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**Internationale standarder for Country of Origin Information sammenholdt med nyeste rapporter om
sikkerhedssituationen for returnees i Syrien**

Working Paper

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Marts 2023

Dette arbejdspapir sammenholder internationale standarder for anvendelsen af Country of Origin Information med de nyeste baggrundsoplysninger om sikkerhedssituationen for returnees i Syrien. Gennem en intertekstuel metode, dvs. en analyse af COI-rapporternes reference til hinanden, identificeres den eksisterende viden om sikkerhedssituationen for returnees.

1. Internationale standarder for Country of Origin Information

EASO (nu EUAA), der er EU's supportkontor for de nationale asylmyndigheder, har i deres praktiske manual samlet de gældende internationale standarder for udvælgelse og anvendelse af COI (EASO 2020). Standarderne følger af såvel faglig metodelitteratur som international retspraksis fra Den Europæiske Menneskerettighedsdomstol og skal sikre den fornødne kvalitet og gennemsigtighed i myndighedernes anvendelse af COI.

EASO opstiller i alt 9 standarder, der både omhandler indsamling, udvælgelse, anvendelse og gennemsigtighed i produktionen og fortolkningen af COI; *neutrality, objectivity, reliability, balance, accuracy, currency, transparency, traceability og relevance*.

Standarderne indbefatter således krav til *produktionen* af COI, altså kilderne og disses anvendte undersøgelsesmetoder: *neutralitet, objektivitet og reliabilitet*. I dette arbejdspapir fokuseres på standarderne for *anvendelse* af COI, især standarderne for *balance, currency, accuracy og transparency*. EASO definerer disse 4 standarder således:

Balance	•As each source has its own perspective and focus, different sources and different types of sources should be consulted to achieve the most comprehensive and balanced picture possible
Currency	•Up-to-date or the most recent, and time-relevant, COI should be used.
Accuracy	•There should be conformity between the statement or opinion, or information with the factual reality or truth. Accuracy can be achieved by cross-checking and corroborating information.
Transparency	•COI should be clearly presented and its meaning must not be distorted.

Figur 1: EASO 2020, s. 14-15

1.1. Den Europæiske Menneskerettighedsdomstol og udvælgelse og anvendelse af COI

Kravet om *balance*; at inddrage en bred og afbalanceret række og typer af kilder (f.eks. både statslige, FN-organer og NGO'er) skal sikre den bedst mulige oplysning af sikkerhedssituationen fra flere perspektiver. De forudgående krav om kildernes kvalitet i forhold til objektivitet, reliabilitet og neutralitet er forudsætninger for kravet om balance. Denne generelle pointe om at udvælge og inddrage en bred og balanceret vifte af

kilder har EMRK understreget i en række sager vedrørende udsendelse af personer, der frygter en krænkelse af EMRK artikel 3:

“it would be **too narrow an approach** under Article 3 in cases concerning aliens facing expulsion or extradition if the Court, as an international human rights court, were only **to take into account materials made available by the domestic authorities** of the contracting state concerned **without comparing these with materials from other, reliable and objective sources**. [...] **for instance, other contracting or non-contracting states, agencies of the United Nations and reputable non-governmental organisations.**”

(afsnit 136, *Salah Sheek v. the Netherlands*. 1984/04. *Fremhævningerne foretaget af EASO* (2018, s. 5))

For domstolen hænger balancen også sammen med kravet om *accuracy*; at der i vurderingen af COI-materiale må lægges vægt på, hvorvidt kildernes oplysninger bekræftes af andre kilder:

“In assessing such material, consideration must be given to its source, in particular its independence, reliability and objectivity. In respect of reports, the authority and reputation of the author, the seriousness of the investigations by means of which they were compiled, **the consistency of their conclusions and their corroboration by other sources** are all relevant considerations

(afsnit 120, *NA v. The United Kingdom*. 25904/07. *Fremhævningerne foretaget af EASO* (2018, s. 6))

I domstolens konkrete praksis har den ligeledes lagt vægt på at inddrage et bredt perspektiv af kilder, og har konkret vurderet kildernes troværdighed og hvorvidt disses oplysninger bekræftes af andre kilder (altså standarderne om *balance* og *accuracy*).

“131. To that end, as regards the general situation in a particular country, the Court has often attached importance to the **information contained in recent reports from independent international human rights protection associations such as Amnesty International, or governmental sources, including the United States State Department** [...]

143. In the present case the Court has had regard, firstly, to the **reports of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch** on Tunisia (see paragraphs 65-79 above), which describe a disturbing situation. The conclusions of those reports are corroborated by the report of the United States State Department (see paragraphs 82-93 above). [...] Bearing in mind the **authority and reputation of the authors of these reports**, the **seriousness of the investigations by means of which they were compiled**, the fact that on the points in question their conclusions are **consistent with each other** and that those **conclusions are corroborated in substance by numerous other sources** (see paragraph 94 above), the Court does not doubt their reliability. Moreover, the government **has not adduced any evidence or reports capable of rebutting the assertions made in the sources** cited by the applicant.

(afsnit 131, 143. *Saadi v Italy*. 37201/06. *Fremhævningerne foretaget af EASO* (2018, s. 6))

Også i forhold til den aktuelle situation for returnees i Syrien har domstolen inddraget og lagt vægt på en række forskellige kilder.

“The Court observes that the applicants’ own accounts of events in Syria are **consistent with information from reliable and objective sources about the general situation**, indicating that their personal circumstances put them at a heightened risk of ill-treatment there. In particular, all of the applicants, as returnees, risk being subjected to harassment, arbitrary arrest and incommunicado detention upon arrival despite having obtained security approval, torture and other forms of ill-treatment, as well as property

confiscation and movement restrictions, including on account of individuals' perceived anti-Government opinion (see paragraphs 38 and 46 above)."

(afsnit 110, *M.D. and others v Russia*. 71321/17. *Mine fremhævninger*).

De kilder, som domstolen henviser til (para 38 og 46), er to COI-udgivelser fra UNHCR (2020, 2021), der samler allerede udgivet information fra en lang række kilder, f.eks. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Amnesty International, Danish Immigration Service, Human Rights Watch, Danish Refugee Council, European Institute of Peace, SAWA, Syrian Network for Human Rights og UNWRA.

I domstolens praksis fremhæves således standarder om *balance* og *accuracy* som afgørende, forudsat de metodiske krav om objektivitet, neutralitet og reliabilitet er opfyldt hos de enkelte kilder. Samtidig optegner domstolen indirekte gennem sine henvisninger til de konkrete kilder, som domstolen tillægger vægt, en række eksempler på kilder, der lever op til domstolens krav om neutralitet, objektivitet og reliabilitet.

2. Intertekstualitet i Country of Origin-rapporter. En metode til at analysere transparens og aktualitet.

COI-rapporter udgør en særlig genre, der i hovedtræk kan opdeles i to grupper: Rapporter der på baggrund af faglige kvalitetstjek udelukkende *udvælger og refererer allerede udgiven information*, og rapporter der *udgiver ny information, typisk opsummerende noter fra interviews med kilder med kendskab til temaet*. En række rapporter udgør en kombination af disse to, hvor allerede udgiven information kombineres med ny information.

Genren er altså i høj grad kendetegnet ved, at konkrete informationer "genudgives" i en række rapporter, hvormed de ved en hurtig læsning kan fremstå som nyere end reelt tilfældet og bekræftet af flere kilder end reelt tilfældet. Opmærksomheden bør således rettes mod, hvorfra og hvornår den konkrete information oprindeligt stammer, for at leve op til de internationale standarder om *transparency* og *currency*.

COI-rapporter er dermed "*intertextual, that is, referring to and transforming other texts. [...] This is done through recontextualization, that is, by selecting certain parts of the text and reformulating them to the new context*" (Bodstöm 2023; 197). COI-genrens "*repetitive nature*" (Bednar 2015) kalder dermed på en intertekstuel metode, dvs. en systematisk analyse af de enkelte informationer, de enkelte referencers, oprindelige kilde. En sådan systematik kan generelt sikre standarder om *transparens* og *currency*, og kan i dette konkrete tilfælde besvare arbejdsspørgsmålet: Hvad ved vi om sikkerhedssituationen for returnees i Syrien?

Inddrages standarderne om *balance* og *accuracy*, bliver det også muligt at kortlægge – med EMD's formulering - hvilke kilder, der "*are consistent with each other*" og hvilke kilders "*conclusions are corroborated in substance by numerous other sources*".

Det følgende afsnit er baseret på en sådan intertekstuel analyse af de nyeste COI-rapporter om sikkerhedssituationen for returnees i Syrien. Perioden er afgrænset til udgivelser siden juni 2021, dvs. alle større rapporter udgivet efter publikationen af UNHCR's seneste *Protection Considerations* (2021), som EMD henviste til. Altså perioden 1.6.2021-1.3.2023.

Dermed er der medtaget COI-rapporter fra EUAA, Human Rights Watch, Danish Immigration Service og Amnesty International. Ud fra standarden om *currency (up-to-date/most recent)* er der kun medtaget den nyeste rapport om return fra Danish Immigration Service (maj 2022), og ikke den ældre fra oktober 2021. I den nyeste rapport fra DIS fra 2022 har DIS udvalgt og refereret til en række oplysninger fra rapporten fra 21. Disse er medtaget.

Der er udelukkende medtaget materiale om *returnees as such*, altså generelt om gruppen af tilbagevendende, og ikke specifikke informationer om forskellige grupper af i øvrigt profilerede returnees, f.eks. individer der er eller opfattes som militærnægtere, politiske aktivister, tilhængere af oppositionen, beboere fra oppositionskontrollerede områder og disses familier.

Der er også medtaget information om såkaldte "status settlements" og "security clearances" for returnees, herunder myndighedernes organisering samt praksis for "wanted lists".

I bilag 1 fremlægges den fulde analyse af rapporterne. Her er det angivet, hvorvidt hver information om returnees i hver enkelt rapport er ny (og i så fald fra hvilket interview med hvilken kilde), eller hvilken tidligere udgivelse, informationen stammer fra. Bilaget kortlægger således dels de enkelte rapporters konkrete spor af intertekstualitet, dels de enkelte informations oprindelige kilde.

For overblikket skyld er de enkelte informationer kategoriseret efter hvorvidt de angiver, at der eksisterer en konkret risiko for returnees eller angiver, at der ikke eksisterer en konkret risiko for returnees.

Bilaget muliggør således et samlet billede af *hvilke informationer, der stammer fra hvilke kilder og hvornår*. Samtidig muliggør kortlægningen en samstilling af hvilke informationer om sikkerhedsforhold for returnees, der er "*consistent with each other*", og i hvilken grad de er "*corroborated in substance by numerous other sources*".

3. Sikkerhedssituationen for returnees i Syrien ifølge COI

Indledningsvist skal det understreges, at adgangen til informationer om sikkerhedssituationen for returnees i Syrien er begrænset, primært grundet de syriske myndigheders hindring af adgang.

"Due notably to GoS restrictions on UN and UNHCR, no systematic monitoring of returnees has been carried out and as a result, obtaining information about the extent of mistreatment and violations committed by GoS against returnees is not possible"

(EUAA 2022, s. 32)

Samtidig er der "no clear pattern for the way the returnees are treated by the authorities. This is mostly because the individual officer, who is in charge of a checkpoint or an intelligence service officer dealing with the case of a returnee in the local area the person returns to, plays a significant role in what happens to the person. Sometimes, people who have been members of the opposition groups or family members of profiled opposition persons can return without facing issues, and sometimes people who have no issues with GoS face problems."

(DIS 2022, s. 14).

Denne uforudsigelighed bekræftes af flere kilder: "a researcher from Human Rights Watch stated that she 'cannot identify a profile which will predict who will or will not face human rights abuse on return'."

(Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center and EIP, The Context of a Refugee Return in Syria, 11 April 2022)

I en sådan kontekst af hindret adgang til monitorering og en uforudsigelighed i de syriske myndigheders praksis, præsenteres her hovedpointerne fra den intertekstuelle analyse af nyeste COI. De enkelte informationer er angivet med sin oprindelige udgivelseskilde, og altså ikke eventuelle efterfølgende genudgivende referencer. Hermed gives det klareste mulige billede af informationernes *currency*.

3.1. Information og kilder, der angiver at der eksisterer ingen eller en mindre risiko for returnees uden øvrig profilering

- Ingen konsekvenser for at have søgt asyl i udlandet og ingen risiko for myndighedsfølgelse ved return
 - According to one source, there were no consequences known of having applied for asylum abroad and the source had no information that such applicants were specifically punished on return. The same source also reported that returnees who have not engaged in opposition activities and departed Syria only due to the war tended not to face problems upon return unless somebody in their absence had reported them to the authorities alleging that they were, for example, involved in activities opposing the GoS.
(Anonym **“human rights organization**. Interviewet af DIS I April 2022. DIS: Treatment upon return. Maj 2022).
 - in general terms, returnees who have not engaged in opposition activities and departed Syria only due to the war tend not to face problems upon return
(Samme anonyme **“human rights organization**. Interviewet af DIS I April 2022. DIS: Treatment upon return. Maj 2022).
 - In DIS’ report published in February 2019, a **GoS official** stated that the Syrian authorities would not prosecute or arrest people for having obtained asylum in neighbouring countries or other countries, including Western countries.
(DIS and DRC, *SYRIA: Security Situation in Damascus Province and Issues Regarding Return to Syria*, February 2019)
 - In a DIS’ report **Center for Operational Analysis and Research (GOAR Global)** said that the mere fact that someone stayed abroad during the Syrian civil war was not an issue upon return.
(DIS and DRC, *SYRIA: Security Situation in Damascus Province and Issues Regarding Return to Syria*, February 2019)
 - No unambiguous answer could be found to the question about how those having applied for asylum abroad will be treated upon return. **General Naji Numeir, the Chief of the Syrian Immigration and Passports Department**, told the DIS during an interview held in November 2018 that returnees would not be prosecuted or arrested upon return for obtaining asylum in neighbouring countries or other countries, including Western countries. **A Damascus-based lawyer** told the DIS in November 2018 that having applied for asylum in other countries does not lead to punishment upon return, unless the returnee in case is a well-known political or military opponent
(DIS and DRC, *SYRIA: Security Situation in Damascus Province and Issues Regarding Return to Syria*, February 2019)
- Ingen/mindre konsekvenser for ulovlig udrejse.
 - In 2019, Syria’s Ministry of Interior issued Circular No 342 which stated that persons who left Syria irregularly without obtaining an exit stamp would not face issues with the authorities upon return. Thus, **the EIP** observed that returnees are no longer obliged to report to a security branch to answer questions regarding their irregular exit.
(EIP, *Refugee Return to Syria*, September 2021)

- those who left Syria illegally have to report to local intelligence services where they ‘will be questioned about the reason for their leave and about their activities while staying abroad’. According to the source, if someone reported them to the authorities for being involved in opposition activities, they would ‘risk being subject to further interrogation, detention and/or money extortion’, otherwise nothing more would happen to them.
(Anonym **“human rights organization**. Interviewet af DIS I April 2022. Oprindelig udgivelse: DIS: Treatment upon return. Maj 2022).
 - the mere fact of having applied for asylum abroad does not make an individual subject to mistreatment, noting that the GoS is aware that large numbers of Syrians living abroad are refugees and that applying for asylum was the only pathway for them to get residency in their host country
(Samme anonyme **“human rights organization**. Interviewet af DIS I April 2022. DIS: Treatment upon return. Maj 2022).
- Ingen risiko for forfølgelse i tilfælde af godkendt ”status settlement”/”security clearance”
 - if a person’s application for status settlement is approved by the GoS, it means that the person would officially not be wanted or prosecuted anymore by the GoS. Most applications for status settlement are approved by the GoS.
(DIS, Syria: Security clearance and status settlement for returnees, December 2020)
 - According to sources DIS interviewed in 2020, persons who have obtained a status settlement because of illegal exit usually do not face any problem with the GoS upon return, and their application for a status settlement would not have consequences for their family members
(DIS, Syria: Security clearance and status settlement for returnees, December 2020)

3.2. Information og kilder, der angiver at der eksisterer risici for returnees uden øvrig profilering

Som det fremgår af bilag 1 er omfanget og antallet af informationer og kilder, der angiver risici for returnees, betragteligt større end ovenstående antal informationer, der beskriver, at der er ingen eller kun mindre risici for returnees.

For overblikkets skyld er derfor her kun medtaget eksempler på konkrete informationer om risici under de enkelte overskrifter. Men samtlige kilder, der angiver informationer om den relevante overskrift, er angivet. For gennemgang af samtlige konkrete informationer om risici for returnees og disses kilder, se bilag 1.

- Mistanke og risici som følge af tilbagevenden fra ophold i udlandet
 - According to **Suhail al-Ghazi, a Syrian researcher specialised in return dynamics**, ‘nearly everyone who returns will face some form of interrogation’. ‘Whether it’s a cup of tea with the security agencies or a full-blown torture session, they want to know why people left.
(HRW, “Our Lives Are Like Death”: Syrian Refugee Returns from Lebanon and Jordan, 20 October 2021,
 - According to the **Voices for Displaced Syrians Forum (VDSF)** and **Operations and Policy Center (OPC)**, nearly half (48%) of the returnees to GoS areas interviewed reported that they or a family member had experienced persecution due to having left Syria illegally, applying for asylum abroad or because of their area of origin.
(VDSF and OPC, Is Syria Safe for Return? Returnees’ Perspective, November 2021)
 - In its February 2020 report on the situation of Syrians in Lebanon, ICG concluded that there is no certainty about who is safe from arrest upon return, because the authorities’ concept of who is an opponent is not always clear or can change over time.
(**International Crisis Group**, Easing Syrian Refugees’ Plight in Lebanon, 13 February 2020)

- According to **returnees' testimonies** collected by **Amnesty International**, Syrian officials perceived individuals who left the country as having been disloyal and supportive of the opposition 'either because of the fact that they fled or because of the place where they sought refuge'. Refugees were perceived 'as traitors, given that they readily incriminate the Syrian government before host countries in order to obtain protection there'.
(AI, "You're going to your death", Violations against Syrian refugees returning to Syria, 7 September 2021,)
 - A **Legal and Human Rights Adviser at SJAC** reported that it varies from case to case. This expert knew of former asylum seekers who did not experience any personal problems with the Syrian authorities upon return, whereas other former asylum seekers were either killed or forcibly disappeared by the Syrian authorities upon return
(Interviewet af **EASO**, oprindelig udgivet EASO 2021: Syria Situation of Returnees from Abroad)
 - A **detention expert** told EIP in May 2021 that returnees who were detained after returning to Syria regularly reported that security branch interrogators requested lists of names of family, friends, colleagues, neighbours, refugees, IDPs or people of the same (displaced) community as the returnees, using torture to extract the information.
(EIP, Refugee Return to Syria, September 2021)
 - Sources noted that persons who departed from Syria were viewed with suspicion by the Syrian authorities for leaving the country.
(**SJAC**, The State of Justice in Syria 2022, March 2022)
- Risici til trods for godkendt "status settlement"/"security clearance"
 - **Human Rights Watch** received reports of returnees who were faced with human rights violations and persecution, despite having had their name checked against wanted lists, with the checks coming back clear. Similarly, **EIP** stated that there have been cases of returnees who had their names checked and were informed that it was safe for them to return and who then ended up being detained 'almost immediately after they cross back into government-held territory'
HRW, "Our Lives Are Like Death", 20 October, EIP, Refugee Return to Syria, September 2021

Lignende informationer fra følgende kilder: **Amnesty International**, *You're going to your death: Violations against Syrian refugees returning to Syria*, September 2021, **EASO**, *Syria - Situation of returnees from abroad*, June 2021, **DIS**, *Syria - Issues regarding return to Syria*, October 2021, **EIP**, *Refugees Return in Syria: Dangers, Security Risks and Information Scarcity*, July 2019, **Urmammu for Justice and Human Rights**, e-mail correspondence med EASO, 2021,
 - Risiko til trods for ikke at være opført på sikkerhedsmyndighedernes "wanted lists"
 - According to **International Crisis Group** (ICG), although a person is not wanted by the GoS, he/she can still risk being detained as a consequence of being 'reported by GoS informers'. Informers report people to the security agencies in order to achieve personal gains or to lift doubts about their own loyalty.
(ICG, *Easing Syrian Refugees' Plight in Lebanon*, 13 February 2020)
 - The **Syrian human rights organisation** interviewed by **DIS** in April 2022 pointed out that returnees can face problems if someone in their absence has reported against them to the authorities accusing them of, for example being involved in opposition activities. In such cases, the returnee risk being subject to further interrogation, detention and/or extortion.
(Anonym "human rights organization. Interviewet af DIS 1 April 2022. Oprindelig udgivelse: DIS: Treatment upon return. Maj 2022).

- Risici for afhøring, tilbageholdelse og tortur i forbindelse med check-points, "status settlement"/"security clearance"
 - the officer in charge at the border checkpoint has power to make his own decision about the individual returnee; the officer may decide to cause problems to a person who has no outstanding issues with the GoS, or the officer may decide to let a person, who have outstanding issues, to enter at the border without causing him any problem.
(Anonym "human rights organization. Interviewet af DIS I April 2022. Oprindelig udgivelse: DIS: Treatment upon return. Maj 2022).
 - Many returnees from abroad and reconciled individuals are summoned for interrogation. Once a person is in the custody of a security branch, a 'cycle of information gathering, interrogation, and (often) torture begins.' [...] According to **EIP**, return forms had the specific aim to gather intelligence. EIP noted that these forms ask questions on the individual's or their relatives' past that create 'interest profiles' that would 'likely lead to [their] interrogation and/or arrest'
(**EIP**, Security and Detention in Syria, September 2021,)
 - According to **Nessma Bashi, Legal Fellow at the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre**, security clearance 'could mean that they make it to Syria for a day and the next day they get a call and need to go to a security branch'
(**Syria Direct**, 'Syria is safe, refugees should return': The dangers of the growing narrative, 29 June 2021)
 - Visiting a security branch brings along the risk of getting interrogated, arrested, detained, tortured and/or forced to become an informant, government soldier or pro-government militia member.
According to a **Legal and Human Rights Adviser at SJAC**, this practice puts the returnee in an unwinnable situation. If the returnee presents himself or herself at the security branch in case, he or she might get exposed to serious harm. However, if the returnee does not adhere to the written instruction to visit a security branch, an arrest warrant will be issued against him or her.
(Interviewet af **EASO**, April 2021. Oprindelig udgivet i **EASO 2021: Syria Situation of returnees from abroad**)
 - According to a February 2019 article from the Germany-based aid and human rights organization, **Medico International**, at least two returnees from Germany, who voluntarily repatriated, disappeared after having been interrogated by the security services.
(**Medico International**, *Starthilfe in den Tod*, 11 February 2019)
 - There was no clear, legal procedure for persons to be able to check their 'wanted status' and the process was not protecting returnees from human rights abuses.
(**HRW**, "Our Lives Are Like Death", 20 October 2021)
 - A **Syrian human rights organisation** that requested anonymity interviewed in April 2022 by DIS stated that those who left Syria illegally have to report to local intelligence services where they 'will be questioned about the reason for their leave and about their activities while staying abroad'. According to the source, if someone reported them to the authorities for being involved in opposition activities, they would 'risk being subject to further interrogation, detention and/or money extortion'
(Anonym "human rights organization. Interviewet af DIS I April 2022. DIS: Treatment upon return. Maj 2022).

4. Opsummering

Fire centrale internationale standarder for anvendelse af COI er *balance, accuracy, currency* og *transparency*. Med andre ord skal *nyeste* COI fra *en bred række og type af kilder* angives med *tydelig reference til informationens ophav* og informationerne kan vurderes ud fra hvorvidt de bekræftes af andre kilder.

Samme standarder fremhæves af EMD, både som generelle kriterier for udvælgelse og anvendelse af COI og i domstolens konkrete praksis, når der udvælges og lægges vægt på konkrete kilder og i hvilket omfang disses oplysninger bekræftes af andre.

Sammenholdes disse internationale standarder med resultaterne af den intertekstuelle analyse af COI-rapporter om sikkerhedssituationen fra juni 2021 til marts 2023 tegner der sig følgende billede:

- Der er væsentligt flere (og forskellige typer af) kilder, der peger på en række forskellige risici for returnees, end kilder der peger på, at der er ingen/kun mindre risici for returnees.
- - Primært kilder interviewet af Danish Immigration Service angiver oplysninger om ingen/mindre risici:
 - En anonym syrisk *human rights organisation* er ophav til en stor del af disse informationer.
 - I to tilfælde er det repræsentanter for de syriske myndigheder, der oplyser om ingen/mindre risiko til DIS
 - De ældre informationer fra DIS (2020), der fortsat cirkulerer i nyere rapporter om ingen risici, såfremt godkendt status settlement modsiges af følgende kilder: Human Rights Watch (2021), EIP (2021), Amnesty International (2021), EASO (2021), DIS (2021), Urnammu for Justice and Human Rights (2021), International Crisis Group (2020).
 - Andre kilder, der ligeledes angiver informationer om ingen/mindre risici for returnees uden øvrig profilering: Center for Operational Analysis and Research (2019), European Institute for Peace (2021). Sidstnævnte angiver, ligesom Danish Immigration Service (2021), dog samtidig en række risici for returnees.
- En række kilder angiver information om, at det at være returnee i sig selv kan generere mistanke hos de syriske myndigheder, og at det grundet uforudsigelighed i de syriske myndigheders praksis ikke på forhånd kan vides om en sådan mistanke fører til afhøring, tilbageholdelse eller tortur:
 - Danish Immigration Service, EASO, Human Rights Watch, Voices for Displaced Syrians Forum, Operations and Policy Center, European Institute for Peace, International Crisis Group, Amnesty International, SJAC.

Litteratur

- Bednar, N.R. (2015): *Social Groups Semantics: The Evidentiary Requirements of "Particularity" and "Social Distinction" in Pro Se Asylum Adjudications*. Minnesota Law Review, 100:1, s. 255-404
- Bodström, E. 2023: *Illusions of objectivity: The two functions of country of origin information in asylum assessment*. Migration Studies, Volume 11:1, 197-217.
- EASO 2018: *Compilation of Jurisprudence. Judicial Practical Guide on Country of Origin Information*.
https://euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/coi-cj_en.PDF
- EASO 2020: *Practical Guide on use of Country of origin information by case officers for the examination of asylum applications. December 2020*.
https://euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EASO_Practical_guide_COI_EN.pdf
- UNHCR 2020: *Country of Origin Note: Participation in Anti-Government Protests; Draft Evasion; Issuance and Application of Partial Amnesty Decrees; Residency in (Formerly) Opposition-Held Areas; Issuance of Passports Abroad; Return and 'Settling One's Status*
<https://www.refworld.org/docid/5ec4fcff4.html>
- UNHCR: *International Protection Considerations with regard to people fleeing the Syrian Arab Republic, Update VI*
<https://www.refworld.org/docid/606427d97.html>
- Bilagets COI-rapporter angives på særskilt litteraturliste i bilaget.