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Summary of stakeholders' submissions on the Islamic Republic of Iran*

Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

I. Background

1. The present report was prepared pursuant to Human Rights Council resolutions 5/1 and 16/21, taking into consideration the periodicity of the universal periodic review and the outcome of the previous review.¹ It is a summary of 82 stakeholders' submissions² for the universal periodic review, presented in a summarized manner owing to word-limit constraints.

II. Information provided by stakeholders

A. Scope of international obligations³ and cooperation with human rights mechanisms

2. JS13 recommended ratifying the first and second Optional Protocols to the ICCPR, the CAT and its Optional Protocol (OP-CAT), the CEDAW and its Optional Protocol (OP-CEDAW), and the ICPPED.⁴

3. JS13 also recommended ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.⁵

4. ICAN urged the Islamic Republic of Iran to ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.⁶

5. JS13 recommended that the Islamic Republic of Iran accept all outstanding visit requests of special procedures, including the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran without any hindrance or restrictions on duration or scope. JS13 and AI also recommended immediately and fully cooperating with the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran, including by allowing the Mission unhindered access to the country.⁷

* The present document is being issued without formal editing.



B. National human rights framework

1. Constitutional and legislative framework

6. AI noted that the Constitution contained some human rights safeguards, which were undermined by vague qualifications of compliance with Islamic criteria.⁸

7. JS13 recommended that the Islamic Republic of Iran reform domestic legislation, including the Islamic Penal Code and the Press Law to bring them in compliance with international human rights law, including by repealing all provisions that unduly restricted the rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly.⁹

8. IranHRDC recommended that the Islamic Republic of Iran decriminalize insolvency and eliminate the option of imprisoning the insolvent until they satisfy or settle their debts.¹⁰

2. Institutional infrastructure and policy measures

9. JS7 stated that the Government's proposed bill on the establishment of a national human rights institution (NHRI) envisaged the creation of a body that was inconsistent with the Paris Principles, which required NHRIs to be fully independent from the Government.¹¹ JS7 recommended that the Government expedite steps to establish a national human rights institution in full accordance with the Paris Principles.¹²

C. Promotion and protection of human rights

1. Implementation of international human rights obligations, taking into account applicable international humanitarian law

Equality and non-discrimination

10. HRAI recommended that the Islamic Republic of Iran repeal laws criminalizing same-sex relations and transgender identities, ensuring non-discrimination in line with international human rights standards.¹³

Right to life, liberty and security of person, and freedom from torture

11. AI noted that since the previous UPR, at least 2,311 people had been executed.¹⁴ JS18 also stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran had increased the frequency of executions over the last five years, including executing 834 individuals in 2023, which represented a 43 per cent increase in executions since 2022, a year that witnessed 582 executions.¹⁵ AI highlighted that the authorities had increasingly used the death penalty as a tool of repression against protesters, dissidents and ethnic minorities to sow fear, stifle dissent and deter further protests.¹⁶ JS18 also stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran disproportionately executed members of ethnic minority groups for drug-related offenses.¹⁷ JS7 stated that the authorities had frequently imposed the death penalty against minors and had executed them when they turned 18 or, occasionally, before.¹⁸

12. AI highlighted that Iranian authorities continued to cover up the real number of those unlawfully killed by security forces during the nationwide protests of September-December 2022, November 2019 and previous protests, and denied and distorted the truth about the circumstances surrounding the killings.¹⁹

13. AI stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to commit crimes against humanity through the ongoing enforced disappearance of at least 5,000 imprisoned political dissidents who were extrajudicially executed in secret between July and September 1988.²⁰

14. JS17 highlighted that human rights defenders, journalists, activists, and those exercising their human rights to freedom of expression were subjected to severe penalties, including long prison sentences, flogging, and even capital punishment, following unfair trials disregarding the most basic guarantees of fair trial and due process.²¹ FLD stated that since its last UPR review in 2019, human rights defenders, including women human rights defenders continued to be subjected to severe reprisals as a result of their legitimate work. They continued to face digital and physical threats, legal harassment, arbitrary arrest,

detention, long and recurring prison sentences, targeting family members, denial of rights to education and work, and inhuman treatment under detention, which in some cases had ended in their deaths.²² JS2 expressed deep concern about the systematic misuse of the criminal justice system to punish and retaliate against human rights defenders, journalists and protesters, including through the use of the death penalty to punish and deter peaceful human rights work.²³ JS5 also highlighted that during and after the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, Iranian authorities intensified their crackdown on women human rights defenders, targeting independent hubs, groups, safe houses, and shelters.²⁴

15. AI also stated that the authorities continued to arbitrarily detain foreign and dual nationals for leverage, in some cases constituting the crime of hostage taking.²⁵

16. JS2 was also alarmed by the criminalization of advocacy for women’s rights and gender equality, characterised by systematic targeting and imprisoning of women human rights defenders in repeated cycles of criminal litigation, including through the continuous filing of additional charges against those already serving lengthy prison sentences in retaliation for their peaceful human rights activities.²⁶

17. JS8 also stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran was responsible for perpetrating acts of transnational repression against members of the Iranian diaspora, including dissidents, human rights defenders, journalists, and their families.²⁷

18. JS18 stated that investigating authorities commonly used torture to extract forced confessions for political purposes. Authorities often used televised confessions as a means of convicting defendants.²⁸

19. HRAI stated that Iranian prisons were severely overcrowded, leading to inhumane living conditions. Cells were often filled beyond capacity, resulting in insufficient sleeping space, inadequate sanitation, and poor ventilation.²⁹ HRAI and WHRIA also noted that there was a significant lack of access to necessary medical treatments, medications, and specialized care. Many inmates with chronic or serious health conditions were denied adequate medical attention.³⁰

International humanitarian law

20. JS19 recommended that the Islamic Republic of Iran immediately stop its intervention in a third country and oblige the pro-Iranian militias and mercenaries to take all possible measures to protect civilians, and prohibit attacks on civilians and civilian objects.³¹

Human rights and counter-terrorism

21. ADVT recommended that the Islamic Republic of Iran identify those terrorism victims who did not have the necessary protections or were deprived of such protections and provide them with access to suitable services.³²

Administration of justice, including impunity, and the rule of law

22. JS1 stated that Iran’s political structure lacked truly democratic institutions and a robust system of checks and balances, leading to a judiciary that did not operate independently from the executive and legislative branches.³³ JS7 highlighted that Iran’s judiciary continued to be controlled exclusively by clerics, who had no proper legal and judicial qualifications and training.³⁴ JS7 stated that the Islamic Revolution Courts had played a significant role in suppressing all forms of dissent. They had operated outside of the scope of the law, overseeing summary trials and failing to comply with due process, such as by not allowing defendants to have lawyers or preventing the work of lawyers, for example by withholding information and documents.³⁵

23. JS1 noted that the new regulations adopted in 2023 placed the Iranian Bar Association under the control of the judiciary and the executive branch, giving government-appointed judicial officials the authority to issue and revoke lawyers’ licenses.³⁶ JS7 also highlighted that independent lawyers who had taken up cases of human rights defenders, members of civil society, and political activists before the Islamic Revolution Courts had routinely been targeted, detained, charged, tried, and sentenced to lengthy prison terms, severely restricting the ability of defendants to appoint lawyers of their own choosing.³⁷ JS8 expressed similar

concerns.³⁸ OIAD recommended that the Islamic Republic of Iran legislate explicit guarantees of the Iranian Bar Association's autonomy, including protection against government interference.³⁹

24. AI stated that defendants were systematically denied fair trial rights, including the rights to: access a lawyer of their own choosing; challenge the legality of their detention; the presumption of innocence, not self-incriminate; and meaningful review.⁴⁰ AI also noted that forced confessions obtained under torture were frequently broadcast on State television and used by courts to issue convictions.⁴¹ JS7 also highlighted that defendants had often had no access to lawyers during pre-trial investigations, and defendants facing national security-related charges had been barred by law from having lawyers of their choosing.⁴² JS12 and OIAD recommended that the Islamic Republic of Iran guarantee the right of access to a lawyer for accused persons at all stages of criminal proceedings, including those charged with internal or external security crimes.⁴³

25. AI highlighted that since the previous UPR, no public official had been investigated or prosecuted for extrajudicial executions and other unlawful killings, torture including rape or enforced disappearances.⁴⁴ JS13 recommended that the Islamic Republic of Iran ensure that prompt, independent, transparent, impartial and thorough investigations are conducted into human rights violations and crimes under international law, including those committed in the context of protests in 2017 2018, 2019, 2021, and 2022.⁴⁵ It also recommended ceasing immediately the harassment of those seeking truth, justice and reparation, including families of victims, lawyers, and human rights defenders and releasing unconditionally all persons detained in connection with their activism.⁴⁶ JFI also called upon the Government to investigate, prosecute and punish those responsible for international crimes and serious human rights violations, including during the November 2019 protests, the 2022-23 Woman, Life, Freedom protests, and from 1981-2 and 1988.⁴⁷

Fundamental freedoms and the right to participate in public and political life

26. ADF International expressed deep concern about the continued existence of laws criminalizing blasphemy, the often vague and ambiguous language of which was inconsistent with international human rights law and could lead to arbitrary and discriminatory punishment for the peaceful expression of religious or other beliefs or opinions.⁴⁸ JS13 recommended that the Islamic Republic of Iran: identify and reform all laws that restricted the right to freedom of religion and belief and discriminate or had a discriminatory impact on persons belonging to religious minorities; and end all forms of discrimination and persecution on the basis of persons' religion or belief.⁴⁹

27. JS3 stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran had continued to target Christians, and particularly converts to Christianity, with lengthy periods of arbitrary detention and imprisonment on unfounded charges typically related to national security, extremism and propaganda.⁵⁰ JS4 and ECLJ recommended that the Government release immediately and unconditionally Christians detained under investigations, criminal charges or prison sentences related to peaceful religious activities.⁵¹

28. JS2 stated that the Government maintained a firm grip on domestic media content and exerted considerable control over access to regional media. State television, a primary news source for many Iranians, was tightly censored and highly influenced by the security apparatus. Persian-language broadcasts from outside the country were regularly jammed and satellite dishes were prohibited, cutting off alternative channels of information. Access to international websites, including news outlets and social media platforms, was tightly filtered. Newspapers and magazines operated under stringent censorship.⁵²

29. JS13 stated that the authorities had continued to systematically repress any expression of dissent, both online and offline arbitrarily arresting and detaining thousands of people for exercising their human rights. Among them were peaceful protesters, journalists and media workers, bloggers, artists, writers and human rights defenders, including trade unionists, minority rights activists lawyers, women's rights defenders and student activists.⁵³ JS15 noted that since the Woman, Life, Freedom protests, the Government had employed increasingly repressive measures to censor Iranians and control the public narrative, including through surveillance, blacklisting, and other punitive measures.⁵⁴ JS7 also stated

that dozens of journalists were arrested nationwide following the September 2022 protests, because of their reporting on human rights abuses or instances of corruption.⁵⁵ JS13 recommended that the Islamic Republic of Iran: refrain from shutting or disrupting internet and telecommunications services, particularly during protests or in times of mass unrest; and immediately restore full access to the Internet and all communication services, including blocked social media and messaging applications.⁵⁶

30. JS7 stated that the Government systematically cracked down on vastly peaceful demonstrations and assemblies. This systematic repression involved the widespread use of unnecessary and/or disproportionate force, arrests, long prison terms, extra-judicial killings, and executions of protesters on trumped-up charges.⁵⁷ JS2 stated that in practice, freedom of assembly was routinely restricted as security forces often used brutal and lethal violence to disperse peaceful protests and exploited broad and ambiguous criminal laws to target them.⁵⁸

31. JS7 highlighted that the most recent wave of large-scale and largely peaceful nationwide street protests began in September 2022, when a young Kurdish woman, Mahsa (Zina) Amini, died in custody of the morality police in Tehran. Police and plainclothes agents used live ammunition, pellets, tear gas, water cannons, and batons to suppress the demonstrations. The crackdown on protesters resulted in the killing of at least 805 people, including 107 children, the injury of many others, and the arrest and detention of thousands of protesters and civil society activists.⁵⁹ JS2 also noted that the authorities used live ammunition against numerous peaceful protesters, killing hundreds and injuring many others.⁶⁰

32. JS9 also highlighted that the authorities disproportionately used unnecessary and unlawful force, including lethal force, to suppress protests and dissent in provinces with significant ethnic minority populations, such as Kurdistan, Kermanshah, West Azerbaijan, East Azerbaijan, Sistan and Baluchistan, and Khuzestan. The unlawful use of lethal force, including firearms such as military grade assault rifles and metal pellets during protests had resulted in the killing of minorities, including minority children as well as severe, painful, and irreversible injuries, including permanent disabilities such as the total loss of vision.⁶¹

33. JS7 stated that recent elections had consistently failed to be genuine, inclusive, and participatory. Members of religious faiths other than Shia branch of Islam had been prevented from standing in presidential election.⁶² JS9 also highlighted that the Government prevented ethnic minorities from forming political parties or advocacy groups, frequently harassing minority rights activists. The vetting process (Gozinesh) excluded individuals based on religious and political beliefs, further marginalizing ethnic minorities. The Guardian Council routinely disqualified ethnic minority candidates, perpetuating systemic inequities, and undermining the democratic process.⁶³

Right to privacy

34. JS8 noted that increasingly, surveillance cameras in public spaces, particularly thoroughfares, were being utilized by the police to identify and penalize women who did not comply with the mandatory hijab rule.⁶⁴ JS20 also stated that the authorities frequently pressured detained activists to surrender social media login details, subsequently using these accounts for surveillance and phishing attacks.⁶⁵

35. JS13 and JS20 recommended that the Islamic Republic of Iran draft privacy and data protection laws in line with international human rights standards, repeal provisions of the Computer Crimes Law that undermined encryption, privacy and people's rights against surveillance, and cease all forms of unlawful surveillance and digital attacks against individuals exercising their right to freedom of expression, assembly and association.⁶⁶

Right to marriage and family life

36. JS6 noted that the minimum age of marriage was set at 13 for girls and 15 for boys.⁶⁷ JS6 and IKSS recommended that the Islamic Republic of Iran enact a law that specifies the minimum age of marriage for both girls and boys as 18 without exception.⁶⁸

Prohibition of all forms of slavery, including trafficking in persons

37. JS10 stated that the authorities did not publish official and comprehensive statistics of victims of human trafficking, or numbers of investigations, prosecutions, convictions and sentences for perpetrators. There were no national procedures or measures to proactively identify victims of trafficking. In addition, the State Welfare Organization did not offer special protection services to victims of trafficking, including special shelters or medical, psycho-social, and legal assistance.⁶⁹

38. JS6 stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran had failed to take adequate steps to end child, early, and forced marriage, all of which facilitated increased rates of domestic and sexual violence against women and girls.⁷⁰

Right to work and to just and favourable conditions of work

39. JS2 stated that Iranian authorities did not permit the creation of labour unions, allowing only state-sponsored labour councils. Labour rights groups continued to face escalating pressure with prominent leaders and activists being imprisoned under national security charges.⁷¹ ITUC also highlighted that assault and suppression of workers extended to a wide range of sectors, including oil, gas, iron, steel and sugarcane as well as other sectors. Protesting workers, most of them on precarious contracts, were being brutally attacked by anti-riot forces, threatened with dismissal and replacement, arrested and detained. Their leaders were jailed on security charges.⁷²

40. HRAI stated that women often faced barriers to employment, unequal pay, and lack of access to leadership positions. Ethnic minorities encountered discriminatory hiring practices and unequal treatment at work.⁷³ JS9 also stated that minority-populated provinces experienced significantly higher unemployment and corresponding poverty rates compared to the national average of 8.2 per cent in 2024.⁷⁴

Right to social security

41. FDAss and HARAA noted that the Government provided social insurance coverage for non-working mothers residing in rural and nomadic areas with three children.⁷⁵

Right to an adequate standard of living

42. CNWNGOs noted that the Sixth Economic, Social, and Cultural Development Plan had envisaged a scheme for empowering and providing housing for female heads of households with financial needs.⁷⁶

43. IACHildren recommended that the Government improve the food security of children under five years of age by allocating a free food basket of essential and desirable goods.⁷⁷

Right to health

44. Abshar Atefeh Charity Institute, JS16, PSA, and Raha noted the challenges such as the interruptions in the distribution of medicines and the decrease in the quality of medical services caused by unilateral coercive measures.⁷⁸ ASCP also stated that since the re-imposition of US sanctions in 2018, the Islamic Republic of Iran had been denied access to drugs to treat thalassemia, disrupting patient care, which had resulted in increased morbidity and mortality among thalassemia patients.⁷⁹

45. HI recommended that the Government continue providing health insurance for all citizens, including those in rural areas.⁸⁰ CWVA also recommended that the Government continue to provide health services in specialized medical centres to Sardasht chemical weapons victims of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war.⁸¹ IATA also recommended that the Government take practical measures to protect the general health of people and to prevent the spread of tobacco use, especially among women and children.⁸²

46. AHRAI stated that the Youthful Population and Protection of the Family Law significantly deteriorated the rights of women and girls but also men to sexual and reproductive health, which prohibited the free distribution of contraceptives in the public health care system and limited access to contraceptives in pharmacies, imposed a ban on

voluntary sterilization for men and women, enacted a policy of restricting access to information on family planning, and further criminalized abortion for both women and medicals. A medical doctor who performs an abortion for the fourth time would face the death penalty.⁸³ JS6 and HRAI noted similar concerns.⁸⁴

Right to education

47. JS10 stated that schools in minority-populated provinces were often underfunded, with few resources and poorly trained teachers. Other barriers included inadequate educational facilities in minority areas, cultural biases favouring male education, and neglect in addressing gender disparities.⁸⁵ Broken Chalk stated that students from low income families and rural areas had a limited access to education, qualified teachers and transportation.⁸⁶

48. Broken Chalk urged the Islamic Republic of Iran to prioritize education and allocate funds to provide training programmes to teachers, improve teacher salaries and enhance educational structure to provide students with a high quality education.⁸⁷ BAC also recommended that the Government strengthen efforts to support the right of women to education in border and rural areas and continue to allocate facilities for the education of immigrant women and girls.⁸⁸

49. FODASUN recommended that the Government increase efforts to include training on human rights and citizenship rights in the primary and secondary education system.⁸⁹

Cultural rights

50. JS21 noted that Farsi was the only official language in the country and the sole language of instruction in schools, which had a detrimental impact on non-Persian students, including harming student self-confidence and attainment, as well as causing high rates of school drop-outs, among, for example, Ahwazi Arab students.⁹⁰

51. JS9 stated that Government extended control over cultural expressions with festivals and local initiatives facing bureaucratic hurdles or bans if perceived to promote ethnic identity over national unity, which limited minorities' ability to express and preserve their unique cultural heritage openly.⁹¹

Development and the environment

52. IAJW recommended that the Government develop and implement policies that promoted sustainable development, balancing economic growth with environmental preservation and social well-being.⁹²

53. JS9 stated that the environmental crisis in the country disproportionately affected poor, vulnerable, and marginalized groups, particularly in minority-populated provinces such as Sistan and Baluchistan, and Khuzestan, where a severe environmental and water crisis exacerbated already challenging socio-economic conditions.⁹³ JS9 also stated that decades of dam construction and water diversion had resulted in severe water shortages in Khuzestan, impacting health, agriculture, livelihoods, and biodiversity.⁹⁴

54. EnAC recommended that the Government: investigate and implement preventive measures for social and environmental health problems caused by the drying of Lake Urmia, including issues related to agriculture, unemployment, and migration; take additional measures, including comprehensive public awareness campaigns to promote water-saving practices and further invest in innovative irrigation technologies; and empower local communities to take part in the management and restoration of wetlands through education and participatory programmes with a view to enhancing local ownership and sustainable practices.⁹⁵

2. Rights of specific persons or groups

Women

55. JS10 stated that discrimination and exclusion found in the Constitution and the Iranian legal framework were further institutionalized through and reinforced by countless

regulations, guidelines and policies sanctioning the severe deprivation of human rights and the pervasive policing of women's and girls' conduct and choices. Regulations and laws mandating the compulsory veil and other dress requirements had been used as a key tool of the Government to control and subjugate women and girls. The authorities targeted women and girls through arbitrary arrests and detention, prosecution and sentencing, and through the denial of their rights to education, employment, freedom of movement, health and access to justice.⁹⁶

56. JS6 highlighted that for decades, legal and systematic discrimination against women had led to women being one of the most significant forces of resistance and change. They had consistently been suppressed in political and social arenas, more than other groups. Women's efforts had publicly exposed ongoing discrimination, oppression, and injustice. This struggle had caused women to face serious risks and costs, including detention, imprisonment, house arrest, internal exile, travel bans, state-sponsored sexual and gender-based violence, and social pressure.⁹⁷ JS7 highlighted that women had been treated as second-class individuals in law and practice. Discriminatory legal provisions deprived women of equal rights in many areas, including with regard to: control over their own body; marriage; divorce; custody of their children; inheritance; nationality; freedom of movement; access to employment; and participation in public affairs. Furthermore, child and forced marriage involving women and girls were widespread and had long been ignored by the authorities.⁹⁸ AI noted similar concerns.⁹⁹

57. JS7 stated that honour killings had continued to be committed exclusively against women with impunity, because Article 301 of the Islamic Penal Code exempted "fathers and paternal grandfathers" from severe punishment for the killing of their children or grandchildren, and granted full impunity to husbands for killing their wives if caught in the act of adultery.¹⁰⁰ UNDUPRAC expressed similar concerns.¹⁰¹

58. JS7 noted that in an attempt to enforce more stringent hijab laws, the Government drafted the Bill for the Protection of Family through Promotion of the Culture of Hijab and Chastity, which would punish "nudity," "lack of hijab," "improper clothing," and "the promotion of such affairs that undermined man and woman's peace of mind within the family, increased divorce and societal harms, and reduced the value of family." The Bill prescribed prison terms ranging from six months to 10 years and heavy fines for offenders. Children from the age of nine upwards were liable under the Bill. Although the draft law had not yet been adopted, many punishments stipulated in the Bill had already been enforced.¹⁰² AI also highlighted that since April 2024, when the authorities announced the implementation of the nationwide "Noor (light) plan", security forces had further intensified their violent enforcement of compulsory veiling, subjecting women and girls to constant surveillance, beatings, sexual violence, electric shocks, arbitrary arrest and detention.¹⁰³

59. JS10 also stated that minority women and girls who did not comply with repressive dress laws and/or protested against them, thereby exercising their rights to freedom of expression, religion and belief and equality faced arrest, detention, judicial prosecution and punishments, and violence from security forces.¹⁰⁴ JS13 recommended that the Islamic Republic of Iran repeal all laws that imposed compulsory hijab (veiling) on women and girls in violation of their rights to equality and non-discrimination, freedom of belief and religion, freedom of expression and the absolute prohibition on torture and other ill-treatment.¹⁰⁵

60. JS13 also recommended that the Islamic Republic of Iran adopt legislation to criminalize rape and sexual and gender-based violence, including domestic violence and marital rape in line with international law and standards and ensure accountability for violence against women, including when committed by state agents.¹⁰⁶ JS6 recommended that the Government enact a law that explicitly prohibits all forms of female genital mutilations in the country.¹⁰⁷

61. JS8 stated that women and girls suffered from restrictions to their movement. Among others, a husband had the right to forbid his wife from obtaining a passport to travel abroad and or even prevent her from travelling abroad if she already had a passport.¹⁰⁸

62. JS7 highlighted that women had been deprived of the right to take part in public affairs. The number of women in decision-making positions in different branches of government had been traditionally very low. Women accounted from between three to five

percent of the 290 parliamentarians in the current legislature (2020-2024). Women had also been barred from seeking political office.¹⁰⁹ FdAss recommended that the Government increase the presence of women in political positions and strengthen women's political and economic participation.¹¹⁰

Children

63. PFT stated that there had been a growing increase in child labour amid the escalating poverty crisis in the country, while noting reports indicating that 15 per cent of children in the country were currently engaged in various labour activities.¹¹¹

64. ECP recommended that the Islamic Republic of Iran: repeal the legal defences for the use of corporal punishment by parents/guardians in the Civil Code 1935, the Islamic Penal Code 2013 and the Child Protection Law 2002 and prohibit all corporal punishment in childrearing and alternative care settings; confirm the clear policy against corporal punishment in the Schools Executive Directive and clearly prohibit corporal punishment in all education settings, public and private, at all levels; and repeal all provisions authorizing corporal punishment as a sentence for offences committed by persons under 18, including for minors under the age of criminal responsibility.¹¹²

65. AI highlighted that the age of criminal responsibility was nine lunar years for girls but at 15 lunar years for boys.¹¹³

Persons with disabilities

66. IAA stated that people with autism spectrum disorders continued to face difficulties when it came to accessing healthcare, education, public and social services. In addition, they continued to lack participation in decision-making processes, access to post-secondary education and participation in social and economic activities in the community.¹¹⁴

67. APD recommended that the Government: continue its awareness-raising activities to combat stigma and discrimination against persons with disabilities; pay special attention to improving the social security system for persons with disabilities; and make further efforts to provide health insurance for persons with disabilities.¹¹⁵

Minorities

68. JS9 highlighted that members of minorities were routinely subjected to major human rights violations enabled by law and deliberately facilitated through state policies and practices, including arbitrary arrest and detention, extrajudicial killings, torture, and ill-treatment, but also a range of violations of economic, social, and cultural rights linked to discrimination, including through the denial of access to schools and universities, expropriation of land, as well as a denial of employment opportunities.¹¹⁶ JS9 stated that the systemic discrimination against ethnic minorities in the country resulted in over-policing, ethnic profiling, and biased sentencing, leading to high incarceration rates and disproportionate representation among those sentenced to death.¹¹⁷ JS14 recommended that the Islamic Republic of Iran take the necessary measures to respect and guarantee the rights of all minorities, prevent and eradicate discrimination in law and in practice against religious and ethnic minorities.¹¹⁸

69. BIC stressed that Bahá'ís continued to face violent home raids and confiscations of belongings, arbitrary arrests, summons, and interrogations by government officials solely based on their religious beliefs.¹¹⁹ Bahá'ís also continued to endure harsh conditions, including solitary confinement with frequent interrogations.¹²⁰

70. BIC stated that many Bahá'ís were denied access to their lawyers up until the last moment, and those lawyers were given inadequate time to prepare their arguments. Judges were heavily biased and often made crude and defamatory remarks against the defendant Bahá'ís.¹²¹ BIC also stated that orchestrated hate campaigns against the Bahá'ís had intensified since the previous review cycle, which were characterized by widespread dissemination of misinformation through both traditional and social media, employing repetitive and coordinated tactics to provoke public hostility against the Bahá'í community.¹²²

71. BIC also stated that Bahá'ís faced constant harassment in their professions and workplaces and had been barred from employment in the public sector.¹²³ Broken Chalk noted that Bahá'í students were barred from admission to higher education unless they signed a declaration form.¹²⁴

Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons

72. AI highlighted that laws criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual conduct and gender non-conformity had fostered an environment where killings and other violence against LGBTIQ+ individuals by non-state actors were tolerated amid pervasive impunity for homophobic and transphobic hate crimes.¹²⁵ 6Rang highlighted that the Islamic Republic of Iran had failed to adopt legislation or policies to protect LGBTIQ+ individuals, who continued to face severe persecution and discrimination. The Islamic Penal Code criminalized same-sex conduct, imposing severe punishments, including flogging and the death penalty. Transgender and non-binary expressions faced restrictions and penalties. Medical practices often misdiagnosed and abused LGBTIQ+ individuals, including the use of harmful conversion therapies. State and non-state actors perpetrated physical and psychological violence against LGBTIQ+ persons with impunity.¹²⁶

73. 6Rang also emphasized that LGBTIQ+ human rights defenders were prosecuted, and might have faced the death penalty. Hate speech by state officials against the LGBTIQ+ community exacerbated societal hostility and alienation, particularly as a part of the crackdown on protests. Gender-based violence against LGBTIQ+ protestors, particularly during the crackdown on the 2022-23 nationwide protests constituted crimes against humanity of gender persecution.¹²⁷

Migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers

74. Broken Chalk stated that despite efforts to improve education opportunities, the Islamic Republic of Iran had a significant rate of child refugees who still faced restrictions regarding access to education.¹²⁸ As such, it noted that one-third of the Afghan refugee population in the country were children and there was a decrease of the attendance rate of Afghans at school in 2022, due to more restrictions regarding enrolment requirements and an increase in tuition fees.¹²⁹ CICR recommended that the Islamic Republic of Iran continue efforts to improve access to education for refugees, especially in rural areas, and reduce the number of dropouts.¹³⁰

Notes

¹ A/HRC/43/12, A/HRC/43/12/Add.1, and A/HRC/43/2.

² The stakeholders listed below have contributed information for this summary; the full texts of all original submissions are available at: www.ohchr.org (one asterisk denotes a national human rights institution with A status).

Civil society

Individual submissions:

AI	Amnesty International, London (United Kingdom);
Abshar	Abshar Atefeh Charity Institute, Mashhad (Islamic Republic of Iran);
ADF International	ADF International, Geneva (Switzerland);
ADVT	Association for Defending Victims of Terrorism, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
AHRAI	All Human Rights for All in Iran, Vienna (Austria);
APD	Association of people with disabilities, Kashan (Islamic Republic of Iran);
ASCP	Association of save special patients, Birjand (Islamic Republic of Iran);
ASPP	Association for support of Pakdasht prisoners, Varamin (Islamic Republic of Iran);
BAC	Banu Amin's Center, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
BIC	Bahá'í International Community, Geneva (Switzerland);
Broken Chalk	The Stitching Broken Chalk, Amsterdam (Kingdom of the Netherlands);

	Netherlands);
BWA	Better World Association, Zanjan (Islamic Republic of Iran);
CIL	Center of Iranian Lawyers, Ghazvin (Islamic Republic of Iran);
Chatra	Payamavaran Hamyari, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
CICR	Center for Immigrant Children's Rights, Shiraz (Islamic Republic of Iran);
CNWNNGOs	Network of Women's Non-governmental Organizations in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
CWVA	Chemical Weapons Victims Association, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
ECLJ	European Centre for Law and Justice, Strasbourg (France);
ECP	End Corporal Punishment, Geneva (Switzerland);
EnAC	Environmental activist's Center, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
FFA	Family Foundation Association, Kolahdooz (Islamic Republic of Iran);
FDA	Freedom Defenders Association, Saveh (Islamic Republic of Iran);
FDAss	Family Defenders Association, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
FLD	Front Line Defenders, Dublin (Ireland);
FODASUN	Foundation of Dialogue and Solidarity of United Nations, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
FSGE	Foundation for supporting girls' education, Karaj (Islamic Republic of Iran);
HI	Help Institute, Boostan (Islamic Republic of Iran);
HARAA	HARAA Cultural Institute, Qom (Islamic Republic of Iran);
HRAI	Human Rights Activists in Iran, Tysons Corner (United States of America);
IAA	Iran Autism Association, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
IACChildren	Institute of Action for Children, Chaloos (Islamic Republic of Iran);
IAJW	International Association of Justice Watch, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
IATA	Iranian Anti-Tobacco Association, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
ICAN	International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, Geneva (Switzerland);
IDE	Institute of Development for Everyone, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
IESW	Institute of Entrepreneurial and Successful Women, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
IFWA	International Foundation Witnesses Ashoori, Mazandaran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
IJfa	Institute of Justice for all, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
IKSS	Iranska Kvinnosamfundet i Sverige, Stockholm (Sweden);
IPWR	Institute for Protection of Women's Rights, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
IranHRDC	Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, New Haven (United States of America);
IREC	Iranian Elite Research Center, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
ISDNGO	Institute of Sustainable Development, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
ISPD	Institute of Solidarity for Peace and Development, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
ISPF	Institute of Solidarity for Peace and Freedom, Golestan (Islamic Republic of Iran);
ITUC	International Trade Union Confederation, Brussels (Belgium);
JFI	Justice for Iran, London (United Kingdom);
MSA	Mothers' Support Association, Mashhad (Islamic Republic of Iran);

	Iran);
MSAUIP	Medical Support Association for Underprivileged Iranian Patients, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
OIAD	Observatoire International des Avocats en Danger, Paris (France);
PFT	Partners for Transparency, Cairo (Egypt);
PHS	Institute of Peace and Humanitarian Supporter, Esfahan (Islamic Republic of Iran);
PSA	The Patients Support Association, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
Raha	Mehrafzoon e Fardaye Raha, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
RSCenter	Refugee Support Center, Booshehr (Islamic Republic of Iran);
SRS	The Society for Recovery Support, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
UNDUPRC	University of Notre Dame UPR Clinic, Washington D.C. (United States of America);
UWW	Union of Women for Women, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
WAIPWL	World Association of Isargar Peace Loving Women, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
WHRIA	Women's Human Rights International Association, Paris (France);
6Rang	Iranian Lesbian and Transgender Network, Oxford (United Kingdom).
<i>Joint submissions:</i>	
JS1	Joint submission 1 submitted by: Barreau de Paris, Paris (France); Association of Lawyers at Risk in Iran;
JS2	Joint submission 2 submitted by: CIVICUS; Gulf Centre for Human Rights (GCHR), Geneva (Switzerland);
JS3	Joint submission 3 submitted by: Christian Solidarity Worldwide, New Malden (United Kingdom); CSW-Nigeria (Nigeria);
JS4	Joint submission 4 submitted by: Article 18, London (United Kingdom); Christian Solidarity Worldwide, New Malden (United Kingdom); Middle East Concern (MEC); Open Doors;
JS5	Joint submission 5 submitted by: Centre for Supporters of Human Rights, London (United Kingdom); Zamaneh Media, Amsterdam (Kingdom of the Netherlands);
JS6	Joint submission 6 submitted by: Equality Now, New York (United States of America); Centre for Supporters of Human Rights, London (United Kingdom); Femena;
JS7	Joint submission 7 submitted by: International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH), Paris (France); League for the Defence of Human Rights in Iran (LDDHI), Paris (France);
JS8	Joint submission 8 submitted by: International Bar Association Human Rights Institute, London (United Kingdom); Coalition for Genocide Response, (United Kingdom);
JS9	Joint submission 9 submitted by: Impact Iran; Kurdistan Human Rights Network; Kurdpa Human Rights Organization; Balochistan Human Rights Group; Rasank; Ahwaz Human Rights Organization; Kurdistan Human Rights Association – Geneva; All Human Rights for All in Iran;
JS10	Joint submission 10 submitted by: Siamak Pourzand Foundation; Impact Iran; All Human Rights for All in Iran;
JS11	Joint submission 11 submitted by: Jubilee Campaign, Surrey (United Kingdom); Set My People Free;
JS12	Joint submission 12 submitted by: The Law Society of England and Wales, London (United Kingdom); Lawyers for Lawyers; Iran Human Rights Documentation Center;

JS13	Joint submission 13 submitted by: Access Now, New York (United States of America); ARTICLE 19, London (United Kingdom);
JS14	Joint submission 14 submitted by: Movement contre le Racisme et Pour l'Amitié entre Les Peuples (MRAP), Paris (France); Kurdish Centre for Human Rights (Kurd-CHR), Geneva (Switzerland);
JS15	Joint submission 15 submitted by: Artistic Freedom Initiative, New York (United States of America); Voices Unbound, New Jersey (United States of America);
JS16	Joint submission 16 submitted by: Organization for Defending Victim of Violence (ODVV), Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran); United Nations Association of Iran (UNA-Iran); Medical Support Association for Underprivileged Iranian Patients (MSAUIP); Rahbord Peimayesh Research & Educational Services Cooperative (RPRESC); Jameh Ehyagaran Teb Sonnaty Va Salamat Iranian (JETSYSI); Family Health Association of Iran (FHA Iran); Comprehensive Non-Governmental Center for Employment and Entrepreneurship; Empowerment of Women and Family; International Assembly of Women of Monotheistic Religions;
JS17	Joint submission 17 submitted by: PEN America, New York (United States of America); Impact Iran; ARTICLE 19, London (United Kingdom); All Human Rights for All in Iran;
JS18	Joint submission 18 submitted by: The Advocates for Human Rights, Minneapolis (United States of America); Iran Human Rights, Oslo (Norway); Iran Impact; The World Coalition against the Death Penalty;
JS19	Joint submission 19 submitted by: The Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression (SCM), Paris (France); Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ); Caesar Families Association;
JS20	Joint submission 20 submitted by: Small Media, London (United Kingdom); The Miaan Group;
JS21	Joint submission 21 submitted by: Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), Brussels (Belgium); Ahwaz Human Rights Organization (AHRO); Balochistan Human Rights Group (BHRG); Association of Human Rights in Kurdistan – Geneva (KMMK-G), Geneva (Switzerland).

³ The following abbreviations are used in UPR documents:

ICERD	International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
OP-ICESCR	Optional Protocol to ICESCR
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICCPR-OP 1	Optional Protocol to ICCPR
ICCPR-OP 2	Second Optional Protocol to ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
OP-CEDAW	Optional Protocol to CEDAW
CAT	Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
OP-CAT	Optional Protocol to CAT
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
OP-CRC-AC	Optional Protocol to CRC on the involvement of children in armed conflict
OP-CRC-SC	Optional Protocol to CRC on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography
OP-CRC-IC	Optional Protocol to CRC on a communications procedure
ICRMW	International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All

CRPD
OP-CRPD
ICPPED

Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
Optional Protocol to CRPD
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance

- ⁴ JS13, p. 4.
- ⁵ JS13, p.6.
- ⁶ ICAN, p. 1.
- ⁷ JS13, p. 3; AI, p. 5.
- ⁸ AI, para. 5.
- ⁹ JS13, p. 11.
- ¹⁰ IHRDC, para. 24(1).
- ¹¹ JS7, para. 41.
- ¹² JS7, para. 62. See also IREC, p. 5.
- ¹³ HRAI, p. 2.
- ¹⁴ AI, para. 40.
- ¹⁵ JS18, para. 2.
- ¹⁶ AI, para. 38.
- ¹⁷ JS18, para. 42.
- ¹⁸ JS7, para. 14. See also JS18, para. 68; CIL, paras. 10 – 17.
- ¹⁹ AI, para. 46.
- ²⁰ AI, para. 43.
- ²¹ JS17, para. 5.
- ²² FLD, p. 1. See also JS7, paras. 8 and 26.
- ²³ JS2, para. 1.5.
- ²⁴ JS5, para. 7.
- ²⁵ AI, para. 15.
- ²⁶ JS2, para. 1.6.
- ²⁷ JS8, para. 48.
- ²⁸ JS18, para. 52. See also HRAI, p. 5.
- ²⁹ HRAI, p. 2. See also ASPP, p. 4.
- ³⁰ HRAI, p. 3; WHRIA, pp. 2 – 3.
- ³¹ JS19, p. 10.
- ³² ADVT, Recommendation No. 6 on p. 4.
- ³³ JS1, p. 5.
- ³⁴ JS7, para. 4.
- ³⁵ JS7, para. 6. See also AI, para. 12.
- ³⁶ JS1, p. 6.
- ³⁷ JS7, para. 10.
- ³⁸ JS8, paras. 44 – 46.
- ³⁹ OIAD, p. 8.
- ⁴⁰ AI, para. 13.
- ⁴¹ AI, para. 14.
- ⁴² JS7, para. 9.
- ⁴³ JS12, para. 58(vi); OIAD, p. 5.
- ⁴⁴ AI, para. 44.
- ⁴⁵ JS13, p. 6.
- ⁴⁶ JS13, p. 7.
- ⁴⁷ JFI, para. 29.
- ⁴⁸ ADF International, para. 16.
- ⁴⁹ JS13, p. 22. See also FDA, paras. 35 – 40; ADF International, para. 34(c); JS11, para. 19.
- ⁵⁰ JS3, para. 16.
- ⁵¹ JS4, para. 58; ECLJ, para. 32.
- ⁵² JS2, para. 4.3.
- ⁵³ JS13, para. 17 on p. 9.
- ⁵⁴ JS15, para. 12. See also JS2, paras. 4.9. – 4.10.
- ⁵⁵ JS7, para. 29.
- ⁵⁶ JS13, p. 20. See also ISPF, p. 5.
- ⁵⁷ JS7, para. 39.
- ⁵⁸ JS2, para. 5.2. See also IFWA, para. 10.
- ⁵⁹ JS7, para. 40. See also AI, paras. 9 – 10.
- ⁶⁰ JS2, para. 5.4.

- 61 JS9, para. 24. See also BWA, p. 3.
- 62 JS7, para. 45.
- 63 JS9, para. 38.
- 64 JS8, para. 23.
- 65 JS20, para. 47.
- 66 JS13, p. 17; JS20, pp. 16 – 17.
- 67 JS6, para. 29.
- 68 JS6, p. 12; IKSS, p. 2.
- 69 JS10, paras. 25 – 26.
- 70 JS6, para. 27. See also IKSS, p. 1; JS10, paras. 27 – 33.
- 71 JS2, para. 2.5.
- 72 ITUC, p. 4.
- 73 HRAI, p. 10. See also PHS, para. 16; UWW, paras. 10 – 12.
- 74 JS9, para. 45.
- 75 FDAss, para. 8; HARAA, p. 3.
- 76 CNWNNGOs, para. 10.
- 77 IACHildren, p. 3.
- 78 Abshar, para. 12; JS16, para. 28; PSA, paras. 6 – 7; Raha, paras. 12 – 13.
- 79 ASCP, para. 9.
- 80 HI, para. 21. See also MSAUIP, paras. 12 – 14.
- 81 CWVA, p. 5.
- 82 IATA, p. 2.
- 83 AHRAI, para. 7.
- 84 JS6, para. 50; HRAI, pp. 10 – 12.
- 85 JS10, para. 46.
- 86 Broken Chalk, para. 20. See also IDE, paras. 16 – 25.
- 87 Broken Chalk, para. 35.
- 88 BAC, paras. 15 and 18. See also FSGE, para. 18; ISPD, para. 15.
- 89 FODASUN, para. 20(b).
- 90 JS21, para. 32.
- 91 JS9, para. 40.
- 92 IAJW, p. 4. See also ISDNGO, para. 24.
- 93 JS9, paras. 56 – 57.
- 94 JS9, para. 59. See also UNDUPRC, paras. 22 – 23.
- 95 EnAC, paras. 9, 11 and 16.
- 96 JS10, para. 3.
- 97 JS6, para. 9.
- 98 JS7, para. 32.
- 99 AI, para. 32. See also FFA, para. 15.
- 100 JS7, para. 33.
- 101 UNDUPRAC, para. 5.
- 102 JS7, para. 35.
- 103 AI, para. 33.
- 104 JS10, para. 11.
- 105 JS13, p. 24.
- 106 JS13, p. 24.
- 107 JS6, p. 12.
- 108 JS8, para. 14.
- 109 JS7, para. 36.
- 110 FDAss, p. 5. See also IESW, pp. 3 – 5; IPWR, para. 14; MSA, p. 4; WAIPWL, para. 10.
- 111 PFT, p. 5.
- 112 ECP, p. 2.
- 113 AI, para. 32.
- 114 IAA, para. 7.
- 115 APD, paras. 14 – 16.
- 116 JS9, para. 3.
- 117 JS9, para. 29.
- 118 JS14, para. 33(x).
- 119 BIC, para. 6.
- 120 BIC, para. 7.
- 121 BIC, para. 13.
- 122 BIC, para. 26.

¹²³ BIC, para. 14.

¹²⁴ Broken Chalk, para. 15.

¹²⁵ AI, para. 29.

¹²⁶ 6Rang, p. 2. See also UNDUPRC, paras. 7 – 9; Chatra, paras. 25 – 27 and 33.

¹²⁷ 6Rang, p. 2.

¹²⁸ Broken Chalk, para. 22.

¹²⁹ Broken Chalk, para. 23.

¹³⁰ CICR, para. 18. See also RSCenter, para. 16; SRS, paras. 12 – 13.
