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**PROFILE OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT :
SOMALIA**

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PROFILE SUMMARY

Since the 1970s Somalia has been in a state of fluctuating complex emergency, characterized by more than one interstate and internal wars, major famines, and a serious humanitarian crisis in the 1990s, partly the result of international mismanagement. The Somali conflict has centered around the appropriation of resources such as land, relief items, as well as control over the livestock trade. At the height of fighting in 1992, up to 2 million people were displaced and up to half a million had died (USCR 1998, p. 92; USCR 1995, p.75). By mid-2002, rough estimates indicated that more than 400,000 were displaced in the country (UN November 2001, p. 5). Due to chronic conflict upsurges combined with the Somali nomadic lifestyle, information on IDPs in Somalia has been very hard to collect, and has made the extent of displacement difficult to assess. However, the sporadic indicators available, typically show unparalleled levels of distress. After a somewhat hopeful start in 2001, an upsurge of inter-factional fighting and a third consecutive year of drought, have pushed Somalia back on the forsaken path and new displacements are on the rise.

From dictatorship to warlordism

In 1969 Barre's military coup instored a dictatorial regime, and its clan divide-and-rule polity, succeeded in polarizing grievances into clan-based wars and eventually splintered its own support-base. During the 1980s, the Isaak clan in the north and the Hawiye in the south were victims of persecutions and massacres, and by late 1990 there were at least 400,000 internally displaced Somalis (USCR 1991). In 1991, the loose anti-government coalition which overthrew Barre splintered and proved incapable to change pre-established war patterns. Thereafter until today, the race for power, which went hand in hand with the usurpation of public resources, erupted in violent militia wars. Warlords fought to forcibly establish their hegemony over Somalia's most fertile lands in the south -- between the Jubba and the Shabelle rivers -- as well as key ports like Mogadishu. Warlords left wrecked societies, where hungry, displaced and unemployed young men, craving for a sense of worthiness, provided an easy pool of untrained militias recruits. Since more than ten years, the people of Somalia remain some of the most vulnerable in the world, as no functioning government has provided them with civil rights and protection.

Initially received with great optimism, the Transitional National Government (TNG), presided by Mr. Abdulkassim Salat Hassan was established in September 2001. However, it has found it increasingly difficult to assert control over Mogadishu and it has no recognition from Somaliland and Puntland, which established their autonomy in 1991 and 1998 respectively. During the latest cycle of national unrest, trouble is not only restricted to the forlorn areas of southern Somalia but has spread to these historically calmer regions. The self-proclaimed Somaliland Republic in the North, was somewhat more successful in promoting grass-root peace processes and institutional change, (a multi-party system was voted in 2001), and in the aftermath of late President Egal's death, his deputy, Dahir Riyale Kahin was sworn in (UNICEF, 12 June 2002). In Puntland leader's reluctance to delegate political power when his term elapsed fuelled the worst conflict in six years in the region. Furthermore, in April 2002 the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) set up a new regional administration in the Bay and Bakol regions of southwestern Somalia. To complicate the picture, Ethiopia in violation of Somalia's sovereignty and the UN Security Council's arms embargoes, is providing ammunitions to factions opposed to the TNG, and Ethiopian troops had invaded Gedo and Bakool (UN SC 17 May 2002).

Causes of Displacement

Somalis, have fled from war-induced famines and generalized violence. Warlords purposely looted and destroyed food stocks, mined water-points, grazing lands and major trading roads, destroyed medical and administrative infrastructures, with the intent to prevent people from another clan from sustaining a livelihood. Armed factions waged battles in order to claim clan sovereignty over their supposed 'native

territories' traditionally belonging to other clans, thus forcing local populations to become loyal to their invaders, and often demanding payment in exchange of 'protection'.

The regions most ravaged by conflict, have been in the South – most notably Gedo, Bay, Bakool, Lower and Middle Juba as well as the main ports of Mogadishu and Kismayo, where the livestock trade concentrates. Since July 2001, southern Somalia has been prey to flare ups of violent confrontations. Clans opposed to the TNG and warlord factions grouped under the umbrella of the Somalia Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC), have now taken up arms against the TNG forces and its allied militias, resulting in heightened clashes in the capital as well as in other parts of Southern Somalia. Bloody confrontations over the control of Kismayo port and in Lower and Middle Juba, forced many people to flee. Similarly, in Bay and Bakool, conflict between TNG and SRRC forces claimed hundreds of lives, and since March 2002 acute violence in Gedo forced tens of thousand people to flee the region.

In addition, the traditionally most fertile riverine lands, are also now situated where drought conditions are most severe. The successive crop failures and other natural calamities have pushed Somalis to move in search of water, food and medical assistance, notably to the Lower Shabelle areas of Mogadishu and Merka. As a result of the third consecutive year of drought in 2002, in the regions of Bay, Bakool, Gedo and Hiran, water reservoirs were seriously depleted and crop production severely reduced (IRIN-CEA 9 July 2001; UNICEF 7 September 2001).

Many IDPs come from the farming Bantu and Bajuni communities as well as the Rahanweyn clan, which have had a low social status in Somalia and have suffered a long history of discrimination and land dispossession. In 1999, in Baidoa (Banadir region), Aideed's militias committed human rights violations mainly against the Rahanweyn minority group. During the first half of 1999, 20,000 people were internally displaced and 30,000 fled across the border (USCR 2000, pp.115-116). While protection is granted through clan affiliation, the Bantu and Bajuni groups, politically less organized, have been particularly exposed to serious human rights abuses (Menkhaus, November 2000, p. 9).

Patterns of Displacement and Living Conditions

Tracking displaced populations in Somalia is particularly difficult as virtually all Somalis have been displaced by violence at least once in their life. Furthermore, 80 percent of Somalis live a nomadic and semi-nomadic lifestyle, traditionally moving with their herds to and from grazing lands and water sources. However, wars and severe droughts have complicated and hampered these seasonal migrations, and since the 1990s families have increasingly moved to urban areas in search of humanitarian assistance. This greatly complicates the targeting of humanitarian assistance, as other urban poor or returnees are no less needy.

Scattered in overcrowded urban areas, IDPs mingle with other indigent groups and refugees who are returning in waves, especially to the north, where they enjoy some degree of stability. IDPs tend to shelter around Hargeysa (Somaliland), where there are four camps; and Bosasso in Puntland, shelters tens of thousands 10,000 IDPs (UN CHR, 26 January 2000, p.32). It is estimated that between 100,000 and 250,000 displaced persons in Mogadishu live in approximately 200 camps and squatter settlements (UN November 2001; USCR 2001). However, since 1999 there were hardly any IDP camps left in the country, and the displaced are increasingly dispersed (UN November 2001).

The combination of IDPs mingling with other indigent groups, acute insecurity and rareness of camps, makes IDP's conditions very difficult to assess. However, from the few surveys compiled, an extremely distressing reality transcends. Renewed fighting and drought mean that conditions in the camps that do exist are presumably more crowded than ever with diseases reportedly widespread. Diarrhea and dehydration are the second cause of death, reflecting the fact that less than 20 percent Somalis have access to safe drinking water and proper sanitation is lacking (US Fund for UNICEF 6 September 2000, "Water and Sanitation"; UN March 2001, p. 27). Serious outbreaks of cholera have been reported especially in Mogadishu (WHO, 23 April 2002). Cerebral malaria is the main killer in Somalia, reflecting the high levels of dislocation to zones where people are not immune against the different types of malaria parasites. The

nutritional status of IDPs, food security reports conducted during 2001 show global malnutrition rates as high as 37 percent, and the internally displaced presumably make up most of the 780,000 people in need of food assistance in 2002 (SC UK January 2002).

People situated in the Gedo region were the worst off, and Action Contre la Faim (ACF) reported an unprecedented increase in the number of IDPs admissions at its supplementary feeding centre in Luuq (ACF 26 July 2001; ACF 21 December 2001). In addition, the towns' solely available overcrowded hospital reported cases of cholera. The extreme scarcity of medical facilities, is compounded by the fact that people constantly on the move find themselves outside of the health coverage system.

Further stretching coping mechanisms to unparalleled limits, are recent economic shocks which brought Somalia to a state of economic collapse (UNDP-EUE 21 February 2001). The US closed one of the main money transfer company and the telecommunications systems in November 2001, on alleged grounds of terrorist links. Remittance companies, the single most powerful business in Somalia, generate up to US\$800 million per year. Families relying on relatives abroad for basic survival are now totally destitute. Furthermore, the livestock import ban imposed by the Gulf States since 2000, have caused considerable loss of trade-related employment, affecting at least 80% of the population. In addition, the printing of a new currency led to inflation and drastically reduced purchasing power.

Humanitarian Assistance and Access Impediments

As there are no government structures to provide citizens with social services and protection, neither to channel humanitarian assistance. In response, in 1993, the Somali Aid Coordination Body (SACB) was established to provide policy and operational coordination for rehabilitation and development activities. It hosts under its umbrella the UN Country Team, the NGO Consortium and the Red Cross Movement.

However, there is not one single agency specifically focusing on IDPs, but IDPs are often de-facto included into programmes targeting returning refugees. The Somali Red Crescent is the only humanitarian institution represented across the nation, since 1991, providing health care, disaster preparedness and relief. The NGO Action Contre la Faim has been the most active in assisting IDPs in Mogadishu, and was also one of the only still present in Mogadishu during the 2000 confrontations. Islamic organizations have also assisted IDP in Mogadishu.

In the absence of a widely recognized authority enforcing law and order, extortion, banditry and crime prevail in Somalia. Since the early 1990s, humanitarian agencies rely on militias and gunmen for protection. Humanitarian access has always been obstructed by unpredictable political dynamics and violence, it has however been reported that the 2001 upsurge in fighting has brought it to its lowest point since 1995. Populations in dire need of assistance, in regions of Gedo, Lower and Middle Juba and Middle Shabelle as well as the ports of Bossaso, Mogadishu, Merka and Kismayo, have experienced some of the most intense clashes in years, and have been staying off-limits of regular humanitarian work. Insecurity has been so acute in Southern Somalia, that it has been difficult to plan assistance and deliver it in due time. In Mogadishu and other seriously insecure regions, humanitarian workers are regularly kidnapped or even killed by militias, and the ambush and looting of humanitarian vehicles are common occurrences. As a result, many agencies are forced to momentarily pull out and interrupt their activities. In addition, there is a lack of permanent international presence in the country: UN staff are based in Nairobi and fly in just for some quick missions.

Given considerable access problems and donor fatigue, only 28% of funds were received for humanitarian assistance in May 2002 (UN May 2002), far from sufficient to cover the needs of displaced populations. Astonishingly, the people of Somalia have been extremely resilient and extraordinarily resistant to prolonged extreme situations. Prevalent lack of security is often a prime reason given by donors for lack of funding. However, Somaliland who achieved five consecutive years of peace, is still not recognized by the international community and suffers similar lack of assistance (USCR, December 2001, p.5).

CAUSES AND BACKGROUND OF DISPLACEMENT

General background to present situation

Conflict in Somalia began with struggle to topple Siad Barre in late 1980s

"Siad Barre seized power in 1969 and increasingly employed divisive clan politics to maintain power. Civil war, starvation, banditry, and brutality have wracked Somalia since the struggle to topple Barre began in the late 1980s. When Barre was deposed in January 1991, power was claimed and contested by heavily armed guerrilla movements and militias based on traditional ethnic and clan loyalties. Savage struggles for economic assets by the various factions led to anarchy and famine." (Freedom House 1999, "Overview")

With no central government authority, clan divisions have led to violence and lawlessness since early 1990s

- Somalia has always been divided along clan – rather than religious or ethnic – lines
- Absence of central government authority has left vacuum where violence and lawlessness prevail
- All government infrastructure has been destroyed
- The "black hole" of Somalia is said to attract criminals and subversives

"Clan loyalties are the basis for most civil organization in the vacuum left by the disappearance of central authority. Harsh Islamic law has returned a semblance of order to some areas, including parts of Mogadishu long plagued by lawlessness. Islamic courts are imposing sentences that include executions and amputations in accordance with Shari'a law. Right to free expression and association are ignored. Few autonomous civic or political groups can organize or operate safely. Several small newspapers and newsletters are published in Mogadishu, but the few independent journalists are under constant threat. International correspondents visit only at great risk. Radio stations are mainly operated by various factions, although the United Nations now sponsors new 'peace programming'. During the year, several journalists were arrested in Somaliland for criticizing the local government and suggesting that full press freedom does not exist." (Freedom House 1999, "Political rights and civil liberties")

"Virtually all the infrastructure of government - from buildings and communications facilities to furniture and office equipment - has been looted. All government archives and records, libraries, files and museums have been totally destroyed. In most of the country, there are no police, judiciary or civil service. Communications, apart from private satellite and cellular telephones and radio links, are non-existent. Electricity is not available on a public basis, but only to those who can afford generators. There is no postal service.

[...]

In both informal and formal discussions of the Security Council, member States have expressed concern about the increasingly evident effects of the lack of a functioning central government in Somalia. Somalia is being seen as a 'black hole' where the absence of law and order is attracting criminals and subversives. The Prime Minister of Yemen told my Representative that his Government was concerned about refugee flows from Somalia. He expressed fears that Somalia was being used as a transit-point for the trafficking of narcotic drugs and as a haven for terrorists. President Moi of Kenya called on the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to repatriate tens of thousands of Somali refugees living in north-eastern Kenya. He accused the Somalis of abusing Kenyan hospitality by smuggling arms into the country.

To worsen the situation, a Somali militia group disarmed a Kenyan platoon on 1 July 1999 and stole its equipment. Most of the stolen goods were returned after the Government of Kenya threatened punitive action against the perpetrators. A batch of fake Somali shillings, with an estimated value of \$4 million, arrived in Somalia on 9 and 10 April 1999, followed by a second batch, worth about \$5 million, on 8 June 1999. As a result, the value of the Somali shilling fell from about 7.5 shillings to the dollar to over 10,000 shillings to the dollar. There are now four different Somali shillings in circulation in Somalia.

As a country without a national government, Somalia remains unique. The functions that states perform, such as the provision of social services, including health and education, the regulation, for example, of the movement of goods and persons, control of the environment, airspace and coasts, and so on, as well as the representation of the Somali people in intergovernmental and international fora, are absent, notwithstanding the fact that administrations in some parts of the country, notably in north-western Somalia ('Somaliland') and north-east Somalia ('Puntland'), have begun to provide some basic services to their people.

Somalia is different from other African societies in crisis, given its fundamentally homogeneous character. There is no major religious divide, ethnic division or dispute over the allocation of wealth derived from natural resources. Rather, Somalia is a polity in crisis. It is divided on clan lines, with each clan fearful of the incursions of others. The violence, where it is not simple banditry, is mainly defensive in nature. The crucial missing ingredient is trust. Without trust, there can be no peace or security in Somalia and no central government can be re-established." (UNSC 16 August 1999, paras. 61- 64)

"Somalia is an example where effective government and the accountability of political power are no longer coterminous with a defined national territory. The growth of regional problems across boundaries creates overlapping communities of fate: the fortunes and prospects of individual communities are increasingly bound together. One of the major relationships has been the weather – drought or flooding has had an enormous impact on the whole region." (UN November 1999, p. 6)

International community responded to conflict and famine in Somalia with UN peacekeeping operation (1992-1995)

- UN deployed troops in 1992 despite threatening stance posed by Somali faction leaders
- UNOSOM troops experienced ambushes and suffered casualties in 1993
- All UNOSOM forces were pulled out by 1995

The international response to the armed conflict and the displacement situation was slowed by insecurity due to marauding factions and rampant banditry. Massive infusions of relief aid during the period from August through November 1992 helped to mitigate the impact of famine, but could not eliminate its causes (UN December 1998, p. 4). The continued violence prompted the formation of a UN peacekeeping force known as the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). Soon after their deployment the leaders of some of the contending Somali factions began to take an aggressive, threatening stance toward the United Nations. (UN 1996, p. 9)

"Extensive television coverage of famine and civil strife that took approximately 300,000 lives in 1991 and 1992 prompted an American-led international intervention in Somalia. The armed humanitarian mission in late 1992 quelled clan combat long enough to stop the famine, but ended in urban guerrilla warfare against Somali militias.

The last international forces withdrew in March 1995 after the casualty count reached the thousands. Approximately 100 peacekeepers, including 20 American soldiers, were killed. The \$4 billion United Nations intervention had little lasting impact. Today, neighboring countries and others as far afield as Libya and Egypt are reportedly backing competing warlords." (Freedom House 1999, "Overview")

"In June 1993 Hussein Aïdeed's militia attacked Pakistani UNOSOM peace-keepers in South Mogadishu. Sporadic clashes between UNOSOM II forces and Aïdeed's militia continued until October 1993 when a small US force was ambushed, suffering heavy casualties. The United States withdrew its forces, and by March 1995 all remaining UNOSOM forces had left." (UN December 1998, p. 4)

De facto regional governments have been established since the fall of Barre regime (1991-2002)

- The Northeast region was less affected by conflict and several ports enjoyed economic expansion and Garowe was elected regional capital
- Somaliland proclaims independence in 1991 and after five years of sustained peace 97% of Somaliland voters approved a new constitution (May 2001), the UN does not recognize Somaliland as a sovereign state
- In the aftermath of the passing away of President Egal of Somaliland, Dahir Riyale Kahin his deputy was sworn in
- Northeastern "Puntland" was created in 1998; fierce internal power struggle exploded when former President Abdullahi Yusuf rejected the election of his successor President Jama Ali Jama (Nov-Dec 2001)
- RRA sets up new autonomous region: State of Southwestern Somalia (SWS), headed by former colonel of Barre's secret police (March 2002)

"External encouragement to political consolidation since 1998, however, has taken two somewhat incompatible forms. One, the so-called 'building-block' approach, has sought to encourage the emergence of regional or trans-regional political authorities, as a first step towards a re-unified Somali state with a loose federal or confederal form of government. After UNOSOM's failure at state building, this approach was initially embraced by neighboring countries, the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the executive committee of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SCAB) in the late 1990s [...]. Its advocates consider it the path that can provide a more legitimate grass-roots and participatory form of governance to facilitate the task of rebuilding a war-torn society. Its critics contend that it has limited applicability in the south and that it encourages secessionism and clanism and is designed to meet foreign interests that want to keep Somalia weak and divided.

The second approach, which has regained the support of regional and international bodies, is based on reviving the Somali state through a process of national reconciliation and the formation of a national government, albeit within a federalized system." (UNDP Somalia 2001, pp.51)

"The Northeast region of Somalia was the only region that was spared from the severe levels of physical destruction wrought during the civil war [...]. The region's principal seaport, Bossaso, has also enjoyed a commercial boom, which has driven an impressive economic recovery in the region. A regional authority was established following a meeting of over 400 delegates in 1998. Garowe was selected as the regional capital, a president was elected and line ministries were appointed." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p.3)

Somaliland:

The overthrow of Siad Barre in 1991 led to a *de facto* division of Somalia, with the self-proclamation of the northern Republic of Somaliland on 18 May 1991 as one of the results. (Africa South of the Sahara September 1996, pp. 842-45)

"The Republic of Somaliland has exercised de facto independence since May 1991. It is headed by President Mohammed Ibrahim Egal and based in Hargeisa, where resistance to the Siad Barre dictatorship in the 1980s was most intense. Egal has said that a referendum on independence will not take place until a peace agreement covering the rest of the country has been reached. Somaliland is far more cohesive than the rest of the country, although reports of some human rights abuses persist." (Freedom House 1999, "Political rights")

"In 1991, when the central Government of Somalia collapsed, 'Somaliland' declared itself independent and sought separation from Somalia, citing the massive discrimination its people had suffered during the regime of Siad Barre. Although, the international community and the United Nations, which upholds the territorial integrity of Somalia, have not recognized the separate status of 'Somaliland', the international community has acknowledged with deep appreciation the good level of security and stability that 'Somaliland' has achieved over the years." (CHR 26 January 2000, p. 22)

"The self-declared state of Somaliland, northwestern Somalia, is the second territory in the Horn of Africa in a decade to hold a referendum for full independence. Unlike the Red Sea of Eritrea – which established internationally-recognised independence in 1993 – the Somaliland bid has not only failed to meet with international approval, but has passed by with barely an international whisper.

[...]

Held on 31 May 2001, the Somaliland referendum was characterised by poor preparation, intimidating diaspora propaganda, and an admirable openness at the polling booths. The vote for independence was combined with the vote for a new constitution which brought in sweeping political changes by Somaliland President Muhammad Ibrahim Egal. The first article of the new constitution asserted the independent status of Somaliland, and Article Nine removes the present clan-based system by laying the basis for a new multiparty system." (IRIN-CEA 10 July 2001, Part 1)

"Since 1991, a functional and modest state structure has been established, with a bicameral parliament, judiciary, police force, and municipal structures. The restoration of security has revitalized the economy and facilitated the rehabilitation of the damaged infrastructure and public services. In terms of volume of trade, Berbera port is flourishing, while Hargeisa has the only airport in Somalia that receives regular commercial passenger airlines from the Gulf States and other countries in the region. Revenue raised mainly from import duties has enabled the administration to oversee the formation of a police force, sectoral ministries and municipalities which provide a mechanism for the prioritisation of needs and planning, as well as basic education and health systems. An active local NGO sector, new business initiatives and an active media challenge the stereotypical description of Somalia as aid dependent." (UNDP Somalia 2001, p.52)

"In May 2001, a resounding 97 percent of Somaliland voters approved a new constitution, affirming the self-declared nation's ten-year-old independence from Somalia.

[...]

Somaliland's five years of uninterrupted peace, on of its greatest achievements since declaring independence in 1991, currently presents the international community with a long-awaited opportunity to significantly assist many long-term Somali refugees in repatriating, reintegrating, and rebuilding their homeland." (USCR, December 2001, p.5)

"In the aftermath of the passing away of Mohammed Egal, the President of the Northwest zone of 'Somaliland,' residents of the zone have called for unity, consultative leadership, and consolidation of the nation's gains. The deputy president, Dahir Riyale Kahin, was immediately sworn in as interim President in accordance with the constitution, following an extra-ordinary session held by the three topmost councils in the zone." (UNICEF 12 June 2002)

For full analyses of the Somaliland referendum and its political consequences, please refer to the IRIN-CEA reports on this issue: Part I [External link] and Part II [External link].

Puntland:

"In contrast with 'Somaliland', 'Puntland' does not consider itself a separate entity. Rather, it describes itself as a regional government of Somalia. In her report to the previous session of the Commission on Human Rights (E/CN.4/1999/103), the independent expert reported on how 'Puntland' came into being in 1998. The 'Puntland' Constitutional Conference was held in Garowe, between 15 May and 30 July 1998. It was attended by 470 delegates from the Bari, Nugal, Sool and Sanaag regions, as well as hundreds of observers. None of the delegates were women. The conference ended by formulating a new 'social contract' as a basis for the restoration of effective State authority in these regions." (CHR 26 January 2000, p. 28)

"The area described as the North-east of Somalia or 'Puntland' has the largest surface and the longest coastline in the country. It is an arid area with low potential for developing water resources or rain-fed agriculture. The majority of the largely nomadic population depends on the livestock trade and to a much lesser extent on fishing and dealing in frankincense. Relative peace and security have allowed an export-oriented economy to develop and the north-east is increasingly developing as a region of transition and recovery. Although a government was elected in September 1998, only the President, Vice President and nine ministers [had been appointed as of December 1998]. One of the first priorities of this Administration has been to establish proper security forces (police and prisons) and a judiciary system." (UN December 1998, p. 26)

"For the first time in over six years, the peace that has existed in the zone was broken. This followed a decision by a meeting of elders to cancel the extension of the mandate of President Col. Abdullahi Yusuf's administration that had been given by Parliament, and install an interim President. Militias of groups opposed to Col. Yusuf's regime occupied the airport and seaport, effectively taking control. Col. Yusuf responded through force, and attacked the militias at the airport.

There was fierce fighting in Bossaso for two days. On the second day, Col. Yusuf's forces withdrew from the airport and returned to Garowe. The opposition regained control of the airport. The fighting reportedly led to 20 deaths, and over 60 people injured." (UNICEF 7 September 2001)

"Formed in 1998, Puntland's administrative structures are still embryonic. Lacking the infrastructure and potential revenue sources of Somaliland the administration's impact on public services and the economy has been more limited. However, Puntland can boast active business and NGO sectors. The population of the region has increased greatly since the war as people originally from there fled the south. This has led to high levels of investment by Somalis in housing and businesses and drenches the public's confidence in the political and security situation.

Although relations with Somaliland are strained over border definitions and Puntland's southern border is intermittently insecure, the region has managed to avoid any major security threats for ten years. In June 2001, the administration's three-year term expired. The failure to agree upon a transfer of power led to a constitutional crisis, which has now threatened the region's security." (UNDP Somalia 2001, p.51)

"The term of Puntland leader Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed came to an end in June. Under the Puntland Charter he was replaced temporarily by the President of the Supreme Court, Yusuf Haji Nur. Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed refused to acknowledge his replacement, and supporters of both sides clashed in August in Bosaso, where around 40 people were killed. In November Jama Ali Jama was appointed by elders as the next leader, although this decision was again rejected by Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. Fighting between supporters of both sides broke out in November and December in Garowe, resulting in the deaths of at least 13 people." (AI, January 2002)

"Heavy fighting was reportedly raging near the village of Berta Boqorka, near the town of Qardho some 280 km northeast of Garowe, regional capital of the self-declared autonomous region of Puntland, northeastern Somalia, on Tuesday, according to local media sources.

Forces loyal to the region's former president, Col Abdullahi Yusuf, were reportedly engaged in fierce fighting with forces loyal to Puntland's current president, Jama Ali Jama" (IRIN, 7 May 2002)

"Meanwhile, in the Northeast, former president, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, rejected the outcome of the elections of 2001 where Jama Ali Jama was elected to lead Puntland. Colonel Yusuf has retreated with his forces from Garoowe (political capital) to Galkacyo and has created a separate southwestern state, declaring himself president. Colonel Yusuf has since recaptured Garoowe. Mr. Jama retreated to Bosaso (economic capital). In the Northeast, Mr. Egal's term as leader has been extended by one year by the Parliament and he is engaged in the process of developing a multi-party system of governance in "Somaliland". (UN, May 2002, p.3)

Bay and Bakol:

"Since 1999, the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) has begun to establish an administration in the two southern regions of Bay and Bakol that have been chronically insecure for most of the past decade." (UNDP Somalia, 2001, p.34)

Better security since then has improved the food security situation and access for international aid agencies. Although the RRA participated in the Arta peace conference, some of the leaders withdrew their support soon after it was concluded. Since then the RRA has sought to consolidate its own regional administration. While certain civil structures have been established, the RRA has yet to transform itself into an effective civilian administration." (UNDP Somalia 2001, p.53)

"The Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA), which controls the Bay and Bakol regions, southwestern Somalia, has set up a new regional administration, an RRA senior official told IRIN on Monday. The new autonomous region would be known as the State of Southwestern Somalia, Muhammad Ali Adan Qalinle, the governor of Baidoa, said.

This is the third regional administration to be set up in Somalia, following the establishment of Somaliland (northwestern Somalia) and Puntland (in the northeast).

The decision was reached at a meeting of the RRA central committee and over 70 elders from the Digil and Mirifle clans. The meeting, which had been in session in Baidoa, the capital of Bay Region, 240 km southwest of Mogadishu, since 22 March, elected Colonel Hasan Muhammad Nur Shatigadud, the chairman of the RRA, as president on Sunday. "He was inaugurated in Baidoa today, and will serve an initial four year term," Qalinle told IRIN on Monday. Baidoa will be the capital of the new state.

Shatigadud was a colonel in the notorious secret police, the National Security Service (NSS) of the former dictator Muhammad Siyad Barre, [...]

The move to establish the autonomous region now is seen by Somali observers as a way for the RRA "to come to the talks as an established administration as opposed to a faction". It may also sound the death knell of the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) said one observer. The SRRC is grouping of southern factions opposed to the Transitional National Government." (IRIN, 1 April 2002)

Also see IRIN-CEA report entitled "Somalia: Leader Abdullahi Yusuf chased out of Bosaso" [External link].

Eritreans and Ethiopians both accused of being involved in Somali civil war (1999-2002)

- Ethiopian troops accused to invade Gedo and Bakool violating state sovereignty and non-interference in a country's internal affairs
- Ethiopia accused of violating Security Council resolutions and providing arms to clans opposed to interim government
- Ethiopia and Eritrea have both been suspected of supporting clans in the Somali conflict for some time

Ethiopia in particular is accused of supporting clan factions opposed to new interim government:

"Briefing correspondents on the latest developments in Somalia, he said that in the last few weeks Ethiopian troops had continued to invade two major regions in south-western Somalia: Gedo and Bakool, capturing the capital of the Gedo region, Garbahaarrey, and a vibrant commercial centre near the Kenyan border -- Bulla Hawa. [...]

The invasion has caused many innocent civilian deaths and displacement of thousands of people, he continued. As a result of the fighting, Bulla Hawa had been burning yesterday. In Garbahaarrey, the Ethiopian troops had captured the leadership of the region, whose fate remained unknown. Ethiopian troops were also poised to attack the southern port city of Kismaayo.

Earlier, with Ethiopia's military assistance, a coup d'état had been staged in the north-east of the country, he said, where elected legitimate authorities were overthrown by force. Ethiopia also continued to flood Somalia with all sorts of weapons, including mortars, AK47s and anti-personnel mines. In the last 10 days, large weapons consignments had been shipped by Ethiopia "to its own favouring warlords" in Mogadishu and several other towns.

Ethiopia's aggression against Somalia had become a pattern in violation of relevant Security Council resolutions reaffirming Somalia's unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Both resolutions and presidential statements (the latest of 30 March) adopted by the Council urged in the strongest terms that neighbouring countries should not interfere in the internal affairs of Somalia. The Ethiopian regime was also in violation of the arms embargo imposed by resolution 733 of the Security Council. The continued flow of arms into Somalia posed a threat not only to his country, but to the stability of the whole subregion of the Horn of Africa.

[...]

With regard to the national reconciliation process, Ethiopia continued to be the main obstacle to the achievement of peace and stability in Somalia, he said. It did not want to see a strong, vibrant and unified Somalia -- it wanted a "balkanized" Somalia of small fiefdoms it could dominate. He was asking Ethiopia to stop its aggression.

[...]

He also confirmed that the invasion was continuing at the time of the briefing. As it needed access to sea, Ethiopia was trying to capture Somalia's ports by force.

[...]

What form was the aggression taking? a correspondent asked. Mr. Hashi said that it was a military invasion, with Ethiopia's armed troops entering Somalia's territory.

[...]

Thus, a correspondent suggested, this was not a new, but a continuing, situation. Mr. Hashi responded that since 1996 Ethiopia had been repeatedly crossing the border, and its aggression had become a pattern.

[...]

While invading Somalia, Ethiopia could not be an honest broker in the reconciliation process. For that reason, it should be removed from the committee preparing the national reconciliation process.

[...]

The total number of people displaced by fighting in Somalia was actually unknown." (UNDIP, 17 May 2002)

"The Somali Prime Minister, Ali Khalif Galayr, has accused neighbouring Ethiopia of arming factions opposed to the interim government. Speaking on Djibouti radio and television, Galayr said that Ethiopian arms destined for faction leaders opposed to his government had recently reached the Somali capital, Mogadishu.

The interim Somali government had grown weary of keeping a low profile on Ethiopia's activities in Somalia, Galayr said. 'Ethiopia is obstinately and flagrantly continuing its interference in Somalia and is seeking to revive the civil war', AFP quoted him as saying. Galayr also alleged that an attempt to kidnap Somalia's parliamentary speaker, Abdalla Derow Issak, on Saturday [6 January 2001] had been carried out by a team armed and supported by Ethiopia." (IRIN-CEA 9 January 2001)

"By hosting a group of Somali warlords and other dissidents who this week joined forces in calling for the new regime in Mogadishu to be replaced, Ethiopia has once again shown itself to be a key player in Somalia's political turmoil.

The support Addis Ababa initially lent Somalia's nascent transitional government (STG) – by attending the talks in Arta, Djibouti last year that led to its formation – has proved short-lived.

While the United Nations, the Arab League and the Organisation of African Unity all back the STG, Ethiopia quickly became critical of its top officials, such as President Abdulkassim Salat Hassan, Prime Minister Ali Khalif Galaydh and Speaker of Parliament Abdallah Derrow Issak.

After two weeks of talks in the southern Ethiopian town of Awasa, the Somali faction leaders and other opponents of the STG on Thursday set up a Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) in order to prepare the way for yet another national reconciliation conference which, in theory, will lead to the establishment of a 'legitimate' and more representative government in Mogadishu." (AFP 23 March 2001)

For more details on the supply of ammunitions delivered by Ethiopia to factions opposed to the TNG see UN Security Council document (22 May 2002) [External link]

Eritrea and Ethiopia are said to have been involved in the conflict in Somalia for some time:

"Eritrea and Ethiopia were directly involved in the inter-factional fighting, with Ethiopia supplying troops, hardware and humanitarian support to the Rahenweyn Resistance Army (RRA) in Bay and Bakol. The RRA used its increased military power to contain the advances of Hussein Aideed's forces. Ethiopia also reportedly supported the Somali Salvation Democratic Front which had formed a government in the self-proclaimed Puntland State, and a faction of the United Somali Congress–Peace Movement. Eritrea and Yemen provided arms to the Somali National Alliance (SNA) militias of Hussein Aideed. Around 200 fighters from the Ethiopian armed opposition group the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), supported by Eritrea, were also involved in the Somali conflict on the side of the SNA. Hussein Aideed attended a series of meetings on peace and reconciliation with Ethiopian government officials in October [1999]. His forces subsequently disarmed a group of OLF fighters in their base in Mogadishu." (AI 2000, "Background")

"Mogadiscio est toujours divisée entre différentes factions, avec d'un côté une alliance de circonstance entre Aideed et Mahdi, visant à mettre en place une administration centrale dans la région, et de l'autre une opposition puissante. Les deux alliances sont soutenues respectivement par l'Erythrée et l'Éthiopie, et donc indirectement parties prenantes du conflit." (ACF 2000, "Contexte")

Djibouti peace process resulted in creation of interim government (August 2000)

- Transitional National Assembly elects interim president at peace talks
- International community supports process and president

The Djibouti peace process:

"The peace process, which focuses on civil society groups rather than on faction leaders, was initiated last September [2000] by President Ismail Omar Guelleh of Djibouti. The peace conference started with a civil society technical symposium on 21 March [2000] in Djibouti and is scheduled to end on 15 July." (UNHCHR 10 July 2000, para. 5)

"A major Somali peace conference – the thirteenth peace effort since 1991 – got underway in neighboring Djibouti, attended by some 900 official Somali conferees and more than 1,000 other Somali observers. The gathering, known as the 'Somali Peace and Reconciliation Conference,' was still underway at the end of July [2000]." (USCR 28 August 2000, para. 12)

"The three months have been dominated by the conference in Arta, Djibouti, hosted by the Djibouti government. Several thousand Somalis from all walks of life, many of them living in exile, succeeded in electing a clan-based 245 member parliament after four months of deliberations." (IFRC 18 October 2000, para. 4)

Creation of Transitional National Assembly and election of Somali President:

"After 10 years of civil war, Somali parliamentarians of the Transitional National Assembly at the Djibouti Peace talks held in the town of Arta elected Dr Abd-al Qasim Salad Hasan as President on the morning of 26 August 2000." (UNICEF 7 September 2000, para. 1)

"In contrast to the anarchy and civil war that had prevailed in Somalia for the past 10 years, the recent creation of the National Assembly ushered in a new era for peace and stability and constituted the first step of restoring order and central authority in the country, the President of Somalia told the fifty-fifth regular session of the General Assembly this morning, as it continued its general debate.

The spontaneous reaction of hundreds of thousands of Somalis, he said, demonstrated vividly that they wanted to leave years of civil war behind and open a new era of peace, tranquility, good governance, restoration of the rule of law and national unity. He called upon the warlords to review their positions, hear the voice of reason and respect the legitimate aspirations of the Somali people to achieve national unity, social and economic development, and durable peace." (UNGA 15 September 2000, paras. 2 and 3)

International community supports Somali assembly and newly-elected President:

"On 16 August [2000], the UN Security Council met in informal consultations after which the current President of the Council gave a statement welcoming the Somali parliament and called on all political forces in Somalia to join the ongoing peace process." (UNCU 18 August 2000, para. 2)

"The European Union is willing to enter into dialogue with the new Somali authorities and, once they have established their authority, to support their efforts to rebuild the country, while continuing to give its backing to recovery measures in all areas of Somalia where stable conditions exist.

The European Union calls on the authorities of Somaliland and Puntland to establish constructive relations with the institutions which have emerged from the Arta process. It also urges the future transitional government to establish a constructive dialogue as soon as possible with the aforementioned authorities for the purpose of re-establishing national unity in peace and with respect for the elements of stability achieved." (EU 8 September 2000, paras. 1-3)

For a detailed analysis of the Arta peace process, see November 2000 report by Ken Menkhaus [External link].

New government has failed to assert credibility and control in Mogadishu (2002)

- A year after the establishment of transitional government, Mogadishu remains as anarchic as ever
- Somalia remains divided, TNG faces opposition by Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC), Somaliland and Puntland
- The TNG in difficult economic position due to economic shocks, lack of assistance resorted to bilateral and private financial assistance to pay its police
- The National Reconciliation Conference for Somalia due in April 2002 was postponed

"The first quarter of 2001 has been characterised by the TNG's continued attempts of the TNG to establish its credibility in Mogadishu. It has met with very limited success. Attempts to impose its authority outside the capital have been unsuccessful. [...] A number of police stations were reopened in Mogadishu, together with the central prison, while security personnel were put through training courses. But the city remained divided with four well armed factions controlling significant areas. " (IFRC 8 May 2001)

"Since its establishment in Mogadishu seven months ago, the new Transitional National Government (TNG) has struggled to assert control over the Somali capital, demobilise thousands of armed militia, and deal with rampant inflation. Initially received with great optimism in Mogadishu, the TNG has faced continued opposition from Mogadishu-based faction leaders; the newly formed southern-based Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Committee (SRRC); the self-declared independent state of Somaliland, northwestern Somalia; and the self-declared autonomous region of Puntland, northeastern Somalia. Opposition leaders have rejected the Djibouti-hosted Somali peace talks in Arta, which led to the election of the TNG in August 2000, and have dismissed the new government as 'illegal' and 'unrepresentative' – despite the fact the it has received international recognition." (IRIN-CEA 14 May 2001)

" Efforts by the TNG to reach out to these groups have met with some limited success, and at least one major faction leader (Mohamed Qanyare) has now pledged to use his militia to support the TNG. While the TNG has been successful in improving security in the parts of Mogadishu that it controls, and continues to engage in constructive dialogue with other factions, control of the city remains divided among five small armies fuelled by emotionally intense personal, political and financial goals and objectives." (UNICEF 12 July 2001, sect. 1)

"A year after the arrival in Mogadishu of Abdulkassim Salat Hassan as head of Somalia's newly-established interim government, the Horn of Africa nation remains as anarchic as ever. [...]Salat's Transitional National Government (TNG) was set up with the approval of the international community following talks hosted by Djibouti last year.

While the new regime enjoys backing from the international community, it has yet to gain more than a toe-hold in Somalia itself, where most warlords and the two regions in the northwest and northeast reject its authority.

In some parts of central and southern Somalia, militias, who often shift alliances, currently back the TNG in exchange for 'logistical support', but without any tangible contribution to peace, experts say.

Warlords, who for a decade failed to agree on anything and whose warfare destroyed the country, have now ganged up, united in opposition to the TNG.

They met in Addis Ababa in March and launched a common front, the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), bent on TNG's destruction by setting up what they term a more 'representative' government.

The police force, itself drawn from Mogadishu's numerous clan militias, cannot venture into areas controlled by warlords opposed to the TNG, including the southcentral regions of Bay and Bakol, where TNG and SRRC forces fought in July, leaving 200 people dead and hundreds wounded.

Few expatriate aid workers are permanently stationed in Somalia since the kidnapping in March of two UN staff by gunmen, who freed them in Mogadishu after week in captivity.

Even the business community in Mogadishu, believed to be solidly behind the TNG, has yet to give up its arsenal of arms.

[...]

TNG Foreign Minister Ismail Muhumed Hurre Buba is an arch-rival of Somaliland President Mohamed Ibrahim Egal.

TNG Water and Mineral Resources Minister Hassan Abshir Farah resigned as Puntland's interior minister after political disagreements with his leader Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed.

More than 60 of the 245 transitional assembly members either hail from Somaliland or Puntland, who have on several occasions influenced the TNG to call for change in the two former northwest and northeast Somali regions.

Their calls have been compounded by a major power struggle in both Puntland and Somaliland in the past one month, the results of which could alter the political equation of the Horn of Africa nation.

In Puntland, the struggle has been between Abdullahi Yusuf and Yusuf Haji Nur, the region's former high court chairman, sacked by Abdullahi Yusuf in June, over the extension of the president's term and that of parliament.

In Somaliland, Egal has also been in a power struggle with clan elders opposed to his rule.

He recently detained the elders, resulting in demonstrations demanding their release and counter-demonstrations calling for their prosecutions earlier this week.

" (AFP 31 August 2001)

"However, the hope of attracting substantial foreign aid has not materialized as most Western donors have adopted a 'wait and see' approach and made aid conditional on signs of 'effective government'. With Mogadishu port closed, lacking revenue from livestock exports, and unable to raise taxes, the TNG has had to depend on some friendly states and members of the Mogadishu business community to finance the police force, judiciary, demobilisation and rehabilitation." (UNDP Somalia 2001, p.54)

"Security conditions varied enormously throughout Somalia during the year [2001]. While the TNG struggled to exert its authority and ward off attacks by armed factions, anarchy and violence worsened, compounding persistent drought and food insecurity throughout southern and central Somalia. Puntland suffered an internal power struggle and its worst violence in six years. Somaliland remained relatively peaceful, although it, too, experienced isolated demonstrations and political violence in mid-2001." (USCR, June 2002, pp.94-97)

"Somalia remains a highly militarised and divided society, with various de facto authorities continuing to control most parts of the country, as well as sections of Mogadishu. The President of the Transitional National Government (TNG), Abdikassim Salad Hassan and Prime Minister Hassan Abshir Farah maintain that the reconciliation process with regional administrations and faction leaders is a priority. The President has visited districts including Dusa Merab, El-buur, Brava and Merka in the South. However, opposition to the TNG continues to grow stronger, with the leaders of the Northeast/"Puntland" and Northwest, as well as leaders of the opposition including the Southern Regional Resource Centre (SRRC).

[...]

In the Northeast, Mr. Egal's term as leader has been extended by one year by the Parliament and he is engaged in the process of developing a multi-party system of governance in "Somaliland". (UN, May 2002, p.3)

"Despite significant challenges, the Arta peace process still represents the most viable basis for peace and national reconciliation in Somalia. In a 28 March Presidential Statement, the UN Security Council reiterated its support to the process and urged the TNG and all local authorities "to make every effort to complete, without preconditions, the peace and reconciliation process through dialogue and involvement of all parties." The Council also pledged to tackle illicit trade of weapons and ammunition in Somalia, which has continued to fuel the conflict.

[...]A technical team comprising the frontline States – Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya - was established to convene the proposed National Reconciliation Conference for Somalia, initially scheduled to take place in April. This conference has been postponed to a later date." (UN, May 2002, p.3)

For detailed information on the political situation in the country, refer to the November 2000 paper of Ken Menkhaus [External link].

Intense inter-clan fighting has reignited since July 2001

- Overall security poor in Mogadishu and in Lower and Middle Juba
- Southern port of Kismayo captured by forces of Morgan's Somali Patriotic Movement, the RRA and the South Somali National Movement in August 2001

"However, in various parts of the south conflict leads to the loss of civilian life and displacement. Struggles for control of the strategic seaports of Kismayo and Merka continued, as well as numerous clashes in Gedo region. Mogadishu was the site of pitched battles between opposing warlords and businessmen supporting the TNG in June and July [2001]. Such conflict has continued to restrict agency access and operations. For large parts of the year populations in Middle and Lower Juba, Lower Shabelle, Gedo and Benadir have been off limits to UN and partner agencies." (UN November 2001)

"Heavy fighting has been continuing in Mogadishu, as militia loyal to faction leaders Husayn Aydid and Usman Ato clashed with militia loyal to the Transitional National Government (TNG), [...]
The fighting, which is concentrated in the KM-7 area of southwest Mogadishu, is taking its toll of the residents of Medina district, sources said. Medina has so far been spared the fighting. Most of the latest fighting was concentrated in north Mogadishu[...].

Monday's fighting is the latest in a series of confrontations between various groups in Mogadishu since 12 July. On 12 July, over 25 people were reportedly killed when two Abgal sub-clans, the Wa'asle and Warsangeli, fought around the Suq-Ba'ad area of north Mogadishu.

[...]

However, on the morning of 14 July, militia loyal to faction leader Muse Sudi Yalahow attacked positions of the Warsangeli militia in the Sana area of north Mogadishu. At least 20 people were reportedly killed in that battle, humanitarian sources said. The two sides used all sorts of weapons including mortars [...]."
(IRIN-CEA 16 July 2001)

"The general security situation in Mogadishu was tense and unstable. The main seaport and airport facilities remain closed. The Somalia Transitional National Government (TNG) started collecting taxes in Mogadishu. Banditry and acts of violence were reported." (UNICEF 7 September 2001)

"Somalia's transitional government suffered its biggest military blow yet Monday [6 August 2001] when forces bent on its downfall took the key southern port of Kismayo after two weeks of heavy fighting in the southern region near the city.

[...]

The forces that captured Kismayo are made up of Morgan's Somali Patriotic Movement, drawn from the Darod clan, the Rahanwein Resistance Army, and the South Somali National Movement." (AFP 6 August 2001)

"Dozens of families were Monday [3 September 2001] fleeing Somalia's southern Middle Juba region in fear of renewed interclan fighting following the deployment of rival militia forces, residents said.

[...]The JVA and Morgan have clashed in the nearby Lower Juba since July 27, leaving some 200 people dead and displaced hundreds of families, militia and medical sources said.

'Already dozens of families left and more others who can afford to get food during the voyage would go to Mogadishu and the port town of Merka,' said another Jilib resident, Asha Ibrahim." (AFP 3 September 2001)

IRIN-CEA chronology of the conflict in Somalia (1960-2000)

"NAIROBI, 1 September (IRIN) - The following is a chronology of recent events in Somalia leading up to the establishment of a new interim administration which will govern the country for three years, pending elections:

26 June 1960: The former British Somaliland Protectorate gains independence

1 July 1960: The former Italian colony becomes independent. The former British (northwest) and Italian (south) colonies unite

15 October 1969: Democratically elected President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke is assassinated by one of his police bodyguards

21 October 1969: The army under Major-General Muhammad Siyad Barreh overthrows the civilian government, after parliament hits deadlock trying to select a new president. The army suspends the constitution, bans all 86 political parties, and promises to end corruption. Siyad Barreh heads the 25-member Supreme Revolutionary Council, consisting of army and police officers

21 October 1970: The army junta declares Somalia a socialist country and adopts "Scientific Socialism". This signals a shift towards Soviet backing, and security organs and intelligence networks are given greater powers

21 October 1972: A written script for the Somali language is established. A modified Roman alphabet is adopted as the official orthography for the Somali language

1974: Somalia becomes a member of the Arab League

July 1977: A low-level war of attrition between Somali-backed insurgents and the Ethiopian army becomes an all-out battle between Somalia and Ethiopia, when Somalia declares war on Ethiopia. The war goes down in history as the fiercest Cold War battle on the continent, played out in the Ethiopian Ogaden region

13 November 1977: Somalia expels about 6,000 of Russian, Cuban and other Soviet allies, after the Soviet Union switched sides and allied itself with the Ethiopia

March 1978: The Somali Government announces the withdrawal of its forces from the Ogaden

8 April 1978: After the defeat of the Somali army, a group of army officers try to topple the Siyad Barreh regime. The attempted coup is crushed and Siyad Barreh tightens his grip further. He begins a process of putting power into the hands of his relatives, and sub-clan, the Darod Marehan. He also empowers the related Dulbahante and Ogadeni sub-clans

May 1988: The Somali National Movement (SNM) mounts an offensive in the north of the country, as a result of the regime's brutal post-Ethiopian war policies. Siyad Barreh responds by bombing the area. Hundreds of thousands of civilians are displaced, and many killed. It is the first real challenge to Siyad Barreh's rule, and the beginning of the proliferation of armed opposition to the regime

May 1990: A manifesto is published in Mogadishu calling for an all inclusive national reconciliation convention to avert protracted civil war. It is signed by 144 people, including politicians, religious leaders, professionals and business people, representing all Somali clans

December 1990: Armed uprising erupts in Mogadishu.

27 January 1991: Siyad Barreh flees Mogadishu. Forces loyal to the Hawiye-based United Somali Congress (USC) capture the city

28 January 1991: The Manifesto Group of USC appoints an hotelier, Ali Mahdi Muhammad, as president. The military wing of USC, led by General Muhammad Farah Aydid, rejects the appointment

17 November 1991: Full-scale fighting starts between the two factions of the USC

3 March 1991: A ceasefire comes into effect between the warring factions in Mogadishu

1991: Fighting erupts in the northeast region between the Al-Ittihad Islamic fundamentalists and militia loyal to the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), lead by Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmad

18 May 1991: The former British Protectorate of Somaliland declares independence from the rest of Somalia, in the town of Burao

July 1991: A conference was held in Djibouti, in which Ali Mahdi in which was chosen as interim president

April 1992: The United Nations Operation in Somalia, UNOSOM I, begins work in Somalia

December 1992: UNITAF forces under American leadership land in Mogadishu

February 1993: A three month conference in Borama seeks a new leader for the self-declared state of Somaliland. Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal, a former prime minister, is elected in May

March 1993: The next serious attempt at peace talks. An Ethiopian imitative evolves into a joint UN-Ethiopian sponsored reconciliation conference held in Addis Ababa

4 May 1993: UNITAF hands over to UNOSOM II

5 June 1993: 23 Pakistani peacekeepers are killed by Aydid loyalists

12 July 1993: American helicopter gunships kill over 50 unarmed Somalis holding a meeting in a private house in Mogadishu, increasing local hostility to the international intervention forces

3 October 1993: American-led forces looking for Aydid's senior aides are involved in a shoot-out, which leaves 18 Americans and hundreds of Somalis dead. The body of a dead American is dragged through the Mogadishu streets, and, caught on camera, sparks an international outcry

August 1996: Aydid dies of gunshot wounds sustained in operations against his former lieutenant, Osman Ali Atto. His son, a former American marine, Husayn Muhammad Aydid, is chosen by the clan to replace his father

November 1996: Ethiopian government-sponsored reconciliation conference brings most of the factions together. But it is boycotted by Aydid's son

November 1997: All faction leaders met in Cairo, with limited success, leaving Somalia without a national leader and Mogadishu still divided and insecure

2 May, 2000: On the initiative of the Djibouti government, the Somali National Peace Conference brings together more than 2,000 participants in Arta, Djibouti. It is the first conference where the warlords do not have control of the conference agenda

26 August, 2000: A 245-strong Transitional National Assembly, based on clan representation, elects Abdiqasim Salad Hassan as the new president of Somalia

27 August, 2000: President Abdiqasim Salad Hassan is sworn in an inauguration ceremony attended by the heads of governments of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Yemen, and the host country Djibouti, along with representatives from the UN, EU, Arab league, OAU, France, Italy, Kuwait, and Libya." (IRIN-CEA 1 September 2000, as found in UN Consolidated Appeal March 2001, Annex III, p. 128)

Main causes for displacement

Mass displacement began with outbreak of civil war in 1988

- Hundreds of thousands displaced in northern Somalia after outbreak of civil war in 1988
- War moved into the streets of Mogadishu by late December 1990
- Some 400,000 persons said to be internally displaced by end of 1990

"The outbreak of civil war in northern Somalia in mid-1988, and the Somali government's brutal retaliation against civilians in northern Somalia . . . led more than 400,000 Somalis to flee to Ethiopia and Djibouti and displaced hundreds of thousands of other Somalis within northern Somalia. Renewed fighting in northern Somalia led another 31,000 Somalis to flee to Djibouti. Other armed insurgent groups joined the battle against the government of President Siad Barre during 1990. Two of these groups, the United Somali Congress (USC) and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) scored major successes against the government, bringing the war into the streets of Mogadishu, the Somali capital, by late December [1990]. At year's end, chaos prevailed in Mogadishu. Foreigners were evacuated, tens of thousands of the city's residents had fled, there was fighting in the streets between government and rebel forces, indiscriminate shooting, raping, and pillaging by armed persons, and the bodies of the dead littered the capital. USCR

estimate[d] that by late 1990 there were a minimum of 400,000 internally displaced Somalis." (USCR 1991, p. 53)

For a detailed survey evaluating the reasons why Somali families were forced to flee in the early phases of the conflict, see Robert Gersony's "Why Somalis Flee: Synthesis of Accounts of Conflict Experience in Northern Somalia by Somali Refugees, Displaced Persons and Others" produced for the US State Department in 1989 [External link].

The cruel combination of clan conflict and climatic extremes resulted in repeated displacements throughout the 1990s

- Clan conflict persisted in the face of a complete collapse of government structures
- An incursion from Ethiopia forced thousands of persons to flee in 1996
- Major flooding in late 1997 resulted in the displacement of hundreds thousands more Somalis

General:

"As political confrontation and civil war degenerated into clan conflict, the remnants of government structures collapsed. What remained of Somalia's physical, economic and social infrastructure was largely destroyed. In 1991-92, the heavily populated inter-riverine areas (between the Juba and Shabelle river valleys) were very vulnerable. With crop failures and the escalation of the conflict combined with drought and flood, thousands of people became destitute. Famine resulted in mass population displacement, and widespread loss of life." (UN December 1998, p. 4)

Incursion by Ethiopian troops forced thousands of persons from their homes in 1996:

"In Western Somalia, several hundred thousand persons were temporarily uprooted [during 1996], when Ethiopian troops attacked an armed religious group based in Somalia. Most families displaced by the incident reportedly returned to their homes by September." (USCR 1997, p. 93)

Major flooding in late 1997 was particularly devastating to Somali populations:

"[F]loods inundated much of southern Somalia's fertile land in late 1997, killing approximately 2,000 people. The floods destroyed food stocks, decimated 60,000 hectares of planted crop land, displaced 230,000 people, and left a total of one million affected." (USAID 1998 Annual Summary, para. 2)

"Heavy flooding during late 1997 and early 1998 affected an estimated 600,000 people and exacerbated harsh humanitarian conditions in southern areas of Somalia. More than 2,000 people died and up to 200,000 became temporarily homeless because of the floods. The floods destroyed crops – the harvest was one-third smaller than the previous year – and ruined about 40 tons of grain in storage.

The floods particularly harmed populations already displaced by the country's warfare. Heavy rains washed away makeshift huts housing displaced families in Mogadishu. Other displaced families in the capital continued to live in abandoned government buildings, schools, factories, and houses left empty by the country's decade of instability." (USCR 1999, p.88)

Thousands forced to flee human rights abuses in Aideed-controlled areas during late 1990s

- Aideed's militia allegedly committed serious human rights abuses against people of Baidoa

- Individuals of Rahanwein minority were particularly at risk
- Due to abuses, Baidoa was called "city of death"

The Special Rapporteur of the U.N. Secretary-General reported the following after her visit to the region in late 1999:

"The independent expert visited Baidoa [Banadir region] on 17 and 18 November 1999. Aideed's militia had held this town, which was dubbed, during the peak of the Somali famine, 'the city of death', for the previous four years. During this period, the people of Baidoa and its surroundings left. Allegedly, individuals were massacred, women were raped, wells were destroyed, and villages were looted and burnt. Persons were allegedly detained without charge or trial, sometimes in containers. Their families were forced to pay to secure their release. As a result, the town, mainly inhabited by Rahanweins, was largely deserted. The Rahanwein are a minority group in Somalia, who have been widely discriminated against.

[...]

During the time Aideed's troops controlled the area, the village (Doynounay) [near Baidoa] was allegedly looted and burnt. The only building spared was said to have been the mosque.

[...]

Many serious violations allegedly took place in Doynounay. [T]he independent expert met a man who had allegedly survived a massacre. He told her that about 60 men from the village were rounded up and taken to Baidoa, where they were shot...During that time, women were allegedly raped, wells were destroyed and the village itself was burnt." (CHR 26 January 2000, pp. 20- 21)

War and drought causes of major displacement in 1999-2000

- Violence forced 50,000 persons to flee their homes in first half of 1999
- Thousands of families moved to Gode town following absence of seasonal rains in 1999
- 6,000 persons displaced by flooding of Shabelle river in 2000
- Drought severely affected families in central and southern Somalia during 2000

In the year 1999:

"A deadly combination of warfare, drought, and food shortages pushed tens of thousands of people from their homes during the year [1999], joining hundreds of thousands of Somalis uprooted in previous years.

[...]

Violence in southwestern Somalia forced at least 50,000 persons to flee their homes in the first half of 1999, including about 20,000 who fled to Kenya and 10,000 who reportedly crossed into Ethiopia. Thousands of other families reportedly fled to Mogadishu from war-racked and drought-ridden southern regions during the year, while thousands of Mogadishu-area residents temporarily fled their homes when heavy fighting erupted in Mogadishu." (USCR 2000, pp. 115-116)

"It is likely that the stress in the rural areas is extensive. Many poor rural people are said to be too weak to come to the urban centres in search of food. The UN-EUE field officer was told that in some cases people migrating to town had died along the way, and he observed first-hand people eating the meat from animals that had died from weakness or disease." (UNDP-EUE 14 December 1999, pp.1,4)

In the year 2000:

"Some 900 families or about 6,000 people have been displaced by flooding in central Somalia after the Shabelle River burst its banks, a local official said Monday [in May 2000]." (AFP 22 May 2000)

"The impact of this drought is having major effects on up to 1,200,000 people, including 300,000 children under 5 years, in the districts of Bay, Bakool, Gedo, Hiran and Middle Shabelle in Southern and Central Somalia, and the area will remain at risk up to the next harvest following the next Dyer season (January 2001). Women, children and other vulnerable people in Bakool are now starting to move in search of water, food, and basic health services." (UNICEF 20 June 2000, para. 2)

Intensification of inter-factional conflicts in Southern Somalia main causes of death and displacement (2002)

- Conflict among the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) concerning establishment of an autonomous South Western State (SWS) killed at least 20 in Baidoa (July 2002)
- May 2002 at least 62 killed and 100 wounded in Mogadishu following conflict between the Transitional National Government (TNG) and opposition loyal to Mohamed Dhere (May-June 2002)
- Hundreds of families fled Mahaday to Jalalaqsi due to heavy fighting in Middle Shabelle between the TNG and Mohamed Dhere forces (June 2002)
- Thousands of families fleeing Gedo due to fighting between Marehan sub-clans supporting the TNG and those supporting the SRRC (April 2002)
- Hundreds of families fled fight pitting forces of the Juba Valley Alliance and TNG against the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) in Bardhere which killed over 50 people (February 2002)
- Hundreds of families fled clan fight in Galkayo (January 2002)

Baidoa:

"Fresh fighting erupted in the town of Baidoa on Thursday in which at least 20 people were killed, [...]"

It follows two days of relative calm after clashes on Monday in which seven people died. The fighting is pitting forces loyal to the chairman of the RRA, Hasan Muhammad Nur Shatigadud, against those loyal to his two deputies, Shaykh Adan Madobe and Muhammad Ibrahim Habsade.

[...]

The fighting, which reportedly died down by midday, intensified by late afternoon. "We have so far confirmed the deaths of at least 20 militia from both sides," a business source told IRIN. "There are reports of many civilian deaths, but it is difficult to ascertain, since it is impossible to move around."

[...]

Tension had been rising in Baidoa, the headquarters of the RRA, due to a deepening split between Shatigadud and his deputies over the establishment of the self-declared autonomous region of the South West State of Somalia (SWS). Shatigadud was declared SWS president in late March." (IRIN, 4 July 2002)

Mahaday:

"Heavy fighting once again resumed on Tuesday afternoon in Middle Shabelle region between the forces of the transitional national government (TNG) of Somalia and those of warlord Mohamed Omar Habeb best known as Mohamed Dhere.

[...]

Because of Tuesday's fighting, there have been hundreds of families who fled their villages [mainly Mahaday].

Many of these internally displaced people have reached Jalalaqsi district of Hiran region not very far away from where the fighting started.

[...]

Mohamed Dhere has accused the government of destabilizing Middle Shabelle region, while the government accused Warlord Mohamed Dhere of trying to force the people in Middle Shabelle region to support him forcefully and pay taxes." (Xinhua, 18 June 2002)

Mogadishu:

"At least 62 people were killed and more than 100 wounded in factional fighting in the Somali capital Mogadishu on Tuesday, top faction leader Hussein Mohamed Aidid told AFP." (AFP 28 May 2002)

"The security situation in Mogadishu deteriorated with an increase in kidnappings, and an upsurge in armed conflict between the Somalia Transitional National Government (TNG) and opposition groups. Militia loyal to Mohamed Dhere attacked the residence of TNG Interior Minister, Mr. Dahir Dayah. The attack caused significant casualties including death, injuries and destruction of property. Fighting broke out between TNG forces and opposition militias in North Mogadishu resulting in over 30 deaths and 60 injuries." (UNICEF, 12 June 2002)

Gedo:

"Thousands of people have fled, or are fleeing, their homes in the Gedo region of southwestern Somalia because of fighting between rival groups, local sources told IRIN on Thursday.

They have been streaming out of the border towns of Bulo Hawa, and Lugh, despite the onset of the main Gu season rains.

According to the sources, the fighting is between an alliance of the Marehan sub-clans of Rer Hasan, Hawarsame and Habar Ya'qub, which are supported by the opposition Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), and other Marehan sub-clans sympathetic to the Transitional National Government (TNG). The Marehan clan dominates the Gedo region.

Scores of people have been killed and many more wounded in the fighting, which flared up between the two groups in late March and reportedly displaced thousands of people, said Alidhuh Mahmud, head of the social affairs committee of Bardhere town in Gedo Region, and a member of the regional authority. "At least 3,000 families have been displaced, most of them from Bulo Hawa," he added. He said many of the displaced had crossed the border into the northeastern Kenyan town of Mandera. "Many others are scattered across the region," he said.

Alidhuh expressed concern not only at the plight of the Mandera refugees but also the displaced within Gedo, "who do not have shelter, food and medical assistance". "They are in urgent need of assistance," he stressed." (IRIN 25 April 2002)

Bardhere:

"Hundreds of families are fleeing their homes in the southwestern regions of Somalia for fear of renewed fighting, local sources told IRIN on Wednesday.

The exodus follows two outbreaks of heavy fighting within a week between opposing militias in the town of Bardhere.

The fighting, in which over 50 people were killed and many more wounded, occurred on 12 February and again on 18 February. It pitted forces of the Juba Valley Alliance, which supports the Transitional National Government (TNG), against those of the opposition Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC).

Families were leaving Bardhere town and the surrounding villages to the east, which bore the brunt of the fighting, and were moving in response to reports of renewed fighting and a fear that "the fighting will go on

for some time", Abdi Gesey, a Bardhere businessman, told IRIN. The two militias were reportedly receiving reinforcements and preparing to renew hostilities [...].

Humanitarian sources told IRIN that people were also leaving the town of Baidoa, about 200 km northwest of Mogadishu, for fear that the fighting might spread from Bardhere. "We have had reports of families coming from Baidoa to Buur Hakaba [about 80 km to the southeast of Baidoa] in the last two days," (IRIN, 20 February 2002)

"However, recent clashes and continuing tensions between JVA and SRRC forces in Bardhere (Gedo's most populated town) can only be expected to complicate this situation. Already, an estimated 40 people were killed, 50 wounded and an unknown number of people displaced in clashes earlier this week." (UNCU, 21 February 2002)

"However, recent clashes and continuing tensions between JVA and SRRC forces in Bardhere (Gedo's most populated town) can only be expected to complicate this situation. Already, an estimated 40 people were killed, 50 wounded and an unknown number of people displaced in clashes earlier this week." (UNCU, 21 February 2002)

Galkayo:

"About 40 people have been killed and 60 wounded in inter-clan fighting in the Mudug region of central Somalia, sources in the regional capital Galkayo told IRIN on Wednesday.

The fighting was concentrated in and around the village of Afbarwaqo, some 200 km east of Galkayo, but has now died down.

According to a local elder, Muhammad Salad Du'ale, the fighting - which broke out two weeks ago - occurred between the Sa'd sub-clan of the main Habar Gedir clan, and the Dir clan. It was sparked off by revenge killings for the deaths of eight fishermen near Afbarwaqo, but the ensuing escalation of the violence was also attributable to the scarcity of water and grazing in the area, Du'ale said.

[...]

The violence has reportedly displaced hundreds of families, who have sought refuge in areas where "there is not a single well or water point", Sheko Harir said. "Those are the ones who need immediate help." (IRIN, 30 January 2002)

POPULATION PROFILE AND FIGURES

Population profile

Population profile of returnees and IDPs around Hargeisa in Somaliland (June 2002)

- An estimated one out of ten households considers itself to be IDPs out of a total of 8,600 households
- 8% of households were displaced from Southern Somalia most of whom were found in Daami area
- Half households from Southern Somalia consider themselves immigrants rather than IDPs
- Among the 500 families in Aw Aden, about 6% are from Southern Somalia and consider themselves IDPs
- Among the 1,700 families living in Daami 35% are from southern Somalia
- In Stadium among 5,000 residents, about 1/5 consider themselves IDPs although they are primarily Somalis from Somaliland or Ethiopia

"In and around Hargeisa, there are now four IDP camps: Mohamed Morge, Sheick Nor, Darmi and the State house area." (Lindgaard 23 March 2001)

"In February, March, and April of 2002, a group of international NGOs and UN agencies coordinated their activities to conduct a broad assessment of the returnee settlement areas around Hargeisa." (Clark, June 2002, p.5)

"The assessment working group, made up of representatives from participating organizations, decided that this assessment should focus on the eight largest and most conspicuous returnee settlement areas around Hargeisa. These include the four permanent, city-planned areas of Ayaha, Aw Aden, Mohamed Mooge, and Sheikh Nur; the two neighborhoods of Daami and Sinai; and the two informal areas of Stadium and State House. The assessment developed tools and proceeded with the assessment as described in this section." (Clark, June 2002, p.13)

"Categories of people include returned refugees, IDPs, and immigrants.

[...]

The use of these terms in this report, then, does not conform with UNHCR standards; rather, it conforms with the respondents' perceptions of the terms and their own situations." (Clark, June 2002, p.20)

"Two thirds of the households living in these eight areas consider themselves to be returned refugees, while one in seven considers itself to be immigrant. One in 10 households considers itself internally displaced." (Clark, June 2002, p.27)

General population profile:

"The total population in the 8 areas was estimated at 8,600 households, or 57,000 people.

-Households in the survey ranged in size from 2 to 18 members, with a median of 6 members.

[...]

-20% of households in the areas reported that they are female-headed.

[...]

-One half the population living in these areas is under age 15, while almost two thirds are under age 20 years." (Clark, June 2002. p.5)

"-The middle half of all area residents (25th to 75th percentiles) have lived in their settlement area for between 2 and 4 years. The duration of residence in the area did not correlate significantly with a household's current wealth.

- Over all 8 areas, 60% of households were in Ethiopian refugee camps immediately before arriving at the Hargeisa returnee settlement areas; 8% were from Southern Somalia, and 16% reported they moved there from elsewhere in Hargeisa. The remaining households reported that they had been in Ethiopia though not in a camp (9%), elsewhere in Somaliland (4%), or elsewhere abroad (2%).

- 80% of the residents are originally from Somaliland before the wars, 9% from Southern Somalia, and 8% are non-Somali Ethiopians. 3% are Somali Ethiopians.

- Daami area contains most of the Southern Somalis, and Daami and Sheikh Nur share the non-Somali Ethiopian population. The settlement areas are in general ethnically organized, and minority ethnicities tend to group together within the areas.

-One half of those families from Southern Somalia consider themselves immigrants rather than IDPs. Overall, 1 in 7 families living in the returnee settlements considers itself to be an immigrant household.

- 80% of those living in the areas plan to remain there, insh'allah.

- Of those families who consider themselves returned refugees and who returned after 1997, 51% reported receiving assistance from UNHCR." (Clark, June 2002. p.6-7)

"In summary, most of those originally from Somaliland consider themselves returned refugees, while those considering themselves immigrants are split between Southern Somalis and Ethiopians, both Somali and non-Somali. Southern Somalis often consider themselves immigrants rather than IDPs. Virtually all the non-Somali Ethiopians consider themselves immigrants." (Clark, June 2002, p.28)

Aw Aden:

"The household survey shows that around 6% of families there are originally from Southern Somalia; this group considers itself to be internally displaced. This assessment's estimated population for the area (as of March 2002) is 500 families comprising 3,500 people." (Clark, June 2002, p.21)

Ayaha:

"The focus groups revealed a small minority of Southern Somali IDPs, but the household survey did not find this population at all, perhaps because they live in a single small neighborhood.

[...]

Estimates from this assessment put Ayaha's population at 500 families, or 3,100 people." (Clark, June 2002, p.21)

Daami:

"The population of Daami encompasses Southern Somali IDPs and immigrants, Ethiopian immigrants, and minority clans, all in relatively large proportions. The Southern Somali IDPs and immigrants are primarily from Baidoa, Wajid, Beletweine, and Mogudishu, and settled in Daami in 1994 after fleeing the conflict in the South. This population is mostly of the [xxx] subclan; most had their possessions in the south looted or stolen before moving north (Medani, 2000). [...] The [other] Somalis living in the area [...] consider themselves returned refugees, while the Southern Somalis split between considering themselves immigrants and IDPs*.

[...]

This assessment estimates the population living in Daami neighborhood at 1,700 families, or roughly 10,000 people, making it the second largest returnee settlement area in this survey." (Clark, June 2002, p.21-2)

"In all areas, a majority of households say they are originally from Somaliland; this number is lowest in Daami, with a high percentage of families from Southern Somalia (35%) and non-Somali Ethiopian households (14%)." (Clark, June 2002, p.27)

"In Daami, all those from Ethiopia considered themselves immigrants, while 24 of the 35 families from Southern Somalia considered themselves not IDPs but immigrants." (Clark, June 2002 p.28)

Stadium:

"Stadium is the most central of the eight returnee settlement areas in this assessment, located on the south bank of the river next to the old Hargeisa football stadium. The land belongs to the government, which insists that the settlement there will not be a permanent one and is currently engaged in a strategy to relocate the population to permanent sites.

[...]

About 1/5 of residents consider themselves IDPs even though they are primarily Somalis originally from Somaliland or Ethiopia.

Stadium is geographically quite small (approximately 17 hectares), but is very densely populated. This assessment estimates the population at about 750 households with 5,000 people." (Clark, June 2002, p.23)

"The residents in Stadium stand out because more than 1/5 of respondents originally from Somaliland consider themselves IDPs." (Clark, June 2002 p.28)

**Note that on request of the government, names of clans have been removed.*

Recent returnees from Ethiopia who are unable to regain homes now make up portion of IDP population (2001-2002)

- Refugee returnees become IDPs as very little opportunities exist for returning to their areas of origin or to reintegrate

"In a country that has to deal with the consequences of large numbers of people who are displaced, the distinction between internally displaced (IDPs) and refugees has little relevance. In the case of Somalia, refugees as well as IDPs may be reluctant to return to their home areas since they remain replete with mines. Many former refugees are now IDPs since on-going conflict often prevents them from accessing their regions of origin. Equally significantly, demobilised militia, who may still retain their arms, have little incentive to return to their original towns or villages." (UNDP, June 2002, p.5)

"Humanitarian sources in Hargeysa said people living in the [resettlement] camps had 'come from a variety of circumstances, and a variety of places'. Some were spontaneous returnees from Ethiopia who had been living in poor, makeshift accommodation for years, while others had returned through formal, assisted repatriation programmes by UNHCR. There are also small groups of displaced people from southern Somalia – who are known as 'refugees' by the Somaliland authorities, but considered 'displaced' by international humanitarian agencies. "These are the 'invisibles'," a local source said of the southerners.

[...]

Humanitarian sources told IRIN that most returnees had congregated in the Somaliland capital rather than returning to their original home areas. Various reasons had been suggested for the phenomenon, including loss of livestock and homes, the need for cash-based employment, dislocation and habitual dependency, the source said." (IRIN-CEA 22 August 2001)

Global figures

An estimated 400,000 persons said to be displaced in Somalia (2002)

- International observers cite figures between 300,000 and 400,000 for internally displaced population
- Accurate estimates of IDPs in Somalia is impossible to establish due to incessant flow of people due to drought, conflict, seasonal migrations as well as unsettled returnees


"In this case, the vulnerable population would likely fall to near 400,000 people - roughly the same number as the caseload of internally displaced persons (IDPs)." (UN November 2001, p. 5)

"There are approximately 300,000 internally displaced persons in the country, representing approximately 4 percent of the population." (USDOS February 2001, Freedom of Movement)

"In Somalia, an estimated 350,000 of the country's 7 million inhabitants are internally displaced. This figure includes some 40-50,000 Somalis displaced in 1999. During the war to oust the Siad Barre regime, political violence, banditry and lawlessness produced famine conditions and induced mass population displacement. While there was a gradual return of IDPs to their locations of origin between 1993 and 1995, continuing violence, food insecurity and water shortages have exacerbated their living conditions." (UN March 2001, p. 114)

Total figures of internally displaced for 1992-2001 period:

Year	Estimated number of IDPs	Source
End 2001	400,000	(USCR 2002, p.6)
End 2000	300,000	(USCR 2001, p.6)
End 1999	350,000	(USCR 2000, p.6)
End 1998	250,000	(USCR 1999, pp. 87-88)
End 1997	200,000	(USCR 1998, p. 92)
End 1996	250,000	(USCR 1997, p. 92)
End 1995	300,000	(USCR 1996, p. 66)
End 1994	500,000	(USCR 1995, p. 74)
End 1992	2,000,000	(USCR 1998, p.92)



"At the peak of Somalia's upheaval in 1992, more than 800,000 Somalis were refugees in neighboring countries, and as many as 2 million people were internally displaced. Large numbers gradually returned to their home areas during 1993-95, despite sporadic violence and new population flight in some regions. Only 5,000 repatriated in 1996." (USCR 1998, p. 92)

Somaliland:

"By 1988 full scale civil war broke out in Northwest, where Siyad Barre's force attacked the city of Hargeysa in a brutal campaign against the Isaaq clan that led to charges of genocide" (IGAD/UNHCR/UNDP, December 2000, p.7)

"Siad Barre's sustained military offensive crippled agricultural production, destroyed nearly all of the region's livestock, decimated northwest Somalia's businesses, places of worship, and water infrastructure, and uprooted almost the entire population of approximately 2.5 million people.

Fleeing war, mass executions, and torture, approximately 4000,000 residents of northwest Somalia sought refuge in other countries.[...] An estimated 1.5 million additional people were displaced within northwest Somalia." (USCR, December 2001, p.15)

"It is virtually impossible to estimate the number of IDP while it seems that most of the population has been displaced at one time or another during the past ten years of conflict. There are many different categories of IDP in Somalia. These include people who moved from one part of the country to another due to civil conflict and/or fear of persecution; economic migrants who had little option but to move to urban centres in order to survive; pastoralists permanently displaced by drought; returnees who have not been able to return to their traditional areas of origin; demobilised soldiers; widows and orphans." (IGAD/UNHCR/UNDP, December 2000, p.12)

Geographical distribution

Majority of displaced persons believed to reside in and around Mogadishu (1999-2002)

- Between 100,000 and 230,000 displaced persons said to live in and around Mogadishu
- Thousands of newly displaced reached Mogadishu in early 2000
- Internally displaced reportedly make up 20 to 25% of Mogadishu population

"More than 200,000 displaced persons continued to live in some 200 Mogadishu-area camps and squatter settlements at year's end [2001]. Thousands of others remained internally displaced in relatively peaceful Somaliland, including newly uprooted civilians who had fled violence in southern Somalia." (USCR, 2002, p.94-97)

"Several thousand people fled into Mogadishu, further crowding the city with displaced families. About 230,000 displaced persons lived in some 200 Mogadishu-area camps and squatter settlements as the year ended [2000]." (USCR 2001, p. 105)

"More than 350,000 people are internally displaced and tend to live off subsistence wages for unskilled day labour, including over 100,000 in Mogadishu." (UN March 2001, p. 114)

"During the first half of the year [2000], thousands of newly displaced Somalis descended on the capital, Mogadishu; gunfights in Mogadishu and at other locations left hundreds dead; a local aid worker was killed and two international relief workers were kidnapped; and floods damaged two displacement camps and killed thousands of livestock." (USCR 28 August 2000, para. 2)

Estimates on the number of camps in and around Mogadishu vary: according to the Somali Refugee Agency SORA, there are 138 camps in Mogadishu, north and south, in which 30 per cent of the population are refugees, while the non-governmental organization Action Contre la Faim estimates that 234,000 displaced Somalis live in 201 camps in Mogadishu (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999), whereas another source indicates the number of IDPs in Mogadishu is almost 250,000 in about 150 camps in open areas, comprising approximately 20 to 25 per cent of the population of Mogadishu. (FEWS Network 26 February 1999)

Northern provinces host tens of thousands of displaced persons (2000-2002)

- The Northwest host about 11,000 IDPs, mainly in urban centers notably Hargeisa has four IDP camps: Mohamed Morge, Sheick Nor, Darmi and the State house
- Burao town as a major trading center hosts very large numbers of IDPs and several camps are located in the district
- The Northeast has no infrastructure to absorb an indeterminable numbers of IDPs from southern Somalia as well as influx of returnees
- Bossaso and Galkayo towns host about 33,000 IDPs in camps
- IDPs were said to make up 30% of Bossaso's population in 2001 and in 2000 there were an estimated 165,000 IDPs

Northwest Somalia:

"Within Somalia there is also a significant population of IDPs whose situation needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency. There are an estimated 11,000 IDPs living in Northwest Somalia,[...] primarily in Hargeysa and other urban centres." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p.4)

Hargeysa District:

"In and around Hargeisa, there are now four IDP camps: Mohamed Morge, Sheick Nor, Darmi and the State house area." (Lindgaard 23 March 2001)

"Hargeysa town is the biggest agglomeration in the Northwest and concentrates public administration, private sector and international community interventions. Urban growth started before the war with the migration of the rural population. Since the end of the hostilities Hargeysa has undertaken significant reconstruction and rehabilitation activities and is the destination for a large number of refugees and IDPs.

Hargeysa town hosts about 60% of the returnee population, most of whom are spontaneous returnees of 1991-1997. In addition, a considerable number of refugees remaining in the Ethiopian camps (Camaboker, Rabasso, Daror) are choosing Hargeysa as their zone of repatriation." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, pp.22-23)

Burao District:

"Burao town is an important livestock trade centre, with a considerable concentration of urban population. There are also a significant number of rural populations in the district. Strongly affected by the past conflict, both urban and rural zones have to cope with the presence of a very large number of IDPs (several camps of IDP are located in the district). It also has received many spontaneous returnees during the past years.

Burao district will be a significant destination of the repatriation movement as a large number of refugees remaining in the Daror camp in Ethiopia have selected this district." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p 23)

Northeast Somalia:

"Due to its relatively unscathed status the Northeast has been the destination for many of Somalia's IDPs, particularly from the war-ravaged south. It is impossible to quantify the precise numbers of IDPs who have moved to this region since many of them have integrated into communities where they have family ties. However, it is clear that there has been a considerable influx of population into the region, which does not have the infrastructure to cope with such a population increase." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p.3)

In addition to this, an estimated 33,000 IDPs are living in camps on the outskirts of Bossaso and Gal kayo [...] in Northeast Somalia, with minimal infrastructure and economic livelihood opportunities." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p.4)

Bossaso District:

The total population of Bossaso District is estimated at 250,000 persons. Bossaso town suffered a moderate level of physical destruction and has to cope with poverty and environmental problems. Strongly affected by a large influx of IDPs (including an estimated 28,000 in settlements around the town [...]) the district has a limited absorption capacity because of its weak urban services. After the war Bossaso became the most important port of the Northeast, which is a unique employment source." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p 23)

"In Bossaso, for instance, IDPs are estimated to make up 30% of the population. IDPs often come from the minority groups (Bantu) and clans with low status in the community." (Lindgaard 23 March 2001)

"Bossaso town suffered a moderate level of physical destruction and has to cope with poverty and environmental problems. Strongly affected by influx of IDP estimated at 165,000 and returnees (close to 8,000), the district has a limited absorption capacity because of its weak urban services. After the war Bossaso became the most important port of the Northeast, which is a unique employment source." (UNHCR/UNDP, December 2000, p.34)

"Tens of thousands of people remained internally displaced in relatively calm Somaliland and Puntland, according to aid agencies. Thousands of residents from southern Somalia fled to northern areas, particularly to Puntland, hoping to escape Somalia by boat to Yemen. Hundreds drowned in overcrowded boats en route to Yemen. Another 7,000 reached Yemen during the year." (USCR 2000, pp. 115-116)

Garowe District:

Has been selected due to its role as the administrative centre of Northeast Somalia. It is experiencing a rapid urbanisation process and, as such, it has a strong potential to attract IDPs and returnees. (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p 23)

Fighting and food insecurity in southern Somalia result in the continual displacement of families (2000-2002)

- Insecurity in Gedo has displaced families to Bay and Bakol as well as across the border with Kenya
- Some 300-400 IDP families have congregated in Rabdure, Bakool since early 2001
- An upsurge in inter-clan fighting has led to new displacements in Bulo Hawo, Kismaio and elsewhere in Middle and Lower Juba
- Many IDPs reportedly moved from Lower Shabelle to Baidoa in 2000

Gedo:

"The FSAU field monitor in the region also reports that some Gedo IDPs have moved in to Bay and Bakol to flee the insecurity" (FSAU Food Security, June 2002)

"In recent weeks, fifteen to twenty thousand people are estimated to have crossed to Mandera in Kenya from Belet Hawa in Somalia. Of these, 3,700-5,000 are reported to have registered for resettlement in Dadaab refugee camp. A significant number have also integrated through kinship and clan structure with the population of Mandera town." (FSAU Nutrition Update, June 2002)

"However, the second influx from Belet Hawa town has remained in at location on the outskirts of Mandera known as BP1 (border Post 1) a few hundred metres inside Kenya. [...] Reports suggest that many of the refugees at BP1 are formerly internally displaced people from within Somalia who had been trying to make a living in Belet Hawa and who have no ties with the Mandera community. Even before these former IDPs arrived in Mandera, their nutritional status is likely to have been extremely poor." (FSAU, Food Security, June 2002)

Rabdure, Bakool:

"For poor and very poor agro-pastoralist families in Bakool region, a 25-40% food energy deficit is expected over the one-year period from July 2001 to June 2002. However, some areas and populations within these areas are more vulnerable than others due to disproportionately low rains and/or influx of IDPs. Rabdure District in Bakool Region is one such area. Within a three-kilometre radius of Rabdure town, 300-400 families have settled within the past two months. The majority of these IDPs, at least 70%, are Somalis who had settled in Barey and Kumbul areas of Ethiopia due to insecurity in early 1990s but have returned to Somalia since April 2001 due to increased tension between them and the Ethiopian communities. These people had their origins in Rabdure and so may not be absorbed in other villages outside that area. The remainder of the IDPs have come from within Bakool Region (Wajid district and the surrounding villages of Rabdure town) with their movement being triggered by rumours of food distribution. It was reported that this latter group initially came in large numbers but have been moving out

towards Elberde in search of pasture while some returned to their homes when they realised that there was no general food distribution. This trend may continue." (FSAU 16 August 2001, Bakool Update)

Bulo Hawo:

"Heavy fighting in Bulo Hawo in April claimed the lives of over eighty militia and an unconfirmed number of civilian casualties. Up to 10,000 persons fled across the border to Mandera, Kenya. Although IDPs are now slowly returning to Bulo Hawo, the area remains tense and prolonged displacement may have an impact on food security." (UNICEF 12 July 2001, sect. 1)

Middle and Lower Juba:

"Dozens of families were Monday fleeing Somalia's southern Middle Juba region in fear of renewed interclan fighting following the deployment of rival militia forces, residents said.

[...]

The JVA and Morgan have clashed in the nearby Lower Juba since July 27, leaving some 200 people dead and displaced hundreds of families, militia and medical sources said.

'Already dozens of families left and more others who can afford to get food during the voyage would go to Mogadishu and the port town of Merka,' said another Jilib resident, Asha Ibrahim." (AFP 3 September 2001)

Kismaio:

"Hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced by the recent fight for control of the southern port town of Kismaio between the rebel forces and those pro-government troops." (Xinhua 28 August 2001)

Baidoa:

"The RRA [Rahanweyn Resistance Army] referred to the situation of the internally displaced persons from Lower Shabelle region who are coming to Baidoa. The harsh conditions in the town make their absorption difficult. The RRA also emphasized that the Rahanweyn in Lower Shabelle are still living under oppressive conditions." (CHR 26 January 2000, p. 21)

PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT

General

IDPs tend to flee northwards to take refuge where some degree of peace and stability allowed some recovery (2002)

- Security is better in Somaliland, Bay, Bakool and Middle Shabelle
- Somaliland hosts the highest number of IDPs
- Urban-rural patterns of displacement as IDPs fled to their 'clan-areas' considerably expanded smaller regional towns during the 1990s
- This trend was further exacerbated by the lack of decentralisation of humanitarian assistance

"At the same time, this reporting period has seen modest improvements in the security situation in some regions including "Somaliland", Bay, Bakool and Middle Shabelle. Cooperation of local authorities in these regions towards maintaining peace and stability has resulted in the increased ability of humanitarian agencies to expand programmes. The Northwest/"Somaliland" hosts the highest number of IDPs who tend to flee northwards to escape drought, poverty and conflict. It also hosts the largest number of refugee returnees. It is imperative that humanitarian and development work continue as "peace dividends" in these more peaceful parts of Somalia." (UN, May 2002, p.2)

"For a time during the war this process was reverse as people fled the main towns and moved to areas that their clans came from. Consequently, the populations of previously small regional towns such as Beletweyne, Galkaiyo, Qardo or Baidoa, and rural villages such as Jeriban, rose dramatically. The population of Bosasso is estimated to have increased from 10,000 to 60,000 since 1991, as people fled fighting in Mogadishu, the Lower Juba and the interriverine areas. [...]Smaller towns are experiencing similar trends, which present a challenge for urban planning. The concentration of aid agencies in urban centers such as Hargeisa, and a lack of clear policies by the administrations on investment in rural areas, exacerbate this trend." (UNDP Somalia, 2001, p.58)

IDPs are largely integrated within urban and rural communities (November 2001)

"Reaching vulnerable groups in Somalia is further complicated by the dispersion of destitute populations. For instance, since 1999, there are very few IDP camps in Somalia. Rather, IDPs and other high-risk groups are integrated within larger urban communities and rural villages. This renders their vulnerability less visible and makes targeting difficult, although the suffering of poor Somalis is no less real." (UN November 2001)

Somalis are largely nomadic making it difficult to assess patterns of displacement (1993-2001)

- 80% of Somalis are said to be "pastoral nomadic" with only 20% as "urban agricultural"
- Even prior to conflict, people travelled great distances in search of food, pasture and water
- Over last years, there has been continuous movement of people from rural to urban centres

"Quantifying displacement is extremely difficult in Somalia given the prevalence of nomadic and semi-nomadic social structures. Even prior to the collapse of the central state, populations travelled great distances in search of food, pasture and water during times of stress. The protracted nature of displacement offers its own analytical challenges, particularly given the recurrence of multiple 'waves' and directions of displacement.

Displacement trends are also changing. With the decreasing volume and regularity of food relief distributions, 'food camps' no longer exist. Households now move from drought- and conflict-stricken areas toward riverine and urban areas, returning when situations improve. Populations communicate over long distances to ascertain better knowledge of localised conditions before deciding on their direction of movement. Many long-term IDPs have dispersed in large towns. They are destitute populations living in shanty camps and abandoned buildings in peripheral urban areas." (UN March 2001, p. 114)

"The Somalis are largely nomadic, roaming throughout the Horn of Africa. They live in small, temporary hamlets that are dismantled and loaded on to camels for quick and easy migration. Because of this nomadic way of life, social units tend to be small and self-sufficient...

Roughly 80% of the Somali population is 'pastoral nomadic' and only 20% can be described as urban agricultural. The social and economic life of Somalia is therefore defined by a nomadic, rural style of life with trade consisting mainly of agricultural products. Over many years there has been a continuous movement of the population from the rural areas to the big urban centres in the south like Mogadishu, where there is a now large permanent urban population, mostly dependent on agriculture." (Jama 13 December 2000 in Humanitarian Affairs Review, Nomadic culture)

"More than two-thirds of Somalia's populace are nomadic or semi-nomadic. During the dry season the nomads concentrate in villages near water sources; when the rains begin they disperse with their herds. Traditionally, nomadism is the most desirable life-style. Somalis constitute the vast majority of the population. Cultural divisions between pastoral nomads (the *Samaal*) and sedentary cultivators and herdsmen (the *Saab*) have been weakened by large migrations from the countryside into towns, but most Somalis maintain a strong loyalty to one of many clans and sub-clans." (Encyclopaedia Britannica, Micropaedia, 1993, p. 4)

Discrimination against Bantu and Rahanweyn minorities makes them particularly vulnerable to displacement and other human rights abuses (1999)

- Bantu peoples subject to human rights abuses and the taking of land by militia and bandits
- Rahanweyn minority has also been subjected to dispossession and displacement

"Non-discrimination is a fundamental principle embodied in the first paragraph of common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Although Somali society appears to be homogeneous, there are several minority groups in the country. These minorities have been the main victims of the famine and the civil war. The Bantu minority lives along the banks of the Juba and Shabelle rivers, which constitute the life lines of Somalia. The Rahanweyn minority lives between these two rivers, in Bay and Bakool. While the Bantus are largely unarmed, the Rahanweyn Resistance Army is armed to some extent, although insignificantly compared to the other groups. Other minorities live in the coastal areas.

The Bantus, who are thought to descend from slaves brought to Somalia from other east African countries in the eleventh century, are considered a low-status ethnic group. They frequently suffer discriminatory practices and violence. For instance, the Bantus in the Hiran region require permission to go to Belet Weyne, the main town of the region. They have their own market and they are not allowed to mix with the rest of the population. They are brought into town for hard labour. They have less access to education and fewer economic opportunities than other Somalis. Their villages have been burnt, and Bantu women have

been raped. During the civil war, the Bantu population has been systematically pushed off their land towards the river by militias or bandits. They are now so close to the river that they face a real risk of their settlements being washed away during floods.

[...]

The Rahanweyn minority lives on fertile agricultural land and is more advanced in agriculture. It too has been subjected to dispossession and displacement." (CHR 18 February 1999, paras. 77-80)

"In Somaliland and Puntland, there are problems of discrimination against minorities and internally displaced persons. (CHR 26 January 2000, p. 5)

Families moving early to water and grazing sites as result of failed rains (July-September 2001)

- Various indications that pastoral families have moved their animals to better grazing areas earlier than normal this year
- Many families also moving to Lower Shabelle and Mogadishu in search of employment

"An inter-agency co-ordination meeting in Baidoa discussed the drought situation in the zone resulting from poor Gu rains and its effect on vulnerable communities in Bay and Bakool regions. Reports from partners in these areas indicate estimates of 50-90 per cent population migration from villages seriously affected by the drought into larger towns within the district in search of water and food. Farming communities are worst affected because of successive crop failure." (UNICEF 7 September 2001)

"The dry weather has also seriously affected the grazing and fodder conditions for livestock. Many families have already begun to take their animals elsewhere in search of better grazing while others have left the area seeking alternative means of survival. Migration is normal in this region, but this year it has started far too early." (WFP 22 August 2001)

"Nearly a million Somalis are affected by drought in large areas of their country, a minister in the new transitional government said on Sunday [15 July 2001].

[...]

Thousands of rural families had been forced to move from their homes in search of food and water, he said." (Reuters 15 July 2001)

"There are also some indications of the beginnings of population movement...That is a standard coping mechanism. When people see the rains have failed and they are not going to have much of a harvest, and they have livestock to feed, they try to move to areas where they can graze their animals or get employment. And they move considerable distances. Water is another trigger, and the water supplies throughout the south are very low indeed.

It's mainly the pastoral population who are taking their animals for better grazing, as well as people simply looking for employment. Of course, I am not speaking of massive numbers of people yet, but certainly some have started moving out, mainly to Lower Shabelle and Mogadishu...Employment opportunities in these areas are not very good." (IRIN-CEA 9 July 2001)

Somali families reportedly move regularly and even split up in order to reach resources (1999-2000)

- Families in 'Puntland' sometimes split up so that at least some benefit from refugee assistance
- More than two-third of Somalis are nomadic or semi-nomadic

- Somalis have repeatedly moved to Mogadishu seeking relatives and opportunities

"The independent expert in her report to the Commission in 1998 (E/CN.4/1998/96) reported about the situation of the internally displaced. She said that Bosaso hosted tens of thousands of internally displaced persons, who constituted about one third of the city's population. She reported that many internally displaced preferred that part of their family became refugees by crossing the Gulf of Aden by boat to Yemen in order to be eligible for refugee status and to be assisted by UNHCR, or that they continued to Saudi Arabia." (CHR, 26 January 2000, p. 32)

"Many families in the camps have been repeatedly displaced, and for some, it is their second or third time in the capital. Some arrive seeking relatives, but others come because it remains a traditional migration route – even with Mogadishu's precipitous decline, the displaced still expect the capital to provide opportunities. The majority [of IDPs] said they survived by begging, by receiving food scraps, and by earning a little cash by providing 'carrying services' to people in the market – earning about 2,000-3,000 Somali shillings a day." (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999).

PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

General

UNICEF targets IDP children as a priority group in need of special protection (2002)

- IDP children have needs above basic survival
- Compared to other war-ravaged countries Somali childsoldiers are not many, however, children still join the militias when most alternative survival strategies fail
- War has eroded social protection networks and minorities such as the Bantu and Ogadeni are particularly prey to abuses

"All children in Somalia have been directly affected by the conflict, but there are subgroups who have special social problems and needs - and have a right to - special care, protection and, in some cases, social reintegration over and above the basic survival and development needs of children in general. There are tens of thousands of displaced children, youth and women living in camp conditions in extreme poverty; thousands of children living on the streets; hundreds of children live in orphanages and large numbers of physically and mentally disabled and handicapped children. While compared to other war-torn countries, the number of child soldiers in Somalia is not considered to be very large, a considerable number of children under 18 live in the company of older siblings serving with militia groups or simply attach themselves with such groups. While many children benefit from some forms of support from the traditional clan assistance mechanisms, some, mostly minority groups such as Bantus and Ogadenis, who are generally marginalised by the Somali society, are particularly vulnerable, and often suffer from deprivation and abuse. Moreover, the residual impact of the decade-long conflict has weakened traditional family protection mechanisms.

Prioritisation of target groups to be assisted will be made on information derived from recent assessments. However, based on existing information, support will go to increase educational and recreational opportunities, health care and psychosocial services to children in internally displaced camps, street children and disabled children (including mine victims) and the reintegration of children currently attached to militia and being demobilised. UNICEF will continue advocacy efforts with both local and central authorities to ensure that a portion of local resources is reserved for basic social services." (UN Appeal, November 2001, p.73)

Human rights abuses remain commonplace in many parts of Somalia (1998-2002)

- Widespread abuses by armed militias and clan-based factions particularly in Mogadishu during May, July and October 2001
- Islamic courts do not meet standards of fair trial and judicial competence Freedom of expression limited with peaceful demonstrator shot dead and political opponent imprisoned
- Women children and minorities are primary victims

"Fighting between rival clans and factions continued throughout 2001. Hundreds of civilians were killed in outbreaks during which indiscriminate force was used. Incidents took place mainly in the Mogadishu area and in the south and reportedly also involved Ethiopian troops supporting the Rahanwein Resistance Army. Scores of civilians were indiscriminately killed during fighting between rival clans and factions in May and

July in Mogadishu. In October, 30 people were killed in Mogadishu in fighting between government forces and militia linked to political factions. There were killings and reprisal killings of clan opponents, expulsions of members of other clans, cases of kidnapping as well as detention, and torture or ill-treatment of prisoners. Women and minorities were particularly vulnerable to abuses. None of the factions respected the principles of international humanitarian law which regulate the conduct of armed conflict and protect civilians.

In November, 18 students were reportedly shot dead by armed factions at their school near Buulo Barde in Hiran region.

In March gunmen in Mogadishu abducted four UN staff members and three from the non-governmental organization *Médecins sans frontières*. All were released unharmed several days later.

Rule of law

A process to gradually bring Islamic courts, established by faction leaders, into the national judicial system began in Mogadishu. However, there was concern that they did not meet recognized standards of fair trial and judicial competence. Several death sentences were imposed by such courts, which were reportedly immediately carried out. Concern continued that judicial administrations and police forces in Somaliland and Puntland displayed inconsistent respect for legal rights. Reports persisted by human rights defenders in Somaliland of arbitrary detentions, unfair trials, poor prison conditions and cases of torture and unlawful killing by police.

Freedom of expression

Freedom of expression was very limited in all areas of the country, with little tolerance by government authorities or armed factions of criticism by individuals or the media. Scores of journalists and others were arrested and detained without charge for days or weeks. Many were prisoners of conscience. Human rights groups continued to urge the government and factions to respect human rights.

In February, Safiyo Abdi Haji Garweyne, an 18-year-old woman, was killed and others injured when police reportedly opened fire on a crowd protesting at the arrest of a number of people following a peaceful demonstration in Bosasso, Puntland.

Suleiman Mohamed Gaal, a former Somaliland presidential candidate, was arrested in May in Hargeisa, Somaliland, and held for two weeks. He was accused of supporting the TNG. He remained on bail without charge at the end of 2001." (AI, January 2002)

Internally displaced women and children at risk (1999-2000)

- Rape and sexual abuse are common in internally displaced persons camps
- Thousands of displaced children live on the streets and in orphanages; others attached to militia groups
- Bantu, Ogadenis and Rahanweyn minorities often marginalised and even targeted in some cases

"All children in Somalia can be considered as being in 'especially difficult circumstances' but, there are subgroups who have special social problems and needs – and have a right to – special care, protection and, in some cases, social reintegration over and above the basic survival and development needs of children in general.

There are tens of thousands of displaced children, youth and women living in camp conditions in extreme poverty; many thousands of children living on the streets; hundreds of children live in orphanages; large

numbers of physically and mentally disabled and handicapped children; and, unknown numbers of children attached to militia groups.

While many benefit from some forms of support from the traditional clan assistance mechanisms, some, mostly minority groups such as Bantus and Ogadenis, who are generally marginalised by the Somali society, are particularly vulnerable, and often suffer from deprivation and abuse." (UN March 2001, p. 76)

"There are believed to be substantial numbers of children and women living in camps in extreme poverty; [...]

Gender discrimination is deeply rooted in the traditional socio-cultural structures of Somali society and remains a formidable barrier to women's participation in decision-making and access to resources. Violence against women and girls, resulting either from tradition or the civil war, includes the almost universal practice of female genital mutilation and sexual violence against the displaced, particularly against members of rival clans and minority groups." (UNICEF 2000, paras. 7 and 8)

"Human rights defenders reported to the independent expert that there are many cases of sexual abuse of women and children, particularly among the internally displaced population. The situation with regard to internal displacement is making the number of street children rise. Although most of these children are 'Somalilanders', there are also other groups, including Ethiopians. An increase in the use of alcohol and hashish among children has also been cited." (CHR 26 January 2000, p. 26)

"Gender discrimination is deeply rooted in Somali society, where the rights of women in both the private and public spheres are seriously undermined. Rape, which was uncommon in Somalia before the war, has become a weapon of war for the militia and bandits, as well as in camps for displaced persons and returnees. Women belonging to minority groups, such as the Bantus and the Rahanweyn, are particularly subject to these crimes." (CHR 18 February 1999, para. 74)

Most Somalis ensure personal security by residing in clan "home areas" (November 2000)

- Rule of law, guarantees of personal security and protection from human rights abuses vary from location to location
- Much of Somali countryside - especially Somaliland, Puntland and pockets of southern Somalia - are considered safe
- Politically weak groups such as the Bantu and Bajuni are least able to secure protection from extortion, rape and other abuses

"Notwithstanding the general perception of Somalia as 'anarchic', basic law and order is in fact the norm in most locations. Though hard data is not available, anecdotal evidence suggests that much of the Somali countryside - especially Somaliland, Puntland, and pockets of southern Somalia - is safer for local residents than is the case in neighbouring countries. There are, to be sure, shifting zones of very dangerous banditry and criminality in places like Jowhar, the lower Jubba valley, and parts of Mogadishu. It is also true that both Somali nationals and foreigners associated with an international organization or a profitable business are frequent targets of kidnapping for ransom, especially in Mogadishu. But it is important not to confuse the security problems of international aid agencies with security problems for average residents.

Public order, rule of law, and personal security throughout the country continue to be based on a combination of traditional mechanisms: kinship protection, or mutual obligations within blood-payment groups (*diya*); clan-based customary law (*xeer*) and mediation structures provided by elders or respected sheikhs; and protection of weaker social groups via the practice of *shagad*, or adoption into a stronger clan. [...]

In practice, rule of law, guarantees of personal security, and protection of human rights in Somalia vary from location to location and according to the social standing of the individual. Most Somalis ensure their personal security by residing in the 'home areas' of their clan, where they are assured full status and protection by their kin group. Ironically, for many Somali urbanites, this arrangement can lead to a situation in which they are simultaneously 'at home' in their clan's territory, but 'internally displaced', in that they are forced to live in areas far from their actual homes in the capital city. Somalis are increasingly able to both visit and live in cities outside their clan's traditional domain, but typically as a guest of more dominant clans, an arrangement which requires time and sometimes protection money to ensure. Politically weak social groups, such as the Bantu and Bajuni, are least able to secure protection from extortion, rape, and other abuses by criminal elements of more powerful clans; they remain somewhat vulnerable no matter where they reside." (Menkhaus November 2000, p. 9)

PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT

General

Return and reintegration of IDPs and returnees is one of the three priorities of UN 2002 Appeal

- Returnees and IDPs seem to be "de-facto" inter-changeable labels in Somalia and projects target returnees, host communities and IDPs
- Security conditions in the northeast and northwest of Somalia have attracted many displaced and returnees
- Return projects have been hampered by recurrent livestock import bans undermining absorptive capacity of the Northwest
- IOM is no longer involved in IDP return and reintegration projects in Somalia due to lack of funding

"In a country that has to deal with the consequences of large numbers of people who are displaced, the distinction between internally displaced (IDPs) and refugees has little relevance. In the case of Somalia, refugees as well as IDPs may be reluctant to return to their home areas since they remain replete with mines. Many former refugees are now IDPs since on-going conflict often prevents them from accessing their regions of origin. Equally significantly, demobilised militia, who may still retain their arms, have little incentive to return to their original towns or villages." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, pp.5-6)

"Many of the IDPs actually reside in areas to which Somali refugees will return. Therefore targeting the returnees and ignoring the IDPs would negatively affect the reintegration process especially the reconciliation aspect. Although UNHCR is not directly responsible for IDPs in Somalia and does not provide individual assistance packages to them, they will benefit from the reintegration activities in those areas receiving returnees." (UN Appeal, November 2001, p.106)

"The present prevailing security conditions in many regions – particularly the northeast and northwest of Somalia – has prepared the way for the return and reintegration of many of these populations. UNHCR and UNDP's joint efforts in Somalia are part of the Regional Programme for Refugee reintegration recognising the need to promote integrated and comprehensive development to returnees and resident populations alike, in areas of return as well as former host communities. The comprehensive and lasting reintegration and rehabilitation of returnees and IDPs cannot be sustained without rebuilding the productive capacities of the affected areas." (UN Appeal, November 2001, p.105)

"It is within the context of these returning, returned and internally displaced populations that the need for an integrated and coordinated approach to the situation has been identified. Although Northwest and Northeast Somalia have achieved a remarkable process of recovery and rehabilitation following the civil war, both regions are vulnerable to the heavy demands brought about by an influx of population such as the one they are currently experiencing and will continue to experience. Whilst relative economic recovery has indeed occurred in both these regions they still contain a significant population of poor and vulnerable people who struggle to survive within the current infrastructure and services and the current economic climate. The arrival of a large number of returnees will only serve to strain the existing resources and economic livelihood opportunities for both existing residents and "returning" residents." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p.4)

"Since 1992, in response to these developments UNHCR has been promoting the voluntary return of refugees from the camps in Ethiopia back to northern Somalia. However, it was not until 1994 that they initiated serious plans to return the refugee population from Ethiopia. These plans were suspended later that year and the process was re-started in 1997. However, it was suspended once again in November 1998 due to the Somaliland authorities' concern about the absorptive capacity of the Northwest following Saudi Arabia's economically devastating livestock import ban." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p. 3)

"The Northeast have not yet developed such a specific plan to address repatriation and reintegration needs, but a recent statement the authorities in the Northeast highlighted the return and reintegration of refugees and IDPs as a high priority on their policy agenda. A thorough assessment of the specific needs of Northeast Somalia, particularly in relation to IDPs, is a crucial factor in ensuring that a successful reintegration and rehabilitation process occurs. The first phase of this programme needs to ascertain the current situation regarding returning refugees, IDPs and demobilised militias and the existing capacity to deal with this." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p.5)

"Effective refugee return inevitably depends upon the ability of refugees to integrate or reintegrate into their chosen communities. Often after years of exile, refugees enter an environment where the receiving community is frequently hostile towards them. They are typically perceived to have benefited from assistance at levels that have not been available to those in the communities to which they return. Furthermore they often make claims on property that is occupied by others. They may enter situations in which they are liable to be regarded as having deserted their communities. Such factors are relevant to many returnees and communities in Somalia. It is for this reason that sustainability will depend upon a community-based approach to a refugee return programme." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p.5)

"IOM [was ...] undertaking preliminary studies with agency partners to develop a programme for return and resettlement of IDPs. IOM [was ...] planning large-scale activities to ensure an effective plan for movement and reintegrating of displaced populations into places of origin. This action plan will include pre-departure assistance, medical screening and profiling. On arrival, inputs such as income generation projects and agricultural implements will be provided. UNICEF will continue to provide resettlement kits to returning IDPs in Somalia." (UN November 2000, Strategy Paper, pp. 11-12)

IOM is no longer involved in IDP reintegration and return projects in Somalia, due to lack of funding. (Phone communication, IOM Geneva, and Nairobi Ms Mio Sato, June 2002)

Refugees and displaced persons have had little reason to return to the South (2002)

- Very few displaced return to the south due to lack of security and no economic viability in their war-ravaged areas of origin
- The unresolved issue of violent transfer of property and land along clan nepotistic policies is a major obstacle to return
- 44% IDPs from Southern Somalia in Hargeisa want to stay there
- Over 80% Southern Somalis state war as the main obstacle to return
- No social services or infrastructure in communities of origin
- Poor security is impediment to return and reintegration

"However, few of the existing displaced seem to be returning to their original homes. For some who were displaced from rural areas such as Bay and Bakol, there is little economic incentive to do so. For others who were originally residents of Mogadishu, a significant proportion do not feel it is safe or viable to return there. This is a potential obstacle for future reconciliation. First, because it reflects the continuing instability

of several regions, and second because it reflects a consolidation of population realignments and the violent transfer of property, such as land, that occurred during the war." (UNDP Somalia, 2001, p.61)

Interagency assessment conducted in 8 areas around Hargeisa (Somaliland) in returnee and IDP settlements (June 2002). The second largest settlement, Daami hosts about 10,000 people, of whom 35% are displaced from Southern Somalia (Clark, June 2002, p.27)

"All respondents were asked if they planned to remain living "here" for the rest of their lives, insh'allah; [...] Residents in all areas but Daami, State House, and Stadium responded "yes" in large numbers. The residents of State House and Stadium are aware that they do not own the land and that they may well be resettled, accounting for the low rate of planning to remain there. Overall, non-Somali Ethiopians planned to remain at a significantly lower rate than those from Somaliland (a rate of 71% [56-82%] versus 85% [81-89%] ($P<0.05$)). Those originally from Southern Somalia planned to stay at a rate of 44% [30-60%] compared to 85% [81-89%] ($P<0.0001$) for those originally from Somaliland." (Clark, June 2002, p.28)

"Southern Somalis report owning land before the wars at a significantly higher rate than those residents who are originally from Somaliland. Over 80% of Southern Somalis who had land before the war cited war or insecurity as a reason they could not return; the rest cited drought (under "other reason")." (Clark, June 2002, p.31)

"It is unlikely that the Somali diaspora can be attracted to return to a country where mere survival is often the main priority, development beyond aspiration and where social services and economic and administrative infrastructure have collapsed. Effectively addressing these gaps in services is crucial to the reintegration of the absolute poor, including returning refugees, IDPs and the poorest sectors of the urban and rural populations, who live on the brink of disaster.

[...]

Until security issues are addressed, recovery or progress towards it through reintegration, will remain under threat. Insecurity is a key component of recurrent emergencies in Somalia and one that needs to be taken into account in order to find viable and enduring solutions. Rehabilitation and reintegration interventions have significant potential to reduce insecurity. In particular, the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-militia during rehabilitation phases contribute to overall security in a region. Settling the militia has been a pre-requisite for lasting peace and security in current zones of recovery and transition." (UN December 1998, p. 10)

Displacement and return are occurring simultaneously as populations move to access resources (1998-1999)

- Refugees and IDPs apparently have returned to their homes with improved security conditions in many parts of the country
- Families move repeatedly to access relief aid
- Large part of the population is nomadic, moving away from homes and back again with seasons

"As security conditions continued to improve in many parts of the country, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) returned to their homes..." (USDOS February 2001, Freedom of Movement)

"Many families in the camps have been repeatedly displaced, and for some, it is their second or third time in the capital. Some arrive seeking relatives, but others come because it remains a traditional migration route – even with Mogadishu's precipitous decline, the displaced still expect the capital to provide opportunities. The majority [of IDPs] said they survived by begging, by receiving food scraps, and by earning a little cash by providing 'carrying services' to people in the market – earning about 2,000-3,000 Somali shillings a day." (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999)

"The character of Somalia's displaced people is complicated by several factors. Since the civil war, virtually everyone has either had to leave the country or has been permanently displaced following fighting. A large part of the population is nomadic, and so has no fixed residence. The war has taught Somalis how to be resourceful and, therefore, they can easily 'displace' themselves if there is an opportunity to gain something by it through relief channels. These factors make it almost impossible to put a fixed number on IDPs within Somalia at any one time." (Redding and Hansen 1998, pp. 82-83)

Return in Somalia is threatened by landmines (1999)

- "Somaliland" is particularly risky area
- Populations wish to return to their communities of origin once mines are removed

"Somalia, including Somaliland, is one of the most mined countries in Africa. The independent expert is pleased that work to de-mine Somaliland is finally under way, with the support of UNDP and its Somali Civic Protection Programme. So far, up to 500 mixed anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, unexploded ordinances (UXO), artillery shells and bullets have reportedly been collected. The work is being carried out by 63 local people, trained by UNDP for the National De-Mining Agency, which was established in 1996.

Hargeisa was de-mined, although not fully, in 1993. Work on de-mining the town of Burao, mined in 1995 during the civil war, started in July 1998. De-mining resolves some of the problems of displacement. It has been noted that as soon as an area is de-mined the population return to their former places of living. Although the government has recently passed a law committing itself to destroying the mines that are being collected, this is still not carried out." (CHR 18 February 1999, paras. 112-113)

HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

General

Very poor situation of access in Somalia hampers humanitarian programming (2001-2002)

- UNDP staff member released and UN operations in Mogadishu resume (May 2002)
- Gedo and Puntland off limits to international agencies with inaccessible starving populations in Gedo since April
- During most of 2001 populations in Middle and Lower Juba, Lower Shabelle, Gedo and Benadir have been off limits to UN and partner agencies
- Somalia declared by UN the most dangerous operational environment, which constraining UN response and presence in Somalia
- Humanitarian access considered at its lowest at end 2001 since the departure of UNOSOM forces in 1995

"The UNDP staff member, who was kidnapped on 28 April in Mogadishu, was unconditionally released on 25 May. The UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia welcomed the release of Prof. Abukar. On behalf of the UN, he strongly condemned attacks on humanitarian personnel and called upon all parties in Somalia to respect fully the security and safety of its staff. UN operations have subsequently resumed in Mogadishu. Recent renewed and ongoing militia fighting between the interim government and warlords may, however, affect these operations.

[...]

WFP and other agencies have not resumed operations in Gedo due to insecurity. WFP has been planning a relief distribution in Gedo since April but access continues to be a problem. Nevertheless, WFP continues to pre-position food in Mandera for Gedo distribution as soon as access becomes possible. UN air operations into the area still suspended.

[...]

International staff of aid agencies are still out of Puntland (Northeast). Authorities have advised that no aid workers should return to the area until further notice. The UN humanitarian coordinator is expected to hold discussions with the authorities." (WFP, 31 May 2002)

"Struggles for control of the strategic seaports of Kismayo and Merka continued, as well as numerous clashes in Gedo region. For large parts of the year populations in Middle and Lower Juba, Lower Shabelle, Gedo and Benadir have been off limits to UN and partner agencies." (UNICEF 11 February 2002)

"All UN agencies have a permanent presence in Somalia, although they have remained based across the border in Kenya since UNOSOM's withdrawal in 1995. With such an operation, there are a number of over-arching constraints. These include restricted and unpredictable access due to insecurity; lack of presence in much of southern and central Somalia of international partners; limited or late funding curtailing emergency prevention and preparedness, as well as longer-term activities where feasible. However, in light of the changing security dynamics in the country, UN projects and programs are increasingly being relocated to Somalia, in order to strengthen the local monitoring / response capacity in four main areas of Baidoa, Garowe, Hargeisa and Mogadishu. Additionally, a common UN House is being rehabilitated in Baidoa to accommodate further staff." (UN Appeal, November 2001, p.2)

"Continuing insecurity poses the greatest constraint for UN agencies and NGOs providing relief to the most vulnerable populations in Somalia. Although large-scale factional fighting is rare, banditry, extortion and kidnapping threats are rife in the absence of any authority to enforce law and order. This was demonstrated by the attacks on ACF, MSF and UNICEF in Mogadishu in late 2000 and early 2001.

Insecurity is often related to contractual and administrative disputes, preventing the modification of project designs and slowing rapid response to emergencies by aid agencies with risk-averse project designs. To overcome these constraints, UNICEF, WFP and other UN agencies ensure flexible operational profiles, balance national staff with members of all Somali clans, and use novel forms of sub-contracting and bonded transport.

Reaching vulnerable groups in Somalia is further complicated by the dispersion of destitute populations. For instance, since 1999, there are very few IDP camps in Somalia. Rather, IDPs and other high-risk groups are integrated within larger urban communities and rural villages. This renders their vulnerability less visible and makes targeting difficult, although the suffering of poor Somalis is no less real.

Four regions in Somalia – Middle and Lower Juba, Lower Shabelle and Benadir / Mogadishu – due to insecurity and lack of funding, have very little continued agency presence and programmes. Hence some 1.6 million Somalis are denied access to basic social services and relief assistance." (UN November 2001)

"The recent flare-up of fighting in Somalia has led to concern among humanitarian agencies over the impact of renewed conflict on an already vulnerable population. Fighting in the southern port of Kismayo and in the northeastern port of Bosaso has been among the heaviest seen in recent years. It comes at a time when aid workers are trying to sound the alarm over poor rains and crop failure in areas of the south, and the effects of general economic malaise as a result of a livestock export ban imposed on Somalia by the Gulf states in 2000. Randolph Kent, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia, Nairobi, talked to IRIN about the need to establish essential humanitarian access in the face of the new crisis.[...]

Response of UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia when asked about the effect of upsurge of fighting in south on humanitarian access:

We are very concerned that with fighting not only in the south but also in the northeast, we will see more and more people in greater need, who are prevented from getting assistance... More than that, we are very worried that the kind of fighting going on now will create more vulnerable people. The food shortages and water shortages we have seen in recent weeks in Gedo, Bay and Bakol, possibly Hiran, and elsewhere, are intensifying, because the fighting drives people out of their homes... [it] makes their lives not just more miserable, but perhaps threatens their very existence." (IRIN-CEA 7 August 2001)

Serious challenges facing the new government regarding improvement of security and humanitarian access (2000)

- Security situation has been new president's biggest challenge and main priority
- Mogadishu business community has provided 300,000 USD per month toward establishment of a security force

"In Somalia, the Transitional National Assembly and the new Government have stated their determination to address the chronic insecurity prevailing in the South and other areas of Somalia. Opposition to the establishment of a new Government is generating new forms of instability with potential regional dimension that may pose a security concern for the humanitarian community." (UN 2001, p. 13)

"The biggest hurdle is the security situation, particularly in Mogadishu - which the new government decided was nevertheless secure enough to move to. Although the security situation has improved

considerably over the last two years, businessmen and international humanitarian staff still rely on protection from militia, and an absence of law and order means fire fights between gunmen and clans can break out without restraint. Talking to reporters after his arrival, Abdiqasim said the security situation would be his priority.

[...]

Somali political sources pointed out that, in order to succeed, the government must have a cohesive cross clan force that answers only to a centralised authority, and not to their respective clans. Presently, the militia and their 'technicals' - jeeps mounted with heavy weaponry - belong to the clan. "We have to break the link between the security forces and the clans" said a businessman. Previously, faction leaders proved unable to break the clan's grip on the militias and their weapons. They depended on clan allegiance to utilise gun men they were otherwise unable to pay or equip.

As a central authority, the interim government now faces the challenge of finding the means to pay its nascent security force - and also equip it. The Mogadishu business community, tired of large overhead costs on security, have so far pitched in to the tune of \$300,000 a month toward the establishment of a security force for Mogadishu. 'How long can they sustain this?' a Mogadishu resident posed.

Local and international expectations will focus on the ability of the new government to get a grip on Mogadishu. During the Djibouti peace process, when clan representatives negotiated power, the Hawiye, who control the capital, were given the presidency in recognition that it was the only way to reestablish peace and security in Mogadishu - after a decade of competing Hawiye sub-clans laying waste to the city. 'The Hawiye created this mess, they have to sort it out', one of the clan representatives said during the peace talks.' (IRIN-CEA 16 October 2000, "Security")

International presence in Mogadishu on a visiting basis only in 1999 and 2000

- ACF is only international NGO in Mogadishu
- Poor security has chased rest of international aid community out of capital
- Most international organisations work out of Nairobi
- Without permanent presence, information is scarce

"ACF is the only international NGO in Mogadishu with a permanent presence in both north and south Mogadishu." (UN Sub-Committee on Nutrition 25 July 2000, p. 31)

"The vulnerability of Somalia is exacerbated by the pull-out of most international humanitarian organisations, leaving Mogadishu very isolated. The threat to aid workers in Mogadishu was such that aid moved out of the capital and almost exclusively into the regions - particularly Somaliland, Puntland, and areas of southern Somalia - with expatriate presence in Mogadishu on a visiting basis only. In Mogadishu, since the pull-out of the humanitarian and military operation, expatriate staff are, in many ways, seen as a "commodity" or a "resource". Hostage-taking has sometimes resulted in huge pay-outs by local businessmen. Likewise, aid programmes are seen far more as an economic opportunity than a humanitarian effort - in terms of employment, finances and equipment. Not only an economic asset, the expatriate aid worker is also a political target, with resentment over the international military and humanitarian effort still a factor.

International organisations have therefore headquartered themselves in Nairobi and operate 'in absentia' through a skeleton local staff, which results in large proportions of available funding being used for logistics and salaries - and has increased feelings of resentment. One consequence of this is that Mogadishu has become one of the most isolated capitals in the world. Apart from the strictly controlled aid flights, no commercial flights as such operate from the capital - chartered small aircraft from Nairobi, carrying the stimulant plant qat, take only one or two passengers at a time. Information is therefore very scarce, and

dependent on the security perspective of humanitarian agencies based in Nairobi - which try to act in concert over threats, kidnappings and killings in order to protect staff and programmes. This extreme isolation of Mogadishu and lack of information in itself inhibits development.

[...]

Western humanitarian organizations maintaining a rudimentary presence in Mogadishu are ICRC, MSF Spain, Action Internationale contre la Faim, Peace and Life (Sweden), and Daily Bread from Germany. United Nations offices include representatives from UNDP, FAO, UNHCR, WFP and WHO. These humanitarian agencies presently have no permanent expatriate presence and depend on a skeleton structure of local staff. Some local Somali humanitarian organizations have made efforts to work in the camps, but lack funding. For example, the Somali Refugee Agency SORA, founded in December 1998, has mapped out the camps and compiled lists of families, adults and children, as well as the main health and sanitation problems." (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999)

