host community. The market destruction disrupted the livelihoods of many traders and residents. Further, protection partners reported the destruction of schools and displacement of teachers which continue to deprive children of their education preventing communities to recover and regain resilience, thus perpetuating the cycle of poverty.^{xxi}

According to protection surveys conducted by protection partners in Luuq, physical violence (15.1 percent) emerged as a primary risk, followed by theft, extortion and/or destruction of property (13.5 percent). While civilians suffer from insecurity and risk of attacks, women and girls experience the impact differently and are often more affected, facing increased vulnerability to violence, including gender-based violence. Minority groups and marginalized communities, including IDPs, are disproportionately impacted by attacks and exposed to recurrent displacement.^{xxii} They also experience economic hardship, loss and disruption of community facilities. Minority clans in Luuq, are excluded from accessing customary justice systems such as *xeer*, limiting their ability to resolve disputes and seek protection. This exclusion contributes to a culture of impunity, where perpetrators of rights violations act without fear of accountability.

The limited government presence in hard-to-reach areas controlled by clan militias and Al-Shabaab significantly hinders the State's ability to fulfill its primary protection mandate, leaving residents without access to security and safety. Weak community protection mechanisms, insecurity, and inadequate justice systems allow perpetrators to act with impunity. Historical claims of land ownership, political factors, and revenge motivations contribute to attacks on civilians. The presence of clan militias without proper oversight of State security forces and lack of appropriate measures for civilian protection exacerbates vulnerabilities. Additionally, the presence of non-state armed groups and easy access to small arms and light weapons are significant triggers of conflict.^{xxiii}

Other consequences include multiple displacements, family separation, destruction of facilities and livelihood assets, while forced eviction due to lack of proper land tenure agreements further displaces vulnerable populations. The humanitarian crisis continues to worsen as mistrust grows among communities due to discrimination, unequal access to resources, and imbalanced community power structures. Social cohesion is severely damaged, leading to community-wide suffering, economic hardship, and lasting psychological distress including trauma from killings, injuries, and displacement.^{xxiv}

RISK 3

Forced recruitment and association of children in armed forces and groups

Protection partners continue to record high numbers of grave violations against children, most notably forced recruitment by both state and non-state armed forces and groups. Protection and Solution Monitoring Network (PSMN)^{xxv} assessments conducted in Luuq at the end of 2024, identified forced recruitment and association of children with armed forces and groups as a major human rights violation committed by parties to the conflict. United Nations Secretary General report on Children and Armed Conflict notes that armed groups committed 2,283 grave violations in Somalia^{xxvi}, in which forced recruitment constitutes a major portion of these violations.

Al-Shabaab continues to recruit in the areas within their control, including Luuq, often using coercion and forced recruitment methods^{xxvii}. According to protection surveys carried out by protection partners, non-state armed actors exploit clan-based divisions, manipulating grievances to advance their agenda, either through indoctrination or by offering incentives. Minority clans are particularly vulnerable, as they are frequently targeted due to longstanding grievances and marginalization.

There have also been reports of Al-Shabaab coercing youth who refuse to support their activities, subjecting them to beatings, intimidation, and threats that often extend to their families, further heightening the vulnerability of young people. Data indicates that 6,843 children have been recruited by Al-Shabaab, underscoring the extent to which recruitment is ingrained in

the group's strategy.^{xxviii} There have been reported cases of children from pastoral communities being accused of spying by armed groups, exposing them to serious protection risks.^{xxix}

Recruitment spans across all age groups, professions, and genders. Clan militias also engage in recruitment to maintain control over their territory, often driven by competition for resources, political influence, and territorial dominance. While specific reports on recruitment methods in Luuq are limited, broader patterns across the Gedo region indicate that clan militias, often with the involvement or endorsement of clan elders, recruit children under the pretext of community defense or territorial control. This practice places children in Luuq at serious risk of exploitation, as elders and local leaders may play a direct role in facilitating or legitimizing such recruitment.^{xxx} Clan-affiliated militia are based within urban centres and IDP sites, posing unacceptable risks for civilians and triggering secondary displacements. To illustrate, in late 2024, armed attacks disrupted beneficiary registration exercises, and two off-duty aid workers were killed during clan violence. In the same period, a militiaman entered an INGO-run hospital and shot a patient from a rival clan.

The most affected categories of persons include children, youth, families, and their community members, administrators (local authority), teachers and children affiliated with minority and marginalized groups.

Children involved with armed groups experience unimaginable forms of violence. They undergo training and are subjected to hazardous labour, including participation in combat, which puts them at a higher risk of death, chronic injuries, and disabilities. They may also be forced to participate in acts of torture and killings^{xxxi}. Additional consequences include displacement, loss of family protection, psychosocial distress, radicalization, death or injuries, family separation, and loss of education opportunities.

RISK 4 Children and forced family separation

According to assessments conducted by child protection partners, 72 percent^{xxxii} of the new IDP households have children not living with their caregivers, the actual case number of UASC is not readily available due to the gaps in operational capacity of child protection actors in Luuq. 23 percent of families separated cited increased disappearance of children/caregivers in the immediate aftermath of the conflict. Major concern is the absence of child protection service providers in Luuq to support with the case management including reunification of children, all of the three local NGO's closed down their programs due to funding challenges, however community based child protection workers have documented referred a total of 285 Boys and 145 girls between ages 8-16 as unaccompanied or separated to child protection actors with operations in other districts in Juba land. Children not living with primary caregivers or not in any protective environment are at heightened risk to all forms of abuse, exploitation, violence and neglect. Lack of protection especially for UASC's is fodder for recruitment in to armed groups, sexual violence, neglect, exploitation, and other forms of abuse. Family separation leads to disruption of education and school dropouts among affected children. Community members have cited threats of forceful recruitment of children into armed groups while in other locations voluntary and involuntary child recruitment in armed groups has increased.

The psychological trauma from separation has lasting effects on children's safety and wellbeing, they face increased risks of sexual exploitation and abuse, child marriage, child labour (particularly for adolescent girls), and association with armed forces and groups.

Psychological distress

Children in Luuq are also facing enormous psychological challenges due to the conflict, uncertainty, and overwhelming levels of stress. Children are exhibiting symptoms of anxiety, stress and depression due to disruption of their normal routine and a sense of hopelessness. Child protection actors operating in Luuq continue to notice and report changes in the behavior of displaced children since the conflict, with more than half of child protection partners reporting children had become more aggressive.

Two child friendly spaces were burnt down during the clan conflict, while two other centers were closed for safety reasons. The breakdown of their routines and daily structure, the inability to go to school and spend time with their peer groups, the lack of opportunities to just play and be children in a safe place, all further exacerbate the impact of the conflict on their mental health. The lack of Mental Health and Psychosocial Support (MHPSS) services is a major challenge as no humanitarian organization address this need. An assessment conducted by child protection actors, indicates that 63 percent of 71 community members interviewed in Luuq mentioned that MHPSS support stands as one of the most urgent needs for displaced children.

RESPONSE

Between July 2024 and May 2025, a total of 4,230 individuals were reached with protection services delivered by Protection Cluster partners. In the second half of 2024, 1,659 individuals benefited from activities implemented by AMARD, ASEN, ICAN, and Trocaire, with Housing, Land, and Property (HLP) services provided by NRC and SHRA, and explosive hazard interventions by UNMAS. In the first five months of 2025, 2,571 individuals were supported by AMARD, ASEN, DFS, and Trocaire, alongside continued HLP services by NRC and SHRA.

The protection services provided included community-based protection, community self-protection initiatives, Psychosocial Support Services (PSS), Individual Protection Assistance (both cash and in-kind), CP/GBV services, supported referrals, and comprehensive protection case management. Among the beneficiaries were forcibly displaced communities from areas previously contaminated by explosive hazards who not only benefited from clearance efforts that made these areas safe for use but also received awareness training on explosive ordnance risks.

Displaced persons received support to secure their Housing, Land, and Property (HLP) rights, acquire secure tenure documents, and access training on HLP issues aimed at preventing evictions. Overall, the assistance reached 912 girls, 716 boys, 1,702 women, 596 men, and 304 elderly persons, including 406 persons with disabilities (PWDs).

RECOMMENDATIONS

RISK 1

Unlawful impediments or restrictions to freedom of movement, siege and forced displacements

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND JUBALAND STATE GOVERNMENT

- Increase engagement and efforts to address existing grievances, enforce peace agreements and prevent further escalation of violence and displacement.
- Implement measures to dismantle barriers imposed along clan lines, promote inclusive dialogue among clans to reduce tensions, and strengthen security in conflict-prone areas. Enhance presence, monitoring and protection mechanisms to safeguard civilians' rights to access their homes, markets, and services without discrimination.

HUMANITARIAN ACTORS

- Ensure humanitarian assistance is delivered in accordance with humanitarian principles, with clear guidelines to maintain neutrality and prevent exacerbating clan divisions and tensions and exclusion of marginalised and minority groups
- Issue clear directives on how to engage with non-state armed actors including the parties to the conflict in a conflict zone to ensure the safety and impartiality of humanitarian efforts
- Engage local communities, including women's groups and elders, to foster peace and dialogue is essential to address underlying grievances and reduce tensions.

DONORS

- Allocate targeted funding to support community-led peacebuilding efforts that foster inter-clan dialogue and reconciliation in Luuq. In parallel, investing in equitable livelihood programs, accessible to all clans will help address underlying resource competition, reduce tensions, and promote lasting social cohesion.

RISK 2

Attacks on civilians and other unlawful killings, and attacks on civilian objects

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND JUBALAND FEDERAL MEMBER STATE

- Strengthen access to justice and accountability mechanisms to uphold civilian protection and deter violations, including through reinforcing formal and traditional justice bodies to ensure victims of unlawful killings, attacks on civilians, and other grave violations can access redress and compensation.
- Establish or strengthen independent mechanisms to investigate and prosecute violations of IHL and IHRL, ensuring accountability for perpetrators and deterring future abuses. Simultaneously, establish robust oversight of security forces and armed actors to ensure adherence to IHL/IHRL and to prevent the misuse of force and unlawful destruction of civilian property and civilian objects protected under IHL, particularly in civilian-populated areas.

HUMANITARIAN ACTORS

- Conduct capacity building of the government bodies on civilian protection and property rights to enhance protection measures and security arrangements to protect civilians and prevent attacks.
- Strengthen community-based protection/community self-protection mechanisms and support inclusive community protection structures.
- Address the specific needs of women and girls and marginalized and minority communities to advance their rights, including through tailored interventions which secure access to healthcare, education, economic opportunities and justice
- Negotiation for access and protection outcomes by humanitarian actors to safeguard the civilians from human rights abuse and ensure their basic rights are respected.

RISK 3 Forced recruitment and association of children in armed forces and groups.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND JUBALAND FEDERAL MEMBER STATE GOVERNMENT

- Strengthen peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts and promote transitional justice specifically for children.
- Support disarmament demobilization and reintegration programs for children formerly associated with armed forces and groups, including those involved in the armed conflict.
- Ensure full compliance with Somalia's obligations under international and national law by strengthening national and local mechanisms to protect children from all forms of violence, abuse, and neglect, in line with international human rights and humanitarian law standards, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Convention against Torture, and the Convention on Civil and Political Rights which Somalia is a Contracting Party to.

HUMANITARIAN ACTORS

- Conduct sensitization and awareness strategy on child recruitment, their use in armed conflict, and forced recruitment, to create a protective environment for all.
- Promote the piloting of a *Civilian Self-Protection Strategy* to equip communities with the tools to prevent, reduce and mitigate protection risks through strengthening their own civilian self-protection approaches.

RISK 4 Children and forced family separation

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND JUBALAND FEDERAL MEMBER STATE

- Strengthen the legal frameworks on the mitigation and accountability for children and forced family separations.

HUMANITARIAN ACTORS

- Enhance access to response services while strengthening community and family-based care for separated and unaccompanied children.
- Activate and strengthen community early warning systems and develop robust contingency plans with stakeholders.
- Promote joint advocacy and awareness on the impacts of forced family separation.

Endnotes

- ⁱ See inter alia PSMN flash alerts available at: [Country - Somalia](#), see also: [Somalia | OCHA](#) and RNA reports conducted in Galmudug, Puntland, and Jubaland, see also: [Somalia - iMMAP Inc.](#); OCHA analysis: PSMN reports/flash alerts, available at: [Country - Somalia](#), field reports from protection partners/ I/NGOs covering various regions across Somalia, such as MCAN (Middle Shabelle), IMC(Middle Shabelle), Trocaire (Luuq/Gedo region), Ayub NGO (Lower Shabelle) SEDHURO (Luuq/Gedo region), and CEDA (Luuq/Gedo region), NRC, Galmudug Commission for Refugees and IDPs (Galmudug), GCEPD (protection partner in Galmudug). See also: [Multi-hazard Displacement Projections Quarter 2 \(April-June 2025\) - Somalia | ReliefWeb](#).
- ⁱⁱ [Document - Flash Alert 16 Escalating Clan Conflict and Insecurity in Luuq District, Gedo Region, Jubaland, Somalia](#)
- ⁱⁱⁱ <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/111970>
- ^{iv} Ibid
- ^v This is a conservative estimate, see for example Protection and Solution Monitoring Network (2024). [UNHCR Somalia PSMN Displacement and Protection Information - Region Level Dashboard - Dec 2024.pdf](#).
- ³ NRC/UNHCR (2025): Protection and Conflict Sensitive Analysis in Somalia. [Protection and Conflict Sensitive Analysis in Somalia - Somalia | ReliefWeb](#)
- ^{vii} NRC/UNHCR (2025) Access to Land and Tenure Documents: A Situational Analysis of Minority Groups in Southwest, Jubaland, and Puntland States of Somalia. [minority-access-to-land-and-tenure-documents-in-puntland-jubaland-and-southwest-states-somalia.pdf](#)
- ^{viii} Somalia 2025: Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan. <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somalia-2025-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-hnpr>
- ^{ix} Ibid
- ^x See [Disrupting al-Shabaab's hold on Mogadishu's economy | Global Initiative](#), April 2025, available at: [Disrupting al-Shabaab's hold on Mogadishu's economy | Global Initiative](#), see also [Overcoming Reintegration Barriers for Former Al-Shabaab Members in Somalia](#), February 2025, available at: [Overcoming Reintegration Barriers for Former Al-Shabaab Members in Somalia No.17 \(February 2025\) - Somalia | ReliefWeb](#), See moreover, Somalia: Impact of Clan Conflicts, Marc 2025, available at: [20250319 ACAPS Crisis Impact of clan conflicts in Somalia.pdf](#)
- ^{xi} Ibid.
- ^{xii} [Protection and Solutions Monitoring Network](#)
- ^{xiii} DTM projections, Somalia January 2025
- ^{xiv} See Assessment Report on Minority Groups – Somalia 2025, available at: [Assessment Report on Minority Groups – Somalia 2025 \(February 27, 2025\) - Somalia | ReliefWeb](#)
- ^{xv} NRC/UNHCR (2025): Protection and Conflict Sensitive Analysis in Somalia. [Protection and Conflict Sensitive Analysis in Somalia - Somalia | ReliefWeb](#)
- ^{xvi} Ibid.
- ^{xvii} [Somalia and Somaliland Quarter 4 2024, TalkTo's Top-New Website](#)
- ^{xviii} [Somalia: Conflict in Luuq District, Jubaland State Flash Update No.1 \(as of 23 October 2024\) | OCHA](#)
- ^{xix} EUAA, March 2025: Country of Origin Information:Country of Origin Information: Somalia: Security Situation
- ^{xx} See various articles published by reputable and objective local media outlets, corroborated through protection engagement with affected communities and verified humanitarian assessments by UN OCHA and Community Based organisations. These sources collectively provide credible information on related casualties in Luuq. Sources include Shabelle Media, Hiiraan Online, Mustaqbal Media, AllAfrica, NAPAD (CBO) and UN OCHA reports.
- ^{xxi} See inter alia Somalia: Conflict in Luuq District, Jubaland State Flash Update No.1 (as of 23 October 2024) - Somalia | ReliefWeb, [20250319 ACAPS Crisis Impact of clan conflicts in Somalia.pdf](#), see also EUAA Country of Origin Information:Country of Origin Information: Somalia: Security Situation, March 2025
- ^{xxii} Protection monitoring conducted by Protection Cluster partners (AMARD, LIDOSOM) in Luuq and nearby villages of Yurkud, Neefso, Elbon, Haruba, Dulmurax, Ceeldamer and Bashihiro where the affected communities sought refuge.
- ^{xxiii} Key informant interviews conducted by Protection Cluster partner (AMARD) in Luuq.
- ^{xxiv} [Somalia and Somaliland Quarter 4 2024, TalkTo's Top-New Website](#)
- ^{xxv} Protection and Solution Monitoring Network (2024). [UNHCR Somalia PSMN Displacement and Protection Information - Region Level Dashboard - Dec 2024.pdf](#).
- ^{xxvi} Children and Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary General: <file:///C:/Users/KIM/Desktop/Annual%20Report%20SG.pdf>
- ^{xxvii} Reports by Protection Cluster partners (AMARD, LIDOSOM), **see also** EUAA Report on Persons fearing recruitment by Al-Shabaab, 2023 <https://euaa.europa.eu/country-guidance-somalia-2023/33-persons-fearing-recruitment-al-shabaab>
- ^{xxviii} Grave Child Rights Violations in Somalia: Statement by the Group of Friends of Children Affected by Armed Conflict (CAAC) of Somalia: <https://www.unicef.org/somalia/press-releases/grave-child-rights-violations-somalia>
- ^{xxix} Focus Group Discussions with protection partners operating in Luuq
- ^{xxx} EUAA, March 2025: Country of Origin Information:Country of Origin Information: Somalia: Security Situation
- ^{xxxi} Children Recruited by Armed Forces and Groups: <https://www.unicef.org/protection/children-recruited-by-armed-forces>
- ^{xxxii} CPAoR situation monitoring report Microsoft Power BI

Methodology: this PAU represents a joint analysis undertaken by the Protection Cluster, its Areas of Responsibility, and Protection Cluster partners operating in Luuq district. The methodology prioritized field-based primary data collection through regular community consultations and direct observation, complemented by review of secondary data. The Protection Cluster carried out risk-based analysis through the Protection and Solutions Monitoring Network (PSMN). All analytical processes strictly adhered to Global Protection Cluster standards.