

Flygtningenævnets baggrundsmateriale

Bilagsnr.:	703
Land:	Nigeria
Kilde:	eyeWitness to Atrocities, International Committee on Nigeria og Bwatiye Community Development Association
Titel:	Joint submission to the Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
Udgivet:	17. juli 2023
Optaget på baggrundsmaterialet:	11. juni 2024



International
Committee
On Nigeria



**JOINT SUBMISSION TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL
UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA
Fourth Cycle, 45th Session
January-February 2024**

Submitted by: eyeWitness to Atrocities
International Committee on Nigeria
Bwatiye Community Development Association

Date of submission: 17 July 2023

eyeWitness to Atrocities, initiated by the International Bar Association in 2015, seeks to bring the perpetrators of atrocities to justice by providing legal and technical expertise in building photo and video dossiers that can be authenticated for use in criminal investigations or trials.

Website: <https://www.eyewitness.global/>

International Committee On Nigeria is a non-governmental organisation working to secure a future for all Nigerians, where rule-of-law, justice, religious freedom and constitutional rights are secured for all Nigerians, regardless of religion, tribe, or location.

Website: <https://iconhelp.org/>

Bwatiye Community Development Association is a community-based organisation undertaking documentation missions as a community of practice member of Global Rights, a non-governmental organisation with a mandate to increase access to justice.

I. Introduction

1. eyeWitness to Atrocities, the International Committee On Nigeria, and the Bwatiye Community Development Association (together, the “submitting organisations”) jointly submit this report to inform the examination of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (“Nigeria”) during the fourth cycle of the Universal Periodic Review (“UPR”).¹ This report focuses on the serious human rights violations resulting from repeated attacks against civilians in the Middle Belt region of Nigeria, including violations to the right to life, right to housing, right to food, freedom of religion, and right to an effective remedy.

2. At Nigeria’s last UPR in 2018, the Special Rapporteur on minority issues noted that some States of the Middle Belt region “had suffered episodes of intercommunal violence that, while exhibiting ethnic and religious dimensions, had root causes that were complex and multifaceted,” including socio-economic factors.² The United Nations country team added that Nigeria’s “initiatives to enhance interreligious dialogue [...] had come under pressure owing to conflicts between farmers and herders, which, while ostensibly resource-based, had taken on a religious and ethnic connotation.”³ Civil society organisations likewise submitted at least eight reports exposing the dire situation faced by farming communities as a result of repeated attacks in the region.⁴ With specific reference to “recurring intercommunal violence,” the delegation of New Zealand recommended that Nigeria “undertake effective and impartial investigations into massacres, bringing those responsible to justice and ensuring redress for victims.”⁵

3. Whilst Nigeria expressed support for this recommendation,⁶ attacks continue to occur. Repeated attacks have resulted in “significant loss of lives and livelihoods, undermine[d] food security, permit[ed] the proliferation of small arms, displace[d] large numbers of people, and divert[ed] resources meant for development. Vulnerable groups such as women, children and youth, IDPs, and indigenous people are particularly impacted.”⁷ In 2020 alone, Amnesty International reported that more than 1,531 persons died as a result of the violence in the Middle Belt region, “forc[ing] many farming families to flee to urban areas or displacement camps.”⁸ In a report released a year later, the former Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions described the situation as Nigeria’s “gravest security challenge.”⁹

II. Information upon which this report is based

4. Since March 2019, documenters in Nigeria have used the eyeWitness to Atrocities mobile camera App (the “App”) to gather verifiable evidence of human rights violations. The App enables users to capture footage and uses the device sensors to record metadata that helps to authenticate the date, time, location, and integrity of the images and sound. It is complemented by transmission protocols and a secure server that create a chain of custody with embedded information for the footage from the point of capture to its receipt on eyeWitness to Atrocities’ Server (the “Server”).¹⁰ To date, documenters have

uploaded more than 5,850 photographs, video recordings, and audio files to the Server, many of which portray the immediate aftermath of violent attacks against villages located in the Middle Belt region, including in the States of Adamawa, Kaduna, Nasarawa, Ondo, and Plateau.

5. In June 2022, the submitting organisations and Rev. Canon Hassan John exposed 69 attacks that were carried out between 15 October 2017 and 12 January 2022 in the States of Adamawa, Kaduna, Nasarawa, and Plateau, all of which were documented with the App (the “Joint Urgent Appeal”).¹¹ Since then, documenters continued to record additional attacks with the App, including at least one attack in a Catholic church in the town of Owo, Owo Local Government Area (“LGA”) of Ondo State, that claimed at least 50 lives and overwhelmed local hospitals with injured casualties.¹²

6. The footage captured by documenters in the Middle Belt region focuses almost exclusively on attacks against farming communities. Yet, attacks are “part of seemingly endless retaliations” between farming and herding communities.¹³ An analysis of the footage, accompanying documenters’ notes, data relevant to the date, time, and location of capture, as well as open-source information reveals that non-State armed groups operate in the Middle Belt region with impunity, killing unarmed civilians, setting villages ablaze, and destroying food reserves and farms. In this context, witnesses, documenters, and open-source information relevant to attacks documented with the App point to the identification of the alleged perpetrators as members of Fulani ethnic militia(s).¹⁴ They further report instances in which Nigerian security forces were informed of both impending and ongoing attacks or were present in the vicinity of villages under attack but failed to intervene until hours later. Similarly, only a handful of attacks appear to have led to investigations, the findings of which remain inaccessible to the public, with no arrests or prosecutions in sight.

7. The submitting organisations caution against conflating Fulani civilians, who are also victims of attacks, with a violent minority among the Fulani ethnic community that has organised in militias and exploits pre-existing intercommunal tensions. For these reasons, this report uses the wording “Fulani ethnic militia” rather than any other, as it is the least biased of terms. In no way does citing to a source indicate that the submitting organisations support the message promoted by the source – it only indicates that the source is considered to have valuable information regarding an attack.

III. Rise of militia groups in the Middle Belt

8. Violence in the Middle Belt region is often primarily characterised as a conflict over scarce resources between nomadic herders, 90% of whom are Muslim Fulani pastoralists, and sedentary crop farmers, predominantly Christian from various ethnic groups. Yet, “[e]thnic militias have mobilized, and lines between conflict drivers have blurred as violence has grown to encompass resource disputes between herders and farmers, gang-style violence by rival ethnic militia, and opportunistic criminality.”¹⁵

Indeed, in response to the Federal Government's apparent failure to protect its citizens against frequent retaliatory attacks, herders and farmers alike have taken it upon themselves to defend their villages, attack vulnerable populations, and commit mass killings.¹⁶

9. According to the International Crisis Group, “[t]he emergence of criminal gangs, whom the Nigerian government and mass media call “bandits”, has aggravated an already precarious security situation. Some of these gangs started as herder-allied groups but now operate autonomously. Many are exclusively or predominantly Fulani, while others are ethnically diverse.”¹⁷ In 2019, the Global Terrorism Index reported that “[c]ertain deaths within the ongoing conflict between pastoralists and the nomadic Fulani have been categorized as terrorism and attributed to extremist elements within the Fulani.”¹⁸ These so-called “Fulani extremists” “were responsible for 26 per cent of terror-related deaths in Nigeria at 325 fatalities [...] Terrorist violence declined in most [S]tates in which Fulani extremists operate, except Kaduna which recorded a 77 per cent increase in terror-related deaths.”¹⁹ The Global Terrorism Index further reported that, in 2021, Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) were aligning “with local communal conflicts and their leaders to gain recruits by siding on divisions between ethnic groups, such as the Fulani ethnic groups in Nigeria, as well as the long-standing farmer-herder violence over water and grazing areas.”²⁰

10. Incidents reported in the submitting organisations’ Joint Urgent Appeal and those documented since, along with the identification of perpetrators by witnesses, documenters, and open-source information appear consistent with this analysis. With the possible exception of one of the 69 attacks detailed in the Joint Urgent Appeal,²¹ witnesses, documenters, and open-source information identified Fulani ethnic militia(s) as the perpetrators, occasionally describing them as wearing black or dark clothes,²² carrying AK-47 assault rifles,²³ and shouting “*Allah Akbar*” as they carried out attacks.²⁴ Assailants were also identified by the language they were heard speaking or their accent.²⁵ On several occasions, witnesses reported that attacks on villages were carried out by large groups – at times in the hundreds – of armed assailants.²⁶ In 2022, the National Publicity Secretary of the Irigwe Development Association reported that attacks on villages of Plateau State were carried out by “herdsmen working with Muslim terrorists believed to be members of Boko Haram or its offshoot, the [ISWAP].”²⁷

IV. Violations of the right to life

11. **Legal framework.** The right to life is protected under both the Constitution of Nigeria and human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) to which Nigeria is a party. Specifically, the Constitution provides that the security and welfare of the people of Nigeria “shall be the primary purpose of the government”²⁸ and guarantees that “[e]very person has a right to life, and no one shall be deprived intentionally of his life.”²⁹ Similarly, Article 6(1) of the ICCPR recognises that no one should be arbitrarily deprived of their inherent right to life. States have a duty to

both refrain from engaging in conduct resulting in the arbitrary deprivation of life and to protect the lives of persons against deprivations caused by individuals or entities, including militia groups, whose conduct is not attributable to the State.³⁰ As such, States must not only take special measures to protect those in vulnerable situations, in particular where there are pre-existing patterns of violence,³¹ but also investigate and prosecute the perpetrators of killings.³²

12. **Analysis.** Several villages of the Middle Belt region have been, and continue to be, subjected to frequent attacks leading to heavy civilian casualties. For instance, the villages of Hukke and Ancha, located within a kilometre of each other in Bassa LGA of Plateau State, were attacked at least nine times between July 2019 and January 2022; with a death toll of at least 40.³³ Similarly, assailants stormed four villages of the Kwall district, Bassa LGA of Plateau State, in less than three weeks, leaving up to 19 dead and five injured.³⁴ Numan LGA of Adamawa State was the stage of four separate attacks between September and October 2019.³⁵ In Kajuru LGA of Kaduna State, a series of retaliatory attacks – four of which were documented in the Joint Urgent Appeal – led to the death of up to 250 persons in February and March 2019.³⁶ In 2021, villages of Kauru LGA, Kaduna State, were invaded at least three times,³⁷ including in an attack that killed at least 40 and injured nine in September 2021.³⁸ In May 2022, the National Publicity Secretary of the Irigwe Development Association reported that seven villages of Miango district, Bassa LGA of Plateau State, had been attacked in just a month, resulting in the death of at least 21 persons and the injury of 30.³⁹ Documenters captured footage of the aftermath of at least one of these attacks on the village of Ariri.⁴⁰ In the first four months of 2023, a resident of Zangon Kataf LGA in Kaduna State recounted that the area had been attacked three times, resulting in the death of 58 persons.⁴¹ This includes an assault on the village of Runji in the evening of 15 April 2023, documented with the App a mere few hours later, that claimed at least 33 lives and resulted in the destruction by fire of at least 40 houses.⁴²

13. An analysis of attacks documented with the App reveals that, on many occasions, assailants attacked villages in the late hours of the night or as residents were asleep and unarmed.⁴³ On other occasions, assailants bearing small arms and light weapons as well as cutting weapons stormed villages and surrounding areas in broad daylight, attacking the unarmed local population, including women, children, and the elderly.⁴⁴ For instance, at least four attacks resulted in the killing of pregnant women,⁴⁵ while another attack led to the death of seven elderly persons who were unable to flee the village of Hukke, Bassa LGA of Plateau State.⁴⁶ Throughout, some victims appear to have been killed as a result of indiscriminate gunshot⁴⁷ while others were killed in close contact with firearms⁴⁸ or cutting weapons⁴⁹ and, in some cases, burnt as the assailants set fire to their houses.⁵⁰ In Runji, Zangon Kataf LGA of Kaduna State, documenters captured footage of several burnt bodies.⁵¹ There, 14 of the 33 recorded deaths were children, including a five-year old boy who was reportedly beheaded.⁵² Footage captured

with the App reveals that victims were beheaded by the assailants on at least three other occasions between 2019 and 2021.⁵³

V. Violations of the rights to housing and to food

14. **Legal framework.** The Constitution of Nigeria does not expressly recognise socio-economic rights. However, the rights to housing and to food are both enshrined in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), to which Nigeria is a party. Under Article 11 ICESCR, everyone has the right to “an adequate standard of living,” meaning that every person shall enjoy necessary subsistence rights, including adequate housing and food. “Attacking, destroying and demolishing housing or rendering it uninhabitable are thus fundamental attacks on the right to housing, which strip it of its core function to protect the right to live somewhere in security, peace and dignity.”⁵⁴ The right to food, recognised by Article 11 ICESCR both as a fundamental human right and as part of the right to an adequate standard of living, is the right “to have regular, permanent and free access, either directly or by means of financial purchases, to quantitatively and qualitatively adequate and sufficient food corresponding to the cultural traditions of the people to which the consumer belongs, and which ensures a physical and mental, individual and collective, fulfilling and dignified life free of fear.”⁵⁵

15. **Analysis.** In addition to causing heavy casualties, assailants almost systematically set houses and infrastructure on fire and destroyed food reserves. In Adamawa State, more than 100 houses and food barns were burnt down in a single attack in April 2019.⁵⁶ In Plateau State, at least 12 villages were set on fire between May 2019 and January 2022.⁵⁷ There, assailants also burnt down several churches⁵⁸ and at least one clinic⁵⁹ and one school.⁶⁰ Similarly, in Karamai, located in the Kajuru LGA of Kaduna State, more than 100 houses were razed in an attack that also killed 40 persons.⁶¹ In 2020, 63 houses, food barns, and water pumping machines used in farm irrigation were set on fire in the village of Ntiriku, also known as Ungwan Magaji, Kauru LGA of Kaduna State.⁶² In March 2022, an attack on the village of Agban Kagoro, also in Kauru LGA, Kaduna State, resulted in the destruction of 200 houses and 32 shops.⁶³ Similarly, in Ariri, located in Bassa LGA of the neighboring Plateau State, 25 houses, 40 barns, 28 kitchens, and one church were burnt to the ground in April 2022.⁶⁴ In Runji, Zangon Kataf LGA, Kaduna State, assailants reportedly set fire to 40 houses in April 2023.⁶⁵

VI. Violations of the freedom of religion

16. **Legal framework.** Freedom of religion is protected by Article 38 of the Constitution of Nigeria and Article 18 ICCPR. Under both provisions, every person has the right to religious freedom, including the freedom to have or adopt a religion of her/his choice and to manifest her/his religion in worship, observance, and practice. With specific reference to the situation in Nigeria, the former Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief noted that “[f]reedom of religion or belief, like other human

rights, is properly enjoyed where a satisfactory level of security exists. If one is afraid to leave home to go to church or to go outside in Muslim dress, freedom of religion is restricted even though not directly imposed by the authorities, or even by members of another religious community.”⁶⁶

17. **Analysis.** The violence in the Middle Belt region is increasingly taking on ethnic and religious dimensions. In 2019, a resident of Miango, Bassa LGA of Plateau State reported that attacks are usually carried out “on Sundays during worship hours or Thursdays when church activities are held.”⁶⁷ Hundreds of churches have reportedly been destroyed, reinforcing that “[...] religious tensions are also a major contributing factor to the conflict[...].”⁶⁸ Footage captured by documenters evidences this phenomenon, with burnt churches depicted on several occasions.⁶⁹ One of the most recent attacks documented with the App took place on 5 June 2022, when armed men reportedly entered St Francis Catholic Church in Owo, Ondo State, and “fired at the congregation during a service to mark the holiday of Pentecost”⁷⁰ killing at least 50 persons and injuring dozens.⁷¹ Sources differ as to the identification of the perpetrators, with the Federal Government attributing the responsibility to ISWAP cells, while witnesses suggest that the attack was carried out by Fulani ethnic militia who were seen fleeing through the forest.⁷²

VII. Violations of the right to an effective remedy

18. **Legal framework.** Under international human rights law, all victims of human rights violations have a right to an effective remedy. Specifically, Article 2 of the ICCPR “requires that in addition to effective protection of Covenant rights States Parties must ensure that individuals also have accessible and effective remedies to vindicate those rights [...] A failure by a State Party to investigate allegations of violations could in and of itself give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant. Cessation of an ongoing violation is an essential element of the right to an effective remedy.”⁷³ The same article requires State Parties to make reparations to the individuals whose rights have been violated. “[W]here appropriate, reparation can involve restitution, rehabilitation and measures of satisfaction, such as public apologies, public memorials, guarantees of non-repetition and changes in relevant laws and practices, as well as bringing to justice the perpetrators of human rights violations.”⁷⁴ Similarly, Article 2 ICESCR recognises that State Parties must take measures to give effect to the rights that the treaty embodies.

19. **Analysis.** Measures taken by the Federal Government to curb the violence – including the launch of military operations such as Operation Safe Haven⁷⁵ and the deployment of additional security units in affected areas⁷⁶ – have remained ineffective. Indeed, security agencies often intervene, if at all, only after attacks have taken place.⁷⁷ In Kaduna State, an attack unfolded despite rumours circulating that a village would be targeted on the night of 15 April 2023, with an army captain calling residents to warn them that “the Fulani were coming.”⁷⁸ According to witnesses, security operatives only reached the village 30 minutes after the attack had started, after people had already been killed.⁷⁹

20. In the same State, at least two attacks reported in the submitting organisations' Joint Urgent Appeal were carried out in the vicinity of military or police checkpoints without intervention.⁸⁰ In addition, following a December 2022 attack on the village of Malagum 1, Kaura LGA of Kaduna State, the Speaker of Kaura LGA said that efforts of the security operatives and government are neither "seen" nor "felt."⁸¹ Whilst some sources only highlight the need for doubled efforts "to curtail the renewed killings in the area," other witness' accounts suggest the complacency of the military in the attacks, who were reportedly only 30 meters away from the village that was attacked.⁸² According to notes accompanying the footage captured by documenters, the military may have also been directly involved in the killings.⁸³

21. In nearby Plateau State, authorities failed to take preventive measures despite being alerted hours prior of impending attacks that ultimately lasted for several hours.⁸⁴ On one occasion, the authorities argued that they were unable to intervene due to a lack of secure equipment, despite hearing AK-47 gunshots in a village under attack.⁸⁵ Yet only two months later, authorities allegedly equipped with armoured personnel carriers also failed to halt another hours-long attack that left up to seven dead, nine injured, and considerable destruction of property.⁸⁶

22. In addition to security agencies' untimely interventions, several of the incidents reported in the Joint Urgent Appeal point to the complicity, if not the active involvement, of security forces in attacks. In March 2018, Lieutenant General Theophilus Y Danjuma, the former Army Chief of Staff and Defence Minister, publicly stated that the armed forces were "not neutral, they collude" in the "attempt at ethnic cleansing" by "armed bandits," calling on villagers to defend themselves because relying on the armed forces would result in them dying "one by one."⁸⁷ Five months prior, soldiers stationed in Nkiendoro, Bassa LGA of Plateau State had reportedly locked villagers in a classroom upon being bribed by Fulani assailants, resulting in the killing of 29 persons.⁸⁸ In Plateau State, evidence suggests that at least one other attack was carried out by, or with the assent of, soldiers in the area, who then prevented peacekeepers from accessing the bodies of the victims.⁸⁹

23. Formal investigations into attacks are also infrequent. While public scrutiny has, at times, led to the creation of commissions of inquiry by State Governors, their findings remain inaccessible to the public.⁹⁰ Not a single incident detailed the Joint Urgent Appeal appears to have resulted in prosecutions, or trials – even when victims identified the assailants by name.⁹¹ Likewise, the submitting organisations found no public records of investigations and/or prosecutions into attacks that took place since the last incident reported in the Joint Urgent Appeal on 12 January 2022. This is consistent with the conclusions of former Special Rapporteur Agnès Callamard, who noted in 2019 that two years after the killing of 29 persons in Nkiendoro, Plateau State, "none of the survivors had been asked to provide testimonies or to attend trial, if trials did indeed occur."⁹² The Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West

African States similarly recognised the Federal Government of Nigeria’s failure to investigate the mass killing of the Agatu community in Benue State allegedly carried out by Fulani herdsmen in 2016.⁹³

24. Both the Federal and State Governments have attempted diplomatic avenues in a concerted effort to try and halt the waves of attacks. Former President Muhammadu Buhari and other senior officials have reportedly met with community leaders and relevant State Governments to discuss common long-term solutions to halt the attacks. Examples include the decision to establish “cattle colonies” in 2018⁹⁴ and the more comprehensive ten-year National Livestock Transformation Plan (the “Plan”) adopted in 2019.⁹⁵ Despite preliminary steps taken by the Federal Government in support of the Plan, and its endorsement received at the State level, many obstacles continue to hinder and stall its implementation, such as widespread insecurity, budgetary constraints, and lack of political leadership.⁹⁶ Dialogue between the different communities involved in the conflict has similarly been promoted at the State level. For instance, Plateau State established a Peace Building Agency in 2016 in order to engage with both State and non-State actors and coordinate “all conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts in Plateau [S]tate.”⁹⁷ Despite having implemented a number of specific conflict resolution interventions⁹⁸ as well as long-term peacebuilding strategic plans,⁹⁹ reprisals and killings continue, with certain attacks being carried out within mere hours or days of peace building initiatives.¹⁰⁰ As an illustration only, a March 2022 attack on Agban Kagoro, located in Kaura LGA of Kaduna State, was reportedly carried out a few hours after peace negotiation meetings between various local tribes.¹⁰¹

VIII. Recommendations to the Government of Nigeria

- Fully cooperate with human rights protection mechanisms, in particular by reporting to all United Nations Treaty Bodies and extending invitations to relevant Special Rapporteurs;
- Continue efforts to enhance dialogue and effective participation of grassroots ethnic and religious groups to formulate a comprehensive peacebuilding and reconciliation plan in the Middle Belt region of Nigeria;
- Take steps to ensure the effective protection of vulnerable groups, including women, children, the elderly, and internally displaced persons in the Middle Belt region of Nigeria;
- Undertake effective and impartial investigations into human rights violations in the Middle Belt region of Nigeria, bring those responsible to justice, and ensure redress, rehabilitation, and compensation to victims and survivors.

IX. Endnotes

¹ The submitting organisations wish to acknowledge the contribution of Rev. Cannon Hassan John. Rev. Cannon

Hassan John is a priest and journalist, working as the Media Director of the Anglican Diocese of Jos, the West Africa Editor for Global Christian News, and a stringer for CNN.

² Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, [Universal Periodic Review – Nigeria](#): Compilation of UN Information, A/HRC/WG.6/31/NGA/2 (27 August 2018), para. 54.

³ Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, [Universal Periodic Review – Nigeria](#): Compilation of UN Information, A/HRC/WG.6/31/NGA/2 (27 August 2018), para. 36.

⁴ UPR Info, [Nigeria: Session 31 – November 2018](#): Civil Society and Other Submissions.

⁵ Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, [Universal Periodic Review – Nigeria](#): Matrix of Recommendations, Recommendation No. 148.180.

⁶ Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, [Universal Periodic Review – Nigeria](#): Matrix of Recommendations, Recommendation No. 148.180.

⁷ United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, [Nigeria – Transitioning from Humanitarian Relief to Long-Term Development: Addressing the Herdsmen-Farmers Conflict in Nigeria](#) (October 2018-April 2022).

⁸ Amnesty International, [Report 2020/21: the State of the World’s Human Rights](#) (7 April 2021), p. 269.

⁹ United Nations Human Rights Council, [Visit to Nigeria. Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Agnès Callamard](#), A/HRC/47/33/Add.2 (11 June 2021), para. 50.

¹⁰ For more information on eyeWitness to Atrocities’ technology, see <https://www.eyewitness.global/>.

¹¹ eyeWitness to Atrocities, International Committee On Nigeria, Rev. Canon Hassan John, Bwatiye Community Development Association, [Joint Urgent Appeal: Extrajudicial Executions in the Middle Belt region of Nigeria](#), 7 June 2022 (“Joint Urgent Appeal”).

¹² See E. Akinwotu, The Guardian, [Nigeria: Gunmen Kill Dozens in ‘Satanic’ Attack on Catholic Church](#) (5 June 2022), referring to an attack on Owo, Owo LGA, Ondo State, the aftermath of which was documented with the App on 12 and 17 June 2022 (on-file with eyeWitness to Atrocities).

¹³ United Nations Human Rights Council, [Visit to Nigeria. Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Agnès Callamard](#), A/HRC/47/33/Add.2 (11 June 2021), para. 53.

¹⁴ eyeWitness to Atrocities does not itself conduct witnesses’ and victims’ interviews. As such, its legal team relied on footage captured by documenters, accompanying documenters’ notes, and open-source information for the identification of those allegedly responsible for the attacks. Witnesses, documenters, and open-source information often identify alleged perpetrators using wording such as “herders,” “herdsmen,” “Fulani,” “Fulani herders,” “Fulani militants,” “Islamic Fulani militias,” “Fulani-speaking group,” “Fulani terrorists,” or “armed Fulani.” The submitting organisations use the wording “Fulani ethnic militia” throughout the report as it carries less bias.

¹⁵ Congressional Research Service, [Nigeria: Key Issues and U.S. Policy](#) (25 March 2022), p. 15.

¹⁶ International Crisis Group, [Violence in Nigeria’s North West: Rolling Back the Mayhem](#) (18 May 2020), pp. 6-9; Amnesty International, [Harvest of Death: Three Years of Bloody Clashes between Farmers and Herders in Nigeria](#) (17 December 2018).

¹⁷ International Crisis Group, [Halting the Deepening Turmoil in Nigeria’s North West](#) (26 May 2021).

¹⁸ Vision of Humanity, [Global Terrorism Index 2020](#), p. 21.

¹⁹ Vision of Humanity, [Global Terrorism Index 2020](#), p. 21.

²⁰ Vision of Humanity, [Global Terrorism Index 2022](#), p. 58.

²¹ See [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incident dated: 13 September 2020, paras 85-86. Sources differ as to the identification of the alleged perpetrators, alternatively claiming that “gunmen,” “herdsmen,” and “military operatives” were responsible for the killing of a 45-year-old man and his 32-year-old wife near a military checkpoint in the village of Hukke, Bassa LGA, Plateau State).

²² See [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incidents dated: 3 October 2018, para. 15; 11 March 2019, paras 21-22; 28 May 2020, paras 80-82; 19 March 2021, paras 92-93).

²³ See [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incidents dated: 15 October 2017, paras 10-12; 11 March 2019, paras 21-22; 22 September 2019, paras 36-37; 10 December 2019, para. 45; 5 May 2020, para. 79; 28 May 2020, paras 80-82; 15 March 2021, para. 91). In addition to witnesses and survivors accounts describing perpetrators bearing small arms and light weapons, documenters reportedly found cartridge cases at the location of several of the reported attacks. See [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incidents dated: 10 February 2019 and 10 March 2019, paras 17-18; 17 June 2019, para. 27; 4 September 2019, para. 34; 22 September 2019, paras 36-37; 8 December 2019, paras 42-44; 31 March 2020, paras 61-62; 1 April 2020, paras 63-65; 3 April 2020, para. 66; 7-8 April 2020, paras 68-69; 11-12 January 2021, paras 115-17).

²⁴ See [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incidents dated: 15 October 2017, paras 10-12; 3 October 2018, para. 15; 11 March 2019, paras 21-22; 15 July 2019, para. 32; 20 March 2020, paras 57-58; 14 April 2020, paras 70-72; 11-12 January

2022, paras 115-17).

²⁵ See [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incidents dated: 3 October 2018, paras 15-16; 7 or 8 April 2020, paras 68-69; 14 April 2020, paras 70-72; 19 March 2021, paras 92-93). See also G. George, The Punch, [We Now Live in Fear after Terrorists Killed 38, Burnt our Houses – Survivors of Kaduna Attack](#) (26 March 2022), referring to an attack on Agban Kagoro, Kaura LGA, Kaduna State, the aftermath of which was documented with the App on 21 and 22 March 2022 (on-file with eyeWitness to Atrocities).

²⁶ See [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incidents dated: 26 February 2019, paras 19-20; 17 June 2019, para. 27; 31 March 2020, paras 61-62; 1 April 2020, paras 63-65; 19 April 2020, paras 73-76; 19 March 2021, paras 92-93).

²⁷ Morning Star News, [Children among 29 Christians Killed in Plateau State, Nigeria](#) (9 May 2022).

²⁸ Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Act No. 24, 5 May 1999), Section 14 (2b).

²⁹ Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Act No. 24, 5 May 1999), Section 33 (1).

³⁰ United Nations Human Rights Committee, [General Comment No. 36 on article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the right to life](#), CCPR/C/GC/36 (3 September 2019), paras 7, 21.

³¹ United Nations Human Rights Committee, [General Comment No. 36 on article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the right to life](#), CCPR/C/GC/36 (3 September 2019), para. 23.

³² United Nations Human Rights Committee, [General Comment No. 36 on article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the right to life](#), CCPR/C/GC/36 (3 September 2019), paras 27-28.

³³ See [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incidents dated: 4 July 2019, para. 30; 15 July 2019, para. 32; 23 September 2019, para. 38; 12 October 2019, para. 33; 20 March 2020, paras 57-58; 31 March 2020, paras 61-62; 1 April 2020, paras 63-65; 13 September 2020, paras 85-86; 11-12 January 2022, paras 115-17).

³⁴ See [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incidents dated: 24 March 2020, para. 59; 24 March 2020, para. 60; 7 April 2020, para. 67; 7-8 April 2020, paras 68-69; 14 April 2020, paras 70-72).

³⁵ See [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incidents dated: 22 September 2019, paras 36-37; 10 October 2019, para. 39; 26 October 2019, para. 40; 31 October 2019, para. 41).

³⁶ See [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incidents dated: 10 February 2019, 26 February 2019, 10 March 2019, 11 March 2019, paras 16-23).

³⁷ See [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incidents dated: 15 March 2021, para. 91; 19 March 2021, paras 92-93; 26 September 2021, paras 107-09).

³⁸ See [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incident dated: 26 September 2021, paras 107-09).

³⁹ Morning Star News, [Children among 29 Christians Killed in Plateau State, Nigeria](#) (9 May 2022).

⁴⁰ Footage captured with the App on 15 April 2022 in Ariri, Bassa LGA, Plateau State (on-file with eyeWitness to Atrocities).

⁴¹ J. Adeiye, Foundation for Investigative Journalism, [REVEALED: Army ‘Had Foreknowledge’ of Latest Southern Kaduna Attack But...](#) (28 April 2023).

⁴² See T. Obiezu, Voice of America, [33 Killed in Attack by Gunmen in Northwest Nigeria](#) (17 April 2023); J. Adeiye, Foundation for Investigative Journalism, [REVEALED: Army ‘Had Foreknowledge’ of Latest Southern Kaduna Attack But...](#) (28 April 2023), referring to an attack on Runji, Zango Kataf LGA, Kaduna State, the aftermath of which was documented with the App on 16 April 2023 (on-file with eyeWitness to Atrocities).

⁴³ See, e.g. [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incidents dated: 17 April 2019, para. 24; 26-27 January 2020, paras 50-53; 24 March 2020, para. 59; 31 March 2020, paras 61-62; 3 May 2020, paras 77-78; 31 July 2021, paras 104-06; 26 November 2021, paras 110-12; 11-12 January 2022, paras 115-17). See also The State of Plateau, [Facebook Post](#) (4 April 2022) (accessed 1 June 2023); Morning Star News, [Children among 29 Christians Killed in Plateau State, Nigeria](#) (9 May 2022), referring to an attack on the village of Ariri, Bassa LGA, Plateau State, documented with the App on 15 April 2022 (on-file with eyeWitness to Atrocities). See also Morning Star News, [Children among 29 Christians Killed in Plateau State, Nigeria](#) (9 May 2022); D. Malison, [Facebook Post](#) (29 April 2022) (accessed 1 June 2023), referring to an attack on the village of Rikwe-Chongu, Bassa LGA, Plateau State, documented with the App on 29 April 2022 (on-file with eyeWitness to Atrocities).

⁴⁴ See, e.g. [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incidents dated: 15 October 2017, paras 10-12; 10 February 2019 and 10 March 2019, paras 17-18; 17 June 2019, para. 27; 15 July 2019, paras 32-33; 22 September 2019, paras 36-37; 23 September 2019, para. 38; 26 October 2019, para. 40; 10 December 2019, para. 45; 1 April 2020, paras 63-65; 2 October 2020, paras 88-89; 15 October 2021, para. 13). See also Emancipation Centre for Crisis Victims in Nigeria, [Fulani Militia Killed 4 Children and 3 Adults with 2 Injured in Plateau State](#) (1 August 2022), referring to an attack on Chugwi, Jos South LGA, Plateau State, the aftermath of which was documented with the App on 1 August 2022 (on-file with eyeWitness to Atrocities).

⁴⁵ See [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incidents dated: 15 July 2019, paras 32-33; 31 March 2020, paras 61-62; 14 April 2020, paras 70-72; 27 June 2021, paras 99-100).

⁴⁶ See [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incident dated: 1 April 2020, paras 63-65).

- ⁴⁷ See, e.g. [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incidents dated: 17 June 2019, para. 27; 17 June 2019, paras 28-29; 4 July 2019, para. 30; 10 October 2019, para. 39; 26 December 2019, para. 48; 3 April 2020, para. 66; 7-8 April 2020, paras 68-69; 14 April 2020, paras 70-72; 3 May 2020, paras 77-78; 28 May 2020, paras 80-82; 31 July 2021, paras 104-06). Relevant footage on-file with eyeWitness to Atrocities.
- ⁴⁸ See, e.g. [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incidents dated: 17 June 2019, para. 27; 17 June 2019, paras 28-29; 14 September 2019, para. 35; 14 April 2020, paras 70-72; 23 May 2021, paras 96-97). Relevant footage on-file with eyeWitness to Atrocities.
- ⁴⁹ See, e.g. [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incidents dated: 11 December 2019, para. 46; 23 February 2020, para. 54; 3 April 2020, para. 66; 14 April 2020, paras 70-72; 13 September 2020, paras 85-86; 19 March 2021, paras 92-93; 29 July 2021, paras 101-103). Relevant footage on-file with eyeWitness to Atrocities.
- ⁵⁰ See, e.g. [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incidents dated: 3 May 2019, para. 25; 1 April 2020, para 63-65; 19 March 2021, paras 92-93; 26 September 2021, paras 107-09; 26 November 2021, paras 110-12). Relevant footage on-file with eyeWitness to Atrocities.
- ⁵¹ Footage captured with the App on 16 April 2023 in Runji, Zango Kataf LGA, Kaduna State (on-file with eyeWitness to Atrocities).
- ⁵² Christian Solidarity Worldwide, [Zangon Kataf LGA in Southern Kaduna under Siege](#) (18 April 2023).
- ⁵³ See [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incidents dated: 14 July 2019, para. 31; 4 September 2019, para. 34; 10 May 2021, para. 95). Relevant footage on-file with eyeWitness to Atrocities.
- ⁵⁴ United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Adequate Housing, [The Right to Adequate Housing during Violent Conflict](#), A/77/190 (19 July 2022), para. 11. See also Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, [General Comment No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing \(Art. 11\(1\)\)](#) (13 December 1991), para. 7.
- ⁵⁵ United Nations Commission on Human Rights, [Report by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food](#), E/CN.4/2001/53 (7 February 2001), para. 14.
- ⁵⁶ See [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incident dated: 17 April 2019, para. 24).
- ⁵⁷ See [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incidents dated: 3 May 2019, para. 24; 17 June 2019, paras 28-29; 26-27 January 2020, paras 50-53; 24 March 2020, para. 59; 31 March 2020, paras 61-62; 1 April 2020, paras 63-65; 3 April 2020, para. 66; 14 April 2020, paras 70-72; 29 July 2021, paras 101-103; 31 July 2021, paras 104-06; 26 November 2021, paras 110-12; 11-12 January 2022, paras 115-17).
- ⁵⁸ See [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incidents dated: 3 May 2019, para. 25; 17 June 2019, paras 28-29; 26-27 January 2020, paras 50-53; 3 April 2020, para. 66).
- ⁵⁹ See [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incident dated: 17 June 2019, paras 28-29).
- ⁶⁰ See [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incident dated: 3 April 2020, para. 66).
- ⁶¹ See [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incident dated: 26 February 2019, paras 19-20).
- ⁶² See [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incident dated: 19 April 2020, paras 73-76).
- ⁶³ Footage captured with the App on 21 and 22 March 2022 in Agban Kagoro, Kauru LGA, Kaduna State (on-file with eyeWitness to Atrocities); G. George, The Punch, [We Now Live in Fear after Terrorists Killed 38, Burnt our Houses – Survivors of Kaduna Attack](#) (26 March 2022); Sahara Reporters, [Bandits Killed Two Soldiers, 32 Others, Burnt 200 Houses In Southern Kaduna Attack – Commissioner](#) (22 March 2022).
- ⁶⁴ Footage captured with the App on 15 April 2022 in Ariri, Bassa LGA, Plateau State (on-file with eyeWitness to Atrocities). See also The State of Plateau, [Facebook Post](#) (4 April 2022) (accessed 1 June 2023); International Christian Concern, [Church Burned, Three Killed In Central Nigeria](#) (6 April 2022); Morning Star News, [Children among 29 Christians Killed in Plateau State, Nigeria](#) (9 May 2022).
- ⁶⁵ Footage captured with the App on 16 April 2023 in Runji, Zangon Kataf LGA, Kaduna State (on-file with eyeWitness to Atrocities); T. Obiezu, Voice of America, [33 Killed in Attack by Gunmen in Northwest Nigeria](#) (17 April 2023); Christian Solidarity Worldwide, [Zangon Kataf LGA in Southern Kaduna under Siege](#) (18 April 2023).
- ⁶⁶ United Nations Commission on Human Rights, [Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Asma Jahangir. Mission to Nigeria](#), E/CN.4/2006/5/Add.2 (7 October 2005), para. 44.
- ⁶⁷ Morning Star News, [Pregnant Mother among Five Christians Slain in North-Central Nigeria](#) (22 July 2019).
- ⁶⁸ In this sense see, for instance, Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust, [Long Read: Violence in Nigeria's 'Middle Belt' States: Ethnic and Religious Dimensions](#) (19 March 2021).
- ⁶⁹ See, e.g. [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incidents dated: 3 May 2019, para. 25; 17 June 2019, paras 28-29; 26-27 January 2020, paras 50-53; 3 April 2020, para. 66); footage captured with the App on 15 April 2022 (on-file with eyeWitness to Atrocities); The State of Plateau, [Facebook Post](#) (4 April 2022) (accessed 1 June 2023); International Christian Concern, [Church Burned, Three Killed in Central Nigeria](#) (6 April 2022); Morning Star News, [Children among 29 Christians Killed in Plateau State, Nigeria](#) (9 May 2022).
- ⁷⁰ BBC, [Nigeria Owo Church Attack: Gunmen Kill Catholic Worshipers in Ondo](#) (6 June 2022).

⁷¹ See E. Akinwotu, The Guardian, [Nigeria: Gunmen Kill Dozens in ‘Satanic’ Attack on Catholic Church](#) (5 June

2022), referring to an attack on Owo, Owo LGA, Ondo State, the aftermath of which was documented with the App on 12 and 17 June 2022 (on-file with eyeWitness to Atrocities).

⁷² Notes attached to the footage captured with the App on 17 June 2022 in Owo, Owo LGA, Ondo State (on-file with eyeWitness to Atrocities).

⁷³ United Nations Human Rights Committee, [General Comment No. 31 \(80\) on The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant](#), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (26 May 2004), para. 15.

⁷⁴ United Nations Human Rights Committee, [General Comment No. 31 \(80\) on The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant](#), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (26 May 2004), para. 16.

⁷⁵ Operation Safe Haven is a joint military task force set up in 2010 to maintain peace in Plateau State. The task force comprises the following actors: Nigerian Army, Navy, Air Force, Police, Nigerian Security and Civil Defense Corps and Department of State Security. With its operational command based in Jos, Operation Safe Haven is now in charge of the security of both the lives and properties in Plateau, Bauchi and parts of Southern Kaduna States. For more information, see Global Security, [Plateau State Operation Safe Haven](#) (accessed 1 June 2023).

⁷⁶ International Crisis Group, [Stopping Nigeria’s Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence](#) (26 July 2018), p. 21.

⁷⁷ See, for instance, [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incidents dated: 8 December 2019, paras 42-44; 31 March 2020, paras 61-62; 7-8 April 2020, paras 68-69; 14 April 2020, paras 70-72; 28 May 2020, paras 80-82; 23 May 2021, paras 96-97); footage captured with the App on 16 April 2022 in Runji, Zango Kataf LGA, Kaduna State (on-file with eyeWitness to Atrocities); The State of Plateau, [Facebook Post](#) (4 April 2022) (accessed 1 June 2023); International Christian Concern, [Church Burned, Three Killed In Central Nigeria](#) (6 April 2022).

⁷⁸ J. Adeiye, Foundation for Investigative Journalism, [REVEALED: Army ‘Had Foreknowledge’ of Latest Southern Kaduna Attack But...](#) (28 April 2023).

⁷⁹ J. Adeiye, Foundation for Investigative Journalism, [REVEALED: Army ‘Had Foreknowledge’ of Latest Southern Kaduna Attack But...](#) (28 April 2023).

⁸⁰ See [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incidents dated: 8 December 2019, paras 42-44; 10 May 2021, para. 95).

⁸¹ I. Bulus, The Punch, [28 Killed in Fresh Southern Kaduna Attack](#) (19 December 2022).

⁸² I. Bulus, The Punch, [Southern Kaduna: How Terrorists Murdered 40 Villagers – Survivors](#) (31 December 2022).

⁸³ Notes attached to the footage captured with the App on 19 and 22 December 2022 (on-file with eyeWitness to Atrocities).

⁸⁴ See [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incidents dated: 31 March 2020, paras 61-62; 14 April 2020, paras 70-72).

⁸⁵ See [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incident dated: 23 May 2021, paras 96-97).

⁸⁶ See [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incident dated: 31 July 2021, paras 104-06).

⁸⁷ TVC News Nigeria, [Danjuma Speaks Tough, Accuses Nigerian Armed Forces of Colluding with Armed Bandits](#) (24 March 2018).

⁸⁸ See [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incident dated: 15 October 2017, paras 10-12).

⁸⁹ See [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incident dated: 13 September 2020, paras 85-86).

⁹⁰ For example, following a series of attacks in Kaduna State in February and March 2019, a ten-member Judicial Commission of Inquiry was established to investigate the killings and, inter alia, “identify the perpetrators” and “recommend appropriate legal and other actions to be taken against those responsible for the disturbances.” While the Commission issued a report to Kaduna State Governor el-Rufai in September 2020, its findings are yet to be made public. See B. Agande, Vanguard, [El-Rufai Inaugurates Commission of Inquiry into Kajuru Killings](#) (8 August 2019); Kaduna State Government of Nigeria, [El-Rufai Inaugurates Kajuru Commission of Inquiry](#) (2 March 2021); D. Silas, Daily Post, [Kaduna: Judicial Commission of Inquiry submits Report on Kajuru Crisis to El-Rufai](#) (3 September 2020). Former Special Rapporteur Agnès Callamard made similar findings concerning the Judicial Commission of Inquiry set up in 2016 to investigate the Zaria incident, in which seven members of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria were killed by soldiers. See United Nations Human Rights Council, [Visit to Nigeria. Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Agnès Callamard](#), A/HRC/47/33/Add.2 (11 June 2021), para. 77.

⁹¹ See, for instance, [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incidents dated: 28 September 2020, para. 87; 27 June 2021, paras 99-100. See also 8 December 2019, paras 42-44).

⁹² United Nations Human Rights Council, [Visit to Nigeria. Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Agnès Callamard](#), A/HRC/47/33/Add.2 (11 June 2021), para. 56.

⁹³ Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States, Rev. Fr. Solomon MFA et al. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria et al., [Judgment No. ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/19](#) (26 February 2019).

⁹⁴ International Crisis Group, [Stopping Nigeria’s Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence](#) (26 July 2018), pp. ii, 23-25.

⁹⁵ Following a wave of violence in the Middle Belt Region in 2018, the Federal Government formulated the National

Livestock Transformation Plan aimed at modernising the livestock sector. The Plan, adopted in January 2019 by the National Economic Council, is meant to set aside land for predominantly nomadic herders to encourage them to switch to ranching and other sedentary livestock production systems, with the ultimate goal to minimise their movement and curb the conflict between herder and farming communities. See International Crisis Group, [Ending Nigeria's Herder-Farmer Crisis: the Livestock Reform Plan](#) (4 May 2021); International Crisis Group, [Stopping Nigeria's Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence](#) (26 July 2018); European Asylum Support Office, [Nigeria Security Situation: Country of Origin Information Report](#) (June 2021).

⁹⁶ International Crisis Group, [Ending Nigeria's Herder-Farmer Crisis: the Livestock Reform Plan](#) (4 May 2021), pp. 9-18.

⁹⁷ Plateau Peace Building Agency, [About Us](#) (accessed 1 June 2023).

⁹⁸ For example, Irigwe and Fulani communities signed a document by the Plateau State Peace Building Agency agreeing to peaceful co-existence in Bassa LGA, Plateau State. See The News Nigeria, [World Peace Day: Plateau Irigwe, Fulani Leaders Meet for First Time in 6 Years](#) (21 September 2019).

⁹⁹ In March 2018, Former President Muhammadu Buhari launched a five-year peace building strategic plan for Plateau State. Plateau Peace Building Agency, [Plateau State Road Map to Peace: PPBA Strategic Action Plan \(2018 – 2022\)](#) (8 March 2018).

¹⁰⁰ See, for instance, [Joint Urgent Appeal](#) (incidents dated: 8 March 2018, para. 14; 23 September 2019, para. 38); J. Adeiye, Foundation for Investigative Journalism, [REVEALED: Army 'Had Foreknowledge' of Latest Southern Kaduna Attack But...](#) (28 April 2023).

¹⁰¹ Daily Trust, [Fear, Anguish in Southern Kaduna over Recurrent Killings](#) (26 March 2022).