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
MAIN DEVELOPMENTS IN UKRAINE BETWEEN 1 SEPTEMBER AND 31 DECEMBER 2025

- Between September–December 2025, humanitarian access in frontline oblasts remained challenging following shifts in the front line, with raions in these areas experiencing a deterioration in humanitarian access and service disruptions.
- Frontline shifts towards the western parts of Donetsk and Zaporizka oblasts continue to pose significant access constraints in and beyond Pokrovskiyi and Polohivskiyi raions, limiting humanitarian access and prompting additional civilian movement through key transit points further west.
- Synelnykivskiyi raion in Dnipropetrovska oblast has become the latest high-profile location where hostilities have escalated, prompting numerous mandatory evacuations in eastern parts of the raion as Russian forces move closer to Pavlohrad. Movement to Pavlohrad, which may be the next major defensible point for the Ukrainian military, would also put Dnipro city under more substantial fire and may cause additional displacement and disruptions to humanitarian operations in the city.
- Advances in Sumska and Kharkivska oblasts have been minimal, with Russian forces making small gains close to the international border over the reporting period. Towns and cities in affected areas continue to receive evacuation orders and face the shutting down of essential services, often requiring civilians to travel to larger cities to access services or humanitarian assistance. Checkpoints have also been causing some significant delays, largely in Sumska oblast, even in areas relatively far from the frontline, including Sumy city and Romny.
- While ground attacks have increased in nearly all parts of the front line, aside from Khersonska oblast, Russian air attacks and shelling have decreased compared to May–August 2025, coinciding with consistently high access constraints in frontline areas and slightly improved access in raions further from the front line. Khersonska oblast has maintained a high level of insecurity despite little ground movement given the natural river border. Significant attacks on transportation infrastructure leading to Khersonska oblast, as well as on a key route for transporting goods from Europe to southern Ukraine, have also impeded movement.
- Large-scale energy and heating infrastructure strikes have persisted through the start of the winter season at the national level, continuing a targeting trend on energy infrastructure since the June of 2025. Combined with intense cold setting in between the end of December 2025 and the beginning of January 2026, needs related to heating and electricity are likely

to be more significant than in recent years, with less response capacity owing to resource constraints.

- In occupied territories, civilians without Russian passports in Russian-occupied territories are likely to face further service access constraints and an increased risk of arbitrary detention. There are cases of people being forcibly removed from occupied territories and health service provision being tied to Russian status, affecting the ability of civilians to access services and humanitarian organisations to operate, even remotely.

Map 1. Humanitarian access severity at the oblast level by 31 December 2025



Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 04/01/2026)

Note: maps showing access severity at the raion level are available further in the report.

ABOUT THIS REPORT

Aim

This report compares access challenges across Ukrainian raions and oblasts to inform humanitarian responders and support decision-making. It is part of ACAPS' regular analysis of access constraints, with the latest report published on 25 September 2025.

Methodology

This analysis is based on changes in the access severity model between **1 September and 31 December 2025**. ACAPS developed these updates using data collected from secondary sources and six interviews conducted in January 2026 with international and community responders.

The third section of this report provides a short description of the methodology. The complete methodology, access events dataset, and access severity model API are available on the [ACAPS Ukraine hub website](#).

This report contains the scoring and mapping of access constraints at the raion level. Scores are based on the application of ACAPS' subnational access model for the raion-level data collection of access events, with minor modifications detailed in the methodology section at the end of this report.

ACAPS produces its access report three times per year and access-related datasets monthly.

Limitations


This analysis relies primarily on publicly available data, which, as a result of the dynamic situation, is unlikely to be comprehensive. Access severity scores at the raion level may be lower than expected, particularly in Russian-occupied territories, owing to an extremely limited response, fewer reported incidents, and lower conflict intensity. In extreme cases where scores do not adequately reflect the operational reality, they may be slightly elevated to best reflect actual conditions according to operational responders. This report also incorporates information from only a small number of key informant interviews, which may not fully account for the access constraints and dynamics in the response.

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
ACCESS TRENDS IN OBLASTS AND RAIONS FACING THE HIGHEST ACCESS CONSTRAINTS

Map 2. Severity of restrictions to people's access to services and assistance by 31 December 2025




Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 04/01/2026)

Map 3. Severity of access constraints for humanitarians by 31 December 2025



Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 04/01/2026)


Map 4. Severity of physical and security constraints across Ukraine by 31 December 2025



Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 04/01/2026)

Dnipropetrovska oblast

Map 5. Access severity at the raion level in Dnipropetrovska oblast by 31 December 2025



Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 04/01/2026)

Table 1. Access severity at the raion level in Dnipropetrovska oblast by 31 December 2025

RAION	ACCESS OF PEOPLE IN NEED TO HUMANITARIAN AID	ACCESS OF HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS TO PEOPLE IN NEED	PHYSICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND SECURITY CONSTRAINTS	ACCESS SCORE
Dniprovskyi	1.5	1.7	2.6	1.9
Kamianskyi	1.5	0.0	0.6	0.7
Kryvorizkyi	1.5	0.0	2.3	1.3
Nikopolskyi	1.5	0.8	2.4	1.6
Pavlohradskyi	1.5	0.0	1.3	0.9
Samarivskyi	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.2
Synelnykivskyi	4.5	4.3	2.4	3.8

- **Access severity score trend since August 2025:** sharp deterioration in Synelnykivskyi raion
- **Raion with the highest number of events:** Synelnykivskyi raion
- **Most recurrent access event:** service access restriction and obstruction

Dnipropetrovska oblast experienced the greatest percentage increase in the number of armed conflict events compared with other frontline oblasts, with five times more armed clashes occurring between September–December (1,321) than from May–August (235), though the total number of armed clashes remains low compared to other frontline oblasts (ACLEDA accessed 13/01/2026). This increase is likely linked to the movement of the front line into eastern Synelnykivskyi raion at the end of the summer and into the fall towards Pokrovske, which has continued to be an active and dynamic portion of the front line. Russian forces have continued to make concrete but slow gains south of Mezheva and south and east of Pokrovske to surround Orikhiv in northern Zaporizka oblast and Kramatorsk and Sloviansk in Donetsk oblast, since these cities are strategically important as command, defensive, and transport points for movement (Deep State Map accessed 03/01/2026). The Kramatorsk–Sloviansk road is also one of the last major urban agglomerations still standing in Donetsk, and its fall could have implications for the full occupation of Donetsk oblast.

Eastern Dnipropetrovska oblast, including Synelnykivskyi raion, where Russian forces are currently advancing, has terrain that requires main movements to be undertaken by major roadway. This allows Ukrainian forces to build defences more proactively at key points that intersect with major roadways, including in Pavlohrad, which is likely to be the next


significant defensive position of the Ukrainian military. More evacuations are likely east of Pavlohrad, and advancement there may open Dnipro city up to targeting by nearly all weapon types in the coming year, which could mean larger-scale displacement from Dnipro, besides affecting humanitarian coordination, logistics, and office operations managed from the city. Depending on weather conditions, Pavlohrad could become a relevant fighting point as soon as the next reporting period, as the winter season continues (KII 12/01/2026). Widespread power outages in the oblast have more widely been leaving hundreds of thousands of people without electricity and heating, aggravating an already difficult situation (Mezha 19/12/2025).

Access to services: until September, daily Russian KAB and drone attacks continued, causing communication and electricity outages in Danylivka and surrounding areas. Buses for community members to nearby Pokrovske to collect food and medicine have stopped operating, requiring older people or those with disabilities to use taxis. Nearby villages, such as Vyshneve, which is even closer to the front line, maintain some level of internet and gas connection, but with the active hostilities fast closing in on villages and evacuations in progress, services may cease entirely (Suspilne 26/09/2025). As of mid-January, the area was experiencing active ground fighting.

Attacks against humanitarian responders: at least two confirmed instances of Russian shelling striking warehouses were publicly reported in November and December (LB.ua 20/11/2025; Suspilne 10/12/2025). On 19 November, a strike damaged a UN humanitarian storage centre, which held food kits for distribution to civilians near the front line. At least 10,000 food kits were destroyed, which may delay future distributions to frontline areas, although some distributions had already taken place in November (LB.ua 20/11/2025). The second instance occurred on 6 December, when Russian shelling struck an NGO warehouse, destroying or damaging beyond use and delaying the delivery of medicines for an estimated 30,000 people (Suspilne 10/12/2025). There were no reported casualties in either facility strike.

Damage to civilian infrastructure: attacks against civilian energy infrastructure have continued at high rates since September, forcing emergency outages during the current winter season that began in November (Suspilne 16/10/2025; DTEK Telegram 16/10/2025). The systematic targeting of fuel depots and gas supply systems has also increased, following the trend of warfare on key infrastructure crucial for heating during winter (ACAPS accessed 07/01/2026). Over the last reporting period, Nikopolskyi raion was the focus of gas facility attacks, and Synelnykivskyi raion also experienced an uptick in the shelling of gas facilities (ACAPS accessed 17/01/2026; Ukrinform 20/12/2025).

Figure 1. Main damage per type of infrastructure in Dnipropetrovska oblast, May–August vs. September–December 2025




Civilian access to services: Dnipro city and the wider region are struggling with emergency energy shutdowns, given the compounding impacts of attacks on energy infrastructure, the high number of industrial facilities in the region, and the need to balance electrical capacities in frontline regions (Dnestr 15/12/2025). Areas experiencing frequent and high levels of attacks, such as Nikopol, are seeing the reduced availability of goods in stores, including hygiene products, health supplies, and medication, as a result of destroyed logistics operations and routes, contributing to elevated humanitarian need (Nikopol 02/10/2025). Access to drinking water in areas within 20km of the front line is also critically low, such as in Novopavlivska and Malomykhailivska hromadas, with Novopavlivska hromada also demonstrating a localised crisis in terms of people's ability to access markets (KII 12/01/2026).

Mandatory evacuation: the mandatory evacuation of children in Mezhyivska and Pokrovska hromadas of Synelnykivskyi raion in Dnipropetrovska oblast was initiated on 9 November following the September evacuation of children and families from Andriivka, Danylivka, and Ostapivske, where Russia frequently deploys first-person view (FPV) drones (Suspilne 12/11/2025, 13/10/2025, 26/09/2025, 24/09/2025, and 27/09/2025). New evacuation orders were announced on 30 December for the few people still inhabiting areas of eastern Synelnykivskyi raion considering increased threats to their life and safety. The evacuation was scheduled to last for 30 days, and community members were warned that once the evacuation is completed, medical, social, and administrative services will be suspended and available only through a transit centre in Voloske (RBC 30/12/2025).

Donetska oblast

Map 6. Access severity at the raion level in Donetska oblast by 31 December 2025



Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 04/01/2026)

Table 2. Access severity at the raion level in Donetska oblast by 31 December 2025

RAION	ACCESS OF PEOPLE IN NEED TO HUMANITARIAN AID	ACCESS OF HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS TO PEOPLE IN NEED*	PHYSICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND SECURITY CONSTRAINTS	ACCESS SCORE
Bakhmutskiyi	5.0	2.7	2.2	3.3
Donetskyyi	5.0	2.7	1.6	3.1
Horlivskiyi	5.0	2.7	2.1	3.3
Kalmiuskyyi	5.0	2.7	1.0	2.9
Kramatorskyyi	5.0	4.3	2.8	4.1
Mariupolskyyi	5.0	2.7	0.9	2.9
Pokrovskyyi	5.0	4.3	3.4	4.3
Volnovaskyyi	5.0	2.7	1.5	3.1

*Given extremely constrained physical access to Russian-occupied territories, fewer incidents may be reported, leading to lower-than-expected scores.

- **Access severity score trend since September 2025:** persistent access constraints in Kramatorskyyi and Pokrovskyyi raions
- **Raion with the highest number of events:** Kramatorskyyi raion
- **Most recurrent access event:** service access restriction and obstruction

Fighting in Donetska oblast has intensified, with the operational focus shifting towards Pokrovsk and later Siversk, as Russian forces prioritised advances along the western and northern Donetsk axis (Deep State Map accessed 07/01/2026). Armed clashes in Donetska oblast increased by 11% between September–December (22,999) compared to the May–August period (20,700) (ACLEd accessed 13/01/2026). In late October, Ukrainian authorities reported active urban fighting and the deployment of Ukrainian reinforcements as control over parts of the city became contested (Reuters 30/10/2025). In November, there were reports of direct combat in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (Reuters 06/11/2025). Ukrainian forces confirmed their withdrawal from Siversk on 23 December after weeks of intense fighting, effectively ending any minimal humanitarian access to the area (Reuters 24/12/2025).


Urban combat in Pokrovsk has significantly increased civilian protection risks, exposing the few remaining residents to crossfire, shelling, and explosive remnants of war, making evacuation in some areas almost impossible (Reuters 05/11/2025). The escalation of fighting between November–December triggered additional displacement, placing increased strain

on host communities and humanitarian services already stretched by prolonged war and funding shortfalls (Ukrainska Pravda 12/11/2025). Combined with winter conditions, these events have contributed to a worsening humanitarian outlook in eastern Ukraine, marked by heightened needs in shelter, energy, and more for newly displaced people (ISW 24/12/2025; CGTN 10/12/2025).

Pokrovsk is largely contested in the western section, where Ukrainian forces maintain some defensive capabilities and the ability to disrupt the Russian logistics setup. Should the area fall entirely, it could mean the next robust defences would be around the Sloviansk–Kramatorsk road given soil quality making off-road movement challenging. Should close ground fighting move to that area in spring and summer 2026, the additional displacement and relocation of transit centres may be necessary, given that Sloviansk and Kramatorsk are major transit and logistical centres for the eastern front (KII 12/01/2026).

Access constraints for humanitarian: humanitarian access constraints in Donetska oblast were repeatedly documented around Kostiantynivka in Kramatorskyi oblast, where NGOs reported that hospitals had ceased operating and teams were forced to withdraw from mobile clinic locations and leave multiple hospitals and ambulance bases because of their proximity to shelling and bombardment, representing an explicit case of access and security constraints halting humanitarian health activities (MSF 02/10/2025). While no injuries were reported, direct attacks on humanitarian movement were also recorded in Kostiantynivka on 8 November, when a Russian fibre-optic FPV drone struck an armoured NGO evacuation vehicle (Ukrainska Pravda 08/11/2025). Further west along the Donetsk front, regional authorities reported on 29 October that evacuation from Pokrovska hromada of Pokrovskyi oblast was “practically impossible” – a clear indication that persistent insecurity had severely constrained humanitarian evacuation and assistance for the remaining civilians in that area (Ukrainska Pravda 29/10/2025). On 12 December, Donetsk regional authorities also reported six injuries from Russian FPV-drone attacks on civilian transport in Druzhkivka, Kramatorskyi raion, illustrating a broader road and vehicle security threat to humanitarian movement (Donetsk ODA 12/12/2025).

Figure 2. Number of air, drone, and shelling attacks in raions experiencing the highest level of attack, May–August vs. September–December 2025




Source: ACAPS using data from ACLED (accessed 04/01/2026)

Attacks on humanitarian responders and facilities: during the reporting period, repeated Russian FPV-drone and aerial attacks on NGO and volunteer movements and humanitarian premises were reported particularly around Kostiantynivka and Sloviansk, in Kramatorskyi raion. On 8 November, Russian FPV drone struck an armoured vehicle of a UN NGO affiliate in Kostiantynivka while it was conducting humanitarian- and evacuation-related movement, damaging vehicles but causing no injuries (Ukrainska Pravda 08/11/2025; UNHCR 22/12/2025). On 4 December, Russian air strikes in Sloviansk damaged an NGO staff house/building, two vehicles, and an ambulance, although no one was injured (MSF 09/12/2025; Insecurity Insight 16/12/2025). On 25 December, a Russian drone struck an evacuation mission in Kostiantynivka, killing one civilian and injuring two more (Ukrainska Pravda 25/12/2025).

Civilian infrastructure damage: attacks across Donetska oblast caused concentrated damage to energy, water, health, and education infrastructure, keeping barriers to essential services high, particularly in Pokrovskyi and Kramatorskyi raions. Russian aerial bombs damaged residential and public buildings in Kramatorsk on 15 September and hit residential areas and a thermal power plant in Sloviansk on 30 October, killing two people. The impact contributed to repeated power outages spanning days for tens of thousands of people across the oblast and directly affected health facilities, pharmacies, markets, and water systems (Reuters 02/11/2025, 15/09/2025, and 30/10/2025).

Figure 3. Main damage per infrastructure type in Donetsk oblast, May–August vs. September–December 2025




Civilian access to services: civilians' access to essential services in Donetsk oblast deteriorated as intensified hostilities compounded longstanding infrastructure damage and sharply constrained civilian movement, particularly in Pokrovskiy raion (Nfront 10/12/2025). Service access constraints in Donetsk oblast were repeatedly documented around Kostiantynivka in Kramatorskyi raion, where OHCHR reported that the last hospital closed in September and that constant shelling prevented ambulances from reaching people in need, indicating a location-specific collapse of frontline medical access and referral capacity that also constrained humanitarian operations (OHCHR 09/12/2025). A 9 September strike on a pension-distribution point in Yarova also killed 24 civilians and injured 19 others queued for payments (AP 09/09/2025). Towns closer to the front line, most notably Kostiantynivka, experienced loss of power during the impending cold for at least two days (Ukrinform 03/10/2025). Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, and Sloviansk retained comparatively greater functionality but faced repeated emergency power outages, including an oblast-wide disruption in early November that interrupted water supply, healthcare continuity, and communications, illustrating the fragility of remaining service networks under sustained attack. The entire oblast was cut off from the national energy grid following the attack (Euromaidan 02/11/2025; Reuters 02/11/2025).

In occupied portions of Donetsk oblast, water shortages also persist, increasing WASH-related risks where repairs and governance capacity remain severely constrained (UNN 09/11/2025).

Mandatory evacuations: evacuation measures in Donetsk oblast are increasingly centred on the evacuation of families with children in and around key frontline areas. As the security situation around Kramatorsk worsened, oblast authorities confirmed the implementation of new evacuation orders in early October, including villages in Kramatorsk (Dontesk ODA 08/10/2025). On 9 October, the oblast administration announced a decision to forcibly evacuate families with children from the outskirts of Kramatorsk, including Vasylivska Pustosh and Semenivka (Dontesk ODA 09/10/2025; Novosti 09/10/2025). In mid-November, evacuation measures were further expanded at the town or city level, including an official decision on 18 November to begin the mandatory evacuation of families with children from Komyshevakh (Dontesk ODA 18/11/2025; Interfax 18/11/2025). On 15 December, the forced evacuation zone for minors was expanded to include nine settlements in Sviatohirsk community, reflecting tightening protection measures in areas facing intensified shelling and service disruptions, including the closure of remaining Nova Poshta facilities (Ukrainian News 16/12/2025). Finally, on 24 December, Ukraine's Coordination Headquarters for Evacuation Measures announced the mandatory evacuation of children and their parents from 19 settlements (Ukrainska Pravda 24/12/2025; UNN 24/12/2025).

Kharkivska oblast

Map 7. Access severity at the raion level in Kharkivska oblast by 31 December 2025



Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 14/09/2025)

Table 3. Access severity at the raion level in Kharkivska oblast by 31 December 2025

RAION	ACCESS OF PEOPLE IN NEED TO HUMANITARIAN AID	ACCESS OF HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS TO PEOPLE IN NEED*	PHYSICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND SECURITY CONSTRAINTS	ACCESS SCORE
Berestynskiyi	1.5	0.0	1.8	1.1
Bohodukhivskiyi	0.0	0.0	3.2	1.1
Chuhuivskiyi	4.5	2.7	3.5	3.6
Iziumskiyi	4.5	4.1**	3.5	4.0
Kharkivskiyi	4.5	3.2	3.7	3.8
Kupianskyyi	4.5	4.3	3.3	4.0
Lozivskiyi	1.5	0.0	2.5	1.3

*Given extremely constrained physical access to Russian-occupied territories, fewer incidents may be reported, leading to lower-than-expected scores.

** To reflect operational reality, the Iziumskiyi P2 score has been slightly inflated.

- **Access severity score trend since August 2025:** slight improvement in Kharkivskiyi and Iziumskiyi raions
- **Raions with the highest number of events:** Kharkivskiyi and Kupianskyyi raions
- **Most recurrent access event:** service access restriction and obstruction

The number of armed clashes in Kharkivska oblast increased by 17% between September–December (6,566) compared with the May–August period (5,609), which made it the oblast with the second-highest number of armed clashes after Donetsk oblast (ACLED accessed 14/01/2026). Kupianskyyi raion experienced the highest proportion of intensified attacks and ground fighting, but up to 70% of the residents remaining in Kupiansk city were unwilling to evacuate unless their house was damaged, lessening the number of evacuees but increasing needs in the area. Intense attacks are also leaving civilians in the eastern part of the raion without access to substantial markets, administrative services, and legal support, requiring civilians to travel to larger urban areas or transit centres to access everything from shopping to pension services and document recovery (KII 14/01/2026).

Kindrashivska hromada, north of Kupiansk, has also experienced a marked rise in attacks since the May–August period, in alignment with high raion-level access scores in Kupianskyyi raion indicating the continued strategic importance of the Kupiansk axis for Russian forces

(ACLEd accessed 13/01/2026). Settlements within 20km of the front line, such as energy, railways, and housing, have been suffering significant damage to critical infrastructure, limiting access to water, electricity, medical care, and hygiene (ACAPS accessed 13/01/2026; RCC 13/01/2026). In mid-December, Ukrainian forces advanced to the Oskil River and reported retaking parts of Kupiansk and nearby towns and cities, including Kindrashivka (ISW 12/12/2025). The ability to hold these military lines in early 2026 will have implications for maintaining the roadways to Kharkiv.


Russian forces are expected to maintain their focus on territorial gains in the oblast and continue offensive operations, especially around Kupiansk and Kupiansk-Vuzlovyyi, in an attempt to capture Kupiansk and sever Ukrainian logistical routes to the west and south, hinder the sizeable Ukrainian military presence in the oblast from redeployment, and prompt additional displacement from the region by targeting water, gas, and electrical stations, which has been taking place amid a cold snap (ISW 23/12/2025; KII 12/01/2026; The Guardian 16/01/2026). The cold season is already putting civilians remaining in Kupiansk at increased risk from harsh weather and disrupted access to electricity, water, and heating, with the provision of water, gas, electricity, and evacuation support having been closed off since the end of September (Ukrainska Pravda 28/09/2025). Low temperatures and limited medical services in the wider oblast are likely to cause health issues, particularly for older people, people with disabilities, and children who have not been evacuated. Further deterioration of the security situation may increase the need for evacuation from frontline hromadas (KII 14/01/2026).

Access constraints to services and humanitarian assistance: by September, access to Kupiansk city was completely closed to civilians and humanitarians given the rapidly changing war situation and increased security risks. Evacuation measures have become limited, and infrastructure damage prevents the remaining civilians from accessing electricity, gas, and water (KYIV24 29/09/2025). Civilians in the settlements up to 20km from the front line report limited access to markets and full food stocks, while humanitarian responders face limited or no capacity to deliver assistance (RCC 13/01/2026). Civilians in Iziunskyi and Kupianskyi raions struggle to access medical, administrative, and transport services (RCC 13/01/2026; KII 14/01/2026).

Damage to civilian infrastructure: the number of new damages to civilian infrastructure in Kharkivska oblast significantly decreased between September–December (287) from the May–August period (445). Kharkivskyi raion received the most damage, with Iziunskyi and Kupianskyi raions also experiencing proportionally high rates in line with their elevated access scores (ACAPS accessed 07/01/2026). Drone attacks on energy facilities, power grids, and high-voltage lines on 17 September and 10 October led to emergency and scheduled power outages lasting several days in towns and cities in Chuhuivskyi, Iziunskyi, and Lozivskyi raions and Kharkiv city (Ukrinform 17/09/2025; Suspilne 11/10/2025). The deteriorated security situation caused by Russian drone attacks suspended municipal health services in Borova,

Iziunskyi raion, and prompted the movement of hospital services to Iziun city, increasing time and financial access barriers for rural families (Suspilne 16/09/2025). Sustained attacks on railway infrastructure delayed and forced the rerouting of trains within and out of the oblast, with some towns/cities and stations, such as Starovirivka, temporarily losing access to train connections (Suspilne 18/11/2025).


Figure 4. Main damage per infrastructure type in Kharkivska oblast, May–August vs. September–December 2025



Mandatory evacuations: in October, the oblast authorities reported evacuating 409 families, including 600 minors, from 40 settlements in Shevchenkivska, Velykoburlutska, and Vilkhuvatska hromadas in Kupianskyi raion (Kharkiv ODA 14/10/2025). Until 12 December, an estimated 1,200 civilians, 12 of whom were children, still remained in the settlements of Kupianska hromada (Ukrinform 12/12/2025).

Khersonska oblast

Map 8. Access severity at the raion level in Khersonska oblast by 31 December 2025



Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 14/09/2025)

Table 4. Access severity at the raion level in Khersonska oblast by 31 December 2025

RAION	ACCESS OF PEOPLE IN NEED TO HUMANITARIAN AID	ACCESS OF HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS TO PEOPLE IN NEED*	PHYSICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND SECURITY CONSTRAINTS	ACCESS SCORE
Beryslavskiyi	1.5	2.0	3.0	2.1
Henicheskyyi	5.0	2.7	0.5	2.7
Kakhovskyyi	4.5	2.7	1.3	2.9
Khersonskyyi	4.5	4.3	3.4	4.1
Skadovskyyi	4.5	2.7	1.0	2.9

*Given extremely constrained physical access to Russian-occupied territories, fewer incidents may be reported, leading to lower-than-expected scores.

- **Access severity score trend since September 2025:** slight deterioration in Beryslavskiyi raion
- **Raions with the highest number of events:** Khersonskyyi raion
- **Most recurrent access event:** presence of mines and explosive devices

Armed clashes in Khersonska oblast remained fairly consistent between the periods of May–August (964) and September–December (971) (ACLED accessed 13/01/2026). Strikes remained high across the oblast, with conditions worsening slightly in Mylivska and Novoraiska hromadas in Beryslavskiyi raion (ACLED accessed 12/01/2026). Russian forces made several attempts to attack Antonivskyi road and railway bridges, aiming to extend the range of attacks on the right bank of the Dnipro River and increasing insecurity on movement routes (LB.ua 10/11/2025; LIGA.net 16/11/2025). Russian forces also continued direct attacks on civilians by dropping explosives from drones, causing injuries and fatalities and deterring civilian movement (LB.ua 18/12/2025 and 31/12/2025). Khersonska oblast also experienced attacks on energy infrastructure, including a major strike on a thermal power plant on 4 December, affecting heating for 40,000 residents during the cold season (Suspilne 04/12/2025).

Russian forces may continue attacking the right bank of the Dnipro River over the coming months, targeting critical infrastructure. These attacks may cause both emergency and scheduled power outages, affecting access to heating and energy during the cold season. Evacuation measures will likely continue and may expand to towns/cities farther from the riverbank as the range of long-range combat unmanned aerial vehicles increases. Transit centres close to the front line are not particularly active given the low level of needs. In

Kherson city, the remaining civilians largely comprise older people, who may be reluctant to evacuate but require special care (KII 17/01/2026). Russian attempts to cross the Dnipro River during the frozen winter months (November–March) are unlikely owing to an insufficient number of troops to advance in the area (KII 12/01/2026).


Access constraints for humanitarian: Highway M14 from Mykolaiv to Kherson remains under Russian FPV-drone attacks, resulting in occasional closures affecting access to Khersonskiyi and Beryslavskiyi raions. Reports of this route closing to humanitarian operations for up to two weeks surfaced at the end of the third quarter of 2025, though current threat levels may have decreased thanks to anti-drone measures set up during the closure period (DRC 25/11/2025). By October, Darivska, Novooleksandrivska, and Tiahynska hromadas faced deteriorated access, while Stanislav remained inaccessible for INGOs (OCHA 06/11/2025). There has been at least one Russian drone attack on humanitarian aid operations in Bilozerka on 14 October. No casualties were reported, but two trucks were damaged, demonstrating the level of insecurity that exists throughout the oblast given its proximity to the front line and raising concerns about humanitarian visibility in missions (UN 14/10/2025). At the same time, authorities in Kherson city reported that demining efforts have cleared 90% of previously occupied land, opening up new avenues for humanitarians and civilians alike in terms of livelihoods and agricultural programmes (Ukrinform 18/12/2025). Despite this, large swathes of the area are still at risk, and with continued air attacks, drones or faulty explosive devices may recontaminate previously cleared areas.

Attacks on humanitarian responders and facilities: the number of reported attacks against humanitarian responders increased between September–December (nine) compared to the May–August period (five), mainly in Beryslavskiyi and Khersonskiyi raions, constituting the highest number of aid worker incidents in an oblast (ACAPS accessed 05/01/2026). Russian drone and artillery attacks on 16 September injured INGO and community responders and destroyed humanitarian vehicles and cargo, specifically food packages (Suspilne 16/09/2025; TVP World 14/10/2025; Vgoru 02/12/2025). Russian FPV drones also struck a US convoy in Bilozerka community on 14 October. No one was hurt, but equipment needed for carrying out humanitarian delivery was damaged or destroyed (UN 14/10/2025).

Civilian access to services: older people remaining in Kherson city require access to specialised social services, such as assisted living needs. Difficulties in hiring skilled workers willing to reside in Kherson city, particularly in health roles, create a gap between specialised service provision and resourcing (KII 16/01/2026). Attacks on transportation infrastructure leading to Khersonska oblast and the southern region more broadly, including the Maiaky bridge, have also led to delays on motorways entering Khersonska oblast, causing brief disruptions to the transport of gas and other goods from the EU. The authorities would suggest alternative routes through Vinnytska oblast given the lengthy repairs required on the bridge (LIGA.net 19/12/2025). Until the beginning of September, eight schools were operating in

shelters in Khersonska oblast, despite the majority of institutions having moved online (KMU 02/09/2025). This, alongside frequent disruptions to energy infrastructure for up to two days at a time, such as after Russian shelling on 15 October and 13 November, has implications to further disrupt learning within the city, as well as other services (MOST 15/10/2025; Ukrinform 13/11/2025). As with much of the country, heating cuts in the middle of winter have also affected significant portions of Kherson city, with a 3–4 December drone and artillery attack causing daily emergency outages for more than 40,000 people (Ukrainska Pravda 04/12/2025). Understaffed emergency services, such as the police, are often delayed in responding to needs. Shelters in Khersonska hromada are also insufficient in number and condition, increasing people's vulnerability to winter-related impacts (Opora UA 11/12/2025).

Figure 5. Main damage per type of infrastructure in Khersonska oblast, May–August vs. September–December 2025




Damage to civilian infrastructure: damage to routes, a deteriorated security situation, and the absence of detours, specifically to Muzykivka and Kyselivka in Khersonskiyi raion, occasionally force humanitarian responders to postpone their missions, delaying aid deliveries to civilians. One INGO reported trying to implement activities online, but with blackouts intensifying, this alternate approach may not be secure (ACAPS accessed 05/01/2026; KII 13/01/2026). From 3–4 December, Russian forces shelled the Kherson city thermal power plant, resulting in 40,000 residents losing access to heating during winter (Interfax 06/12/2025). Settlements close to the right bank of the Dnipro River face prolonged power cuts and severe access to electricity, water, gas, and heating, depriving more than 100,000 people for days at a time as constant shelling inhibits repair. 24/7 resilience centres providing heat, hot meals, water, and internet have also been targeted (Suspilne 16/10/2025; Suspilne 27/10/2025; Suspilne

13/12/2025; Kherson ODA 11/12/2025). Finally, the attack on the Maiaky bridge briefly disrupted the major route for logistics, supplies, and fuel from the EU, causing queues and delays in delivering equipment via the most accessible southern route into Ukraine (KII 16/01/2026; LIGA.net 19/12/2025).

Mandatory evacuations: by 24 December, 50 towns/cities under constant shelling were subject to mandatory evacuation (Kherson ODA Facebook 24/12/2025). Two transit centres have opened within Kherson city for those who wish to leave frontline locations, with medical, psychological, and legal support provided at each (KII 17/01/2026; MOST 19/12/2025).

Luhanska oblast

Map 9. Access severity at the raion level in Luhanska oblast by 31 December 2025



Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 04/01/2026)

Table 5. Access severity at the raion level in Luhanska oblast by 31 December 2025

RAION	ACCESS OF PEOPLE IN NEED TO HUMANITARIAN AID	ACCESS OF HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS TO PEOPLE IN NEED*	PHYSICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND SECURITY CONSTRAINTS	ACCESS SCORE
Alchevskiyi	4.5	2.7	0.6	2.6
Dovzhanskyi	4.5	2.7	0.4	2.5
Luhanskyi	4.5	2.7	0.5	2.6
Rovenkivskyi	4.5	2.7	0.5	2.6
Shchastynskyi	4.5	2.7	0.5	2.6
Siverskodonetskyi	4.5	2.7	0.5	2.6
Starobilskyi	4.5	2.7	0.5	2.6
Svativskyi	4.5	2.7	1.3	2.8

*Given extremely constrained physical access to Russian-occupied territories, fewer incidents may be reported, leading to lower-than-expected scores.

- **Access severity score trend since September 2025:** slight improvement in all raions
- **Raions with the highest number of events:** Siverskodonetskyi raion
- **Most recurrent access event:** service access restriction and obstruction

Luhanska oblast was the only one to record a reduction in the number of active armed clashes between September–December (1,132) compared with the May–August period (1,513) (ACLED accessed 13/01/2026). This decline, however, is largely attributable to the limited area of the oblast that remains outside Russian occupation, resulting in constrained reporting, the limited visibility of humanitarian incidents, and reduced information-sharing overall. While the movement of people remained minimal, intensified military activity in northern Donetsk and southern Kharkivska oblasts suggests a potential effort to encircle the remaining Ukraine-controlled territories within Luhanska, which could further restrict military access and humanitarian supply routes (Deep State Map accessed 05/01/2026).

Mobile network connectivity in frontline areas is effectively unavailable, and service coverage in occupied territories remains severely degraded. This significantly constrains civilians' ability to communicate and may limit access to essential services, including emergency medical transport and the limited online humanitarian assistance mechanisms that remain available (Eastern Variant 26/09/2025; KII 14/01/2026). Telecommunications tools are

being blocked, restricting communication channels and resulting in a controlled information environment (Suspilne 04/12/2025). People without a Russian passport are also being deported. At least 88 people in occupied Luhanska were forcibly deported from September–October 2025 alone, in line with the 30 December 2024 decree to regulate the legal status of categories of non-nationals (Suspilne 09/10/2025).

In the first four months of 2026, health, energy, and heating shortages are likely to persist. Combined with winter impacts for those with insufficient or damaged shelter, inconsistent heating, and lack of other resources, this may have a compounding effect on humanitarian needs. Continued passportisation has also become a key structural constraint to accessing essential services, marginalising people in Russian-occupied territories. While some humanitarian responders are still operating through remote registrations or community partnerships, the space for Ukraine-based organisations to work in the Russian-occupied territories continues to shrink owing to security concerns (KII 14/01/2026). From September–November 2025, a relatively small number of people (119) were evacuated from the occupied territories by one NGO, but access to information, services, and movement in the region remains limited (Helping to Leave 30/09/2025, 31/10/2025, and 30/11/2025). While the number of evacuees remains small, humanitarian services will need to ensure coverage of these at-risk groups, in line with strategic priority 2 of the 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (OCHA 13/01/2026).


Constrained access to utilities: electrical, heating, gas, and water resources are running low. While the humanitarian and service access implications are unclear, reports in Siverskodonetsk detail that two lakes/reservoirs have completely dried up (Eastern Variant 03/12/2025). Other reports estimate that power supply disruptions have left about 100,000 people without water in at least five towns/cities in western Luhanska oblast for up to two weeks (Suspilne 20/11/2025). Heating capacity is not meeting needs, with reports estimating that some families are able to use heat for only a day, requiring waiting up to four days for heat to return (Eastern Variant 31/12/2025). Rural areas around Siverskodonetsk have not seen consistent electrical coverage return owing to the fact that minimal repairs have been completed or started (Eastern Variant 03/12/2025). In September, there were also reports of gas shortages, which closely followed a slew of attacks by the Ukrainian armed forces on the Druzhba pipeline, Novoshakhtinsk Oil Refinery, Syzran Refinery, and other key fuel logistical and transport points (Suspilne 02/09/2025; Oleksiy Kharchenko Facebook 02/09/2025).

Healthcare access: as heat, electrical, and gas capabilities drop with months of cold winter weather still to come, older people and people with underlying health conditions, particularly in rural areas, may be especially vulnerable to winter-related risks. Hospitals are not able to admit patients in Siverskodonetsk and many other smaller towns/cities, nor are they able to serve patients effectively, and a shortage of medical personnel and beds continues to grow, hindering many patients from accessing treatment, examinations, and medical monitoring

(Tribun 19/11/2025; Suspilne 27/12/2025). There are only two ambulance teams functioning in Siverskodonetsk, which is well below the need (Eastern Variant 14/09/2025). That said, there is a mass vaccination campaign in parts of occupied Ukraine being conducted in shopping centres given the lack of available medical infrastructure, although free access to these vaccines requires taking Russian documentation (Eastern Variant 05/10/2025). There are cases of civilians accessing services in secret, suggesting that the space for these backend services may be shrinking as passportisation expands (Meduza 23/10/2025).

Sumska oblast

Map 10. Access severity at the raion level in Sumska oblast by 31 December 2025



Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 14/01/2026)

Table 6. Access severity at the raion level in Sumska oblast by 31 December 2025

RAION	ACCESS OF PEOPLE IN NEED TO HUMANITARIAN AID	ACCESS OF HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS TO PEOPLE IN NEED*	PHYSICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND SECURITY CONSTRAINTS	ACCESS SCORE
Konotopskiy	1.5	0.8	2.2	1.5
Okhtyrskiy	1.5	0.8	2.3	1.6
Romenskiy	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.3
Shostkynskiy	1.5	1.9	3.3	2.3
Sumskiy	5.0	3.2	3.2	3.8

*Given extremely constrained physical access to Russian-occupied territories, fewer incidents may be reported, leading to lower-than-expected scores.

- **Access severity score trend since March 2025:** slight improvement in Sumskiy raion
- **Raion with the highest number of events:** Sumskiy raion
- **Most recurrent access event:** service access restriction and obstruction

Sumska oblast experienced a 67% increase in the number of armed clashes in the region between September–December (1,061) compared with the May–August period (635), making it the oblast with the second-highest percentage increase (ACLED accessed 13/01/2026). Sumskiy raion – where Russian forces continued their efforts near border areas, particularly in Yunakivka – was the target of most ground attacks. Lack of thick vegetation in the area, which is often used to conceal troops from drones and other air attacks, has made it difficult for both sides to advance. The Russian Federation hopes to secure a wider area along the internationally recognised border, possibly even as peace talks continue (ISW 30/09/2025). Despite the lack of frontline movement, there have been evacuations in towns/cities alongside the international border, particularly in the 5km zone (RBC-Ukraine 07/11/2025). In December, Russian forces were positioned within 30km of Sumy city, and there are reports of the forced removal of up to 50 citizens from the area around Hrabovske (ISW 29/12/2025; Ukrainska Pravda 21/12/2025). Importantly, despite significant humanitarian need in border areas, there are delays at checkpoints relatively far from the border, including in Romny and Sumy city, putting additional burden on humanitarian access (KII 09/01/2026).


Still, a small portion of civilians remain in Sumskiy and Shostkynskiy raions near the front line. Should there be a surge of attacks in the region, additional displacement could occur, putting extra burden on transit and collective sites. Developments in Sumska in early 2026

may be tied to developments on the Kharkivska front and the ability to redeploy troops should the Russian forces take more aggressive action in Sumskyi raion (KII 12/01/2026). There are also multiple humanitarian operators in Sumskyi raion, while Shostynskyi raion has less coverage. Only a few organisations work in Esmanska hromada, despite it experiencing the highest number of air attacks since September 2025 (ACLEd accessed 13/01/2026; KII 09/01/2025).

Access constraints for humanitarian responders: the risk of Russian air and drone strikes remains high and consistent, particularly in frontline and border areas (ACLEd accessed 13/01/2026). Portions of Sumskyi raion are currently under occupation, amounting to deteriorating access in and around occupied areas of Hrabovske (ISW 21/12/2025). Significant delays at checkpoints persist and are affecting timely humanitarian access to at-risk communities in the oblast, particularly in Romenskyi, Shostkynskyi, and Sumskyi raions. Up to 13 extensive screenings have been officially reported, resulting in significant delays and the cancellation of missions (OCHA 06/11/2025; KII 09/01/2026). Key informants highlight that personal information is often needed for continued movement, including full name, citizenship, date of birth, vehicle details, and accommodation, as well as demonstrating that first aid kits and personal protective equipment are available. Some areas, such as Esman and Shalyhyne, are entirely cut off from humanitarian aid operations and can only be reached through coordination hubs in Hlukhiv (KII 09/01/2026). Train suspensions, including regional train lines from Kyiv to areas of Konotopskyi raion, and unstable local routes and the refusal of private carriers to travel to areas north of Sumy city, including Rybtsi and Radkivka, have implications for access to the area.

Damage to civilian infrastructure: the level of damage to civilian infrastructure decreased from September–December in line with the number of air attacks targeting the oblast. Rural areas near the international border in Shostkynskyi raion, such as Esman, lack a variety of services, including transportation and healthcare, and accessing them requires taking expensive private transportation to nearby Shostka or Hlukhiv, which is time-consuming and costly (KII 09/01/2026). Attacks have also disrupted transportation routes. Damage in Shostka in October created short-term disruption to suburban and intercity train lines, prompting delays of up to ten hours or the use of bus routes as an alternative (Suspilne 10/10/2025; Zmina 04/10/2025). In October, an attack on a bus near Postolne killed one person, prompting the authorities to consider safer routes for such travel (Suspilne 26/10/2025). Shostka city continues to experience frequent attacks against civilian infrastructure. Continuous shelling on and around 9 November on energy and industrial facilities led to blackouts for at least 3,000 people for days and dealt damage to some facilities beyond repair (Suspilne 09/11/2025). Shostka and Sumy have also experienced damage to enterprises, schools, and Ukrposhta services during this period (RBC-Ukraine 12/12/2025; Suspilne 21/12/2025; CUKR 11/09/2025).

Figure 6. Main damage per type of infrastructure in Sumska oblast, May–August 2025 vs. September–December 2025




Civilian access to services: most basic services in Druzhba, Esman, Seredyno-Buda, and Shalyhyne are closed off. To access basic services or humanitarian aid, civilians must travel to Hlukhiv, Shostka, or Sumy, but there is no regular transportation among these locations, requiring an expensive taxi ride to purchase goods (KII 09/01/2026). The most critical gaps exist in electricity and heating supply, which is constantly disrupted as a result of attacks on critical energy infrastructure, increasing winter vulnerability. Emergency service providers, such as firefighters, also experience double-tap strikes – i.e. when a second air attack closely follows an initial one, targeting the same location following the arrival of emergency services, as is what happened on 24 November. This targeting approach can damage emergency response equipment and decrease responders' capacity to respond to future emergencies (Ukrainska Pravda 24/11/2025). Impacts to the energy grid also have implications for accessing clean drinking water and cause additional needs for health assistance and response gaps. On 4 October, two Russian drones struck the main railway station in Shostka, killing one civilian, injuring 30, disrupting the railway service, and increasing security considerations for accessing the region (Reuters 04/10/2025).

Mandatory evacuation: at least 213 settlements in Sumska oblast are under mandatory evacuation, with 64 of these already having been completely evacuated. Around 35,000 people are reported to remain in the 149 settlements under evacuation order (Ukrainian Women's Guard 14/11/2025). By December, there were about 4,000 people who continued to refuse assisted evacuation (LIGA.net 24/12/2025). Further evacuations continue in other areas

based on needs given the relatively small number of people remaining in embattled areas. There are also cases of state-supported evacuations of older people and other vulnerable people from Druzhba and similar cross-border areas (Zmina 07/10/2025 and 10/11/2025). Intense Russian shelling in districts around Yunakivka north of Sumy city have also led to phased evacuations (Suspilne 02/12/2025). In general, collective centres in Romny and Sumy seem to be meeting shelter needs better than facilities in Shostka and Klyshky thanks to better conditions and information dissemination (KII 09/01/2026).

Zaporizka oblast

Map 11. Access severity at the raion level in Zaporizka oblast by 31 December 2025



Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 14/09/2025)

Table 7. Access severity at the raion level in Zaporizka oblast by 31 December 2025

RAION	ACCESS OF PEOPLE IN NEED TO HUMANITARIAN AID	ACCESS OF HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS TO PEOPLE IN NEED*	PHYSICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND SECURITY CONSTRAINTS	ACCESS SCORE
Berdianskyi	4.5	2.7	0.9	2.7
Melitopolskyi	4.5	2.7	0.9	2.7
Polohivskyi**	5.0	3.2	2.4	3.5
Vasylivskyi	4.5	2.7	2.2	3.1
Zaporizkyi	2.0	2.5	2.7	2.4

*Given extremely constrained physical access to Russian-occupied territories, fewer incidents may be reported, leading to lower-than-expected scores

- **Access severity score trend since March 2025:** slight deterioration in Polohivskyi raion
- **Raions with the highest number of events:** Polohivskyi raion
- **Most recurrent access event:** service access restriction and obstruction


Zaporizka oblast experienced a 48% increase in the number of armed clashes from September–December (2,571) vs. May–August (1,738). Many of these were focused on Orikhiv and Huliaipole as the Russian forces attempted to move on relatively flat terrain in the direction of Dobropillia, deteriorating regular service provision and access within Polohivskyi raion (ACLED accessed 13/01/2026). On 20 December, active fighting between Ukrainian and Russian forces was recorded in Huliaipole (TKI 29/12/2025). Advances linked to the offensive in Donetsk oblast since the beginning of September have resulted in the seizure of Novohryhorivka between late October and early November, with pushes shifting towards Krasnohirske (Suspilne 01/11/2025; Deep State Map accessed 08/01/2026).

Additional western movement within Zaporizka oblast is assumed to continue given climatic conditions making progress in the oblast more favourable than in others. Conditions during the first part of winter were relatively mild, but a sudden cold snap occurred between late December and early January, complicating transportation, energy repairs, and construction (Open4Business 28/12/2025; Mezha 03/12/2025). Given the flat terrain in Zaporizka oblast, harsh winter conditions and the freezing of the upper layers of the ground for prolonged periods may present opportunities for the Russian forces to make quick gains in the region since only

a few natural barriers exist there (KII 12/01/2026). Indications of a cold snap in early January 2026 are already apparent, with temperatures reaching -19°C and expected to stay low (CNN 12/01/2026). The intense cold will increase the vulnerability of civilians, particularly if they are forced to uproot in the midst of the intense cold.

Access constraints for humanitarian: humanitarian access along the frontline hromadas has deteriorated, with both frontline and rear urban areas to air strikes, such as Zaporizhzhia, continuing to be targeted. Orikhiv and Huliaipole are no longer accessible for some INGOs that used to operate there because of an increased level of hostilities and movement in the western direction (Deep State accessed 06/01/2026; OCHA 06/11/2025). Stepanivska hromada experienced the greatest change in humanitarian movement because of insecurity (OCHA 06/11/2025). As well as physical access constraints, frequent attacks on energy infrastructure have caused water outages and disruptions for more than 58,000 people for multiple days on separate occasions, creating barriers for communication and the registration of certain aid modalities, including cash, which is significant given that Zaporizka oblast was second among those targeted for multipurpose cash assistance programming in the country in 2025 (UNN 05/10/2025; RBC-Ukraine 02/11/2025; Acted et al. accessed 18/01/2026).


Figure 7. Number of air, drone, and shelling attacks in raions experiencing the highest levels of attacks, May–August vs. September–December 2025



Source: ACAPS using data from ACLED (04/01/2026)

Damage to civilian infrastructure: there has been a slight uptick in air attacks on fuel and water processing and distribution systems, affecting civilian access to critical resources, while industrial centres continued to experience damage most frequently. Reported cumulative damage to infrastructure was lower than in the period from May–August, although there was a slight spike in new damage from September–October compared to August (ACAPS accessed 13/01/2026). Damage is largely focused around frontline areas, such as Huliaipole and Orikhiv, as well as on facilities and residential buildings in Zaporizhzhia city, which experiences Russian drone and missile attacks on heating and energy infrastructure, disrupting civilian heating capabilities and operations in industrial facilities, including a steel processing plant (Ukrainska Pravda 05/10/2025 and 23/12/2025).

Figure 8. Main damage per type of infrastructure in Zaporizka oblast, May–August 2025 vs. September–December 2025



Civilian access to services: energy and fuel outages continue to be a consistent issue in both Ukraine-controlled territories of Zaporizka oblast. Drone and ballistic attacks on energy infrastructure on 2 November saw 58,000 people lose power, some for days, given the inability for repairs during attacks (Ukrinform 11/11/2025; RBC-Ukraine 02/11/2025). In December, reports from the small settlement of Marivka, where 1,500 residents remain, indicated that mobile connection had been unstable for more than three weeks, inhibiting their ability to call emergency services despite facing drone assaults daily (Suspilne 16/12/2025). Implementers report that market access is strained in Huliaipole and Stepanivka communities and water access is nearly nonexistent (KII 12/01/2026).

Mandatory evacuation: in October, residents in frontline areas of Polohivskiy raion were evacuated, followed by additional evacuations in early November of over 1,800 people from Polohivskiy and Vasylivskiy raions (Suspilne 03/12/2025). Shortly after, intensified hostilities also mandated evacuations from Malokaterynivka community in Zaporizkyy raion (Suspilne 11/11/2025).

METHODOLOGY

The data used in this report comes from publicly available and unpublished sources circulated within the response. The narrative presented is based on data analysis and a secondary data review. Access severity scores were calculated using oblast- and raion-level data on events related to access constraints. The collected access events are available in the [Ukraine hub humanitarian access events dashboard and dataset](#). ACAPS has predefined 75 event types and grouped them into 35 subindicators, nine indicators (I1–9), and three pillars (P1–3). Indicators receive a score between 0–3, and pillars receive a score between 0–5. The final access severity score is an average of the three pillar scores.

Pillar 1: access of people in need to humanitarian aid

- I1. Denial of existence of humanitarian needs or entitlements to assistance
- I2. Restriction and obstruction of access to services and assistance

Pillar 2: access of humanitarian organisations to people in need

- I3. Impediments to enter the country (bureaucratic and administrative)
- I4. Restriction of movement within the country (impediments to freedom of movement and/or administrative restrictions)
- I5. Interference into implementation of humanitarian activities
- I6. Violence against humanitarian personnel, facilities, and assets

Pillar 3: physical, environmental, and security constraints

- I7. Insecurity or hostilities affecting humanitarian assistance
- I8. Presence of landmines, improvised explosive devices, explosive remnants of war, and unexploded ordnance
- I9. Physical constraints in the environment (obstacles related to terrain, climate, lack of infrastructure, etc.)

More information on ACAPS's humanitarian events monitoring and access scoring system is available in [this methodology note](#). For Ukraine's oblast-level scoring, calculations were done on a continuous numerical scale instead of thresholds, allowing for decimals and a more nuanced result. The resulting scores were classified into the following groups:

- 0–1 low access constraints
- 1–2 moderate access constraints
- 2–3 high access constraints
- 3–4 very high access constraints
- 4–5 extreme access constraints.

Changes for raion-level access severity scoring

- When applying the oblast-level model to raions, the following changes were made to the methodology.
- Only events logged at the raion level were taken into account, with the exception of subindicators S9.1, S9.3, and S9.4 (weather events, logistical constraints on consumable goods, and the presence of remote locations), as information for these is mostly reported at the oblast level. For these subindicators, scores were taken by computing all entries in the oblast.
- Thresholds for scoring subindicators S7.1, S7.2, and S9.2 and indicator I6 were recalibrated to reflect the number of events at the raion level.
- I3 (impediments to enter the country) was not included when computing scores, as it is not relevant to the raion level.

Limitations

- The analysis relies on publicly available data, which is unlikely to be comprehensive in a dynamic war situation such as Ukraine. Reported data may come with a delay, meaning some published data may no longer be applicable at the time of analysis. This analysis collected data through a review process to ensure that selected subindicators for a given oblast were still relevant. The evolving situation and amount of data collected mean that some inaccuracies will likely remain.
- Detailed information is lacking on the humanitarian response and access constraints facing humanitarians in Russian-occupied areas, including Crimea and Sevastopol.
- As hostilities in Russian-occupied raions are less intense, raion-level access scores for such areas may be lower than expected. For these raions, P1 and P2 scores may be more accurate reflections of the actual access severity.