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Côte d'Ivoire*

The present report is a summary of 18 stakeholders' submissions¹ to the universal periodic review. It follows the general guidelines adopted by the Human Rights Council in its decision 17/119. It does not contain any opinions, views or suggestions on the part of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), nor any judgement or determination in relation to specific claims. The information included herein has been systematically referenced in endnotes and, to the extent possible, the original texts have not been altered. As provided for in resolution 16/21 of the Human Rights Council, where appropriate, a separate section is provided for contributions by the national human rights institution of the State under review that is accredited in full compliance with the Paris Principles. The full texts of all submissions received are available on the OHCHR website. The report has been prepared taking into consideration the periodicity of the review and developments during that period.

* The present document was not edited before being sent to United Nations translation services.



I. Information provided by stakeholders

A. Background and framework

1. Scope of international obligations

1. World Coalition Against the Death Penalty noted that in its National Report submitted to the 2009 UPR, Côte d'Ivoire stated that ratification of the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR was "expected in the near future". However, as of 12 September 2013, Côte d'Ivoire had not yet ratified or acceded to the Second Optional.²

2. Joint Submission 2 (JS2) noted that Côte d'Ivoire had not yet ratified a number of international human rights conventions, including the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.³

2. Constitutional and legislative framework

3. Réseau Equitas Côte d'Ivoire (REQCI) noted that the Constitution contained 22 articles on the freedoms, rights and duties of citizens. REQCI also noted that under article 87 of the Constitution, duly ratified treaties and agreements had primacy, once promulgated, over national legislation.⁴

4. Regarding the recommendation made to Côte d'Ivoire during the last UPR review to "finalize the ongoing legislative reforms, particularly those related to family law, the criminal code and the criminal procedural code", the Association des Femmes Juristes de Côte d'Ivoire (AFJCI) said that some but not all articles had been changed. The Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure had not been revised. In that regard, AFJCI recommended the complete revision of the Personal and Family Code, some whose articles seriously undermined the rights of persons.⁵

5. Human Rights Implementation Centre of University of Bristol (HRIC) noted that the Criminal Code did not contain a specific individual offence criminalizing acts of torture per se nor was there a specific definition of 'torture' in the national legislation.⁶ Actions pour la Protection des Droits de l'Homme (APDH) added that perpetrators of torture remained unpunished or inadequately punished because Côte d'Ivoire had not yet incorporated the concept of torture into its Criminal Code.⁷

3. Institutional and human rights infrastructure and policy measures

6. JS2 pointed out that the budget of the National Human Rights Commission had to pass through the Minister of Justice, Human Rights and Civil Liberties before being included in the State budget, which failed to ensure the autonomy and independence of the Commission as required by the Paris Principles.⁸

B. Cooperation with human rights mechanisms

1. Cooperation with treaty bodies

7. HRIC noted that Côte d'Ivoire had not submitted its initial report to the Committee against Torture, which is 15 years overdue.⁹

2. Cooperation with special procedures

8. Joint Submission 1(JS1) recommended that a standing invitation be extended to the UN Special Procedures, particularly to the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders, Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, and Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.¹⁰

C. Implementation of international human rights obligations, taking into account applicable international humanitarian law

1. Equality and non-discrimination

9. With regard to the recommendation to abolish all legislation that discriminates against women, AFJCI stated that provisions had been adopted to support women in relation to marriage. It also noted that basic legislation on living conditions in Côte d'Ivoire still contained many discriminatory provisions. AFJCI further said that Côte d'Ivoire should speed up the legislative review process in order to eliminate all discriminatory provisions.¹¹

2. Right to life, liberty and security of the person

10. JS5 recommended that the Government adopt the new Criminal Code as soon as possible in order to bring the Code into line with the country's international commitments on the abolition of the death penalty.¹²

11. JS2 observed that although disarmament had begun it had not yet been completed. Out of 64,000 former combatants, only 11,000 had been disarmed according to the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Authority. In addition to the former combatants, there were also "dozos" and other parallel forces that had never been disarmed. The national police was not adequately equipped to fulfil its mission.¹³

12. According to JS5, extrajudicial killings had now considerably decreased and were committed mainly by the Forces Républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI), by former combatants who had not been demobilized or by militia who had not been disarmed.¹⁴

13. JS1 stated that intimidation, harassment and attacks on human rights defenders were orchestrated by the Ivorian military and armed factions each accusing activists of supporting either the former regime or the current Government under President Alassane Ouattara. Human rights violations had included arbitrary arrests and detentions, intimidation, harassment and human rights defenders were regularly threatened, a tactic aimed at dissuading them from carrying out their work.¹⁵ JS2 expressed similar concerns.¹⁶

14. HRW noted that in July 2012, members of the Republican Forces and allied militia groups participated in the destruction of the Nahibly internally displaced persons camp near Duékoué, during which some people at the camp were killed or disappeared. In response to a wave of attacks on military installations in August 2012, members of the Republican Forces committed widespread human rights abuses against young men from typically pro-Gbagbo ethnic groups, including mass arbitrary arrests, illegal detention, extortion, cruel and inhuman treatment, and, in some cases, torture. There had been no prosecutions to date for these crimes, although authorities had taken preliminary steps in the Nahibly investigation.¹⁷ APDH and JS2 raised the same concerns.¹⁸ APDH also recommended that Côte d'Ivoire put an end to arbitrary arrests by bringing detainees before a judge within the statutory deadline of 48 hours.¹⁹

15. JS5 noted that enforced disappearances were frequent in Côte d'Ivoire. Many cases had been recorded during the post-election crisis. The report of the National Commission of Inquiry identified many cases of disappeared persons, including many children.²⁰

16. APDH noted that FRCI forces continued to commit abuses on civilian populations in the course of identity controls at illegal roadblocks.²¹

17. REQCI reported that, since the post-election crisis of November 2010, there had been a significant increase in gender-based violence, particularly sexual violence.²² It also reported that female genital mutilation continued to be practised throughout the territory.²³

18. With reference to the recommendation to “take all measures to protect women against all forms of sexual violence and bring to an end the related impunity”, AFJCI noted that violence against women had increased in the country. Accordingly, AFJCI said that there was a need to make police stations and similar premises more approachable by introducing the presence of women in the police force or the gendarmerie in order to enable women survivors of sexual violence to file complaints. AFJCI added that such a move would put an end to the growing impunity that arose from the fact that victims were rebuked or were ashamed to explain their misfortune to men.²⁴

19. With reference to the recommendation to “provide adequate support to the victims of sexual violence, in particular through the provision of counselling services and safe places”, the AFJCI noted that the only centre established for that purpose was not functioning very effectively, while some centres were functioning well, they had been created and were managed by NGOs, that ensured the “safety” of women victims of sexual violence. AFJCI suggested that the State could subsidize the NGOs that ran shelters and could also approach women’s NGOs that wished as part of their strategic plan to create a shelter, which the State could provide with logistical and financial support.²⁵

20. Regarding the recommendation to investigate cases of domestic violence and sexual abuse at schools and sanction the perpetrators, AFJCI noted that there was no specific legislation governing domestic violence in Côte d'Ivoire and that the Criminal Code only covered physical violence in general. AFJCI therefore recommended that Côte d'Ivoire adopt a specific law on domestic violence.²⁶

21. Furthermore, JS6 observed that children, even the very youngest, were not protected from abuse — including sexual abuse — at school, which affected their education. JS6 also referred to the fact that school dropout among girls was linked to early pregnancy and especially to sexual violence, which sometimes affected sexual and reproductive health.²⁷

22. Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children stated that despite the Government’s acceptance of recommendations concerning protection of children from violence, the legality of corporal punishment had not changed since the first cycle UPR: corporal punishment of children remains lawful in the home, schools and alternative care settings.²⁸

3. Administration of justice, including impunity, and the rule of law

23. JS2 noted that there were deficiencies in the justice system related to problems of access to justice for populations owing to their distance from courts, the high cost of services and lack of knowledge of the law and legal procedures. Moreover, the justice system was also hampered by a shortage of logistical resources, judges and court officials.²⁹

24. JS5 reported that there were many cases of unlawful pretrial detention. A number of prisoners had remained in pretrial detention for several years. Some of them had been released because the charges against them had not been substantiated, while others had remained imprisoned for a period longer than that provided for by their prison sentence

without receiving any compensation for the harm suffered.³⁰ JS5 added that reparations for unlawful or unjustified detention had rarely been made.³¹

25. HRW stated that the Government had made significant progress in rehabilitating courthouses and prisons, many of which were seriously damaged during the conflict. In June 2013, a long-awaited tribunal opened in Guiglo, in western Côte d'Ivoire, potentially improving access to justice in one of the country's most sensitive regions. However, corruption and lack of independence within the judiciary remained a serious concern, with the one-sided justice for the post-election crisis adding to people's perception that civilian and military officials close to the Government remained above the law. The Government had also been slow to undertake promised reforms that would better protect defendants' rights.³²

26. JS5 noted that the Criminal Code did not criminalize torture and did not contain any provisions prohibiting the use as evidence of confessions obtained under torture.³³

27. With reference to the recommendation to "pay special attention to protection of children of persons in detention or prison", AFJCI recommended that the authorities computerize the records of detainees, by entering factual information such as marital status and physical address, in order to allow the competent services to take care of the children of detainees.³⁴

28. JS7 stated that prisons in Côte d'Ivoire were generally overcrowded. On the basis of 5m² of space per person, prison capacity was estimated at 4,078 prisoners, but JS7 estimated prison overcrowding at some 243 per cent for the country as a whole.³⁵

29. JS5 recommended that the Government should reduce prison overcrowding by opposing unlawful pretrial detention and providing for alternatives to detention for some offences, and should improve food and sanitation in places of detention.³⁶

30. JS5 noted that persons were placed under police custody for civil reasons such as non-payment of rent or child maintenance or occupation of land without a land title. Such abuses of authority were widespread on account of poverty, which prevented defendants from being assisted by a lawyer.³⁷

31. HRW noted that the Government had increased the judiciary's budget in an effort to improve access to justice.³⁸ HRW also noted that while Ivorian authorities had investigated and charged numerous Gbagbo supporters for their role in post-election violence, there had been a complete absence of accountability for serious crimes committed by pro-Ouattara forces during the crisis, continuing the country's dangerous legacy of impunity. The one-sided justice had also undermined much-needed reconciliation efforts.³⁹ JS3 also reported that the doctrine of victors' justice produced unilateral justice in respect of post-election violence and exacerbated the dangerous legacy of impunity in Côte d'Ivoire.⁴⁰

32. HRW elaborated that despite the Government's rhetoric and creation of national justice institutions, there had been scant progress toward fair and impartial accountability for the massive human rights abuses committed. On the Gbagbo side, Ivorian authorities had notably charged more than 150 civilian and military leaders, including at least 55 with serious violent crimes. However, two and a half years after the crisis, trials had yet to start. Most defendants had languished in pretrial detention for that entire period, violating their right to a trial within a reasonable time. Ivorian authorities did provisionally release 14 pro-Gbagbo defendants in early August 2013.⁴¹

33. In that regard, JS2 noted that the National Commission of Inquiry had published its report in August 2012, in which it had referred to serious crimes, attributed to both Gbagbo and Ouattara supporters. To date, there appeared to have been no judicial follow-up in response to the recommendations of the report. JS2 also noted that the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission had been created on 13 July 2011 and officially established in

September 2011, with a two-year mandate, to shed light on past and recent crimes. One month before the end of its mandate, neither investigations, nor public hearings, nor national consultations had yet begun. Moreover, JS2 stated that a special investigation unit had been set up to investigate and prosecute perpetrators of crimes committed during the post-election crisis, including serious crimes. However, JS2 stressed that a change of judges had led to instability in the special investigation unit and had undermined its effectiveness. Some 99 per cent of persons prosecuted to date were pro-Gbagbo supporters.⁴²

34. HRW also noted that while there had been some progress in security sector reform since the crisis, significant challenges remained. Several military commanders repeatedly implicated in serious human rights abuses had been promoted to key positions.⁴³

35. In addition, HRW stated that during the post-election crisis, members of the armed forces on both sides committed targeted acts of sexual violence against women perceived as supporters of the other side – continuing a disturbing practice that dates back to the 2002–2003 armed conflict. While Côte d'Ivoire's national commission of inquiry documented 196 cases of sexual violence and noted that rape was used as a weapon of war, there had not been any prosecutions to date for these crimes. Even after the post-election crisis, sexual violence remained a widespread problem, with authorities often responding ineffectively.⁴⁴

4. Right to marriage and family life

36. REQCI noted that the Minors Act contained discriminatory provisions against women in respect of the rights recognized to fathers and mothers over the person and property of their minor children. For instance, article 6 of the Act used the term “paternal authority” rather than “parental authority”, which gave men the exercise of those rights.⁴⁵

37. REQCI also noted that some of the articles contained discriminatory provisions, including in the event of remarriage of divorced persons, when women had to wait 300 days before remarrying, while no waiting period was required for men.⁴⁶

38. JS2 recommended that Côte d'Ivoire broadly disseminate the Marriage Act.⁴⁷

39. According to JS4, between 2000 and 2011 79 per cent of births were registered in urban areas compared with 41 per cent in rural areas. The birth registration rate thus remained relatively low in Côte d'Ivoire despite the Government's efforts to organize procedures that would enable every child to obtain a birth certificate free of charge. The low birth registration rate denied many children official legal status and, as a consequence, a number of rights such as the rights to nationality, education and social security. Moreover, children were left much more vulnerable to risks of exploitation and forced labour in illegal and undeclared networks.⁴⁸

5. Freedom of religion or belief, expression, association and peaceful assembly, and right to participate in public and political life

40. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) stated that the arbitrary detention and violence to which journalists were subjected showed that the UPR recommendations made in that regard in 2009 were far from being implemented, notwithstanding the commitments made by Côte d'Ivoire. Furthermore, RSF noted that the harassment of pro-Gbagbo journalists clearly showed that reconciliation, though advocated by the regime of Alassane Ouattara, had not taken place.⁴⁹

41. APDH noted that since the establishment of the new regime in Côte d'Ivoire in April 2011, freedom of opinion, expression and assembly had been curtailed. The activities of the political opposition and of groups hostile to the regime were generally repressed and dispersed.⁵⁰

42. APDH added that the State media, which were supposed to report on the activities of political parties, were not always impartial, as they were controlled by the Government, in

disregard of the applicable legislation. Thus the activities of the Front Populaire Ivoirien (Ivorian Popular Front) since the end of the post-election crisis had not been fully reported. Newspapers close to the opposition had been suspended or ordered to pay often excessive fines before appearing in court for crimes of opinion or charges of causing offence to the President of the Republic, while pro-Government newspapers had not been penalized.⁵¹

43. JS1 stated that journalists and representatives of the media faced persecution for expressing views critical of the Government. The National Press Council (NPC), the body in charge of regulating print media in the country, had often acted against pro-opposition newspapers and publications critical of the Government.⁵² JS1 noted that in November 2011, journalists of the daily newspaper *Notre Voie* were arrested after publishing information critical of the Government. They were detained at the police station in Abidjan. Etou and Sivori were accused of offending the country's president after publishing a story on 21 November allegedly accusing the president of purchasing luxury cars for his government officials while a majority of Ivoirians wallowed in poverty.⁵³

44. JS1 noted that on 3 March 2011, approximately 3,000 unarmed women who took to the streets to protest against the antics of President Gbagbo in clinging to power after the November 2010 elections were attacked in the town of Abobo by military personnel. The military opened fire on the protesters killing at least seven women and critically wounding others.⁵⁴

45. JS1 recommended that Côte d'Ivoire unconditionally release those still in detention for exercising their rights to freedom of conscience, expression, assembly and association; all cases of arbitrary arrest and detention be fully investigated and be brought to justice; and threats to journalists and representatives of the media be adequately investigated and those found guilty of issuing such threats brought to justice.⁵⁵

46. JS1 recommended that investigations be carried out on the killings of protesters during demonstrations in 2011 and those found guilty should be brought to justice irrespective of their political affiliation; and security forces in charge of crowd control be equipped with non-lethal weapons and provided with training on humane means of crowd control as well as on the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms.⁵⁶

47. APDH said that in addition to the arrest of senior staff of the Front Populaire Ivoirien, the harassment of party militants and the fear of reprisals left communities reluctant to take part in any of the legislative, municipal or regional elections. JS2 expressed similar concerns. JS2 also said that the legislative and local elections of December 2012 and April 2013 had resulted in some places in violence and destruction of electoral material.⁵⁷

6. Right to work and to just and favourable conditions of work

48. REQCI had found that, as a result of the crisis, some women employed in the private or public sector had been dismissed from their jobs, in violation of national labour legislation.⁵⁸

49. JS4 noted that children worked from a very early age in families performing domestic chores or were employed in coffee or cocoa plantations or in mines. Furthermore, child labour was aggravated in cases of forced labour or trafficking. Unfortunately, notwithstanding awareness-raising campaigns, the problem persisted in the country, particularly in some regions and even in urban areas, where domestic workers were in demand.⁵⁹

7. Right to health

50. JS4 stated that people's access to medical care remained difficult on account of the high costs of consultations and medicines and other medical services. Despite the positive

initiative taken by the Government in 2011 to guarantee free medical care in public hospitals, especially for women and children, the lack of medicines and equipment had led people to attend more expensive clinics. Corruption was one of the reasons for the lack of resources in the public medical sector, insofar as the medicines provided by the public health pharmacy were often diverted to the parallel illegal market.⁶⁰

51. JS6 noted that the immunization coverage for diseases targeted by the Expanded Immunization Programme was low as a result of logistical problems, including the lack of equipment, an inadequate cold chain and the disruption of mobile vaccination strategies. Epidemic outbreaks occurred as a result, and due to the deterioration of public health during the post-election crisis and of the slow rate of full redeployment of public health institutions.⁶¹

52. In that regard, JS6 recommended that the Government improve access for children, particularly newborns, to preventive and curative health services, through increased investment in capacity-building for health personnel in order to benefit the most vulnerable mothers and newborns.⁶²

53. Although funds had been raised, JS2 noted the inadequate coordination, follow-up and evaluation of anti-HIV activities undertaken by the Ministry of Health and the Fight against AIDS, as a result of which preventive and curative health services were geographically inaccessible and poorly distributed in some areas.⁶³

8. Right to education

54. JS2 reported that in Côte d'Ivoire the right to education was poorly respected. The State had taken no practical measures to make school compulsory. Many school-age children did not attend school, while others were taken out of school before the age of 15. JS2 added that the system of free primary education was ineffective. Not only were school textbooks distributed late and in insufficient numbers, but enrolment fees and other contributions, although prohibited by the State, were often demanded of parents. Inadequate school infrastructure, excessive numbers of pupils and too few teachers led to poor-quality education.⁶⁴

55. JS4 recommended that Côte d'Ivoire improve the quality of its school infrastructure by opening new classes in order to ensure decent schooling conditions for pupils and reduce enrolment fees for public sector higher education institutions. That would allow the most disadvantaged to access university education.⁶⁵ JS6 made similar recommendations.⁶⁶

56. JS7 stressed the need to request technical and financial assistance from the international community in order to continue offering human rights education and training at all educational levels.⁶⁷

9. Persons with disabilities

57. JS2 highlighted the case of certain persons with disabilities, including deaf mute and blind persons, whose characteristics were not covered by the law.⁶⁸

58. According to SOS Exclusion, the quality of specialized education for persons with disabilities should be consistent with the standards and objectives of general education. There were virtually no special measures for the education of persons with disabilities or specialized public centres, while private centres were extremely expensive. Thus the needs of persons with disabilities were not accommodated in the mainstream education system.⁶⁹

10. Indigenous peoples

59. Club Union Africaine Côte d'Ivoire (Club UACI), having examined the main obstacles to the implementation of the 1998 Rural Land Act, noted that they stemmed not only from ignorance of the law and of the procedures related to its implementation, but also and especially from an insufficiently developed implementation mechanism (inadequate

logistical resources and mobility of decentralized departments) and little action being taken to prevent and settle land disputes.⁷⁰

60. In the light of the foregoing and in order to reduce land disputes with a view to effectively promoting and protecting human rights in Côte d'Ivoire, Club UACI recommended establishing and training village rural land management committees throughout the national territory and deciding to authorize Ministry of Agriculture officials, including land officials, to set up boundary posts as part of the plot demarcation process. That decision would reduce the costs of land certificate applications and the monopoly of chartered land surveyors; provide decentralized departments with supplies of land registration application forms; offer Ministry of Agriculture officials training in conflict management and prevention; and launch an extensive information campaign to publicize the Rural Land Act throughout the territory and raise public awareness of the formalities required to obtain a land certificate.⁷¹

61. JS2 noted that rural land issues in fact continued to be a source of conflict, as recently demonstrated by the conflict that had arisen in the department of Koro (40 kms from Touba), in the region of Bafing. The land dispute had taken place between the indigenous populations, on the one hand, and non-indigenous and immigrant populations (Burkina Faso nationals, Baoulé and Lobi), on the other, and had led to the destruction of 1,668 hectares of plantation and 535 households, and 3 serious injuries.⁷²

11. Internally displaced persons

62. HRW stated that the Government had failed to adequately support local administrative and judicial mechanisms involved in resolving land conflicts, resulting in many people being unable to access their land more than two years after the post-election crisis. During the 2009 UPR, a key accepted recommendation was the need to swiftly disseminate and implement the country's law on rural land tenure. This remained a pressing need. Western Côte d'Ivoire had experienced some of the country's worst atrocities over the last decade and could prove host to more atrocities if the Government would not ensure the fair resolution of land disputes.⁷³

12. Right to development and environmental issues

63. JS4 stated that the illegal and non-sustainable exploitation of natural resources and its impact on local communities were of growing concern. Since the military and political crisis of 2002, during which the authorities had departed from some regions of the country, many forest areas had been excessively — or even illegally — exploited, as in the west and centre of the country, with the exploitation of natural essences, sometimes in protected forests. The exploitation of forest resources led to massive deforestation for the purposes of mining and agriculture.⁷⁴

64. JS4 further stated that the non-sustainable exploitation of forest resources also had an impact on local populations. The establishment of extractive industries led to population displacement. The compensation paid by mining companies to the State for the benefit of displaced populations did not always reach the intended beneficiaries, especially since the views of the displaced populations were not sufficiently taken into account.⁷⁵

65. According to JS4, the massive pollution caused by the spreading of more than 500 tons of oil-derived toxic products offloaded by the ship Probo Koala in the city of Abidjan in 2006 still had repercussions. The toxic waste had had serious effects on the health of individuals, with more than 17 deaths and some 40,000 cases of intoxication being reported as a result of the pollution.⁷⁶

66. The Union des Victimes des Dechets Toxiques d'Abidjan et Banlieues (Union of Victims of Toxic Waste of Abidjan and Its Surrounding Areas) recommended that Côte d'Ivoire be fully committed to finding a definitive solution to the problem through initiatives such as granting victim status to persons suffering from the various diseases

caused by the toxic waste in order to enable them to receive assistance; entrusting recognized associations with the management of hospitals built for persons suffering from diseases caused by the toxic waste; and disseminating environmental conventions by providing capacity-building training for the various stakeholders involved in the implementation of the conventions.⁷⁷

Notes

- ¹ The stakeholders listed below have contributed information for this summary; the full texts of all original submissions are available at: www.ohchr.org.

Civil society

Individual submissions

AFJCI	ASSOCIATION DES FEMMES JURISTES DE COTE D'IVOIRE, Abidjan, (Côte d'Ivoire);
APDH	Actions Pour La Protection Des Droits De L'Homme, Abidjan, (Côte d'Ivoire);
CLUB UACI	Club Union Africaine Côte d'Ivoire, Abidjan, (Côte d'Ivoire);
GIEACPC	Global Initiative to End All Forms of Corporal Punishment of Children, London (UK);
HRIC	Human Rights Implementation Centre of University of Bristol, Bristol (United Kingdom);
HRW	Human Rights Watch, Geneva (Switzerland);
SOS Exclusion	SOS Exclusion (Côte d'Ivoire);
REQCI	Réseau Equitas Côte d'Ivoire;
RSF	Reporters Sans Frontières, Paris (France);
UVDTAB	UNION DES VICTIMES DES DECHETS TOXIQUES D'ABIDJAN ET BANLIEUES, Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire);
WCADP	World Coalition Against the Death Penalty, Montreuil (France).

Joint submissions

JS1	Joint submission 1 submitted by: CIVICUS, Johannesburg (South Africa); West African Human Rights Defenders Network; and Coalition Ivoirienne des Défenseurs des Droits Humains;
JS2	Joint submission 2 submitted by: Centre Féminin pour la démocratie et les droits humains en Côte d'Ivoire (CEF-CI); Coalition Ivoirienne des Défenseurs des Droits Humains (CIDDH); Club Union Africaine Côte d'Ivoire (CLUB UACI); Ligue Ivoirienne des Droits de l'Homme (LIDHO); and Mouvement Ivoirien des Droits Humains (MIDH);
JS3	Joint submission 3 submitted by: Syndicat National de la Recherche et de l'Enseignement Supérieur (SYNARES); Fédération des Syndicats Autonomes de Côte d'Ivoire (FESACI); Confédération Ivoirienne des Syndicats Libres-DIGNITE (CISL-DIGNITE); Réseau Ivoirien de la Défense de Droits de l'Enfant et de la Femme (RIDDEF); Enseignants d'Ici et d'Ailleurs (EIA); Réflexions et Actions pour la Promotion des Initiatives Démocratiques (RAPID); Initiative Paix et Solidarité (IPS); Ligue Ivoirienne des Groupements Estudiantines et Solidarité (LIGES); Observatoire de la Démocratie et des Libertés Publiques en Afrique (ODLPA); and Organisation pour l'Assistance aux Détenus de Côte d'Ivoire (OADCI);
JS4	Joint submission 4 submitted by: Franciscans International (FI); and Social Justice (Côte d'Ivoire);
JS5	Joint submission 5 submitted by: Action des chrétiens pour l'abolition de la torture en Côte d'Ivoire, Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire) and Fédération Internationale de l'Action des Chrétiens pour l'Abolition de la Torture;
JS6	Joint submission 6 submitted by: Forum des ONG et Associations d'Aide à l'Enfance en Difficulté; Association des Enfants et Jeunes Travailleurs de Côte d'Ivoire;

JS7 Joint submission 7 submitted by: REDHCI composed of: Action des Chrétiens pour l'Abolition de la Torture; Association des Femmes Juristes de Côte d'Ivoire; Amnesty International, section Côte d'Ivoire; Ligue Ivoirienne des droits de l'Homme; SOS Exclusion Côte d'Ivoire; and Grenier International.

- ² WCADP, paras. 2–3.
- ³ JS2, para. 7.
- ⁴ REQCI, paras. 6–7.
- ⁵ AFCJI, p. 2.
- ⁶ HRIC, para. 9.
- ⁷ APDH, p. 2.
- ⁸ JS2, para. 20.
- ⁹ HRIC, para. 3.
- ¹⁰ JS1, para. 5.4.
- ¹¹ AFJCI, p. 2.
- ¹² JS5, p. 12.
- ¹³ JS2, para. 45.
- ¹⁴ JS5, p. 11.
- ¹⁵ JS1, para. 3.1.
- ¹⁶ JS2, para. 10.
- ¹⁷ HRW, p. 2. See also JS2, para. 23.
- ¹⁸ APDH, p. 2 and JS2, para. 25.
- ¹⁹ APDH, p. 3.
- ²⁰ JS5, p. 12.
- ²¹ ADPH, p. 3.
- ²² REQCI, para. 19.
- ²³ REQCI, para. 22.
- ²⁴ AFJCI, p. 2. See also JS2, paras. 26–28.
- ²⁵ AFJCI, pp. 2–3.
- ²⁶ AFJCI, p. 4.
- ²⁷ JS6, para. 3.2.
- ²⁸ GIEACPC, para. 1.2.
- ²⁹ JS2, para. 52.
- ³⁰ JS5, p. 9.
- ³¹ JS5, p. 10.
- ³² HRW, p. 3.
- ³³ JS5, p. 3.
- ³⁴ AFJCI, p. 4.
- ³⁵ JS7, p. 6.
- ³⁶ JS5, p. 6.
- ³⁷ JS5, p. 7.
- ³⁸ HRW, p. 1.
- ³⁹ HRW, p. 1.
- ⁴⁰ JS3, p. 6.
- ⁴¹ HRW, p. 2.
- ⁴² JS2, paras. 14–16. See also JS5, p. 1.
- ⁴³ HRW, p. 4.
- ⁴⁴ HRW, p. 4.
- ⁴⁵ REQCI, para. 25.
- ⁴⁶ REQCI, para. 26.
- ⁴⁷ JS2, para. 65.
- ⁴⁸ JS4, para. 14.
- ⁴⁹ RSF, p. 3.
- ⁵⁰ ADPH, p. 4.
- ⁵¹ ADPH, p. 4.
- ⁵² JS1, para. 2.1.
- ⁵³ JS1, para. 2.7.

- ⁵⁴ JS1, para. 4.2.
 - ⁵⁵ JS1, para. 5.1.
 - ⁵⁶ JS1, para. 5.3.
 - ⁵⁷ JS2, para. 34.
 - ⁵⁸ REQCI, para. 29.
 - ⁵⁹ JS4, para. 18.
 - ⁶⁰ JS4, para. 11.
 - ⁶¹ JS6, para. 3.1.
 - ⁶² JS6, para. 3.1.
 - ⁶³ JS2, para. 50.
 - ⁶⁴ JS2, paras. 38–41. See also SOS Exclusion, para. 3.1.
 - ⁶⁵ JS4, para. 10.
 - ⁶⁶ JS6, para. 3.2.
 - ⁶⁷ JS7, pp 3–4.
 - ⁶⁸ JS2, para. 55.
 - ⁶⁹ SOS Exclusion, para. 3. 4.
 - ⁷⁰ Club UACI, para. 21.
 - ⁷¹ Club UACI, paras. 22–27.
 - ⁷² JS2, para. 18.
 - ⁷³ HRW, p. 3.
 - ⁷⁴ JS4, para. 21.
 - ⁷⁵ JS4, para. 22.
 - ⁷⁶ JS4, para. 25.
 - ⁷⁷ UVDTAB, p. 4.
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