

Humanitarian Implications of Violence in Northern and Central Iraq

18 June 2014

	Insignificant	Minor	Moderate	Important	Major
Expected impact				X	
Need for international assistance	Not required	Low	Moderate	Important	Urgent
				X	

Key Findings

- Anticipated scope and scale**
- Some 500,000 people displaced from Mosul: 200,000 currently in Dohuk governorate, 100,000 in Erbil governorate, 25,000 still within Mosul, and 175,000 scattered throughout the region. Many are in makeshift camps along the border with the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I). Children could number as much as 250,000, or half of the freshly displaced.
 - Further smaller-scale displacements from other ISIL-controlled areas.
 - Before the offensive, Ninevah hosted the second largest population of IDPs within Iraq.
 - Added to Anbar's 480,000 displaced, the total number of IDPs in Iraq since the start of 2014 amounts to one million.
 - IDP numbers are almost certain to rise significantly as the conflict evolves, especially if hostilities move to Baghdad.


- Priorities for humanitarian intervention**
- Outside Mosul, food, shelter, NFIs and medical assistance have been flagged as priorities since displacement began.
 - Within Mosul, food, water and fuel are priorities, and depending on how ISIL administers the city, other issues including protection could quickly come to the fore. In addition, the risk of outbreaks is increasing ahead of the summer months.

Humanitarian constraints

Humanitarian access to militant-held areas is a challenge at this early stage of the crisis, and only slightly better outside of the KR-I. A number of roads connecting affected major cities, such as Mosul–Kirkuk, are reported closed.

Key events

- 6-10th June 2014, ISIL invade and occupy Mosul, northern Iraq. 500,000 people are estimated to be displaced.
- ISIL forces move south fighting in Baiji and Tikrit within the vicinity of strategic oil infrastructure. 40,000 people are estimated to be displaced.
- ISIL makes further advances into Diyala governorate in the towns of Jalawla and Saadiya.
- ISIL battles the ISF and Shiite militia at Baqubah, in proximity to Baghdad.



Crisis Overview

Affected groups	Total	Ninevah	Kirkuk	Diyala	Salah al Din
Resident population	7.1M	3.2M (Mosul: 2.5m)	1.3M	1.4M	1.2M
Affected population	546,000	500,000	N/A	6,000	40,000
Previously displaced	812,894	303,529	83,578	342,287	83,500
Anbar crisis		1,668	12,780	756	83,500 residing in Samarra
Post-2006		158,721	49,702	47,903	
Returnees		143,140	21,096	293,628	
Total newly displaced	546,000	Mosul: 500,000, 25,000 still in city Tal Afari: 2-3,000 families	N/A	6,000	40,000 from Tikrit and Samarra
Re-displaced IDPs	Assessments ongoing	Assessments ongoing	Assessments ongoing	Assessments ongoing	Assessments ongoing

Key Information

- Iraq, now more than ever intertwined with the Syrian civil war, has reached another inflection point with ISIL's (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) current Ramadan offensive.
- After heavy fighting in Mosul, Iraq's second city, from 6 June, ISIL took over the western Arab half of Iraq's second largest city on 10 June, including the international airport, government buildings and military bases. Half a million people were displaced. ISIL also abducted some 89 Turkish nationals, including the Turkish consul-general in Mosul (HRW 12/06/2014 Guardian 11/06/14 Foreign Policy 11/06/14 IOM, 11/06/2014; UNHCR, 11/06/2014).

- On 11 June, ISIL occupied parts of Baiji, including a power station that supplies electricity to Baghdad and Kirkuk. Iraq's largest oil refinery remains in government control, but production was halted owing to mortar attack risks. The militants seized Tikrit, the capital of Salah al Din governorate and Saddam Hussein's birthplace, with little resistance. ISIL reportedly freed 300 inmates from a prison, and temporarily abducted the provincial governor of Saleh al Din (IBTimes 17/06/14 Almadia 11/06/14).
- On 11–12 June, ISIL contested Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) for Samarra, an important Shi'ite focal point, as it had on 5 June, but was pushed back with the aid of Shiite militias. ISIL captured Dhuluiya on 12 June.
- ISIL has also taken Hawijah, Tuz Khurmatu, Salman Beg, and Sharqat area, including an army barracks and a power station that serves Baghdad. At the time of writing, they had just been pushed back from Baquba, the closest yet to the capital (AFP, 11/06/2014 AFP 17/06/14).
- Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki asked parliament to declare martial law, which effectively amounts to emergency powers, but the vote was boycotted by Kurdish and Sunni parliamentarians and has been delayed (HRW 12/06/14).
- On 13 June, ISIL took Jalawla and Saadiya, in Diyala governorate. ISF shelling triggered a wave of displacement towards Khanaqeen, near the Iranian border. In Jalawla, no confrontations took place between ISIL and the Kurdish Peshmerga forces, sent to secure Kurdish political offices (Reuters 13/06/14).
- On 14 June, ISIL took Tel Afar, a Turkmen town (both Sunni and Shia) in Ninevah and strategically situated en route to Syria's northeast. (RT 16/06/14 ECHO 17/06/14)
- Up to 3,000 families are thought to have been displaced from Tel Afar (RT 16/06/14 ECHO 17/06/14). Some 40,000 people have been displaced from Tikrit and Samarra, and a further 6,000 from Diyala. Indiscriminate shelling is reportedly ongoing, as is a spate of suicide attacks in Baghdad and elsewhere (IOM, 11/06/2014 BBC 15/06/14).
- ISIL may attempt to take the Iraqi capital, Baghdad. But with a far larger population, and a far larger proportion of armed Shi'ites than any of the largely Sunni cities taken so far, combined with possible Iranian intervention, the prospects look uncertain. If Baghdad doesn't fall, the frontlines are likely to settle along the Sunni–Shia faultline north of Baghdad.

Past Displacement

Iraq has a history of displacement dating from US invasion in 2003 and even before, under Saddam Hussein's rule. Since then, hundreds and thousands of Iraqis have undergone secondary displacement since seeking refuge in Syria during the 2000s. Then, since January 2014 and ISIL's push into Anbar governorate, some 480,000 individuals have been displaced throughout the country (IOM 11/06/14 IDMC 11/06/14).

Key Drivers of the Current Conflict

- ISIL's current push into Iraq's heartland proceeds from its declared intention to establish a Sunni Islamic caliphate across Syria and Iraq (WashingtonPost 11/06/14) ISW 11/06/14).
- The ongoing civil war in Syria, with which Iraq shares an extremely porous border, has also had a particularly destabilising effect on the region, particularly in Iraq, which has yet to recover from its own internecine fighting.
- The Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki's alienation of Sunnis has fuelled the current crisis: the ISF for example, is an increasingly Shia-only army. Without a more inclusive approach from the Government, a sustainable long-term solution is unlikely (ICG 14/08/13 Brookings 14/06/14).
- The preceding elements conjointly paint a picture of sectarian conflict. Should an anxious Iran intervene militarily, the Sunni-Shia factor will become more pronounced. However, the position of Iraq's moderate Sunni Arabs is not as clear-cut, and while their discontent may have been a driving factor, the central conflict remains confined to Sunni extremists and the Shi'ite Government.

Relevant Stakeholders

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL): an outgrowth of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), led by Ibrahim Awwad al Badri al Samarrai, known as Abubakr al Baghdadi, ISIL intends to establish a Sunni caliphate across both Iraq and (Greater) Syria. In 2013, ISIL fell out with Al Qaeda's official group in Syria, Al Nusra Front, and with Al Qaeda's leader Ayman al Zawahiri over al Baghdadi's refusal to focus exclusively on Iraq. It has since adopted a brand of extremism that surpasses even Al Qaeda. ISIL fighters are easily recognised by their black flags on which appears a variant of the *Shahada*. ISIL in Iraq appears to be Iraqi in composition, and numbered at least 10,000 as the Ramadan offensive began. Since taking Mosul, ISIL has been gathering strength by requisitioning US military equipment abandoned by the ISF, freeing and recruiting 1,500–3,000 prisoners, and looting over USD 400m in cash and gold bullion from Mosul's Central Bank, making the group less dependent on foreign donors. By controlling significant swathes of Anbar, Ninevah, and Salah al Din governorates, ISIL secures the minimal territorial continuity across the Jazeera desert to eastern Syria (primarily Ar-Raqqa and Deir-ez-Zor) strategically necessary to realise its vision (WSJ 15/06/14 IBTimes 11/06/14).

Other Sunni groups: Jaysh al Mojahedeen, Ansar al Sunnah, and Jaysh Rijjal al Tariqah al Naqshbandiyya, among others, have all facilitated ISIL's advance. The latter is composed of surviving Baathists, and members of the Mukhabarat and the Special Republican Guard, led by Saddam Hussein's former deputy Izzat Ibrahim al

Douri. But ISIL very clearly dominates. The militants' successes may be partly explained by their extensive insurgency experience and local knowledge. Moreover, their advance appears to have been facilitated, or at the very least unchallenged, by other Sunnis disgruntled with the Shi'ite government (WSJ 12/06/14 Brookings 14/06/14 Independent 13/06/14 ISW 11/06/14).

Kurdish Peshmarga: Effectively the armed forces of the Kurdish Regional Government the Kurdish Peshmarga have filled parts of the vacuum left by ISF, most prominently in the oil city of Kirkuk, and on the Kurdish eastern bank of Mosul. With ISF's growing defections and spiralling morale, the Peshmarga will very likely take on a more crucial operational role (NYTimes 12/06/14).

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF): The ISF has been nicknamed 'Maliki's militia' owing to their increasingly Shi'ite character. 10,000 ISF were deployed in and around Mosul before fleeing. Sunni ISF deployed in cities overrun by ISIL in recent days have reportedly refused to stand up to ISIL's onslaught. Of 14 divisions, four have reportedly been incapacitated. At the same time, the Prime Minister has announced the formation of reserves to fight ISIL, in line with Iraqi Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani's general appeal for Shia to defend the country. Recruitment centres are being set up in the key Shi'ite cities (Brookings 14/06/14 Stratfor 11/06/2014 HRW 12/06/2014 Independent 13/06/14 Almada 11/06/14).

International and Neighbouring Countries' Relationship to the Conflict

Syria: The Syrian conflict has had clear destabilising consequences for its neighbours. ISIL's virtual control of the Jazeera plains spanning both countries enables it to create strategic depth, strengthen its logistical chain, improve its offensive approaches, and mobilise fighters and equipment to different fronts. The battlespace linkages in both countries are also evident in that a diversion of fighters to Iraq will weaken ISIL's position in Syria, just as a corresponding shift of anti-ISIL Shi'ite fighters to Syria may weaken the Assad regime (Stratfor 11/06/14).

Iran: ISIL's advance in Iraq poses a core threat to Iran's security posture, and the latter has already positioned troops along the border and begun bolstering its support for Iraq's Shi'ites and Maliki's Government. The Prime Minister has yet to formally request Tehran's help. But if it does, and should ISIL continue gaining ground and pushing towards the Shi'ite heartland and its holy places, Iran is likely to shift towards a more confrontational approach. The chief of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards' foreign wing, the Quds Force, recently visited Baghdad for counteroffensive plans (WSJ 12/06/14 WSJ 12/06/14 Independent 13/06/14 WSJ 12/06/14).

Turkey: ISIL's advance ostensibly weakens Baghdad's posturing over the Kurdistan Regional Government's (KRG) recent, defiant international oil exports via Turkey. But

a scenario in which ISIL were to redirect their advance on the Kurdish north would clearly jeopardise massive Turkish investments across multiple sectors. On the ground, Turkish nationals have been directly caught up in the conflict, with some 80 individuals held to ransom, including 49 consulate staff. Ankara has yet to respond firmly to ISIL operations on both sides of the Syrian–Turkish border, and may now be pushed to do so. Turkey maintains a string of military outposts on the northern fringes of Dohuk governorate, originally intended to monitor PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) activities (Hurriyet 11/06/14 Stratfor 11/06/2014).

The United States: The US has invested much blood and treasure in stabilizing Iraq over the past decade, and therefore has an important stake in containing ISIL. Washington is not likely to send ground troops back into Iraq, but the Obama administration is considering alternative ways, including sending Special Forces advisors and trainers, air strikes (a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier is already in the Arabian Gulf), and even some degree of cooperation with Tehran, with which it is currently engaged in nuclear negotiations together with the other members of the P5+1 (NYTimes 16/06/14).

Crisis Impact

Displacement

- An estimated 500,000 Iraqis have fled their homes in Mosul: most took flight on 10 June. Three main patterns of displacement have been observed: from the west bank to the east bank of the city; to other parts of Ninevah governorate; and to KR-I. The Kurdish regional government will only permit entry to those with family already residing in KR-I, or a sponsor.
- Not all who fled Mosul did so in fear of ISIL; some may have done so in fear of ISF reprisals. Some (Sunni) IDPs have reportedly returned to Mosul, which suggests they may to some degree view ISIL's takeover as respite from central, Shi'ite control. Additionally, all checkpoints and barriers within Mosul previously maintained by the ISF have now been removed (DailyBeast 16/06/14 WFP 14/06/14).
- A number of Palestinian families who were already stateless have been subjected to secondary displacement from Mosul (PI 12/06/14).

Food

- IDPs assessed in Erbil, owing to lack of finances, report negative coping strategies, eating either once a day or once every other day. Others have indicated their preference to return to Mosul should they run out of means (PI 16/06/14).

- Host families are also running low on food supplies (IOM, 11/06/2014). Due to longstanding instability, the accessibility and quality of essential services have deteriorated significantly. The Public Distribution System (PDS) for instance remains the main source of food for the poorest Iraqis. The influx of Syrian refugees into northern Iraq already presented an added burden, and with the current wave of IDPs resources will be further strained (WFP 2014).

Shelter

- The need for shelter is significant. 99% of people interviewed in Erbil city reported not having resources to support themselves in their current accommodation arrangements for more than a week. Others are unable to move out of hotels into relatively cheaper rented houses for the lack of KR-I residency permits. Those who have received short-term permits do not know how to have them renewed. Without any alternative, people who have exhausted their resources are liable to return to Mosul or other cities of origin (UNAMI 15/06/14 UNHCR PI 16/06/14).
- Within Mosul, some 25,000 people are seeking shelter in schools and mosques (WHO 16/06/14).

Water

- Neighbourhoods in western Mosul lack drinking water as the main water station serving the area has been destroyed by bombing (IOM 11/06/2014 UNAMI 15/06/14).

Health

- Three of the seven hospitals in Mosul are at partial capacity due to a lack of human resources and funding. The others, including a paediatric hospital and a surgical hospital, remain functional. 37 of 40 primary facilities remain functional and adequately manned and supplied (WHO 16/06/04).
- The Department of Health in Dohuk (KR-I) has reported shortages in trauma kits, dialysis supplies, desferal infusion pumps, IV fluids, diarrhoea treatment kits. The Department of Health in Erbil reported overcrowding at the dialysis centre due to shortage of machines, and at chemotherapy centres, alongside a lack of chemotherapy drugs. Both governorates reported overcrowded emergency/trauma rooms as well as a spike in burns patients (PI 17/06/04).
- Measles and polio outbreaks are assessed to be critical and immediate health risks. The former is endemic in Mosul (WHO 16/06/04).
- Disruptions in water and sanitation facilities increase the risk of waterborne diseases including acute watery diarrhoea, particularly in the hotter months (WHO 16/06/04).

Protection

- Extrajudicial killings associated with ISIL and observed in Syria, have so far been limited to captured Iraqi government security forces. Nonetheless, ISIL has a local history of civilian abuse, including forced taxation, attacks on journalists, abductions, executions, and, throughout Iraq, suicide bomb attacks (HRW 12/06/14).
- According to the UN's human rights chief, reports suggest that the number of summary executions by ISIL in the second week of June may have been in the hundreds (OHCHR 13/06/14).
- The ISF is reported to have indiscriminately accused some IDPs arriving in Baghdad with ISIL. (PI 12/06/14)
- Concerns have been raised about violence directed at minors, including the potential recruitment of children, sexual violence, abductions and extrajudicial killings. At present it remains unclear to what extent these concerns have materialized (SCI 15/06/14).
- Monitoring at key checkpoints and border crossings, including at Gwer, where the bridge has been destroyed and IDPs are obliged to cross the river, needs to be improved. (PI 12/06/14)
- Some children and women, especially those living in parks or unfinished buildings, have resorted to begging (PI 12/06/14).
- A civilian vehicle ban and a general curfew has been in place in Mosul since 9 June (UNAMI 15/06/14 IOM 11/06/14).
- There is a lack of child-friendly spaces for IDP children in Erbil (SCI 15/06/14).

Electricity

- Few areas in Mosul receive electricity and only for one or two hours per day. (IOM 11/06/2014).

Fuel

- Fuel stations are functional but have reportedly capped purchases at 20 litres per day, still at the regular prices (DailyBeast 16/06/14).
- Fuel production has been halted at the Baiji refinery, Iraq's largest and the key refinery for the north. Reserves of diesel, kerosene, and petrol are reportedly only sufficient for the coming month (IBTimes 17/06/14).

Communications

- Cellphone networks still function in Mosul, but the internet has been cut off, reportedly by Baghdad (SCI 15/06/04 DailyBeast 16/06/14).

Affected Vulnerable Groups

- Children, women, and the elderly, and especially those who have resorted to begging or negative coping mechanisms in the absence of resources or breadwinners.
- Approximately 1 million IDPs and 110,000 stateless people in Iraq eligible for assistance from UNHCR, including: Palestinians granted asylum by the previous regime, who live in locations across Iraq; some 250,000 Syrian refugees, the majority of whom reside in KR-I or Anbar governorate; Refugees and asylum-seekers of Kurdish Iranian or Turkish origin; growing numbers of Iraqi returnees from neighboring countries (UNHCR 2014 UNHCR 15/05/14).

Humanitarian Constraints

- Access to ISIL-held areas remains a challenge mere days after the takeover. In the absence of security guarantees, humanitarian agencies are likely to adopt caution, which will delay assistance to communities in need.
- The road connecting Baghdad with Khanaqeen is reported closed. Any assistance to Khanaqeen must for the moment pass through KR-I (UNAMI 15/06/14).

Potential Aggravating Factors

- **Developments in Syria influence the Iraqi arena**, and vice versa. Not only is Iraq receiving Syrian refugees in large numbers, it is also reabsorbing Iraqi returnees, who are vulnerable to secondary displacement. The large numbers of refugees, returnees and now IDPs are placing even greater strain on the local infrastructure and essential services. Socioeconomic development is stagnating, and institutional capacity is limited, which will hamper the ability of IDPs and refugees to re-assimilate into society (UNHCR, 2014).
- **The call-to-arms by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and redeployment from Syria of Iraqi Shi'ite volunteer fighters** threatens to ratchet up the level of sectarian violence already endemic within Iraq. This will be all the more pronounced if military discipline and command-and-control remain haphazard. Between January and end May 2014, UNAMI estimates that at least 799 Iraqis were killed and another 1,409 injured in terrorism and violence (OHCHR 13/06/14 NYTimes 12/06/14).
- **De facto Kurdish control of Kirkuk and parts of Mosul, key territorial flashpoints** between the Baghdad government and the KRG, may further encourage the latter's secessionist bent, setting the stage for another bout of armed conflict. Whether the Kurds secede will depend more on the KRG's neighbours Turkey, and to an extent, Iran (Stratfor 17/06/14).

- **If ISIL returns to the draconian brand of justice associated with it in Syria**, or at least with its recent, alleged execution of 1,700 captured ISF members in Tikrit, the protection situation in areas under its control could deteriorate. For now, ISIL seems to be largely respecting residents and attempting to improve everyday life in cities it controls. Indeed, many Mosul residents are so hostile to Baghdad that they have apparently so far welcomed ISIL's takeover. Also, many ISIL fighters happen to originate from Mosul, which may also explain the current lack of violence (PI 12/06/14 DailyBeast 16/06/14 NYTimes 12/06/14 RT 16 June 2014)
- **Election-related violence.** Maliki's State of Law may have won the parliamentary majority, announced at the end of May, but his persistent exclusion of leading Shia and Sunni rivals, and the multiple bombings that took place across the country during the period, very likely presage another cycle of violence aimed at his increasingly authoritarian style of government (ICG 01/06/2014).
- Heat in summer throughout Iraq will make life on the move much harder for IDPs, render shelters and water supply even more crucial, and is expected to attend a rise in morbidity patterns such as cholera and other communicable diseases (WHO 13/06/14).
- **Foreign military intervention**, especially one involving ground operations, will heighten further still the already prevailing humanitarian risks.

Response Capacity

- The KRG has granted safe passage to some 300,000 IDPs (two-thirds in Dohuk and the rest in Erbil). It has established two IDP camps, in Dohuk and Erbil. Resources are stretched as large numbers of Syrian civilians have already sought refuge in the region. This comes amid a worsening financial crisis linked to the KRG's first international oil shipment via Turkey and the central Government's consequent decision to cut budget payments to Erbil, which according to the constitution amounts to 17% of the national budget. (OilPrice 20/01/14 Reuters 17/03/14 UNAMI 15/06/14).
- Khazir camp, set up on 11 June at the Khazir checkpoint into Erbil governorate, 40km from Mosul, is a permanent camp hosting about 1,700 individuals. No material problems were noted at the time of this report. IDP camps are being established at Al Shikhan. Others are planned for Telkaif (UNAMI 15/06/14 SCI 15/06/14 PI 17/06/14).
- Rapid protection assessments have been conducted by interagency teams for 2,340 individuals/520 households in Erbil (PI 17/06/14).
- WFP has approved an Immediate Response Emergency Operation that will feed 43,500 of the most vulnerable IDPs for two months (WFP 14/06/14).

- The Department of Health in Dohuk is preparing contingency plans in the event of a cholera or typhoid outbreak, despite certain shortages. It has also deployed 5 mobile medical teams on a needs basis (PI 17/06/14).
- UNICEF has dispatched water tanks, showers, hygiene kits and latrines to the newly established Garnawa IDP camp in Dohuk governorate. In Erbil's Khazir camp, it provided additional latrines and water tanks. UNICEF will be the WASH focus in camps. (UNAMI 15/06/14)
- WHO continues to strengthen the KRG's health system outside the camps. In June 2014, it provided interagency emergency health kits, supplementary kits, and cholera kits (WHO 13/06/14).
- The Directorate of Health-Erbil has started operating a mobile clinic for IDPs in Kalak, on the Erbil side of the checkpoint, with MSF's probable short-term support (UNAMI 15/06/14).
- A team of WHO experts from the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) has been deployed in Iraq to analyse the conditions which may increase the likelihood of epidemics, with the aim of improving service delivery in IDP and refugee camps (UNAMI 15/06/14).
- The recent, May round of polio vaccinations covered some 97% of children in Mosul, and is expected to conclude in another round in June, although the organisers face difficulties linked to displacement and incomplete registration. MoH, with support from WHO and UNICEF is undertaking vaccinations of those aged 6 months to 20 years at checkpoints around Khebat camp and three other camps (WHO 13/06/14).
- UNHCR is providing cash assistance, through Muslim Aid, to Anbar IDPs in the KR-I. In the first two weeks of June, some 299 households were surveyed. IRC mobile teams are supporting by identifying and referring potential cash assistance beneficiaries. In Baghdad, an INGO is also distributing cash assistance (PI 12/06/14).
- Iraq's Ministry of Migration and Displacement and civil society organisations in Mosul have responded by providing IDPs with basic non-food relief items. Local authorities have also appealed for support from international agencies as displacement grows and the humanitarian situation deteriorates (IOM 11/06/2014).
- The ICRC has distributed one-month food parcels and other relief items to over 10,000 IDPs in Zummar and al-Qosh, north of Mosul (ICRC 12/06/14).
- The IRCS has released a total of USD 120,000 to the Red Crescent branches currently responding to the IDPs crisis to cover. IRCS Dohuk, in coordination with local authorities, distributed hot meals and water to about a third of the IDPs camped in Badriya. IRCS, in coordination with the Office of Erbil Governor, also helped set up 100 tents at the Khazir camp site (IFRC 13/06/14 ICRC 13/06/14).
- The Iraq Strategic Response Plan is being revised to include the new projected caseload and broader geographic coverage (UNAMI 15/06/14).

- The CERF secretariat is reviewing a concept note for the assistance, likely up to three months, of one million IDPs, with equal numbers from Anbar and Mosul (UNAMI 15/06/14).
- Finally, the refugee appeal is only 18% funded, and the IDP appeal less than 10% funded. An urgent response is required from the international community (IRC 12/06/14).

Information Gaps and Needs

- Numerical or percentile breakdown of the numbers of women, children, and elderly among the displaced.
- Numerical or percentile breakdown of Palestinian refugees, other refugees or asylum-seekers besides Syrians, returnees, and stateless persons.
- Clarifications regarding temporary permits issued to IDPs, and renewal procedures.
- Dynamic protection sitrep in ISIL-controlled cities.
- A profile of coping mechanisms, especially of the most vulnerable.
- Morbidity patterns relating to communicable diseases between Syria and Iraq, given the volume of cross-border movement.
- An approximate cost of living index (price movements of commodities and essential items) in the weeks following ISIL's takeover.