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Update on the human rights situation in Afghanistan:

APRIL – JUNE 2025 UPDATE

About this update

This update on the human rights situation in Afghanistan, covering the period from April to June 2025,¹ is based on monitoring by UNAMA's Human Rights Service conducted in accordance with its mandate from the UN Security Council.²

Rights of women and girls

Education

The *de facto* authorities continue to prevent women and girls from accessing education beyond grade six.³ On 27 April, the *de facto* National Examination Authority, announced plans to hold the university entrance examination (*kankor*) for secondary school students from 28 May to 11 July.⁴ No mention was made regarding the inclusion of women and girls.

Freedom of expression and freedom of movement

The *de facto* authorities' monitoring of women's adherence to the *hijab* instruction⁵ appeared to intensify in some parts of the country. For example:

- In Herat, in May, *de facto* Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice inspectors began requiring women to wear the *chador* (a full-body cloak that covers the head). Between 8 and 30 May, in Herat city, dozens of women deemed not in compliance with the *hijab* instruction

because they were not wearing *chadors*⁶ were barred from entering markets or using public transport by *de facto* Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice inspectors. Several women were detained until relatives brought them a *chador*.

- In June, UNAMA also recorded instances in Tirinkot city, Uruzgan province, where women who were wearing a *hijab* instead of a *burqa*⁷ were arrested by *de facto* Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice inspectors.

Provincial *de facto* Departments for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice are applying the *mahram* requirement⁸ in ways not clearly specified by the Law on Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice or other instructions issued by the *de facto* Ministry. UNAMA received reports of *de facto* Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice inspectors instructing health clinics, shops, markets, government offices and taxi drivers to deny services to women not accompanied by a *mahram*. For example, on 13 April, in Kandahar province, Upper Maywand district, *de facto* Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice inspectors reminded drivers, travel agents, and travelers at the local bus station that women and girls are not allowed to travel without a *mahram*.

Women were also denied access to public recreational areas such as parks and gardens, in line with the *de facto* Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of

[1] All dates referenced refer to 2025, unless otherwise specified.

[2] United Nations Security Council Resolution 2626 (2022), extended by Resolution 2777 (2025).

[3] The *de facto* authorities initially closed schools to girls above sixth grade in September 2021, and on 23 March 2022 announced that girls' schools above sixth grade would remain closed. Women and girls have been banned from attending higher education since December 2022.

[4] The announcement was made at a press conference on 27 April 2025. Source: GMIC Afghanistan [@gmicafghanistan], YouTube, 27 April 2025. Available at: https://youtu.be/3_VQjC9qU8s?si=l2Nb50lUKWQ5RrKC [last accessed 8 July 2025].

[5] On 7 May 2022, the *de facto* Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice introduced the *hijab* decree requiring women to cover their entire bodies (except their eyes). The Law on the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, made public on 21 August 2024, codified the *hijab* requirement. See further: UNAMA, *Human Rights Situation in Afghanistan: July – September 2024 Update*, 31 October 2024.

Available at: https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/english_-_unama_-_update_on_hr_situation_in_afghanistan_-_july-sept_2024.pdf [last accessed 8 July 2025].

[6] A full-body cloak that covers the head and body.

[7] A full-body cloak that covers the head and includes a mesh screen over the eyes.

[8] On 31 December 2021, the *de facto* Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice announced that women must not travel without a *mahram* for over 78km. Under Article 20 of the Law for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, drivers should not offer transport to women unaccompanied by a *mahram*.

Vice's November 2022 instruction barring women from using parks, gyms and public baths. For example:

- On 23 May, in Ghor province, Lal Wa Sarjantal district, *de facto* Police forced several families to leave a recreational area. They warned the families from visiting outdoor picnic sites with women.
- Similarly, on 16 May, in Herat province, in Injil district, Pul Pashtun bridge, *de facto* Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice inspectors stopped family groups with women and girls from accessing an open recreational area, allowing only all-male groups to access the area.

Work

UNAMA received various reports of the *de facto* authorities impeding women's right to work, despite publicly affirming that Islam permits women to work and to be entrepreneurs:⁹

- During the reporting period, UNAMA recorded reports of the *de facto* authorities enforcing their July 2023 ban on women's beauty salons, with women beauticians who were secretly operating beauty salons being detained and later released after committing not to repeat the same act or being warned against repeating the same act.
- In May, in Kandahar province, an instruction was introduced requiring female healthcare workers to be accompanied to work by a *mahram* who has a "*mahram* identification card". The card is issued by the *de facto* Department

of Public Health and establishes the relationship between the card holder and the female health worker. The process to apply for a *mahram* identification card is reportedly cumbersome and can take up to several weeks as it requires the *de facto* Department for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice and a member of the local community (e.g. malik, imam or village elder) to verify the relationship.

- In May, dozens of UN female national staff were subjected to explicit death threats from unidentified individuals in relation to their work with UNAMA and other UN agencies, funds and programmes, requiring the UN to implement interim measures to protect their safety. In subsequent engagements with the *de facto* authorities, they informed UNAMA that their personnel were not responsible, however an investigation by the *de facto* Ministry of Interior is underway.¹⁰

Gender-based violence against women and girls

During the reporting period, the *de facto* Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice posted numerous announcements on its X account¹¹ regarding the handling of women's rights-related cases across the country. On 28 May, the *de facto* Supreme Court announced that from 1 January to 29 March 2025, the *de facto* courts had handled 6,516 cases and matters related to women, including cases related to the women's rights decree of December 2021.¹² The cases included: 1,332 related to women's

[9] See, for example, Spokesperson of the *de facto* Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice's comments on women's right to work to Al Jazeera on 31 August 2022. Source: Al Jazeera, *Taliban official says Islam grants women right to education, work*, 31 August 2022. Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/31/taliban-official-says-islam-grants-women-right-to-education-work> [last accessed 8 July 2025].

[10] UNAMA, *Briefing to the United Nations Security Council by the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Afghanistan, Roza Otunbayeva*, 23 June 2025. Available at: https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/briefing_to_the_un_security_council_by_the_secretary-generals_special_representative_for_afghanistan_-_23_june_2025_.pdf [last accessed 8 July 2025].

[11] دامر بالمعروف، نهی عن المنکر او شکایتونو اوریدلو وزارت [@MOPVPE], X (formerly Twitter). Available at: <https://x.com/MOPVPE> [last accessed 8 July 2025].

[12] On 3 December 2021, the Taliban leader issued a ten-article decree on women's rights (Decree No. 395). Amongst other rights, the decree granted "an adult woman" the "right to consent to marriage". See: Zabihullah (ذبیح الله م.) [@Zabehulah_M33], X (formerly Twitter), 3 December 2021, 11:26AM. Available at: https://twitter.com/Zabehulah_M33/status/1466662484375326720 [last accessed 8 July 2025].

inheritance and property rights, and 2,602 related to the registration of a property deed in the name of a woman where the property was determined to be *mahr* (dowry).¹³ There is no publicly available information setting out how the *de facto* Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, and the *de facto* Supreme Court handled these cases.

Between 1 April and 30 June, UNAMA recorded incidents of gender-based violence against women and girls, including cases in which officials of the *de facto* authorities were accused of being both perpetrators of forced marriage and enforcing forced marriages. The Taliban leader's 3 December 2021 women's rights decree prevents forced marriage.

UNAMA report on human rights risks faced by returnees

On 24 July, UNAMA released *No safe haven: Human rights risks faced by persons involuntarily returned to Afghanistan*.¹⁴ The report details human rights risks faced by specific population groups if they are involuntarily returned to Afghanistan. Among those found to be at heightened risk are women and girls, former officials of the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and Afghan National Defence and Security Force members, civil society activists, human rights defenders and journalists. Individuals who worked with former foreign embassies based in Kabul also reported being targeted by the *de facto* authorities.

The report is based on interviews with 49 individuals, who fall within these specific population groups and who were involuntarily returned to Afghanistan. Many reported serious concerns for their safety after their return to the country, with some telling UNAMA that they had been arbitrarily arrested and/or ill-treated by the *de facto* authorities.

The report calls on the *de facto* authorities, as

the duty bearers of Afghanistan's human rights obligations, to ensure that no one is targeted after their return to Afghanistan, including through upholding their own, publicly stated, amnesty for former government officials and members of the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces.

The report also appeals to the international community, and particularly member states who have given shelter to Afghans over the years, to increase the availability of safe pathways for the resettlement of Afghans at risk. It calls on Member States to refrain from returning Afghan migrants and refugees to Afghanistan in the absence of an individualized assessment to ensure their return is not a violation of their human rights.

Death penalty

On 11 April, the *de facto* authorities carried out public executions in Badghis, Farah and Nimroz provinces:

- In Badghis, Qala-e-Naw city, two men convicted of separate murders were executed in public in the sports stadium. The two men were executed by being shot by the respective victims' relatives.
- In Nimroz, Zaranj city, at Shahid Haqqani Sports Stadium, one man convicted of murder was executed in public in the sports stadium. The man was executed by the father of the murder victim, who shot the man (who was handcuffed and blindfolded) from behind, using an AK-47.
- In Farah, Farah city, in the sports stadium, one man convicted of murder was executed in public in the sports stadium. The man was executed by being shot by the murder victim's wife and son.

[13] Supreme Court Of Afghanistan (سپټرہ محکمہ) [@SupremeCourt_af], X (formerly Twitter), 28 May 2025, 5:11PM. Available at: https://x.com/SupremeCourt_af/status/1927706679551889589 [last accessed 8 July 2025].

[14] UNAMA, *No safe haven: Human rights risks faced by persons involuntarily returned to Afghanistan*, 24 July 2025. Available at: https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_hrs_-_human_rights_risks_and_returns_-_3_august_25_final.pdf

In each instance, *de facto* officials reportedly attempted to encourage the victims' families to pardon the perpetrators, to avoid the implementation of the death penalty. These efforts were ultimately unsuccessful. The executions were attended by hundreds of local residents, in addition to senior *de facto* officials.

The *de facto* Supreme Court stated on its X accounts that, for each execution, the decision to impose the death penalty had been reviewed by the Primary, Appeal and Supreme Courts and approved by the Taliban leader before being carried out.

In response to a post by UNAMA on X regarding the executions,¹⁵ the *de facto* Supreme Court Spokesperson issued a statement on 12 April, stating that no foreign authority has the right to interfere in the Sharia, religion, or judicial system of the 'Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan' (IEA).¹⁶ The *de facto* Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement on 16 April, which said that it considered the implementation of Sharia-prescribed punishments to be a religious obligation.¹⁷

Since August 2021, the *de facto* authorities have carried out six judicially sanctioned, public executions in Farah, Laghman, Ghazni, Jawzjan, and Paktya provinces (in addition to the abovementioned incidents).

Corporal punishment

The *de facto* authorities continue to implement judicial corporal punishment in public on a weekly basis. Punishments are often imposed in addition to the imposition of prison terms.

Between 1 April and 30 June, UNAMA Human

Rights documented judicial corporal punishment against at least 234 individuals (185 men, 48 women and one boy).

Former government officials and Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) members

Between 1 April and 30 June, UNAMA Human Rights documented at least eight instances of arbitrary arrest and detention and at least three instances of torture and ill-treatment of former government officials and former ANDSF members, in addition to at least seven killings of former ANDSF members.

During a visit to Kapisa province on 26 June, the *de facto* Minister of Interior, Sirajuddin Haqqani, reaffirmed the *de facto* authorities' commitment to the general amnesty for individuals affiliated with the former government and security forces, stating that no one has permission to "raise a hand against anyone's rights".¹⁸

Civilian harm

Between 1 April and 30 June, three IED attacks in Mazar-e-Sharif caused harm to civilians:

- On 7 April, an IED attached to a rickshaw exploded, wounding three adult men. The Afghanistan Freedom Front claimed responsibility for the attack.
- On 9 April, an IED explosion wounded four adult men. The explosion reportedly targeted a *de facto* security force vehicle parked in the area. The Afghanistan Freedom Front claimed

[15] UNAMA News [@UNAMAnews], X (formerly Twitter), 11 April 2025, 5:54PM. Available at: <https://x.com/UNAMAnews/status/1910685362160025949> [last accessed 9 July 2025].

[16] عبدالرحيم راشد [@rashid_haqqani], X (formerly Twitter), 12 April 2025, 4:09PM. Available at: https://x.com/rashid_haqqani/status/1911021307971457469 [last accessed 9 July 2025].

[17] Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Afghanistan [@MoFA_Afg], X (formerly Twitter). (1) English: 16 April 2025, 1:28PM. Available at: https://x.com/MoFA_Afg/status/1912430462003269883; (2) Pashto: 16 April 2025, 12:02PM. Available at: https://x.com/MoFA_Afg/status/1912408705783472140; (3) Dari: 16 April 2025, 1:28PM. Available at: https://x.com/MoFA_Afg/status/1912430462003269883; (2) Pashto: 16 April 2025, 12:02PM. Available at: https://x.com/MoFA_Afg/status/1912408705783472140 [all last accessed 9 July 2025].

[18] M.Abdul Mateen Qani مفتي عبدالمتين قانع [@abdulmateenqani], X (formerly Twitter), 26 June 2025, 9:42AM. Available at: <https://x.com/abdulmateenqani/status/1938102936531349558> [last accessed 8 July 2025].

responsibility for the attack.

- On 14 April, an IED detonated killing an adult man and wounding nine adult men and one boy. There was no claim of responsibility for the attack.

Explosive remnants of war also continue to cause civilian harm, with children making up the majority of victims. UNAMA recorded 70 casualties (18 girls, 35 boys, 4 women, 13 men) due to explosive remnants of war.

Cross border incidents

Cross border incidents in Kunar and Nuristan provinces resulted in civilian casualties in Afghanistan:

- In the night of 11 April in Nuristan province, Kamdish district, Gawardesh village, Doba and Mandragal areas, mortar rounds fired by Pakistani military forces wounded two adult men, an adult woman and a four-year-old boy. Two homes were damaged and a number of livestock were killed.
- On 12 June, in Kunar province, Dangam district, Baidad area, shrapnel from mortar rounds fired by Pakistani military forces wounded a teenage girl. She was hospitalized for her injuries.
- On 13 June, in Kunar province, Dangam district, Dubandai area, mortar rounds fired by Pakistani military forces killed a 13-year-old boy.
- On 19 June, in Kunar province, Dangam district, Loya Giriga area, mortar rounds fired by Pakistani military forces wounded an adult woman. She was hospitalized for her injuries.

Mass arrests of members of the Uzbek community in Faryab province

On 8 June 2025, in Faryab province, Dawlat Abad district, Quzby Qala village, clashes between members of the local Pashtun and

Uzbek communities resulted in the arrests of at least 87 Uzbek individuals by the *de facto* authorities. Two Pashtun boys were also arrested in connection with the incident.

The altercation occurred after a group of Pashtun youths threw firecrackers at a group of Uzbek women, resulting in a physical altercation between the Pashtun youths and a group of Uzbek males who had witnessed the incident. *De facto* Police and GDI arrested both groups involved in the altercation, in addition to approximately 30 male Uzbeks who tried to prevent the arrest of the Uzbek youths.

Later the same day, Uzbek villagers gathered and protested against the arrests, including reportedly storming the police station. Between 8-10 June 2025, police detained approximately 48 additional male Uzbek villagers who had allegedly participated in the protests, including some children. They were all subsequently released from detention.

Poppy eradication campaigns in Badakhshan

Instances of arbitrary arrest and detention, ill-treatment and killing of protestors against the *de facto* authorities' poppy eradication activities were recorded in Badakhshan in May and June:

- On 5 May in Argo district, around 20 farmers were arrested by *de facto* military forces after having protested against the *de facto* authorities' poppy eradication efforts, with some reportedly beaten.
- On 25 May in Jurm district, *de facto* military forces opened fire on protestors, killing one man and wounding six others.
- On 19 June in Khash district, *de facto* security forces opened fire on protestors and beat a number of them.
- On 30 June in Khash district, *de facto* security forces opened fire on protestors, killing at least eight men

and wounding 22 other people (21 men and one girl). The following day, *de facto* security forces opened fire on mourners at the burial ceremony for those killed on 30 June, killing at least one man and wounding 12 others.

On 1 July, in an interview with BBC Pashto, the *de facto* Provincial Governor of Badakhshan confirmed that clashes between protestors and *de facto* security forces had resulted in casualties, although he did not provide casualty figures. He further acknowledged the lack of non-lethal crowd control equipment in the province, stating: “In the mountainous and remote areas of Afghanistan there are no tools like tear gas or water cannons to disperse people. We have requested these items.”¹⁹

In May 2024, in response to similar incidents in Khash, Daraiem and Argo districts, the *de facto* authorities announced on X that a committee had been formed to investigate the “poppy eradication process, and problems encountered in Badakhshan”.²⁰ No information on the outcome of these investigations has been publicly shared.

Situation of the media sector

Space for privately-owned media continues to shrink, due to various factors including the general economic difficulties of the country and the withdrawal of donor funding. Policies promulgated by the *de facto* authorities stifle meaningful debate and limit media content, which in turn undermines viewership and deters financial investment and international assistance to the media sector. As a result, some privately-owned media outlets have

reportedly cut between one-third to half of their staff and others foresee further cuts and eventual closures. For the population of Afghanistan, access to information is increasingly limited, which in turn limits public debate on a broad range of issues.

Although not directly referring to media, the Taliban leader’s 4 June speech on the occasion of Eid-ul-Adha emphasized the need for “unity and harmony” and the importance of obedience to the leadership.²¹ One day earlier, on 3 June, an article in Shariat daily newspaper (a publication aligned with the *de facto* authorities) stated that media outlets reporting on human rights were affiliated with the enemies of Islam, and they use human rights as a cover for “promoting prostitution”.²²

Article 17 of the Law on the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice requires *de facto* Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice inspectors to prevent the publication of content which contradicts Sharia or contains images of living beings.²³ At the time of writing, around half of Afghanistan’s provinces are subject to some level of prohibition on images of living beings – ranging from the prohibition of photos of the *de facto* authorities being taken during meetings to a complete ban on images of living beings on television.

On 29 June, in a meeting, the *de facto* Ministry of Information and Culture shared a new directive with media representatives which regulates political content in the media. The directive reinstates political talk shows, which were suspended in February 2025. The new directive requires political analysts to adhere

[19] BBC Pashto, 1 July 2025 (in Pashto). Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/pashto/articles/c3vddyknz5qo> [last accessed 8 July 2025].

[20] Zabihullah Mujahid [@Zabehulah_M33], X (formerly Twitter), 4 May 2024, 11:51PM. Available at: https://x.com/Zabehulah_M33/status/1786838702213280018 [last accessed 8 July 2025].

[21] The Afghanistan Official Voice, *Congratulatory Message from His Highness Amir al-Mu’minin, Sheikh al-Quran wal-Hadith, Mawlawi Hibatullah Akhundzada (may Allah protect him), on the Auspicious Occasion of Eid al-Adha*, 4 June 2025. Available at: <https://www.alemarahenglish.af/congratulatory-message-from-his-highness-amir-al-muminin-sheikh-al-quran-wal-hadith-mawlawi-hibatullah-akhundzada-may-allah-protect-him-on-the-auspicious-occasion-of-eid-al-adha/> [last accessed 9 July 2025].

[22] Shariat Daily, 3 June 2025 (in Pashto). Available at: <https://shariatdaily.com/%D9%82%D8%B6%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%AA-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%A7%DA%AF%D8%B0%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%AF/> [last accessed 9 July 2025].

[23] *De facto* Ministry of Justice [@MojAfghanistan], X (formerly Twitter), 21 August 2024, 4:06PM. Available at: <https://x.com/mojafghanistan/status/1826221822846591036?s=46> [last accessed 8 July 2025].

to Sharia and to obtain an identification card issued by *de facto* Ministry of Information and Culture. A committee under the supervision of the *de facto* Ministry of Information and Culture was also established to monitor all political content.

Freedom of expression

The *de facto* authorities have also increased their monitoring of and restrictions on social media and poetry, further curtailing freedom of expression.

In May, the *de facto* Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice announced that it has extended its monitoring of social media.²⁴ On 14 May 2025, the Spokesperson for the *de facto* Ministry stated that “the use of media for intellectual deviation, insult and humiliation, ethnic prejudice, and against religious values, is legally a crime. No individual or institution is allowed to engage in illegal activities on social media.”²⁵ In the same month, UNAMA documented the arrests of five individuals, in Baghlan, Balkh, Kunduz and Zabul provinces, by inspectors of the *de facto* Department for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice. They were accused of posting videos with inappropriate content on TikTok.

On 19 June, the Taliban leader approved the Law on Regulating Poetry Gatherings which intends to regulate poetry in accordance with Islamic principles and culture.²⁶ As time of writing, the Law has not been published in the Official Gazette. However, on 30 June, the *de facto* Ministry of Information and Culture held a three-day seminar with its provincial *de facto*

Departments on the Law.²⁷

Administration of justice

Between April and June, various *de facto* institutions made announcements regarding the administration of justice:

- On 24 April, the *de facto* Ministry of Justice announced that over the past three and a half years, it had published ten laws in the official gazette, including the Laws on Prevention of Land Grabbing and Restitution of Grabbed Lands, Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, Hearing Complaints, Money Exchange and Financial Services, Industrial Areas, and Leasing Emirate Lands, as well as four procedures, one regulation, and dozens of decrees, edicts, and directives from the Taliban leader. It further reported it had finalized 196 legislative documents based on the Quran, Sunnah, and Hanafi jurisprudence, including the law [Procedure] on Regulation of Prison Affairs, Mining, Transfer and Restitution of Prisoners, Environment, Customs, Labor, Private Investment, and Police Law.²⁸
- On 7 and 10 May, the *de facto* Supreme Court announced that between 1 January and 29 March, its central *Tamiz* Division for Military personnel, and its Military Personnel Division of the Supreme Court's Southwest Zone *Tamiz* had processed 82 cases (51 and 31 cases respectively).²⁹ The military court has jurisdiction to adjudicate complaints involving *de facto* security forces, as well

[24] RTA Dari News [@rtadarinews], X (formerly Twitter), 12 May 2025, 9:08AM. Available at: <https://x.com/rtadarinews/status/1921787146626617562> [last accessed 8 July 2025].

[25] SAiFKHAIbAR سيف خير [SAiFKHAIbAR1718], X (formerly Twitter), 14 May 2025, 12:36PM. Available at: <https://x.com/SAiFKHAIbAR1718/status/1922564280068542578> [last accessed 8 July 2025].

[26] Bakhtar News Agency [@bnapashto], X (formerly Twitter), 19 June 2025, 2:42PM. Available at: <https://x.com/bnapashto/status/1935641506163142789> [last accessed 9 July 2025].

[27] د اطلاعاتو او کلتور وزارت/وزارت اطلاعات و فرهنگ [MoICAfghanistan], X (formerly Twitter), 30 June 2025, 3:22PM. Available at: <https://x.com/MoICAfghanistan/status/1939638160645836871>; د اطلاعاتو او کلتور وزارت/وزارت اطلاعات و فرهنگ [MoICAfghanistan], X (formerly Twitter), 2 July 2025, 3:47PM. Available at: <https://x.com/MoICAfghanistan/status/1940369355042075110> [last accessed 8 July 2025].

[28] وزارت عدليه - وزارت د عدليې وزارت [MojAfghanistan], X (formerly Twitter), 24 April 2025, 9:58AM. Available at: <https://x.com/MojAfghanistan/status/1915276722351542599>; *De facto* Ministry of Justice, 24 April 2025. Available at: <https://t.co/bC5RbHaMTR> [last accessed 8 July 2025].

[29] Supreme Court Of Afghanistan (ستره محكمه) [SupremeCourt_af], X (formerly Twitter), 7 May 2025, 2:37PM. Available at: https://x.com/SupremeCourt_af/status/1920057918780510392; *Ibid*, 10 May 2025, 1:41PM. Available at: https://x.com/SupremeCourt_af/status/1921131021824586077 [last accessed 8 July 2025].

as civilians accused of certain crimes.³⁰

- On 24 May, the *de facto* Supreme Court announced that between 1 January and 29 March, its *de facto* General Directorate of Judicial Inspection – which ensures oversight of judges and judicial personnel – had received 157 cases of complaints from litigants before the central and provincial courts, of which 105 were investigated and reports submitted to the Supreme Court, while the remaining 52 were still under investigation by judicial inspectors. They also announced that they had prepared a report on shortcomings by judicial and administrative personnel that were “harmful to the administrative system and society” and submitted them to the Supreme Court for further instructions, and had sought information from individuals who had appeared in the courts to examine how they had been treated by court officials.³¹
- On 1 June, the *de facto* Ministry of Justice announced that since the re-establishment of the “Emirate”, it had licensed 832 new defence attorneys and renewed 1,511 licenses, totaling 2,343 active attorneys nationwide at the end of 1403 (20 March 2025). The *de facto* Ministry also reportedly conducted four entrance exams with 1,718 of 2,121

applicants passing.³² Women lawyers are still not formally permitted to be relicensed or practice.

- On 4 June, ahead of the occasion of Eid al-Adha, the *de facto* Supreme Court announced that 1,559 eligible prisoners were released from eight prisons (Kabul, Nangarhar, Laghman, Panjshir, Parwan, Kapisa, Khost, and Nimroz provinces), and the sentences of 950 other prisoners were reduced.³³ Separately, on 5 and 7 June, the *de facto* Office of Prison Administration announced the pardon and release of around 730 prisoners from fifteen prisons (including Khost and Nimroz prisons) and sentence reductions for 210 prisoners of Khost and Nimroz prisons.³⁴
- On 11 June, ToloNews reported that, according to the *de facto* Office of Prison Administration Spokesperson, over the past year, more than 400 Afghan prisoners who had been sentenced to prison in Iran had been transferred to Afghanistan.³⁵ Previously, on 21 April, the *de facto* High Directorate of Supervision and Prosecution of Decrees and Edicts announced that 199 Afghan prisoners who were repatriated from Iran (17 April) were transferred to their respective provinces to serve the remainder of their

[30] See *de facto* Supreme Court Circular No. 20 of 28 July 2022 determining the jurisdictions of court divisions including the Criminal Court, Civil Court, Public Security Division and Military Court. Available at: Afghanistan Rule of Law Observatory (ARLO), (1) English: https://arलो.online/upload/legislation/file_en_1696135132_034_English.pdf; (2) Pashto: [https://arलो.online/upload/legislation/file_pa_1696135132_034_SC_circular_No_\(20\)_Pashto.pdf](https://arलो.online/upload/legislation/file_pa_1696135132_034_SC_circular_No_(20)_Pashto.pdf) [last accessed 8 July 2025]. In addition, two decrees confer jurisdiction on the *de facto* Military Courts to hear cases referred without distinguishing between status. See (1) Decree No. 23, Referring cases of the High Directorate of Supervision and Prosecution of Decrees and Edicts to the Military Courts of 5 February 2024; (2) Decree Regarding the Prevention of Human Trafficking of 12 December 2024. Available at: <https://x.com/MojAfghanistan/status/1871784514655252674> [last accessed 9 July 2025].

[31] Supreme Court Of Afghanistan (سټره محكمه) [@SupremeCourt_af], X (formerly Twitter), 24 May 2025, 3:03PM. Available at: https://x.com/SupremeCourt_af/status/1926224911900479596 [last accessed 8 July 2025].

[32] وزارت عدليه وزارت - وزارت عدليه [@MojAfghanistan], X (formerly Twitter), 1 June 2025, 10:32AM. Available at: <https://x.com/MojAfghanistan/status/1929056037530751275> [last accessed 8 July 2025].

[33] Supreme Court Of Afghanistan (سټره محكمه) [@SupremeCourt_af], X (formerly Twitter), 4 June 2025, 4:36PM. Available at: https://x.com/SupremeCourt_af/status/1930234822980415499?t=04BecEsGwYatq5OzqTtsoA&s=19 [last accessed 8 July 2025].

[34] د زندانونو چارو د سمون اداره [@opa_af], X (formerly Twitter), see:

5 June 2025, 1:43PM. Available at: https://x.com/opa_af/status/1930553562540491142;

5 June 2025, 3:54PM. Available at: https://x.com/opa_af/status/1930586455040032895;

5 June 2025, 9:40PM. Available at: https://x.com/opa_af/status/1930673589407138295;

5 June 2025, 9:44PM. Available at: https://x.com/opa_af/status/1930674578600116239;

6 June 2025, 10:08PM. Available at: https://x.com/opa_af/status/1931043122286379420 [all last accessed 8 July 2025].

[35] ToloNews, *Over 400 Prisoners Transferred from Iran to Afghanistan*, 11 June 2025. Available at: <https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-194618> [last accessed 8 July 2025].

sentences near families.³⁶

- On 19 June, Bakhtar News Agency reported that the Taliban leader approved two new laws, namely the Law on the Regulation of Poetic Gatherings, endorsed by Decree No. 22 dated 19 May 2025, and the Law on Preventing the Smuggling of Food, Medicine, and Health Products, endorsed by Decree No. 24 dated 25 May 2025.³⁷
- During the reporting period, the *de facto* Supreme Court issued several announcements on *de facto* courts' role in mediating murder cases, highlighting efforts to avoid *Qisas* (the death penalty). The cases reportedly resolved occurred in Badakhshan, Ghazni, Helmand, Kabul, Kapisa, Kunar, Logar, Uruzgan, and Zabul provinces.³⁸

[36] @HDS_Afghanistan, 21 April 2025, 9:57AM. Available at: https://x.com/HDS_Afghanistan/status/1914189245771665616 [last accessed 8 July 2025].

[37] Bakhtar News Agency, *New Legislative Measures Signed into Law in Afghanistan*, 19 June 2025. Available at: <https://www.bakhtarnews.af/en/new-legislative-measures-signed-into-law-in-afghanistan/> [last accessed 8 July 2025].

[38] Supreme Court of Afghanistan (سټره محكمه) (@SupremeCourt_af), X (formerly Twitter), see:
10 May 2025, 11:53AM. Available at: https://x.com/SupremeCourt_af/status/1921103912020361263;
13 May 2025, 3:05PM. Available at: https://x.com/SupremeCourt_af/status/1922239323673346499;
14 May 2025, 5:02PM. Available at: https://x.com/SupremeCourt_af/status/1922631006093279634;
19 May 2025, 12:45PM. Available at: https://x.com/SupremeCourt_af/status/1924378433850646599;
20 May 2025, 11:54AM. Available at: https://x.com/SupremeCourt_af/status/1924727857059647534;
22 May 2025, 12:35PM. Available at: https://x.com/SupremeCourt_af/status/1925463041111683131;
25 May 2025, 11:34AM. Available at: https://x.com/SupremeCourt_af/status/1926534788304740856;
15 June 2025, 3:13PM. Available at: https://x.com/SupremeCourt_af/status/1934200122662891532;
16 June 2025, 12:28PM. Available at: https://x.com/SupremeCourt_af/status/1934520959605653957;
24 June 2025, 12:03PM. Available at: https://x.com/SupremeCourt_af/status/1937413664400613766;
24 June 2025, 2:20PM. Available at: https://x.com/SupremeCourt_af/status/1937448346651607411 [all last accessed 8 July 2025].

