



U.S. Department of State



Country Reports on Terrorism 2021

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BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM

Country Reports on Terrorism 2021 is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (the “Act”), which requires the Department of State to provide to Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of the Act.

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Foreword

Since September 11, 2001, the United States has established a strong and sophisticated counterterrorism enterprise to reduce the threat of large-scale terrorist attacks on the homeland. Twenty-one years later, the terrorist threats we face are more ideologically diverse and geographically diffuse than ever before. At the same time, the United States is confronting a dynamic range of national security challenges, including strategic competition, cybersecurity threats, and climate change. Therefore, to confront evolving and emerging terrorist threats within the context of broader national security priorities, the United States is entering a new era of counterterrorism, one increasingly rooted in diplomacy, partner capacity building, and prevention, and recognizing successful counterterrorism efforts require use of the full range of counterterrorism tools and a whole-of government and whole-of-society counterterrorism approach.

In 2021, the United States and its partners continued to make major strides against terrorist organizations under this new framework, bolstering diplomatic and multilateral engagements and partner capacity building efforts. Through U.S. leadership, the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS (Defeat-ISIS) raised more than \$600 million in pledges to support stabilization projects in liberated areas of Iraq and Syria and established the Africa Focus Group (AFFG) to provide a mechanism for direct engagement with African Coalition members on addressing the threat of ISIS affiliates on the African continent. The United States designated three ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K) leaders, including Emir Sanaullah Ghafari, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists, in response to the August attack on Kabul International Airport, which killed at least 185 people — including 13 U.S. servicemembers supporting evacuation operations — and injured more than 150 others. The United States also completed nine designations against al-Qa’ida (AQ)-linked individuals and entities and offered a reward of up to \$7 million for information leading to the location or identification of Abu Ubaydah Yusuf al-Anabi, the leader of the terrorist organization AQ in the Islamic Maghreb. Additionally, the United States increased diplomatic engagement across the globe to counter Iran-backed Hizballah’s destabilizing activities, with more countries using their national authorities to designate, ban, or otherwise restrict the terrorist organization. The United States released its first-ever *National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism*, which includes a focus on transnational Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism (REMVE). To that end, the United States, in partnership with the United Kingdom and the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law (IIJ), launched the first-ever criminal justice practitioner’s guide on countering REMVE. The United States, partnering with Norway, also launched a Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) effort to develop a GCTF REMVE Toolkit for policymakers and practitioners that will build on the IIJ’s REMVE guide.

Despite key counterterrorism successes, terrorist groups remained resilient and active. ISIS continued to promote a large-scale terrorism campaign, responding to increased counterterrorism pressure by adapting its tactics and techniques. Groups affiliated with ISIS ramped up activities in the Lake Chad Region of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. Despite losing its territorial “caliphate” in 2019, ISIS in Iraq and Syria maintained a significant operational structure and conducted terrorist operations in that region.

In 2021, AQ and its affiliates constituted an enduring threat to the United States and its allies. AQ continued to leverage its branches in the Middle East and Africa — notably AQ in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Shabaab, and Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin — that remain quite capable of inflicting damage on our allies and targeting our interests. AQ-related threats expanded from West Africa and the Sahel into the Gulf of Guinea littoral states in 2021, with Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo reporting terrorist group activity and attacks in their northern border regions.

In Afghanistan, ISIS, elements of AQ, and regionally focused terrorist groups maintained an active presence and conducted terrorist activities. Despite taking significant losses from U.S. and NATO forces in recent years, ISIS-K continued to conduct terrorist attacks against civilians and the Taliban. ISIS-K remained a resilient enemy with roughly 2,000 to 3,000 fighters in the country, although precise estimates are hard to determine. AQ and its regional affiliate AQ in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) continued to have a presence in Afghanistan. Haqqani Network members and key leaders also have assumed formal and informal roles within the Taliban. Although the Taliban committed to preventing terrorist groups from using Afghanistan to stage attacks against the United States or others, the extent of its ability and willingness to prevent AQ and ISIS-K from mounting external operations remained unclear.

Iran continued to be the leading state sponsor of terrorism, facilitating a wide range of terrorist and other illicit activities around the world. Regionally, Iran supported acts of terrorism in Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen through proxies and partner groups such as Hizballah and Hamas. Additionally, senior AQ leaders continued to reside in Iran and engaged with other AQ elements from the country. Globally, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security remained Iran's primary actor involved in supporting terrorist recruitment, financing, and plots across Africa, Asia, Europe, and North and South America. Iran also maintained a near-global procurement network, obtaining cutting-edge technology from companies and locales around the world to bolster its terrorist and military capabilities.

REMVE remained a threat to the United States and our allies. Violent white supremacists and like-minded individuals continued to promote violent extremist narratives, recruit new adherents, raise funds, and conduct terrorist activities — both online and offline — across Australia, Brazil, Canada, Europe, New Zealand, South Africa, and the United States. REMVE actors also continued to exploit the COVID-19 pandemic to radicalize individuals and incite violence, particularly against health professionals, government officials, and minority populations. Additionally, the December arrest of four neo-Nazi actors in Brazil for allegedly plotting an attack against Jewish and Black residents on New Year's Eve demonstrates the growing reach and influence of REMVE adherents globally.

As terrorist threats morphed and metastasized, the United States adapted its counterterrorism approach and marshalled international efforts to counter global terrorism. In 2021, the United States supported the listing of two individuals to the UN Security Council's 1267 ISIL/Da'esh and al-Qa'ida Sanctions Committee and three individuals to the 751 Somalia Sanctions Committee; these were the first three additions to the 751 Somalia Sanctions Committee since 2018. The UN also listed ISIS-Tunisia (aka JAK-T) at the 1267 Sanctions Committee, bringing the total number of ISIS affiliates listed at the UN since 2019 to seven.

In December the United States co-chaired a political director-level meeting of Defeat-ISIS Coalition members that also included an inaugural meeting of the AFFG, an endeavor the United States co-leads with Italy, Morocco, and Niger to counter ISIS networks in the sub-Saharan region. At this meeting, the Defeat-ISIS Coalition welcomed Burkina Faso as its 84th member. Further, the United States continued to make notable gains in a high-level diplomatic campaign to counter Hizballah's terrorist and other illicit activities. In May, Austria banned the use or display of any Hizballah-related symbols, building on the previous ban that was limited to symbols of Hizballah's so-called military wing. In November, Australia announced its intention to expand its domestic designation of Hizballah by declaring the group in its entirety a terrorist organization. Through U.S. diplomatic efforts, 15 countries have now designated, banned, or otherwise restricted Hizballah, applying their national authorities over the past several years.

The United States prioritized multilateral engagements to advance its counterterrorism priorities, bolster partner capacity to implement international obligations and commitments, and promote greater burden sharing. To maintain international momentum on the use of battlefield evidence to investigate and prosecute terrorism cases, the United States and the IJ co-hosted a UN General Assembly side event in September that brought together more than 100 criminal justice practitioners and senior policy officials from around the world to highlight recent advances in collection, exploitation, and international sharing. In September, the 30-member GCTF adopted a *Strategic Vision for the Next Decade* and new framework documents that provide the international community with tools to prevent terrorist travel and enhance border security measures; address terrorist financing related challenges; and develop capacity to investigate and prosecute terrorist actors. Similarly, the United States led the successful negotiation of UNSCR 2617 (2021), which was unanimously adopted in December and renewed the UN Counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate mandate for another four years, preserving all precedent text related to the protection of human rights, inclusion of civil society, and importance of rule of law-based approaches. The United States also leveraged other multilateral organizations such as NATO, INTERPOL, OSCE, OAS, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Council of Europe, the IJ, and Hedayah.

Additionally, the United States continued to bolster partner capabilities to detect, disrupt, and dismantle terrorist networks. The United States supported partner governments on the front lines against terrorist threats in critical areas, including information sharing, aviation and border security, law enforcement investigations and prosecutions, and countering the finance of terrorism, leading to real-world results that advanced shared security national security interests and protected the U.S. homeland. To restrict terrorist travel, the United States also signed two new and expanded arrangements under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 to share information on known and suspected terrorists, bringing the total number of partner countries to over 75. Under the Watchlisting Assistance and Support Program, the United States provided capacity building for countries to develop terrorist watchlists and exchange terrorist identity information. The Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES) border security platform grew to include 227 ports of entry in 23 countries, with international partners using it to screen hundreds of thousands of travelers each day and disrupt terrorist travel.

Through capacity building efforts, the United States also emphasized to its partners the critical responsibility of governments engaged in counterterrorism operations to ensure that their security forces' respect international human rights and humanitarian law. The United States also stressed the importance of partner governments' holding their security forces accountable for violations and abuses committed against civilians during these counterterrorism operations.

Another major line of effort in 2021 was facilitating the repatriation, rehabilitation, reintegration, and prosecution of ISIS FTFs and family members, where appropriate.

About 2,000 non-Syrian and non-Iraqi FTFs remain in detention facilities controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and some 56,000 associated family members from more than 60 countries remain in displaced persons' camps across northeastern Syria. The only durable solution for this complex security and humanitarian crisis is the repatriation, rehabilitation, reintegration, and, where appropriate, prosecution of these populations. To ensure that ISIS fighters and family members captured by the SDF never return to the battlefield, the United States continued to lead by example in bringing back its citizens and prosecuting them when applicable. As of December the United States had repatriated 30 U.S. citizens from Syria and Iraq — 13 adults and 17 children — and the Department of Justice charged 10 of the adults with a variety of terrorism-related crimes. The United States also urged other countries to repatriate, rehabilitate, reintegrate, and prosecute their citizens and assisted several countries in doing so with their citizens or nationals.

Furthermore, the United States continued to promote a whole-of-government, whole-of-society approach to prevent and counter violent extremism by engaging with governments, local religious leaders, and tech companies. The Department of State supported international initiatives, including the Strong Cities Network and the Global Community Engagement & Resilience Fund, and concentrated on building local resiliency to terrorist radicalization, recruitment, and mis/disinformation, including in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kenya, Somalia, Tunisia, the Sahel, and the Western Balkans. The United States also advanced international efforts by engaging the Global Internet Forum to Counterterrorism and endorsing the Christchurch Call to Action to Eliminate Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content Online to support voluntary collaboration with technology companies to address terrorist and violent extremism, including REMVE, content online. In September, the United States engaged with Twitter, Facebook, and Google/YouTube senior representatives to discuss the digital security of Afghan nationals with U.S. connections who may be targeted by the Taliban and other designated terrorist groups in Afghanistan.

This constitutes a brief overview of the United States' ongoing work to protect our people from the ongoing threat of terrorism. Country Reports on Terrorism 2021 provides a detailed review of last year's successes and the ongoing challenges facing our country and our partners, challenges that will require a continued commitment to and investment in global counterterrorism efforts going forward.

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Abbreviations

AAA	Asbat al-Ansar	
AAB	Abdallah Azzam Brigades	
AAB	al-Ashtar Brigades	
AAD	Ansar al-Dine	
AAH	Action Against Hunger	<i>and</i>
	Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq	
AAI	Ansar al-Islam	
AAMB	Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade	
AAS-B	Ansar al-Shari'a in Benghazi	
AAS-D	Ansar al-Shari'a in Darnah	
AAS-T	Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia	
ABM	Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis	
ACA	Armed Peasant Association (<i>Agrupación Campesina Armada</i>)	
ADF	Allied Democratic Forces	
ADMM	ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meetings	
AFFG	Africa Focus Group	
AFRICOM	United States Africa Command	
Afripol	African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation	
AILCT	International Academy for the Fight Against Terrorism	
AIPJ2	Australian-Indonesia Partnership for Justice Phase 2	
AMIA	Argentine Jewish Mutual Association	
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia	
AML/CFT	Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism	
AMLO	Anti-Money Laundering Office	
ANA	National Customs Authority (Panama)	
ANF	al-Nusrah Front	
ANIF	National Agency for Financial Investigation (Chad)	
Ansaru	Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis-Sudan	
AOI	Army of Islam	
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation	
APG	Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering	
API	Advance Passenger Information	
APJG	Asia/Pacific Joint Group	
APML	Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering (Serbia)	
AQ	al-Qa'ida	
AQAP	al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula	
AQI	al-Qa'ida in Iraq	
AQIM	al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb	
AQIS	al-Qa'ida in the Indian Subcontinent	
AQY	al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula	
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum	
AS	al-Shabaab	
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations	
ASF	Aryan Strikeforce	

ASG	Abu Sayyaf Group
ATA	Antiterrorism Act
ATM	automated teller machine
ATT	Anti-Terrorism Tribunal (Bangladesh)
ATU	Anti-Terrorism Unit (Bangladesh)
AU	African Union
AUM	Aum Shinrikyo
AWD	Atomwaffen Division
BARMM	Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
BCIJ	Central Bureau of Judicial Investigation (Morocco)
BGSF	Border Guard Security Force
BH	Boko Haram
BIA	Security Intelligence Agency (Serbia)
BIFF	Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
BITMAP	Biometric Identification Transnational Migration Alert Program
BLM	Black Lives Matter
BLA	Balochistan Liberation Army
BNM	Bank Negara Malaysia
BNPT	National Counterterrorism Agency (Indonesia)
BRAC	Border Risk Assessment Centre (Pakistan)
BPRM	Baloch Peoples Resistance Movement
BSIAT	<i>Brigade Spéciale des Investigations Antiterroristes</i>
BSIAT	Special Anti-Terrorism Investigation Brigade
C5+1	the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, plus the United States
CAERT	African Center for the Study and Research of Terrorism
CANIF	Mauritania Central Bank's Financial Intelligence Unit
CARD	Committee Against Racism and Discrimination
CBL	Central Bank of Libya
CBR	Central Bank of Russia
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CBUAE	Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates
CBY	Central Bank of Yemen
CCE	Commission for Countering Extremism (UK)
CDCT	Council of Europe counterterrorism committee
CDE	Ciudad del Este (Paraguay)
CDP	Cabo Delgado Province (Mozambique)
CENAREF	Democratic Republic of the Congo Financial Intelligence Unit
CENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
CFA	West African franc
CFATF	Caribbean Financial Action Task Force
CFK	Cristina Fernández de Kirchner
CFT	Countering the Financing of Terrorism
CICO	Interministerial Framework for Intervention and Coordination of Counterterrorism Operations (Senegal)
CICTE	Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism

CIFG	Counter-ISIS Finance Group
CIRA	Continuity Irish Republican Army
CITCO	Intelligence Center for Counterterrorism and Organized Crime (Spain)
CIU	Corrections Intelligence Unit
CJTF-OIR	Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve
CNI	National Intelligence Council (Paraguay)
CNLTC	National Counterterrorism Commission (Tunisia)
CoE	Council of Europe
COVID-19	coronavirus
CPC	Country of Particular Concern
CPP	Communist Party of the Philippines
CPP/NPA	Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army
CROAT	Counter-Terrorism Operational Intelligence Centre (Côte d'Ivoire)
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
CT	counterterrorism
CT3	Counterterrorism (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019
CTA	Center for Terror Analysis (Denmark)
CTAC	counterterrorism academic curriculum
CTAP	Counterterrorism Action Plan
CTC	Counter-Terrorism Committee (of the United Nations Security Council)
CTED	Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate
CTF	counterterrorism financing
CTR	Cooperative Threat Reduction
CTS	Counter-Terrorism Service (Iraq)
CT Service	Counterterrorism Service (Serbia)
CTTCU	Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime Unit (Bangladesh)
CTU	Albanian State Police Counterterrorism Unit
CTWG	Counterterrorism Working Group
CUTA	Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis
CVE	countering violent extremism
CW	chemical weapons
CYCLOPS	Cyprus Center for Land, Open-seas, and Port Security
DANS	State Agency for National Security (Bulgaria)
DDDR	Disengagement, Disassociation, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration
DDIS	Danish Defense Intelligence Service
DDR	disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
Defeat-ISIS	Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS
DGAPR	General Delegation for Prison Administration and Reintegration
DGS	Directorate of General Security
DGST	General Directorate for Territorial Surveillance
DHKP/C	Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front
DHS	U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DIWM	Dawlatul Islamiyyah Waliyatul Mashriq
DNP	Djiboutian National Police
DOJ	U.S. Department of Justice
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea

and

	North Korea	
DSA	Digital Security Act (Bangladesh)	
DSS	Department of State Security	<i>and</i>
	Dubai State Security	
DSN	Directorate for Security and Intelligence (Austria)	
DST	<i>Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire</i>	
DVE	domestic violent extremism	
DXX	State Security Service (Uzbekistan)	
EAG	Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism	
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	
EGP	<i>Ejército Guerrillero Popular</i>	
ELN	<i>Ejército de Liberación Nacional</i>	<i>and</i>
	National Liberation Army (Colombia)	
EML	Mariscal López's Army (<i>Ejército del Mariscal López</i>)	
EOD	explosive ordinance disposal	
EPL	<i>Ejército Popular de Liberación</i>	
EPP	Paraguayan People's Army	
EPPK	<i>Euskal Preso Politikoen Kolektiboa</i> , the union of incarcerated Basque separatist terrorists	
ERDIN	Resilience Plan for Northern Mozambique	
ESAAMLG	Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group	
ETA	Basque Fatherland and Liberty (<i>Euzkadi ta Askatasuna</i>)	
EUTM	European Union Training Mission	
EXBS	Export Control and Related Border Security	
EU	European Union	
EU-9	composition of the European Union beginning on January 1, 1973: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany (Federal Republic), Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.	
Europol	European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation	
EXBS	Export Control and Related Border Security	
FACI	Armed Forces of Côte d'Ivoire	
FAES	Special Action Forces (FAES)	
FALN	Armed Forces for National Liberation	
FAMa	Mali's Armed Forces	
FANB	Venezuelan Armed Forces	
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia	
FARC-EP	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army	
FARDC	Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo	
FATF	Financial Action Task Force	
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation	
FDS	Mozambican Defense and Security Forces	
FETO	Fethullah Terrorist Organization	
FID	Financial Intelligence Directorate (Bahrain)	
FIFA	International Federation of Association Football	

FinCEN	Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, U.S. Department of the Treasury
FINTRAC	Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada
FinTRACA	Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Center of Afghanistan
FIO	Financial Intelligence Office
FIU	Financial Intelligence Unit
FRC	Financial Reporting Center
FSB	Federal Security Service (Russia)
FTC	Paraguayan Internal Operational Defense Command
FTF	foreign terrorist fighter
FTO	Foreign Terrorist Organization
GABAC	Task Force on Money Laundering in Central Africa
GAFILAT	Financial Action Task Force of Latin America
GAO-R	<i>Grupo Armado Organizado Residual</i>
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GCTF	Global Counterterrorism Forum
GETZ	Joint Extremism and Terrorism Prevention Center (Germany)
GIABA	Intergovernmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa
GICNT	Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
GID	General Intelligence Directorate (Jordan)
GIF	Financial Intelligence Office (Macau)
GIFCT	Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism
GNNT	Gendarmes, Army, Customs, and the National and Nomadic Guard
GNU	Government of National Unity
goAML	an anti-money laundering reporting platform developed by the UN for Financial Intelligence Units to collect suspicious transaction reports
GSPC	<i>Le Groupe Salafiste Pour la Predication et le Combat</i> Salafist Group for Call and Combat Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
GSU	General Service Unit (Kenya)
GTAZ	<i>Gemeinsames Terrorismusabwehrzentrum</i> (Joint Counterterrorism Center, Germany)
GTR	Global Threat Reduction Program
HASM	Harakat Sawa'd Misr
HAS/TM	Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount
HM	Hizbul Mujahideen
HQN	Haqqani Network
HSI	Homeland Security Investigations
HTS	Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham
HUJI	Harakat-ul Jihad-i-Islami
HUJI-B	Harakat-ul-Jihad Islami/Bangladesh
HUM	Harakat ul-Mujahideen
IAMG	Iran-aligned militia group
ICA	Immigration and Checkpoints Authority (Singapore)
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization

ICEPCVE	Center of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism	
ICSVE	International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism	
IDEK	Islami Dawat-e-Kafela	
IDF	Israeli Defense Forces	
IDP	internally displaced person	
IG	Gama'a al-Islamiyya	
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development	
IJJ	International Institute of Justice and Rule of Law	
IIT	Investigation and Identification Team	
IJU	Islamic Jihad Union	
IKR	Iraqi Kurdistan Region	
IM	Indian Mujahedeen	
IMU	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan	
INCSR	<i>International Narcotics Control Strategy Report</i>	
INP	Indonesian National Police	
INTERPOL	International Police Criminal Organization	
IOM	International Organization for Migration	
IPOB	Indigenous People of Biafra	
IRA	Irish Republican Army	
IRGC	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps	
IRGC-QF	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force	
IS-21	Invincible Sentry 21	
ISA	Internal Security Act (Singapore)	<i>and</i>
ISF	Internal Security Force (Qatar)	<i>and</i>
	Internal Security Forces (Lebanon)	<i>and</i>
	Iraqi Security Forces	
ISF-IM	Islamic Security Force-Indian Mujahideen	
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant	
ISIL-Libya	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Libya	
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria	
ISIS-DRC	ISIS-Democratic Republic of the Congo	
ISIS-GS	ISIS-in the Greater Sahara	
ISIS-K	ISIS Khorasan	
ISIS-K	Islamic State's Khorasan Province	
ISIS-M	ISIS-Mozambique	
ISIS-Mozambique	ISIS affiliate in Mozambique	
ISIS-P	ISIS-Philippines	
ISIS-Somalia	Islamic State branch in Somalia	
ISIS-SP	ISIS-Sinai Province	
ISIS-WA	ISIS-West Africa	
IS-Khorasan	Islamic State's Khorasan Province	
ISN	Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation	
ISP	ISIS-Philippines	
JAF	Jordan Armed Forces	
JAK-T	ISIS-Tunisia	<i>and</i>
JAT	Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid	

J&K	Jammu and Kashmir
JeM	Jaish-e-Mohammed
JIFC	Joint Intelligence Fusion Center
JI	Jemaah Islamiya
JNIM	Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin
JRTN	Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandi
JUD	Jamaat-ud-Dawa
K-12	kindergarten through 12th grade
KC	Kahane Chai
KCS	Kosovo Correctional Service
KDF	Kenya Defense Forces
KH	Kata'ib Hizballah
KNB	Committee for National Security (Kazakhstan)
KP	Kosovo Police
KST	Known and Suspected Terrorists
LAF	Lebanese Armed Forces
LeT	Lashkar e-Tayyiba
LFI	licensed financial institutions
LGBTQI	lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex
LGBTQI+	lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex, and their compatriots
LJ	Lashkar i Jhangvi
LNA	Libyan National Army
LPS	London Police Service (London, Ontario)
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MA3AN	all together
MASAK	Financial Crimes Investigation Board (Türkiye)
MBT	main battle tank
MCC	Millennium Challenge Corporation
MPCP	Militarized Communist Party of Peru
MEHE	Ministry of Education and Higher Education (Qatar)
MER	Mutual Evaluation Report (Mozambique) <i>and</i> mutual evaluation review (Senegal)
MHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
MIATE	Mauritanian Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Traditional Education
MIDAS	Migration Information and Data Analysis System
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MISD	Ministry of Information and Social Development (Kazakhstan)
MIT	Mujahidin Indonesia Timur
MMA	Maldives Monetary Authority
MML	Milli Muslim League
MNDF	Maldives National Defense Force
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force
MOKAS	Unit for Combating Money Laundering (Cyprus)

MONEYVAL	Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MOU	memorandum of understanding
MPS	Maldives Police Service
MSC	Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem
MUIS	Islamic Religious Council of Singapore
MUJAO	Unity and Jihad in West Africa
MVD	Ministry of Internal Affairs (Russia)
NAP	national action plan, National Action Plan
NBT	National Bank of Tajikistan
NCCVECT	National Committee for Countering Violent Extremism and Countering Terrorism (North Macedonia)
NCFI	National Center for Financial Information (Oman)
NCT	National Center for Terrorist Threat Assessment (Sweden)
NCTC	National Counterterrorism Center <i>and</i> National Counterterrorism Committee
NCTV	National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2019
NDIA	Nigerian Defense Intelligence Agency
Neo-JMB	Neo-Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh
NFIU	Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit
NIA	National Investigation Agency (India)
NPA	New People's Army
NPF	Nigeria Police Force
NPO	non-profit organization
NRA	National Risk Assessment
NRA-2	Second National Risk Assessment
NRA 2020	National Risk Assessment 2020 (Malaysia)
NRM	Nordic Resistance Movement
NSCDC	Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps
NSO	National Socialist Order
OAS	Organization of American States
OAS-CICTE	Organization of American States' Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OLA	Oromo Liberation Army
ONCDOFT	Office Against Organized Crime and Terrorism Financing (Venezuela)
OPCW	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OPDAT	Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training program
PA	Palestinian Authority
P/CVE	Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
PET	Danish Security and Intelligence Service
PF	Brazilian Federal Police
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

PFLP-GC	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command
PGO	Prosecutor General's Office
PIJ	Palestinian Islamic Jihad
PISCES	Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System
PIU	Passenger Information Unit
PJ	Judiciary Police (Macau)
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
PLF	Palestinian Liberation Front-Abu Abbas Faction
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PM	Prime Minister
PMF	Popular Mobilization Forces
PMRI	People's Resistance Movement of Iran
PNP	Paraguayan National Police
	Peruvian National Police
PNR	Passenger Name Record
PPO	Public Prosecutor's Office (Kuwait)
PPRF	Palestinian Popular Resistance Forces
PS	Public Safety Canada
PSC	Peace and Security Council (African Union)
PSD	Public Security Directorate's (Jordan)
PSNI	Police Service of Northern Ireland
PTA	Prevention of Terrorism Act (Sri Lanka)
PVE	preventing violent extremism
QF	Qods Force
RAB	Rapid Action Battalion (Bangladesh)
RATS SCO	Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
RDF	Rwanda Defense Force
READ Act	Reinforcing Education Accountability in Development Act
REMVE	racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism
RePET	Public Register of People and Entities Linked to Acts of Terrorism and Their Financing
RESILAC	Inclusive Economic and Social Recovery Program for Lake Chad
RFJ	Rewards for Justice
RIM	Russian Imperial Movement
RIRA	Real IRA
RLG	Roma-Lyon Group on Counterterrorism and Counter-Crime
RMP	Royal Malaysia Police
ROP	Royal Oman Police
ROYG	Republic of Yemen government
R&R	rehabilitation and reintegration
RRG	Religious Rehabilitation Group (Singapore)
RS	Revolutionary Struggle
RSM	Regional Security Mechanism
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAJ	Special Anti-Terrorist Unit

and

SARPs	Standards and Recommended Practices
SCLCT-CTO	Central Service for the Fight Against Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime
SCN	Strong Cities Network
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SCRA	State Commission for Religious Affairs (Kyrgyz Republic)
SDF	Syrian Democratic Forces
SDGT	Specially Designated Global Terrorist
SEARCCT	Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counterterrorism
SEBIN	Bolivarian National Intelligence Service
SENAFRONT	National Border Service (Panama)
SGSecure	Singapore's community response to the threat of terrorism
SIC	Special Investigation Commission (Lebanon)
SINAI	National Intelligence System (Paraguay)
SIPA	State Investigation Protection Agency (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
SL	Shining Path (<i>Sendero Luminoso</i>)
SLTD	stolen and lost travel document
SNA	Somali National Army
SNI	National Intelligence Secretariat (Paraguay)
SNP	Spanish National Police
SOE	State of Emergency
SPF	Somali Police Force
SPO	State Prosecutor's Office
SRF	<i>Le Service de Renseignements Financiers</i> (Djibouti's financial information service)
SSB	Qatar State Security Bureau
SSSG	State Security Service of Georgia
STC	Yemeni secessionist Southern Transitional Council
SZPLIV	Serbian Border Police's System to Check Persons and Vehicles
TAJK	Tehreek-e-Azadi Jammu and Kashmir
TASS	Russian News Agency TASS
TC	Turkish Cypriot
TES	Service for Combating Terrorism and Extremism (Serbia)
TF	terrorist financing
TFN	Taskforce Nightingale (Trinidad and Tobago)
TFTC	Terrorist Financing Targeting Center
TNP	Turkish National Police
TPB	Terrorism Prevention Branch (of UNODC)
TPLF	Tigrayan People's Liberation Front
TS	Technical Secretariat
TSCTP	Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
TTP	Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan
TVEC	Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UN	United Nations
UNCCT	UN Counterterrorism Center

UNCTED	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UN OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNOCT	United Nations Office of Counterterrorism
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council resolution
UPDF	Ugandan People's Defense Forces
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USNCB	U.S. National Central Bureau
UTIP	Police Intervention Tactical Unit (Macau)
VBIED	vehicle-borne improvised explosive device
VDPs	Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland
VE	violent extremism
VEO	Violent Extremist Organization
VPSHR	Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights
VRAEM	Valley of the Rivers Apurímac, Ene, and Mantaro Rivers
VTRF	Voluntary Transparency Reporting Framework
WASP	Watchlisting Assistance and Support Program
WCO	World Customs Organization
WIT	white-identity terrorism
WMD	weapons of mass destruction
WMDT	Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism

For More Information

The Human Rights Report

Significant human rights issues influenced the state of terrorist activity in many countries in this report, which may have impeded effective counterterrorism policies and programs or supported causes and conditions for further violence. Such human rights issues included, among others, unlawful and arbitrary killings, including extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, torture, and arbitrary detention (all of the preceding by both government and nonstate actors); harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; violence against and unjustified arrests of journalists; substantial interference with the rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; widespread and pervasive corruption; repression of religious freedom and violence against religious minorities; and forced and bonded labor.

Please see the U.S. Department of State *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* and the *2021 Report on International Religious Freedom* for more information:

<https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/>
and <https://www.state.gov/international-religious-freedom-reports/#report2021>

The International Narcotics Control Strategy Report

For additional information on money laundering and financial crimes regarding many of the countries in this report, see the *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*:

<https://www.state.gov/2021-international-narcotics-control-strategy-report/>

Members of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS

Country or Organization	Continent or Region
Afghanistan	South and Central Asia
Albania	Europe
Australia	East Asia and the Pacific
Austria	Europe
Bahrain	Middle East and North Africa
Belgium	Europe
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Europe
Bulgaria	Europe
Cameroon	Africa
Canada	Western Hemisphere
Central African Republic	Africa
Chad	Africa
Croatia	Europe
Cyprus	Europe
Czech Republic	Europe
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Africa
Denmark	Europe
Djibouti	Africa
Egypt	Middle East and North Africa
Estonia	Europe
Ethiopia	Africa
Fiji	East Asia and the Pacific
Finland	Europe
France	Europe
Georgia	Europe
Germany	Europe
Greece	Europe
Hungary	Europe
Iceland	Europe
Iraq	Middle East and North Africa
Ireland	Europe
Italy	Europe
Japan	East Asia and the Pacific
Jordan	Middle East and North Africa
Kenya	Africa
Kosovo	Europe
Kuwait	Middle East and North Africa
Latvia	Europe
Lebanon	Middle East and North Africa
Libya	Middle East and North Africa
Lithuania	Europe
Luxembourg	Europe
Malaysia	East Asia and the Pacific

Mauritania	Africa
Moldova	Europe
Montenegro	Europe
Morocco	Middle East and North Africa
Netherlands	Europe
New Zealand	East Asia and the Pacific
Niger	Africa
Nigeria	Africa
Norway	Europe
Oman	Middle East and North Africa
Panama	Western Hemisphere
Philippines	East Asia and the Pacific
Poland	Europe
Portugal	Europe
Qatar	Middle East and North Africa
Republic of Guinea	Africa
Republic of North Macedonia	Europe
Romania	Europe
Saudi Arabia	Middle East and North Africa
Serbia	Europe
Singapore	East Asia and the Pacific
Slovakia	Europe
Slovenia	Europe
Somalia	Africa
South Korea	East Asia and the Pacific
Spain	Europe
Sweden	Europe
Taiwan	East Asia and the Pacific
Tunisia	Middle East and North Africa
Türkiye	Europe
Ukraine	Europe
United Arab Emirates	Middle East and North Africa
United Kingdom	Europe
United States	Western Hemisphere
Yemen	Middle East and North Africa
Arab League	Middle East and North Africa
Community of Sahel-Saharan States	Africa
INTERPOL	Global
NATO Western Hemisphere	Europe
The European Union	Europe

About 1,500 Ethiopian Peacekeepers are deployed in support of the UN Mission in South Sudan, and some 3,800 Ethiopian Peacekeepers are deployed to Somalia in support of the AU peacekeeping mission. Ethiopia also participates in the IGAD and its CT programs and trainings, including the IGAD Security Sector Program, which builds regional capacity to mitigate, detect, and deter terrorist activity.

KENYA

Overview: In 2021, Kenya continued to suffer terrorist attacks primarily along the Kenyan-Somali border. IEDs and ambushes targeting Kenyan security forces and important infrastructure were the primary means of attack. Indiscriminate IED attacks on roads used by Kenyan security forces have resulted in numerous additional civilian casualties. While Kenyan security forces were the principal targets, teachers and key infrastructure also were targeted. Though large-scale attacks decreased with the onset of COVID-19, possibly because of pandemic countermeasures such as travel restrictions and lockdowns, al-Shabaab has maintained a consistent operational tempo in the border region.

A member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, Kenya plays a leading role in regional CT cooperation. The Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) continued to participate in AMISOM and supported border security and counter-IED efforts within Kenya. Security services responded to numerous terrorist incidents, while also disrupting al-Shabaab and ISIS attack planning, recruitment, and travel. Reports of human rights violations and abuses by security forces during CT operations continued, including allegations of extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, and torture. However, Kenyan security forces demonstrated improved procedures regarding protection of human rights in response to terrorist threats and attacks.

2021 Terrorist Incidents: Terrorist incidents in 2021 included the following:

- On January 16, suspected al-Shabaab (AS) operatives attacked the village of Waco Dadacha in Mandera, 150 kilometers from the Kenya-Somalia border. During the five-hour siege, one civilian was killed, one injured, and significant property damaged.
- On March 24, four persons were killed and 10 wounded (four critically), when a bus operating between the cities of Lafey and Mandera hit an IED planted on a busy highway in Mandera County.
- On July 2, AS operatives killed three nonlocal construction workers and wounded one in Dhobley, Garissa County, near the Somalia border.
- On October 12, six KDF personnel were wounded, one seriously, when their vehicle detonated an al-Shabaab IED in Lamu County.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Kenya's government continued to rely on the Prevention of Terrorism Act (amended in 2014) to investigate and prosecute terrorism. Crowded court dockets and the lack of continuous trials slowed progress on many terrorism proceedings. However, 2021 saw the opening of the U.S.-funded Kahawa Law Court in Nairobi. This secure courthouse is a dedicated resource for bringing suspected terrorists to trial and has heard numerous cases.

Despite successes, challenges persist. Access to defense counsel for terrorism suspects is limited because the government has not fully funded the National Legal Aid Service. The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions has been working to develop a uniform and consistent nationwide policy on plea negotiations. The use of plea agreements could provide a mechanism for cooperation of lower-level accomplices against higher-level terrorism suspects. Both CT-focused prosecutors and judges have begun using plea agreements in proceedings.

CT functions are divided among the three branches of the National Police Service: 1) the Kenya Police Service (including the paramilitary General Service Unit (GSU); the Traffic Police; and the regional, county, and local police); 2) the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (including the investigative Antiterrorism Police Unit, the Bomb Disposal Unit, and the Cyber Forensics Investigative Unit); and 3) the Administration Police (including the Border Police Unit).

The National Intelligence Service, elements of the KDF, and the interagency also shared responsibility for CT functions. Uneven coordination, resource constraints, insufficient training, corruption, and unclear command and control continue to hinder CT effectiveness. Kenya's National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) continued to work with private security companies on preventing soft target attacks. Kenya's interagency Joint Terrorism Task Force began operations and made its first arrest on November 13.

Kenyan officials continued to work to secure the nation's porous land borders to prevent terrorist exploitation, but hurdles remain. While aviation safety and security at Nairobi's international airport and at several points of entry have improved with the establishment of Joint Operations Centers, watchlist screening and basic equipment at smaller ports of entry were generally lacking.

The Kenyan government worked to prevent the transit of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), including Kenyans attempting to join AS or ISIS, and those returning from abroad. Kenyan security services also detected and deterred terrorist plots and responded to dozens of terrorism-related incidents. The Kenyan government cooperated on threat information and security at Embassy Nairobi, including through a dedicated GSU CT response team funded by the United States.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Kenya is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG). Kenya helped host a regional counterterrorism financing (CTF) meeting in Nairobi in November, during which Kenyan officials explored expanding CTF collaboration with their Djiboutian and Somali counterparts.

Countering Violent Extremism: The NCTC's County Action Plans for CVE in all 47 counties continue to be the primary framework for U.S. and other international CVE programming at the local level, but implementation of action plans in many counties remained hampered by a lack of funding. Police in Nairobi, coastal, and northeastern counties participated in community engagement training and early warning and response programs. Prison and justice sector stakeholders improved handling of terrorist suspects and convicts, and judicial officials worked to improve management of remand prisoners through plea bargaining and other methods. Kenya's second largest city, Mombasa, is an active member of the Strong Cities Network.

International and Regional Cooperation: Nairobi hosts the UN headquarters in Africa. The KDF continued its participation in AMISOM and is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. Although not a member, Kenya participated in regional meetings of the GCTF.

MALI

Overview: The transition government, installed following the 2020 coup d'état, undertook another extraconstitutional change in government on May 24, when military forces arrested transition President Bah N'Daw and transition Prime Minister Moctar Ouane. Assimi Goita, who led the 2020 coup and had served as vice president following it, subsequently assumed the transition government presidency.

Mali's longstanding counterterrorism partnerships with foreign forces in country — particularly France's Operation Barkhane — experienced increased disruptions throughout 2021. In fall and winter of 2021, French troops withdrew to Gao from bases in Kidal, Tessalit, and Timbuktu. Barkhane handed the bases over to the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA). In a nod to its populist leanings, the transition government ratcheted up anti-France rhetoric in late 2021. In December, the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group deployed to Mali. The security vacuum created by the withdrawal of French and other international forces cannot be filled by Malian forces and Wagner Group forces.

Terrorist activities increased in lethality throughout the country and continued to target civilians, FAMA, international peacekeepers, and international military forces, with 1,826 fatalities recorded by Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project for 2021. Terrorist groups active in Mali include ISIS-GS and JNIM — an AQ-affiliated umbrella group that formed when the Sahara branch of AQIM, al-Murabitoun, Ansar al-Dine, and the Macina Liberation Front merged.

2021 Terrorist Incidents: JNIM and ISIS-GS continued to conduct terrorist attacks, primarily targeting Malian and international military forces. While attacks principally occurred in the central area of Mali, terrorist groups continued to press farther south along the Burkina Faso border into the Sikasso Region. Additionally, attacks occurred along Mali's borders with Côte d'Ivoire and Mauritania, further enveloping Bamako and other population centers:

- On June 25, 13 MINUSMA peacekeepers were seriously injured during the largest suicide-vehicle-borne IED attack in recent memory against a temporary UN base near the village of Ichagara in the Gao region.
- On August 8, Gunmen on motorcycles attacked several villages in a coordinated assault against several villages in the Gao region along the border with Niger, killing more than 50 civilians. A day later, across the country in Dioura, in southern-central Mali, terrorists killed 30 civilians, including 20 Dozo hunters, for refusing to pay religious "taxes."
- JNIM claimed responsibility for a September 28 complex ambush against an Australian-owned gold mining convoy about 100 miles from Bamako. Five Gendarmerie Special Forces soldiers guarding the convoy were killed, and several vehicles were destroyed.

Murabitoun.” In 2015, al-Murabitoun announced a re-merger with AQIM. In 2017 the Sahara Branch of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Murabitoun, Ansar al-Dine, and the Macina Liberation Front came together to form Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM).

Activities: In 2013, what is now known as al-Murabitoun claimed responsibility for the attack against the Tiguentourine gas facility near In Amenas, in southeastern Algeria. More than 800 people were taken hostage during the four-day siege, resulting in the deaths of 39 civilians, including 3 U.S. citizens.

In 2013, al-Murabitoun participated in twin suicide bombings on a northern Nigerien military base and a French uranium mine in Arlit, Niger. The coordinated attacks killed more than 20 people, including all the attackers.

In 2015, al-Murabitoun claimed responsibility for an attack at La Terrasse restaurant in Bamako, Mali, that killed a French national, a Belgian national, and three Malians. Al-Murabitoun also claimed responsibility for the 2015 hotel siege in central Mali that killed 17 people. Also in 2015, al-Murabitoun operatives participated in the strike against the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako, Mali, taking more than 170 people hostage — including U.S. citizens. At least 26 people were killed in the attack, among them a U.S. international development worker.

Al-Murabitoun was reportedly involved in the 2016 AQIM attack on a hotel in Burkina Faso that killed nearly 30, including a U.S. citizen. In addition, al-Murabitoun claimed responsibility for a 2017 suicide car bombing at a military camp in Mali that killed more than 47 people and injured more than 115. In 2018, al-Murabitoun was involved in fighting against French forces in Mali. Al-Murabitoun did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2021.

Strength: Precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali, and Niger

Funding and External Aid: In addition to the support it may receive through its connections to other terrorist organizations in the region, al-Murabitoun is likely funded through kidnapping for ransom and other criminal activities.

al-Shabaab

Aka Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin; al-Shabab; Shabaab; Youth Wing; Mujahidin al-Shabaab Movement; Mujahideen Youth Movement; Mujahidin Youth Movement; al-Hijra; al Hijra; Muslim Youth Center; the Youth; MYC MYM; Pumwani Muslim Youth; Pumwani Islamist Muslim Youth Center; Hizbul Shabaab; Hisb’ul Shabaab; al-Shabaab al-Islamiya; al-Shabaab al-Islaam; al-Shabaab al-Jihaad; the Unity of Islamic Youth; Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin; Harakatul-Shabaab al Mujaahidiin; Mujaahidiin Youth Movement

Description: Al-Shabaab was designated as an FTO on March 18, 2008. Al-Shabaab was the militant wing of the former Somali Islamic Courts Council that took over parts of southern Somalia during the second half of 2006. Since the end of 2006, al-Shabaab and associated

militias have engaged in violent insurgency using guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics against the transitional governments of Somalia.

Al-Shabaab is an official al-Qa'ida (AQ) affiliate and has ties to other AQ affiliates, including al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula and al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb. The group's leader is Ahmed Diriye, aka Ahmed Umar, aka Abu Ubaidah.

Composed of Somali recruits and foreign terrorist fighters, Al-Shabaab since 2011 has seen its military capacity reduced owing to the efforts of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali forces and to clashes within the group itself. Despite al-Shabaab's loss of urban centers since 2012, the group has maintained its hold on large sections of rural areas throughout Somalia and has conducted attacks in Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, and Djibouti.

Activities: Al-Shabaab has used intimidation and violence to exploit divisions in Somalia and undermine the Somali government, recruit new fighters, extort funding from local populations, and kill activists working to bring about peace through political dialogue. The group has claimed responsibility for several high-profile bombings and shootings throughout Somalia targeting AMISOM troops and Somali officials. Al-Shabaab has assassinated numerous civil society figures, government officials, journalists, international aid workers, and members of non-governmental organizations.

In 2010, Al-Shabaab was responsible for suicide bombings in Kampala, Uganda — its first attacks outside of Somalia. The attacks, which took place during the World Cup, killed 76 people, including a U.S. citizen. In 2013, al-Shabaab staged a significant attack against the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya. The multiday siege resulted in the deaths of at least 65 civilians, including foreign nationals from 13 countries as well as 6 soldiers and police officers. Hundreds of others were injured. In 2015, al-Shabaab carried out a raid with small arms and grenades on Kenya's Garissa University College that killed 148 people.

Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for one of the deadliest attacks against AMISOM troops in Somalia in 2016. Using a VBIED and small arms fire, al-Shabaab assembled against a Kenyan AMISOM base and killed more than 100 soldiers. Also, that year, al-Shabaab attempted to down Daallo Airlines Flight 159 with 74 passengers on board, but only the suicide bomber was killed in the explosion.

In 2017, al-Shabaab is believed to have conducted a double truck bombing in a Mogadishu intersection with heavy vehicle and pedestrian traffic that killed more than 500 people and injured 300 others.

Al-Shabaab was involved in more than 1,000 violent events in Somalia and eastern Kenya in 2019. In 2020, al-Shabaab fighters attacked the United States Armed Forces' Camp Simba in Manda Bay, killing 3 U.S. citizens; attacked a Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) convoy with small arms and grenades in Mandera County, Kenya, killing 1; detonated a car bomb at the gates of the Elite Hotel in Mogadishu, starting a four-hour gun battle with security official that killed at least 16 people; and claimed responsibility for killing 24 Somali troops in the Afgooye District, northwest of Mogadishu.

In January a suicide bomber on a motorcycle attacked a Turkish construction company in Mogadishu, killing at least 5 people and wounding at least 14 others. In April, at least 7 persons were killed and more than 11 others were injured when an al-Shabaab vehicle exploded outside of a police headquarters in Somalia's capital city. In August, al-Shabaab fighters stormed a military base and recaptured the town of Amara, which it had lost to government forces earlier that month. In September, al-Shabaab detonated a car bomb at a Presidential Palace checkpoint in Mogadishu, killing at least eight persons. In November, al-Shabaab was responsible for a large explosion outside a school in Mogadishu that killed at least eight people, including students.

Strength: Al-Shabaab is estimated to have between 7,000 and 9,000 members.

Location/Area of Operation: Kenya, Somalia, and Uganda

Funding and External Aid: Al-Shabaab receives enough income to launch attacks throughout Somalia, including against AMISOM bases and other civilian targets. Al-Shabaab obtains funds through illegal charcoal production and exports, "taxation" of local populations and businesses, and by means of remittances and other money transfers from the Somali diaspora (although these funds are not always intended to support al-Shabaab members).

al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb

Aka AQIM; GSPC; *Le Groupe Salafiste Pour la Predication et le Combat*; Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat; Salafist Group for Call and Combat; Tanzim al-Qa'ida fi Bilad al-Maghrib al-Islamiya

Description: The Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) was designated as an FTO on March 27, 2002. The Department of State amended the GSPC designation in 2008, after the GSPC officially joined with al-Qa'ida in 2006 and al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) became the primary name of the group. Although AQIM remains largely a regionally focused terrorist group, it has adopted a more anti-western rhetoric and ideology. The group aspires to overthrow "apostate" African regimes and create an Islamic state. Following the death of AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel, who was killed in 2020 by French forces, the group chose Abu Obaida Yusuf al-Annabi as Droukdel's successor.

Activities: Following AQIM's 2007 bombing of the UN headquarters building and an Algerian government building in Algiers, which killed 60 people, AQIM's northern leadership was contained to northeastern Algeria, while the group's southern battalions focused mostly on kidnapping-for-ransom efforts. In 2011 and 2012, however, AQIM took advantage of the deteriorating security situation across Libya, Mali, and Tunisia to expand its operations. Terrorists with ties to AQIM were involved in the 2012 attack on U.S. facilities in Benghazi that killed U.S. Ambassador to Libya J. Christopher Stevens and three other embassy staff members. In 2014, AQIM killed 14 Algerian soldiers in an ambush east of Algiers.