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Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in February 2024

The OHCHR Reiterates that Syria
is **Not Safe** for the Return of
Refugees

Tuesday 05 March 2024

The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), founded in June 2011, is a non-governmental, independent group that is considered a primary source for the OHCHR on all death toll-related analyses in Syria.

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I. Introduction and Methodology

This report summarizes the state of human rights in Syria in February 2024. To this end, the report provides details of the most notable developments documented by the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) during the last month, as well as of the context in which these violations occurred, while also providing the essential details of some violations in order to ensure that the report is of a manageable length. The report also summarizes the civilian deaths we have documented in this period at the hands of the parties to the conflict and the controlling forces, as well as providing details of the numbers of arrests, enforced disappearances, indiscriminate attacks and attacks on civilian objects documented by SNHR's team during the past month. Lastly, the report outlines the most notable developments regarding Syria at the international level.

It should be noted that, in assessing the situation in Syria, we are guided by the criteria of international humanitarian law and international customary law, in parallel with international human rights law, while, in a few cases, we draw attention to the Syrian regime's violations of the Syrian Constitution and of the domestic laws the regime itself promulgated. For a detailed explanation of our [methodology](#), please visit the following link.

This report only represents the bare minimum of the actual severity and magnitude of the violations that occurred. Also, it doesn't include any analysis of the profound social, economic, and psychological ramifications of these events.



II. State of Human Rights in Syria in February 2024

A. Brief summary of the most notable incidents documented by SNHR on the ground, and the context in which these incidents occurred:

1. Northwestern Syria¹

February saw more ground attack by Syrian regime forces which targeted the villages and towns of southern and eastern rural Idlib, western rural Aleppo, and Sahl al-Ghab in western rural Hama, all of which are areas close to the dividing lines with armed opposition factions. The attacks also targeted villages and towns in southern and eastern rural Idlib governorate and western rural Aleppo which are far from the dividing lines. Some of these attacks resulted in [civilian casualties](#), as well as material losses and property damage. [On February 18](#), for instance, Syrian regime artillery forces fired a shell at the outskirts of Kansafra village in Jabal al-Zawiya in southern Idlib, injuring a civilian, and killing a number of sheep that were at the impact site. [On February 20](#), a regime artillery detachment fired a shell at a house in Afis village, killing one woman and injuring another two. On February 26, regime forces fired a guided anti-armor rocket at al-Ashrafiya area in Darat Izza city in western Aleppo, which killed one civilian and injured his parents, as the rocket landed near them while they were in front of their house.



↑👁 Elderly woman injured in a ground attack by Syrian regime forces on Afis village in Idlib - February 20, 2024


1. Northwestern Syria encompasses the Idlib area and parts of the governorates of Hama, Aleppo, and Latakia. Unless stated otherwise, all of these areas are under the control of armed opposition factions/SNA and HTS

Regime ground attacks also damaged a number of vital civilian facilities in Idlib. Most prominently, [a February 10 attack](#) by regime artillery forces partially destroyed the minaret [and building](#) of the Grand Mosque, 'al-Masjid al-Kabir,' in Ma'ar Ballit in the Jabal al-Zawiya district of southern Idlib.

Also in February, we noticed the Syrian regime's increasingly heavy use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), commonly known as drones. Drones were used to carry out several attacks on areas in Sahl al-Ghab in western rural Hama, as well as eastern rural Idlib and western rural Aleppo, which are all close to the dividing lines. While these attacks mostly targeted outposts for armed opposition factions and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), some drone [attacks resulted in civilian injuries](#). [On February 15](#), for instance, two civilians were injured in a drone attack by regime forces that targeted a motorbike on the public road between al-Zqoum and al-Dqmaq in the Sahl al-Ghab area of western rural Hama governorate. On February 22, regime force used drones to carry out six indiscriminate consecutive attacks on areas in Sahl al-Ghab in western Hama, one of which targeted a motorbike ridden by a man and his two children on a public road near al-Zeyara village, with all [three sustaining injuries of various severity](#).

We also documented a number of ground attacks targeting areas of Aleppo governorate under the control of the Syrian National Army (SNA) that originated from adjacent areas under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The most prominent of those attacks took place [on February 9](#) when SDF personnel used machine guns to target the [Nahr al-Furat 'Euphrates River' water station](#) on the bank of the Euphrates River in eastern Jarablos city, [damaging the station's solar power systems](#). The station pumps water to Jarablos city and surrounding rural areas in eastern Aleppo.

On February 27, the family of female activist Heba Suhaib Haj Aref found her body in her home in Bza'a city in eastern rural Aleppo governorate, with signs indicating that she had been hanged. A few hours later, her body was removed by officers from the Bza'a Police Station, which is affiliated with the SNA, and taken to the al-Bab al-Jadid Hospital for autopsy. The civilian police force in the city is currently investigating her death. At the time of her death, Heba was working as an educational supervisor at the Fraternity Center for Public Education, which is affiliated with the New Step Educational Association for Culture and Solidarity [Yeni Adım Eğitim Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği], as well as being a member of the Women's Protection Network, the Women's Support and Empowerment Unit, and the Syrian Women's Feminist Movement. On September 28, SNHR [released a statement](#) condemning her murder.



↑ 👁 Destruction to the Grand Mosque's minaret in Ma'ar Ballit village in Idlib following a ground attack by Syrian regime forces - February 10, 2024



↑ 👁 Damage to a car caused by a drone attack by Syrian regime forces in the vicinity of Qastoun village in Hama - February 22, 2024

On the subject of bombings, [a motorbike bomb of unknown source](#) was detonated on February 6 near the al-Nowruz Roundabout in Afrin city in northern rural Aleppo governorate. The explosion injured four civilians, including one child, in addition to causing various types of damage at the impact site.

The residents of the IDP camps densely spread across northwestern Syria are still living in dire conditions in every way. [On February 10](#), a fire, caused by the misuse of heating devices, broke out in al-Ziyadiya IDP Camp in Afrin city in northwestern rural Aleppo governorate. While no casualties were recorded, the contents of one IDP housing unit were completely destroyed, while the unit itself sustained heavy damage.

Moreover, [the poor and harsh weather conditions](#) in February damaged at least eight IDPs camps spread across the rural areas in the governorates of Idlib and Aleppo. In those camps, [floodwaters formed torrential streams and pools of muddy water, which cut off roads](#). The flooding completely destroyed two tents in the camps and partially destroyed approximately 64 tents and temporary housing units.




↑ 👁 Muddy pools of floodwater among the IDPs' tents in al-Jabal Camp located near Jarablos city in eastern Aleppo following heavy rainfalls - February 14, 2024

As for the living and service conditions in northwestern Syria, civilians are still grappling with worsening economic and living standards in light of rising prices for foodstuff and supplies. Residents in these areas are already suffering from greatly reduced purchasing power due to the widespread unemployment and rising poverty rates, as well as low wages, especially in the areas housing IDPs camps, all of which challenges are exacerbated by the plummeting value of the Turkish Lira (TRY), the currency used in northwestern Syria, with one USD currently equaling over 30 TRY. In terms of services, many areas are also suffering from poor water access in light of the weak water grid and frequent power outages.

On February 12, [the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs \(OCHA\) announced](#) that the UN and the Syrian regime had reached an agreement to extend the regime's consent for the OCHA to use the Bab al-Salam and al-Ra'ie Crossings by three months (until May 13, 2024), in order to deliver cross-border humanitarian assistance into northwestern Syria. These understandings became especially important following the devastating earthquake that hit northwestern Syria on February 6, 2023. The OCHA also revealed that about 5,000 trucks loaded with UN relief aid had crossed from Türkiye into northwestern Syria via the Bab al-Hawa, Bab al-Salam, and al-Ra'ie crossings since February 2023.

Relatedly, February 2024 marked the first anniversary² of the February 6 earthquake, which devastated northwestern Syria. To mark the occasion, many bodies released reports and statement in observance of that catastrophic tragedy, including [the OCHA](#), [the UN Refugee Agency \(UNHCR\)](#), [the UNICEF](#), [the International Rescue Committee \(IRC\)](#), [Doctors Without Borders \(MSF\)](#), [Save the Children](#), and the [Danish Refugee Council \(DRC\)](#). These statements summarized the massive number of deaths and huge devastation left in the wake of the earthquake, and its impact which is still being felt a year later, especially in northwestern Syria, a region that has been grappling with the effects of the 13-year-long Syrian conflict, with the earthquake sharply exacerbating the already-horrific suffering of its residents, particularly children. [Martin Griffiths, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordination](#), also released a special statement, as did [Geir O. Pedersen](#), the UN Special Envoy for Syria. In their statements, both UN officials spoke about the ongoing effects of the earthquake in northwestern Syria a year later, and how these had exacerbated the humanitarian, economic, and social crises in those areas as the conflict continues.

SNHR has documented the **Deaths of 10,024 Syrians**, including **2,267 children** and **1,627 women** caused by the earthquake and the late UN and international response. Deaths are distributed by territory as follows:



↑👁 Massive destruction in Harim city in rural Idlib following the earthquake - February 6, 2023, ©SNHR

2. A devastating 7.7 magnitude earthquake (epicenter in Kahramanmaraş province in southern Türkiye) that struck southern Türkiye and northwestern Syria on February 6, 2023. The earthquake, which razed thousands of homes, led to the displacement of tens of thousands more families in northwestern Syria. SNHR has [released multiple reports](#) on the earthquake catastrophe and the resultant human and material losses.

2. Regime-held areas and southern Syria

In February, Syrian regime forces continued their restrictive policies against civilians in areas under regime control, with civilians still being persecuted and targeted over their political dissidence and [expression of dissenting views, a freedom that should be protected by both the Syrian Constitution and international law](#). Syrian regime forces have also carried out arrests and other acts leading to enforced disappearances throughout the areas under their control. The governorates of Damascus, followed by Rural Damascus 'Rif Dimshaq', and then Homs saw the highest number of such practices in the month of February. Meanwhile, torture is still widespread in regime detention centers, [with SNHR documenting new deaths due to torture and medical negligence in regime detention centers during this period](#). On the same subject, SNHR [released a statement on February 22](#) revealing that at least 16 deaths due to torture in regime detention centers, and 246 arrests/detention by regime forces, had been documented since the ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that indicated a number of provisional measures to be adopted by the regime³ in the case brought against the regime by Canada and the Netherlands concerning the application of the Convention of Torture. As such, the statement noted, the Syrian regime has blatantly violated the ICJ's ruling. In the same context, it noted, at least 135,000 people are still forcibly disappeared in regime detention centers despite the 23 amnesty decrees promulgated by the Syrian regime since 2011.

Meanwhile, the regime continues to confiscate properties, a practice legitimized by a system of laws and articles of legislation that we provided details on in an extensive report released on March 25, 2023: '[The Laws Employed by the Syrian Regime to Control Real Estate Ownership and Lands Before and After the Beginning of the Popular Uprising in March 2011](#)'.⁴ Syrian regime forces are also still enforcing practices that may restrict the return of refugees and IDPs to their original areas.

Moreover, the Syrian regime is still misappropriating aid funds and using them in service of its goals, as well as to control the fates of the intended recipients of said funds. The regime has been enforcing these practices through its control over the NGOs receiving and managing those funds. On December 28, 2023, SNHR released a report entitled, '[How The Syrian Regime Uses the Humanitarian Organizations SARC and STD to Steal Humanitarian Aid](#)', which provides a case study on the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) and the Syria Trust for Development (STD) as the two primary fronts used by the regime to receive aid funds.

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3. 1. "Take all measures within its power to prevent acts of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and ensure that its officials, as well as any organizations or persons which may be subject to its control, direction or influence, do not commit any acts of torture or other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."
 2. The Syrian Arab Republic "shall take effective measures to prevent the destruction and ensure the preservation of any evidence related to allegations of acts within the scope of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment."
 4. While the laws passed by the regime can theoretically affect every single Syrian citizen, these laws in particular were directly and principally aimed at three main groups, namely: first, the forcibly displaced (both IDPs and refugees), estimated today at 12.3 million Syrian citizens according to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); second: the forcibly disappeared, estimated to number at least 112,000 Syrian citizens according to SNHR's database (it is important to note that the Syrian regime is directly responsible for the disappearance of over 85 percent of this total at least); and third: victims (civilians and fighters alike), who are estimated today to number at least half a million Syrians, the overwhelming majority of whom have not been recorded as dead in the civil registry. Needless to say, the overwhelming majority of the victims were dissidents opposed to the Syrian regime's autocratic rule, who were killed by the regime which has been continuously committing violation since March 2011. It is clear, therefore, that these laws pose a direct threat to at least half of the Syrian population.

Below are the most notable developments on the ground that took place in regime-held areas in February 2024

On February 8, [two civilians](#), one of them a woman, were killed by stray gunfire in al-Sanamayn city in northern Daraa amidst infighting between two Syrian regime armed groups; the first, affiliated with the regime's Military Security Intelligence Directorate, is led by a man named Ahmad al-Labbad, while the second, affiliated with the Syrian regime's State Security forces, is commanded by a man named Muhsin al-Heymad. The clashes, which lasted for a few hours, were mostly concentrated in al-Jam'iya neighborhood of al-Sanamayn city, and involved the use of machine guns and RPGs, with many fighters also killed and injured on both sides.

On February 15, two women were mildly injured in an attack by Syrian regime forces who used tanks and heavy machine guns to bombard the town of Mahajja as part of their attempts to raid the town, following the town residents' refusal to surrender a number of regime defectors living there. Clashes ensued between the raiding regime forces and armed local residents⁵ in Mahajja backed by forces from the Eighth Brigade who were stationed in the town. A member of the Eighth Brigade⁶ was killed by stray gunfire in the clashes, although he was not involved in the fighting on this occasion. In retaliation for the regime's attempted raids, the local armed residents and the Eighth Brigade, attacked a State Security facility in the town, resulting in another round of clashes, in which a State Security officer was killed. The situation ended with the regime forces withdrawing from the vicinity of the town, when commanders of the Eighth Brigade and members of the Central Committee, which is composed of popular representatives chosen to handle talks with the regime, intervened.

On February 17, [two civilians were killed](#) by stray gunfire in al-Rastan city in northern Homs amid infighting between two regime groups, affiliated respectively with the 47th Brigade's Rapid Intervention Regiment and the Fifth Division.

On the morning of February 28, we documented that [a man was killed](#) by [indiscriminate gunfire](#) from Syrian regime forces attempting to break up a [demonstration by protestors](#) who tried to enter a settlement center (a facility used by the regime to conduct official 'settlements' with citizens) in the center of Suwayda city. Another protester was slightly injured in the same indiscriminate regime gunfire. On the night of that day, [a number of civilian houses were damaged](#) when unidentified gunmen used RPGs and light machine guns to target regime security facilities and military outposts in Suwayda city, with some of the gunfire hitting houses in the vicinity of the targeted buildings. At the end of February, [the US Embassy in Damascus, in a post on its X \(formerly Twitter\) account](#), expressed concern over the Syrian regime's "use of excessive force against peaceful protestors in Suwayda."

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5. Former armed opposition fighters who were in control of Daraa governorate. As per the settlement agreement in 2018, which was struck between the Syrian regime and negotiations committees representing the residents of Daraa governorate under Russian sponsorship, these fighters were entitled to keep their weapons when regime forces took over Daraa.
 6. The Eighth Brigade was founded in 2018 following the settlement agreement in 2018, which was struck between the Syrian regime and negotiations committees representing the residents of Daraa governorate under a Russian sponsorship. Initially, the Eighth Brigade was affiliated with the Russian-backed Fifth Division, which included large numbers of former armed opposition fighters who were in control of the governorate. Later on, the allegiance of the Brigade, which is mostly established in eastern rural Daraa, shifted from the Fifth Division to the Syrian regime's Military Intelligence Directorate. Today, the members of the Eighth Division hold ID cards issued by the Syrian regime's Ministry of Defense and receive wages from it.

In the same context, civilian demonstrations continued throughout February in the regime-controlled governorate of Suwayda for the seventh consecutive month. The protestors continued to condemn Bashar Assad for the dire state of the country, and to call for the regime's downfall. These protests are continuing at a time of multiple, unprecedented and increasingly dire economic, living, and human rights crises in Syria.



↑👁 Anti-regime civilian protests continue in Suwayda city for the seventh month in a row
- February 23, 2024, ©SNHR

In February, [multiple civilians were killed](#) in regime-held areas in Deir Ez-Zour governorate [by gunfire](#) from SDF personnel stationed in locations adjacent to regime-held areas (separated by the Euphrates River). The most prominent incident of this kind came on February 12, when [a 12-year-old boy was shot dead](#) by SDF personnel stationed in Theyban town in eastern Deir Ez-Zour while he was herding sheep near al-Mayadeen city's bridge on the opposite riverbank.

On February 7, we documented the killing of six civilians simultaneously in an airstrike by fixed-wing warplanes believed to be affiliated with the Israeli Air Force, which fired missiles at a residential building [in al-Hamra neighborhood](#) in Homs city, with the building itself also almost completely destroyed. The attack also killed and injured a number of military servicemen, some of whom were Iranian nationals. On the same day, the Syrian regime's Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) reported that Israeli air forces carried out an attack on multiple sites in Homs city and surrounding rural areas.

On February 9, [Syrian media outlets reported](#) that the Syrian regime's air defense had shot down two drones that entered Syrian airspace from the direction of the occupied Golan. On February 10, [SANA reported](#) that the Israeli Air Force had carried out airstrikes on multiple targets in Rural Damascus governorate, resulting in material losses. [On February 21](#), the Israeli Air Force carried out a missile attack targeting a residential building in Kafrsousa neighborhood in Damascus city, which resulted in significant human and material losses. On February 22, Sudipto Mukerjee, the UN Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator for Syria ad interim, [issued a statement](#) expressing his concern over the missile attacks that targeted a residential building in Kafrsousa neighborhood in Damascus. The statement revealed that the attack took place "less than 250 meters from the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) office" and "resulted in two deaths and one injury". On February 28, [SANA reported](#) that the Israeli Air Force had carried out more attacks targeting multiple points in Rural Damascus governorate, which resulted in material losses.

In early-February, some regime-controlled areas in Deir Ez-Zour governorate [were the target of intensive airstrikes by the US Air Force](#). These attacks were concentrated on military outposts where pro-regime Iranian militias have been stationed, particularly in the two cities of al-Boukamal and al-Mayadeen in eastern Deir Ez-Zour and Ayyash village in western Deir Ez-Zour. [On February 5, these attacks were addressed at an UN Security Council meeting](#), where they were described as “retaliatory airstrikes” for the targeting of three US servicemen in three Middle East countries. The session acknowledged that these attacks threaten international peace and security, and “threaten to further exacerbate an already volatile regional situation”.

February also saw more skirmishes between pro-Iranian militias stationed in regime-controlled areas and US-led forces stationed at US-led International Coalition military airbases, with the two sides targeting each other in ground attacks in the two governorates of Hasaka and Deir Ez-Zour. We also recorded drone attacks believed to be carried out by Iranian militias which targeted US-led International Coalition military bases.

Furthermore, [more victims were killed](#) and injured by explosions of landmines of unidentified source in regime-controlled areas in February, [including children](#). [On February 23](#), for instance, a child was killed by the explosion of a landmine of unidentified source while harvesting desert truffles in Tal'da village in a rural area to the north of al-Salamiya city in eastern Hama governorate. [The deadliest landmine incident this month took place on February 25](#), when 14 civilians were killed and another eight injured by the explosion of a landmine of unidentified source. The victims were in a truck near Jabal al-Sbe'ie in the badiya or 'desert' area near al-Rasafa city in southern rural Raqqa governorate, on their way to harvest desert truffles, when the landmine exploded.

More victims were also killed by unidentified gunmen in February in regime-controlled areas. This month's killings were concentrated in the governorates of Daraa, Deir Ez-Zour, Homs, and Hama. Most prominently, on February 23, [five shepherds were shot dead](#) by unidentified gunmen, suspected to be affiliated with Syrian regime forces, on the outskirts of al-Haywaniya village in Jab al-Jrah area in eastern rural Homs governorate. We also recorded cases in [which civilians were found dead bearing gunshot wounds](#) after having gone missing earlier, with some of these victims' bodies showing signs of torture. On February 7, for instance, local residents [found the body of a young man](#) bearing gunshot wounds in his back and marks of torture all over his body, near Jasim city in northern Daraa.



↑ 👁 Mohammad al-Amer's body was found, bearing gunshot wounds, by local residents near Jasim city in Daraa February 7, 2024

On February 26, we documented that unidentified individuals carried out an attack on the Khaled bin al-Walid Mosque [in the regime-controlled town of Kafr Shams in northern Daraa](#), wrecking the mosque [and smashing up some of its contents and interior furnishing](#).

As for bombings, on February 6, the explosion of an improvised explosive device (IED) of unidentified source seriously injured a young man in al-Sanamayn city in northern rural Daraa governorate. [The young man died of his injuries two days later, on February 8](#). Also on February 5, a boy was severely injured by the explosion of an unidentified object in al-Ashara city in eastern Deir Ez-Zour. The boy had his left hand amputated as a result of his injuries. On February 19, [a civilian was killed](#) by the explosion of an unidentified object near the river crossing in al-Bghelia in western Deir Ez-Zour.

On February 7, the [Jordan News Agency \(Petra\) reported](#) that Jordanian Border Guards had thwarted an attempt to smuggle large quantities of narcotics from Syria in the Eastern Military Zone. The agency reported that three smugglers had been killed and one Jordanian Border Guard serviceman injured in the shootout that ensued between the two sides. [On February 18](#), Petra also reported that large quantities of narcotics had been recovered following another foiled smuggling attempt in the Eastern Military Zone, with the attempt ensuing in clashes, in which five smugglers were killed and another four injured.

Meanwhile, economic and living conditions continued to deteriorate, along with the service and security situation, across all sectors in regime-controlled areas of Syria. [The value of the Syrian Pound \(SYP\) has continued to plunge against US Dollars](#). Naturally, this leads to price increases for all goods and services, including food supplies, adversely affecting citizens' already limited purchasing power. [This includes prices for red meats and vegetables](#). Also, the Syrian regime's Ministry of Internal Trade and Consumer Protection announced in February that the price a 1,100 gram-pack of round flatbreads had been doubled from 200 SYP to 400 SYP. Similarly, [the same ministry announced new prices for fuel](#), as well as firewood, [with one ton now costing 3.5 million SYP](#). Moreover, the Syrian regime's government is still enforcing a rationing policy for electricity, with electricity costs set to increase at the beginning of March, [according to a statement issued by the Syrian regime's Ministry of Electricity on February 18](#). Another issue plaguing regime-controlled areas is the state of rampant insecurity, with constant thefts and assaults [targeting public institutions and facilities](#).

3. Northeastern Syria⁷

In February, we recorded multiple civilian deaths and [injuries](#), including children, who were shot dead by SDF personnel in SDF-controlled areas of northeastern Syria. [On February 4](#), for instance, a 65-year-old man was shot dead by SDF patrolmen on the public road in al-Jarhi town in eastern Deir Ez-Zour. [On February 14](#), a 13-year-old boy was shot dead by SDF personnel at the river crossing. The gunfire came from the direction of al-Shnan village in eastern Deir Ez-Zour.

7. The term northeastern Syria refers to all SDF-controlled areas in northern and northeastern Syria, unless stated otherwise.

Also in February, SDF personnel arbitrarily arrested a number of civilians, while also [continuing to abduct children for the purpose of conscription](#). The most prominent of these arrests came [on February 11](#), when SDF's al-Shabiba al-Thawriya, (Revolutionary Youth) faction, also known as the 'Joanne Schurchkar', abducted two boys aged 13 and 15 in Dafi village, which is administratively a part of Ein al-Arab city in eastern Aleppo. The two children were then taken to an SDF recruitment facility. Furthermore, we also recorded the death of a child in February due to torture in an SDF detention center. [We released a statement condemning this incident on February 20](#).


On February 12, we documented artillery attacks carried out by forces believed to be affiliated with Turkish forces stationed in the vicinity of Afrin city in Aleppo governorate. The attacks targeted the SDF-controlled Abin (Beneh) village, administratively a part of the Sherawa subdistrict in northwestern Aleppo governorate. While the shelling mostly targeted SDF military sites, some shells hit houses and other civilian properties in the village, resulting in the death of one civilian and injuring another, when a shell struck a house.



↑ 👁 Damage to a house caused by a ground attack by Turkish forces on Abin village in Aleppo
- February 12, 2024

Meanwhile, artillery attacks by regime forces and pro-regime Iranian militias targeting SDF-controlled areas in Deir Ez-Zour continued, with the SDF retaliating with similar attacks on regime-held areas in the governorate.

More [civilian deaths](#) and injuries due to landmines were also recorded in SDF-controlled areas across northern and eastern Syria in February. In one case, a 13-year-old boy was killed [on February 2](#) by the explosion of a landmine of unidentified source, while he was herding sheep near his home village of Jub Abyad in eastern Aleppo. The boy had found the landmine and begun playing with it, apparently not knowing what it was, which triggered its explosion. [On February 9](#), another boy was killed by a landmine of unidentified source in al-Tabaqa city in western Raqqqa.



↑ 👁 Abdul Karim Kahlat, a boy,
was killed by a landmine
of unidentified source in
al-Tabaqa city in Raqqqa
- February 9, 2024

Similarly, [February saw more killings by unidentified gunmen](#) in SDF-controlled areas. Those incidents were concentrated in the governorates of Deir Ez-Zour and Raqqa. We also documented cases in which the bodies of civilians who had been shot dead were found by local residents after the victims had gone missing. [On February 7](#), local residents found the body of young man bearing gunshot wounds in al-Mazrli neighborhood in northern Manbij city in rural Aleppo.

Meanwhile, the clashes in Deir Ez-Zour which began on August 27, 2023, between the SDF and Arab tribes backed by the Deir Ez-Zour Military Council, continued in February, albeit more sporadically, and were limited to areas of eastern Deir Ez-Zour, where Arab tribes have been targeting and engaging in clashes with SDF troops by carrying out focused attacks in the areas where they are stationed.

IDPs' suffering also continued in February in many of the IDPs camps spread across northern and eastern Syria, particularly the irregular IDPs camps located in western rural Deir Ez-Zour, where IDPs are still grappling with inadequate access to basic services, and lack of water and power, all further exacerbated by the harsh winter weather conditions. [On February 27, an IDP child died](#), and his parents were injured in a fire of unidentified cause that broke out in their tent in al-Sad IDPs Camp in southern Hasaka city. Meanwhile, the SDF has increased its persecution of the residents of al-Hawl Camp,⁸ with intensified raids and arbitrary arrests, leading many international organizations to temporarily suspend their operations in the area, as indicated by the OCHA in [an updated report released on February 4](#). Another crucial update came on February 15 when the UNICEF abruptly cut off the drinking water supply to five IDP camps in al-Shahba area⁹ in northern Aleppo governorate, which house internally displaced families from Afrin city and the surrounding areas in northern rural Aleppo. As of this writing, UNICEF has not resumed its operations in these five camps, namely Sardam Camp (al-Asr), housing around 1,050 families; Barkhdan Camp (al-Muqawma), housing about 700 families; Faghir Camp al-Awda), housing about 125 families; Afrin Camp, housing about 108 families, and al-Shahba Camp, housing about 148 families. Prior to ceasing its operations in the area, UNICEF would supply drinking water through filling plastic water tanks in those camps. This water supply would be transferred from Aleppo city through water tenders. Given the lengthy duration of the lack of any replacement drinking water supply and the controlling forces' failure to secure a new water supply for these camps, the residents have no choice but to buy water from artesian well owners, resulting in several problems. Amongst other things, the available quantity of this water is severely limited, while there are numerous logistical challenges in transferring it to the camps. However, the most pressing issue is the fact that the artesian well water is often contaminated and dangerous to consume, which might lead to the spread of waterborne disease in those camps, most notably severe diarrhea, which, in such cases, is a common result of drinking contaminated water. It should be noted that civilians in al-Shahba area are already struggling with a shortage of basic supplies and foodstuffs due to the restrictive practices and policies of the military personnel at checkpoints erected by Syrian regime forces in the area's vicinity.

8. Located near al-Hawl town in eastern rural Hasaka governorate, al-Hawl IDPs Camp is under the control of the SDF.

9. Al-Shahba area, which is under the control of the SDF, includes Tal Ref'at city and its surrounding districts in northern rural Aleppo governorate. It is bordered by areas controlled by the Syrian National Army (SNA) to the north and west, and by areas controlled by Syrian regime forces to the south and east. Usually, al-Shahba area receives its basic essentials and food supplies from the regime's side.




↑👁 Sardam IDPs Camp in al-Shahba area in northern Aleppo on February 26, 2024. Sardam Camp was one of the camps that the UNICEF stopped supplying with drinking water in February 2024 ©SNHR

Meanwhile, the living and security situation in northeastern Syria is increasingly worsening. Prices of food, including vegetables and meat, as well as fuel and other essential commodities in the region, continue to rise. For instance, [a gas cylinder costs now \\$15](#). These price rises are a result of the controlling forces' failure to regulate the market, coupled with the escalation of hostilities in northeastern Syria. Relatedly, the continued clashes and military escalation by all parties in northeastern Syria is further adversely affecting civilians and their ability to secure water, fuel, and everyday needs. On February 9, [Human Rights Watch \(HRW\) published an opinion piece](#) shedding light on the adverse effects of the attacks carried out by Turkish forces in the last few months in northeastern Syria. The article stresses that these attacks have exacerbated civilians' suffering in the region and disrupted access to basic services by targeting some of the water and power sources in the area.

B. Most notable human rights violations in Syria in February 2024 as documented on SNHR's database

This report summarizes the most notable human rights violations committed by the parties to the conflict and the controlling forces in Syria that were documented by SNHR in February 2024. The infographic below outlines February's most notable violations.



1. Extrajudicial killing

In February 2024, SNHR documented the killing of 78 civilians, including seven children and four women (adult female). The largest proportion of the 78 victims were killed by other parties. These deaths include one medical worker and nine individuals who died due to torture, while we also documented at least three massacres this month. On March 1, we released [a report](#) detailing the civilian victims documented killed at the hands of the parties to the conflict and controlling forces in Syria in February 2024.

Civilian deaths recorded in February 2024 were distributed by the parties to the conflict and the controlling forces in Syria as follows:

A. Main parties:

- Syrian regime forces (army, security, local militias, and Shiite foreign militias):¹⁰ Eight civilians, including one woman.
- Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS):¹¹ One civilian.
- All armed opposition factions/Syrian National Army (SNA): Three civilians.
- Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF): Seven civilians, including three children.

B. Other parties:

We documented the killing of 59 civilians in February, including four children and three women, at the hands of other parties, distributed as follows:

- Landmines of unidentified source: 24 civilians, including four children and two women.
- Gunfire of unidentified source: 16 civilians.
- Bombings by unidentified parties: Two civilians.
- Killings by unidentified parties: Six civilians.
- Israeli forces: Six civilians.
- Jordanian Border Guard: Three civilians.
- Turkish forces: One civilian.

2. Arbitrary arrest and enforced disappearance

In February 2024, SNHR documented at least 194 arbitrary arrests/detentions carried out by the parties to the conflict and the controlling forces in Syria, with those detained including seven children and five women (adult female). Most of these arrests were carried out by Syrian regime forces. We [released a report](#) on March 22 detailing the arbitrary arrests and enforced disappearances which we documented in February 2024 by the parties to the conflict and the controlling forces in Syria.

10. We generally use the term 'the Syrian regime' rather than 'the Syrian government', because the nature of the ruling power in Syria is that of a totalitarian dictatorship where power is concentrated in the hands of a small circle of individuals, namely the President of the Republic and the heads of the regime's security apparatus. As a result, the ministers, including the Prime Minister and the Minister of Interior, play a restricted, largely ceremonial role, which is limited to implementing precisely what the ruling regime orders, with no real decision-making power or active role of their own. Syria is under autocratic, hereditary rule, with no independent decision-making structure. Rather, the government is an empty façade merely for show. The Minister of Interior receives orders from the security branches over which he supposedly presides. The Minister of Justice cannot even summon a low-ranking security officer, let alone a security branch head. Syria is ruled by the president assisted by the heads of the security branches.

While we are aware that the United Nations and its agencies use the term 'the Syrian government', we believe that this is a completely inaccurate and misleading term in the Syrian context.

11. Designated as a terror group by the UN.

Cases of arbitrary arrests were distributed by the parties to the conflict and the controlling forces as follows:

- Syrian regime forces: 86 individuals, including one child and three women.
- Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS): 14 individuals.
- All Armed opposition factions/Syrian National Army (SNA): 35 individuals, including two women.
- Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF): 59 individuals, including six children.

3. Attacks on vital civilian facilities

SNHR documented at least five attacks on vital civilian facilities during February 2024, three of them by Syrian regime forces, which were concentrated in Idlib governorate.

Of these five attacks, we documented one attack targeting an educational facility (a school), and three on places of worship.

The attacks on vital civilian facilities documented in February 2024 were distributed by the parties to the conflict and controlling forces in Syria as follows:

A. Main parties

- Syrian regime forces: Three attacks.
- Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF): One attack.

B. Other parties

- Attacks by unidentified parties: One attack.

III. Brief on February's Most Notable Developments Related to Syria at the International Level

On February 9, the [ICJ issued a statement](#) providing updates on the case of the Application Of The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman Or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Canada and The Netherlands Vs. Syrian Arab Republic). As the statement revealed, the court has specified February 3, 2025, as the deadline for the submission of the written plea by the parties bringing the case, namely Canada and The Netherlands, and February 3, 2026, as the deadline for the submission of the counter-argument by the party against which the case is being brought, namely the Syrian regime. It should be noted that, [on November 16, 2023](#), the ICJ indicated provisional measures against the Syrian regime that call for ending its use of torture. On February 12, the UN Human Rights Office in Syria (OHCHR Syria) released a statement entitled, '[Pursuing Accountability in Syria: The Application of the Convention against Torture Case before the International Court of Justice](#)' which outlines the legal course of the case, the implementation of the decisions related to it, and its implications for accountability in Syria.

On February 13, the OHCHR released [an extensive report](#) on the violations and gross abuses faced by Syrian refugees who have returned to Syria. Those violations, the report stressed, are being perpetrated by the Syrian regime and other main parties across the country. Among the most prominent violations documented by the report are: Arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment, sexual and gender-based violence, enforced disappearance and abduction. Moreover, the report proved, through the use of rigorous investigative methodology, that Syria is wholly unsafe for the return of refugees. In a related context, the report shed light on the persecution and refolement practices being used against Syrian refugees in a number of countries, especially those neighboring Syria. SNHR contributed to this report, coordinating with the OHCHR team which released it.

On February 14, the US Congress passed the '[Assad Regime Anti-Normalization Act of 2023](#)', with 389 congress members voting in favor at the session held on the same day. Meanwhile, 32 congress members voted against the bill, while 10 abstained from voting. The bill, codenamed H.R. 3202, was first introduced by Republican Representative Joe Wilson on November 11, 2023. Most notably, the bill provides for the extension of the Caesar Syrian Civilian Protection Act of 2019, and prohibits the recognition of any Syrian government headed by Bashar Assad. Additionally, the bill expands the sanctions imposed on the Syrian regime circle and regime supporters, on multiple levels. On February 22, Alena Douhan,¹² the UN Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on human rights, [released a statement](#) claiming that this US law could "worsen the already dire humanitarian situation of the Syrian people and destroy their hope of rebuilding a peaceful life." In response to this claim, SNHR notes that sanctions were imposed on the Syrian regime because of the crimes against humanity that the regime had been committing against the Syrian people for over 13 years. [We have also released a statement](#) addressing the report submitted by Ms. Douhan to the Human Rights Council, in which we noted that the report apparently turned a blind eye to the regime's responsibility for incurring sanctions. In her statement, Ms. Douhan should have called on the Syrian regime to end all forms of violations, including torture and enforced disappearance, to return pillaged lands and properties to their rightful owners, and compensate all victims, which would be the only right and proper path to lift sanctions.

12. A Belarusian national, Aleina Douhan is a professor of International Law at the Belarusian State University. Douhan assumed her duties as the UN Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of the unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights on March 25, 2020.

On February 14, [SNHR held an event entitled, 'Unshakable Voices: Syrian Women's Struggle for Rights and Accountability'](#) at the Hague in the Netherlands. The event featured Nicole Chaaya, Gender Focal Point at the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights' (OHCHR) Civil Society and Technical Cooperation Unit; Kathryne Bomberger, Director-General of the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP); Marie Forestier, Senior Syria Advisor at the European Institute of Peace (EIP); Alaa Aljizawi, a Syrian woman activist and survivor of arrest and enforced disappearance; and Fadel Abdulghany, SNHR Executive Director. The event marked the release of SNHR's report, ['Unshakable Voices - Syrian Women Who Overcame the Trauma of Detention and the Tribulations Following Their Release'](#), which outlined the most prominent challenges faced by women in Syria. Despite facing such daunting challenges, it noted, these women have continued the fight for freedom and democracy and confronted the additional obstacles that followed their release, going to become inspiring and extraordinary success stories. The event also featured an exhibition of portraits of women still missing in Syria in an attempt to further highlight the continuing nature of enforced disappearance in Syria, and how this issue affects the return of refugees.

On February 22, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons' (OPCW) Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) [released its fourth report](#). In the report, the IIT, whose mandate include identifying the perpetrators of the crime of using chemical weapons, summarized the findings of its investigation into who carried out a chemical weapons attack in Marea town in rural Aleppo governorate on September 1, 2015. This came after the OPCW's Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) had established that chemical weapons were used at that time in that location. The report confirms that ISIS used sulfur mustard in Marea on September 1, 2015, between 09:00-12:00 local time (UTC+3), in the course of a sustained offensive to capture the town. Sulfur mustard was deployed, using one or more guns. The remnants and munition examined from the impact locations were conventional 122-mm caliber artillery projectiles. The report adds that at least 11 individuals showed "symptoms consistent with exposure to sulfur mustard". On February 26, [SNHR released a statement](#) welcoming this report, revealing that SNHR has been a principal source in all the IIT's reports, with SNHR continuing to support the IIT's mandate in Syria. [The statement also referenced the report released by SNHR on September 16, 2015](#), which documented ISIS' use of chemical weapons on September 1, 2015, with the attack injuring at least 37 civilians who exhibited symptoms ranging from breathing difficulties to redness of the eyes, as well as skin symptoms, such as itchiness, blisters, and ulcers.

On February 22, the OPCW's FFM, whose mandate includes responsibility for determining whether or not toxic chemicals have been used as a weapon of war in Syria but not assigning culpability in any alleged attacks involving the use of chemical weapons, [released its report](#) outlining the findings of an investigation into allegations reported by the Syrian regime's government to the OPCW's Technical Secretariat on November 1, 2017. The regime alleged that ISIS used chemical weapons in an attack targeting outposts for the Palestinian faction Region of the Holy House [Aknūf Bayt al-Maqdis] in al-Yarmouk area in Damascus on October 22, 2017, requesting that the OPCW investigate this incident.

The report summarized the findings of the FFM's investigations into the alleged attack that have been going on since November 2017 up until the report's release date. The report concluded that "there are no reasonable grounds to determine that toxic chemicals were used as a weapon" in the incident reported by the Syrian regime. SNHR believes that the findings of this report once again prove that the Syrian regime lacks any shred of credibility. In fact, the Syrian regime has lied dozens of times with respect to the issue of chemical weapons use in Syria, working tirelessly and systemically, alongside its Russian and Iranian allies, to spread misinformation in order to distort the well-established facts of the regime's repeated CW

use in the country. [The OPCW had previously disproved](#) allegations made by the regime on two reported incidents into which the regime had requested investigation. On February 29, [SNHR released a statement on this report](#), in which it renewed its recommendations to the OPCW to ignore and not waste any further efforts and resources on allegations made by a regime whose deadly use of chemical weapons is well-established.

On February 23, in response to the IIT's aforementioned report the previous day, Germany's Federal Foreign Office (AA) [issued a press release](#) condemning ISIS's attack involving the use of chemical weapons on Marea city in rural Aleppo in September 2015.

On February 24, France's Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs [issued a statement](#) stressing that ISIS's documented and irrefutable use of chemical weapons in its attacks on Marea in rural Aleppo in September 2015 was "unacceptable", further condemning the attack. The statement also welcomes the IIT's report released two days before on September 22.

On February 26, Lord (Tariq) Ahmad of Wimbledon, the UK Minister of State for Middle East, North Africa, South Asia, United Nations and the Commonwealth, and the UK Prime Minister's Special Representative for Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict, [issued a statement](#) condemning ISIS' use of chemical weapons in its September 2015 attack on Marea. The statement noted that the UK "condemns all use of chemical weapons during the Syrian conflict perpetrated by Daesh and the Assad regime," adding, "UN and OPCW mandated investigations have found the Assad regime responsible for at least 9 chemical weapons attacks including using sarin and chlorine."

On February 27, [the UN Security Council held its regular session on the situation in Syria](#). Geir O. Pedersen, the UN Special Envoy for Syria, [stressed in his briefing that](#) "we still see no concrete results in addressing the situation of an estimated one hundred thousand arbitrarily detained, forcibly disappeared, and missing persons, as called for in resolution 2254." Meanwhile, Martin Griffiths, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordination, stressed that Syria's humanitarian outlook remains bleak, with 16.7 million people requiring humanitarian assistance, nearly three quarters of the population and the highest number of people in need since the start of the crisis. Mr. Griffith further noted that escalating hostilities in the north of Syria and recent attacks in Damascus, rural Damascus and Homs governorates continue to result in civilian deaths, as well as displacement and extensive damage to critical infrastructure. France's representative to the UN Security Council also stressed that, for 14 years, "the Damascus regime has remained deaf to the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people". During the same session, the OPCW presented the [OPCW Director General's report on the "Progress in the Elimination of The Syrian Chemical Weapons Program"](#).

In early-February, the Syrian regime revealed that Syrian regime head Bashar Assad [had accepted the credentials of Mr. Hassan Ahmed al-Shehhi as the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the UAE to Syria, Mr. Ali Muhammad Jalalovich as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Abkhazia to Syria, and Mr. Sidi Ould Doumane as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Mauritania to Syria](#). SNHR reiterates once again that restoring relations with the Syrian regime without its first fulfilling any of the requirements asked of it, including revealing the fate of forcibly disappeared persons in its detention centers, is viewed, according to international law, as a form of support for the violations being committed by the regime against the Syrian people since fighting gross violations that constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes is a core part of the responsibility of all the world's states as ratifiers of the Geneva Conventions.

IV. Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions

- SNHR notes that for more than 13 years to date, the Syrian regime has perpetrated the most horrific types of violations against the Syrian people, some of which amount to crimes against humanity. Since the regime continues to commit such violations up to the present day, as exhaustively documented in the numerous reports we have released, it is clear that any normalization of relations with the regime or efforts to rehabilitate it are acts of support for a criminal entity engaged in crimes against humanity, each of which constitutes a violation of international law.
- The evidence we have gathered confirms that attacks continue to be directed against civilians and civilian objects. Syrian-Russian alliance forces have committed various crimes, including extrajudicial killings, arrests, torture, and enforced disappearances. In addition, the indiscriminate bombardment and other attacks carried out caused the destruction of facilities and buildings. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the war crime of attacking civilians has been committed in many cases.
- The Syrian regime has not only violated international humanitarian law and customary law, but has also breached a number of UN Security Council resolutions, particularly resolution 2139, resolution 2042 on the release of detainees, and resolution 2254, all without any accountability.
- We could not find any record of any warnings being issued by the Syrian regime or Russian forces prior to any attack as required under international humanitarian law. This has been the case since the beginning of the popular uprising for freedom, providing another blatant demonstration of these forces' total disregard for the lives of civilians in Syria.
- The magnitude and frequency of the violations, the disproportionate use of military force, the indiscriminate manner of the bombing, and the coordinated approach of these attacks lead to the inescapable conclusion that these acts are wholly deliberate and based on high-level orders, and as such constitute a part of state policy.
- The indiscriminate and disproportionate bombardment carried out by the SDF is a clear violation of international humanitarian law, with such indiscriminate killings amounting to war crimes.
- HTS has violated international humanitarian law, causing the death of many civilians, as well as damage to vital civilian facilities.
- All armed opposition factions/SNA have violated UN Security Council Resolution 2139 through carrying out attacks that are considered to violate customary international humanitarian law, causing civilian casualties or accidental injuries.
- All the attacks documented in this report, particularly bombings, have caused massive collateral damage involving loss of lives, injuries, or significant damage to civilian objects. There are strong indicators suggesting that this damage was excessive compared to the anticipated military benefit.
- The use of explosive munitions to target densely populated areas reflects a criminal and wholly deliberate mindset, with the perpetrators clearly intending to inflict the greatest possible number of deaths, which is a clear contravention of international human rights law and a flagrant violation of the Geneva IV Convention (Articles 27, 31, 32).

Recommendations

UN Security Council

- The UN Security Council must take additional steps following its adoption of Resolution 2254, which clearly insists that «all parties immediately cease any attacks against civilians and civilian objects as such.»
- The Syrian issue should be referred to the International Criminal Court and all those responsible for violations should be held accountable, while Russia must stop using its veto, since it is a party to the Syrian conflict, and the UNSC states' veto power should be withheld when crimes against humanity and war crimes are committed.
- Ensure peace and security and implement the principle of responsibility to protect civilians' lives and to save the Syrian people's homes, heritage and historical artifacts from destruction, pillaging and vandalism.
- The Security Council should adopt a resolution banning the use of cluster munitions and landmines in Syria, similar to the existing prohibition on the use of chemical weapons, and should include advice on how to safely remove the remnants of such dangerous weapons.
- The four other UNSC permanent member states should put pressure on the Russian government to end its support for the Syrian regime, which uses chemical weapons, and to expose its involvement in this regard.
- Request that all relevant United Nations agencies make greater efforts to provide food, as well as medical and humanitarian assistance, in areas where fighting has ceased, and in internally displaced person camps, and to follow-up with those states that have pledged voluntary contributions.

International Community

- In light of the split within the UN Security Council and its utter inability to take any effective action, action should be taken at the national and regional levels to form alliances to support the Syrian people by protecting them from daily killing and by lifting sieges, as well as by increasing support for relief efforts. Additionally, the principle of universal jurisdiction should be enacted in local courts regarding these crimes in order to conduct fair trials for all those involved in perpetrating them.
- SNHR has repeatedly called for the implementation of the 'Responsibility to Protect' doctrine in dozens of studies and reports and as a member of the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICR2P) after all political channels through the Arab League's plan and then Mr. Kofi Annan's plan proved fruitless, along with the Cessation of Hostilities statements and Astana agreements that followed. Therefore, steps should be taken under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, while the norm of the 'Responsibility to Protect (R2P)', which was established by the United Nations General Assembly, should be implemented. Through failing to take these essential steps, the UN Security Council is still hindering the protection of civilians in Syria.
- Renew pressure on the UN Security Council to refer the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court.
- Work to ensure justice and achieve accountability in Syria through the United Nations General Assembly and the Human Rights Council and to activate the principle of universal jurisdiction.

UN Human Rights Office (OHCHR)

- The OHCHR should submit a report to the UN Human Rights Council and other organs of the United Nations on the incidents mentioned in this report and previous reports since these attacks were perpetrated by the parties to the conflict and the controlling forces.

Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (COI)

- Launch investigations into the cases included in this report and previous reports. SNHR is willing to cooperate and provide further evidence and data.
- Focus on the issue of landmines and cluster munitions within the next report.

International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism (IIIM)

- Collect further evidence about the crimes documented in this report.

The United Nations Special Envoy for Syria

- Condemn the perpetrators of crimes and massacres, and those who were primarily responsible for dooming the de-escalation agreements.
- Re-sequence the peace process so that it can resume its natural course despite Russia's attempts to divert and distort it, empowering the Constitutional Committee prior to the establishment of a transitional governing body.

Syrian regime

- End all indiscriminate shelling and targeting of residential areas, hospitals, schools and markets, and end the use of outlawed weapons and barrel bombs.
- Ensure compliance with UN Security Council resolutions and customary humanitarian law.

Russian regime

- Launch investigations into the incidents included in this report, make the findings of these investigations public for the Syrian people, and hold those responsible accountable.
- Compensate all the damaged centers and facilities, rebuild and rehabilitate them, and compensate all the families of victims who were killed by the current Russian regime, as well as all those wounded by it.
- Completely cease the bombing of hospitals, protected objects, and civilian areas, and respect customary international law.
- As a guarantor party in Astana talks, the Russian regime must stop thwarting de-escalation agreements, and must apply pressure on the Syrian regime in order to end all indiscriminate attacks and to allow unconditional passage of humanitarian aid to besieged areas.

The Coalition (US-led International Coalition and the SDF)

- The states supporting the SDF should apply pressure on these forces in order to compel them to cease all of their violations in all the areas, towns and villages under their control.
- The SDF must immediately stop conscripting children, hold the personnel involved in such violations accountable, and pledge to return all children who have been arrested for conscription immediately.

All Armed Opposition factions/SNA

- The Armed Opposition/SNA must ensure the protection of civilians in all areas under their control. These forces should also take care to distinguish between civilians and military targets and cease any indiscriminate attacks.
- Take punitive action against those who commit violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law.

Humanitarian Organizations

- Develop urgent operational plans to secure decent shelter for internally displaced persons.
- Provide protected facilities and vehicles, such as medical facilities, schools, and ambulances, with distinctive signs that can be distinguished from long distances.

Acknowledgment

We extend our most sincere gratitude to the victims' families and friends, and to eyewitnesses and local activists for their invaluable contributions to this report.



Annex

This annex features some of the reports and investigative reports released by UN and international organizations on Syria in the month of February 2024

- [United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs \(OCHA\)](#). (2024, February 7). Humanitarian Update Syrian Arab Republic - Issue 19 / December 2023.
- [UN World Food Programme \(WFP\)](#). (2024, February 12). WFP Syria Situation Report #12.
- [Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees \(UNHCR\)](#). (2024, February 21). 2024 Syria Needs Overview.
- UNICEF. (2024, February 23). [UNICEF Whole of Syria Humanitarian Situation Report](#), January - December 2023.
- [Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees \(UNHCR\)](#). (2024, February 26). Syria Operational Update (January 2024).
- Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR). (2024, February 28). [The Syrian Regime Perpetrates Multiple Types of Violations Against Citizens Obtaining Passports In and Outside Syria](#)
- Human Rights Watch (HRW). (2024, February 29). ["Everything is by the Power of the Weapon" - Abuses and Impunity in Turkish-Occupied Northern Syria](#)



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No justice without accountability

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