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Letter dated 15 October 2024 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023) concerning Somalia addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023) concerning Al-Shabaab, and in accordance with paragraph 29 (c) of Council resolution 2713 (2023), I have the honour to transmit herewith the final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023).

The Committee would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) **Yamazaki** Kazuyuki
Chair

Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023)
concerning Al-Shabaab



Letter dated 17 September 2024 from the Panel of Experts on Somalia addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023) concerning Al-Shabaab

In accordance with paragraph 29 (c) of Security Council resolution 2713 (2023), we have the honour to transmit herewith the final report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023) to be submitted to the Council by 15 October 2024.

(Signed) Sanaa **Elkahim**
Coordinator and humanitarian expert

(Signed) Nikhil **Acharya**
Arms expert

(Signed) Stella **Attakpah**
Finance Expert

(Signed) Justine **Fleischner**
Armed groups expert

(Signed) Lydelle **Joubert**
Maritime/natural resources expert

Summary

The adoption by the Security Council on 1 December 2023 of its resolutions [2713 \(2023\)](#) and [2714 \(2023\)](#) marked a pivotal moment for Somalia, by ending the long-standing territorial arms embargo first imposed by the Council on 23 January 1992 in its resolution [733 \(1992\)](#). All restrictions on the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia regarding imports of weapons, ammunition and military equipment have been removed, allowing key Somali security sector institutions – the Somali National Army, the National Intelligence and Security Agency, the Somali National Police Force and the Somali Custodial Corps – to acquire military equipment without limitations. By its resolution [2713 \(2023\)](#), the Council imposed an arms embargo focused on Al-Shabaab to prevent the group's access to weapons and ammunition and reduce the threat posed by improvised explosive devices. It also retained certain arms control procedures for the federal member states, regional governments and licensed private security companies, as detailed in its annexes A and B to the resolution.

The lifting of the arms embargo on the Government also marks a new chapter, providing both opportunities and challenges for the Government and its security forces. The above-mentioned resolutions aimed to ensure that the Government strengthen its national security architecture, including through better control over its land and maritime borders, while refocusing the investigations of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution [2713 \(2023\)](#) on degrading the capabilities of Al-Shabaab, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)-Somalia and any other threats to the peace and security of Somalia.

The safe and secure management of weapons and ammunition in Somalia remains challenging owing to illicit weapons trafficking, lack of accountability over heavily armed clan militias and the limited analysis and tracing capacity regarding seized weapons, ammunition and improvised explosive devices. Weapons seized from Al-Shabaab were manufactured as recently as 2021, proving that the group maintains access to illicit weapons supplies. Successful base overruns and weapons diversion from bases operated by the Somali National Army and the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), spillovers from regional conflict and illicit trafficking networks remain key sources of resupply for Al-Shabaab.

In this light, Al-Shabaab continues to pose the most significant threat to peace and security in Somalia. The group remains resilient in response to Government-led military operations against it. Al-Shabaab continues to carry out complex attacks against the Government, ATMIS and international forces, as well as civilians and the business community, including inside protected areas in Mogadishu. On 2 August 2024, Al-Shabaab carried out one of the deadliest complex attacks against civilians in years, targeting the Beach View Restaurant at Lido Beach in Mogadishu.

Al-Shabaab sustains a solid financial base through its highly sophisticated business strategies. The group exploits both licit and illicit means to generate revenue for its operations, including through checkpoints, extortion of businesses and forced taxation, and the use of third-party businesses and their accounts. The Panel received information that Al-Shabaab's overall total financial income for 2023 exceeded \$150 million, amassed via several revenue-generating activities that the Panel continues to investigate.

Efforts to degrade Al-Shabaab must remain cognizant of the context of overwhelming humanitarian needs and persistent threats to the civilian population. Throughout 2023 and 2024, the civilian population bore the brunt of the cycle of conflict, violence and climatic shocks, which caused displacement, strained resources

and disrupted infrastructure and livelihoods. In 2024, it is estimated that 6.9 million people in Somalia require humanitarian assistance, including 3.9 million internally displaced persons. Neutral and impartial humanitarian access is restricted in areas controlled by Al-Shabaab, underscoring the need for such access. To allow humanitarians to provide this assistance, it is important that counter-terrorism legislation exclude impartial humanitarian activities from the scope of their applications.

The Panel noted the high number of reports of sexual and gender-based violence, including conflict-related sexual violence, and grave violations against children. Al-Shabaab remains the perpetrator with the highest recorded number of incidents of recruitment and use of children, abduction and forced marriage. Despite the Government's commitment to the 2014 standard operating procedure for the handover and reception of children associated with armed groups, these children continue to be held in official and unofficial detention locations and in some cases subject to the death penalty for offenses committed while associated with Al-Shabaab.

Over the course of its mandate, the Panel investigated changes in the strength and disposition of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL QDe.115) faction in Somalia, including the re-emergence of the Al-Karrar office as a key administrative and financial hub for ISIL globally. The presence of ISIL-Somalia is concentrated in the Bari region of Puntland, where there has been a rise in extortion and smuggling, as well as an influx of foreign fighters, presenting new security risks for Somalia and the region.

The Panel notes the persistent modus operandi of smuggling weapons and ammunition in cargo and fishing dhows (traditional sailing vessels) across the Arabian Sea, which are intended for non-State armed groups in Somalia or Yemen. On 11 January 2024, the United States of America Navy intercepted a dhow in the Arabian Sea with a cargo of missile components. The smuggling operation was the third in a larger operation that commenced in August 2023, in which arms were allegedly smuggled from the Islamic Republic of Iran to be transferred to another vessel off the coast of Somalia, with Yemen as the final destination. Furthermore, the Puntland authorities have successfully intercepted weapons and apprehended several weapons smugglers since August 2023, including six Yemeni nationals.

The Panel noted the reemergence of Somali piracy since 24 November 2023, with more than 25 attacks, including hijackings, reported on commercial vessels and dhows. Piracy in Somalia is linked to insecurity and economic challenges on land. For several years, piracy has been suppressed by security measures such as the deployment of foreign navies, the implementation of best management practices on ships and the presence of private armed security teams on ships. Over time, however, fewer vessels have such teams on board, and there has been a relaxation of best management practices by shipping companies. None of the vessels hijacked and boarded during the current wave of piracy had a private armed security team.

Furthermore, by its resolution [2696 \(2023\)](#), the Security Council authorized the one-off sale of charcoal stockpiles in and around Kismaayo. On 29 May 2024, the Panel was informed that the business community in Jubbaland had confirmed to the Government that it was able to find an interested buyer of the charcoal. Since then, three cargo dhows have loaded the charcoal in Kismaayo and departed for Dubai. To date, around 125,000 bags of charcoal have been exported from Kismaayo as part of the one-off sale. The Panel continues to monitor the progress on, and compliance with, the authorized one-off charcoal disposal.

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
Summary	3
I. Mandate and methodology	7
II. Al-Shabaab and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant faction threats to peace, security, and stability in Somalia	7
A. Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiin (Al-Shabaab)	7
B. Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant in Somalia	11
III. Overview of regional security perspectives	14
IV. Update on Al-Shabaab finances	15
A. Sources of Al-Shabaab finances	15
B. National efforts to disrupt Al-Shabaab financial capabilities	16
C. Misappropriation	19
D. Whistleblower protection mechanisms	19
E. Somaliland and the national financial disruption plan	19
V. Post-Government arms embargo: weapons and ammunition management and tracing	20
A. Limited information on notifications under annex A and B to resolution 2713 (2023)	21
B. Weapons and ammunition management: progress and challenges at the Government and federal member state levels	21
C. Al-Shabaab arms seizures from ATMIS and Somali National Army bases	23
D. ATMIS drawdown and transition into the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia: drawing on lessons learned	24
E. Panel investigations and tracing of weapons, ammunition and related components used by Al-Shabaab	25
F. Cross-border arms trafficking: a subregional perspective	25
G. Arms seizure in Abudwak, Galmudug	26
H. Monitoring and investigating Al-Shabaab indirect fire attacks	26
VI. The threat posed by improvised explosive devices	27
A. Improvised explosive device trends during the reporting period	27
B. Analysis of the use of improvised explosive devices by Al-Shabaab	27
VII. Charcoal ban	29
A. Implementation of the charcoal ban	29
B. One-off, complete disposal of charcoal stockpiles	29
VIII. Maritime security	29
A. Trafficking and maritime interdictions	29
B. Resurgence of piracy	31

IX.	Key protection and humanitarian considerations	37
A.	Impact of conflict and insecurity on the civilian population	37
B.	Exacerbating effect of climatic shocks	38
C.	Humanitarian access in Al-Shabaab-controlled areas	39
D.	Update on the implementation of resolution 2664 (2022) (humanitarian carveout)	39
E.	Sexual and gender-based violence	40
F.	Grave violations against children	42
X.	Recommendations	43
	Annexes*	46

I. Mandate and methodology

1. In its resolution 2713 (2023), the Security Council outlines the mandate of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023). In accordance with paragraph 29 (c) of the resolution, the Panel submits to the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Al-Shabaab the present final report on its investigations.

2. The Panel was appointed by the Secretary-General in his letter to the President of the Security Council dated 29 December 2023 (S/2024/48). The Panel is composed of five experts. At the time of writing, the armed groups/regional expert, while appointed by the Secretary-General, is yet to join the Panel. This report contains the findings of the Panel from September 2023 to 30 August 2024.

3. From January to August 2024, the Panel conducted multiple visits to Somalia and met with the authorities of the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia, the federal member states and regional governments. The Panel visited Mogadishu, Garowe, Baidoa, Kismaayo and Hargeisa. The Panel also met with representatives of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), as well as representatives of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), United Nations agencies, international partners, various diplomatic missions and civil society organizations. In May 2024, the Panel participated in a national weapons and ammunition management coordination meeting, convened by the Central Monitoring Department of the Office of National Security, which brought together representatives from the Government, federal member states,¹ Somali security forces and international partners. In addition, the Panel participated in the 15th Industry Strategic Meeting, hosted by the European Union Naval Force, which was held on 29 and 30 May 2024, in Madrid.

4. The Panel is guided by the standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (see S/2006/997) and the Secretary-General's bulletin on information sensitivity, classification and handling (ST/SGB/2007/6). A detailed note on its methodology is contained in annexes 2 and 3 to the present report.

5. At the time of writing, the Panel is engaged in discussions with the Government on modalities of cooperation with the Government. Missions by the Panel to Somalia are expected to resume once the outstanding matters have been addressed.

II. Al-Shabaab and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant faction: threats to peace, security and stability in Somalia

A. Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiin (Al-Shabaab)

6. Al-Shabaab (SOe.001) remains the most significant threat to peace and security in Somalia and has managed to withstand repeated Government-backed military offensives against it. Not only has Al-Shabaab managed to withstand those operations, but has also recaptured previously liberated areas, including Ceel Buur and Cowsweyne in Galmudug. The group continues to carry out complex attacks against the Government, ATMIS and international targets, as well as civilians and the business community, including attacks targeting busy markets in Mogadishu.² The group

¹ Galmadug, Hirshabelle, Jubaland, and South-West State.

² See Al Jazeera, "Ten dead, 20 others injured in multiple blasts in market in Somali capital", 6 February 2024.

benefits from the presence of its Amniyat intelligence service in Government-controlled areas, which has proved difficult for security services to disrupt.

1. Leadership structure and dynamics

7. In recent years, Al-Shabaab's senior leadership structure has remained relatively stable. Over the past year, there has been one new high-level appointment: Yassir Jiis (not listed) was replaced by an individual known as Guled "Ilkacase" (aka Guled with the red teeth, not listed) aka Muse, as the head of the military office (Jabhat Maktab). Guled is from north-west Somalia and was previously based in the Galgala mountains then the Gedo region. Yassir Jiis remains an important senior leader within Al-Shabaab but does not currently hold an official position.

8. The Panel has not been able to substantiate claims of Al-Shabaab in-fighting. Ahmed Diriye (SOi.014, aka Ahmed Umar, Abu Ubaidah) remains firmly in control as Emir, with Abukar Ali Adan (SOi.018) as his deputy. Mahad Karate (SOi.020), the former deputy Emir, is a close confidante of the emir.

9. Al-Shabaab maintains both an executive and a shura council, but neither currently holds regular meetings, for security reasons. The executive council includes the equivalent of all heads of offices (*makatib*), while the shura council includes heads of offices, regional governors (*walis*), military commanders (*jabha*) and some foreign fighters. There is also a general command (*Qiyadatal Aama*) – a small inner circle consulted more closely by Diriye. Nevertheless, Al-Shabaab's emir ultimately has sole decision-making authority (see confidential annex 5).

2. High-profile attacks in Mogadishu

10. Al-Shabaab continues to carry out high-profile attacks in Mogadishu. These attacks serve to challenge the authority of the Government and demonstrate Al-Shabaab's continued ability to gain access to sensitive and protected areas.

11. The attacks include:

- On 10 February 2024, an insider attack on the General Gordon military base, targeting military advisors from the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain³
- On 14 and 15 March 2024, a complex attack against a hotel located just over half a kilometre from Villa Somalia⁴
- On 3 May 2024, the assassination of Police Lieutenant Colonel Adan Omar Ahmed inside a protected area in Xamarjajab district⁵
- On 14 July 2024, a complex attack against civilians at a coffee shop in Boondhere district⁶
- On 2 August 2024, a complex attack targeting civilians at a restaurant in Lido Beach, Mogadishu, with over 284 casualties reported, including nearly 100 people killed⁷

³ Jon Gambrell, "Al-Shabab claims attack in Somali capital that kills 4 Emirati troops and 1 Bahraini officer", Associated Press, 12 February 2024.

⁴ Abdi Sheikh, "Three soldiers die in hotel attack in Somali capital: police", Reuters, 15 March 2024.

⁵ Horn Observer, "Weeks after police officer's abduction, another policeman assassinated in Mogadishu", 5 May 2024.

⁶ Ibrahim Aden and Basillioh Rukanga, "Car bomb kills Somalis watching Euro football final", BBC, 15 July 2024.

⁷ Confidential security report, August 2024.

- On 21 August 2024, multiple attacks on security forces and checkpoints, including two vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices successfully intercepted by the National Intelligence and Security Agency⁸

12. The Government has invested in mitigation measures to prevent Al-Shabaab from carrying out complex attacks, including installing cameras at checkpoints entering Mogadishu, frequent rotations and co-location of security force personnel and enhanced screening of vehicles entering Mogadishu. Internal investigations and the review of camera footage have in some cases led to the arrest of security forces personnel, but also suggest improved concealment of explosive containers by Al-Shabaab that may require additional training and explosive detection equipment to intercept (see para. 130).⁹

3. Military gains and losses against Al-Shabaab

13. Since the height of the Government-led offensive against Al-Shabaab in 2022 and 2023, the Government has faced some significant setbacks that have highlighted challenges associated with force generation and holding liberated areas. The ability of Somalia special forces to fight on multiple fronts at the same time, and issues with Al-Shabaab infiltration of the security forces, moreover, have come into sharp focus as a result of these military losses.

14. Al-Shabaab continues to carry out attacks against ATMIS and the Somali National Army, particularly in Lower and Middle Shabelle, surrounding Mogadishu.¹⁰ Al-Shabaab uses routes in these areas to tax local traders and move its fighters, finance and weapons. The most direct route from Jilib and Bu'aale to Mogadishu passes through Baraawe, Buulo Mareer and Merca. Although those towns are controlled by the Government, the surrounding areas are contested. Other key transit routes from Mogadishu pass through Afgoye in Lower Shabelle and Balcad in Middle Shabelle. These towns, with close proximity to Mogadishu, continue to experience insecurity, intimidation and violence against civilians by Al-Shabaab and other armed actors.

15. Attacks using improvised explosive devices continue to target the Somali National Army and ATMIS convoys, presenting significant security risks for troop movements and resupply, as well as casualty evacuation and medical evacuation operations, which has knock-on effects for offensive operations and force morale. Al-Shabaab's ability to disrupt Army logistics, including ammunition resupplies, remains a key challenge and vulnerability (see paras. 104–105).

16. Despite these challenges, the Government continues to hold key liberated areas in Ceel Dheer, Xarardheere, the natural port at Ceel-Huur and Masagaway in Galmudug.

17. In August 2023, the Government-led offensive faced significant setbacks in Budbud, Ceel Buur, Cowsweyne and Galcad. These locations remained under Al-Shabaab control as of August 2024.

18. On 26 August 2023, Al-Shabaab conducted a major attack on the Somali National Army in Cowsweyne, which had only been liberated days prior. Al-Shabaab

⁸ See <https://mogadishu24.com/al-shabaab-claims-deadly-attack-on-security-checkpoints/>.

⁹ Official confidential source.

¹⁰ Official confidential source. See also, Armed Conflict Location and Event Data, "Somalia: dispute over constitutional amendment and increased Al-Shabaab attacks", 26 April 2024; and Armed Conflict Location and Event Data, "Somalia: Al-Shabaab regains lost territories amid run-up to State elections", 28 March 2024.

media claimed to have killed over 175 members of the Army during the attack.¹¹ Between 29 and 30 August 2024, Al-Shabaab recaptured Ceel Buur, which was briefly held by the Army.¹²

19. On 24 January 2024, Al-Shabaab claimed a major attack on the Somali National Army in Caad area, Mudug, including Danab, Gorgor, Darawish and Macawisley forces. Al-Shabaab's *Al-Kata'ib* media subsequently published photos and videos from the attack, during which Al-Shabaab claimed to have captured vehicles, weapons and other types of military equipment.¹³

20. Between 9 and 14 March 2024, Al-Shabaab recaptured several key towns in the Mudug region that had previously been liberated in 2022 and 2023.¹⁴

21. On 27 April 2024, Al-Shabaab recaptured Ciidciidka and Cali Fooldeere in Mahaday district, Middle Shabelle, Hirshabelle, as the Somali National Army withdrew.¹⁵ In Hirshabelle, the Government continues to control liberated areas east of the Shabelle river but has struggled to control an increase in clan conflict, presenting new security challenges (see paras. 101–103 and 171).

22. Al-Shabaab continues to claim its highest number of attacks in South-West State, where there have been no major gains made by the Somali National Army during the reporting period.¹⁶ Ethiopian forces, including as part of ATMIS, currently provide protection in major towns and cities under the control of the Government in Baidoa, Ceel Barde, Dinsoor, Hudur and Waajid, as well as Bardheere, Garbaharrey and Luuq in Gedo in Jubbaland.

23. On 1 September 2024, Al-Shabaab launched an indirect fire attack against the airport in Baidoa. No casualties were reported, but minor damage was sustained to the runway, highlighting the vulnerability of the de facto capital of South-West State (see annex 19).¹⁷

24. In July and August 2024, Government-led operations against Al-Shabaab in Jubbaland successfully cleared over 100 kilometres along the main highway between Kismaayo and Afmadow, resulting in heavy Al-Shabaab losses. On 22 July 2024, federal and regional forces repelled three separate Al-Shabaab attacks on their positions in Bulo Haji, Harbole and Mido/Biibi, again resulting in significant Al-Shabaab losses.¹⁸ A press release by the Jubbaland administration reported that over 135 Al-Shabaab militants had been killed (see annexes 4a and 4b).

25. Al-Shabaab is also reportedly seeking to develop new capabilities, including the use of weaponized uncrewed aerial vehicles (see annex 22). Commercial uncrewed aerial vehicles are in use in Somalia and have been used by Al-Shabaab to carry out

¹¹ Horn Observer, "Dozens of Somali soldiers killed, others captured in a daring Al-Shabaab attack", 26 August 2023.

¹² "Al-Shabaab recaptured El Buur", The Somali Digest, 30 August 2023.

¹³ Site Intelligence, "Shabaab leadership announce 191 dead in major operation on special SNA units in Mudug", 24 January 2024.

¹⁴ Horn Observer, "Al-Shabaab seizes control of towns and villages abandoned by Somali army, militia", 18 March 2024.

¹⁵ Jama, "Al-Shabab regains strategic locations in middle Shabelle amid clan rivalries", The Somali Digest, 27 April 2024.

¹⁶ Confidential source. See also, Site Intelligence, "Shabaab claims 3 targeted killings, multiple raids on Somali, Ethiopian, Kenyan, and Ugandan military positions", 22 May 2024.

¹⁷ See Somali Guardian, "Mortar barrage hits Somalia's Baidoa airport", 1 September 2024.

¹⁸ Staff reporter, "Somalia: dozens of Al-Shabaab militants killed in foiled attack", Garowe Online, 22 July 2024.

surveillance.¹⁹ This capability does not require or necessarily indicate technology transfers from other armed groups, although the Panel continues to investigate.

4. Al-Shabaab media and propaganda

26. Al-Shabaab continues to maintain a sophisticated online presence and social media wing, including its *Al-Kata'ib* media foundation and Arabic-language Shahada News Agency, which recently expanded its global coverage.²⁰ Al-Shabaab is also regularly featured in Al-Qaida media and propaganda.

27. The National Intelligence and Security Agency routinely identifies and shuts down Al-Shabaab-affiliated websites, social media accounts and chat groups, but the digital media space remains difficult to control. New websites, social media accounts and chat groups quickly replace those that are shut down.

28. The Panel has taken note of Al-Shabaab's efforts to capitalize on recent events in the region and the Middle East. Al-Shabaab media also continues to report on civilian casualties attributed to ATMIS and international forces, at times using the language of international humanitarian law.²¹

29. On 18 June 2024, *Al-Kata'ib* released its annual Eid propaganda video. The Panel reviewed the video, which prominently features graphic footage under the subheading: "How can we be content with abandoning jihad?" Around the 30-minute mark, a Pashto-language chant (*nasheed*) is played praising the Taliban. The video also displays dozens of "special forces" training at the Usama Bin Laden Military Academy.²²

B. Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant in Somalia

30. The Panel has taken note of a significant shift in the strength and disposition of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) faction in Somalia, which had been significantly degraded following the death in January 2023 of Suhayl Aalim Abd El-Rahman, aka Bilal al-Sudani. ISIL-Somalia is led by a cadre of former Al-Shabaab militants based in the Bari region of Puntland but has recently received an influx of foreign fighters that have expanded and enhanced the group's capabilities against Al-Shabaab. This has coincided with the re-emergence of the Al-Karrar office as a key administrative and financial hub for ISIL globally.²³

31. Puntland provides a "strategic bridge" between the Horn of Africa and the Gulf across the Red Sea, which ISIL has sought to leverage in order to move and train its fighters, smuggle weapons and generate income through various illicit activities, as well as tax collection (*zakawat*) from businesses in Bossaso and elsewhere in Somalia, including in Mogadishu.

32. The Al-Karrar office has re-emerged as an important hub for ISIL administration and finance. This has raised new security risks for Somalia, as ISIL-Somalia has simultaneously expanded its base of operations in Puntland, which provides a base for ISIL operations more broadly in the region. The opaque use of cryptocurrency presents additional challenges for government and federal member state authorities

¹⁹ Official confidential sources.

²⁰ See Africa Defense Forum, "Al-Shabaab continues to expand media operations", 30 July 2024.

²¹ See Site Intelligence, "Amid Eid festivities in Shabaab-controlled territories, Somalis remember Gaza and decry alleged Ethiopian ambitions, 15 April 2024; and Site Intelligence, "Shabaab vows revenge for alleged Ugandan massacre of Somali farmers in lower Shabelle", 17 July 2024.

²² In addition, see Caleb Weiss, "Shabaab advertises creation of 'special forces' unit", Long War Journal, 19 June 2024.

²³ S/2024/556, p. 3.

that require new investigative capabilities and enhanced awareness to identify cryptotransactions.

33. Notably, none of the top leadership of ISIL-Somalia or the Al-Karrar office is currently listed under any United Nations sanctions regime.

1. ISIL-Somalia leadership dynamics

34. The exact leadership structure of the Al-Karrar office and the ISIL-Somalia “province” (*wilaya*) remains opaque. The Al-Karrar office collects and distributes funds, facilitates the movement and training of foreign fighters, coordinates operations between affiliates and is likely involved in the smuggling of weapons and other goods in support of ISIL operations globally. Al-Karrar reports to the general directorate of provinces, which in turn reports to the “office of the caliphate.”

35. Some reports suggest that Abdul Qadir Mumin (not listed) may have been promoted to global “caliph”, but the Panel has received no evidence to substantiate that claim. His last confirmed position is as head of the general directorate of provinces, placing him in a leadership role over ISIL-affiliates in Africa.

36. Abdirahman Fahiye Isse Mohamud, aka Fahiye, (not listed) is the emir of ISIL-Somalia and, in that role, is responsible for ISIL operations in Somalia. Abdiwali Waran-Walac (not listed), also from the Bari region of Puntland, currently serves as the head of finance for ISIL-Somalia.²⁴

37. Investigations into the Al-Karrar office suggest there has not been one individual who has replaced Bilal al-Sudani, but rather a few key individuals that have taken on his previous roles and responsibilities, making these networks more decentralized and difficult to disrupt.²⁵ The Panel has received information that at least one Syrian national currently holds a leadership position within the Al-Karrar office.²⁶

38. Mumin was previously a member of Al-Shabaab and established the ISIL-Somalia faction in Puntland in October 2015, declaring allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi along with a small cadre of defectors from Al-Shabaab.²⁷ Mumin, Fahiye and Waran-Walac benefit from the protection afforded to them by their sub-clan affiliations and networks in the Bari region, as well as the difficult terrain in the Cal Miskaad mountains, which makes counter-ISIL operations difficult.

2. Recent fighting between ISIL-Somalia and Al-Shabaab in the Cal Miskaad mountains

39. Between late 2023 and mid-2024, ISIL-Somalia made significant gains against Al-Shabaab in Puntland’s Cal Miskaad mountains, pushing the group into a small corner south-east of Bosaso.²⁸ The advance of ISIL has been described as a “drastic change” from previous years, and official sources note this is likely due in part to an increase in foreign fighters.²⁹

40. In April 2024, the ISIL weekly online journal, *Al-Naba*, reported that ISIL-Somalia had taken full control of Cal Miskaad, including seizures of weapons and

²⁴ Official confidential sources.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ BBC Monitoring, “IS issues rare Somalia video as part of global allegiance series”, 20 July 2019.

²⁸ Confidential interview, June 2024.

²⁹ Confidential interview, March 2024.

military equipment (see annexes 5a and 5b). While those claims are exaggerated, ISIL-Somalia is reported to be at its greatest strength since its inception.³⁰

41. ISIL-Somalia currently holds no population centres in the Bari region, but rather has established bases in four districts: Balidhidin; Hunbays; Iskushuban; and Qandala.³¹

42. Al-Shabaab maintains its stronghold in the western Cal Madow mountains spanning parts of Bari and Sanaag. Al-Shabaab fighters in Galgala are primarily recruited from southern and north-western Somalia, with only 20 per cent reportedly recruited from Puntland.³²

43. Both groups pay higher salaries to fighters based in the Cal Madow and Cal Miskaad due to harsh conditions, and both groups maintain a foothold to extract extortion payments from businesses and have access to well-established smuggling routes in the Bari region of Puntland.³³

3. Foreign fighters in ISIL-Somalia

44. The ISIL force size and strength are difficult to verify, but recent estimates suggest the group has likely doubled in size, in part due to an influx of foreign fighters. In 2019, the Panel estimated the group had a force strength of 340 fighters in Puntland.³⁴ More recent reports suggest that the current force size of the group is between 600 to 700 fighters.³⁵ Foreign fighters arrive in Puntland using both maritime and overland routes. Notably, Puntland encompasses nearly one third of the coastline of Somalia and is only 130 nautical miles from Yemen.

45. The use of overland routes by foreign fighters to enter Puntland has been confirmed to the Panel based on visas and flight tickets provided for individuals currently under investigation with relevant Member States.³⁶ Coordination and information-sharing among regional Member States has proved particularly challenging for intercepting foreign fighters seeking to join ISIL-Somalia in Puntland.

46. Over the past year, Puntland has arrested dozens of foreign fighters from Ethiopia, Morocco, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Sudan, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yemen.³⁷ In March 2024, Puntland convicted six Moroccan nationals for joining ISIL, but their death sentences were later commuted.³⁸ While in custody, the detainees confirmed that there was a significant presence of foreign fighters training in small groups with trainers from the Middle East.³⁹

47. The Panel is also investigating foreign fighters that had been sent for training in Cal Miskaad before returning to their home countries or other ISIL-affiliates in the region.

4. Competition between ISIL-Somalia and Al-Shabaab over extortion payments

48. ISIL-Somalia has repeatedly targeted businesses for non-payment of *zakawat* as it seeks to expand revenue generated from extortion payments in Bosaso and Mogadishu

³⁰ Official confidential source.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Confidential interviews, June and August 2024.

³⁴ S/2019/858, para. 56.

³⁵ Official confidential sources.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Staff reporter, "Somalia: military court releases Moroccans sentenced to death for joining ISIS", Garowe Online, 14 May 2024.

³⁹ Official confidential source, June 2024.

in direct competition with Al-Shabaab. The Panel has taken note of at least three improvised explosive device and grenade attacks against businesses in Bosaso during the reporting period:

- On 20 November 2023, a Puntland explosive ordnance disposal team conducted a render-safe procedure on an improvised explosive device targeting Bulsho Construction Company in Bosaso⁴⁰
- On 5 May 2024, a remote controlled IED attack against Bulsho Construction Company in Bosaso
- On 9 July 2024, a grenade attack against the Marhaba Trading Company warehouse in Bosaso (see annex 9)

49. The amount of revenue generated by ISIL-Somalia annually is unconfirmed, but multiple official sources have reported an increase from previous years. ISIL-Somalia is believed to have now surpassed Al-Shabaab in terms of its revenue collection in Bosaso.⁴¹

50. Given the relatively small size of ISIL-Somalia, the group can sustain itself and generate additional revenue for other ISIL-affiliates through the Al-Karrar office.

51. While the ISIL presence in Somalia remains confined and its budget relatively meagre in comparison with Al-Shabaab, the rise in foreign fighters, extortion and smuggling activity associated with the expanded ISIL-Somalia presence in Puntland constitutes a significant threat to peace and security in Somalia, with broader implications for peace and security in the region.

III. Overview of regional security perspectives

52. At the time of submission of the present report, the Panel is still without a regional expert. The Panel plans to expand on its regional investigations as soon as the expert is able to join and notes the information below for further investigation.

53. In its 2023 final report, the Panel reported on Al-Shabaab cross-border attacks in Ethiopia and Kenya.⁴² During the current reporting period, Al-Shabaab continued to carry out cross-border attacks into Kenya, in particular in the north-eastern counties of Garissa, Lamu, Mandera, and Wajir along the border with Somalia. The Panel reiterates the value of cross-border cooperation⁴³ to trace Al-Shabaab weapons caches seized by Kenyan security forces (see annex 21).

54. Reports also show that Al-Shabaab has been involved in the trafficking of women and girls from Kenya to Somalia for sexual slavery and forced marriages, using various means, including deception, coercion and abduction.⁴⁴ The Panel will continue to investigate these reports.

55. Al-Shabaab maintains an office of foreign fighters dedicated to resettling and supporting foreign fighters in Somalia. Maalim Salman (SOi.013) heads the office, but his responsibilities are reportedly mainly financial and administrative, rather than operational. The Panel will continue to investigate.

⁴⁰ Staff reporter, “Somalia’s Puntland foils ISIS terrorist attack in Gulf of Aden port city”, Garowe Online, 20 November 2023.

⁴¹ Official confidential source.

⁴² S/2023/724, paras. 33–36.

⁴³ Ibid., paras. 33, 34, 100 and (recommendation) 131(a).

⁴⁴ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), “Tackling sexual violence in Somalia: prevention and protection”, 7 May 2024, p. 15.

56. Since November 2023, the Houthis have launched attacks in the Red Sea from Yemen against ships affiliated with or linked to regional conflicts. The attacks have impeded global trade and freedom of navigation, as a high percentage of companies have diverted their ships from the Red Sea to the longer and more expensive route around the Cape of Good Hope. The tonnage of ships entering the Gulf of Aden fell by more than 70 per cent between early December 2023 and the first half of February 2024.⁴⁵

57. Simultaneously, a re-emergence of piracy along the coastline of Somalia was noted (see paras. 146–166). The combination of the two maritime threats affected maritime security, as well as regional security and stability, not only in the Red Sea, but also in the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and the wider Western Indian Ocean (see annex 8).

58. Coordinated regional and international cooperation to strengthen the national security architecture of Somalia and its capacity to secure its weapons and ammunition stockpiles, reduce illicit weapon and ammunition flows, control land borders, strengthen maritime domain awareness and manage ports of call will positively affect the security of the Horn of Africa region.

59. The Panel noted the increased participation of Somali delegations in key regional and global arms control processes, including the Fourth Review Conference of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and its related International Tracing Instrument, held at Headquarters, as well as the regional preparatory meetings held in Nairobi.

IV. Update on Al-Shabaab finances

A. Sources of Al-Shabaab finances

60. Over the past five years, as part of its mandate, the Panel has mapped Al-Shabaab's methods of raising, moving, storing and using funds. The Panel has also developed case studies for relevant government institutions to identify and investigate financial crimes and terrorist financing activities, to disrupt the group's finances.

61. The Panel notes the raids by the Government on checkpoints and the closure of bank and mobile money accounts, as cited in the Panel's 2023 final report, which temporarily affected Al-Shabaab's revenues. However, this was short-lived due to limited capacity to sustain a coordinated approach to disrupt its modes of operation. The group continues to use the same methods to raise, move and store funds.

62. Al-Shabaab continues to have a strong financial base deriving from the illegal taxation of all economic activities and all products transiting through areas under their control, including property levies within and beyond their zones of control. A study⁴⁶ shows that the group's income generation has remained within a margin of +/- 20 per cent from 2019 (\$163 million) to 2023, with a dip in 2022 (\$144 million). The Panel received information that Al-Shabaab's overall financial income for 2023 exceeded \$150 million, resulting from its extensive financial operations, including the identification of new products such as scrap metals and new tariffs and taxation in 2024 (see annex 9). As an indicator of a single income-generating activity for the group, a truckload of scrap metal generates between \$4,000 and \$6,000, depending on the size of the truck; assuming that 15 trucks can cross Al-Shabaab-controlled territory in a single day, the group can generate as much as \$90,000 per day, or \$1,080,000 per year.

⁴⁵ Céline Bacrot and Marc-Antoine Faure, "Red Sea crisis and implications for trade facilitation in Africa", UNCTAD Transport and Trade Facilitation Newsletter, No. 101, 17 April 2024.

⁴⁶ Confidential report, April 2024.

63. Al-Shabaab reacted to the recent introduction by the Government of a 5 per cent sales tax⁴⁷ and issued a warning to financial institutions and businesses, urging people to close their accounts and collect their funds from those institutions, which caused disruption to services in Mogadishu. On 24 August 2024, two markets⁴⁸ in Mogadishu were targeted by Al-Shabaab, causing losses of goods worth millions of dollars.

64. During the reporting period, the Panel received information that Al-Shabaab had established an investment committee led by the group's head of finance⁴⁹ and operating under the direction of its emir. The purpose of the committee⁵⁰ was reportedly to ensure that "funds are invested in legal businesses, with all dues and taxes paid, so that no funds are lost."⁵¹ Final investment decisions are made from Al-Shabaab's base in Jilib. According to the information received, most of the group's investments in legal businesses are in the major regions of Somalia, including Mogadishu. Those business ventures can relate to the investment in or establishment of legitimate businesses or the provision of funds for start-up businesses;⁵² in those cases, Al-Shabaab's return on investment would range from 50 to 80 per cent.⁵³ The Panel is in the process of mapping those businesses.

65. The Panel also identified business accounts with abnormal transactions, such as patterns of large cash deposits above the threshold, suggesting the comingling of legitimate and illicitly acquired funds (see confidential annex 12). The Panel also identified suspicious⁵⁴ account numbers, one of which is domiciled in a financial institution in Hargeisa for an individual or business in the southern part of the country. The Panel continues to investigate this. On 4 September 2024, a trial in Mogadishu revealed how Al-Shabaab had been able to move over \$12 million through the banking sector.⁵⁵

B. National efforts to disrupt Al-Shabaab financial capabilities

1. Sanctions implementation and Al-Shabaab financial disruption

66. As previously noted, the Government has made significant efforts to implement its financial disruption plan, in line with Security Council resolution [2551 \(2020\)](#) and subsequent resolutions.⁵⁶

67. Recently, the Government issued two national designation lists of individuals suspected of financing Al-Shabaab terrorist activities, in line with article 6 of the Targeted Financial Sanctions Act of 2023:⁵⁷ one on 13 April 2024, designating nine individuals; and another on 18 July 2024, designating eight individuals suspected of financing or facilitating terrorism (see annexes 10 and 11).

⁴⁷ Staff reporter, "Al-Shabaab threatens financial institutions over Somalia's new 5 per cent sales tax", Garowe Online, 26 August 2024.

⁴⁸ Horn Observer, "Al-Shabaab attack on Mogadishu markets inflicts \$4 million in losses amid Government's failure to protect businesses", 28 August 2024.

⁴⁹ Official confidential source.

⁵⁰ [S/2021/849](#), para. 52 (on the entrepreneurial nature of Al-Shabaab with regards to investments).

⁵¹ Confidential source.

⁵² Official confidential sources.

⁵³ Confirmed through various sources.

⁵⁴ Official confidential information of account on watch-list.

⁵⁵ Dalmar, "Al-Shabab network moved \$12.6 million through Mogadishu's banking system", *The Somali Digest*, 4 September 2024.

⁵⁶ Requesting the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia, UNODC, and the Panel to exchange information with regard to a concrete plan to disrupt Al-Shabaab's finances.

⁵⁷ Somalia, Office of the Prime Minister, Targeted Financial Sanctions Regulations (2023).

68. In May 2024, two individuals⁵⁸ were identified and apprehended for facilitating Al-Shabaab financial transactions using their bank accounts.⁵⁹

69. Furthermore, as stated in the Panel's 2023 final report,⁶⁰ in the last quarter of 2022 and in early 2023, Somali authorities froze 320 accounts suspected of being connected to Al-Shabaab, following information received from law enforcement. During the Panel's current mandate, the Government informed it that the total amount contained in those frozen accounts was around \$320,000.

70. Freezing accounts is the first of three steps and usually precedes a judicial seizure of assets. The process of freezing is therefore an exceptional measure used to intercept suspicious money-laundering or terrorism financing transactions. The Panel notes that these early successes can only be sustained with a coordinated and collective approach from all relevant institutions, backed by a robust legal, regulatory and institutional framework. The Panel continues to investigate the outcome of freezing the above-mentioned accounts.

71. The Financial Reporting Centre of the Government also reported to the Panel that, in order to improve the anti-money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism framework, all institutions involved in the anti-money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism ecosystem need capacity enhancement to better grasp those issues, and to establish better coordination, collaboration and joint investigations. The respective roles and responsibilities of the relevant institutions will need to be clarified by those institutions. The current financial disruption plan, developed with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and other partners as mandated in Security Council resolution 2713 (2023), is a good starting point. Lessons learned from the initial experience should be built upon and implemented effectively.

2. Upcoming Middle Eastern and North Africa Financial Action Task Force mutual evaluation exercise

72. The National Anti-Money Laundering Committee is currently preparing for the upcoming Middle Eastern and North Africa Financial Action Task Force mutual evaluation, which assesses the compliance of Somalia with the 40 Financial Action Task Force recommendations regarding anti-money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism. This is a unique opportunity for Somalia to identify gaps and develop a comprehensive anti-money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism strategy and action plan to be adopted by all relevant agencies, and ensure that the necessary human, material, technical and financial resources are in place to address deficiencies. It is also an opportunity for the Government to make progress on addressing anti-money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism risks and improve the country's standing with international investors and banks, which is a key step towards correspondent banking relationships – a priority for the public and private sectors alike.

3. Private sector role in the anti-money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism architecture

73. The private sector, which includes financial and non-financial institutions, and the designated non-financial businesses and professions are at the forefront of the anti-money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism campaign. Effective anti-money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism policies and

⁵⁸ Mustaqbal Media, "Mogadishu court sentences elderly man for financing terrorism", 17 May 2024.

⁵⁹ Halqabsi News, "Woman sentenced to eight years for terrorism financing and money laundering", 20 May 2024.

⁶⁰ S/2023/724, para. 40.

measures for the sector are key to the integrity and stability of national economies, as well as the international financial system.

74. The Somali private sector needs a robust legal framework, regulatory guidelines and human resources to address the challenges of money-laundering and terrorism financing in the country. Although the Financial Reporting Centre and the Central Bank⁶¹ have made notable progress in the past two years to strengthen the anti-money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism architecture in Somalia, the Panel notes the absence of key legislative texts and guidelines,⁶² and the necessary human resources.

75. In addition, banks in Mogadishu have mainly reported large cash transactions⁶³ for the first quarter of 2024 and no suspicious transaction reports yet. The designated non-financial businesses and professions sector has yet to start submitting suspicious activity reports or cash activity reports to the Financial Reporting Centre. Without suspicious transaction reports, the Centre cannot perform its analysis and disseminate financial intelligence products to the appropriate law enforcement agencies for investigation, prosecution and adjudication of money-laundering and terrorism financing cases. The Panel notes that the 2023 financial disruption exercise focused on the Financial Reporting Centre, with limited collaboration from other members of the National Anti-Money Laundering Committee at the operational level, and the private sector.

76. Furthermore, financial institutions reported that it is “not clear whether the Financial Reporting Centre is an administrative or law enforcement type of financial intelligence unit.” They suggested that the Centre could engage more closely with the financial and other relevant private sector institutions, to provide more clarity on the role of the Centre and improve relations with the reporting entities. For instance, of the more than 100 registered notaries in Mogadishu, very few have benefitted from awareness programmes on anti-money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism.⁶⁴ Notaries are gatekeepers in the anti-money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism framework because of their role as the authenticators of property and businesses in Somalia. The financial institutions rely on them for verification and authentication of their clients/customers.

4. Delays in the national identification project

77. As reported in the Panel’s 2022⁶⁵ and 2023 reports, the lack of a national identification document, with unique spellings of names, is the main barrier to effective know-your-customer and customer due diligence compliance for reporting entities in Somalia. This is a major gap in the anti-money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism ecosystem, which prevents Somalia from complying with recommendation 10 of the Financial Action Task Force, in line with resolution 2713 (2023).⁶⁶ However, the Panel notes the significant progress made by the Government in putting in place regulatory and institutional foundations for a national identification system. This will not only facilitate service delivery to the Somali people but will also allow the identification of those who engage in illicit activities.

⁶¹ The Financial Reporting Centre is the supervisor of the designated non-financial businesses and professions sector, and the Central Bank of Somalia is the regulator of the financial sector.

⁶² See, for example, www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/recommendations/FATF%20Recommendations%202012.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf.

⁶³ The Financial Reporting Centre, for the third quarter of 2024, recorded 108 large cash transactions reports (42 in January, 40 in February and 26 in March), see <https://frc.gov.so/lctr-received/>.

⁶⁴ Interview with notaries, March 2024.

⁶⁵ S/2022/754, paras. 58–60.

⁶⁶ Resolution 2713 (2023), para. 9(c).

C. Misappropriation

78. In accordance with paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 2002 (2011), the sanctions listing criteria include the misappropriation of financial resources, which undermines the ability of the Government to fulfil its obligations in delivering services within the framework of the Djibouti Agreement. The country's legal framework criminalizes abuse of office, bribery, embezzlement and trading in influence, but anti-corruption laws are not effectively implemented. Civil society organizations reported widespread corruption and large-scale misappropriation of public funds by government officials. As the Panel reported in 2023,⁶⁷ the Auditor General's July 2023 annual audit report mentioned possible widespread embezzlement by government officials, with approximately \$21 million missing from government coffers.⁶⁸ Following that report, several high-level officials were apprehended. However, on 25 May 2024, a court in Mogadishu acquitted the officials owing to a lack of evidence.⁶⁹

79. Recently, the Minister for Defence acknowledged that Danab officers trained in the United States had been involved in the diversion of supplies destined for Somali security forces.⁷⁰ The Panel notes that corruption has also facilitated the infiltration of Al-Shabaab within the security forces.⁷¹

80. The Panel notes the challenges that the Government has been facing regarding corruption, misappropriation and an entrenched patronage system, which undermine the legitimacy of the government at the federal and state levels.

D. Whistleblower protection mechanisms

81. In accordance with paragraph 9 (g) of resolution 2713 (2023), the Government has been called upon to develop a plan to mitigate the risks posed by Al-Shabaab to personnel working in roles related to anti-money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism within national competent authorities and private sectors, as well as a plan to protect those who share information relating to the group's extortion tactics. The Government has yet to develop a whistleblower protection framework and related mechanisms.

E. Somaliland and the national financial disruption plan

82. An effective anti-money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism architecture designed to fight terrorism and the laundering of proceeds from transnational organized crime must cover the totality of Somalia. Nonetheless, this is not the case for the Government and Somaliland, which operate with different currency and monetary policies, as well as intelligence, law enforcement and investigative agencies. There is no cross-border communication between the two jurisdictions, which leaves room for Al-Shabaab and other terrorist organizations to exploit the gap.

83. Somaliland has its own identification system, anti-money-laundering act,⁷² protocols and policies. It also has its own financial intelligence unit, housed within

⁶⁷ S/2023/724, para. 56.

⁶⁸ Hiiraan Online, "Former and current Immigration Directors among 18 senior officials named in corruption scandal", 6 July 2023.

⁶⁹ Somali Guardian, "A court in Somalia's capital acquits former officials of corruption charges", 25 May 2024.

⁷⁰ Ground News, "Somalia detains US-trained commandos over theft of rations", April 2024.

⁷¹ Dalmar, "Danab-Al-Shabab collusion: officer prosecuted for security breach, The Somali Digest, 27 March 2024; and Harun Maruf and Hassan Kafi Qoyste, "16 suspects arrested in Somalia hotel attack", VOA News, 24 March 2024.

⁷² The Panel is yet to receive a copy of the Act.

its central bank. Financial institutions are licensed under the central bank of Somaliland. All financial institutions and other reporting entities in Somaliland report large cash transactions reports, suspicious transactions reports and wire transaction reports to the financial intelligence unit in Hargeisa. The Financial Reporting Centre in Mogadishu has no oversight over the reporting entities in Hargeisa.

84. However, financial sector activities and movements of funds are interlinked, as money flows seamlessly between Hargeisa and Mogadishu. The hawala, mobile money and banking sector activities in Mogadishu are completely integrated in the banking sector in Hargeisa, yet there is no general oversight and no coordination across the divide in accordance with the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force.⁷³ The absence of information-sharing and joint investigations into terrorist financing, or of joint trainings and coordinated working modalities between Hargeisa and Mogadishu is exploited by Al-Shabaab and other terrorist organizations.

V. Post-Government arms embargo: weapons and ammunition management and tracing

85. By its resolutions [2713 \(2023\)](#) and [2714 \(2023\)](#), the Security Council ended the long-standing territorial arms embargo on Somalia, initially imposed by the Council in 1992 by its resolution [733 \(1992\)](#) and partially lifted by subsequent resolutions. All restrictions on importing weapons and military equipment for key Somali national security sector institutions have been lifted. However, arms control procedures remain for the federal member states, regional governments and licensed private security companies,⁷⁴ as outlined in annexes A and B to resolution [2713 \(2023\)](#).⁷⁵ Annex C to that resolution continues restrictions on materials used for the production of improvised explosive devices, urging Member States to support coordinated national initiatives to mitigate the significant threat posed by such devices in Somalia and the region.⁷⁶

86. While the arms embargo on the Government has been lifted, resolution [2713 \(2023\)](#) retains targeted and territorial arms embargoes to prevent illegal arms and ammunition flows to Al-Shabaab and other destabilizing groups, such as ISIL-Somalia, until the Government can effectively strengthen its national security architecture. Key elements include greater control over the coastline, ports and land borders of Somalia by improving maritime domain awareness, enhancing border management, reducing the threat of improvised explosive devices, disrupting arms trafficking networks and establishing centralized control, management and accountability over the acquisition, possession and use of weapons and ammunition, including by clan militia and other forces outside of the country's national weapons and ammunition management framework.

87. In accordance with paragraph 26 of resolution [2713 \(2023\)](#), the Panel continued to engage with authorities at the federal and state levels to monitor progress and challenges in weapons and ammunition management. This includes the development and population of national databases on weapons and ammunition management, captured weapons and counter-improvised explosive devices, as well as specialized tracing, exploitation and counter-diversion capacity to disrupt illicit arms flows to non-State armed groups.

⁷³ Recommendation 2 (policy and coordination), 10 (customer due diligence), 26 (regulation and supervision) in line with paras. 9 (a–g) and 10 of resolution [2713 \(2023\)](#).

⁷⁴ Resolution [2713 \(2023\)](#), paras. 5, 6, 32, 35 and 38.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, paras. 35–37.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, paras. 18–22 and annex C.

88. The Panel also continues to monitor and investigate Al-Shabaab's indirect fire attacks and document, analyse and trace weapons, ammunition and improvised explosive device components, including those trafficked through land and maritime routes (see sect. IX.A) and seized from non-state armed groups in Somalia.⁷⁷

89. Furthermore, under its resolution 2713 (2023), the Security Council requested the Government to facilitate the Panel's access to photograph and trace captured weapons.⁷⁸ In 2024, the Government and federal member states facilitated access for the Panel to physically document five illicit weapons and shared analytical data on an additional 50 illicit captured weapons (47 from Jubbaland and 3 from Puntland – see annex 17). Limited information on ammunition was provided. Essential information, including serial, batch and lot numbers or high-resolution images of markings and headstamps, is often missing, hampering tracing and verification efforts.

A. Limited information on notifications under annex A and B to resolution 2713 (2023)

90. From 2013 until December 2023, the Panel and the joint verification team maintained a registry of the weapons and ammunition officially imported by the Government since the partial lifting of the arms embargo. As of September 2023, the Government had officially received approximately 44,000 weapons and 101 million rounds of ammunition, including around 71,000 RPG-7 rounds.

91. No new delivery notifications of arms consignments to the federal member states, regional governments or licensed private security companies, under annexes A and B of resolution 2713 (2023), were submitted by the Government during the current reporting period, as per paragraphs 36 and 37 of resolution 2713 (2023).

B. Weapons and ammunition management: progress and challenges at the Government and federal member state levels

1. Government weapons and ammunition management update

92. The Government has made notable progress in developing its weapons and ammunition management architecture and processes, including marking and digital record-keeping. The Somali National Army has marked and registered a total of 22,387 weapons (up from 20,710 in 2023), which is a significant increase from the 8,400 weapons in August 2023. The Somali National Police Force has also increased the number of marked weapons to 8,921 (up from 8,867 in 2023). The country's national weapons and ammunition management database has been updated to reflect these figures. In addition, a 2019 database on marking machines has been updated to list approximately 20 desktop, semi-portable and fully portable marking machines currently available to Somali security forces.

93. On 14 February 2024, the Council of Ministers of the Government approved a new standard operating procedure aimed at regulating the use of weapons, ammunition and explosives in Somalia.

2. Operational difficulties and limited progress at the federal member state level

94. Despite the above-mentioned advances, expanding weapons and ammunition management activities to the federal member states remains challenging, often relying on the deployment from Mogadishu of trained weapons and ammunition management

⁷⁷ Ibid., paras. 5, 6, 11, 21 and 27 (c).

⁷⁸ Ibid., para. 27 (a).

personnel and marking machines. The integration of the federal member states into national and regional weapons and ammunition management frameworks⁷⁹ is crucial in addressing the severe shortage of functional weapons and ammunition storage facilities and trained armourers and ammunition storekeepers.⁸⁰

3. Limited exploitation, analysis and tracing capacity

95. There is a pressing need for long-term specialized ammunition technical officer and armourer training programmes on arms management and tracing.⁸¹ This includes instruction on weapons-related technical intelligence, documentation and tracing; explosive ordnance disposal, and improvised explosive device search and exploitation; physical security and stockpile management; and safe ammunition storage, hazard classification, maintenance, propellant analysis and disposal.⁸²

96. Enhancing intelligence-sharing and technical cooperation between the Government and the federal member states, as well as national exploitation and tracing capacity, should be prioritized as part of a functional Somali national security architecture. This would require establishing functional forensic laboratories with specialized analytical equipment and capacity to systematically document, exploit, analyse and trace weapons, ammunition and improvised explosive device components and explosive signatures.⁸³

4. Challenges to safe and secure management of ammunition

97. The effective management of ammunition remains extremely challenging due to ongoing conflicts, complex operational environments and limited resources.

98. Relevant United Nations agencies are currently engaged in risk assessment and mitigation processes to address large-scale explosive risks, which can be effectively mitigated by establishing permanent safe and secure ammunition depots and explosive storehouse facilities.

99. In May 2024, Turkish explosive ordnance disposal teams destroyed approximately 16,000 unserviceable 81/82mm mortar rounds supplied to Somalia by Türkiye, significantly reducing the net high-explosive quantity stored in the Halane central facility in Mogadishu. Subsequently, several PG-7 40mm high-explosive rocket-propelled grenades rounds were reportedly relocated to the Halane facility from Villa Somalia due to construction work. Furthermore, an assessment of the Halane facility conducted in May 2024 by a key international partner of Somalia confirmed an influx of a large amount of high-explosive ammunition.⁸⁴

5. Limited use of the national captured weapons database of Somalia

100. The Government continues to update its national captured weapons database, which was designed to record systematically data on seized and recovered weapons and ammunition. Technical support from Conflict Armament Research has been instrumental in training and equipping a 15-member documentation and tracing team drawn from the Somali National Army, the Somali National Police Force and the National Intelligence and Security Agency. Despite these efforts and the significant amount of materiel seized, to date only 137 weapons and two rounds of ammunition

⁷⁹ See RECSA Secretariat and its Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa (2004).

⁸⁰ S/2023/724, (recommendation) para. 130 (d).

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Multiple confidential sources.

have been recorded in the database (including 52 weapons and zero rounds of ammunition added in the current reporting period; see para. 111).⁸⁵ Emphasizing a “documentation prior to distribution or integration” approach for seized materiel and scaling up the number of weapon and ammunition database entries would enhance identification of diversion trends, as well as the tracing and mapping of illicit flows, and would help prevent seized weapons from re-entering illicit markets.

6. Proliferation of weapons and lack of oversight of non-State weapon holders: challenges with clan militias and private security companies

101. Clan militias, private security companies and non-State armed groups continue to possess a wide array of weapons and military equipment. These include pistols, assault rifles, sniper rifles, machine guns,⁸⁶ rocket-propelled grenades and larger-calibre ammunition, including 107mm rockets, B-10 anti-tank weapons and 60, 81/82 and 120mm mortars. Government and federal member state authorities face persistent challenges in establishing oversight and accountability for these armaments (see confidential annex 21 on the 15 July 2024 Abudwak incident, and paras. 118–120).

102. National oversight requires that all armaments distributed to clan militias or community defence forces should be brought under the national weapons and ammunition management accountability framework. All weapons and ammunition seized, recovered, found and captured on the battlefield by clan militia should be documented, registered, marked and traced prior to reintegration, redistribution or disposal.⁸⁷

103. Under paragraph 32 of resolution [2713 \(2023\)](#), the Government is requested to provide the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#) concerning Al-Shabaab with a list of licensed private security companies authorized to import weapons, ammunition and military equipment into Somalia. This list has yet to be submitted.

C. Al-Shabaab arms seizures from ATMIS and Somali National Army bases

104. Seizing weapons, ammunition and military equipment from ATMIS and the Somali National Army forward operating bases remains a key source of resupply for Al-Shabaab (see sect. III). Such seizures allow Al-Shabaab to enhance its capabilities and maintain operational momentum against ongoing counter-terrorism efforts.

105. The Panel has previously reported on successful base overruns and theft by Al-Shabaab of a range of Somali National Army and ATMIS contingent-owned military equipment and assets, which were subsequently used to attack international and Somali security forces.⁸⁸ During the reporting period, overruns continued, capitalizing on vulnerabilities in the bases’ defences to capture assault rifles, machine guns, ammunition, rocket-propelled grenades, 107mm rockets, mortars and military equipment (see annex 13).⁸⁹ These looted rockets and mortars have been used directly as main charges for improvised explosive devices, or, by harvesting military-grade high-explosive, as a booster in combination with home-made explosives (known as “Al-Shabaab dynamite”) to increase the blast impact and lethal effect of their devices.

⁸⁵ Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia/Central Monitoring Department data to Panel.

⁸⁶ Light and heavy machine guns from 7.62x54R to 12.7x108mm, 14.5mm and 23mm anti-aircraft guns.

⁸⁷ [S/2023/724](#), (recommendation) para. 130(c)(ii).

⁸⁸ [S/2023/724](#), paras. 18, 23, 27 and annex 5.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

D. ATMIS drawdown and transition into the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia: drawing on lessons learned

1. Mitigating base overruns

106. The ongoing ATMIS drawdown will exacerbate the isolation of some forward operating bases as they extend beyond their supply lines, increasing their susceptibility to attacks and limiting their access to resupply and reinforcements. Preventing base overruns by Al-Shabaab, especially in the build-up to the new African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), requires a comprehensive analysis of the vulnerabilities of ATMIS and Somali National Army forward operating bases; improved situational awareness; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capacity; enhanced intelligence-sharing; and contingency planning (see annex 14).

2. Enhanced close air support capability

107. In this transitional period, the delivery by Italy to the Somali National Army of five Agusta-Bell AB412EPX multi-role helicopters in July and August 2024 is a positive development.⁹⁰ The helicopters provide ATMIS and the Army with much-needed close air support capability, medical evacuation, casualty evacuation, troop transport and resupply capabilities (see annex 15). However, sustaining this aerial capacity will remain challenging,⁹¹ given the high maintenance costs of the helicopters and the limited financial resources of Somalia.⁹²

3. Transfer to AUSSOM of the ATMIS-Government standard operating procedure on the management of recovered weapons

108. On 29 June 2021, ATMIS and the Government agreed on a harmonized standard operating procedure for managing recovered weapons. In July 2023, an updated version of the procedure was signed.

109. However, since then, limited progress has been made in its implementation. Appointing dedicated ATMIS focal points at the sector levels would enable the regular transfer of captured materiel to the Halane armoury in Mogadishu for analysis and tracing. Systematic dissemination and integration of the standard operating procedure into pre-deployment training would benefit operational-level explosive ordnance disposal staff within the Somali National Army and ATMIS. Improved coordination and clearer operational guidance on tracing and managing captured weapons would facilitate efforts to trace material evidence, document seized weapons and disrupt illicit arms supplies to Al-Shabaab. This procedure, as well as relevant weapons and ammunition management standard operating procedures, should be prioritized in the handover between ATMIS to AUSSOM to ensure continuity in progress (see annex 16).

4. Pre-deployment training for the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia troop-contributing countries

110. Building on the lessons learned from the 17-year deployment in Somalia of the African Union Mission in Somalia and ATMIS, AUSSOM troop-contributing countries will benefit from pre-deployment training on the Government-ATMIS standard operating procedure and documentation procedures. Additional training should include weapons technical intelligence, tracing and exploitation of weapons, ammunition and improvised explosive device components. Explosive ordnance

⁹⁰ See Military Africa, "Italy supplies Bell 412 helicopters to Somalia", 30 August 2024.

⁹¹ Confidential interviews with senior military leaders in ATMIS TCCs and military analysts.

⁹² Helicopters are reportedly serviced by Somali and Turkish ground crews.

disposal and improvised explosive device search capacity tailored to the evolving tactics, techniques and procedures employed by Al-Shabaab and ISIL will save lives. Enhanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, combat engineering and ammunition technical officer capacity will help secure forward operating bases and ammunition storehouses, preventing overruns and diversion of contingent owned equipment (see annex 16).

E. Panel investigations and tracing of weapons, ammunition and related components used by Al-Shabaab

111. In May 2024, the Government and Jubbaland state authorities facilitated access for the Panel to conduct an inspection in Kismaayo of five illicit weapons, including one weapon captured from Al-Shabaab. Puntland authorities also shared details of three captured weapons. In August 2024, the Government shared with the Panel data relating to a recent seizure of 47 Al-Shabaab weapons captured during the July 2024 offensive in Bulo Haji, Jubbaland. The Panel is in the process of tracing the weapons at the time of writing (see annex 17). No data on ammunition has been received indicating likely redistribution.

112. In that regard, the Government and ATMIS would benefit from analysing and tracing the significant number of weapons and ammunition captured during Somali National Army operations against Al-Shabaab in Hirshabelle and Galmudug, as well as captured weapon caches stored within ATMIS bases in Dhobley (26 weapons in ATMIS Sector 2), Dhusamareb (Sector 4) and Bananey (Sector 3)⁹³ (see annex 17).

113. The Panel has documented Al-Shabaab weapons markings, serial numbers and armoury management stickers from weapons captured in Jubbaland. The markings indicate a degree of centralization and systematic weapons and ammunition management by Al-Shabaab (see annex 18).

F. Cross-border arms trafficking: a subregional perspective

114. The Panel continues to track weapons, ammunition and military equipment flowing into Somalia due to spillovers from regional conflicts⁹⁴ (see annex 20).

115. The Panel continues to monitor unregulated black markets and sales of weapons, ammunition and military equipment within Somalia, as well as regional illicit markets and trafficking networks, including via social media and online communication platforms, and the use of cryptocurrency to execute payments⁹⁵ (see paras. 141–145).

116. AK-pattern assault rifles with SEP21 Houthi markings⁹⁶ have been documented in caches captured from Al-Shabaab fighters in Bulo Haaji, Jubbaland, in July 2024 (annex 17). The presence of these weapons confirms the continued flow of illicit weapons and ammunition from Yemen into Somalia⁹⁷ (see annex 18).

117. The Panel notes an increased presence of weapons and ammunition that falls outside the regular typology of weapons and ammunition observed in Somalia. This includes 9mm-Taurus pattern pistols, Steyr-pattern assault rifles equipped with weapon optics and chambered for 5.56x45mm North Atlantic Treaty Organization

⁹³ S/2023/724, paras. 97–98 and (recommendation) 130(c)(ii).

⁹⁴ Interview with security forces and other confidential sources.

⁹⁵ Multiple confidential sources and monitoring of online illicit networks and sales platforms.

⁹⁶ Houthi militia have used a symbol consisting of 21SEP in a double circle as an identifying mark for small arms and light weapons in their possession, reference to the 21 September Revolution that brought them into power.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

(NATO) ammunition, and modified G3-A3 and A4 pattern assault rifles chambered for 7.62x51mm ammunition with shortened barrels, retractable stocks and additional “ALMARENZ”, “ALMARNZ” or similar markings (see annex 20).⁹⁸

G. Arms seizure in Abudwak, Galmudug

118. On 15 July 2024, two trucks loaded with weapons and ammunition were intercepted by civilians and armed clan militia in Abudwak, Galgadug, along the Ethiopia-Somalia border.

119. This incident represents the largest recorded case of diversion since the lifting of the territorial arms embargo on Somalia. The seized weapons, some manufactured as recently as 2023, were documented in their original packaging. Their origin is currently unconfirmed. The materiel reportedly flooded onto black markets, bringing down illicit weapon prices.

120. The incident highlights persistent issues with the irregular procurement of weapons and ammunition that falls outside national weapons and ammunition management frameworks. The Panel is investigating the origin and intended end user or users (see confidential annex 21).

H. Monitoring and investigating Al-Shabaab indirect fire attacks

121. Al-Shabaab continues to use 60mm and 81/82mm mortars, 107mm rockets and 82mm B-10 recoilless anti-tank weapons to target high-profile protected locations, including the presidential palace (Villa Somalia), the UNSOS compound in Mogadishu and the ATMIS, Somali National Army and United Nations compounds in Baidoa, South-West State.

122. The Panel has tallied 11 attacks using 107mm rockets during current and previous reporting periods, noting consistent technical characteristics in the rocket type, make, model and launch techniques used in previous incidents. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attacks on 1 October 2023 in Mogadishu and on 20 August and 1 September 2024 in Baidoa, when multiple 107mm projectiles were launched at several international targets, which may indicate intent to target the international community (see annex 19A).

123. On 13 June 2024, 82mm B-10 high-explosive anti-tank warheads were used to target the ATMIS and United Nations compounds in Baidoa (see annex 19B).

124. On 3 May 2024, an unmanned aerial missile-type object fell on Taleex district, in the disputed Sool region in northern Somalia.⁹⁹ While the incident is still under investigation, preliminary analysis of missile remnants, including the fuselage, turbojet engine, stabilizers and winglets, indicates that the projectile was a land attack cruise missile (see annex 19C).

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ As reported by local authorities from SSC Khatumo and online in open-source media.

VI. Threat posed by improvised explosive devices

A. Improvised explosive device trends during the reporting period

125. Between August 2023 and July 2024, 584 attacks using improvised explosive devices were recorded across Somalia.¹⁰⁰ This is a significant reduction in the use of improvised explosive devices compared with the previous reporting period, due to a reduction in Government-led offensive operations in the first half of the year. A total of 1,477 casualties related to improvised explosive devices, including 555 civilian casualties and 561 Somali National Army casualties, were recorded. Documented devices included 28 vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and 10 person-borne improvised explosive devices.

126. The majority of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices recorded were used to initiate complex attacks against Somali National Army and ATMIS positions and seize contingent-owned equipment. In total, 48 per cent of improvised explosive device-related casualties recorded among the Army were the result of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices.

127. There was a reduction in the reported number of civilian casualties recorded between August 2023 and July 2024 compared with the previous reporting period, predominantly due to a decrease in military operations. The reported number of civilian casualties of improvised explosive devices remained relatively consistent (361 casualties compared with 381 recorded during the previous reporting period), despite a slight decrease in the number of devices recorded (see para. 173).

B. Analysis of the use of improvised explosive devices by Al-Shabaab

1. Access by Al-Shabaab to improvised explosive device components and chemical precursors

128. During the current reporting period, the Government's efforts to disrupt Al-Shabaab's access to improvised explosive device components and chemical precursors, including items listed in paragraphs 18 to 22 and annex C to resolution 2713 (2023), have had little impact on Al-Shabaab's ability to produce and deploy such devices as part of its military operations and complex attacks, disrupting Somali National Army and ATMIS troop movements, resupply and offensive operations (see paras. 13–24).

129. The Panel continues to monitor Somali legislation and initiatives to curb the availability of improvised explosive device components and reiterates the need for Member States that supply such components to support Somali customs and border-control authorities by imposing restrictions on the export of these items to Somalia.

2. Chemical analysis of explosives used by Al-Shabaab

130. The Panel has previously reported on Al-Shabaab manufacturing home-made explosives using nitroglycerine as an explosive, potassium nitrate as an oxidizer and charcoal as fuel.¹⁰¹ In May 2024, chemical signature analysis of "Al-Shabaab dynamite", or nitroglycerine-based home-made explosives, confirms the continued use of nitroglycerine as the main explosive charge and cyclotrimethylene trinitramine as a booster (see para. 105 and annex 24.1).

¹⁰⁰ Confidential source.

¹⁰¹ S/2019/858, para. 10; and S/2020/949, para. 116.

3. Al-Shabaab sourcing of improvised explosive device components

131. Despite the ban on improvised explosive device components, Panel investigations have confirmed the continued availability of improvised explosive device switches, including motorcycle alarms¹⁰² equipped with disturbance sensors and long-range learning code receivers. These are sourced within Somalia or from open markets in neighbouring countries¹⁰³ (see annex 24.2).

4. Evolution of Al-Shabaab improvised explosive device tactics, techniques and procedures

132. Signature assembly techniques observed across multiple devices indicate the likely presence of an organized and unified improvised explosive device production process. These practices include using thin filaments to extend antennae and enlarge motorcycle alarm coils to increase their range and sensitivity to vibration, using low metal-content objects, such as vehicle tyres, as pressure plates to avoid detection and waterproofing sensitive components (see annex 24).¹⁰⁴

5. Tracing of captured Al-Shabaab improvised explosive device components and explosives

133. The Panel notes limited capacity within ATMIS, the Government and federal member states to exploit, document, analyse and trace seized weapons, ammunition, improvised explosive device components and explosives. The absence of basic forensic tools such as handheld chemical spectrometers and analytical laboratories for the Somali National Army, as well as limited data entry into the counter-improvised explosive device database, should be remedied. Training specialized explosive ordnance disposal and counter-improvised explosive device search teams within Somali security forces, and pre-deployment training for ATMIS and AUSSOM troop-contributing countries to respond to current improvised explosive device tactics, techniques and procedures, should be prioritized.

6. Somalia national counter-improvised explosive device database and strategy

134. The Government is working with specialized agencies, including Conflict Armament Research, as well as with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and the Mine Action Service, to finalize the national counter-improvised explosive device strategy,¹⁰⁵ adopt the UNIDIR-developed counter-improvised explosive device capability maturity model and enhance systematic data collection of improvised explosive device components and explosives, to populate the dormant national counter-improvised explosive device database (see annex 24).

7. Analysis of ISIL-Somalia improvised explosive devices

135. The Panel has taken note of some design differences between ISIL-Somalia and Al-Shabaab improvised explosive devices, particularly the set-up of switches,¹⁰⁶ as detailed in the Panel's 2023 final report and confidential annex 7.¹⁰⁷ As few improvised explosive devices attributed to ISIL-Somalia have been recovered, further investigations are required to substantiate the significance of the design differences noted (see annex 23).

¹⁰² S/2023/724, paras. 14–15, and annex 4.

¹⁰³ Panel investigations conducted from February to July 2024.

¹⁰⁴ Confidential sources.

¹⁰⁵ Panel correspondence with the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia.

¹⁰⁶ Confidential source.

¹⁰⁷ S/2023/724, (confidential) annex 7.

VII. Charcoal ban

A. Implementation of the charcoal ban

136. The Panel investigated reports of possible charcoal smuggling, but no evidence has been found to date. The Panel was informed that newly produced charcoal can bleed into existing stockpiles and that the one-off sale of charcoal as authorized by the Security Council in its resolution [2696 \(2023\)](#) may trigger renewed charcoal smuggling from Somalia. The Panel is monitoring the situation.

B. One-off, complete disposal of charcoal stockpiles

137. In its resolution [2696 \(2023\)](#), the Security Council authorized a one-off disposal of the charcoal in and around Kismaayo. On 29 May 2024, the Government confirmed that the Jubbaland business community had found an interested buyer to purchase the charcoal stock. It also confirmed that they would, in collaboration with the Jubbaland state government, ensure that the one-off disposal followed resolution [2696 \(2023\)](#) and that the sale would be implemented in a transparent manner. The Government agreed to share with the Panel the dates and details of the shipments once they were available.¹⁰⁸

138. On 4 June 2024, the Government informed the Panel that the buyer of the first consignment was Yasmin General Trading LLC. The company was mentioned in a previous report of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group¹⁰⁹ as the buyer of the confiscated charcoal from the cargo dhows *Yasin* and *Shree Nausad* at an auction in the United Arab Emirates on 18 May 2016. That auction had been observed by the Monitoring Group.

139. The United Arab Emirates-flagged cargo dhow *Fahad 4* loaded 40,000 bags of charcoal in Kismaayo Port on 4 June 2024, leaving for the smaller Hamriya Port in Dubai the following day. On 28 June 2024, the charcoal was offloaded at Hamriya Port. Around 10 July 2024, the cargo vessels *MSV Fazlerabbi 2192* and *Al Salima-MNV-2190* entered Kismaayo Port.¹¹⁰ A combined 85,000 bags of charcoal were loaded, and the vessels departed for Dubai on 25 July 2024 (see annex 25). The vessels proceeded to off-load the charcoal in Hamriya Port in early September 2024.

140. The Panel noted changes to the charcoal stockpiles in and around Kismaayo, which are visible on satellite images, with fluctuations to the stockpiles over the past two months. The removal of charcoal corresponds with the times of export (see annex 26).

VIII. Maritime security

A. Trafficking and maritime interdictions

141. The Panel continues to monitor maritime smuggling networks in Somali waters that are potentially involved in supplying weapons and ammunition to Al-Shabaab, ISIL and pirate groups in Somalia in violation of the arms embargo imposed under resolution [2713 \(2023\)](#).

142. Weapons continue to be smuggled between Puntland and Yemen in both directions, often in stateless and nameless dhows and fishing vessels or small skiffs (see annexes 27 and 29–32). During the current reporting period, one Somali national


¹⁰⁸ Communication with ONS, 29 May 2024.

¹⁰⁹ [S/2016/919](#), para. 16.

¹¹⁰ Confidential source, 10 July 2024; and ONS, 12 July 2024.

was arrested in Yemen for weapons smuggling and six Yemenis were arrested in Puntland for a similar offence.

Figure I
Map of maritime seizures of arms and related items, 16 August 2023 to 15 August 2024



Source: Panel of Experts.

143. On 11 January 2024, the United States Navy ship the *USS Lewis B. Puller* intercepted a flagless dhow, the *Yanus*, in the process of smuggling weapons, in the Arabian Sea.¹¹¹ Ballistic and cruise missile components, including propulsion, guidance and warheads for medium-range ballistic missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles, were found on board the *Yanus*. In total, 14 suspects were arrested by the United States Navy. A superseding indictment by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia indicated that the January 2024 smuggling operation had been the third in a larger operation that had started in August 2023. The operation allegedly involved two Iranian brothers who facilitated the smuggling of materials from the Islamic Republic of Iran to the coast of Somalia, which were then transferred to another boat with an end destination in Yemen. The brothers also coordinated and funded the operations and paid the captain 2 billion Iranian rials (\$47,000) through

¹¹¹ United States Central Command, "USCENTCOM seizes Iranian advanced conventional weapons bound for Houthis", 16 January 2024.

hawala services to be distributed to the crew members involved in the three operations (see annex 28).¹¹²

144. On 18 May 2024, the Puntland Maritime Police Force successfully intercepted a shipment of weapons on a boat in Bosaso and apprehended four weapons smugglers. At the time of writing, the Panel was waiting on additional information; however, initial imagery confirms the presence of type-56 and G3-A3-pattern assault rifles among the confiscated weapons (see annex 31).¹¹³

145. On 4 August 2024, Puntland authorities seized weapons from diverse countries of manufacture and camouflage uniforms in Bosaso, Puntland.¹¹⁴ The weapons types seized are commonly found on the black market in Yemen and the region. Two Yemenis and a Somali national were arrested in connection with the incident (see annex 32).¹¹⁵

B. Resurgence of piracy

146. In paragraph 27 of its resolution 2713 (2023), the Security Council urges the Government, federal member states, ATMIS and partners to share information with the Panel regarding conduct or activities by Al-Shabaab and other actors intent on undermining peace and security in Somalia and the region, where covered by listing criteria for targeted sanctions. These listing criteria include having engaged in, or provided support for, acts that threatened the peace, security or stability of Somalia. Piracy and armed robbery against vessels¹¹⁶ threaten the peace, security and stability not only of Somalia, but also the region as a whole, as well as shipping engaged in innocent passage in the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and the Western Indian Ocean. In that context, the Panel investigated the recent increase in piracy and armed robbery of ships by suspected Somali pirates and the ensuing national, regional and international responses.

¹¹² United States, District Court of Virginia, *United States of America v. Muhammad Pahlawan and Others*, Mirkazei Superseding Indictment, July 2024.


¹¹³ Puntland Maritime Police Force, received on 18 May 2024.

¹¹⁴ Confidential source.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Hereon onwards, the Panel uses the term piracy. For the definition of piracy, see article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. On the definition of armed robbery against ships, see International Maritime Organization resolution A.1025(26).

Figure II
Piracy and armed robbery of ships off Somalia, 2003 to April 2024¹¹⁷



Source: Panel of Experts.

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on the above map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

1. Attacks by Somali pirates since November 2023

147. Piracy in Somalia is linked to insecurity on land resulting from the prevailing socioeconomic situation, decades of conflict, limited maritime enforcement capacity

¹¹⁷ Suspicious approaches are excluded from this dataset.

and capabilities, the absence of criminal prosecution of pirate kingpins and financiers, the easy availability of weapons, as well as conflict regarding fisheries. Those issues have been offset by security measures, such as the deployment of international and regional naval forces, the embarkation of private armed security teams on board ships and the implementation of best management practices on ships.¹¹⁸

148. In recent years, analysts and organizations, such as the European Union Naval Force and Combined Maritime Forces, warned that Somalia-based piracy had been suppressed, but not eradicated.

149. Piracy reemerged on 24 November 2023, with the hijacking of the Iranian fishing dhow, *Al-Meraj 1* off the coast of Puntland.¹¹⁹ This was the first hijacking recorded since 2019. Two days later, on 26 November, the chemical tanker *Central Park* was boarded 54 nautical miles (100 km) off the coast of Somalia from a skiff by four Somali pirates.¹²⁰ In keeping with best practices, the crew locked themselves in the citadel¹²¹ and the pirates were unable to reach them. The pirates were subsequently arrested by the crew of the *USS Mason* on the same day (see annex 33).

150. Between that incident and 15 August 2024, the Panel noted seven attacks on commercial vessels, including two successful hijackings. No successful attacks have been recorded since 23 May 2024, although suspicious approaches had been recorded up to 7 June 2024. The lull in pirate attacks was likely due to adverse weather conditions during the monsoon season. On 26 August 2024, another suspicious approach was recorded 55 nautical miles south-east of Aden.¹²²

151. The first successful hijacking of a commercial vessel since the hijacking of the *Aris 13* in 2017 was recorded on 14 December 2023, with the hijacking of the bulk carrier, *MV Ruen*, approximately 700 nautical miles (1,300 km) east of Bosaso (see annex 34). On 12 March 2024, another bulk carrier, *Abdullah*, was successfully hijacked (see annex 35). In addition, three commercial vessels were boarded and two more attacked (see annexes 36 and 37). The Panel also notes that, preceding those attacks, several suspicious approaches on commercial vessels were recorded as early as March 2023.

152. In addition, 18 dhows were attacked or hijacked by Somali pirates, of which 5 were intercepted by the Indian Navy and the Coast Guard of Seychelles (see annexes 38 and 39). In addition to ransom, dhows are used as motherships, allowing pirates to increase their range of operations. Fast skiffs are launched from these motherships far offshore to attack commercial vessels.

¹¹⁸ BIMCO and others, *BMP5: Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea* (Edinburgh, Witherby Publishing Group, 2018).


¹¹⁹ Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre, Weekly report 20–26 November 2023; and European Union Naval Force.

¹²⁰ Information Fusion Centre Indian Ocean Region Monthly Maritime Security Update, November 2023; United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations, Warning 003/NOV/2023; and United States Department of State, 8 April 2024.

¹²¹ A citadel is a safe room usually in the engine room of the ship build for this purpose where crew can assemble in the event of imminent boarding awaiting a potential law enforcement response. A well-constructed citadel will have basic supplies, sanitation, reliable communication, CCTV coverage of the ship and a way to control the propulsion and steering of the vessel.

¹²² X account of United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations, 26 August 2024, available at https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/1828146352762564939.

Figure III
Map of attacks by Somali Pirates, March 2023 to August 2024¹²³



Source: Panel of Experts.

2. Causes of the reemergence of piracy and armed robbery of ships off Somalia

153. Changes in security measures – such as a reduction in international naval contributions in terms of navy ships deployed in the region, embarkation of private armed security teams on board ships and implementation of best management practices on ships,¹²⁴ as well as regional maritime conflict – have all had an influence on the resurrection of piracy off the coast of Somalia.

154. In March 2022, the Security Council did not renew its resolution 2608 (2021), which had allowed international naval forces to launch counter-piracy operations within the territorial waters of Somalia.¹²⁵ The number of private maritime security

¹²³ Compiled from several sources such as Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa, European Union Naval Force, Combined Maritime Forces, United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations, Puntland Maritime Police Force, Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre, Information Fusion Centre, International Maritime Organization Global Integrated Shipping Information System, maritime security companies and media reports.

¹²⁴ BIMCO and others, *BMP5*.

¹²⁵ European Union, Naval Force, “EU NAVFOR Atalanta statement on UNSC resolution on fighting piracy off the coast of Somalia non-extension announcement”, 9 March 2024.

companies decreased from around 472 recorded between 2008 and 2011 at the height of piracy attacks, to around 20 today.¹²⁶ Since the increase in hijackings from November 2023, the demand for guards has increased, although that demand was cushioned by the drop in ship traffic through the Red Sea due to Houthi attacks. There are concerns that private maritime security companies and the floating armouries that support them would not be able to meet the increase in demand, should those attacks on ships in the Red Sea cease. Security companies are however adamant that they will adapt to an increase in demand. Prices for the services of private maritime security companies and for kidnap and ransom insurance have spiked.

155. With time, crews on vessels also became lax in implementing best management practices. Some of the crew of the *Abdullah* filmed the attack with their cell phones while the pirates were boarding the vessel. According to best management practice BMP5, the crew should have locked themselves in the citadel.

3. Pirate operations, networks and affiliations

156. Most piracy activity linked to the hijacking of the *Ruen* and *Abdullah* centred around Eyl, as both ships had laid anchor around 32 nautical miles south of there. Dhows were also held off the coast close to Garacad, from where the attack on the *Basilisk* was launched. The attack on the *Chrystal Artic* was launched from a landing site west of Qandala in northern Puntland. A high number of attacks and suspicious approaches were recorded in the Arabian Sea, making northern Puntland an ideal launching point for attacks (see annex 40).

157. Two of the five convicted pirates involved in the *Central Park* hijacking, Abdikarim Salah Mohamed (alias “Owkoombe”) and Mohamed Ali Osman, had previous convictions for acts of piracy. The remaining three members had no prior affiliation with piracy and had each been offered \$50,000 of the ransom money for their participation. The suspects had no external funding for logistics, such as boats and fuel, or for weapons. They had acquired a skiff used in the operation, which they had taken by force from Somali individuals on the coast. That skiff had been used to hijack a Yemeni dhow, used to function as a mothership. Two rusty AK-pattern rifles were used in the attack (see annex 33).

158. Pirate groups do not often keep large arsenals. Their weapons, which are easily sourced in Somalia, mostly consist of pistols (often Tokarev, Makarov), AK-pattern assault rifles, PKM-pattern light machine guns or equivalent and rocket-propelled grenades,¹²⁷ which are often used to fire at the bridge of vessels during attacks. In several cases in the past, pirates mounted 12.7mm heavy machine guns on the decks of hijacked vessels, while waiting at anchor for ransom negotiations to be finalized, to discourage rescue operations by international navies. In the case of the *MV Abdullah*, the suspected pirates had placed light machine guns on the decks as they had feared a rescue operation by international navies, after the *Ruen* rescue by the Indian Navy (see annex 35).¹²⁸

159. The last hijacking resulting in ransom payment prior to *Al-Meraj 1* was recorded in 2015, when four Iranian dhows were hijacked. The co-owner of the *Al-Meraj 1* said in a television interview that the pirates had demanded \$400,000 for the release of the dhow and the 18 Iranian crew members.¹²⁹ It is unclear what amount was paid. No ransom was paid for the release of the *MV Ruen*, as the vessel was intercepted by the Indian Navy on 16 March 2024. Unconfirmed reports placed the ransom for the release of the bulk carrier

¹²⁶ Lloyds List, “Daily briefing”, 26 March, 2024.

¹²⁷ S/2011/433, para. 101.

¹²⁸ Confidential source.

¹²⁹ X account SBC Somali TV, 23 November 2023, available at <https://twitter.com/sbcsomality/status/1727726875244376259>.

Abdullah at \$5 million, which was dropped in the sea by a small plane. This amount is plausible as the average ransom amount had increased to \$4.97 million by 2011.

4. Interdictions, arrests and prosecutions of pirate suspects

160. Between the end of November 2023 and mid-May 2024, 70 piracy suspects were apprehended in 13 cases by the European Union Naval Force, the United States Navy, the Indian Navy, the Coast Guard of Seychelles and Somali authorities (see annex 38).

161. The five pirates involved in the *Central Park* hijacking were handed over to authorities in Mogadishu on 26 December 2023. On 29 June 2024, they were convicted and sentenced to a combined 5 years, 2 months and 10 days of incarceration.¹³⁰ The *Central Park* suspects were not prosecuted under the Kidnapping Law (Law No. 36 of 30 April 1975), which imposes the death penalty for acts of kidnapping or piracy. Since Somalia lacks specific laws for prosecuting pirates, the Somali Penal Code was applied in this case. A new piracy law is currently in draft form and awaiting parliamentary approval.

162. Following its initial interceptions of the hijacked Iranian dhows *Iman*, *Al Naeemi*¹³¹ and *Omari* in late January 2024, the Indian Navy reportedly caught, disarmed and released more than 18 pirate suspects. However, the 35 pirate suspects arrested by the Indian Navy for the hijacking of the *Ruen*, and the 9 pirate suspects arrested for the hijacking of the dhow *Al Kambar 786*,¹³² will be prosecuted in India under its Maritime Anti-Piracy Act of 2022.¹³³

163. Three suspects arrested on 28 January 2024 by the Coast Guard of Seychelles during the interception of the hijacked Sri Lanka-flagged fishing dhow *Lorenzo Putha-4*¹³⁴ will be prosecuted by Seychelles authorities. Seychelles will also prosecute five suspects involved in the attack of the products tanker *Chrystal Arctic* on 10 May 2024, who were arrested by the European Union Naval Force, as it is among the countries with which Operation Atalanta has a legal agreement that allows for the trial of suspected pirates arrested by their warships.¹³⁵ The Supreme Court of Seychelles set the trial date for mid-January 2025.¹³⁶

164. Puntland authorities also arrested suspected pirates and suppliers of logistics linked to the *Ruen* and *Abdullah* hijackings during four incidents on the coast (see annex 38).

165. Pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia are both unlikely to end soon and unlikely rise to the levels reached between 2008 and 2012. Coordination mechanisms, such as the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations voluntary reporting scheme for vessels, and collaboration between countries and stakeholders played a significant role in suppressing piracy. Such mechanisms remained present while piracy was dormant, albeit with reduced capacity.

166. While high number of arrests and prosecutions will have a deterring effect on piracy, the high ransom amount received for the *Abdullah* will likely fuel more attacks.

¹³⁰ Confidential source.

¹³¹ PMPF letter to the Indian High Commission in Kenya, dated 20 March 2024.

¹³² X account Spokesperson of the Indian Navy, 4 April 2024, available at <https://twitter.com/indiannavy/status/1775740476446191823>.

¹³³ The Indian Navy declined sharing information with the Panel for security consideration due to ongoing operations.

¹³⁴ *The Sunday Times* (Sri Lanka), "Somali pirates threat may affect fishing industry, says owner of 'Lorenzo Putha 4'", 4 February 2024.

¹³⁵ European Union, Naval Force, "Updated information on MV Chrystal Arctic event", 13 May 2024.

¹³⁶ Rita Joubert-Lawen, "Trial of 6 suspected Somali pirates set for January 2025 in Seychelles", Seychelles News Agency, 9 August 2024.

Due to the lack of adequate maritime police, coast guard vessels and infrastructure, Somali counter-piracy measures are only possible from land, but not from the sea. Strategic coordination and operational cooperation among international and regional countries and stakeholders, as well as in-country capacity-building in maritime law enforcement, will be essential to suppress the current wave of piracy. Long-term solutions will have to prioritize building a sustainable blue economy, which should include a lucrative fisheries industry and port investments beneficial to local communities.

IX. Key protection and humanitarian considerations

167. Efforts to degrade Al-Shabaab must remain cognizant of the context of overwhelming humanitarian needs and persistent threats to the civilian population due to ongoing conflict, insecurity and recurrent natural disasters. In 2024, it is estimated that 6.9 million people in Somalia, or nearly one third of the total population, require humanitarian assistance.¹³⁷

168. The number of internally displaced persons in Somalia is currently estimated at 3.9 million.¹³⁸ In 2023, 2.9 million people were displaced, primarily due to floods, conflict and insecurity, and droughts (in that order). Between January and July 2024, 283,000 new displacements were recorded, mainly caused by conflict, insecurity and floods (in that order).¹³⁹ Among the internally displaced person population, 80 per cent are women and children. In addition, an estimated 1.7 million children aged from 6 to 59 months face acute malnutrition between January and December 2024.¹⁴⁰

169. The majority of the internally displaced person population is concentrated in central and southern Somalia, where ongoing conflicts and insecurity, as well as logistical and bureaucratic impediments, pose challenges to humanitarian access.

A. Impact of conflict and insecurity on the civilian population

170. Throughout 2023 and 2024, conflicts and insecurity were driven by the proliferation of weapons and ammunition, asymmetric attacks from Al-Shabaab, the threat of improvised explosive devices, ongoing clan violence and the Government's offensive against Al-Shabaab, including in Jubbaland in July and August 2024 (see para. 24).

171. The reporting period saw several pockets of inter-clan violence that forced nearly 150,000 people to flee their homes across various regions and disrupted humanitarian aid, most notably in Dinsoor, Qoryooley (South-West State), Jowhar (Hirshabelle), Luuq (Jubbaland) and Abud-waaq (Galmudug). For instance, from 5 to 7 July 2024, armed inter-clan violence in Luuq, Gedo region, displaced about 42,000 people, one third of whom fled to hard-to-reach areas, like Yurkud, Ceel Boon and Bashiiro.¹⁴¹ In Mudug region, clan conflicts from 26 June to 2 July 2024 displaced over 26,000 people, primarily from Galdogob and Jariiban districts.¹⁴²

¹³⁷ United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan: Somalia* (2024), p. 18. The document presents an extensive review of humanitarian needs projected for 2024.

¹³⁸ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), "Somalia situation: population of concern to UNHCR", 29 February 2024.

¹³⁹ UNHCR, "Somalia internal displacement: by year", Protection and Return Monitoring Network Dashboard. Available at <https://prmn-somalia.unhcr.org/yearly-displacement>.

¹⁴⁰ Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, "Somalia: acute malnutrition situation for October 2023–February 2024 and projection for March–June 2024", 15 February 2024.

¹⁴¹ United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Somalia situation report", 13 August 2024

¹⁴² Ibid.

172. In July 2024, fighting between Jubbaland forces, supported by the Somali National Army, and Al-Shabaab in the villages of Harbole, Mido, Biibi, Soya and Bula-Haji in Afmadow district, Lower Jubba, prompted further displacement.¹⁴³ Jubbaland forces have reportedly taken control of Harbole and Bula-Haji, although Al-Shabaab allegedly instructed local communities to evacuate these areas, causing residents to flee towards Kismaayo.¹⁴⁴

173. Attacks using improvised explosive devices continue to present a threat to the civilian population and humanitarian access. According to credible reports, civilians represent one third of the total casualties recorded between August 2023 and July 2024 (see para. 125). The emplacement of such devices along vital routes disrupts the population's movement and access to essential services.¹⁴⁵ Most civilian casualties reported appear not to have been the direct targets of the devices. Devices have been placed and initiated in civilian locations, such as the Baraka market in February 2024, the Lido Beach in the attack of August 2024,¹⁴⁶ and several teashops (including in Janaale, Lower Shabelle, in June 2024; Boondhere, Mogadishu, in July 2024; and Daynile, Mogadishu, in August 2024).¹⁴⁷ Devices also disrupt humanitarian access, although the Panel is not aware of any recorded cases of the targeting of humanitarian actors.

B. Exacerbating effect of climatic shocks

174. Recurrent natural disasters cause displacement, strain resources and disrupt infrastructure, shelter, basic services and livelihoods. Somalia experienced the worst drought in decades in 2023, followed by extensive floods in late 2023 and mid-2024. Those events further stretched government and humanitarian resources, highlighting State service gaps and creating opportunities for Al-Shabaab to exploit these weaknesses.

175. The *Deyr* rainy season, which took place from October to December 2023, affected close to 2.5 million people, including over 1.2 million people displaced in 31 districts, mostly in Galmudug, Hirshabelle, Jubbaland and South-West States. Floods submerged about 1.5 million hectares of farmland and damaged infrastructure. Logistical access constraints increased considerably as critical roads, bridges, facilities and airstrips were flooded and/or destroyed, hindering aid delivery. The floods also triggered a spike in waterborne diseases.¹⁴⁸

176. The *Gu* rainy season, which took place from April to June 2024, affected over 225,000 people, causing further displacement and loss of livelihoods, particularly in Jubbaland, Hirshabelle and South-West States. The Somalia Disaster Management Agency warned communities in flood-prone areas to prepare for continued hardships and potential loss of livelihoods.¹⁴⁹

177. In April and May 2024, Al-Shabaab published several videos demonstrating its response to the floods, including repair work on the Juba River, including in Buulo Mareer and Jilib villages, and the reconstruction of homes.¹⁵⁰ The Panel had noted

¹⁴³ The military operation aimed to secure control of the Kismaayo-Afmadow and Dhobley-Afmadow roads to maintain access to key towns in the district.

¹⁴⁴ Global Protection Cluster, "Joint protection and shelter frontline response in Kismaayo and Afmadow districts, Jubaland State", 17 August 2024.

¹⁴⁵ Wen Zhou and Andrea Raab, "IEDs and the Mine Ban Convention: a minefield of definitions", International Committee of the Red Cross, Humanitarian Law and Policy blog, 17 September 2019.

¹⁴⁶ United Nations, "Secretary-General strongly condemns deadly terrorist attack at Lido Beach in Somalia", SG/SM/22325, 3 August 2024.

¹⁴⁷ Confidential reports.

¹⁴⁸ See [S/2024/129](#).

¹⁴⁹ United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Somalia: situation report", 7 May 2024.

¹⁵⁰ See Site Intelligence, "Amid attack claims for Kenya and Somalia Shabaab promotes its civilian

that, in 2022, the group adopted a similar posture in response to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic and droughts.

178. The recent floods have highlighted the critical need for cooperation between the Government, federal member states and international actors to develop robust disaster preparedness and response strategies to address climate-related disasters and provide sustainable solutions for the affected populations. Genuine efforts in that respect could foster community trust and be a factor that draws people to Government-controlled regions.

C. Humanitarian access in Al-Shabaab-controlled areas

179. According to the 2024 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan, 23 of 74 Somali districts are considered “hard” or “extremely hard” to reach.¹⁵¹ The majority of these hard-to-reach areas are under the control of Al-Shabaab, including parts of Gedo, Middle Juba, Lower Juba, Lower Shabelle, Bakool, Galmudug and Mudug.¹⁵²

180. The Panel understands that most humanitarian actors do not provide humanitarian assistance in Al-Shabaab-controlled areas, meaning that there is a limited understanding of the humanitarian and protection needs of vulnerable groups in those areas. However, humanitarian operations have taken place in areas located in proximity to areas under the group’s influence. The underlying reasons for these access constraints underscore the need to uphold the humanitarian imperative to provide assistance wherever it is needed, as a fundamental humanitarian principle.

181. Furthermore, the Panel recalls that, in its resolutions [2462 \(2019\)](#) and [2482 \(2019\)](#), the Council urged Member States to ensure their counter-terrorism measures comply with international humanitarian and human rights law and to consider the potential impacts of counter-terrorism measures on humanitarian activities. Therefore, it is important that counter-terrorism legislation explicitly exclude impartial humanitarian activities from the scope of application.¹⁵³ For instance, the Panel notes that the anti-terrorism bill (2023) of Somalia does not contain specific safeguards for humanitarian organizations, which could potentially deter principled humanitarian actors from providing assistance in areas under Al-Shabaab control. As an example, if the obligation prescribed in article 14 of the bill – to provide information on terrorist groups – is interpreted to include humanitarian actors, it could potentially compromise the humanitarian principle of neutrality.

D. Update on the implementation of resolution [2664 \(2022\)](#) (humanitarian carveout)

182. The Security Council adopted its resolution [2664 \(2022\)](#) to ensure that financial sanctions include a humanitarian carveout across all sanctions regimes. The carveout covers a wider range of humanitarian organizations and activities than in its previous resolutions on Somalia. The Council underlined that United Nations sanctions are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences and reaffirmed that implementing measures need to comply with international humanitarian and human rights law.

183. According to humanitarian sources, the carveout has had a positive impact on humanitarian activities in Somalia. Aid workers have reported that it has created a more conducive operating environment, facilitating humanitarian activities that

centric projects”, n.d.; and confidential reports.

¹⁵¹ The districts correspond to the official Somali administrative boundaries.

¹⁵² See humanitarian access map available in the 2024 *Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan*, p. 31.

¹⁵³ See <https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/counterterrorism-and-ihl-humanitarian-exemptions>.


would previously have been hindered. It was noted that assistance has been provided in a timelier manner, and information-sharing and financial transactions have improved with better due diligence and risk mitigation measures.¹⁵⁴

E. Sexual and gender-based violence

184. Sexual and gender-based violence, and in particular conflict-related sexual violence, in Somalia remain pervasive, significantly underreported and driven by several factors, including structural gender inequalities, insecurity, cyclical humanitarian crises and fear of reprisal. It continues to affect vulnerable groups, such as children, adolescent girls and women. Internally displaced persons, minorities and single heads of households are also especially vulnerable.

185. The statistics on the patterns of sexual and gender-based violence, and more specifically conflict-related sexual violence, vary according to the reporting mechanisms (see annex 42 for statistics from the Gender-Based Violence Information Management System and the Monitoring and Analysis Reporting Arrangements).¹⁵⁵ In his April 2024 report on conflict-related sexual violence (S/2024/292), the Secretary-General provides a recent overview on the patterns and perpetrators of conflict-related sexual violence.¹⁵⁶ According to a report by UNSOM and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR),¹⁵⁷ almost half of the verified cases of conflict-related sexual violence were attributed to unidentified armed actors, followed by Al-Shabaab, State actors, clan militia and regional forces (see figure IV).

Figure IV
Profile of perpetrators of sexual violence (2017–2022)



Source: UNSOM and OHCHR.

¹⁵⁴ Confidential humanitarian sources.

¹⁵⁵ A data management system that enables those providing services to survivors of gender-based violence to safely collect, store, analyse, and share data related to reported incidents of gender-based violence; see www.gbvim.com. The monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements on conflict-related sexual violence is a mechanism created pursuant to Security Council resolution 1960 (2010).

¹⁵⁶ See S/2024/292, paras. 56–58.

¹⁵⁷ OHCHR and UNSOM, “Tackling sexual violence in Somalia”, p. 10.

186. Capturing the role of women and the scope of violence against women in general in Al-Shabaab-controlled areas is very challenging, in part due to limited access by outsiders to those areas (see paras. 179–180), as well as fear of stigma or retaliation against victims for sharing information.

187. Women may also be associated with Al-Shabaab through circumstances that offer them few other options, including adopting Al-Shabaab practices to ensure their own survival and retain their ability to generate a livelihood within the group’s territories of influence or control, or by following their husbands who choose to join (see annex 43).¹⁵⁸

188. Many women are drawn into Al-Shabaab by force. It is widely reported that Al-Shabaab uses conflict-related sexual violence against women and girls as a strategy to subjugate communities under its control, as well as abduction and forced marriage as a form of compensation to its fighters and to forge ties with prominent clan leaders.¹⁵⁹ The Panel interviewed a community member whose 16 year-old cousin had fled her village north of Baidoa after a member of Al-Shabaab had insisted on marrying her, threatening her family if they refused to acquiesce. Subsequently, her father was placed in an Al-Shabaab “detention facility” in an unknown location for seven days and was released upon the payment of the equivalent to \$100.¹⁶⁰

189. Some women may voluntarily participate as operatives, sharing intelligence or providing logistical support. These women can become perpetrators of grave violations against children and conflict-related sexual violence when they use their social influence to exploit girls and boys to support the group or facilitate forced marriages.

190. Studies show that, regardless of their role, most of the women who leave Al-Shabaab are highly vulnerable to stigma and live in extreme poverty due to exclusion from communities and resources. Those who flee do so with few possessions and their children; many are illiterate and unskilled, which renders them dependent on community support and aid. Many choose to live in isolation for fear of stigma.¹⁶¹ The Panel notes the closure of dedicated rehabilitation centres for women formerly associated with Al-Shabaab during the reporting period.

191. The Panel notes that, in September 2022, the Government adopted the National Action Plan for the implementation of the Somali Women’s Charter and of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), which incorporates priorities set out in the joint communiqué on addressing conflict-related sexual violence. This effort can be streamlined with the adoption of a workplan, developed in cooperation with dedicated United Nations expertise.

¹⁵⁸ OHCHR and UNSOM, “Tackling sexual violence in Somalia”, p. 13.

¹⁵⁹ Interviews with community members. See also, OHCHR and UNSOM, “Tackling sexual violence in Somalia”, p. 13.

¹⁶⁰ Panel interview, April 2024.

¹⁶¹ OHCHR and UNSOM, “Tackling sexual violence in Somalia”, p. 18; and Orly Maya Stern and Catherine Peterson, “Assisting women formerly associated with Al-Shabaab: a proposed approach to programming”, 2023, pp. 12–14.

F. Grave violations against children

192. In December 2023, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict highlighted the urgent need to protect children in Somalia¹⁶² from continued high levels of grave violations against children.¹⁶³

193. In July 2023, the Secretary-General reported the verification of 2,783 grave violations against 2,282 children (1,810 boys, 472 girls) in 2022.¹⁶⁴ The Panel notes that various security forces perpetrate such violations and that Al-Shabaab ranks as the highest perpetrator in the recorded incidents of the following: (a) attacks on schools and hospitals (40 cases out of 44 attributed to Al-Shabaab); (b) the recruitment and use of children (902 out of a total of 1,094 children were recruited and used by Al-Shabaab, with the remainder by clan militia and various security forces); and (c) abduction of children (663 out of 696 children reported to be abducted were by Al-Shabaab).¹⁶⁵ There are no indications that this pattern changed in the current reporting period.

194. Children represent a significant number of Al-Shabaab's new recruits, drawn in through abduction and forced recruitment, indoctrination and taxation of their families. The Secretary-General reported that Al-Shabaab's continued abduction of children for the purpose of recruitment and use occurred mostly in Bay, Bakool, Hiraan, Juba Dhexe and Lower Shabelle.¹⁶⁶

195. Al-Shabaab reportedly abducts children as young as 3 years old.¹⁶⁷ The Panel interviewed a community member who recounted the abduction of his 12-year-old nephew by Al-Shabaab from his family. The efforts of the child's father to seek assistance from community leaders to negotiate his son's return were unsuccessful, and he was told to "forget about it".

196. Boys join combat training from the age of 13, and younger children are indoctrinated in schools set up by the group that aim to instil in the children its militant mindset. A video published by Al-Shabaab in June 2024 shows schoolboys parading and carrying weapons during community celebrations in several areas, including Gedo and Galguduud (see confidential annex 44).¹⁶⁸

197. The protection of children formerly associated with armed forces and groups, including those designated as terrorist groups, is both a matter of fundamental rights and a crucial step in providing them with pathways to a positive future and preventing recidivism. These children should be treated primarily as victims.¹⁶⁹ Ensuring their rights and well-being is essential for their rehabilitation and reintegration, reducing re-recruitment and supporting broader counterterrorism and peacebuilding efforts.

198. In July 2023, the Government endorsed age assessment guidelines as part of its 2012 action plan on ending and preventing the recruitment and use and the killing and maiming of children, and the 2019 implementation road map adopted to expedite the

¹⁶² [A/HRC/55/57](#), para. 15.

¹⁶³ The six grave violations against children include incidents of killing and maiming of children; recruitment or use of children as soldiers; sexual violence against children; abduction of children; attacks against schools or hospitals; and denial of humanitarian access for children.

¹⁶⁴ [A/77/895-S/2023/363](#), paras. 151–158 (lists grave violations against children in Somalia broken down by perpetrators).

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁶ [S/2024/129](#), para. 59.

¹⁶⁷ Confidential interview.

¹⁶⁸ Site Intelligence; and Shabaab video, 25 June, 2024 (see screenshot of images in confidential annex 44).

¹⁶⁹ UNICEF, "UNICEF statement on execution of four youths in Puntland state, Somalia", 22 August 2024.

action plan. In addition, the Federal Cabinet approved the juvenile justice bill and the child rights bill in 2023.¹⁷⁰ In 2014, it adopted a “standard operating procedure for the reception and handover of children separated from armed groups”.

199. Despite the normative progress, children formerly associated with Al-Shabaab are at risk of detention, including in unofficial or undeclared detention facilities, and in some cases capital punishment. In March 2024, the Jubbaland Military Court in Kismaayo sentenced to death a 17-year-old boy, among others, for offences committed during their affiliation with Al-Shabaab; following advocacy efforts,¹⁷¹ an appeal was granted.¹⁷² Most recently, in Puntland, four young people were executed for offenses committed as children while associated with Al-Shabaab. The sentences were issued by a military court, which lacks child justice procedures. The Puntland Age Verification Committee confirmed they were minors at the time of the arrest and should not have been subject to the death penalty.¹⁷³ The incidents of detention and prosecution of children associated with armed groups highlight areas where the implementation of the abovementioned 2014 standard operating procedure and the 2019 road map could be improved.

X. Recommendations

200. The Panel recommends that the Security Council:

(a) Encourage strategic partners, including Member States and specialized agencies, to provide capacity-building and technical assistance to the Government, federal member states and regional governments to investigate and track mobile money transfers and cryptocurrency transactions (see para. 32);

(b) Request the Government to provide an update on the progress on the beneficial ownership framework, in line with recommendations 24 and 25 of the Financial Action Task Force, as part of the biannual reporting of Somalia to the Security Council (in accordance with para. 45 (a) resolution [2713 \(2023\)](#));

(c) Encourage the Government, federal member states and regional governments, and Member States to facilitate for the Panel access to suspected members of Al-Shabaab and other persons of interest held in custody, including detainees held on terrorism, terrorist financing, weapon smuggling and piracy-related charges.

201. The Panel recommends that the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution [2713 \(2023\)](#) concerning Al-Shabaab:

(a) Consider convening a meeting of regional Member States to address the resurgence of ISIL-Somalia to strengthen regional coordination and cooperation on counter-terrorism investigations, including the movement of foreign fighters across regional borders (see paras. 44–47);

(b) Organize a visit to Somalia and other regional Member States to raise awareness of the sanctions regime, including regional aspects for degrading the capabilities of Al-Shabaab, and to support the Panel in implementing its mandate;

(c) Call upon Member States and development partners, including the European Union and the United Nations to provide technical assistance to the Government, federal member states and regional governments in financial disruption

¹⁷⁰ [A/79/245](#), para. 29.

¹⁷¹ Confidential report, March 2024.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*

¹⁷³ UNICEF, “UNICEF statement on execution of four youths in Puntland state”.

capacity enhancement programmes on anti-money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism;

(d) Encourage the Government to implement the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force by taking the following actions:

(i) Sharing information and conducting joint investigations among anti-money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism stakeholders within the federal member states, regional governments, international regulators and law enforcement authorities, and fulfilling regulatory functions as indicated in paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution [2713 \(2023\)](#) (see para. 71);

(ii) Establishing a public-private-partnership to foster collaboration between the Financial Reporting Centre and the reporting entities (e.g. national anti-money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism compliance officers forum for financial institutions, and the insurance and designated non-financial businesses and professions sectors, etc);

(iii) Completing the unique identification process, promoting a unique digitized identification and linking it to service delivery (i.e. banking, public services), know-your-customer and customer due diligence;

(e) Request Member States and specialized agencies to facilitate a coordination mechanism between the Mogadishu and Hargeisa financial intelligence units and reporting entities, the financial and non-financial institutions and law enforcement agencies, to facilitate collaboration (see para. 81–84);

(f) Considering the ongoing transition from ATMIS to AUSSOM, request the African Union to:

(i) Take steps to reduce the risk of base overruns and access by Al-Shabaab to weapons, ammunition and other types of contingent-owned equipment (see paras. 104–106);

(ii) Ensure the full implementation and seamless transition of the Government-ATMIS standard operating procedure on recovered weapons from ATMIS to AUSSOM (see paras. 108–110);

(iii) Facilitate cooperation between the Panel and AUSSOM, including access to documents, and trace recovered weapons, ammunition and related material, in line with its mandate;

(g) Encourage the Government to:

(i) Strengthen weapons and ammunition management in the federal member states, including training on marking, tracing and other counter-diversion strategies;

(ii) Integrate all weapons and ammunition distributed to clan militias under the national weapons and ammunition management framework of Somalia;

(iii) Document, mark, register and trace all weapons and ammunition seized on the battlefield by clan militias (see para. 102);

(h) Seek an update from the Government on the list of licensed private security companies authorized to import weapons, ammunition and military equipment into Somalia, in line with para. 32 of resolution [2713 \(2023\)](#) (see para. 103);

(i) Encourage Member States and strategic partners to provide enhanced counter-improvised explosive device training and equipment, including explosives testing and analysis equipment (see para. 133);

(j) Encourage the Government, Member States and international security partners to devise urgently a durable solution to establish permanent safe and secure ammunition storehouse facilities, to reduce the risk of an unintentional munition explosion in Somalia (see para. 97–99);

(k) Call upon Member States to train and equip the Government and federal member states maritime police and coast guards in acquiring adequate offshore patrol capability and coast guard stations, to enhance maritime security, by countering piracy and other illicit maritime activities and conducting search and rescue operations;

(l) Encourage the Government to take into account the potential impact of the recently adopted counter-terrorism legislation on humanitarian activities carried out by impartial humanitarian actors, ensuring that its application does not impede or target the provision of neutral and impartial humanitarian assistance, in a manner consistent with international humanitarian law, in line with paragraph 16 of resolution [2482 \(2019\)](#) (see para. 183);

(m) Welcome the inclusion of the joint communiqué in the national action plan on resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#) and call upon the Government to develop a workplan under the joint communiqué in cooperation with UNSOM and United Nations specialized agencies (see para. 191);

(n) Commend the Government for endorsing age assessment guidelines under the 2012 action plan to end and prevent child recruitment, use, killing and maiming, and encourage the full implementation of the 2019 road map and the 2014 standard operating procedure for the reception and handover of children separated from armed groups (see para. 198);

(o) Urge collaboration between the Government, federal member states, the United Nations and child protection working groups to:

(i) Conduct a thorough mapping of all official and unofficial detention facilities holding children separated from armed groups (see para. 199);


(ii) ensure that child protection actors have timely and unrestricted access to these children during all stages of their release and reintegration process.

Annexes

Annex 1: UN Geographic Information Systems (GIS) Map	48
Annex 2: Methodology	49
Annex 3: ‘The opportunity to reply’ methodology used by the Panel	50
Annex 4: Jubaland statement following Al-Shabaab assault on Bulo Haji	51
Annex 5: Members of the Al-Shabaab Executive and Shura Council	53
Annex 6: Infographic from Islamic State media Al-Naba	54
Annex 7: 9 July ISIL-Somalia grenade attack against ‘Marhaba Trading company’ in Bosaso	56
Annex 8: Regional Perspective on Maritime Security	57
Annex 9: Scrap metal tariffs for 2024	58
Annex 10: Federal Republic of Somalia - The National Anti-money laundering And Counter Terrorism Financing Committee List of Financial Sanctions Targets dated 13 April 2024	61
Annex 11: Federal Republic of Somalia - The National Anti-money laundering And Counter Terrorism Financing Committee List of Financial Sanctions Targets dated 18 July 2024	63
Annex 12: Finance	65
Annex 13: Arms seizure by AS from ATMIS and SNA base overruns	66
Annex 14: ATMIS drawdown and transition into AUSSOM: drawing on lessons learned to mitigate base overruns	75
Annex 15: Helicopter deliveries to Somalia	76
Annex 16: The ATMIS-GFRS SOP on Recovered Weapons, Ammunition and Associated Material and other WAM SOPs	78
Annex 17: Panel investigations and tracing of weapons, ammunition and related components used by Al-Shabaab	81
Annex 18: Al-Shabaab Weapons Markings Analysis	92
Annex 19: Monitoring Al-Shabaab indirect fire attacks	95
Annex 20: Cross-border arms trafficking: a regional perspective	103
Annex 21: Cross-Border Attacks and Weapons Seizures	109
Annex 22: Armed group access to UAVs - August 2024 FPV UAV intercept in Galkayo by Puntland authorities	114
Annex 23: IED likely produced by ISIL-Somalia in Puntland	116
Annex 24: Analysis of Al-Shabaab Improvised Explosive Devices	117
Annex 25: Vessels loading and transporting charcoal from Kismayo	123
Annex 26: Changes in Charcoal Stockpiles in and around Kismayo	125
Annex 27: Maritime weapon interdictions 16 August 2023 to 15 August 2024	128
Annex 28: 11 January 2024 - USCENTCOM seizes dhow carrying missile components	129
Annex 29: 5 February 2024 -Puntland Police Force weapon interdiction	134
Annex 30: 7 February 2024 weapon interdiction Puntland	136

Annex 31: 18 May 2024 PMPF weapon interdiction	137
Annex 32: 4 August 2024 Weapon Interdiction Puntland authorities	138
Annex 33: Central Park Pirate Group	141
Annex 34: The Bulk Carrier, Ruen Hijacking.	144
Annex 35: The Bulk Carrier, MV Abdullah Hijacking.	149
Annex 36: Attempted Hijacking Products Tanker Chrystal Artic.	157
Annex 37: Boarding General Cargo Ship Basilisk	159
Annex 38: Interceptions, arrests and prosecution of pirate suspects	161
Annex 39: Vessels held by Somali Pirates	166
Annex 40: Pirate Launching sites, camps and anchorages	167
Annex 41: Patterns of displacement in 2024	168
Annex 42: UN reported statistics of SGBV and CRSV	169
Annex 43: IOM table on the path followed by women that disengaged from Al-Shabaab	170
Annex 44: Use and recruitment of children by Al-Shabaab	171

Annex 1: UN Geographic Information Systems (GIS) Map



Map No. 3620 Rev. 10 UNITED NATIONS
December 2011

Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section

Annex 2: Methodology

1. The Panel ensured compliance with the methodological standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (S/2006/997). As a matter of principle, the Panel strives to rely on verified documents and, wherever possible, on first-hand, on-site observations by the experts themselves, including photographs.¹ It endeavours to ensure that their assertions are corroborated by solid information and that their findings are substantiated by credible sources.²
2. The Panel has placed importance on the rule of consensus among the Panel members and agreed that, in the developments of its reports, it would only adopt the text, conclusions and recommendations by a majority of four out of the five members. In the event of a recommendation for designation of an individual or a group, such recommendation would be done based on unanimity.
3. The Panel used satellite imagery procured by the United Nations from private providers to support investigations, as well as open-source imagery. Commercial databases recording maritime and aviation data were referenced. Public statements by officials through their official media channels were accepted as factual unless contrary facts were established. While the Panel wishes to be as transparent as possible, in situations in which identifying sources would have exposed them or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel decided not to include identifying information in this document.
4. The Panel reviewed social media, and always seeks to corroborate using multiple independent or technical sources, including eyewitnesses, to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard of proof.
5. The Panel is committed to impartiality in investigating incidents of non-compliance by any party.
6. The Panel is conscious that upholding the confidentiality of sources of information regarding sanctions-busting or non-compliance may be necessary to ensure the personal safety of individual sources. In all cases, the Panel makes effort to ensure the veracity of information gained in confidence against independent and verifiable sources.³ While maintaining confidentiality, the Panel may provide more clarification on such sources by attributing such information received from States to an “official but confidential” source.⁴
7. The Panel observes impartiality and fairness during the report drafting process, and make available to relevant parties (State authorities, entities or individuals), if appropriate, any evidence of wrongdoing for their review, comment and response, within a specified deadline. Responses will be assessed by the Panel and when the Panel agrees, it will seek to address this in future reports by noting the change in previously reported assessments (see Annex 3 for further details on ‘the opportunity to reply’).⁵

¹ S/2006/997, para 22.

² S/2006/997, para 23.

³ S/2006/997, para 24.

⁴ S/2006/997, para 25.

⁵ S/2006/997, para 28.

Annex 3: ‘The opportunity to reply’ methodology used by the Panel

1. Although sanctions are meant to be preventative not punitive, it should be recognized that the mere naming of an individual or entity in a Panel’s report could have adverse effects on the individual. As such, where possible, individuals concerned should be provided with an opportunity to provide their account of events and to provide concrete and specific information/materiel in support. Through this interaction, the individual is given the opportunity to demonstrate that their alleged conduct does not fall within the relevant listing criteria. This is called the ‘opportunity to reply’.
2. The Panel’s methodology on the opportunity to reply is as follows:
 - a. Providing an individual with an ‘opportunity to reply’ should be the norm;
 - b. The Panel may decide not to offer an opportunity of reply if there is credible evidence that it would unduly prejudice its investigations, including if it would:
 - i. Result in the individual moving assets if they get warning of a possible recommendation for designation;
 - ii. Restrict further access of the Panel to vital sources;
 - iii. Endanger Panel sources or Panel members;
 - iv. Adversely and gravely impact humanitarian access for humanitarian actors in the field; or
 - v. For any other reason that can be clearly demonstrated as reasonable and justifiable in the prevailing circumstances.
3. The individual should be able to communicate directly with the Panel to convey their personal determination as to the level and nature of their interaction with the Panel.
4. Interactions between the Panel and the individual should be direct, unless in exceptional circumstances.
5. In no circumstances can third parties, without the knowledge of the individual, determine for the individual its level of interaction with the Panel.
6. The individual, on the other hand, in making their determination of the level and nature of interaction with the Panel, may consult third parties or allow third parties (for example, legal representative or his/her government) to communicate on his/her behalf on subsequent interactions with the Panel.

Annex 4: Jubaland statement following Al-Shabaab assault on Bulo Haji

Figure 1: Jubaland statement following Al-Shabaab assault on Bulo Haji



Hay'adda Sirdoonka iyo Nabad Sugida Jubaland
Jubaland Intelligence and Security Agency

WAR SAXAAFADEED

In ka badan 135 Khawaarij ah oo isugu jira horjoogeyaal iyo maleeshiyaad ayaa lagu dilay hawlgal ka hortag ah oo ay Ciidanka Jubbaland iyo kuwa Xoogga dalka ka sameeyeen deegaannada Buulo Xaaji, Harboole iyo Biibi ee gobalka Jubbada Hoose.

Hawlgalkan ayaa ka dambeeyay kadib markii maleeshiyaadka Khawaarijta ah ay weerar nafla caari ah ku soo qaadeen fariisimo geesiyaasha Jubbaland iyo kuwa Xoogga Dalka ay ku lahaayeen deegaannadan, laakiin ciidanka oo u diyaarsanaa dhagarta cadowga ayaa ku guulaystay inay cagta mariyaan maleeshiyaadka Khawaarijta ah.

Ciidamadda ayaa hawlgalkan ku furtay hub aad u farabadan oo ay wateen cadowga, kuwaasi oo ay ka mid yihiin qoryaha RPG, BKM, AK47 iyo kuwa kale.

Geesiyaasha Jubbaland iyo kuwa Xoogga Dalka ayaa hadda ku jira uruurinta meydadka cadowga ee daadsan goobaha lagu dagaalamay, iyadoo dhanka kale wali lagu raad joogo maleeshiyaad fara ku tiris ah oo isku dayaya inay naftooda la baxsadaan.

Sidoo kale halyeeyada cashirka u dhigay Argagixisada waxa ay gacanta ku dhigeen islamarkaana nolosha ku qabteen koox dhagarqabayaal ah oo kamid ahaa kuwii isku dayay in ay weerar kusoo qaadaan fariisimaha ciidanka.

-Dhammaad-

/Nisajubbaland

Source: Jubaland NISA

Figure 2: Jubaland statement following Al-Shabaab assault on Bulo Haji unofficially translated



Annex 5: Members of the Al-Shabaab Executive and Shura Council

(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)

Annex 6: Infographic from Islamic State media Al-Naba

Figure 1: English translation of Arabic infographic from Islamic State media Al-Naba issue #439 page 8 (original Arabic below) claiming full control of the Cal Miskaad Mountains.



Source: Al-Naba

Figure 2: Original Arabic infographic from Islamic State media Al-Naba claiming full control of the Cal Miskaad Mountains.



Source: Al-Naba

Annex 7: 9 July ISIL-Somalia grenade attack against ‘Marhaba Trading company’ in Bosaso

Images below: 9 July ISIL-Somalia grenade attack against ‘Marhaba Trading company’ in Bosaso.




Source: Puntland Security Coordination Office

Annex 8: Regional Perspective on Maritime Security

With the prevalence of both Houthis attacks against ships allegedly affiliated or linked to Israel, and pirate attacks since November 2023, ships run a gauntlet of possible threats transiting the Red Sea, through the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea to the Western Indian Ocean. With the UAV attack on *MSC Orion*, the range of Houthi attacks increased beyond the Red Sea, into the Arabian Sea, overlapping with attacks by Somali pirates. The combination of these threats affects freedom of navigation, maritime security and regional stability not only in the Red Sea, but also in the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea and wider Western Indian Ocean.

Map: Houthi Conflict related incidents and Piracy Attacks November 2023 to August 2024⁶

Regional Perspective – Piracy and Conflict Related Incidents



Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined.

⁶ Compiled from several sources such as MSCHOA, EUNAVFOR, U.S. Central Command, CMF, UKMTO, PMPF, RMIFC, IFC, IMO GISIS, maritime security companies and media reports.

Annex 9: Scrap metal tariffs for 2024

Image 1: Scrap metal tariffs for 2024

laayada Islaamiga ah ee Sh/hoose

ولاية شبيلي السفلى الإسلامية

التجارة والقطاعات

Tacriifada cusub ee lawaazimta

NO	Magaca qaadidka	Lacagta laga qaadayo
1	Inataree cilinle	
2	Inataree Candho meydle .zy,IWM	\$400
3	L six	\$325
4	Fuso,Fur inataree, Tm,8boole	\$260
5	110,jante diyeeshe	\$220
6	UD	\$130
7	Sabaax iyo BG	\$120
8	UD Imuduufiko	\$120
9	DYNA 3.5tan	\$170
10	Dyna Niic	\$80
11	Dyna box Rar wada	\$60
12	Atlas	\$35
13	Homey xamuul wada	\$40
14	Birta culus fasalkii	\$25
15	Iska rogaha dhagaxa	\$250
16	Iska rogaha carrada	\$5
17	Mooto 3lugood	\$3
18	Xaaji qansiin IWM	\$2
19	Ronet rakaab	Nafar iyo bar
20	Land rovel,Qooqan,cabdi bile baasajeeri ah	Nafar iyo bar
21	Homey noona, Market 2 Baasajeeri	Nafar iyo bar
22	Dyna box Baasajeeri	Nafar iyo bar

FG: gaariga haduu haaf yahay waxaa laga qaadayaa kala bar intii laga qaadi jiray haduuse dhexda kasii buuxsado koontaroolka xiga ayaa looga qaadayaa lacagta inta dhiman rasiid ayaana la siinayaa.

Source: Confidential, May 2024

Image 2: Scrap metal tariffs for 2024

Gaadiidka cusub

<u>NO</u>	<u>Magaca gaadiidka</u>	<u>Lacagta laga gaadayo</u>
1	Riig	\$2000
2	Inataree,candhomeydle.zy	\$1000
3	Tareel,Baldoos,baallar,forliif weyn	\$1000
4	Fuso,Fur inataree,Tm	\$600
5	8 Boole ,Eveeco,Foraliif yar	\$600
6	UD,jantediyeeshe,Dyno	\$500
7	Bass sabaax,cagaf	\$500
8	Dyna box ,Dyna niic	\$300
9	C/bile,landrovel,prado,runet,pajeero IWM	\$300
10	Nissan safari, leyla calaawi	\$300
11	Nissan4X4,Qooqan.	\$300
12	Dyna madax kanool	\$200
13	Market2,corolla,mini pajero, karib	\$200
14	Noho probox , homey ,Suzuki	\$200

dmada badeecada ka gudubta xuduud beenaadyad

nataree cilinle,	\$900
nataree 4 qooble	\$800
indho meydle zy	\$700
oole, fur inataree, fuzo ,Tm	\$400
	\$250
e diyeesh	\$220
o	\$200
	\$120

Source: Confidential, May 2024

Table: Scrap metal tariffs for 2024

Items	Rates payable in \$	Items	Rates payable in \$
1. inataree	400	9. Dyna 3.5 tons	80
2. Inataree candha meydle	325	10. Dyna niic	60
3. Lixle	260	11. Dyna box rar drive	35
4. Fuso fur inataree, Ti, Em 8 bole	220	12. Atlas	40
5.110 janta diyeeshe	130	13. Homey truck driver	
6. yudhii	120	14. Heavy metal class	25 250
7. Sabah bijii	120	15. Rock roll	5
8, yudhii inmadufiko	170	16. Anger	3
		17. tricycle	2
Taxation on vehicle parts as scrap metal			

Annex 10: Federal Republic of Somalia - The National Anti-money laundering And Counter Terrorism Financing Committee List of Financial Sanctions Targets dated 13 April 2024



Federal Republic of Somalia
The National Anti-money laundering And Counter Terrorism Financing Committee
(NAMLC)

Mogadishu – Somalia

REF: NAMLC/001/24

Date: 13/04/2024

List of Financial Sanctions Targets

The National Anti-Money Laundering & Terrorist Financing Committee of NAMLC, in strict adherence to the provisions of Article 6 of the Targeted Financial Sanctions Act of 2023, has issued a national list of individuals suspected of financing Al-Shabaab terrorist group.

Name of the listed individuals

1. Abdullahi Tahleel Hirey
2. Hassan Ali Afgio
3. Abdulkarim Ahmed Jugjuge
4. Feisal Abdullahi Yusuf
5. Noah Isse Lugole
6. Sayed Ali Shirwa
7. Abdullahi Osman Mohamed (Tutah)
8. Abdullahi Hassan Abdi Osobleh
9. Mohamed Sahal Idleh

All reporting entities referred to in Article 4 of the Anti-Money Laundering & Terrorist Financing Act, all Somali citizens & individuals or other entities within Somalia:

1. Are prohibited to deal with the individuals on this list;

2. All reporting entities are obliged to freeze any property belonging or related to the individuals in this list;
3. All reporting entities are required to immediately send a suspicious transaction report on the activities of these individuals to the Financial Reporting Center (FRC).

Rights of Persons Listed by the Commission

Any person on this list who feels that he/she has been wrongly designated has a legal right to request a review of this designation from the Committee and an amendment. In this quest, they are to submit reasonable proof that he/she is not involved in financing terrorism and that the designation was a mistake.

If he is not satisfied with the committee's response to the complaint, he can appeal this decision to the country's Supreme Court in accordance with Article 9 of the Targeted Financial Sanctions Act of 2023. The Court's decision in this regard will be final.

Annex 11: Federal Republic of Somalia - The National Anti-money laundering And Counter Terrorism Financing Committee List of Financial Sanctions Targets dated 18 July 2024



Federal Republic of Somalia

The National Anti-money laundering And Countering the Financing of Terrorism Committee (NAMLC)

Mogadishu – Somalia

REF: NAMLC/002/24

Date: 18/07/2024

List of Financial Sanctions Targets

The National Anti-Money Laundering & Countering the Financing of Terrorism Committee NAMLC, in strict adherence to the provisions of Article 6 of the Targeted Financial Sanctions Act of 2023, has issued a national sanction list of individuals of Al-Shabaab terrorist group.

All reporting entities referred to in Article 4 of the Anti-Money Laundering & Terrorist Financing Act, all Somali citizens & individuals or other entities within Somalia:

1. Are prohibited to deal with the individuals on this list;
2. All reporting entities are obliged to freeze any property belonging or related to the individuals in this list;

1 | Page

National Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Committee (NAMLC)
Mogadishu-Somalia

3. All reporting entities are required to immediately send a suspicious transaction report on the activities of these individuals to the Financial Reporting Center (FRC).

Rights of Persons Listed by the Commission

Any person on this list who feels that he/she has been wrongly designated has a legal right to request a review of this designation from the Committee and an amendment. In this quest, they are to submit reasonable proof that he/she is not involved in financing terrorism and that the designation was a mistake.

If he is not satisfied with the committee's response to the complaint, he can appeal this decision to the country's Supreme Court in accordance with Article 9 of the Targeted Financial Sanctions Act of 2023. The Court's decision in this regard will be final.

National Sanction list of individuals of Al-Shabaab Terrorist Group.

No	Name	AKA	Role	Clan	Age	Comments
1.	Abukar Ali Adan (Abuukar Cali Aadan)	Abdullahi large beard (Cabdullaahi Garweyne)	Deputy of the AS leader	Gaaljeceel, Abtisame	55-60	He has a major role in planning and coordinating activities related to the AS armed wing.
2.	Mohamed Mire Jama (Maxamed Mire Jaamac)	Mire	Governor of the regions	Majeerteen, Idigfacle	59-62	He leads, coordinates and directs the leaders of the regions for the AS.

2 | Page

National Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Committee (NAMLC)
Mogadishu-Somalia

3.	Hassan Yakub Ali Bari (Xasan Yacquub Cali Bari)	Khawlajaan, Abu Abbaas	Leader of the Council of Shura.	Leesaan, Bari	55-60	He influences the direction of the group's general strategy and the decisions made by the Shura council.
4.	Mahad Abdirahman Warsame	Karatay, Qaley, Abu Abdirahman	Deputy AS leader	Habargidir, Cayr	60-63	He leads security, finance and information functions of the AS.
5.	Yusuf Ahmed Haji Nunow (Yuusuf Axmed Xaaji Nuunow)	Geescadde, Bishaar	Head of the security branch	Yantaar, Mad-dheerow	45	He is responsible for planning, supervising, and executing security operations, as well as bombings and assassinations for the AS.
6.	Abdikarim Osman Jilaow (Cabdikariin Cismaan Jilacow)	Mustaf Caato (Mustaf skinny)	Head of regional security branch	Hawaadle, Cabdalle	40-45	He leads the security, bombings and assassinations in the regions for the AS.
7.	Nur Abdi Roble (Nuur Cabdi Rooble)	Nuunuule	Head of the AS in Mudug	Duduble	35-40	He is the leader of the AS militia in the Mudug region. He is central to the group's battles in the country's central regions.
8.	Bakar Bashe Adan Ahmed (Bakar Baashe Aadan Axmed)	Shariif	Head of the zakawaat	Asharaaf	45-50	He is responsible for collecting extortions from merchants in the Bay & Bakool regions.

Wabillaahi towfiq

For more Information Contact

National Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Committee (NAMLC)

E-mail: info@namlc.gov.so

3 | Page

National Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Committee (NAMLC)

www.namlc.gov.so

Mogadishu Somalia

Annex 12: Finance

(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)

Annex 13: Arms seizure by AS from ATMIS and SNA base overruns

Diversion of contingent owned equipment from ATMIS troop contributing countries and the Somali National Army is a key source of resupply for Al-Shabaab, enabling the group to maintain its operations in Somalia.

This annex includes footage released by Al-Shabaab's Al-Kata'ib media channel which often accompanies the groups fighters into battle to document attacks conducted against ATMIS and SNA forces in Somalia. This footage frequently includes footage of the weapons, ammunition and military equipment looted from the SNA base overruns. (Source: Site Intelligence Group)

The materiel seized by Al-Shabaab includes:

- **Weapons:** AK-pattern assault rifles, PKM-pattern light machine guns, SVD-pattern sniper rifles, under-barrel grenade launchers, RPG-7 rocket propelled grenade launchers, mortar tubes
- **Ammunition:** 7.62x39mm, 7.62x54R, 12.7x108mm, 40mm PG-7 rockets, 40mm under-barrel grenades
- **Contingent-owned equipment:** Boots, uniforms, radios, cellphones, generators, ammunition packs and personal protection equipment.

Annex 13 – Appendix A: 22 July 2024 Al-Shabaab successful base overrun of three SNA bases, Jubaland

Al-Kata'ib, Al-Shabaab's news channel published a four-minute video of the group's 22 July 2024 attack on SNA bases in Bulo Haji, Harbole, and Mido in Jubaland. Screenshots of the video are included below.

Source: Site Intelligence Group https://sitemultimedia.org/video/SITE_Shabaab_KNC_Harbole_Raid_220724.mp4



Annex 13 – Appendix B: 10 July 2024 Al-Shabaab ambush of a SNA military convoy outside Buul Haji, Jubaland reportedly killing 31 soldiers

Source: Site Intelligence Group



AMBUSH AGAINST APOSTATE MILITIA | BUULOXAAJI - THE ISLAMIC WILAAYAH OF LOWER JUBBA | 10 - JULY- 2024



AMBUSH AGAINST APOSTATE MILITIA | BUULOXAAJI - THE ISLAMIC WILAAYAH OF LOWER JUBBA | 10 - JULY- 2024



نصب كمين لرتل مليشيات الردة | «بولوحاجي» - ولاية جوبا السفلى الإسلامية | 04 - محرم - 1446هـ
AMBUSH AGAINST APOSTATE MILITIA | BUULOXAAJI - THE ISLAMIC WILAAYAH OF LOWER JUBBA | 10 - JULY- 2024



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AMBUSH AGAINST APOSTATE MILITIA | BUULOXAAJI - THE ISLAMIC WILAAAYAH OF LOWER JUBBA | 10 - JULY - 2024



AMBUSH AGAINST APOSTATE MILITIA | BUULOXAAJI - THE ISLAMIC WILAAAYAH OF LOWER JUBBA | 10 - JULY - 2024



Annex 13 – Appendix C: 15 July 2024 Al-Shabaab counterattack on SNA forces in Waninle, outskirts of El Dheer, in Galguguud, allegedly killing 27 personnel and wounding 38 others

Source of six images: Site Intelligence Group





نصب كمين للمليشيات الصومالية المرتدة | «ونيللي» - ولاية «جلجدود» الإسلامية | 9 - محرم - 1446هـ
AMBUSH AGAINST THE APOSTATE SOMALI MILITIA | WANINLE – ISLAMIC WILAAAYAH OF GALGADUUD | 15-JULY - 2024



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AMBUSH AGAINST THE APOSTATE SOMALI MILITIA | WANINLE - ISLAMIC WILAAAYAH OF GALGADUUD | 15- JULY - 2024

Annex 14: ATMIS drawdown and transition into AUSSOM: drawing on lessons learned to mitigate base overruns

Al-Shabaab's ability to capture weapons, ammunition and military equipment from ATMIS and SNA forward operating bases (FOBs) continues to serve as a key source of resupply for the group. The Panel has previously documented successful base overruns and theft by Al-Shabaab of a range of ATMIS contingent-owned military equipment as well as SNA military assets that have subsequently been used by the group in attacks against international forces and Somali security forces.

Large calibre ammunition rounds including mortars and rocket artillery have frequently been repurposed as IEDs by Al-Shabaab who often use the harvested military-grade high-explosive in combination with home-made explosives to increase the blast impact and lethal effect of their devices.

Mitigating these base overruns will require a comprehensive strategic risk analysis and an improved understanding of Al-Shabaab modus operandi to ensure countermeasures are put in place to reduce the risk of future diversion, particularly in light of the ongoing ATMIS drawdown and transition to AUSSOM. ATMIS and SNA troops manning forward operating bases will need to enhance their ISR capabilities by increasing situational awareness and cultivating local intelligence to thwart potential attacks. Combat engineers embedded within the FOBs as well as Company Commanders need to ensure that mitigation measures such as digging trenches, to counter VBIED attacks; strategic positioning of weapons and ammunition assets around the camp to prevent base overruns; and establishing retreat and fallback positions within the bases in the event of major attacks, are established without delay or graft in order to prevent further loss of life, morale and military assets.

As the ATMIS drawdown continues, some FOBs become increasingly isolated which increases lead times for resupply and reach-back support. Floods and difficult road conditions as well as the presence of roadside IEDs further complicate ground access, lengthening response times of quick-reaction or logistical support teams in the event of an attack. In the current reporting period, the Panel notes Somalia's acquisition of five Italian supplied Bell412XEP multi-role helicopters within the SSF air fleet in order to provide close air support as well as troop transport, surveillance, resupply, MEDEVAC and CASEVAC services. While this is a welcome development, sustaining this aerial capacity given limited financial resources and high maintenance costs has also been identified as a challenge to the Panel by certain troop contributing countries (TCCs).

Analysis of several SNA and ATMIS positions that came under attack reveals that they are technically more similar to 'harbour positions' than a full -fledged FOB. Often there are minimal protections, no HESCO or proper defences such as trenches to thwart vehicle borne IED attacks. In several instances there are no hard structures or explosive storehouses or armouries on the base with minimal facilities and supplies for the troops manning the base. The SNA often extended well beyond lines of support without adequate protection or protected locations from which to launch patrols or conduct surveillance. In the event of an attack, the bases were too far to receive support. A frequently used modus operandi of Al-Shabaab is to conduct mortar attacks on any nearby bases to prevent them from supporting fellow allies under fire.⁷

⁷ Multiple confidential interviews with military experts, combat engineers, SNA, AMISOM and ATMIS personnel.

Annex 15: Helicopter deliveries to Somalia

The Panel notes the presence of five Agusta-Bell412EPX multi-role helicopters within the SAF air fleet. The twin-engine Bell412EPX helicopter can provide close air support as well as troop transport, surveillance, resupply, MEDEVAC and CASEVAC services as well as combat search and rescue and support roles for the civilian population.

Two helicopters were delivered by Italy in July 2024 with another three delivered in August 2024. The groundcrew has reportedly received training in Turkey.

Image 1: Four Agusta-Bell412EXP helicopters stand by on the tarmac in Aden Ade International Airport, Mogadishu, Somalia. August 2024.

Source: <https://www.military.africa/2024/08/italy-supplies-helicopters-to-somalia/>





Image 2 and 3: The first two Agusta-Bell412EXP helicopters in Somalia prior to conducting a demonstration flight in Mogadishu to mark Somalia's Independence Day on 1 July 2024.

Source: https://x.com/abdi_guled/status/1808283338521940341?s=46&t=e-ncYmXy7wtDdgQ0NQ7ZKQ

Annex 16: The ATMIS-GFRS SOP on Recovered Weapons, Ammunition and Associated Material and other WAM SOPs

Annex 16 - Appendix A: Operationalising the harmonized ATMIS-GFRS SOP on Recovered Weapons, Ammunition and Associated Materiel



**HARMONIZED FGS / ATMIS
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE
ON RECOVERED WEAPONS, AMMUNITION AND ASSOCIATED MATERIEL**

Version Reference 2.0

Approved by

Approval date

Effective date

Contact

FGS: ONS WAM NFP

ATMIS: CHIEF OF OPERATIONS

Review date

Reviewed; May 2023

**HARMONIZED FGS / ATMIS STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE ON RECOVERED
WEAPONS, AMMUNITION AND ASSOCIATED MATERIEL**

Table of Contents

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS	4
TERMS AND DEFINITIONS	6
REFERENCES	8
1. INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND	9
2. PURPOSE	10
3. SCOPE	10
4. APPLICATION	10
5. RATIONALE	10
6. PRINCIPLES	11
7. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES	12
8. PROCEDURES	13
A. ACTIONS ON SEIZURE OR RECOVERY OF WEAPONS, AMMUNITION AND ASSOCIATED MATERIEL BY ATMIS DURING THE COURSE OF OPERATIONS:	13
B. RECORD KEEPING	15
C. STORAGE AND SECURITY	15
D. TRANSPORT	17
E. DISPOSAL	17
9. COMPLIANCE, MONITORING AND ACCOUNTABILITY	18
ANNEX 1 – INVENTORY REPORT	21
ANNEX 2 – GUIDELINES FOR THE DOCUMENTATION OF WEAPONS, AMMUNITION AND ASSOCIATED MATERIEL BY ATMIS PERSONNEL	23

Annex 16 – Appendix B: List of relevant WAM SOPs in Somalia

These nine WAM SOPs have been tailored to the specific needs of Somali security forces while aligning with international best practices on weapons and ammunition management including the Modular Small Arms Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC) and International Ammunition Training Guidelines (IATGs).

Implementing these existing SOPs and regularly disseminating them to operational level Ammunition Technical Officers and armourers in Mogadishu and the FMS would positively impact weapons and ammunition management capabilities in the country, preventing diversion, unintentional munitions explosions and facilitate the safe and secure destruction or disposal of surplus ammunition and unserviceable weapons.

SOP 1: General Armoury Procedures

SOP 2: Armoury Procedures for Weapons

SOP 3: Armoury Procedures for Ammunition & Explosive

SOP 4: Accounting

SOP 5: Marking

SOP 6: Destruction of Weapons and Ammunition

SOP 7: Transportation of Weapons and Ammunition

SOP 8: Reception and Documentation at Halane

SOP 9: Management of Captured Weapons

Source: GFRS Office of National Security, Central Monitoring Division, and Joint Verification Team.

Annex 17: Panel investigations and tracing of weapons, ammunition and related components used by Al-Shabaab**Panel access to trace captured weapons**

In line with paragraphs 5 and 6 of Security Council resolution 2713 (2023), following on from paragraph 9 of resolution 2662 (2022),¹ the GFRS has been requested to facilitate access for the Panel to document, analyse and trace recovered weapons, ammunition or related materiel seized from areas liberated by the renewed campaign against Al-Shabaab by Somali security forces, clan militias and ATMIS as well as recovered from Al-Shabaab attacks or defectors. The Panel has also previously requested access¹ to inspect weapons, ammunition and military materiel captured or seized through raids in all major cities and ports of entry, including Mogadishu, in order to more effectively identify and trace illicit supply networks.

Annex 17 – Appendix A: Inspection and tracing of weapons captured from Al-Shabaab, Bar Sanguni, Jubaland

During the current reporting period, the Office of National Security of the GRFS and the Jubaland state authorities facilitated an inspection by the Panel of one weapon that was captured from Al-Shabaab by the Somali National Army during the 19 April 2024 clashes in Bar Sanguni base (located outside of Kismayo in Jubaland). The Panel also documented an additional four weapons presented to the Panel as having been procured from illicit markets in and around Kismayo. In Puntland, the Panel was provided details of three intercepted AK pattern assault rifles seized in Geesaley, Bari region of Puntland in February 2024.

The Panel is currently in the process of tracing these eight weapons, on the basis of their markings and technical characteristics.


The inspected weapons included:

1. One AK pattern rifle captured from Al-Shabaab on 19 April 2024 in Bar Sanguni, Jubaland, Somalia (image 1,2,3):

One AK-pattern rifle with technical characteristics and factory markings similar to a Type 56-1 AK pattern rifle chambered for 7.62x39mm ammunition and manufactured in 2019 with Factory 26 production mark followed by weapon markings CN-19 Type 56-1 64050906.

Source of images 1, 2 and 3: Panel





Annex 17 – Appendix B: Inspection and tracing of weapons sourced from illicit markets, Bar Sanguni, Jubaland

The four AK-pattern assault rifles presented to the Panel as having been procured from illicit or unregulated black markets in Jubaland included:


1. One AK-pattern rifle with technical characteristics and factory markings similar to an original AK-47 rifle chambered for 7.62x39mm ammunition and manufactured in 1951 with markings 1951Г СФ1515.

Source of images 1, 2 and 3: Panel



2. One AK-pattern rifle with technical characteristics and factory markings similar to a AKM pattern rifle chambered for 7.62x39mm ammunition and manufactured in 1962 with markings Δ 1962 ИС 8000.

Source of images 1, 2 and 3: Panel



3. One AK-pattern rifle with technical characteristics and factory markings similar to an AKM pattern rifle chambered for 7.62x39mm ammunition and manufactured in 1974 with markings \triangle 1974 77.

Source of images 1, 2 and 3: Panel



4. One AK-pattern rifle with technical characteristics and factory markings similar to a Type 56 AK pattern rifle chambered for 7.62x39mm ammunition with markings 56 型 (Type) and serial number 40465.

Images 1, 2, 3 Source: Panel



Annex 17 – Appendix C: Inspection and tracing of weapons captured by Puntland security forces

The three AK-pattern assault rifles allegedly captured by Puntland security forces in Gar Saleel in February 2024 included:

1. One AK-pattern rifle with technical characteristics and factory markings similar to an AK pattern rifle chambered for 7.62x39mm ammunition and manufactured in 1980 with weapon markings

G △1980 S-A62247.

Source of image 1: confidential



2. One AK-pattern rifle with technical characteristics and factory markings similar to an AKM rifle chambered for 7.62x39mm ammunition and manufactured in 1974 with weapon markings Δ 1974 491826 on the receiver and 10 1826 on the chamber.

Source of image 2: confidential



3. One AK-pattern rifle with technical characteristics and factory markings similar to an AKM rifle chambered for 7.62x39mm ammunition and manufactured in 1974 with factory markings \star 1974 512357 on the receiver and matching numbers 51 2317 on the chamber.

Source of image 3: confidential



Annex 17- Appendix D: Summary of weapons serial numbers captured from Al-Shabaab in Bulo Haaji, Kismayo in July 2024

date of documentation	location of documentation	date of seizure	seized by unit	city town village of seizure	seized from whom	circumstances of seizure	serial number	weapon type ID (verified)	calibre	year of manufacture
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	66042923	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2021
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	66041902	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2021
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	64054555	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2019
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	64049222	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2019
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	64043430	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2019
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	64054190	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2019
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	64046147	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2019
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	64007204	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2019
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	62111961	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2019
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	64036939	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2019
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	63014674	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2018
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	63014887	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2018
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	62126926	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2017
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	62138516	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2017
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	62109301	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2017
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	62163849	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2017
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	61041106	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2016
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	61085143	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2016
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	60013516	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2015
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	3333189	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	407294	Type 56-2	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	5223531	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	3660110	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	11040388	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	36000168	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	4863155	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	17093971	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	5232351	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	64054163	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	400???	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	61113840	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	67081668	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	51106012	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	62174652	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	64050375	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	67081434	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	60043298	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	64012266	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	63007472	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	14180414	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	62122402	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	60054705	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	308400	RPG Type 69	40 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	1601984	RPG Type 69-1	40 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	907041	RPG Type 69-1	40 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	17-CN 51163	M80 LMG	7.62 x 54R mm	2017
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	EM1702721	AKMS	7.62 x 39 mm	

Source: GFRS ONS/CMD

Overview of captured weapons data:

- **Date of documentation:** 29 July 2024
- **Date of seizure:** 22 July 2024
- **Location:** Bulo Haji Buulo Xaaji
- **Seized by:** Jubaland Darwish Forces
- **Seized from:** Al-Shabaab
- **Total number of weapons:** 47
- **Year of manufacture:** 2015 to 2021
- **Type of weapons:**
 - o 44 Assault Rifles (7.62x39mm), including 43 AK Type 56-1 and 1 AKMS
 - o 02 Rocket Propelled Grenades (40mm PG7), Type 69-1
 - o 01 Medium Machine Gun (7.62x54R), type M80 MMG

NB: The Panel is currently in the process of tracing these weapons.

Annex 18: Al-Shabaab Weapons Markings Analysis

Annex 18 – Appendix A: Al-Shabaab weapon markings, Bulo Haaji, Jubaland, July 2024

Image 1: This likely Type 56-2 AK-pattern assault rifle chambered for 7.62x39mm ammunition was seized from Al-Shabaab fighters by Somali National Army in Bulo Haaji, Jubaland in August 2024. In addition to the weapon serial number 6604192, the weapon contains a sticker on the rear dust cover (contents unverified), as well as a weapons mark associated with the Yemeni Armed Forces stockpiles. Additional markings indicate that the likely Type56-2 weapon was manufactured in 2021 and likely sourced from Yemeni Armed Forces stockpiles diverted to Al-Shabaab. The weapon is currently in the process of being traced.

Source: GFRS and Jubaland authorities



Image 2: Close-up of Yemen Armed Forces marking on the same assault rifle pictured above:



Source: GFRS and Jubaland authorities.

Annex 18 - Appendix B: Al-Shabaab weapons markings, Bullo Haaji, Jubaland, July 2024

Image 1: Al-Shabaab weapons marks on AK Type56-2-pattern rifles. The alphanumeric markings are made by various means including a dot-peen percussion marking machine. In this case, XSH37243 the mark begins with the letters XSH followed by a 5- digit numerical sequence. According to some analysts, XSH represents the Somali-language version of Al Shabaab (Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen).

The weapon was seized from Al-Shabaab fighters by Somali National Army and Jubaland Darwish Forces in Bullo Haaji, Jubaland in July 2024.

Source: GFRS/ Jubaland Darwish Forces



Annex 18 – Appendix C: A list of Al-Shabaab marked weapons captured by ATMIS

These Al-Shabaab marking, and weapon serial numbers represent a sample of AK-pattern rifles seized from Al-Shabaab fighters by ATMIS forces from 2021 to 2024 (source: ATMIS).

1. XSH-43361 (15003386)
2. XSH-43359 (60013158)
3. XSH-43354 (15005828)
4. XSH-14058 (56352602)

XSH and the five-digit number represent a sample of Al-Shabaab post-production marking sequences, while the number in the bracket represents the original production serial number on the weapon.

Annex 19: Monitoring Al-Shabaab indirect fire attacks

Annex 19 – Appendix A: Summary of Al-Shabaab 107mm rocket in Mogadishu and Baidoa, Somalia

A summary of eleven Al-Shabaab 107mm rocket attacks in Mogadishu and Baidoa from 2022, 2023 and in the period from 15 August 2023 to 1 September 2024 are outlined below.

Since submitting its 2023 final report, the Panel has recorded eight additional 107mm rocket attacks conducted by Al Shabab on 19 August 2023, 1 October 2023, 27 December 2023, 30 January 2024, 4 May 2024 in Mogadishu and 28 February 2024, 20 August 2024, 01 September 2024 in Baidoa, South-West State.

9 June 2022

- Al-Shabaab launched seven 107 mm rockets against Villa Somalia.⁸

25 June 2023 and 4 July 2023

- Al-Shabaab used 107 mm rocket variants to conduct two significant attacks in Mogadishu against the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) compound in the Aden Adde International Airport (AAIA) protected area and Villa Somalia on 25 June 2023 and 4 July 2023, respectively.⁹

19 August 2023

- Five 107mm rockets impacted the airport compound in Mogadishu near several UN offices and an embassy. Two additional 107mm rockets were confirmed by ATMIS and SPF teams outside the AAIA area in Mogadishu.



Image 1: 107mm rocket used in Al-Shabaab attack on 19 August 2023 in Mogadishu. (Source: confidential)

⁸ See Panel's report S/2022/754, para. 84.

⁹ See Panel's report 2022 and 2023 final reports accessible online at S/2022/754, para. 84., S/2023/724, para 28 and S/2023/724, annex 5.

1 October 2023

- Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the 1 October 2023 attack where multiple 107mm projectiles were launched at several international targets on the same day in Mogadishu.



Image 2: 107mm rocket used in Al-Shabaab attack on 1 October 2023 in Mogadishu. (Source: confidential.)

30 January 2024

- Four 107mm rockets were fired towards Aden Abdulle International Airport (AAIA) in Mogadishu making impact at 0018hrs. One rocket landed on the airport apron, close to the runway where Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) search teams cleared the area and confirmed there were no casualties. Three other 107mm rockets landed in the Waberi District of Mogadishu where one rocket started a fire that was extinguished by the fire service, indicating a high likelihood of the rocket being equipped with an incendiary warhead, consistent with the 19.85 KG markings observed on the rocket body¹⁰.

¹⁰ Markings on Iranian Fajr-1 or Haseb-1 Type 63 rockets typically indicate the weight of the rocket. Rockets weighing 18.4 kilos typically denote High Explosive (HE) warheads while rockets weighing 19.85 kilos (similar to those in the images from the Mogadishu attacks) represent High-Explosive Incendiary Warheads (HEI).

27 December 2023 and 4 May 2024

- The 107mm rockets used in both the 27 December 2023 and 4 May 2024 attacks resulted in rockets that failed to launch and were documented at their Point of Origin prior to disposal by EOD teams.



Image 3 and 4: 107mm rockets used in Al-Shabaab attack on 4 May 2023 in Mogadishu that failed to initiate. (Source: confidential).

28 February 2024, Baidoa

- Two 107mm rounds fired with point of impact in or in the vicinity of SNA base.

20 August 2024, Baidoa

- Four 107mm rockets fired at UN and ATMIS compounds.

01 September 2024, Baidoa

- Six 107mm rockets fired; five rockets with confirmed point of impact, one rocket made impact outside the safe zone, detected by sense and warm system.

All 107mm rockets used by Al-Shabaab in Baidoa functioned on impact resulting in limited imagery of the weapons.

Analysis of 107mm rocket attacks by Al-Shabaab in Somalia

Despite slight variations in the colour of the 107mm rockets, the lot number 1100 and other identifying markings in all five attacks since 15 August 2023 are consistent with 107mm rockets documented in all previous 107mm incidents in 2023. The method of establishing the rocket trajectory using sandbags for elevation as well as using the electric charge from a cell phone to initiate the propellant in the rocket motor are also consistent with all previously documented 107mm attacks.

As previously reported in 2023,¹¹ remnants of the 107 mm rockets recovered from these attacks in the current reporting period by EOD teams all bore the markings “Lot 1100, NW 19.85 KG”, and exhibited characteristics similar to 107 mm Fajr-1 High-Explosive Incendiary Warheads (HEI) variants known to be stockpiled in ATMIS forward operating bases, including those overrun by Al Shabab as outlined in the Panel’s 2023 final report¹².

Source: confidential source and additional information in 2023 final report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia [S/2023/724](#), [Annex 5](#).

¹¹ Confidential source.

¹² See Panel’s 2022 and 2023 final reports accessible online at [S/2022/754](#), para. 84., [S/2023/724](#), para 28 and [S/2023/724](#), annex 5.

Annex 19 – Appendix B: Al-Shabaab uses B-10 High-Explosive Anti-Tank recoilless rifle to attack UN and ATMIS in Baidoa, Somalia, 13 June 2024

Incident Report: On 13 June 2024, Al-Shabaab attacked the ATMIS and UN protected compounds in Baidoa with multiple 82mm High-Explosive anti-tank warheads using B-10 recoilless anti-tank weapons¹³.

Image 1: Stock image of B-10 High-Explosive Anti-Tank recoilless rifle



Technical Information: B-10 High-Explosive Anti-Tank recoilless rifle

Calibre 82 mm

Length 1,445 mm

Weight (unloaded)

Without tripod: 33 kg With tripod: 41 kg

sighting systems: optical and open sights

Recoilless, multi-vent breech

Muzzle velocity 200–252 m/s

The B-10 is primarily an anti-armour weapon that delivers an 82 mm high-explosive anti-tank warhead to ranges exceeding 2,500 m. The weapon can also fire high-explosive ammunition for use against lightly armoured vehicles, infrastructure, and personnel. The weapon's distinct, bulbous breech (rear end) is arguably its most distinctive identifying feature.

Source: https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/SAS_weapons-recoilless-guns-B10.pdf

¹³ Confidential source.

Annex 19 – Appendix C: Land Attack Cruise Missile (LACM) impact in Sool region, northern Somalia

Incident: Possible LACM impact, Taleex district, Sool, northern Somalia; 3 May 2024


Technical characteristics: The Quds-2 LACM is an upgraded version of the Quds-1 LACM, featuring enhanced speed and a range of up to 1,350 kilometers (840 miles). According to some analysts, Quds-2 LACM missiles are modified versions of a Soumar cruise missile, which in turn is based on the Soviet-era Kh-55 missile.



Image 1, 2, 3: rocket fuselage, winglet and rocket motor.

Source: Twitter/ X:
https://x.com/AAGA_CAWLAN101/status/178632288452628514 and confidential source.

Image 2: Map with location of LACM point of impact in Sool, northern Somalia. (Source: Confidential)




Map Source: Based on United Nations map, 01 March 2012

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Image 3 and 4: Quds-2 LACM engine with serial number “10029399”


Source : https://twitter.com/AAGA_CAWLAN101/status/1786324082838884725



Comparison with previously documented Quds-2 LACM jet engine

Eight digits serial number “10029400” documented on the jet engine of the Quds-2 LACM launched by the Houthis on 17 January 2022 against the ADNOC fuel depot, Abu Dhabi, UAE. This serial number differs only by one digit to the one documented in Somalia “10029399” (see image 3 and 4 above).

Image 5: Quds-2 LACM engine serial number **Source**: Panel of Experts on Yemen 2023 final report [S/2023/130](#), figure 5.18



Annex 20: Cross-border arms trafficking: a regional perspective

Challenges in Controlling Illicit Trafficking

The Panel continues to monitor the black-market sale of weapons and ammunition within Somalia and through regional markets. Ongoing regional conflict in Yemen continues to contribute to the flow of illicit arms into Somalia, complicating efforts to control trafficking. The Panel notes the presence of weapons with markings consistent with ‘Sep21’ Houthi identification marks in Somalia confirming the continued presence of a weapons supply pipeline between Yemen and Somalia. The Panel also confirms the presence of weapons in Somalia commonly available on the illicit market in Yemen (images 3 to 12 below).

These findings highlight the complex challenges of controlling the flow of illicit arms and underscore the need for continued vigilance by Somali and international stakeholders. The presence of such weapons in Somalia represents a significant threat to regional stability and security, necessitating coordinated efforts to disrupt these illicit supply chains.

Image 1 and 2: Houthi Sep21 post-production weapons identification mark (21SEP in a double circle) on a Type56-2 AK-pattern assault rifle

Source: Conflict Armament Research



Image 3: Close-up of Yemeni Armed Forces post-production weapons mark

The Panel confirms weapons with Yemeni Armed Forces markings among weapons offered for sale in illicit markets in Somalia as well as in caches captured from Al-Shabaab.

Source: Conflict Armament Research



Image 4, 5 and 6: G3 pattern assault rifle with Almarenz markings documented in Las Anood. These G3 rifles are often modified with shortened barrels and retractable stocks.

Calibre: 7.62x51mm

Source: Conflict Armament Research



Image 7: Steyr AUG 1 pattern assault rifle documented in Bossaso, Puntland

Calibre: 5.56x45mm

Source: Conflict Armament Research



Image 8, 9, 10 and 11: Taurus pistol documented in Mogadishu

Caibre: 9x19mm

Source: Conflict Armament Research



Annex 21: Cross-Border Attacks and Weapons Seizures

Annex 21 – Appendix A: Materiel seized from Al-Shabaab forces in cross-border attacks into Kenya

Location: Banisa Sub-Country, Mandera along the Kenya-Somalia border, 13 July 2024

Materiel seized by Kenyan security forces from Al-Shabaab fighters included a Type 69 RPG-7 launcher and four PG-7 warheads, a PKM-pattern light machine gun, three AK-pattern assault rifles with 11 magazines and 7.62x39mm ammunition, four 9mm pistols with five magazines and 9mm ammunition.

Source: <https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2024-07-13-kenyan-forces-kill-four-terrorists-deal-major-blow-to-al-shabaab-in-border-operation/> and multiple confidential sources









Annex 21 - Appendix B: Arms Seizure in Abudwak, Galmudug on 15 July 2024

(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)

Annex 22: Armed group access to UAVs: August 2024 FPV UAV intercept in Galkayo by Puntland authorities

Image 1: One of five FPV UAVs reportedly intercepted in Galkayo in August 2024, Source: [Radio Dalsan](#)

Al-Shabaab is also seeking to develop new capabilities, which reportedly includes the use of weaponized uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs). Commercial UAVs have been documented in Somalia and have been used by Al-Shabaab in the past to carry out surveillance. An increase in UAV sightings has been recorded in the current reporting period¹⁴. These capabilities exist within Al-Shabaab and do not require or necessarily indicate technology transfer from other armed groups, including the Houthis.

In a potentially significant development on 26 August 2024, Puntland authorities reportedly intercepted five first-person-view (FPV) UAVs together with a cache of explosives¹⁵. The UAVs and explosives, hidden in speakers, were intercepted in a convoy in Galkayo¹⁶ and seven people were detained. The availability of UAVs, even if not weaponized, represents a threat multiplier as they may be used for surveillance, target identification, and potentially facilitating future attacks.

While any risk of an immediate attack has been successfully mitigated in this incident, initial information indicates that the intercepted UAVs are FPV-type UAVs which, seized together with a cache of explosives, may signify a greater security threat that warrants further investigation. No FPV goggles were declared in the intercept.

FPV-UAVs are significantly more difficult to fly compared to more commonly available commercially available UAVs which would be better suited to carry out surveillance flights, target acquisition or filming propaganda footage. FPV-UAVs are either purpose-built using off-the-shelf components or available as kits. FPV-UAV components are often pared down to save weight and increase the UAV's payload-carrying capacity. FPV-pattern UAVs, including larger winged models, have been customized to carry explosive charges and used to serve as 'one-way attack' or 'suicide' UAVs in ongoing conflicts such as in Syria and Ukraine. While this is an ongoing investigation and there is no confirmation of weaponised UAV-use

¹⁴ Confidential sources.

¹⁵ PPuntland Intercepts Kamikaze Drones from Yemen Intended for Al-Shabaab, PHorn Observer, 27 August 2024, <https://hornobserver.com/articles/2928/Puntland-Intercepts-Kamikaze-Drones-from-Yemen-Intended-for-Al-Shabaab>


¹⁶ PPuntland Seizes Suicide Drones, Arrests Seven Suspects in Major Security Operation, P Radio Dalsan, 27 August 2024, <https://www.radiodalsan.com/puntland-seizes-suicide-drones-arrests-seven-suspects-in-major-security-operation/>

by non-state armed groups in Somalia, the increasing availability of technology and frequency of FPV-UAV use in nearby conflicts requires this potential threat to be closely monitored.

Annex 23: IED likely produced by ISIL-Somalia in Puntland

On 20 November 2023, a Puntland EOD team conducted a render-safe procedure on an IED. The remote-control device utilized a mobile telephone as a switch and had been emplaced to impact the employees of Bulsho Company in Bosaso, Bari region, Puntland.


Image 1: IED likely produced by ISIL-Somalia in Puntland



Source: “Sirdoonka Puntland oo Fashiliyay Qarax Miino oo Lagu Diyaariyay Boosaaso,” Puntland Post, 20 November 2023, <<https://puntlandpost.net/2023/11/20/sirdoonka-puntland-oo-fashiliyay-qarax-miino-oo-lagu-diyaariyay-boosaaso/>>


Annex 24: Analysis of Al-Shabaab Improvised Explosive Devices

Annex 24 – Appendix A: Chemical analysis of Al-Shabaab home-made explosive sample



Images 1 and 2, source: confidential source and Panel

In its 2020 and 2021 final reports (S/2021/849 and S/2020/949), the Panel reported on Al-Shabaab's ability to manufacture its own explosives including nitroglycerine. In the current reporting period, the Panel was able to conduct chemical analysis of a limited sample of home-made explosives (HME) extracted from Al-Shabaab manufactured IEDs. The chemical analysis confirmed the HME main charge was mainly nitroglycerine, a substance restricted under Annex C of resolution 2713 (2023). This analysis aligns with other examples of Al-Shabaab manufactured IEDs using nitroglycerine-based HME as the main charge and military grade explosive such as cyclotrimethylene trinitramine (RDX) as a booster charge (Source: Panel).



Annex 24 – Appendix B: Evolution of Al-Shabaab Improvised Explosive Device techniques, tactics and procedures

Image 1: IED produced by Al-Shabaab with additional waterproofing of key components to ensure functionality in heavy rains and flooding. Waterproofing is normally reserved for victim-operated devices that may have to lie dormant for longer periods of time.



Source: Confidential

Image 2 and 3: The Panel also takes note of signature IED assembly techniques such as adding copper wire coils to battery electrodes to ensure a more reliable connection to generate sufficient electrical charge to initiate the explosive device.

Source: Panel



Annex 24 – Appendix C: Continued availability of motorcycle alarms equipped with disturbance sensors in Somalia

The Panel has previously reported in its 2023 final report (S/2023/724) on specific risks that motorcycle alarms equipped with disturbance sensors pose to Somali and international EOD search teams. Despite the IED components restrictions outlined in Annex C of resolution 2713 (2023), long range learning code receivers and motorcycle alarms equipped with disturbance sensors, such as the one pictured here in image 1-5 below, are still readily available in Somalia or easily sourced from neighbouring countries (source: Panel).



This motorcycle alarm was purchased from a well-known Kenyan supermarket chain, as evident by the close-up image of the purchase tag on the motorcycle alarm box, image 2 (below left).

Source: Panel.



The speaker unit, in image 3 (above right), that is a part of the motorcycle alarm kit is reportedly used by Al-Shabaab IED operatives to test the alarm and ensure the device is functioning (source: Panel).

The second motorcycle alarm (image 4, pictured below), equipped with a disturbance sensor as well as a remote key fob to arm the alarm, was purchased in a market in Somalia for \$16 (source: Panel).



Annex 24 – Appendix D: Examples of Al-Shabaab IED device switches

Image 1: Al-Shabaab manufactured IEDs using similar motorcycle alarm switches found during a seizure of weapons, ammunition and IED components by the SNA on 6 August 2024 at an undisclosed location.

Source: confidential



Image 2: Learning code receivers found during a seizure of weapons, ammunition and IED components by SNA on 26 July 2024 at an undisclosed location. Two killed Al-Shabaab operatives are pictured with an IED steel container, two Honest LCR fobs, Al-Shabaab ‘dynamite’ or home-made explosive, a motorcycle lead acid battery, a Kalashnikov pattern Type 56-2 assault rifle, two ammunition magazines and materiel to implant the IED including duct tape and wire.

Source: Confidential source (NB: image blurred due to graphic content).



Annex 25: Vessels loading and transporting charcoal from Kismayo

Three consignments of charcoal were loaded in Kismayo in June 2024.


Vessels were not transmitting AIS signal at all times. Both the *MSV Fazlerabbi* and *Al Salima* reached Dubai in early August 2024. The charcoal was offloaded at Hamriya Port in early September 2024.¹⁷

Table: Vessels loaded in Kismayo in June and July 2024 as part of the one-off charcoal sale.

Name of Vessel	Flag	MMSI Number	Date Enter Port	Date Left Port	Destination	Consigner	Consignee	Size Consignment - bags
<i>FAHAD 4</i> 0007178	UAE	470007178	2/06/2024	4/06/2024	Hamriya, Dubai, UAE	Waamo Trade and Logistics	Yasmin General Trading LLC	40000
<i>MSV FAZLERABBI</i> 2192	India	419956786	10/07/2024	25/07/2024	Dubai, UAE			
<i>AL SALIMA-MNV-2190</i>	India	419956503	10/07/2024	25/07/2024	Dubai, UAE			

Source: Panel¹⁸

Figure 1: AIS data *Fahad 4* on 18 June 2024.



Source: Data Source Maritime Intelligence Risk Suite¹⁹


Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Photo Source: *Fahad 4*: ONSFigure 2: AIS data *MSV Fazlerabbi* on 12 August 2024

¹⁷ Confidential source, 6 September 2024.

¹⁸ Information from ONS, UN and confidential source. All dates except for the date the *Fahad 4* left port are approximate from source reports and derived from AIS.

¹⁹ <https://maritime.ihs.com>



Source: Source: Data Source Maritime Intelligence Risk Suite

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Figure 3: AIS data Al Salima on 12 August 2024



Source: Data Source Maritime Intelligence Risk Suite

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 26: Changes in Charcoal Stockpiles in and around Kismayo

Satellite image 1: Location of Charcoal Stockpile Sites in and around Kismayo where changes were noted



UNITED NATIONS
Map No. 4690.1 (SEP 2024)

Office of Information and Communications Technology
Geospatial Information Section


Source: UN GIS²⁰

²⁰ Colour map available in <https://www.un.org/geospatial/mandates/securitycouncil>

Satellite image 2: Changes in Stockpiles at Kismayo Market – between 17 May and 7 July 2024

Charcoal stock at Kismayo Market (Area-1)

UN Panel of Experts
Established pursuant to Resolution 2713 (2023)



UNITED NATIONS
Map No. 4690.2 (SEP 2024)

Office of Information and Communications Technology
Geospatial Information Section

Source: UN


GIS²¹

Satellite image 3: Changes in Stockpiles in south Kismayo – between 17 May and 7 July 2024

²¹ Colour map available in <https://www.un.org/geospatial/mandates/securitycouncil>

Charcoal stock at south Kismayo (Area-2)

UN Panel of Experts
Established pursuant to Resolution 2713 (2023)



UNITED NATIONS
Map No. 4690.3 (SEP 2024)

Office of Information and Communications Technology
Geospatial Information Section

Source: UN GIS²²

²² Colour map available in <https://www.un.org/geospatial/mandates/securitycouncil>

Annex 27: Maritime weapon interdictions 16 August 2023 to 15 August 2024

Between 16 August 2023 and 15 August 2024 several maritime interdictions were noted by the Panel. The majority of interdictions were by Puntland authorities. The following table represent some of the interdictions:

Table 1: Maritime Weapons Interdictions - 16 August 2023 to 15 August 2024

Vessel	Date	Place	Authority Intercepted	Detail
Boat	22/10/2023	Bossaso Port	Puntland Police Force	Puntland police seized a vessel, carrying weapons and ammunition allegedly smuggled from Yemen. The weapons included AK-pattern rifles, PKM-pattern machine guns, and pistols. A suspect was arrested.
Boat	23/10/2023	Al Ghayzah, Al Mahrah, Yemen	Yemen Police Forces	Al Ghaydah police intercepted a shipment of 250 small weapons from Somali nationals.
<i>Yunus, Dhow</i>	11/01/2024	49 nm northwest of Socotra, Yemen	US	Intercepted en route to Somali coast. Cargo was intended for ship to ship transfer to Yemen. Weapons included components for MRBM and ASCM, and propulsion and guidance components. (annex 28). 14 suspects arrested.
Boat	7/02/2024	Raas-Casayr	PMPF	Seizure of a boat carrying weapons allegedly intended for pirates. 3 suspects arrested.
Boat	7/02/2024	Carmo	Puntland Police	Weapon seizure. 5 suspected allegedly members of Al-Shabaab arrested.
Boat	15/02/2024	Ash Shihr Al Mahra, Yemen	Yemeni authorities	Yemeni authorities arrested 6 suspects allegedly involved in arms smuggling from Al Mahrah to Berbera on the Somali coasts with links to individuals in Houthi-controlled area.
Boat	2/05/2024	Eyl	PMPF	Weapons seized and pirate suspects arrested in counter-piracy operation.
Boat	18/05/2024	Bossaso	PMPF	Weapons seizure. 4 suspects arrested.
None	4/08/2024	Bossaso	PMPF & PISA	Weapons seizure including anti-aircraft ammunition, PKM-pattern machine guns, AK-pattern rifles, TNT powder, hand grenades, and camouflage uniforms. 3 suspects arrested including 2 Yemenis.

Source: Panel²³

²³ Compiled from PMPF, USCENTCOM, media reports and confidential sources.

Annex 28: 11 January 2024 - USCENTCOM seizes dhow carrying missile components

On 10 January 2024, USCENTCOM Navy forces identified an unflagged dhow, since then identified as the Yanus, which was assessed to be in the process of smuggling.²⁴ On 11 January 2024, U.S. Navy SEALs operating from USS Lewis B. Puller boarded the unflagged dhow near the coast of Somalia, 49nm (90km) northwest of Socotra, Yemen in international waters, seizing ballistic and cruise missile components, including propulsion, guidance, and warheads for medium range ballistic missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles, as well as Pan, Tilt, Zoom (PTZ) high speed cameras

The January 2024 smuggling operation was the third in a larger operation starting in August 2023. The operation allegedly involved two Iranian brothers, who smuggle materials from Iran to the Houthi rebel forces in Yemen. The brothers also coordinated and funded the operations. The crew under the captain completed multiple smuggling voyages, by travelling with weapons from Iran to the coast of Somalia and transferring the weapons to another dhow for a ship-to-ship transfer.²⁵

Timeline

First Smuggling Operation:

- Between August 2023 and October 2023: In August 2023, One of the Iranian brothers paid the captain of the dhow approximately 100 million Iranian Rials from a bank account registered in his name. The captain arranged for hawaladars to engage in hawala services to receive payments from the brothers in Iran and distribute the money to his family and others. The captain and one of the brothers prepared the dhow, Yunus for smuggling operations. They also obtained and had new equipment installed on the dhow.
- 26 October 2023: The brothers paid the captain through hawala services around 800 million Iranian Rials from a bank account in brother A's name.
- 28 October 2023: The Captain left the area of Chabahar Bay, Iran on the dhow and headed for the coast of Somalia.
- 11 November 2023: The crew steered the dhow to a specific latitude and longitude off the coast of Somalia that was provided to him via satellite phone, where they conducted a ship-to-ship transfer of the cargo to another vessel.

Second Smuggling operation

- Between 23 November and 29 November 2023, the captain worked with the brothers in preparation of a second smuggling voyage.
- From 25 November 2023: The captain recruited crewmembers for the upcoming smuggling voyage.
- 26 November 2023, brother B paid the captain through hawala services approximately 300 million Iranian Riyals from a bank account in brother A's name.
- 28 November 2023: The crew sailed the dhow from Konarak, Iran to Chabahar Port, Iran, where multiple bags of cargo were loaded on the dhow.
- 29 November 2023: The dhow left for the coast of Somalia.
- 5 December 2023: The second ship-to-ship transfer was executed off the coast of Somalia.
- 25 December 2023: On return the Iranian authorities allegedly arrested the crew, upon which brother A went to the prison where the captain and the crew were detained and facilitated their release.


²⁴ PUSCENTCOM Seizes Iranian Advanced Conventional Weapons Bound for HouthisP, USCENTCOM, 16 January 2024, <https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3645241/uscentcom-seizes-iranian-advanced-conventional-weapons-bound-for-houthis/>

²⁵ U.S. Department of Justice, Mirkazei Superseding Indictment, July 2024, https://www.justice.gov/d9/2024-08/mirkazei_superseding_indictment.pdf.

Third Smuggling Operation

- 3 January 2024: Brother B paid the captain through hawala services. The captain arranged to transfer approximately 800 million Iranian Rials through hawaladars to the families of his crew and to his own family. Brother B informed the captain that materials were ready for to be transported.
- 5 January 2024: The captain steered, the dhow from Konarak, Iran, to Chabahar Port, Iran, where various packages, which included advanced conventional weaponry such as a warhead, antiship cruise missile components, and ballistic missile components, from a truck in Chabahar Port, Iran into the net hold of the dhow.
- Between 5 January 5 and 11 January 2024: The dhow left the area of Chabahar Bay, Iran underway to the coast of Somalia. The captain communicated with brother A via satellite phone during the journey.
- 11 January 2024: The Boarding Team of the USS Lewis B. Puller interdicted the Yanus. On approach of the Boarding Team, the captain instructed the crew not to stop the dhow and to burn the dhow down. During the interdiction by the Boarding Team, he instructed the crewmembers not to identify him as the captain to the Boarding Team and to lie about the cargo on the dhow.

Image 1: The USS Lewis B, Puller conducted a night-time seizure of an illegal weapons on this dhow suspected of smuggling weapons.



Source: U.S. CENTCOM

Image 2: A search of the dhow revealed suspicious packages throughout the holds of the dhow



Source: U.S. CENTCOM

Image 3: The dhow tied alongside the USS Lewis B. Puller to allow for the offloading of missile components




Source: U.S. CENTCOM

Image 4: Suspicious material was concealed in tubing in the holds of the vessel during the search



Source: U.S. CENTCOM

Image 5: Missile components found on the intercepted dhow included Noor missile guidance sections, Noor missile motors, a Noor missile warhead, Qiam-4 missile motor systems, missile sets, Qiam-4 motor assemblies, and radar antenna assemblies for missiles. The blue missile is similar to a C-802 pattern anti-ship missile.



Source: U.S. CENTCOM²⁶

²⁶ PUSCENTCOM Seizes Iranian Advanced Conventional Weapons Bound for HouthisP, USCENCOM, 16 January 2024, <https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3645241/uscentcom-seizes-iranian-advanced-conventional-weapons-bound-for-houthis/>

Image 6: Missile warhead found on the dhow similar to semi-armour piercing, blast fragmentation warheads designed to penetrate the hull of ships and then explode outward to maximize damage.



Source: U.S. CENTCOM

Annex 29: 5 February 2024 -Puntland Police Force weapon interdiction

On 5 February 2024, the Puntland Police Force arrested three men allegedly involved in piracy in the Ras Casey region, Puntland.²⁷ They also confiscated several items consistent with pirate operations such as firearms, including RPGs, PKM-pattern machine guns, AK-pattern rifles, ammunition and several containers with fuel.²⁸

Image 1: Containers for fuel and a PKM-pattern machine guns and ammunition (Source: Puntland State TV²⁹)



Image 2: Likely type 80 PKM-pattern machine guns and 7.62x54Rmm ammunition (source: Puntland State TV)



²⁷ Confidential Source 8 February 2024

²⁸ *Centre régional de fusion d'informations maritimes (CRFIM)*, Weekly Report, 5 to 11 February 2024

²⁹ Official Facebook Page of Puntland State TV, Garowe, 6 February 2024, https://web.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=pfbid02SL4tcKs9MYJZ4ec44qoXJCt929hY4oggSmSj9vf7SBwjMeUp29qdocB9yXsPKvy11&id=100044155853572&sfnsn=wa&mibextid=RUBZ1f&paipv=0&eav=Afb_xkDC-rKB6Fp4170bONrSf4o64oFghJTH4D_NgR-k3lIC3Y5umP_frsYRXLAKfKQ&_rdc=1&_rdr

Image 3: Likely Type 69-1 pattern RPG-7 launcher (source: Puntland State TV)



Image 4: 40mm rocket propelled grenades (source: Puntland State TV)



Annex 30: 7 February 2024 weapon interdiction Puntland

On 7 February 2024, Puntland authorities intercepted a boat carrying weapons and arrested three suspects on the coast of Raas-Casayr town, Bari. It is alleged that the weapons were intended to be used for piracy.³⁰

Image 1: Weapons intercepted on 7 February 2024 (source: Puntland authorities ³¹)



Image 2: Weapons intercepted on 7 February 2024 (source: Puntland authorities)



³⁰ Dalsan TV Station on X, 7 February 2024, <https://x.com/DalsanTv/status/1755303232346157100>

³¹ Taliska Qaybta Booliska Gobolka Raas casayr, Raas Caseyr Police Division.

https://web.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid02cbALnTRmCGH8B3i9fMXz2FEGWR5UTng6bDxq2CmbwyZ97JU7db2AQBJEdPfFYs2U1&id=100063614635994&locale=cs_CZ

Annex 31: 18 May 2024 PMPF weapon interdiction

On 18 May 2024 the PMPF intercepted a shipment of weapons in Bossaso and arrested four suspected weapon smugglers.

Image 1: In the background - Type56, G3 rifles and 14.5mm heavy machine gun components were amongst the confiscated weapons.



Source: PMPF³²

Image 2: Shipment of weapons confiscated by the PMPF (source: PMPF)



³² PMPF, 18 May 2024.

Annex 32: 4 August 2024 Weapon Interdiction Puntland authorities

On 4 August 2024, PMPF troops in support of PISA seized weapons in Bossaso town.³³ Three individuals, a Somali national and two Yemeni nationals, were arrested.³⁴ Some of the weapons identified from the images are similar to weapons for sale on the black market in Houthi-controlled area.³⁵ These are likely:

- Zastava assault rifles;
- Type 56-1 assault rifle;
- Colt M4 compact assault rifle;
- M80 light machine gun;
- M79 Osa 90mm anti-tank weapon;
- RPG-7 rocket launcher, (Al-Nasirah);
- Type 85 HMG; and
- HG-M75 and RG-4 grenades.

Image 1: In the background - type56 rifles and 14.5mm heavy machine gun components were amongst the confiscated weapons.



Source: PMPF ³⁶

³³ PMPF, 4 August 2024 <https://web.facebook.com/pmpfofficial/videos/3097168470420388>

³⁴ Confidential source.

³⁵ Panel of Experts on Yemen.

³⁶ PMPF, 4 August 2024 <https://web.facebook.com/photo?fbid=899059472251651&set=a.293674539456817>

Image 2: Type56 rifles and 14.5mm heavy machine gun components were amongst the confiscated weapons.



Source: PMPF

Image 3: Likely RG-4 and M75 grenades



Source: PMPF

Image 4: Mortar tube and PG-7 40mm grenades



Source: PMPF

Image 5: Likely 14.5mm HMG barrels, Type77 12.7mm machine guns, M4 and Type56 assault rifles, M79 Osa 90mm anti-tank weapon, M80 LMG, RG-4 and M75 grenades



Source: PMPF

Annex 33: Central Park Pirate Group

On 26 November 2023, the chemical tanker *Central Park* managed by an Israeli registered company was boarded in the International Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) in the Gulf of Aden³⁷, 53 nm off the coast of Somalia.³⁸ The suspects attempted to flee in their small boat when the *USS Mason* and coalition ships counter-piracy task force (TF 151) arrived on the scene.³⁹ They were intercepted and arrested by the crew of the *USS Mason*.

Prior to this incident, on 19 November 2023, the Bahamas-flagged, Israel affiliated, vehicle carrier *Galaxy Leader* was boarded by the Houthis from a helicopter in the Red Sea, hijacked and sailed to Hudaydah off the coast of Yemen. The fact that this hijacking of the *Central Park* was shortly after the *Galaxy Leader* and that no Somali piracy related hijackings on commercial vessels were recorded in several years, resulted in speculation that the hijacking was committed by or instigated by the Houthis working with Somali pirates. This perception was enforced when Houthi members took responsibility for the boarding on social media, and which was later disclaimed by Houthi leaders a day after the attempted hijacking.

Abdulmalik Alejri a senior member of the Ansar Allah (Houthi) Politburo wrote on 27 November 2023:

“The statements issued by the Yemeni Armed Forces are clear that their naval operations only target enemy Israeli ships, and that our naval forces are the authority authorized to carry out any naval operations, and do not allow any other party to carry out any piracy operations that threaten international navigation under any pretext, especially in the territorial waters adjacent to areas. The control of the National Authority in Sanaa, and with regard to the acts of piracy announced by the United States yesterday in the Gulf of Aden, if not a lofty theatrics, it confirms that the fragility of the situation in the occupied territories and the adjacent Yemeni territorial waters represents a suitable theatre for acts of piracy and terrorist groups. Its responsibility lies with the occupation forces.”⁴⁰

It was later confirmed by US authorities⁴¹ that the sole reason for the attack was hijack for ransom and that it was by no means political in nature. The pirate group was also not affiliated with any other group or larger pirate network.


³⁷ DNK IOC INTELLIGENCE REPORT (INTREP) – The threat from Somali Pirates in southern Gulf of Aden and western Indian Ocean, 13 January 2024

³⁸ UKMTO WARNING 003/NOV/2023

³⁹ <https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1728982985238843665>

⁴⁰ Unofficial translation from <https://twitter.com/alejri77/status/1729203821358756030>

⁴¹ Confidential official source

Figure 1: Central Park Pirate Group⁴²

Source: Panel

Profile of suspects:

Two of the five suspects involved in the *Central Park* hijacking were previously involved in piracy and had been convicted for piracy.

Abdikarim Salah Mohamed Mohamud (Ow koombe) was part of a pirate gang based in the town of Alula. He was involved in the hijacking of the tanker, *Aris 13* on 13 March 2017. At that time, no hijackings of commercial ships were reported off the coast of Somalia since 2012. A two-day long standoff between pirates and the PMPF led to negotiations between the pirates, local elders and Puntland authorities and the tanker was subsequently released without the payment of a ransom on 16 March.⁴³ Mohamud was identified through call records from his satellite phone while onboard the *Aris 13*. On 8 April, he was part of a pirate team that hijacked the cargo vessel, *OS 35*. The Chinese and Indian Navies intercepted the vessel the next day and the suspect was apprehended and transferred to Puntland for prosecution and served part of his five-year sentence at Bosaso Central Prison. He escaped from Bosaso Central Prison on 5 March 2021⁴⁴ when Al-Shabaab attacked the prison and freed 400 prisoners, many members of Al-Shabaab.⁴⁵

⁴² Confidential source.

⁴³ John Steed, March 2017.

⁴⁴ Confidential source.

⁴⁵ <https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN2AX183/>

Mohamed Ali Osman was arrested by the IN in 2010, prosecuted and released in 2018. The remaining three members had no prior affiliation with piracy and were each offered \$50,000 of the ransom money for their participation. The suspects had no funding from outside parties for logistics such as boats and fuel or weapons. They used a hijacked Yemeni boat to launch the attack, and two rusty AK pattern weapons were used in the attack.⁴⁶

The case was prosecuted by the Office of the Attorney General in Mogadishu and the weapons used during the attack, hammers and tools to break into the citadel and a video recording of the attack was placed into evidence. On 29 June 2024, the five pirates were found guilty and sentenced.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Confidential source

⁴⁷ Confidential source.

Annex 34: The Bulk Carrier, *Ruen* Hijacking


On 14 December 2023, armed men boarded and hijacked the bulk carrier *Ruen* while underway approximately 700nm East of Bossaso. An Indian maritime patrol plane spotted the merchant ship during the early hours of 15 December, and established radio communications with the crew. According to information received, the 18 crew members were safe and locked in the citadel at the time. Later the same day, the suspected pirates managed to break into the citadel and capture the crew, hijacked the vessel and sailed it to the coast of Somalia.

On 18 December, the ship reached the Somali coast off Geesaley, east of Bossaso in northern Puntland.¹ According to the timeline provided by the Indian Navy, at that point, the pirate suspects allowed an injured member of the crew of the *MV Ruen* to be evacuated to the Indian Navy Ship *INS Kochi*, for medical care.² At this point in time, the *ESPS Victoria* was still tracking the *Ruen* as the GFRS granted the naval vessel ad hoc permission to continue to track the *Ruen* in Somali territorial waters; however, by 19 December the navy vessel left the area for logistical reasons.

The *MV Ruen* then sailed in a southern direction, along the coast of Puntland, moving to a location near Eyl in early January 2024.³ In a coordinated effort, EUNAVFOR and local authorities kept the *Ruen* under constant surveillance. The vessel remained at anchor near Eyl until 14 March 2024 when the ship was spotted on an eastbound course moving out of Somalia's Territorial Waters (STW).⁴⁸ At this stage, no ransom has been paid for the release of the vessel.⁴ The reason for this change in course by the *Ruen* is not clear, but it was speculated that the pirate suspects intended to use the *Ruen* as a mother vessel to hijack other ships.

On 15 March 2024, the Indian Navy reportedly located the *Ruen* approximately 260 nm off the coast of Somalia, confirming that the pirate suspects are still onboard with the help of an UAV, which the suspects allegedly shot down. At this time the pirates turned back to STW. The Indian Navy vessels *INS Kolkata* intercepted the *Ruen* on 16 March 2024, arrested all 35 pirate suspects, confiscated illegal arms, ammunition and contraband in the suspects possession, and safely evacuated the 17 crew members from the vessel.⁶

Image 1: MV *Ruen*: AIS track from 13 December 2023 to 17 March 2024



AIS Source: Maritime Intelligence Risk Suite

Source: Data Panel

⁴⁸ Confidential source.


Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Image 2: MV Ruen - Activity onboard MV Ruen while under pirate control



Source: confidential source

Image 3: Logistical supplies taken to MV Ruen



Source: Confidential source

Image 4: Pirates onboard MV Ruen prior to Indian Navy boarding



Source: Indian Navy open source

Image 5: Pirate firing at IN asset from the deck of the MV Ruen



Source: Indian Navy open source

Image 6: Indian Navy rescue operation



Source: Indian Navy⁴⁹

Image 7: Indian Navy forces boarding Ruen



Source: Indian Navy open source

⁴⁹ “Anti-Piracy Operations against Pirate Ship MV Ruen by Indian Navy”, Indian Ministry of Defence, 16 March 2024, <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2015285%20>

Image 8: Pirate suspect apprehended by Indian Navy



Source: Indian Navy open source

Annex 35: The Bulk Carrier, MV Abdullah Hijacking

On 12 March 2024, the bulk carrier *Abdullah* with a crew of 23 Bangladeshi nationals, was boarded 525nm east of Mogadishu.⁵⁰ The ship was heading towards the Al Hamriyah Port in the UAE at the time, carrying coal from the port of Maputo in Mozambique.⁵¹ EU NAVFOR ATALANTA reported that they contacted the captain of the *Abdullah* who confirmed that there were 20 suspected pirates on board and that the ship's crew were not in the citadel. The suspects took control of the vessel and proceeded towards the Somali coast.⁵²

Shortly after the hijacking a video recording of the attack⁵³, a crew list⁵⁴, an audio recording in Bangla from a mobile WhatsApp account claiming to be from Chief Officer Atiq Ullah Khan to SR Shipping CEO Mohammad Meherul Karim, and another WhatsApp message appearing to be from one Hossain in English, were posted to the Facebook accounts belonging to crew members and accounts belonging to family of the crew.

Part of the translated message allegedly from Chief Officer Atiq Ullah Khan reads as follow:

"...[O]ur ship holds sustenance for 20-25 days, which includes 200 MT of fresh water. We already requested everybody to use the water cautiously and we shall handle the provisions accordingly. There are 55 thousand tons of coal on board, which is a fire hazard, and methane concentration may also go up. The last time we checked the oxygen level, it was 9/10%, which we need to monitor regularly. If the methane level increases, we shall have to consult with the experts. Kindly make arrangements for this."

According to the crew the pirates were looking for a possible target for more than a month before they found and attacked the *Abdullah*. The pirates used the satellite phones onboard the *Abdullah* for instructions after they gained control over the ship and crew. Once on the coast they requested mobile phones. While at anchor there were up to 65 individuals onboard at times, but only one suspect spoke English with the crew. The crew of the *Abdullah* reported that the pirates had close links to the community, they were well organized, had basic knowledge of the communication and bridge equipment, and they maintained their weapons. They constantly chewed khat and they were never hostile to the crew.⁵⁵

On 23 March 2023 the *Abdullah* was anchored 36nm south of Eyl in close proximity to where the *Ruen* was anchored while ransom negotiations were ongoing.⁵⁶ The *Abdullah* was released on 13 April 2024 on payment of ransom. The potentially hazardous nature of the coal on board could be the reason why ransom negotiations were concluded in a relatively short time. The Panel is awaiting a response of the owners concerning this matter. The ransom was dropped in the ocean from a small plane that circled the *Abdullah*. Interviews with the crew after the release resulted in information with regard to the identities of the pirate suspects.⁵⁷

⁵⁰ Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) Alert number 038 / 2024 - UPDATE 009.

⁵¹ IFC IOR MMSU March 2024.

⁵² MSCHOA.

⁵³ <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=802824491871456>


⁵⁴ <https://web.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=1143880173649061&set=pcb.1143880290315716>

⁵⁵ Confidential source.

⁵⁶ MSCHOA Alert number 038 / 2024 - UPDATE 009

⁵⁷ Confidential source

Image 1: AIS track Abdullah before and after hijacking



AIS Source: Maritime Intelligence Risk Suite, accessed March 2024

Data Source: Panel

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Image 2: Pirates approaching the Abdullah



Source: Image from videos posted on Facebook pages of crew and family of crew.

Image 3: Pirate boarding the Abdullah



Source: Image from videos posted on Facebook pages of crew and family of crew.⁵⁸

Full unofficial translation of an audio recording in Bangla from a mobile WhatsApp account claiming to be from Chief Officer Atiq Ullah Khan to SR Shipping CEO Mohammad Meherul Karim⁵⁹

“I am the Chief Officer of Abdullah ship, speaking. This morning, around 10.30 am GMT 7.30, a speed boat approached us at high speed. Hearing the ship alarm, we all went to the bridge, and from there, we went to ... (inaudible)... Captain and the second office were there. We tried reaching UKMTO, but they didn't receive the call. By the time pirates arrived, they had captured the Captain and the second officer. They called all of us and


⁵⁸ <https://web.facebook.com/watch/?v=802824491871456>

⁵⁹ <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=770861178324830>

fired some blank shots. They didn't attack anyone. Then, more pirates came in another speed boat, a total of 15-20 of them. After a while, a pirate fishing boat arrived. That was an Iranian boat that the pirates captured a month back. Since then, the pirates have been doing reconnaissance in the fishing boat, looking for a ship. They wanted to release the Iranian fishing boat and refuel it from our ship. We used the pump and refueled the fishing boat. Then, the pirates went to the engine room and shut down the ship. There has been no damage or casualties as of now by the grace of almighty, but everyone is afraid. Our ship holds sustenance for 20-25 days, which includes 200 MT of fresh water. We already requested everybody to use the water cautiously and we shall handle the provisions accordingly. There are 55 thousand tons of coal on board, which is a fire hazard, and methane concentration may also go up. The last time we checked the oxygen level, it was 9/10%, which we need to monitor regularly. If the methane level increases, we shall have to consult with the experts. Kindly make arrangements for this. Please pray for us and our families. God bless you, sir."

(Unofficial Bangla translation)

Image 5: Pirate watch positions MV Abdullah



Source: Confidential source

Image 6: Pirates onboard MV Abdullah




Source: Confidential source

Image 7: Pirates onboard MV Abdullah



Source: confidential source

Image 8: Pirate Weapons onboard Abdullah



Source: confidential source

Image 9: Ransom drop in sea for Abdullah and crew




Source: confidential source

Annex 36: Attempted Hijacking Products Tanker *Chrystal Arctic*

On 10 May 2024, the Products Tanker, *Chrystal Arctic* were approached from the starboard side by six armed men in a skiff approximately 96 nautical miles northwest of Bossaso. An RPG, AK-pattern rifles and ladder could be observed onboard the skiff. The tanker altered course and sounded its horn in an attempt to prevent boarding from the men in the skiff, but the skiff continued its approach. The onboard security team on the *Chrystal Arctic* showed their weapons, after which the skiff started firing. The armed guards shot 4 rounds which started a fire on the skiff, which later sunk. The skiff did not make use of a mothership during the operation.⁶⁰

After the attack was repelled by the security team, one of ATALANTA warships in the area responded and arrested the six suspected pirates.⁶¹ EUNAVFOR treated injured pirates while one was transferred to hospital and later died from his injuries. On 14 May 2024, the remaining five suspects were delivered to Seychelles Authorities, with whom ATALANTA has a legal agreement for the trial of suspected pirates arrested by warships.

Image 1: AIS track *Chrystal Arctic*



AIS Source: Maritime Intelligence Risk Suite accessed May 2024


Data Source: Panel

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

⁶⁰ Confidential source.

⁶¹ “Updated Information on MV *Chrystal Arctic* Event”, European Union Naval Force, 13 May 2024 <https://eunavfor.eu/news/updated-information-mv-chrystal-arctic-event>

Image 2: GPS tracks from pirates' skiff between Yemen and Somalia led to the assumption that the crew was also involved in other illegal activities



Source: confidential source

Disclaimer: The boundaries used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Image 3: The blue hulled skiff involved in the attack of the Chrystal Arctic caught fire. The suspects were saved by EUNAVFOR.



Blue hulled skiff responsible for attack



Skiff caught fire



Suspects arrested by EUNAVFOR

Source: confidential source

Annex 37: Boarding General Cargo Ship *Basilisk*

On 23 May 2024, six armed suspects in two skiffs attacked and boarded the Liberian flagged general cargo ship, *Basilisk*⁶² approximately 280 nm from Hoby, Somalia. All crew, except for the captain, took shelter in the citadel. There was no communication equipment in the citadel⁶³ which was why the master stayed on the bridge to establish communication for a possible rescue. The pirate suspects were aggressive, and the master sustained a bullet wound in his arm. The pirates were unable to breach the citadel, but damaged the opening mechanism in the process which meant that the crew was unable to open the door from the inside.

Subsequently, Spanish Frigate *Canarias*, part of Operation ATALANTA, intercepted and boarded the cargo vessel fast roping from a helicopter, but no pirates were found onboard. The injured crewmember received medical assistance by the crew of the *Canarias*. The vessel continued to the next port of call.⁶⁴

The crew did not implement BMP5, the citadel was unprepared, and the crew were also unaware that they were in an area that had a high piracy risk.

The skiffs likely operated from Garacaad. Reports from Garacaad local fisheries union indicate that the pirates who attacked the *Basilisk* returned to the Garacaad Area with their hijacked a fishing dhow at coordinates 07.063870N 49.432530E.

Image 1: AIS tracks *Basilisk*



AIS Source: Maritime Intelligence Risk Suite accessed May 2024

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

⁶² Indian Navy, Monthly Maritime Security Update: May 2024, International Fusion Centre, Indian Ocean Region, May 2024 https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/ifc-ior/static/data/reports/monthly/MMSU_May_2024.pdf

⁶³ MSCHOA Alert number 051/2024.


⁶⁴ P Merchant Vessel *Basilisk* Liberated, P European Union Naval Force, 24 May 2024, <https://eunavfor.eu/news/merchant-vessel-basilisk-liberated>.

Image 2: The pirates were unable to breach the citadel, but damaged the opening mechanism



Source: confidential source

Image 3: Boarding team from Spanish Frigate Canarias fast rope onto Basilisk deck



Source: EUNAVFOR⁶⁵

⁶⁵ Ibid

Annex 38: Interceptions, arrests and prosecution of pirate suspects

In total, eight vessels were intercepted by naval forces and the Seychelles Coast Guard. Seventy piracy suspects were apprehended in 13 cases by EUNAVFOR, the US Navy, the Indian Navy, the Seychelles Coast Guard, and Somali authorities between the end of November 2023 and mid of May 2024.

Table: List of Interceptions, Arrests and Prosecution of Pirate Suspects

Name of Vessel and Flag	Date Intercepted	Intercepting Authority	Country Prosecuting	Details of the incident	Number suspects arrested
Central Park, Chemical Tanker, Liberia	26/11/2023	US Navy	Mogadishu, Somalia	On 26/11/2023 the MV Central Park was boarded by 5 suspects. The USS Mason and coalition ships intercepted and arrested the suspects. On 26/12/2023 suspects were transferred to authorities in Mogadishu. The case proceeded to court on 18/05/2024 and all 5 individuals were found guilty and sentenced on 29/06/2024.	5
Lorenzo Putha-4, Fishing Dhow, Sri Lanka	28/01/2024	Seychelles Coast Guard	Seychelles	Intercepted by the Seychelles Coast Guard 230 nautical miles from Seychelles and 3 suspects detained.	3
Iman, Dhow, Iran	29/01/2024	Indian Navy	Suspects likely released	INS Sumitra responded to a distress message from the Iman which had been boarded by pirate suspects. INS Sumitra intercepted the vessel and released the 17 crew members.	0
Al Naeemi, Dhow, Iran	29/01/2024	Indian Navy	Suspects likely released	Al Naeemi was boarded off Abo, Somalia. INS Sumitra intercepted the dhow and released the crew.	0
Omari, Dhow, Iran	2/02/2024	Indian Navy	Suspects likely released	Dhow hijacked on 31/01/2024 off the East coast of Somalia by 7 suspects. Intercepted on 2/02/2024 by INS Sharda and 19 fishermen released.	0
Unknown	5/02/2024	Puntland State Police	Puntland, Somalia	The Puntland State Police arrested 3 suspects.	3
Ruen, Bulk Carrier, Malta	24/02/2024	Puntland State Police	Puntland, Somalia	The Puntland State Police arrested 3 suspects.	3

Ruen, Bulk Carrier, Malta	16/03/2024	Indian Navy	Mumbai, India	INS Kolkata intercepted the Ruen and arrested 35 pirate suspects. On 8/08/2024 it was decided that all suspects will be prosecuted as adults.	35
Abdullah, Bulk Carrier, Bangladesh	17/03/2024	Mudug Regional Police and PMPF	Puntland, Somalia	On 17/03/2024 the Mudug Regional Police and the PMPF captured a vehicle that was delivering supplies to pirates in control of the MV Abdullah near Jiifle.	2
Al Kambar 786, Fishing Dhow, Iran	29/03/2024	Indian Navy	Mumbai, India	Boarded on 29/03/2024 by nine armed suspects approximately 90 nm southwest of Socotra. INS Sumedha intercepted vessel, rescued the crew of 23 Pakistanis and arrested the suspects.	9
Abdullah, Bulk Carrier, Bangladesh	13/04/2024		Likely released	The vessel was released on 13/04/2024. On the same day pirate suspects were reportedly arrested by Puntland Authorities and a part of the ransom recovered. The Panel found some discrepancies in reports. Government sources reported 4 suspects arrested while 8 were reported in the media.	4
Chrystal Arctic, Products Tanker, Marshall Islands	10/05/2024	EUNAVFOR	Seychelles	6 suspected pirates apprehended. The case is under investigation. One injured pirate died. Remainder delivered to Seychelles Authorities on 13/05/2024. ATALANTA has a legal agreement with the Seychelles allowing for the trial of suspected pirates arrested by warships. The Seychelles' Supreme Court set trial date for mid-January 2025.	6

Source: Panel

Image 1: Pirate suspects who hijacked the Al-Naemi apprehended by the Indian Navy



Source: Indian Navy published in open source

Image 2: Three armed suspects on the Dhow, *Al-Naemi*



Source: Indian Navy open source

Image 3: Dhow *Omari*



Source: Indian Navy open source

Image 4: Dhow *Omari*



Source: Indian Navy open source

Image 5: Indian Navy arrested suspects on *Al-Kambar*



Source: Indian Navy open source

Annex 39: Vessels held by Somali Pirates

Since 22 November 2023, two bulk carriers and several fishing dhows have been hijacked off the coast of Somalia, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and the Western Indian Ocean. It is not clear how many dhows are currently held by pirates off the coast of Somalia, but it is likely that the majority has been released. As per the information received by the Panel, the list below contains vessels that are/were allegedly held by pirates off the coast of Puntland or used as motherships in the attack of commercial vessels. The motive of hijacking of dhows is also often related to fisheries conflict between Somali fishermen and foreign dhows.¹

Table: List of hijacked vessels held by Somali Pirates

Ship Name	Type of Vessel	Flag	Date	Released
AL-MERAJ 1	Fishing Dhow	Iran	22/11/2023	5/12/2023
AL-ASHKAAN	Fishing Dhow	Iran	29/11/2023	Yes
RUEN	Bulk carrier	Malta	14/12/2023	16/03/2024
EMERAT-2	Fishing Dhow	Yemen	22/12/2023	11/01/2024
FATAH AL KHAIR	Fishing Dhow	Yemen	22/12/2023	11/01/2024
AL SAQAR 1	Fishing Dhow	Yemen	30/12/2023	
AL YOOS No 81	Fishing Dhow	Yemen	2/01/2024	3/01/2024
AL ANDALUS	Fishing Dhow	Yemen	12/01/2024	
UNKNOWN	Fishing Dhow	Yemen	12/01/2024	
AL JABAR	Fishing Dhow	Yemen	18/01/2024	
AL WAHEEB	Fishing Dhow	Unknown	19/01/2024	
FV AL MECCA	Fishing Dhow	Unknown	28/01/2024	
UNKNOWN	Fishing Dhow	Iran	2/03/2024	
ABDULLAH	Bulk Carrier	Bangladesh	12/03/2024	13/04/2024
UNKNOWN	Fishing Dhow	Unknown	13/05/2024	

Source: Panel


Image 1: AIS track fishing dhow, *Almeraj 1*



AIS Source: Maritime Intelligence Risk Suite accessed January 2024

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 40: Pirate Launching sites, camps and anchorages



- ★ **Pirate camps and anchorages**
- **Hijacking**
- **Boarded**
- **Attack**


Map: Thematic Mapping

Source: Panel⁶⁶

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

⁶⁶ Compiled from information received from the PMPF, piracy reports and confidential source.

Annex 41: Patterns of displacement in 2024



UNHCR SOMALIA
INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT

The UN Refugee Agency Displacements Monitored by UNHCR Protection and Return Monitoring Network (PRMN)

Protection & Return Monitoring Network

Sign in


Back to Data Portal

Clear All


New Displacements

283,000


By Year [2024]




By Month




By Week




Reasons




Priority Needs On Arrival




Arrival Regions




Departure Regions



Arrival Districts



Departure Districts



About PRMN

The PRMN (Protection and Return Monitoring Network) is a UNHCR-led project implemented in partnership with NRC, which reports on displacements and protection risks and incidents underlying such movements. The figures shown refer to displacements not population balances. Not all displacements in Somalia are captured - only figures collected by PRMN are reported. Figures are based on reports by key informants and displaced households at the place of arrival but in the case of flood-related displacements may also include reports from the office of departure. This dashboard should be read in conjunction with the Notes on PRMN Methodology, which outline the approach and certain internal displacement dataset by month, reason and region is available here under CC licence by IGO. Please attribute data to "UNHCR-led Protection and Return Monitoring Network (PRMN) Somalia".

Annex 42: UN reported statistics of SGBV and CRSV

Except from report by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM). “Tackling Sexual Violence in Somalia: Prevention and Protection”. Page 10-11, 7 May 2024 (OHCHR-UNSOM report, May 2024).

“Between 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2022 16 the GBVIMS data gathering organizations reached 1,606,105 with gender-based violence (GBV) prevention, response, and capacity-building services mainly required by women who reported some form of violence against them. While the data available from the GBVIMS covers a four-year period only (instead of the six years covered by the report), service providers reached a significant number of individuals requiring GBV services in this timeframe, thereby illustrating the context is one in which there is systematic violence against women, including in areas where the MARA and the MRM cannot access.

Between 2017 and 2022, the MARA verified cases of CRSV perpetrated against 105 women, 37 girls, two boys and one man. For the same reporting period, the Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting (CTFMR) through the MRM verified incidents of sexual violence against 1,810 girls and 13 boys.


Yearly figures show that for the MRM the number of verified violations ranged between 331 in 2017 to 221 in 2022 with 2020 having the highest number of 406 as follows: 331 in 2017, 331 in 2018, 227 in 2019, 406 in 2020, 307 in 2021 and 221 in 2022. These numbers give an average number of violations of 303.

For the MARA, the number of verified violations ranged between 22 survivors in 2017 to 19 survivors in 2022, with 2021 having the highest number of 31 as follows: 22 in 2017, 22 in 2018, 28 in 2019, 23 in 2020, 31 in 2021 and 19 in 2022. These numbers give an average of 24 survivors.”

Annex 43: IOM table on the path followed by women that disengaged from Al-Shabaab

ENTRY TO AL-SHABAAB (AS)

- **Direct role/participation** in the AS acts of violent extremism as perpetrator
i.e. spies, recruiters, transport of weapons planting of explosive items, fundraising for AS activities
- **Indirect role/non-combative** i.e. as cooks, cleaners, wives of AS fighters etc.



EXIT FROM AL-SHABAAB



* wives of active AS who did not follow their husbands into the group are not included

Figure 5: IOM table on the path followed by women that disengaged from Al-Shabaab

Annex 44: Use and recruitment of children by Al-Shabaab

(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
